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AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

A  CRITICAL  STUDY  OF  THE  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED 

STATES  WITH  REFERENCE  TO  CHINA,  JAPAN  AND 

KOREA  IN  THE  19TH  CENTURY 


2  8  0  7 


^n^^ 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON   ■     CHICAGO   •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA    •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &   CO.,  Limited 

LONDON    •    BOMBAY    •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

A  Critical  Study  of  the  Policy  of  the  United 

States  with  reference  to  China,  Japan 

and  Korea  in  the  10  th  Century 


BY 

TYLER  DENNETT 


4fJ931 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1922 

All  Rights  Reserved 


PfilJMTKD   IN    THE   UNITED   STATES    OF   AMERICA 


Copyright,  1922, 
By  the   MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  printed.      Published  November,  1922. 


Press  of 

J.  J.  Little  &  Ives  Comp.iny 

New  York,  U    S.  A. 


PREFACE 

'0 

<4        The  reader  is  entitled  to  some  intimation  as  to  what  he 

^  may  find  in  the  following  pages. 

This  is  a  study  of  the  origin  and  development  of  Ameri- 
can policy  in  Asia — in  China,  Japan,  Korea,  with  passing 
attention   to   Siam,   and    the   regions  of   the   Indian   and 
Pacific  Oceans — in  the   19th   Century.     It  is  an  entirely 
fresh  study,   based  on  original  records  and  documentary 
^  sources,  the  first  book  ever  attempting  to  cover  the  entire 
^  field.    In  large  measure  the  human  interest  and  the  pecul- 
r(  iarly  personal  qualities  of  the  record  of  Americans  in  Asia 
have  been  retained.    The  actors  are  permitted  to  speak  for 
themselves  in  their  own  words. 

The  viewpoint  is  from  Washington,  not  from  Tokio,  or 

Peking.     American  relations  with  the  separate  nations  of 

the  East,  with  the  Japanese,  the  Chinese,  the  Koreans,  have 

\  developed  not  separately  \y(it  as  a  unity  which  the  student 

I  disregards  at  his  peril,    ^here  has  not  been/one  policy  for 

0  one  country  and  another  policy  for  another.  ^^'The  policy  has, 
^  in  principle,  been  the  same;  the  results  of  the  policy  were 

1  different  because  the  peoples  were  different. 

'^  The  tap-root  of  American  policy  has  been  not  philan-^ 
thropy  but  the  demand  for  most-favored-nation  treatment^ 
One  frequently  meets  the  assumption  that  the  Open  Door 
Policy  was  invented  by  John  Hay  and  first  applied  in  1899. 
The  Open  Door  Policy  is  as  old  as  our  relations  with  Asia. 
It  was  pronounced  in  China  as  early  as  1842,  and  the  spirit 
of  the  policy  is  as  old  as  the  Declaration  of  Independence. 
The  policy  was  not  limited  to  China.  It  was  enunciated  on 
the  coast  of  Africa  in  1832,  and  was  repeated  in  Japan  and 
Korea  many  times  before  1899.  The  policy  had  been  so 
fully    developed    before    1869    when    William    H.    Seward 


vi  PREFACE 

retired  from  the  Department  of  State,  that  no  new  principle 
has  ever  been  introduced  since  that  time.  Neither  Mr.  Jlay 
nor  Mr.  Hughes  appears  to  have  considered  that  they  were 
creating  anything  new. 

.>^ow  can  most-favored-nation  treatment  be  secured?' 
This  was  the  persistent  question  in  the  19th  as  it  will  be 
throughout  the  20th  Century.  In  pre-treaty  days  at  old 
Canton  the  American  merchants  obtained  it  by  conciliation 
of  the  Chinese.  Caleb  Cushing  sought  to  make  it  secure  by 
treaty  and  by  elaboration  of  the  principle  of  extraterritorial- 
ity. Commodore  Perry  strongly  advised  the  acquisition  of 
territory.  Anson  Burlingame  set  out  to  secure  it  by  agree- 
ments between  China  and  the  powers.  Seward  was  willing 
to  join  in  an  almost  unlimited  cooperative  policy  with  the 
powers  against  the  Asiatic  States.  He  even  proposed'a  joint 
armed  expedition  with  the  French  into  Korea.  \His  suc- 
cessors in  office  stead^'ly  withdrew  from  cooperation  with 
I  the  European  Powers  and  turned  to  cooperation  with  and 
:  support  of  Japan,  '^t  the  time  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War 
'  it  was  the  United  States  alone  which  stood  between  Japan 
and  the  intervention/of  the  European  powers  before  the 
conflict  was  over,  ^le  United  States  not  only  desired  the 
open  door,  but  it  also  sought  the  development  of  Asiatic/ 
States  strong  enough  to  be  their  own  door-keepe/s.  ^ 
wanted  a^strong  East ;  tjie_other  powers  did  not.  '^n  tlTi's 
difference  oT'poliby  cooperation  between  the  United  States 
and  the  other  Western  powers  was  wrecked.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  McKinley  Administration  the  Americ^i  Gov- 
ernment was  in  a  dangerous  position  of  isolation.  The  open 
door  was  gravely  threatened.  McKinley  returned  to  the 
policy  of  territorial  acquisition  advocated  by  Perry.  Then 
John  Hay  set  out  to  restore  the  cooperative  policy  and 
found  his  model  in  Burlingame's  method  of  agreement  be- 
tween the  powers.  Hay  would  have  preferred  an  alliance 
with  Great  Britain,  Japan  and  as  many  more  powers  as 
could  have  been  brought  to  agree  upon  the  open  door  and  a 
strong  East.     Hay  was  a  statesman  fifty  years,  perhaps, 


PREFACE  vii 

ahead  of  his  tmie,  but  there  are  many  now  Hving  who  will 
some  day  witness  the  realization  of  Hay's  dream.  Indeed, 
in  a  measure  it  is  already  realized  in  the  treaties  of  Wash- 
ington in  1922. 

In  the  19th  Century  the  issue  in  American  policy  in  Asia 
was  not  the  open  door.  That  was  never  a  question.  ^,^e 
real  issue  was  whether  the JUnitecLSta  follow  an 

isolated  ©^^cooperative  policy  to  make,  gyre  of  the  open 
door,     vXn    isolated    policy    was    essentially    belligerentfV 
"Tt  mevitably  led  to  a  pitting  of  the  United  States  against 
not  one  but  all  of  the  powers  and  against  the  Asiatic  states 
as  well.     It  was  the  isolation  of  1897  following  the  wreck 
of  the  cooperative  policy  which  forced  the  United  States  to 
retain  the  Philippines,  just  as  the  distrust  of  British  and 
French  designs  in  the  fifties  had  led  to  the  attempt  of  some^r 
loyal  but  misguided  Americans  to  seek  the  appropriation  by  j 
the  United  States  of  Formosa.     As  a  matter  of  fact  the/ 
American  flag  did  fly  over  the  principal  port  of  the  island  for 
a  year.     Likewise  today  a  wreck  of  the  newly  established 
cooperative  policy  would  in  the  end  lead  to  belligerency, 
and  very  likely  to  still  further  acquisitions  of  territory  by 
the  United  States.    Those  who  scoff  at  such  a  speculation 
will  do  well  to  study  the  past  records. 

The  maintenance  of  a  cooperative  policy  is,  therefore, 
so  utterly  important  for  the  peace  of  the  East  and  of  the 
world,  that  it  is  w^ell  to  turn  one's  attention  to  the  records 
and  study  well  why  and  where  the  cooperative  policy  failed. 
Such  a  study  is  quite  as  important  for  the  Japanese,  the 
French,  the  British  and  for  the  other  peoples  of  the  West 
as  it  is  for  Americans.  Cooperation  failed  partly  because 
Americans  were,  poor  cooperators,  but  not  wholly  for  that 
reason.  It  also  failed  because  other  cooperating  powers 
sought  to  wrest  the  power  of  that  cooperation  to  serve  their 
separate  purposes.  The  present  policy  may  easily  be 
wrecked  upon  a  similar  reef. 

This  study  of  the  past  is  approached  in  no  partisan 
spirit.    The  wTiter  does  not  regard  himself  as  an  apostle  of 


viii  PREFACE 

peace,  or  of  any  other  doctrine.  He  is  mindful  of  the  fact 
that  there  is  something  in  the  atmosphere  of  Asia  which 
makes  it  very  difficult  for  most  people  to  see  the  half-tones. 
All  has  a  tendency  to  appear  very  black  or  very  white.  The 
writer  does  not  regard  Great  Britain  as  the  benevolent 
source  from  which  all  blessings  flow,  nor  does  he  find  the 
Englishman  the  arch  mischief-maker  of  world  politics.  He 
regards  the  Japanese  neither  as  innocent  lambs  nor  ravening 
wolves.  Least  of  all  has  he  any  desire  to  see  created  any 
alliance  of  powers  for  the  exploitation  of  China  which  must 
remain  for  so  many  years  the  great  unknown  quantity  in 
the  world  equation.  But  whether  we  like  or  trust  each  other 
or  not  we  all  have  to  live  together  in  a  world  which  is  be- 
coming smaller  every  day — and  we  must  either  fight  each 
other  or  cooperate.  The  basis  of  cooperation  must  be  under- 
standing. In  the  following  pages,  therefore,  the  English- 
man, Continental,  Chinese  and  Japanese  as  well  as  the 
American  are  invited  to  view  the  pictures  of  themselves  as 
they  appear  in  the  American  records. 

At  the  risk  of  incurring  the  dislike  which  attaches  to  all 
iconoclasts,  the  writer  has  aimed  to  record  the  facts  as  they 
are,  mindful  that  they  do  not  lead  to  verdicts  which  have 
long  been  accepted.  The  exultant,  complacent  boaster  of 
his  nation's  virtue,  whatever  the  nation,  will  not  find  this  a 
satisfying  source-book,  not  if  he  reads  it  through  to  the 
end.  No  nation,  either  of  the  East  or  of  the  West,  has 
escaped  the  valid  charge  of  bad  faith.  The  guilt  of  all 
parties  being  clearly  proven  it  has  seemed  profitless  to  con- 
tinue the  discussion  of  guilt  with  a  view  to  determining  the 
relative  degrees  of  wickedness.  Each  nation,  the  United 
States  not  excepted,  has  made  its  contribution  to  the  welter 
of  evil  which  now  comprises  the  Far  Eastern  Question.  We 
shall  all  do  well  to  drop  for  all  time  the  pose  of  self-right- 
eousness and  injured  innocence  and  penitently  face  the 
facts. 

Cordial  relations  between  the  United  States,  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  are  now  constantly  being  rendered  unstable 


PREFACE  ix 

by  the  perpetuation  of  historical  fictions  which  were  created 
at  some  time  in  the  past  to  justify  a  position  not  otherwise 
defensible,  and  then  reiterated  with  such  frequency  as  to 
give  them  the  currency  of  inspired  truth.  It  is  hoped  that 
the  following  pages,  carrying  as  they  do  the  documentary 
evidence  for  the  statements  made,  wull  contribute  towards 
the  retirement  of  some  of  these  fictions  and  also  clear  a 
path  for  honest  dealing  and  franker  understanding  in  the 
future. 

The  proportions  assigned  to  the  various  phases  of  this 
study  would  have  been  different  had  \X  been  the  purpose 
to  survey  the  international  relations  di  China,  Japan  and 
Korea  with  the  Western  powers.  \4n  the  international 
relations  of  the  East  with  the  West  the  last  thirty  years  of 
the  century  bulks  larger  than  the  preceding  seventy  years. 
In  a  review  of  American  policy  the  reverse  is  true,  andAhis 
fact  has  determined  the  proportions  of  this  study.  /The 
creative  period  in  the  relations  of  the  Ignited  States/to 
Eastern  Asia  practically  came  to  an  end  in  lS(i8.  /The 
following  thirty  years  were  relatively  barren  in  both  Ameri- 
can enterprise  and  statesmanship.  While  the  three  very  full 
closing  years  of  the  century  may  be  claimed  as  the  vestibule 
to  a  contemporaneous  period  which  is  not  yet  concluded, 
these  years  are  equally  the  conclusion  of  an  epoch  and  bring 
the  cycle  of  policy  back  to  a  point  of  cooperation  similar 
to  that  when  William  H.  Seward  retired  from  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  Anson  Burlingame  was  launched  upon  his 
mission  to  the  Western  Powers.  To  follow  the  policies  of 
the  McKinley  administration  down  through  the  recent  years 
to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  Treaties  of  Washington 
would  be  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  where  speculation  and 
hearsay  evidence  would  have  to  be  substituted  at  impor- 
tant points  for  documentary  facts.  This  period  ha^  already 
been  traversed  by  many  excellent  writers  and  it  has  there- 
fore seemed  wiser  to  bring  this  study  to  a  close  with  a  state- 
ment of  the  initial  policies  of  the  McKinley  administration 


V 


■Y 


X  PREFACE 

and  a  comparison  of  them  with  the  precedents  of  the  pre- 
ceding century. 

Some  of  the  material  which  appears  in  the  following 
chapters  has  already  been  published  in  different  and  more 
elaborate  form  in  the  Journal  of  International  Law  (Jan, 
1922),  and  in  the  American  Historical  Review  (Oct.  1922), 
while  several  of  the  chapters,  now  much  revised,  were  orig- 
inally printed  for  the  use  of  the  American  Commissioners  in 
the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armaments  and  the 
Problems  of  the  Pacific,  but  never  released  for  general 
circulation. 

Bibliographical  footnotes  in  a  most  abbreviated  form  have 
been  inserted  wherever  the  subject  matter  appears  of  suf- 
ficient importaiic£_tQj:££Luire  them,  or  where  the  statements 
mi  the  texf 'are^t  variance  with  those  which  have  appeared 
in  other  works  on  the  subject.  The  student  who  cares  pri- 
marily for  the  sources  of  history  is  recommended  to  read 
first  of  all  Chapter  XXXV,  Notes  on  Bibliography,  where 
the  source  material  for  the  entire  field  is  reviewed. 

Acknowledgments  to  writers  of  books  and  pamphlets 
which  have  proved  of  value  in  the  preparation  of  this  work 
appear  in  Notes  on  Bibliography  (Chapter  XXXV)  and  in 
the  bibliographical  index.  In  addition  to  these  the  author 
is  under  such  obligation  as  only  those  who  have  been 
placed  under  a  similar  debt  can  fully  appreciate  to  the  fol- 
lowing: to  the  officials  and  attendants  of  the  Library,  the 
Bureaus  of  Appointment  and  of  Rolls  and  Indexes  of  the 
Department  of  State,  and  of  the  Libraries  of  Congress,  of 
the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  of  Co- 
lumbia University,  of  the  New  York,  Wisconsin,  and  Min- 
nesota Historical  Societies,  the  Manuscripts  Division  of 
the  New  York  Public  Library,  and  the  Missionary  Re- 
search Library;  to  James  Rankin  Young  for  information 
about  his  distinguished  brother,  John  Russell  Young;  to 
Murray  Olyphant  for  data  and  literature  concerning  his 
famous  grandfather,  D.  W.  C.  Olyphant;  to  Hon.  Charles 
Denby  for  helpful  suggestions  about  the  period  in  China 


PREFACE  xi 

when  he  served  in  the  American  Legation  at  Peking  under 
his  honored  father;  to  Hon.  Henry  White  for  information 
drawn  from  the  rich  stores  of  his  memory  as  Secretary  of 
the  American  Embassy  at  the  Court  of  St.  James;  to  Dr. 
J.  Frankhn  Jameson,  Editor  of  the  American  Historial 
Review,  for  encouragement  and  suggestions,  and  especially 
for  securing  from  His  Excellency,  J.  Jules  Jusserand,  copies 
of  unportant  dispatches  contained  in  the  archives  of  the 
French  Embassy  at  Washington,  and  to  Waldo  G.  Leland 
for  securing  the  copy  of  a  document  from  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  Paris ;  to  Drs.  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck,  A.  L. 
P.  Dennis,  Henry  W.  Wriston,  and  to  Gaillard  Hunt  for 
many  such  helpful  suggestions  and  counsel  as  comes  from 
frequent  conversations  with  those  who  have  given  their  lives 
to  a  study  of  phases  of  the  subject  embraced  in  this  volume; 
to  many  friends  scattered  over  Eastern  Asia  and  Eastern 
Africa  from  Tokio  to  Bombay  and  Cape  Town  who  have 
offered  a  ready  and  never-failing  hospitality  to  a  tired  trav- 
eler; and,  finally,  to  Nelson  Truster  Johnson,  Edwin  Lowe 
Neville  and  Baron  Serge  A.  Korff  who  have  been  patient 
and  kind  enough  to  read  the  manuscript  critically. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface      v 

PART  I.    THE  EAST  INDIA  TRADE 

CHAPTER 

I.    The  Beginnings  of  American  Commerce 1 

The  American  Ports.  The  Vessels  Employed.  Crews, 
Captains  and  Owners.    Cargoes. 

II.    The  Ports  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific 24 

Isle  de  France  and  India.  Adventures — Mocha,  Su- 
matra, Siam.  Batavia  and  Manila.  The  Fur  Trade. 
The  Northwest  Coast. 

III.    Early  China  Trade 44 

Macao,  Whampoa  and  Canton.  Conditions  of  Ameri- 
can Trade.  The  Americans  and  the  British.  The 
Human  Element  in  the  Trade.    Major  Samuel  Sha\% 

PART  II.    THE  FIRST  TREATY  WITH  CHINA 

IV.    The  Foundations  of  American  Polict'  in  Asia  ....       69 
Review  of  Trade :  1815-1839.    Relation  of  U.  S.  Gov- 
ernment to  American  Citizens  in  China.    Relations  with 
Portuguese  and   English.     Relations  with  the  Chinese 
Government.     Terranova  Incident. 

V.    The  Americans  and  the  Anglo-Chinese  W.^r  ....       91 
Foreigners  Imprisoned  in  the  Factories.    The  Ameri- 
cans Petition  Congress.     Congress  Becomes  Interested. 
Commodore  Kearny's  Most-Favored-Nation  Agreement. 
The  Mission  Created. 

VI.    The  American  Share  in  the  Opium  Trade 115 

Turkey  and  India  Opium.  Conflict  with  Chinese — 
the  Pledge.    Commodore  Kearny's  Action. 

VII.    Prep.\ration  for  the  Cushing  Mission 128 

The  Edmund  Roberts  Mission.  Webster  Consults  the 
Merchants.  Instructions  to  Cushing.  Caleb  Cushing 
Goes  to  Macao. 

VIII.    The  Policy  of  Caleb  Cushing •     •      145 

The  Negotiations.  The  Immediate  Application  of 
the  Principles  of  the  Treaty.  Superior  Advantages  of 
the  Cushing  Treaty.  Extraterritoriality.  Responsi- 
bility Placed  on  the  Chinese.  Divergence  from  British 
Policy. 


XIV 


CONTENTS 


PART  III.    A  PERIOD  OF  CONFUSION 


IX.    The  Far  East  Becomes  a  Poutical  Question     ....      175 
The  International  Situation.    Multiplication  of  Amer- 
ican Interests  in  China.    Commissioners  and  Consuls. 

X.    Settlement  of  the  Shanghai  Land  Question     ....      194 
Early    American    in    Shanghai.      American    Protests 
against  ■  Exclusive   Concessions.     The    Municipal   Code. 
Final  Settlement  of  a  Vexed  Question. 

XI.    Humphrey  Marshall  and  the  Taiping  Rebellion       .     .     206 
Growth  of  the  Rebellion.     The  Dilemma  Presented 
to   the    Foreigners.      Marshall    Becomes    Suspicious    of 
British  Designs.     Shall  Shanghai  Become  a  Free  Port? 
Marshall  Forces  Dissolution  of  Provisional  System. 

XII.    The  Poucy  of  Commissioner  McLane 225 

The  Inspectorate  of  Maritime  Customs.  McLane 
Settles  the  American  Claims.  Treaty  Revision.  Mc- 
Lane and  Bowring  Go  to  the  Pei-ho. 

XIII.  Attempts  to  Open  Japan  to  Trade 242 

Japan  and  Early  Pacific  Trade.  Edmund  Roberts 
and  Japan.  Visit  of  the  Morrison,  1837.  Revival  of 
American  Interest  in  Japan.  European  Powers  and 
Japan. 

XIV.  Commodore  Perry's  Poucy 260 

Instructions.  Negotiations  and  Treaty.  Perry's  Pro- 
posals for  Far  Eastern  Policy. 

XV.    The  Poucy  of  Dr.  Peter  Parker — Formosa 279 

Treaty  Revision — Destruction  of  Barrier  Forts.  An 
American  Protectorate  for  Formosa.  Disavowal  by  the 
American  Government. 


XVI.    The  Buchanan  Administration  and  the  Far  East     . 

Increase  of  American  Prestige  under  Pierce.  Ebbing 
Distrust  of  Great  Britain.  Proposals  for  an  Alliance 
with  Great  Britain  and  France.  Instructions  to  William 
B.  Reed. 


292 


PART  IV.    THE  COOPERATIVE  POLICY 

XVII.    William  B.  Reed  and  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin  ....     311 
The    Treaties    of    Tientsin.      The    Revised    Tariff — 
Legalization  of  the  Opium  Trade.    Settlement  of  Claims. 

XVIII,    Ward  and  Tattnall — Exchange  of  Ratifications  .     .  333 

The  Conflict  Renewed.  "Blood  is  Thicker  than 
Water."    The  American  Minister  Goes  to  Peking. 

XIX.    The  Poucy  of  Townsend  Harris  in  Japan 347 

Appointment  of  Townsend  Harris — Instructions  and 
Treaty  with  Siam.  Arrival  of  Harris  in  Japan — (con- 
vention of  1857.  Harris  at  Yedo.  Treaty  and  Tariff 
of  1858. 


N 


CONTENTS  XV 

FAQB 
CHAPTER  ^ 

XX.    Anson   Burungame      .     .     .     .    ..     •     •     •.    •     •     •     •     «io/ 

The  Suppression  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion.  Burlin- 
garae  and  Cooperation.  The  First  Chinese  Mission- 
Treaty  of  1868.  The  Burlingame  Mission  in  Europe 
and  China. 

XXI     The  United  States  and  Japan  :  1858-1869 391 

Anti-foreign  Agitation.     Convention  of  1866. 
XXII.    Seward's  Far  Eastern  Policy     .     .     .     .     .     •     •     •     •     407 
Seward,  Burlingame  and  China.     Coercion  of  Japan. 
Alaska  and  Korea.    Proposed  Joint  Expedition  to  Korea. 

PART  V.    THE  RISE  OF  JAPAN 

XXIII.    First  Steps  in  Japanese  Expansion .     425 

The  Politically  Nebulous  East.     The  Japanese  Em- 
pire   Begins    Consolidation.     Japan    on    the    Verge    of 
War.     Formosa,  the  Lew  Chews  and  Korea. 
XXIV     The  United  St.vtes  and  Korea— Treaty  of  1882      .     .     .     450 
Expediency    of    Disturbing    the    Status    Quo.      The 
United  States  Inclines  Towards  Japan.     Shuteldt  and 
the   Good   Offices  of   Li   Hung  Chang.     The   Personal 
Views  of  Commodore  Shufeldt. 
XXV.  "Beginning  of  the  Contest  for  Korea     .     •     •     •.     •     •     ^66 
Japanese    Advance.     China    and    Great    Britain    Are 
Aroused.    Korea,  1885-1894. 
XXVI     American  Good  Offices— Sin o-Japanesb  War     .     •     •     • 
■  American    Mediation    in    the    Franco-Chinese    War, 

1883-1884.    Good  Offices  of  the  United  States  in  Korea. 
Korea  after  the  Peace  of  Shimonoseki. 

XXVII. \  Treaty  Revision ••■',;**    + 

\         Revision  in  China  by  Interpretation  and  Agreement. 

^     Japanese    Effort    at   Revision,    1872      Policy    of   Judge 

Bingham-Treaty  of  1878.     The  Shufeldt  Treaty,  with 

Korea.     The   Unratified  Treaty   of    1889.     Treaties  of 

1894. 

PART  VI     THE  DISINTEGRATION  OF  THE  CHINESE 

EMPIRE 

XXVIII.    Asiatic  Immigration  and  American  fX^riTT^'caUfornia     ^^ 
The    Coohe    Traffic.      Chinese    Laboi    m    Uaiuornia. 
Treaties  of  1868  and  1880.    Growth  of  111  Feeling.    The 
Threat  of  Japanese  Immigration. 
XXIX    The  Missionaries  and  American  Policy  in  Asia     .     .     •     555 
Missionaries  as  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers.  The 
Status  of  Missionaries  under  the  Treaties.    Missionaries 
and  Neutrality.    Persecution  of  Christians  in  China. 

XXX.  American  Trade:  1844-1898  .  .  •••.•/,  :  '  ■;  ^^^ 
Decline  of  American  Shipping.  Foreign  Advisors  in 
China,  Japan  and  Korea.  Foreign  Concessions  at  the 
Treaty  Ports.  Telegraphs  and  Cables  The  First  Rail- 
ways. Railway  Construction  in  China  after  188D. 
Spheres  of  Influence. 


489 


508 


XVI 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXXI.    Hawah  and  the  Philippines 607/ 

The  Annexation  of  Hawaii.  Suspicion  of  Japanese 
Designs  in  Hawaii.  The  Philippines  in  the  Spanish- 
American  War.  Peace  Negotiations  with  Spain.  De- 
bates on  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines.  Significance  of 
Senate  Approval  of  Treaty  of  Paris. 
XXXII.    The  Reassertion  of  the  Open  Door  PoLicri' 634 

The  Far  East  in  1899.  Overtures  for  an  Alliance. 
John  Hay  and  the  Open  Door  Notes.  What  was  Ob- 
tained? 

XXXIII.  The  United  States  and  the  Boxer  Insurrection  .     .     .     650 

The  Boxer  Insurrection.  The  Desires  of  the  Ameri- 
can Government.    Independent  or  Concurrent  Action. 

XXXIV.  Personalities  and  Principles 669  '^ 

The  Consular  and  Diplomatic  Service.    The  Contribu- 
tors to  American  Policy.     The  Cooperative  Policy. 
XXXV.    Notes  of  Bibliogr.\phy 682 

Bibliography 695 

Appendix 705 

Table  of  Presidents,  Secretaries  of  State,  and  of 
Diplomatic  Representatives  in  China,  Japan  and  Korea, 
1842-1900. 

Index 709 


PART  I 
THE   EAST   INDIA   TRADE 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE 

/  American  policy  in  Asia  has  been  a  development  of  the> 
Vpolicy  of  early  Americans — those  pioneers  who  crossed  the 
seas  and  sometimes  set  up  their  habitations  on  what  were  to 
the  western  world  the  frontiers  of  the  East.  To  understand 
the  policy  in  its  later  amplifications  and  applications  it  is 
very  important  to  know  something  of  the  early  trade  and 
the  conditions  under  which  it  was  accomplished. 

The  term  'East  India  Trade'  itself  belongs  to  the  genera- 
tion which  immediately  followed  the  close  of  the  American 
Revolution.  One  finds  it  in  the  literature  of  the  day  and  in 
the  speeches  in  Congress.  The  use  of  the  term  is  important. 
The  Americans  viewed  Asia  as  a  whole  and  called  it  the 
East  Indies.  The  trade  so  described  included  all  the  com- 
merce the  destination  or  origin  of  which  lay  in  either  the 
Indian  or  western  Pacific  oceans.  There  was  not,  for 
example,  at  the  time  Adam  Seybert  wrote  (1818)  any  one 
section  of  the  trade  so  conspicuous  as  to  overshadow  other 
parts;  the  Calcutta,  Sumatra,  Northwest  Coast  and  Canton 
trade  stood  side  by  side.  They  were  all  more  or  less  related 
to  each  other  and  interdependent  and,  in  turn,  were  all  so 
much  a  part  of  the  South  American,  West  Indian  and 
European  commerce  that  the  separate  trade  reports  can 
never  be  untangled.  The  East  India  trade  was  merely  a 
part  of  the  fabric  of  the  foreign  commerce  of  the  United 
States,  and  yet  it  was  conducted  under  certain  distinctive 
and  unique  conditions,  political  and  economic,  which  gave 
rise  to  separate  policies.  Even  the  earliest  American 
traders  had  to  have  a  policy  in  Asia  and  the  policy  which 
necessity  as  well  as  wisdom  dictated  became  the  foundation 
of  subsequent  policies  adopted  by  their  government.    Mod- 

3 


4  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ern  American  policy  in  Asia  is  largely  a  body  of  precedents 
which  have  accumulated  from  decade  to  decade  since  the 
close  of  the  war  of  the  American  Revolution.  These  pre- 
cedents have  a  remarkable  consistency  due  in  large  measure 
to  the  unchanging  geographical  and  slowly  changing 
economic  and  political  conditions  under  which  American 
trade  with  Asia  has  been  conducted. 

This  trade  may  best  be  understood  when  one  visualizes 
the  scenes  of  the  activities — the  economic  condition  of  the 
colonies  at  the  close  of  the  Revolution,  the  ships,  their 
owners,  officers  and  crews,  the  departure  from  the  Atlantic 
seaboard,  the  barter  for  goods,  the  return  cargoes,  and  the 
life  of  those  who  tarried  for  a  few  years  in  the  Eastern 
ports. 

Previous  to  the  Revolution  the  American  colonists  knew 
of  Asia  only  through  the  tea  which  found  its  way  to  such 
ports  as  Boston  harbour,  or  was  smuggled  in  from  Holland;  ^ 
through  the  small  amount  of  expensive  silks  and  the  larger 
amount  of  Chinese  and  Indian  cottons  which  wore  well ;  and 
through  the  tales  of  the  pirates  who  seventy-five  years 
earlier  had  stalked  through  the  streets  of  their  ports. ^  At 
the  close  of  the  war  we  cannot  call  by  name  more  than 
one  or  two  native  born  Americans  who  had  ever  been  on 
the  coasts  of  Asia,  and  in  1784  probably  there  were  not  a 
half  dozen  people  on  all  the  Atlantic  seaboard  who  had  any 
first  hand  knowledge  whatever  of  the  other  side  of  the 
world.  Where  the  first  charts  came  from  by  which  the 
American  vessels  sailed  to  the  East  is  a  mystery . 

In  the  last  Captain  Cook  expedition  to  the  Pacific,  which 
left  England  in  July,  1776,  and  returned  in  1781,  were  two 
Americans,  John  Gore  of  Virginia  and  John  Ledyard  of 
Connecticut.^  They  were  the  first  lieutenant  and  corporal 
of  the  marines,  respectively,  on  the  Resolution.  Of  Gore 
nothing  else  is  known,  but  Ledyard's  service  to  his  country 
was  considered  in  later  years  of  sufficient  importance  to 
merit  the  attention  of  Jared  Sparks,  the  biographer  of 
Washington.     Ledyard  had  entered  Dartmouth  College  in 

'  Small  numerals  in  text  and  notes  refer  to  bibliographical  references  at  ends 
of  chapters. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE      5 

1772  to  prepare  himself  to  be  a  missionary  to  the  Indians, 
but  had  retired  after  a  few  months  to  go  to  sea.  Working 
his  way  back  to  America  in  the  British  navy,  he  deserted  in 
1782  and  made  his  way  home  to  Connecticut  for  a  brief 
period,  and  then  ordained  himself  a  missionary  to  American 
merchants  to  convert  them  to  trade  with  Asia,  the  limitless 
possibilities  of  which  had  been  impressed  upon  him  when 
he  had  seen  fur  skins,  purchased  on  the  Northwest  coast 
of  America  for  a  sixpence,  and  sold  in  Canton  for  $100. 

Ledyard  urged  the  advantages  of  the  trade  upon  mer- 
chants in  New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Boston.  At  least 
twice  he  was  within  sight  of  success,  once  at  New  London, 
where  the  frigate  Truinhell  was  actually  engaged  for  the 
purpose  and  then  diverted  elsewhere,  and  also  in  New  York 
where  Daniel  Parker  was  employed,  presumably  by  Robert 
Morris  of  Philadelphia,  to  purchase  a  ship  for  a  trial  voyage. 
The  ship  was  purchased,  named  the  Empress  of  China,^  and 
sent  to  Canton  in  February,  1784,  but  Ledyard,  whose  zeal 
and  enthusiasm  did  not  qualify  him,  perhaps,  for  great 
responsibilities,  was  never  permitted  to  carry  out  the  great 
plans  of  which  he  was  the  author. 

Within  the  next  four  or  five  years  we  hear  of  certain 
Englishmen  ^  who  drifted  to  America  after  some  years  of 
experience  in  the  East,  but  none  of  them  appear  to  have 
been  recognized  as  important  assets  in  teaching  the  Ameri- 
cans the  arts  of  the  new  trade.  American  trade  with  Asia 
was  begun  without  the  direct  assistance  of  any  others  than 
Americans  and  made  its  way,  needless  to  say,  in  the  face 
of  no  inconsiderable  opposition  from  British  competitors, 
notably  the  East  India  Company,  as  well  as  with  the  bless- 
ing of  a  few  Englishmen  who  welcomed  any  undermining 
of  the  East  India  Company  monopoly. 

Of  general  causes  leading  to  the  initiation  and  develop- 
ment of  the  East  India  trade  little  need  be  said.  This 
branch  of  the  commerce  of  the  new  nation  was  merely  a  part 
of  a  lively  expansive  movement  which  burst  the  bounds  at 
every  possible  point  and  spread  over  the  face  of  the  earth 
in  search  of  produce,  trade,  capital  and  wealth.    At  the  close 


6  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

.  / 

of  the  Revolution  there  were  idle  ships  just  in  from  their 
privateering;  there  were--  sailors;  there  was  a  market 
in  America  for  the  produce  of  Asia,  which  had  formerly 
come  in  British  vessels;  ^  and  there  was  a  market  in  China, 
as  the  Americans  already  knew  from  the  pre-revolutionary 
trade,  for  at  least  one  American  product — ginseng,  a  root 
utilized  by  the  Chinese  in  medicines."  Furthermore,  there 
was  the  potent  urge  of  poverty.  As  a  non-manufacturing 
people,  shut  up  in  a  limited  area  which  was  not  producing 
many  essential  articles  of  diet,  and  impoverished  by  a  costly 
war,  the  United  States  was  as  far  as  possible  removed  from 
economic  self-sufficiency.  The  first  Americans  went  to  Asia 
because  they  had  to  go — they  had  to  go  everywhere.  In 
later  years,  when  this  necessity  was  removed,  they  showed 
their  preferences  by  electing  to  remain  at  home. 

The  American  Ports 

The  American  ports  especially  concerned  in  the  East 
India  trade  were  Salem  and  Boston,  Providence,  a  few  of 
the  ports  of  Connecticut,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Balti- 
more, and  to  a  slight  extent  Norfolk.  It  is  difficult  to  assign 
to  each  of  these  ports  its  exact  relative  place  in  the  growing 
trade,  for  the  relative  positions  were  constantly  changing, 
and  each  city,  from  Philadelphia  north,  possessed  at  some 
time  or  other  its  own  peculiar  eminence.  To  regard  the 
trade  as  having  in  any  way  been  limited  to  any  single  state 
is  misleading.  New  York  could  claim  the  distinction  of  the 
first  completed  voyage ;  Philadelphia,  as  was  in  accord  with 
its  wealth  and  population,  had  for  a  while  the  largest 
tonnage;  Salem  and  Boston  were  distinguished  for  their 
ship  owners;  and  eventually  the  trade  showed  a  tendency 
to  concentrate  in  the  Port  of  New  York,  whither  Massachu- 
setts, Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  Pennsylvania  and  Mary- 
land sent  their  agents  to  buy  and  sell,  irrespective  of  what 
state  claimed  ownership  of  the  capital  invested,  or  of  the 
ships  employed. 

The  Empress  of  China  was  owned  and  fitted  out  jointly 
by  Robert  Morris  of  Philadelphia  and  a  group  of  New  York 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE      7 

merchants  represented  by  the  firm  of  Daniel  Parker  which 
went  bankrupt  in  1785.  The  captain  was  John  Green,  who 
had  probably  commanded  a  privateer  in  the  Revolution. 
The  supercargo  was  Major  Samuel  Shaw  of  Boston,  who  had 
served  with  distinction  in  the  war  and  who,  but  for  his 
untimely  death  in  1794  en  route  from  China,  would  prob- 
ably have  risen  to  eminence  in  the  life  of  the  young  nation. 
The  Empress  of  China  left  New  York  February  22,  1784, 
sailed  directly  to  Canton  and  returned  directly,  arriving 
home  May  12,  1785.  She  was  furnished  with  the  customary 
sea-letter  with  the  rather  inclusive  introduction  to  the 
''most  Serene,  most  Puissant,  High,  Illustrious,  Noble,  Hon- 
orable, Venerable,  Wise  and  Prudent,  Lords,  Emperors, 
Kings,  Republicks,  Princes,  Dukes,  Earls,  Barons,  Lords, 
Burgomasters,  Councillors,  as  also  Judges,  Ofiicers,  Justici- 
aries and  Regents  of  all  the  good  cities  and  places,  whether 
ecclesiastical  or  secular,  who  shall  see  these  patents  or  hear 
them  read."  ^  The  cost  of  vessel  (360  tons),  the  outfit,  and 
the  expenses  of  the  voyage  are  reported  to  have  been 
$120,000.-*  The  cargo,  what  there  was  of  it,  consisted  of 
something  over  forty  tons  of  ginseng.  The  profits  of  the 
voyage  were  reported  as  $37,727 — in  Major  Shaw's  estima- 
tion hardly  enough  to  go  around,  and  certainly  very  modest 
when  compared  with  the  reported  profits  of  the  expedition 
which  followed. 

The  return  of  the  Empress  of  China  created,  neverthe- 
less, something  of  a  sensation.  To  James  Madison  a  cor- 
respondent ^*^  wrote: 

"I  imagine  you  have  heard  of  the  arrival  of  an  American  vessel 
at  this  place  in  four  months  from  Canton  in  China,  laden  with  the 
commodities  of  that  country. 

"It  seems  our  countrymen  were  treated  with  as  much  respect  as 
the  subjects  of  any  nation,  i.  e.,  the  whole  are  looked  upon, by  the 
Chinese  as  Barbarians,  and  they  have  too  much  Asiatic  hauteur  to 
descend  to  any  discrimination.  Most  of  the  American  merchants 
here  are  of  the  opinion  that  this  commerce  can  be  carried  on,  on 
better  terms  from  America  than  Europe,  and  that  we  may  be  able 
not  only  to  supply  our  own  wants  but  to  smuggle  a  very  considerable 
quantity  to  the  West  Indies.  I  could  heartily  wish  to  see  the 
merchants  of  our  state  engage  in  the  business. 


8  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"Don't  you  think  that  an  exemption  from  duty  on  all  goods 
imported  immediately  from  India  in  (American)  bottoms  to  our  state 
might  have  a  good  effect?" 

This  agitation  so  soon  begun  for  protection  legislation 
for  the  China  trade  did  not  lapse.  Both  Pennsylvania  and 
New  York^^  adopted  protective  duties,  and  by  1791  the 
federal  government  had  extended  to  the  China  trade  such 
favors  as  now  seem  almost  incredible  when  one  comes  to 
consider  their  value.  The  China  traders  not  only  enjoyed 
the  protection  of  the  navigation  act  of  1789  which  imposed 
a  discriminating  tonnage  tax  of  forty-six  cents  per  ton  on 
foreign  bottoms,  and  the  protection  of  the  tariff  act  of  the 
same  year  which  gave  to  the  American  importer  a  121/.  per 
cent,  protection  in  duties  on  East  India  imports  other  than 
tea,  and  on  tea  a  protection  which  absolutely  excluded  im- 
portation in  an}^  but  American  bottoms;  but  they  also  en- 
joyed the  special  favor  of  a  warehousing  system  with  draw- 
backs for  reexportation  and,  most  important  of  all,  a  two 
years'  delay  in  the  payment  of  tea  duties.^-  Tea  duties 
equalled  or  exceeded  the  prime  cost  of  the  tea  at  Canton.^  ^ 
When  one  adds  to  these  favors  the  liberal  credits  extended 
to  the  Americans  in  India  and  China  it  is  not  difficult  to  see 
why  the  trade  prospered. 

The  arrival  of  the  Empress  of  China  was  followed  shortly 
by  that  of  the  Pallas,  with  a  cargo  of  $50,000  worth  of 
teas  taken  by  Thomas  Randall,  Shaw's  partner  and  former 
companion  in  arms.  The  Pallas  had  been  chartered  at  Can- 
ton and  was  commanded  by  Captain  John  O'Donnell,  an 
Englishman  and  former  Indian  merchant  who  immediately 
became  an  American  citizen  and  embarked  upon  the  East 
India  trade  from  Baltimore.  Robert  Morris  took  the  cargo 
of  the  Pallas  and  became  so  enthused  by  the  prospects  of  the 
China  trade  that  he  made  a  proposition  to  Shaw  and  Ran- 
dall to  return  to  Canton  as  his  agents.  The  terms,  however, 
were  not  considered  satisfactory.  Morris  followed  up  the 
trade  from  Philadelphia  and  the  partners  almost  immedi- 
ately accepted  an  offer  from  a  company  of  New  York  mer- 
chants.   Shaw  sailed  again  for  Canton  in  1786,  planning  on 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE      9 

this  voyage  to  stop  at  Batavia.  "The  terms  on  which  I 
go,"  wrote  Shaw  to  his  brother,  "promise  something  clever." 

At  least  nine  voyages  to  the  Far  East,  some  of  them  to 
India  but  not  to  China,  were  initiated  from  New  York  be- 
fore the  end  of  1787. 

Two  months  before  the  Empress  of  China  had  sailed 
from  New  York  the  sloop  Harriet  (55  tons)  had  cleared 
from  Boston,  bound  for  Canton  with  ginseng.  Nine  months 
after  the  departure  of  the  first  New  York  venture  the  Grand 
Turk,  belonging  to  Elias  Haskett  Derby,  sailed  from  Salem 
for  the  Cape  on  a  similar  errand  but  with  a  more  diversified 
cargo.  Neither  the  Harriet  nor  the  Grand  Turk  went  far 
beyond  Cape  Town;  the  sloop  secured  her  small  return 
cargo  out  of  the  private  ventures  of  the  officers  of  the  re- 
turning British  Indiamen,  but  the  Grand  Turk  with  its 
larger  cargo  space  did  not  succeed  so  well. 

"Captain  Ingersoll's  object,"  wrote  Shaw,  who  found  the  Grand 
Turk  at  the  Cape  on  his  return  from  Canton,  "was  to  sell  rum, 
cheese,  salt  provisions,  chocolate,  loaf-sugar,  butter,  etc.,  the  proceeds 
of  which  in  money,  with  a  quantity  of  ginseng,  and  some  cash  brought 
with  him,  he  intended  to  invest  in  Bohea  tea.  But  as  the  ships  bound 
to  Europe  were  not  allowed  to  break  bulk  by  the  way,  he  was  dis- 
appointed in  his  expectation  of  purchasing  that  article,  and  sold  his 
ginseng  for  two  thirds  of  a  Spanish  dollar  a  pound.  .  .  .  He  intended 
remaining  a  short  time  to  purchase  fine  teas  in  the  private  trade 
allowed  to  officers  on  board  the  India  ships,  and  then  to  sail  to  the 
coast  of  Guinea  to  dispose  of  his  rum,  etc.,  for  ivory  and  gold  dust; 
thence,  without  taking  a  single  slave,  to  proceed  to  the  West  Indies 
and  purchase  sugar  and  cotton  with  which  he  would  return  to  Salem." 

Captain  Ingersoll  assured  Shaw  that  Derby  would  rather 
sink  the  whole  capital  employed  than  be  directly  or  indi- 
rectly concerned  in  the  'infamous'  slave  traffic, 

Boston  was  relatively  slow  in  following  up  the  voyage  of 
the  Harriet,  but  Salem,  especially  through  Derby  who  acted 
on  information  secured  at  the  Cape  by  Captain  Ingersoll, 
plunged  boldly  into  the  trade  and  soon  had  several  ships 
in  the  Indian  Ocean,  many  of  which  reached  Canton.  In 
1789  there  were  no  less  than  ten  Salem  ships  in  and  out  of 
the  Isle  de  France  (Mauritius).  Meanwhile  Boston  had 
sent  out  the  Columbia  and  the  Lady  Washington  to  the 


10  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Northwest  coast  (1788),  and  the  Massachusetts  trade  with 
the  Far  East  was  well  launched.  The  Bay  State  developed 
a  good  deal  of  individuality  in  the  East  India  trade.  It 
specialized  to  a  greater  degree  than  did  the  other  ports,  in 
certain  branches,  trading  much  with  Mauritius,  Calcutta, 
Madras,  the  pepper  coast  of  Sumatra,  and  the  Northwest 
coast  of  America.  While  the  Massachusetts  shipowners 
were  also  merchants,  supplying  their  own  markets,  they 
were  primarily  interested  in  the  carrying  trade.  Their 
vessels  were,  to  use  a  modern  term,  Hramp  freighters.'  The 
points  at  which  they  turned  homeward  were  usually  either 
Canton  or  an  Indian  Ocean  port,  but  the  voyage  in  either 
direction  might  include  visits  to  half  a  dozen  European 
ports,  or  several  cities  of  South  America.  Freight  rates 
ranged  from  $2.25  to  more  than  $4  per  ton  per  month. ^* 
Needless  to  say,  the  Massachusetts  traders  prospered. 

Philadelphia  entered  the  trade  directly  in  1787,  sending 
out  at  least  five  vessels,  a  total  of  over  1600  tons,  or  more 
than  could  be  claimed  in  that  year  for  all  of  the  other 
ports  together.  The  Philadelphia  ship  owners,  Robert 
Morris  excepted,  were  little  given  to  explorations  or  experi- 
ments ;  rather,  they  set  to  work  to  build  up  a  fleet  to  supply 
their  needs  along  established  and  proven  routes,  chiefly  to 
Calcutta,  Madras  and  Canton.  The  East  India  trade  of  the 
city  quickly  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  few  substantial 
merchants  of  wealth  like  Stephen  Girard  and  Samuel  Archer 
who  managed  the  trade  in  close  conjunction  with  their 
wholesale  or  retail  merchandising.  In  this  class  of  trade 
Philadelphia  retained  its  leadership  more  than  twenty  years, 
after  which  it  was  forced  to  yield  gradually  to  New  York. 

The  trade  of  Providence  was  very  similar  to  that  of 
Philadelphia.  It  appears  to  have  been  better  supplied  with 
capital  at  the  outset  than  either  New  York  or  Massachu- 
setts, but  the  growth  of  the  trade  was  foredoomed  to  limita- 
tion because  Providence  was  a  poor  distributing  point. 
Before  the  war  of  1812  Providence  had  already  begun  to 
withdraw  its  capital  from  the  trade  to  devote  it  to  the 
spinning  industry.^  ^ 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE    11 

The  Vessels  Employed 

The  fleets  of  the  East  India  traders  make  a  peculiar 
appeal  to  the  imagination.  One  reads  in  their  tonnage  and 
in  the  records  of  their  builders  something  of  the  economic 
history  of  the  struggling  young  nation ;  in  their  adventures, 
trials,  failures  and  successes,  something  of  the  hardihood  of 
the  youthful  American  spirit. 

One  cannot  see  without  a  thrill  the  departure  of  the  55- 
ton  sloop  Harriet,  or  of  the  not  much  larger  sloop  Experi- 
ment from  Albany  just  two  years  later.  The  Harriet  went 
only  to  the  Cape,  but  the  Experiment,  carrying  a  crew  of 
seven  men  and  two  boys,  pushed  on  to  China  and  returned 
in  eighteen  months  with  a  cargo  of  tea.  China-ware  and 
other  goods.  In  1790  Captain  Joseph  Ingraham,  formerly 
mate  on  the  Columbia,  who  had  already  circumnavigated 
the  globe,  took  a  parting  look  at  his  native  shore  and  then 
launched  the  Hope,^^  "being  only  70  tons  &  slightly  built" 
into  the  bosom  of  the  ocean  for  a  voyage  around  the  Horn 
to  the  Northwest  coast.  Thirteen  months  later  Ingraham 
reached  Macao  with  his  cargo  of  pelts.  And  while  he  was 
there,  in  came  the  90-ton  Lady  Washington  with  Captain 
John  Kendrick  from  Nookta  Sound,  four  years  out  of  Bos- 
ton harbor. 

Such  voyages  as  these  were  by  no  means  exceptional. 
The  Pilgrim,  62  tons,  sailed  from  Boston  on  a  sealing  voy- 
age in  the  South  Pacific  in  September,  1803,  and  four  years 
later  arrived  at  Canton  with  between  twelve  and  thirteen 
thousand  seal-skins.  The  schooner  Rajah,  built  for  the 
Sumatra  pepper  trade  was  only  130  tons,  and  carried  a 
crew  of  only  ten  men.  The  voyage  of  the  Betsey  (93  tons) 
of  New  York  in  1797-8  is  notable.  She  went  to  the  South 
Seas  by  way  of  Cape  Horn,  thence  to  Canton,  and  then  back 
to  New  York  by  way  of  Good  Hope,  a  voyage  of  twenty- 
three  months.  There  was  a  crew  of  thirty,  not  one  of  whom 
was  over  twenty-eight  years  old.  The  net  proceeds  of  the 
trip  were  in  excess  of  $120,000,  on  an  initial  outlay  for  the 
cost  of  the  vessel,  outfit,  insurance  and  interest  of  $7,867. 


12  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

After  deducting  the  duties,  the  shares  of  the  captain,  the 
officers  and  the  crew,  and  the  capital  invested,  there  was 
asserted  to  be  a  clear  profit  to  the  owners  of  $53,118 — on  a 
twenty- three  months  trip  of  a  90-ton  vessel!  ^" 

We  are  not  to  beheve  that  these  tiny  sloops,  snows, 
brigantines,  brigs  and  schooners  were  selected  for  the  Pacific 
and  China  trade  in  preference  to  larger  craft.  Their  use 
bears  witness  to  the  poverty  of  the  traders  and  their  lack 
of  capital.  As  rapidly  as  wealth  permitted  the  Americans 
built  larger  craft — from  250-  to  300-ton  vessels  for  the 
Pacific  and  circuituous  routes,  and  slightly  larger  for  the 
direct  trade  with  India  and  Canton,  With  few  exceptions 
there  were  no  American  vessels  anywhere  near  1000  tons  in 
the  East  India  trade  until  after  1840.  Meanwhile  the  Amer- 
ican ship  owner  came  to  see  that  although  the  British  ships 
of  the  day  were  ranging  in  size  from  600  up  to  1400  tons, 
American  vessels  of  half  their  size  and  a  third  their  crews 
were  both  safer  and  more  economical  for  the  East  Indies. 
The  largest  American  vessel  at  Whampoa  in  1813  was  493 
tons;  the  smallest  was  86  tons.  The  thirty-nine  vessels 
which  touched  at  Honolulu  between  February  and  May, 
1826,  were  of  from  200  to  400  tons;  ten  years  later  at  the 
same  port  the  vesels  averaged  about  320  tons,  and  in  1842 
they  ranged  around  350  tons.  The  largest  vessel  at  Batavia 
in  the  summer  of  1834  was  465  tons.^* 

The  experience  of  Major  Shaw  with  the  Massachusetts 
built  especially  for  him  and  launched  at  Quincy,  September, 
1789,  illustrates  the  experimental  character  of  much  of  the 
early  trade,  and  also  throws  some  light  on  the  spirit  of  the 
men  engaged  in  it. 

Shaw,  after  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  methods  of 
trade  used  by  the  British  and  European  companies  in  the 
East  Indies  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  large  ships  were 
advantageous.  "The  experience  of  nearly  a  century,"  he 
wrote  in  his  journal  after  his  return  to  China  from  India 
in  1786,  "has  convinced  the  Europeans  of  the  utility  of 
managing  their  commerce  with  this  country  by  national 
companies  and  with  large  ships."    Shortly  after  this  Shaw 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE    13 

and  his  partner,  Thomas  Randall,  drew  up  a  contract  with 
Eli  Hayden  "American  merchant  and  supercargo  of  the 
brigantine  Columbia,  whereof  is  master  Solomon  Bunker, 
now  riding  at  anchor  at  the  port  of  Whampoa  and  bound  for 
New  York,"  by  which  Hayden  was  to  place  an  order  in 
Massachusetts  for  a  ship  which  would  meet  the  needs  of 
the  case  as  Shaw  understood  them.  The  length  of  the  keel 
was  to  be  one  hundred  and  sixteen  feet,  and  the  ship  was 
to  have  "three  decks,  and  a  round  house  with  a  stern 
gallery  from  the  round  house,  and  a  quarter  gallery  above 
and  below,  with  thirty-two  ports  on  her  second  deck  and  a 
forecastle  on  her  upper  deck."  ^^ 

"With  respect  to  the  other  dimensions  and  disposition  of  the 
ship,"  continued  the  contract,  "those  of  the  Worcester  (an  English 
ship  now  at  Whampoa)  are  annexed  to  these  presents,  but  it  is  under- 
stood by  the  parties  to  this  contract  and  engaged  by  the  said  Eli 
Hayden  that  he  will  build  the  aforesaid  ship  agreeably  to  the  models 
to  be  formed  and  given  by  the  same  (at  the  expense  of  Shaw  and 
Randall)  by  the  person  who  shall  hereafter  be  appointed  for  that  pur- 
pose ...  it  being  further  engaged  that  all  the  aforesaid  and  every 
other  article  which  shall  enter  into  the  construction  of  the  said  ship 
previous  to  her  being  launched  and  delivered  to  said  Shaw  and 
Randall,  or  their  assigns,  in  the  water  and  after  at  the  risque  of  said 
Eli  Hayden,  shall  be  well  and  truly  the  best,  the  very  best  quality,  it 
being  the  true  intent,  spirit  and  meaning  of  the  present  contract  that 
the  said  ship  shall  be  built  as  well  and  as  strong  as  wood  and  iron 
can  make  her." 

To  William  Hackett,  of  Salisbury,  Massachusetts,  who 
had  built  the  Alliance,  were  entrusted  the  responsibilities  of 
making  the  models  and  superintending  the  building  of  the 
ship.  The  instructions  to  him  contained  the  following 
paragraph  indicative  of  the  national  pride  which  character- 
ized very  many  of  the  China  traders : 

"This  ship  is  designed  for  the  India  trade,  where  ships  from  all 
nations  meet  and  where  probably  the  best  ships  the  world  can  produce 
may  be  seen.  It  is  the  expectation  of  Messrs.  Shaw  and  Randall  that 
they  can  produce  from  America  such  a  ship  as  will  bear  the  inspection 
of  the  most  critical  eye,  both  as  to  construction  and  workmanship. 

The  Massachusetts  appears  to  have  met  the  qualifica- 
tions.    Both  British  and  French  naval  commanders  who 


14  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

were  visiting  in  Boston  in  their  national  ships  at  the  time 
of  the  launching  expressed  their  admiration  of  the  model  of 
the  vessel,  and  the  Massachusetts  was  afterwards  pro- 
nounced at  both  Batavia  and  Canton  to  be  "as  perfect  as 
the  then  state  of  the  art  would  permit."  The  vessel  sailed 
from  Boston  in  March,  1790,  and  her  commander,  Job 
Prince,  afterwards  reported  to  Hackett,  her  builder: 

"The  ship  Massachusetts  surpassed  our  most  sanguine  expectations 
so  that  she  met  the  approbation  of  all  the  Europeans  at  Canton.  And 
though  their  eyes  were  open  to  spy  defects  and  their  tongues  ready  to 
find  fault,  they  confessed  that  they  could  not." 

The  report  of  Amasa  Delano,  second  officer  of  the 
Massachusetts,  sheds  another  light  on  the  obstacles  of  ignor- 
ance and  inexperience  which  the  early  Canton  traders  had 
to  overcome  before  substantial  success  crowned  their  efforts. 
Delano  stated: 

"The  ship  was  as  well  built  as  any  ship  could  be  under  the  cir- 
cumstances. The  timbers  were  cut  and  used  immediately  while 
perfectly  green.  It  was  white  oak,  and  would  have  been  very  durable 
had  it  been  docked  and  properly  seasoned.  .  .  .  She  was,  however, 
rotten  when  we  first  arrived  in  China.  She  was  loaded  principally 
with  green  masts  and  spars  taken  on  board  in  winter  directly  out  of 
the  water  with  ice  and  mud  on  them.  The  lower  hold  was  thus  filled, 
and  the  lower  deck  hatches  caulked  down  in  Boston  and  never  opened 
until  we  were  in  Canton.  The  air  was  then  found  to  be  so  corrupt 
that  a  lighted  candle  was  put  out  by  it  nearly  as  soon  as  by  water.  .  .  . 
We  had  taken  four  or  five  hundred  barrels  of  beef  in  the  lower  hold, 
placed  in  the  broken  stowage.  When  fresh  air  was  admitted  so  that 
men  could  live  under  the  hatches  the  beef  was  found  almost  boiled, 
the  hoops  were  rotted  and  fallen  off,  and  the  inside  of  the  ship  was 
covered  with  a  blue  mould  more  than  half  an  inch  thick." 

And  yet  four  or  five  decades  later  the  Americans  had 
learned  how  to  carry  even  cargoes  of  ice  over  the  same 
route  and  dispose  of  them  from  Calcutta  to  Canton  at  a 
profit. 

Major  Shaw  seized  an  opportunity  to  sell  the  Massachu- 
setts and  invested  his  funds  in  a  cargo  which  he  was  able  to 
freight  to  Bombay.  At  the  latter  port  he  transferred  part 
of  the  cargo  to  an  American  ship  and  took  the  balance  in  a 
Danish  vessel  to  Ostend  to  be  disposed  of  in  the  European 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE     15 

market.  He  is  reported  to  have  received  S65,000  for  his 
ship.  If  such  were  the  truth  his  venture  had  by  no  means 
ended  in  disaster  for  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Massachusetts 
cost  more  than  $40,000 — $50  a  ton.  The  sale  of  American 
built  vessels  in  the  ports  of  Asia  was  common  in  those  days. 

Crews,  Captains  and  Owners 

Of  great  interest  to  the  student  of  the  American  policy 
in  Asia  is  the  character  of  the  men  who  sailed  these  ships 
and  represented  the  new  nation  in  the  ports  of  the  East. 
They  were  good,  average  American-born  citizens,  recruited 
either  from  the  sea-faring  population  or  from  the  farms. 
As  late  as  1834,  judging  from  various  consular  reports,  the 
number  of  foreign  born  did  not  exceed  twenty-five  per  cent., 
and  in  the  first  six  months  of  that  year,  out  of  the  276 
sailors  in  19  vessels  which  entered  Manila,  all  but  25  were 
native  born.  Sailors  on  the  sealing  and  fur-trading  voyages 
had  a  share  in  the  profits,  and  in  the  direct  trade  with  Asia 
they  often  made  small  ventures  of  their  own,  buying  cargo 
space  in  the  ship  in  which  they  sailed.  They  had  before 
them  the  possibility  of  either  working  up  through  the  grades 
until  they  became  masters  of  their  own  ships,  as  many  of 
them  did,  or  of  accumulating  enough  capital  to  buy  a  farm 
or  enter  trade  at  home.  The  American  sailors  were  there- 
fore quite  unlike  the  crews  of  the  British  Indiamen,  re- 
cruited from  the  dregs  of  English  cities,  which  at  Canton 
spread  terror  in  their  path,  creating  no  end  of  trouble  for 
the  British  authorities  and  even  imperilling  the  continuance 
of  the  trade  itself.^"  The  early  American  sailor,  be  it  ad- 
mitted, was  also  quite  unlike  his  successor  who  appeared  on 
the  China  coast  after  the  opening  of  California.  The  Ameri- 
can sailor  of  the  early  fifties  in  China  had  all  the  vices  of 
the  earlier  EngHsh  sailor,  plus  initiative  and  a  liberty.  The 
character  of  the  American  sailor  who  appeared  in  the  East 
in  the  early  days  was  a  distinct  asset  to  American  trade  at 
a  time  when  good  will  counted  for  much.  He  merited  better 
treatment  than  he  sometimes  received. 


16  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  American  consul  at  Canton,  shortly  after  the  close 
of  the  War  of  1812,  reported  ^^  that  the  American  sailors 
adrift  in  Canton  preferred  service  under  almost  any  flag 
rather  than  their  own. 

"It  has  often  occurred,"  he  wrote,  "that  the  commanders  of  vessels 
which  have  been  on  long,  tedious  and  laborious  voyages,  sometimes 
two  or  three  years,  particularly  on  the  Northwest  coast  of  America 
and  the  Pacific  Ocean,  illtreat  and  unnecessarily  punish  their  seamen 
for  the  sole  purpose  of  driving  them  to  desert  from  their  vessels,  that 
they  may  forfeit  their  consular  claim  for  wages,  through  which  means 
they  are  driven  to  the  necessity  of  entering  into  foreign  service  .  .  . 
this  takes  place  particularly  about  the  time  of  the  arrival  at  this  port, 
from  which  period  as  many  seamen  are  not  wanted  to  navigate  the 
vessel  to  the  United  States  or  Europe,  as  were  necessarily  employed  in 
the  previous  and  more  lucrative  part  of  the  voyage." 

The  hazards  of  a  sailor's  life  in  those  days  were  also 
formidable.  Out  of  a  crew  of  sixty-one  which  had  sailed  the 
Massachusetts  to  Canton  in  1790,  fifteen  had  in  the  course 
of  years  died  either  at  Canton  or  en  route,  four  were  mur- 
dered at  or  near  Macao,  one  contracted  leprosy  and  one 
became  a  slave  in  Algiers. 

Of  the  ship  masters  it  may  be  said  that  while  some  of 
them  were  hard  drivers  and  merciless,  they  were  on  the 
whole  an  exceedingly  able  set  of  men,  the  type  of  the  Ameri- 
can pioneer.  Many  of  them  were  sons  of  ship-owning 
families,  and  many  more  were  graduated  into  the  ranks 
of  the  merchants  and  bankers  of  the  next  generation,  while 
not  a  few  owned  their  vessels  and  added  to  their  holdings 
until  they  had  a  fleet  of  their  own.  One  reads  the  tale  of  a 
Boston  banker  in  the  fifties  who  was  reported,  half  a  century 
before,  to  have  commanded  a  ship  from  Calcutta  to 
Boston  --  "with  nothing  in  the  shape  of  a  chart  on  board  but 
a  small  map  of  the  world  in  Guthrie's  geography."  One 
may  well  question  the  accuracy  of  the  details  of  this  story 
and  yet  find  in  it  a  measure  of  truth. 

We  may  clearly  distinguish  three  classes  of  owners. 
Many  of  the  smaller  vessels  were  owned  and  fitted  out  on 
shares.  The  six  share-holders  in  the  Columbia  and  the  Lady 
Washington  in  their  memorable  voyage  to  the  Northwest 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE     17 

coast  and  Canton  were  three  Boston  merchants,  Charles 
Bulfinch  the  architect,  a  son  of  Ehas  Haskett  Derby,  and  a 
New  York  merchant.  There  were  many  such  expeditions. 
t  Another  class  was  the  large  retail  and  wholesale  merchants, 
particularly  of  Philadelphia  and  New  York.  They  appear 
to  have  managed  their  voyages  for  their  exclusive  and 
individual  interests;  one  does  not  find  evidence  that  the 
small  adventurer  had  any  part  in  these  enterprises.  There 
were  also  the  shipping  companies,  owned  by  individuals,  by 
families,  or  by  a  group  of  individuals.  The  Derbys  of  Salem 
were  of  this  class.  They  achnitted  a  large  number  of  small 
ventures  which  were  managed  by  the  supercargoes  on  a 
commission  of  2i/{)  per  cent  and  for  which  the  owners  paid 
either  the  regular  freight  charges  or  divided  the  profits  with 
Derby.  In  the  voyage  of  the  Astrea  in  1789,  there  were 
twenty-four  of  these  private  consignments.-^  One  man 
would  send  a  few  casks  of  ginseng,  another  a  few  boxes  of 
"dollars,"  a  third  some  snuff,  and  many  sent  wine  or  beer. 
In  other  instances  the  stock  in  these  trading  companies  was 
rather  widely  distributed.  In  1814  the  firm  of  Oliver  Wol- 
cott  and  Company  of  New  York  reported  sixteen  individuals 
as  having  a  total  stock  of  $405,000  in  the  China  trade. 
Among  the  share-holders  were  William  Rhinelander,  Rufus 
King,  Archibald  Gracie  and  Eli  Whitney.-^ 

The  early  trade  had  in  it  a  large  element  of  speculation. 
The  price  of  tea  fluctuated  greatly  and  the  market  was  fre- 
quently glutted.  The  trade  in  Indian  fabrics  and  in  silks 
was  steadier  but  even  under  the  best  of  market  conditions 
the  trade  was  hazardous.  A  full  cargo  in  a  four  or  five 
hundred  ton  ship  was  valued  at  from  three  to  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars.  Wrecks  were  not  uncommon,  insurance 
was  high,  and  there  were  few  men  in  the  United  States  at 
the  beginning  of  the  last  century  who  could  lose  any  large 
amount  of  money  and  remain  solvent.  Following  the  War 
of  1812  there  was  a  period  of  intense  speculation  ending  in 
very  extensive  failures.  In  1825  one  Philadelphia  house 
failed  -•'  owing  the  government  nearly  $900,000  in  unpaid 
duties.     This  failure  carried  others  with  it  and  not  long 


18  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

afterwards  a  New  York  house  failed  for  $3,000,000.  During 
the  third  decade  of  the  century  one  of  the  wealthiest  of  the 
Boston  firms  claimed  hardly  to  have  made  the  interest  on 
the  money  invested. 

After  the  War  of  1812  the  trade  showed  a  marked  tend- 
ency toward  concentration  in  the  hands  of  a  few  firms.  It 
was  stated  that  in  1825  seven  eighths  of  the  China  trade 
was  conducted  by  four'firms :  Messrs.  Perkins  and  Company 
of  Boston;  Archer  who  was  connected  with  the  Browns  of 
Liverpool,  Jones,  Oakford  and  Company  of  Philadelphia; 
and  Thomas  H.  Smith  of  New  York.  In  1829  one  half  of 
the  entire  trade  was  said  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  house  of 
Perkins.  The  day  of  the  small  trader  had  not  entirely 
passed  but  a  few  merchants  had  a  very  great  advantage. 
The  pioneer  days  were  over  but  they  had  served  a  most 
useful  purpose  in  American  industrial  and  commercial  de- 
velopment. The  "merchant  prince"  had  appeared  at  Can- 
ton but  at  the  same  time  many  an  American  at  home  had 
withdrawn  from  the  China  trade  with  sufficient  capital  to 
serve  his  needs  as  he  entered  into  the  new  industrial  life 
of  the  nation.  The  importance  of  the  early  China  trade  is 
to  be  gauged  not  so  much  by  the  net  trade  returns  for  each 
year  as  by  the  fact  that  it  offered  a  means  for  the  accumula- 
tion in  a  few  years  of  a  large  amount  of  capital  of  which 
the  rapidly  growing  states  were  in  urgent  need. 

Cargoes 

The  outward  cargoes  of  the  East  India  traders  present 
an  interesting  study. 
/  The  first  American  merchants  went  to  the  East  not  so 

much  to  sell  as  to  buy.  The  East  Indian  trade  arose  out  of 
no  notable  demand  in  the  United  States  for  a  market  for 
surplus  produce,  but  rather  out  of  a  desire  to  secure  for  the 
United  States  certain  commodities  such  as  Indian  muslins, 
^spices,  Chinese  teas  and  silks  for  which  there  was  a  demand. 
The  East  was  economically  self-sustaining;  it  required 
nothing  from  the  West.     Theproblem  of  exchange  thus 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE    19 

created  was  theinost-serious  obstacle  which  the  American 
merchant  had  to  meet.  What  could  he  take  to  Asia  to  give 
in  exchange  for  the  produce  which  he  required? 

Fortunately  for  the  American  the  acceptable  articles  of 
exchange  in  the  various  ports  from  Mauritius  to  Canton 
were  varied.  There  were,  scattered  across  Asia,  considerable 
settlements  of  white  men  who  were  dependent  in  part  for 
the  satisfaction  of  their  needs,  both  personal  and  industrial, 
upon  commodities  which  had  to  be  carried  to  Asia  from  the 
West.  The  Americans  seized  upon  this  trade  with  avidity. 
The  native  markets  in  each  country  would  absorb  certain 
articles  which  the  United  States  produced,  or  which  the 
American  merchant  could  collect  en  route  to  the  East. 
Hence  the  advantage  of  the  circuitous  trading.  A  vessel 
might  start  for  Canton  with  farm  produce  or  with  flour. 
At  some  European  or  Mediterranean  port  this  cargo  would 
be  exchanged  for  a  cargo  for  Mauritius,  or  India  or  else- 
where. Sometimes  there  would  be  three  or  four  exchanges 
of  commodities  before  the  ship  reached  Canton. 

The  way  in  which  the  Americans  attempted  to  solve  this 
formidable  problem  of  exchange  may  best  be  seen  in  some  of 
the  old  manifests.  The  Grand  Turk  of  Salem  carried  as 
outward  cargo  in  1785:  pitch,  tar,  flour,  rice,  tobacco,  butter, 
wine,  bar-iron,  sugar,  oil,  chocolate,  prunes,  brandy,  beef, 
rum,  hams,  candles,  soap,  cheese,  fish,  beer,  porter,  port  and 
ginseng,  as  well  as  some  specie.  The  Astrea  in  1789  carried, 
in  addition  to  many  of  the  articles  noted  above :  snuff,  shoes, 
harness  and  saddlery.  The  Asia,  sailing  the  same  year  from 
Philadelphia,  carried  rum,  specie  and  British  manufactured 
goods.  The  General  Washington  from  Providence  in  1791, 
in  addition  to  wine,  spirits  and  ginseng,  carried  tar,  iron 
bars,  anchors,  shot  and  cannon.  For  many  of  the  commodi- 
ties in  the  above  lists  there  could  be  only  a  limited  demand ; 
they  were  obviously  intended  to  supply  the  needs  of 
Europeans  rather  than  of  Asiatics. 

A  few  years  later  we  find  very  much  simpler  manifests. 
For  the  voyage  of  the  ship  Triton,^'^  which  left  New  York 
for  Canton  in  1804,  capital  to  the  extent  of  $120,000  was 


20  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

advanced  by  seven  New  York  merchants  and  firms,  and 
this  was  invested  as  follows :  9533  beaver  skins  at  $5  each, 
$47,665;  and  70.372  Spanish  dollars,  costing  $71,882.  The 
ship  Lion,-'  sailing  from  New  York  early  in  1816,  carried 
among  other  items,  60L  cases  of  opium,  valued  at  $30,015, 
and  also  45  kegs,  and  2  boxes  of  Spanish  dollars,  valued  at 
$110,000.  The  appearance  of  furs,  opium,  and  an  increasing 
proportion  of  specie  in  the  later  manifests  reveals  the  condi- 
tion of  the  problem  of  exchange.  The  Americans  had  been 
forced  to  fall  back  on  Spanish  dollars  the  demand  for  which 
had  pushed  them  to  a  premium,  and  were  supplementing 
this  precious  medium  of  exchange  with  furs  and  opium. 
This  export  of  specie  exerted  a  very  disturbing  effect  on 
the  condition  of  American  currency,  especially  after  the  War 
of  1812.  A  committee  appointed  to  consider  the  subject 
made  a  report  in  the  House  of  Representatives  in  1819  -^ 
that  "  the  whole  amount  of  our  current  coin  is  probably  not 
more  than  double  that  which  has  been  exported  in  a  single 
year  to  India,  including  China  in  the  general  term."  The 
largest  China  merchant  in  New  York  in  1824  admitted  that 
out  of  his  total  exports  to  China  of  $1,311,057  for  that  year, 
nearly  $900,000  was  specie.  His  other  items  of  export  were 
British  manufactured  goods,  $356,407,  and  American  pro- 
duce, chiefly  furs  and  ginseng,  to  the  extent  of  only  $60,000. 
At  that  time  a  Boston  merchant,  probably  Thomas  H.  Per- 
kins, wrote : 

"There  has  been  a  strong  prejudice  existing  against  the  China 
trade  in  this  country,  under  the  idea  that  specie  was  necessarily  ex- 
ported to  procure  cargoes  from  China.  So  far  is  this  from  the  fact, 
in  our  case,  that,  although  our  importations  have  averaged  more  than 
a  million  dollars  annually  for  several  years,  in  the  products  of  China, 
of  which  silks  and  nankeens  form  a  considerable  portion,  that  we 
have  not  shipped  a  Spanish  dollar  for  the  past  tlirec  years  to  China. 
Our  funds  arise  from  the  export  of  opium  from  Turkey,  British  goods 
from  Great  Britain,  lead  and  quick-silver  from  Gibraltar,  and  the 
same  articles  on  a  large  scale  from  Trieste." 

The  same  writer  asserted  that  he  had  already  made  the 
experiment  of  shipping  American  cotton  goods  to  China, 
Manila,   Java,   and   to   the   Mediterranean   ports   and    to 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE    21 

Smyrna,  and  was  satisfied  that  in  the  "more  gross  cotton 
fabrics"  the  American  manufacturers  could  already  compete 
successfully  with  their  British  rivals.  Another  merchant 
predicted  a  trade  with  China  in  raw  cotton  in  competition 
with  the  Bengal  product  ''whenever  raw  cotton  can  be  pur- 
chased in  this  country  at  ten  cents  a  pound."  The  next  year 
cotton  went  down  temporarily  to  eleven  cents,  but  the  mer- 
chant never  lived  to  see  the  day  of  'ten  cent  cotton.'  The 
exportation  of  cotton  goods,  however,  of  the  coarser  grades, 
steadily  increased. 

It  was  asserted  in  1852  -••  that  the  United  States  had 
shipped  silver  to  China  since  1784  to  the  extent  of  $180.- 
000,000.  The  American  port  records  show  nearly  $70,000,- 
000  to  have  been  shipped  between  1805  and  1818.  As  to 
the  total  amount  which  had  been  received  in  China  froiii 
American  ships  there  could  only  be  wild  guesses,  for  no  one 
knows  how  much  specie  for  the  East  was  collected  on  the 
circuitous  voyages. 

The  inward  cargoes  from  the  Far  East  consisted  of 
cotton  and  silk  textiles  from  India ;  spices ;  and  from  China, 
tea,  nankeens,  cassia,  China-ware,  straw  mats  and  matting, 
sugar  and  drugs.  Tea  antl  nankeens  formed  the  greater  part 
of  the  value  of  the  China  cargoes.  One  has  but  to  examine 
this  list  of  commodities  to  see  how  slender  was  the  perman- 
ent basis  for  the  American  trade  with  the  East.  When  the 
United  States  had  become  a  manufacturing  nation  and  had 
developed  the  logical  sources  of  supply  nearer  home,  ther^- 
remained  only  tea  and  spice  as  articles  of  constant  demand, 
and  the  United  States  did  not  become  a  nation  of  tea 
drinkers.  Tea  was  a  luxury  ^"'  in  the  early  days,  costing  in 
1791  from  twenty-eight  cents  to  more  than  a  dollar  a  pound, 
according  to  grade.  Coffee  became  more  popular,  and  it  was 
cheaper.  Expanding  population  and  reexportation,  rather 
than  increased  per  capita  consumption,  accounted  for  the 
growing  East  India  trade. 


22  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

BIBLIOGEAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  See,  for  example,  Philip  Cuyler  Letter  Book  (N.  Y.  Pub.  Lib. 

Mss.  Div.).  At  the  outbreak  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  Cuyler 
ordered  several  barrels  of  tea  (July  20,  1756)  from  John 
Hokson  of  Holland  through  Captain  Corne  "who  sails  this 
day  from  Rotterdam." 

2.  Documents    Relative   to    the    Colonial    History    of    New    York 

(Albany,  1854).    Vol.  4,  pp.  307-10,  446,  459,  480. 

3.  "The  Life  of  John  Ledyard,"  by  Jared  Sparks,  Cambridge,  1828. 

4.  "The  Journals  of  Major  Samuel  Shaw,  the  first  American  Consul 

at  Canton,  with  a  life  of  the  author,"  by  Josiah  Quincy,  Bos- 
ton, 1847. 

5.  "East    India    Trade    of    Providence,    1787-1807,"    by    Gertrude 

Selwyn  Kimball,  Brown  University  Historical  Papers,  1-10, 
1894-99;  3  Dip.  Corres.,  of  U.  S.,  Sept.  19,  1783-March  4,  1789 
(Washington,  1837)  p.  771. 

6.  See,  for  example,  America  and  England  (Mss.  in  Bancroft  Col- 

lection, N.  Y.  Pub.  Lib.) ;  and.  Letters  of  Phineas  Bond, 
American  Historical  Association  Reports,  1896,  Vol.  1. 

7.  "Oriental    Commerce,"    by    William    Milburn,    London,    1813,    2 

vols. ;  "Statistical  View  of  the  Commerce  of  the  United  States 
of  America,"  by  Timothy  Pitkin,  Hartford,  1816. 

8.  Papers  of  Continental   Congress,  Reports   of   Committees,   Vol. 

5,  p.  11.  (Mss.  Div.,  Lib.  of  Congress);  Annex  to  the  Treaty 
of  Amity  and  Commerce  of  Oct  8,  1782,  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Netherlands. 

9.  "Progress   of   New   York    in    a    Century,    1776-1876,"    by   John 

Austin  Stevens,  New  York,  1876. 

10.  Madison  Papers    (N.   Y.   Pub.   Lib.)   Vol.   14;   W.   Grayson   to 

Madison,  May  28,  1785. 

11.  Laws  of  Pennsylvania,  1785,  p.  669;  1787,  p.  241;  Laws  of  New 

York,  1787,  chap.  81,  cited  in  "American  Connnercial  Legisla- 
tion before  1789,"  by  A.  A.  Giesecke,  New  York,  1910. 

12.  See  "History  of  Early  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 

China,"  by  K.  C.  Latourette,  Transactions  of  the  Conn. 
Academy  of  Arts  and  Sciences,  Vol.  22,  1917,  pp.  78-9,  foot- 
note, for  complete  summary  of  protective  legislation  and  its 
detailed  changes. 

13.  Report  ou  the  China  Trade  (S.  Doc.  No.  31:19-1)  gives  much 

information  as  to  the  cost  of  teas  at  Canton. 

14.  Kimball;   "Statistical  Annals  of  the  United  States,"  by  Adam 

Seybert,  Philadelphia,  1818. 

15.  President  Washington,  Jan.  7,  1792,  declined  to  furnish  Brown 

and  Francis  of  Providence  a  recommendation  to  be  vised  in 
Europe  in  securing  a  $100,000  loan  to  build  a  vessel  for  the 
East  India  trade  on  the  ground  that  "it  would  be  almost  im- 
possible to  separate  my  private  from  my  official  capacity  in 
this  case."     (Misc.  Letters,  Dept.  of  State). 

16.  Journal    of   the    Voyage   of   the    Brigantine   Hope,   by    Joseph 

Ingraham  (Mss.  Div.,  Lib.  of  Congress). 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  COMMERCE    23 

17.  Fanning  Memorial.    H.  Doc.  No.  57 ;  26-1 

18.  Consular  Letters  from   Canton,  Honolulu   and   Batavia.     Dept 

of  State. 

19.  Hudson  Collection;  Papers  relating  to  the  building  of  the  ship 

Massarhmetts  at  Braintree,  Mass.,  17S7-91   (N.  Y.  Pub.  Lib.), 

20.  House  of  Commons,  Sessional  Papers,  1821,  Vol.  7. 

21.  Canton  Letters,  Vol.   1,  Feb.  3,   1815.     See  also  Misc.  Letters, 

Nov  1,  1816,  C.  J.  Ingersoll  to  Mr.  Monroe;  and  also  see 
H.  Doc.   No.  71:26-2.  Sept.  22,  1805,  Snow  to   Madison. 

22.  Edward   Everett,    in   Hunt's    "Lives   of   American    Merchants," 

Vol.  1,  p.  139. 

23.  See  Manifest  of  the  Astrea,  printed  at  length,  p.  58ff.,  "Hunt's 

American  Merchants,"  Vol.  2. 

24.  Account  Books  of  Oliver  Wolcott  &  Co.     (N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.) 

25.  H.  Doc.  No.  137:19-1;   S.  Doc.  No.  31:19-1,  give  an  extensive 

exhibit  of  the  condition  of  the  trade  after  1820.  See  also 
Worthy  P.  Sterns,  "Foreign  Trade  of  the  United  States, 
1820-40";  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  8,  1899-1900. 

26.  Wolcott  Account  Books. 

27.  Ibid. 

28.  Lowndes  Report,  Jan.  26,  1819,  H.  Doc.  Ill  :15-2. 

29.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  49  :32-2. 

30.  "Old  Merchants  of  New  York,"  by  Walter  Barrett,  Clerk,  5  Vols. 

New  York,  1885.  Vol.  4,  p.  213.  Barrett,  although  making  an 
enormous  number  of  misstatements,  is  nevertheless  a  valuable 
source  of  information  for  all  the  early  trade,  particularly  for 
that  after  1820. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  POETS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

As  we  follow  the  American  vessels  to  Asia  we  note  that 
there  were  two  possible  routes:  around  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  or  around  Cape  Horn  and  westward  across  the 
Pacific. 

The  eastward  route  was  usually  selected  by  the  larger 
Indiamen  from  Philadelphia,  New  York,  Providence  and 
Massachusetts  which  engaged  in  the  direct  trade  with  India 
or  with  China.  This  route  also  offered  many  advantages 
to  the  tramp  which  depended  in  part  on  cargoes  offered  from 
port  to  port.  In  any  case  the  route  lay  across  the  Indian 
Ocean,  past  the  Malay  peninsula,  and  up  the  China  Sea. 
Ports  along  the  way  invited  attention  and  were,  in  fact,  a 
necessity  for  the  replenishing  of  ship's  stores,  if  not  for 
trade. 

Isle  de  France  and  India 

The  American  trade  with  Isle  de  France  (Mauritius) 
opened  in  April,  1786,  when  the  Grand  Turk  arrived  with 
an  assorted  cargo  evidently  intended  to  meet  the  needs  of 
the  French  settlement.  The  ship  was  then  chartered  to  the 
extent  of  two  thirds  of  the  space  by  a  Frenchman  to  carry 
freight  to  Canton,  the  charterer  agreeing  to  pay  all  the 
port  charges.  The  Grand  Turk  returned  to  Salem  in  May, 
1787,  with  a  cargo  of  tea,  ox-hides,  shammy  skins,  buck- 
skins, wine,  muslins  and  bandanna  handkerchiefs.  Derby 
followed  up  the  Mauritius  and  Indian  trade  and,  finding  it 
more  profitable  than  that  with  Canton,  devoted  himself 
to  it  during  the  last  eight  years  of  his  life.  When  he  died  in 
1799  he  was  reported  to  be  possessed  of  a  million  dollars, 
the  largest  fortune  in  the  United  States.     Commerce  with 

24 


26  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Mauritius  reached  its  height  in  1800;  there  were  seventeen 
arrivals  at  Salem  alone  from  Mauritius  in  the  years  1797 
and  1798. 

The  Mauritius  trade  has  an  interest  aside  from  its 
intrinsic  value,  for  it  was  largely  through  the  action  of  the 
French  Government  in  extending  the  hospitality  of  the 
French  ports  in  the  Indian  Ocean  to  American  ships  in  1783, 
and  in  formally  opening  them  to  American  trade  the  next 
year,  that  the  ports  of  British  India  were  thrown  open  to 
Americans  on  especially  favorable  terms.  Indian  produce 
had  become  available  to  American  vessels  at  the  French 
ports.  The  Dutch  and  the  Danes  also  were  friendly  to  the 
Americans  and  they  also  had  settlements  in  India.  There 
were,  besides,  the  ports  of  the  native  princes.  It  was  the 
policy  of  Great  Britain  with  her  own  nationals  to  control 
the  trade  in  such  a  way  that  all  produce  exported  from 
India  would  either  be  imported  to  England  or  at  least  pay 
toll  in  London,  but  international  competition  made  it  im- 
possible to  maintain  such  a  monopoly  against  American 
ships.  The  Americans  would  get  the  cargoes  in  any  case. 
The  East  India  Company,  therefore,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  no  commercial  treaty  existed  with  the  United 
States,  and  in  spite  of  such  rancor  and  jealousy  as  remained 
from  the  late  war,  determined  not  only  to  admit  American 
vessels  to  British  India  but  even  to  offer  special  induce- 
ments to  bring  them  there.^ 

The  first  American  ship  to  enter  an  Indian  port  was  the 
Chesapeake  of  Baltimore.  The  vessel  had  been  built 
especially  for  the  trade  and  was  commanded  by  her  owner, 
Captain  John  O'Donnell,  who  had  brought  the  Pallas  into 
New  York  in  1784.  The  Chesapeake  cleared,  probably  from 
Norfolk,  in  the  latter  part  of  1786  and  returned  to  Perth 
Amboy  in  1789.  She  was  warmly  welcomed  in  India,  the 
Supreme  Council  of  Bengal  exempting  her,  as  a  mark  of 
special  favor,  from  all  customs  duties.  Lord  Cornwallis 
and  the  Government  of  India  issued  an  order  that  American 
ships  at  the  East  India  Company's  settlements  should  be 
treated  in  all  respects  as  the  most  favored  foreigners.    This 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC  27 

policy  was  confirmed  in  the  commercial  treaty  with  Great 
Britain  in  1794  (Article  13).  The  privileges  secured  were 
even  greater,  for  Americans  paid  only  6  per  cent  import 
duties,  the  same  as  those  paid  by  the  English,  whereas  other 
nations  paid  8  per  cent.  Furthermore,  the  Americans  were 
exempted  from  the  2  per  cent  export  duty  which  was  paid 
by  all  others,  except  the  British.  And  then,  although  the 
treaty  of  1794  limited  the  trade  in  American  vessels  to 
direct  trade  with  American  ports,  special  licenses  were 
issued  permitting  Americans  to  carry  Indian  produce  to 
other  ports  of  the  Indian  Ocean  and  to  China,  thus  linking 
the  peninsula  in  those  circuitous  voyages  to  which  American 
ships  were  so  well  adapted. 

Derby  of  Salem  had  four  vessels  in  the  Indian  Ocean  in 
1787.  They  visited  Surat,  Bombay  and  Calcutta.  They 
carried  among  other  commodities,  Bombay  cotton  to  Can- 
ton, and  brought  Indian  cotton  to  Salem.  Derby's  son 
returned  from  the  East  in  1791  after  a  residence  of  three 
years  in  which  he  had  directed  a°  very  lively  trade  which 
reached  from  Bombay  to  Canton,  and  was  reported  to  have 
made  $100,000  on  his  various  transactions.  The  Betsey  of 
Baltimore,  the  Commerce  of  Philadelphia,  and  the  Leda  of 
Boston  all  visited  India  in  the  season  of  1786-7.  While 
exact  evidence  is  lacking  it  is  probable  that  before  1790  the 
total  American  tonnage  in  the  Indian  ports  exceeded  that 
t  Canton.* 
The  American  tariff  of  1816  ^  imposed  a  protective  duty 
on  coarse  cottons,  setting  on  them  a  minimum  valuation  of 
twenty-five  cents  a  yard,  the  effect  of  which  was  to  place 
the  India  trade  under  a  severe  handicap.  Nevertheless  a 
certain  amount  of  commerce  continued.  In  the  season  of 
1829-30  there  were  sixteen  vessels  with  a  tonnage  of  4941 

*Tho  major  portion  of  this  commerce  with  India  had  been  claimed  for  both 
Salem  and  IMiiladclphia,  but  records  sufficient  for  comparison  are  lacliing. 
Between  17S5  and  1799  Derby  made  forty-seven  voyages  to  the  East  Indies. 
Between  ISOO  and  1.S42  the  vessels  entering  the  port  of  Salem  were:  from  Cal- 
cutta, lir.  ;  Bombay,  20  ;  Bengal,  0 ;  Madras,  0.  There  were  also  two  from 
Ceylon  and  two  from  Siam.  Before  1S12  Joseph  Peabody  of  Salem,  out  of  a 
total  of  1(;4  voyages,  had  38  from  Calcutta  alone.  During  this  same  period 
Peabody  had  oulv  17  voyages  to  Canton.  The  years  of  the  greatest  activity  for 
the  Salem-India  trade  were  1802-7  and  1816-22.  In  1800  twelve  vessels  loaded 
at  Calcutta   for  Bo.ston. 


t 


28  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

tons  clearing  from  British  India  ports,  and  the  following 
year  nineteen  vessels.  The  India  trade,  which  had  dwindled 
as  the  Americans  learned  to  manufacture  their  own  cottons, 
picked  up  again  in  the  two  decades  which  preceded  the  Civil 
War.  The  American  tonnage  at  Calcutta  in  the  second  half 
of  the  year  1845=*  was  8889  tons  (19  vessels),  almost  all 
of  it  being  from  Boston  or  elsewhere  in  New  England, 
The  inward  cargoes  at  Calcutta  consisted  of  lumber,  cotton 
goods  and  ice;  the  outward  cargoes  being  made  up  chiefly 
of  hides,  salt  peter,  indigo,  and  opium.  The  ice  trade  with 
Calcutta  had  been  initiated  in  1835  and  came  "just  in  time 
to  preserve  Boston's  East  India  commerce  from  ruin."  * 
In  1857  one  hundred  and  fifty- two  American  vessels  de- 
parted from  British  India  ports  with  cargoes  valued  at 
$11,000,000. 

The  appointment  of  an  American  consul  in  India  was 
a  subject  of  consideration  very  soon  after  the  close  of  the 
Revolution.  Captain  O'DonnelP  of  the  Chesapeake  had 
applied  for  a  position  as  general  commissioner  for  the 
United  States  for  the  Far  East.  He  desired  authority  to 
negotiate  trade  agreements  with  ''the  principal  independent 
powers  of  Asia"  which  he  described  as  Tippoo  Saib,  son  of 
Hyder  Ally,  the  Marattas  on  the  coast  of  Malabar,  the 
King  of  Acheea  in  Sumatra,  and  the  Malay  King  of  Ternati. 
He  also  outlined  a  plan  by  which  British  merchants  in  India 
would  be  able  to  evade  the  rules  of  the  Company  monopoly 
by  shipping  their  fortunes  to  the  United  States  under  the 
protection  of  blank  passports  issued  by  O'Donnell.  To  this 
plan  John  Jay  reported  to  the  Continental  Congress  some- 
what testily  that  if  residents  of  India  were  to  come  to  the 
United  States,  their  coming  should  be  accomplished  "by 
means  perfectly  unexceptional,  and  not  by  the  sovereign 
of  this  country  giving  false  evidence  of  American  property 
...  to  vessels,  officers  and  crews  entirely  foreign  to  the 
United  States."  The  request  was  denied.  As  for  treaties 
with  the  independent  powers  of  Asia,  the  Continental 
Congress  was  too  much  preoccupied  even  to  entertain  the 
idea.    Political  connections  with  Asia,  so  long  as  ports  were 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC:  29 

open   and   trade   reasonably   free,   was  farthest  from   the 
thought  of  the  American  people. 

The  necessity  for  a  consul  at  Calcutta  increased,  espe- 
cially to  care  for  American  sailors  at  a  time  when  American 
vessels  were  being  sold  in  Indian  ports.  George  Cabot  of 
Boston,  November  16,  1792,  in  a  letter  to  President  Wash- 
ington ^  urged  the  importance  of  appointing  a  consul  and 
mentioned  the  "very  precarious  tenure"  of  American  rights 
in  India.  He  thought  that  an  agent  on  the  spot  might  be 
able  to  accomplish  something  "by  availing  ourselves  as 
much  as  possible  of  the  competition"  which  existed  between 
the  rival  French,  Dutch,  Danish  and  English  interests. 
Cabot,  as  well  as  many  other  Massachusetts  merchants 
recommended  the  appointment  of  Benjamin  Joy  of  New-1 
berryport  and  Boston.  The  appointment  was  made  and 
Mr.  Joy  reached  Calcutta  in  1784.  He  engaged  William 
Abbott,  the  secretary  to  the  Nabob  of  Arcot,  to  act  as  con- 
sular agent  and  vice  consul  at  Madras,  but  was  unable 
to  find  a  suitable  person  to  serve  in  Bombay.  Joy  was 
received  cordially  by  the  British  Government  but  with- 
out orders  from  London  he  could  not  be  recognized  as 
consul. 

Consul  Joy  remained  in  India  less  than  two  years  and 
resigned  his  commission  from  Boston  January  24,  1796. 
Two  successors  were  appointed  in  1796  and  in  1801,  respec- 
tively, one  from  Philadelphia  and  the  other  from  Massa- 
chusetts, but  it  does  not  appear  that  either  of  them  ever 
entered  upon  the  duties  of  the  office.  The  next  consul  was 
James  B.  Higginson  of  Massachusetts  who  entered  upon 
his  work  in  1843. 

The  India  trade  of  the  United  States  was  entirely  with- 
out political  significance.  However,  the  close  association 
of  American  and  British  merchants  in  both  the  direct  India- 
American  and  in  the  India-Canton  trade  exercised  an  influ- 
ence on  American  policy  in  China,  for  it  brought  the 
Americans  and  the  English  together  at  Canton  and  ac- 
counted for  the  disposition  of  many  of  these  merchants  to 
seek  common  action  in  1839  and  later. 


30  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Adventures — Mocha,  Sumatra,  Siam 

While  the  national  establishments  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  European  powers  in  the  Indian  Ocean  led  their  mer- 
chants to  confine  their  trade  chiefly  to  ports  under  their 
respective  flags,  the  Americans  were  inclmed  to  exploration 
and  the  discovery  of  new  markets. 

American  trade  along  the  coast  of  Africa,  Arabia  and 
Persia  in  the  early  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century  ap- 
pears to  have  been  greater  than  that  of  all  the  European 
nations  combined.  The  Recovery  of  Salem  (Captain  Joseph 
Ropes)  opened  the  coffee  trade  with  Mocha  in  1798  and 
soon  a  thriving  commerce,  by  way  of  the  Cape,  was  estab- 
lished between  Mocha  and  Smyrna.  At  the  latter  port  the 
trade  was  quickly  related  to  China,  as  well  as  directly  to 
the  United  States,  by  the  exchange  for  Turkey  opium. 

From  Mocha  the  American  trade  spread  in  all  directions 
through  the  domains  of  the  Sultan  of  Muscat  whose  sway 
extended  from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  Cape  Delgado  on  the 
coast  of  Africa.  While  the  trade  appears  to  have  decreased 
after  the  War  of  1812,  its  importance  was  considered  of 
sufficient  moment  to  include  a  treaty  with  the  Sultan  as 
a  part  of  the  program  of  Edmund  Roberts  in  1832.  In  the 
thirty-two  months,  September,  1832,  to  May,  1835,  out  of 
a  total  of  forty-one  vessels  with  a  total  of  6559  tons,  visiting 
Zanzibar,  thirty-two  vessels  of  5497  tons  were  American.'^ 
Of  the  American  vessels,  twenty  were  from  Salem,  three 
from  Boston,  and  three  from  New  York.  The  exports  con- 
sisted chiefly  of  gum  copal,  aloes,  gum  arable,  columbo  wood, 
drugs,  ivory,  tortoise-shell,  hides,  bees-wax,  and  cocoanut 
oil.  Shortly  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  a  special 
effort  was  made  by  some  New  York  merchants  to  develop 
this  trade  but  the  panic  of  1837  intervened.  However 
American  influence  at  Zanzibar  was  predominant,  according 
to  an  English  historian,  until  at  least  1859.  During  the 
fifties  American  vessels  at  Zanzibar  ranged  from  twenty- 
four  to  thirty-five  annually,  while  British  vessels  never 
numbered  more  than  six. 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC  31 

The  trade  with  the  pepper  coast  of  Sumatra  began  soon 
after  1790,  when  Captain  Jonathan  Games  of  Salem 
brought  home  a  cargo  which  sold  for  seven  hundred  per 
cent  profit.  Such  fabulous  profits  could  not  be  kept  secret 
and  the  trade  grew  rapidly.  In  the  spring  of  1803  there 
were  twenty-one  American  vessels  on  the  northwest  coast 
of  Sumatra  after  pepper.  The  Americans  came  to  have 
practically  a  monopoly.  In  1820  it  was  asserted  that  the 
Americans  were  sending  forty  vessels,  of  about  two  hun- 
dred tons  each,  to  Sumatra  annually.^  It  would  appear 
that  the  trade  at  this  time  was  nearly  equal  to  that  at 
Canton. 

As  a  result  of  the  attack  by  the  natives  of  Quallah 
Battoo  on  the  Friendship  of  Salem  in  1830,  the  U.  S.  Frigate 
Potomac  was  ordered  to  visit  the  coast  and  punish  the 
natives — a  commission  which  was  executed  with  great  thor- 
oughness.^ The  action  of  the  natives  was  usually  repre- 
sented as  entirely  unprovoked  by  the  Americans,  but  there 
is  reason  to  doubt  such  statements.  There  are  hints  that 
some  of  the  Americans  overreached  themselves  in  their 
barter,  even  to  the  extent  of  using  scales  with  hollow  beams 
in  which  quicksilver  had  been  inserted. 

Of  the  trade  with  Siam  little  is  known.  What  little 
there  was  appears  to  have  been  conducted  from  Batavia 
and  later  from  Singapore,  and  its  growth  was  restricted  by 
excessive  port  charges,  high  duties,  and  the  arbitrary  rights 
of  preemption  exercised  by  the  king  and  high  officials  until 
the  treaty  of  1833. 

Batavia  and  Manila 

The  Batavia  trade  of  the  United  States  was  of  some 
importance  in  itself,  and  more  especially  because  of  the 
relation  of  Batavia  to  China  and  Japan.  Although  the 
American  treaty  of  1782  with  the  Netherlands  seems  not 
to  have  contemplated  any  such  trade,  the  Americans  were 
freely  admitted  to  the  port,  except  for  a  few  months  at  the 
beginning  of  the  season  of  1790-1  when  the  Dutch  gov- 


32  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ernor,  prompted  perhaps  by  the  Dutch  East  India  Com- 
pany, was  disposed  to  prohibit  it.  Both  the  Astrea  and 
Three  Sisters  of  Salem  had  difficulty  in  that  season,  but 
Blanchard  and  Thomas  H.  Perkins,  the  supercargoes,  man- 
aged to  "fix"  matters  with  the  authorities.  Shortly  after- 
wards Major  Shaw  arrived  on  the  Massachusetts,  and  met 
with  similar  opposition.  Clothed  in  his  authority  as  Ameri- 
can Consul  at  Canton,  Shaw  entered  a  vigorous  protest 
which  aroused  the  disgust  of  the  Dutch  governor  that  the 
Americans  should  be  inaugurating  the  custom  of  Merchant- 
consuls,  but  the  restrictions  on  American  trade  were  not 
renewed. 

The  relations  between  the  Dutch  and  the  Americans 
became  very  friendly,  and  when  the  newly  created  Batavian 
Republic  hesitated  to  trust  the  annual  Company  ship  to 
Nagasaki  under  a  flag  which  the  British  might  not  respect, 
the  Eliza,  under  the  American  flag,  was  chartered  for  the 
voyage  (1798).  For  several  years  thereafter  the  American 
flag  appeared  regularly  in  Japan  each  season,  and  when  the 
Department  of  State,  in  1832,  began  to  assemble  informa- 
tion with  a  view  to  treaty  relations  with  Japan,  it  was 
mainly  through  Dutch  sources  and  through  Americans  who, 
in  the  employ  of  the  Dutch,  had  been  to  Nagasaki,  that  the 
information  was  secured. 

Unlike  the  British  in  India,  the  Dutch  discouraged 
American  trade  with  Java.  The  import  and  export  duties 
for  goods  in  foreign  vessels  was  double  what  it  was  for  the 
Dutch, ^°  Provisions,  however,  such  as  were  needed  by  the 
Dutch  garrison  could  be  supplied  cheaper  by  America  than 
by  Holland,  and  this  trade  became  of  some  value  in  the 
days  when  it  was  of  so  much  importance  to  collect  abroad 
as  many  Spanish  dollars  as  possible  for  Canton.  Nine 
tenths  of  the  importation  of  salt  provisions  into  Java  in 
1825  were  made  by  the  Americans.  Singapore,  with  its 
freer  trade  regulations,  became  a  rival  to  Batavia  and  the 
American  trade  with  the  latter  port  dechned  sharply,  being 
in  1832  only  a  small  fraction  of  what  it  was  ten  years 
earlier.    In  1834  the  principal  articles  taken  out  of  Batavia 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC  33 

in  American  vessels  were  rice,  sugar,  pepper,  coffee  and 
quicksilver. 

The  chief  importance  of  Java  to  the  Americans  was 
that  the  regular  route  to  Canton  was  past  Java  Head  and 
through  the  straits  of  Anjier  and  after  the  long  voyage 
from  the  Cape,  some  place  of  refreshment  as  well  as  of 
communication  was  a  necessity.  John  McClallam  was 
United  States  commercial  agent  for  Batavia  in  1807." 
Just  before  the  establishment  of  the  American  embargo  he 
was  instructed  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  ships  passing 
from  Canton  and  touching  at  Anjier  Point,  and  to  take 
proper  measures  for  apprising  them  of  the  ''crisis  and  for 
guarding  them  against  the  risks  to  which  it  might  expose 
them."  Similar  instructions  were  sent  to  the  consul  at 
the  Isle  de  France,  but  whether  either  of  these  consuls  ever 
actually  discharged  any  duties  in  their  respective  posts  is 
not  known.  The  first  American  ofl&cer  to  communicate 
with  the  State  Department  from  Batavia  wrote  in  1818, 
acknowledging  the  receipt  of  his  commission  as  "agent  for 
the  United  States  for  commerce  and  seamen."  The  Nether- 
lands Government  did  not  recognize  consular  representa- 
tives in  Java. 

Manila,  because  of  its  geographical  position,  was  an  out- 
post of  Canton  for  the  trader  whether  he  approached  China 
by  way  of  the  Cape,  the  Horn,  or  the  Northwest  coast. 
Independent  of  the  China  trade,  the  Philippines  were  of 
slight  importance  to  Americans.  The  exact  date  of  the 
beginning  of  the  trade  is  difficult  to  fix.  The  Enterprise 
(Captain  Adam  Babcock)  left  Boston  in  1788  and  was  at 
the  Isle  de  France  in  1792.  There  the  America  was  pur- 
chased and  the  two  vessels  went  to  Manila  and  purchased 
sugar  for  Ostend.  They  were  captured  in  the  Straits  of 
Sunda  by  a  squadron  of  British  and  Dutch  ships  and  taken 
into  Calcutta,  though  for  what  reason  is  not  known.^^ 
This  trade  in  sugar  continued,  and  in  1819  the  American 
consul  reported  trade  also  in  indigo,  coffee  and  cotton. 
There  were  23  American  vessels  at  Manila  in  1819,  more 
than  in  any  two  previous  years.^^     There  was  only  one 


34  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

American  resident  in  the  city  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
time  until  1825,  when  the  consul  could  find  no  American 
to  whom  he  could  turn  over  the  duties  of  his  office  while 
he  visited  the  United  States,  The  rice  trade  from  Manila 
to  Canton  sprung  up  about  this  time,  owing  to  the  new 
port  regulation  at  Canton  which  permitted  a  reduction  of 
duty  to  "rice  ships."  ^"^  The  Americans  then  made  increas- 
ing use  of  Manila  as  an  avenue  by  which  the  onerous  port 
charges  at  Whampoa  might  be  lightened.  A  trade  in  beche 
de  Titer ,  a  sea  slug  much  prized  by  the  Chinese  as  an  article 
of  food,  appeared  about  1830.  Four  years  later  the  consul 
reported  that  unbleached  and  colored  goods  of  coarse 
texture,  of  American  manufacture,  had  begun  to  come  into 
Manila  by  way  of  China.  In  the  last  six  months  of  1835, 
13,876  tons  of  American  shipping  arrived,  the  largest 
amount  up  to  that  date  ever  reported. 

The  policy  of  the  Spanish  Government  placed  no  special 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  growth  of  American  trade 
though  the  consul  was  not  recognized.  The  first  consul 
was  appointed  in  1817. 

The  only  American  firm  of  importance  was  that  of 
Russell,  Sturgis  and  Company,  founded  about  1825,  and 
subsequently  incorporated  in  the  famous  Russell  and  Com- 
pany at  Canton. 

The  Fur  Trade 

The  route  around  the  Horn  and  across  the  Pacific  to 
China  was  selected  by  fur  traders,  by  circuitous  traders  at 
South  American  ports,  and  occasionally  by  "out  of  season" 
vessels  in  the  direct  trade  with  Canton.  The  monsoon 
changed  about  the  first  of  November  in  the  China  Sea, 
making  difficult  the  direct  approach  to  Canton  from  the 
South.  Those  vessels  therefore  which  did  not  fall  in  with 
the  course  of  the  monsoons  and  the  general  tide  of  trade  at 
Canton,  and  arrived  in  the  winter,  or  departed  in  the  sum- 
mer, often  chose  to  effect  their  approach  to  or  departure 
from  the  coast  of  China  by  way  of  the  Pacific  route. 


36  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  value  of  ginseng  as  an  article  of  exchange  at  Canton 
was  quickly  proven  to  have  been  over-estimated.  The  fur 
trade  sprang  up  to  take  its  place  and  to  create  for  itself  an 
even  greater  importance.  As  long  as  the  supply  of  furs 
held  out  and  the  cost  of  collection  was  slight,  they  met  ad- 
mirably the  pressing  need  of  Americans  for  an  article  of 
barter. 

The  fur  trade  falls  easily  into  three  classifications:  the 
furs  which  were  brought  from  the  interior — from  the  region 
of  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Mississippi  Valley — to  the  At- 
lantic ports  and  then  shipped  as  part  of  the  regular  cargoes 
to  Canton;  the  seal-skin  trade  with  the  Falkland  Islands 
and  the  South  Pacific;  and  the  trade  with  the  Northwest 
coast  in  both  land  and  sea  skins.  With  the  continental 
trade  through  the  Atlantic  ports  we  are  little  concerned, 
for  while  the  trade  was  extensive  for  thirty  or  forty  years — ■ 
until  the  European  market  for  furs  offered  better  prices — it 
exerted  no  important  or  distinctive  influence  upon  Ameri- 
can relations  with  the  Far  East.* 

The  seal-skin  trade  appears  to  have  been  begun  inadvert- 
ently. About  the  time  of  the  departure  of  the  Empress  of 
China  from  New  York  and  the  Grand  Turk  from  Salem, 
"Lady"  Haley  of  Boston  sent  her  ship  States  to  the  Falk- 
land Islands  for  sea-elephant  oil  and  furs^^.  The  States  is 
reported  to  have  been  of  the  incredible  size  of  about  1000 
tons.  This  ship  brought  back  13,000  skins  which  were  sup- 
posed to  be  those  of  sea-otter.  The  experimental  character 
of  the  early  trade  with  Asia  is  clearly  revealed  in  the  trans- 
actions which  followed.  The  cargo  of  the  States  proved  to 
be  seal-skins  for  which  there  was  no  known  certain  market. 
They  were  sold  for  a  trifling  sum  in  New  York  and  then 
placed  on  board  the  brig  Eleanora  (Captain  Metcalf )  which 
took  them  to  the  coast  of  India.  Just  why  furs  should  be 
taken  to  such  a  market  is  not  very  apparent.  Captain 
Metcalf  sailed  from  New  York  probably  about  the  same 

*The  American  Fur  Trade  papers  in  the  New  York  Historical  Society  and 
the  University  of  Wisconsin  libraries,  as  well  as  the  testimony  of  the  Americans 
in  Canton,  show  clearly  that  in  the  thirties  of  the  last  century  the  continental, 
like  the  Pacilic  fur  trade  with  China,  had  practically  ceased. 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC  37 

time  Captains  Kendrick  and  Grey  departed  for  the  North- 
west coast.  The  Eleanora  lingered  on  the  coast  of  India  a 
while  and  then  brought  its  cargo  to  Canton  where  it  found 
a  ready  market  in  1788.  It  was  the  first  cargo  of  American 
furs  carried  to  Canton.  The  Eleanora  then  entered  the 
Northwest  coast  trade  and  was  wrecked  a  few  years  later 
at  Macao. 

The  seal-skin  trade  developed  rapidly.  It  was  carried 
on  almost  exclusively  by  the  Americans  in  small  vessels 
with  relatively  small  crews.  The  initial  capital  required 
was  merely  the  cost  of  the  vessel  and  outfit.  The  crew 
slaughtered  the  seals,  skinned  them  and  prepared  the  pelts 
for  market.  When  the  cargo  was  obtained  the  vessel  sailed 
immediately  for  Canton  either  directly  or  by  way  of  the 
Sandwich  Islands.  While  the  trade  lasted,  that  is,  until  the 
seals  were  nearly  extinct,  it  was  probably  the  most  profit- 
able branch  of  the  East  India  trade.  It  was,  however,  both 
ruthless  and  reckless,  and  within  a  generation  the  seals  had 
become  so  scarce  that  it  was  no  longer  profitable.^*'  This 
trade  quickly  lured  the  Americans  from  the  Falkland 
Islands  over  into  the  South  Pacific  and  by  1820  there  were 
relatively  few  good  harbors  in  the  Pacific  south  of  the 
Equator  which  had  remained  unvisited  by  American  ships. 
Over  not  a  few  of  the  Islands  the  American  flag  had  been 
raised, ^'^  or  American  sailors,  shipwrecked,  deserted  or  de- 
serting, were  playing  the  roles  of  either  monarch  or  adviser 
to  the  natives,  after  traditional  Anglo-Saxon  fashion. 

The  Northwest  Coast 

The  resources  of  the  Northwest  coast  for  the  Canton 
trade  were  first  disclosed  to  the  survivors  of  the  last  Cap- 
tain Cook  expedition.  In  1778  Captain  Cook  had  made 
some  surveys  of  the  coast  and  had  landed  at  Nootka  Sound 
where  he  acquired  some  furs  from  the  Indians.  Within  ten 
years  after  Captain  Cook's  visit  to  the  Northwest  coast  no 
less  than  seven  states — Russia,  England,  Portugal,  Spain, 
France,  Austria   (Belgium)   and  the  United  States — were 

46931 


38  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

represented  in  that  region  all,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Austrians  and  Portuguese,  setting  up  some  sort  of  claim  to 
sovereignty  over  the  areas  which  were  found  to  be  so  richly 
productive.  In  the  face  of  such  formidable  prospective 
competition  the  Americans  were  especially  favored  by  the 
handicaps  placed  upon  their  competitors.  Only  the  English 
and  Russian  efforts  to  promote  trade  became  earnest.  The 
English  efforts  were  encumbered  by  the  monopoly  o-f  the 
East  India  Company.  English  vessels  to  the  Northwest 
coast  were  allowed  only  by  special  permission  of  the  Com- 
pany, and  were  required  to  bring  their  cargoes  back  to 
China  and  exchange  them,  not  for  Chinese  produce  which 
could  be  taken  to  England  and  the  Continent,  but  for  specie 
which  must  be  deposited  with  the  East  India  Company. 
For  this  specie  the  Company  would  issue  bills  on  London 
at  twelve  months,  sight.^^  The  Americans,  on  the  other 
hand,  by  barter  at  Canton  were  able  to  get  about  twenty 
per  cent  more  for  their  pelts  and  were  at  the  same  time 
free  to  carry  their  cargoes  wherever  they  pleased,  dispose  of 
their  produce  quickly,  and  by  taking  them  to  the  Continent 
could  make  a  second  turnover  before  returning  to  the 
United  States.  The  restrictions  of  the  Company  monopoly, 
therefore,  practically  eliminated  the  British  traders  from 
the  competition.  The  Russian  trade  was  under  the  handi- 
cap of  being  conducted  far  from  its  base  of  supplies,  and 
the  Russians  were  excluded  from  the  Canton  market,  being 
confined  to  the  overland  trade  with  China.  Thus  the 
Americans  were  in  a  favored  position  which  they  were  well 
able  to  utiUze. 

John  Ledyard's  missionary  work,  further  enriched  by 
the  publication  of  Captain  Cook's  journals,  and  the  reports 
of  the  trade  at  Canton,  bore  fruit  in  1787  in  the  fitting  out 
of  the  Columbia  and  the  Lady  Washington  in  Boston. 
Captain  John  Kendrick,  master  of  the  Columbia,  was  the 
commander  of  this  famous  expedition.  The  instructions  to 
Kendrick  were  to  send  the  sloop  Lady  Washington  to  Can- 
ton as  soon  as  a  cargo  of  furs  had  been  obtained,  while  the 
Columbia  was  expected  to  remain  on  the  coast.     Kendrick 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC  39 

was  particularly  cautioned  not  to  mistreat  the  Tnclians.  His 
wages  were  five  pounds  per  month  and  a  commission  of 
five  per  cent  on  the  net  proceeds  of  the  voyage. ^'^ 

The  Columbia  and  her  tender  made  a  long  voyage  and 
did  not  reach  the  coast  until  too  late  in  1788  to  collect  any 
furs  so  they  spent  the  winter  at  Nootka.  The  following 
summer,  provisions  running  short,  Captain  Kendrick  trans- 
ferred himself  to  the  Lady  Washington  and  sent  the  Co- 
lumbia under  the  command  of  Captain  Robert  Grey  to 
China.  While  Kendrick  remained  on  the  coast  Grey  ex- 
changed his  furs  at  Canton  and  returned  to  Boston  by  way 
of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The  Columbia  was  so  unfor- 
tunate as  to  arrive  in  Boston  when  prices  were  depressed 
and  the  voyage  did  not  achieve  financial  success.  However, 
Captain  Grey  was  sent  out  the  second  time  and  in  May, 
1792,  anchored  in  the  harbor  on  the  coast  of  Washington 
which  bears  his  name,  and  also  discovered  the  mouth  of 
the  Columbia  River,  thus  making  one  of  the  primary  claims 
which  were  later  urged  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  for  the  possession  of  Oregon. 

Captain  Kendrick  appears  to  have  been  the  man  with 
the  imagination.  He  was  so  enamoured  of  the  Northwest 
coast  that  he  began  the  purchase  of  land  at  Nootka  Sound. 
One  tract,  eighteen  miles  square,  he  purchased  from 
Tarasson,  an  Indian  Chief,  for  "two  muskets,  a  Boat's  sail 
and  a  quantity  of  Powder";  another  tract  at  the  head  of 
Nootka  Sound,  nine  miles  around,  was  bought  for  "two 
muskets  and  a  quantitj  of  powder" ;  and  still  another  tract 
eighteen  miles  square  cost  four  muskets,  a  large  sail  and 
some  powder.^*^ 

To  some  of  Captain  Kendrick's  heirs  who  subsequently 
sought  to  realize  on  these  estates,  John  Howell,  who  had 
been  a  clerk  on  the  Columbia,  wrote  supplying  some  inter- 
esting details  of  the  character  of  the  man: 

"I  have  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  most  of  Capt.  Kendrick's 
purchases  on  the  IST.  W.  coast  of  America  and  cannot  flatter  you  with 
any  hopes  of  profit  from  them  even  to  yoUr  great-great-great-grand- 
children.    They  cost  but  little,  it  is  true;  and  when  the  Millennium 


40  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

shall  arrive  and  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  shall  be  at  peace  your 
posterity  may  perhaps  settle  there.  That  Capt.  Kendrick  considered 
his  title  a  good  one  I  have  sufficient  proof  of,  when  one  day  he  told 
the  Commandant  at  Nootka  Sound  that  he  bought  his  territories 
while  other  nations  stole  them;  and  that  if  they  [the  Spanish]  were 
impertinent  he  would  .raise  the  Indians  and  drive  them  from  their 
settlements.  This,  though  a  hold,  was  nevertheless  a  moderate  project 
for  a  mind  like  his.  Two  of  his  favorite  plans  were  to  change  the 
prevalence  of  the  Easterly  winds  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  turn  the 
Gulf  Stream  into  .the  Pacific  by  cutting  a  canal  through  Mexico. 
But  with  all  his  follies  he  was  a  wonderful  man — and  worthy  to  be 
remembered  beyond  the  gliding  hours  of  the  present  generation.  He 
was  stunned  [sici  by  his  appointment  to  the  Columhia.  Empires 
and  fortunes  broke  on  his  sight.  The  passing,  two-penny  objects  of 
his  expedition  were  swallowed  up  in  the  magnitude  of  his  Gulliverjjin 
views.  North  East  America  was  on  the  Lilliputian,  but  he  designed 
N.  W.  America  to  be  on  the  Brobdingnagian  scale." 

An  interesting  illustration  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
trade  with  the  Indians  was  conducted  is  preserved  in  the 
journal  of  Captain  Joseph  Ingraham  of  the  Hope  which 
reached  the  coast  in  1791.  To  his  great  disappointment 
he  found  that  the  cloth  and  trinkets  which  he  had  brought 
out  from  Boston  were  not  greatly  desired  by  the  Indians, 
previous  traders  having  supplied  their  needs.  Ingraham 
ingeniously  met  the  situation  by  having  his  blacksmith  set 
up  his  forge  on  deck  and  fashion  iron  collars,  rings  and 
bracelets  which  became  extremely  popular.  For  one  iron 
collar  he  was  able  to  obtain  three  skins  which  were  worth 
about  $75  at  Canton.  Ingraham  reached  Macao  in  Novem- 
ber where  several  fur  ships  had  already  preceded  him.  Be- 
fore the  end  of  the  year  there  were  at  least  seven  cargoes 
of  furs  placed  on  the  market  including  a  consignment  from 
the  Spanish  Company  at  Manila  and  the  Lady  Washing- 
ton's from  Nootka. 

Washington  Irving,  in  his  "Astoria,"  asserted  that  in 
the  summer  of  1792  there  were  twenty-one  vessels  on  the 
Northwest  coast,  the  greater  part  of  which  were  American 
and  owned  by  Boston  merchants.  Twenty-five  years  later 
Thomas  H.  Perkins  of  Boston,  who  had  engaged  in  the  trade 
very  extensively,  stated :  "We  formerly  calculated  that  the 
collection  of  sea-otters  purchased  by  the  American  ships 
annually  was  about  14,000  furs,  the  value  of  them  in  China 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC  41 

may  be  averaged  at  twenty-five  dollars  each — making  an 
aggregate  of  $350,000;  the  trade  employed  from  six  to  ten 
ships  from  200  to  300  tons."  ^^  Perkins  complained  that 
the  trade  had  already  fallen  off  to  less  than  a  quarter  of 
its  former  value,  due  to  Russian  competition.  About  the 
same  time  William  Sturgis  wrote  that  he  had  been  on  the 
coast  in  company  with  as  many  as  sixteen  American  vessels. 
Such  figures  serve  to  show  how  very  small  this  trade  was 
even  in  its  most  prosperous  days,  but  they  also  show,  when 
studied  in  the  light  of  the  American  exports  from  Canton 
which  were  paid  for  in  furs  that  the  trade  was  exceedingly 
profitable  in  proportion  to  the  capital  invested. 

The  fur  trade  was  supplemented  at  an  early  date  by 
partial  cargoes  of  sandal-wood  from  the  Sandwich  Islands 
and  other  places  in  the  Pacific,  and  by  the  trade  in  beche 
de  mer,  only  a  part  of  which  passed  through  Manila. 

The  seal-skins  brought  to  Canton  from  the  South  Pa- 
cific from  1805  to  1834  were  reported  as  amounting  to 
nearly  1,800,000,  the  valuation  of  which  msiy  be  placed 
most  conservatively  at  $3,500,000.  Sea-otter  pelts  from 
the  Northwest  coast  during  the  same  period  amounted  to 
about  160,000,  or  at  least  $4,000,000.  The  value  of  the 
land  skins  shipped  directly  from  Atlantic  ports  was  prob- 
ably less  than  either  of  these  items.  The  value  of  the 
entire  fur  trade  before  1805  can  only  be  guessed  at.  The 
entire  fur  trade  of  the  United  States  from  all  sources  with 
Canton  from  its  beginning  until  its  end  soon  after  1830 
may  be  placed  at  between  $15,000,000  and  $20,000,000.-2 
The  value  of  the  trade  when  the  bartered  China  products 
were  transferred  to  Europe  or  the  United  States  and  sold 
would,  of  course,  show  a  very  great  increase  over  the  value 
in  Canton.  The  value  of  the  exports  from  the  United 
States  to  the  Northwest  coast  in  the  twenty-eight  years 
from  1789  to  1817  averaged  annually  about  $163,000.  No 
known  figures  afford  a  sound  basis  for  exact  statements; 
all  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  trade  was  of  the  utmost  value 
to  the  young  nation  at  a  time  when  vessels  and  crews  were 
easily  obtained  and  Spanish  dollars  were  scarce. 


42  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Unlike  the  trade  in  the  South  Pacific,  that  with  the 
Northwest  coast  left  a  permanent  mark  in  the  establish- 
ment of  a  claim  for  Oregon  Territory,  in  the  settlement  of 
Astoria  in  1811,  and  also  in  the  development  of  a  port  at 
I  Honolulu.  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  by  1832  Ameri- 
cans had  not  only  visited  most  of  the  Pacific  Islands,  but 
had  actually  established  themselves  for  longer  or  shorter 
periods  at  no  less  than  seven  points :  Sandwich  Islands, 
(1787;  Nootka  Sound,  1788;  Marquesas,  1791;  Fanning, 
'1797;  Fifi,  1800?;  Galipagos,  1832;  and  Peel,  1832.  Indeed, 
this  list  might  be  greatly  expanded  were  one  to  count  every 
point  where  Americans  were  known  to  have  been.  The 
significance  of  the  list  is,  however,  not  in  its  length  but  in 
its  shrinkage  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  decades,  and  in 
its  lack  of  influence  on  the  development  of  the  United 
States.  American  interest  gravitated  into  the  North  Pa- 
cific; whale  fisheries  took  the  place  of  the  Northwest  coast 
trade  and  sustained  the  development  of  an  American  set- 
tlement at  Honolulu, 

An  American  agent  for  commerce  and  seamen  was  ap- 
pointed at  Honolulu  in  1820.  American  missionaries  had 
already  arrived.  The  Sandwich  Islands  was  an  object  of 
lively  interest  to  American  trade  and  philanthropy.  It 
was,  however,  until  the  American  nation  had  crossed  the 
continent,  reached  the  Pacific  Coast,  and  opened  up  trade 
with  Japan,  a  lonely  outpost, 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Milburn's    "Oriental    Commerce"    (Ed.    1813). 

2.  Statutes  at  Large,  2 :7C8 

3.  Calcutta  Consular  Letters. 

4.  "Maritime  History  of  Massachusetts,"  by  S.  E.  Morison  (Boston 

and  New  York,  1921),  p.  282. 

5.  3.  Dip.  Cor.,  pp.  773,  766. 

6.  Misc.  Letters  (Dcpt.  of  State). 

7.  Edmund  Roberts  Papers  (Dept.  of  State)  ;  Zanzibar,  the  Island 

Metropolis  of  Eastern  Africa,  by  F.  B.  Pearce,  pp.  133-4. 

8.  House  of  Commons  Sessional  Papers,  1821.     Vol.  7. 

9.  "American    Naval   Vessels    in    the    Orient,"    by    Charles    Oscar 

Paullin.     (Proceedings  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  Institute,  1910). 


THE  PORTS  OF  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC  43 

10.  Batavia  Consular  Letters;  Milburn's  Oriental  Commerce.     (Ed 

1813). 

11.  Despatches  to  Consuls,  Vol.  1,  p.  297. 

12.  Calcutta  Consular  Letters. 

13.  Manila  Consular  Letters. 

14.  Parliamentary   Papers,   1830.     Vol.   5:122;   the   Tan    Kwae'    at 

Canton,  by  an  Old  Eesident  (W.  C.  Hunter)  London,  1882. 
p.  100. 

15.  "Voyage  of  the  Neptune,"  Diary  of  Mr.  Ebenezer  Townsend,  Jr. 

(Papers  of  the  New  Haven  Colony  Historical  Society,  1888. 
Vol.  14.) 

16.  "Voyages  Round  the  World,"  by  Edmund  Fanning  (New  York, 

1833)  gives  many  details  of  this  trade. 

17.  "American  Relations  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East,"  by  James 

Morton  Callahan,  in  Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies. 
Series  XIX.     Nos.  1-3.     (1901.) 

18.  Sessional  Papers,  1821.     Vol.  7. 

19.  Correspondence  concerning   Captain   Kendrick   and   the   Settle- 

ment of  his  Estate.     (Dept.  of  State.) 

20.  Ihid. 

21.  Ihid. 

22.  Fur  trade  statistics   are  to  be  found   in   a  variety  of  sources : 

Pitkin's  "Commerce  of  the  United  States"  (Editions  1816, 
1835);  "Chinese  Repository,"  April,  1835;  Sessional  Papers, 
1821;  Hunt's  Merchants  Magazine,  Vol.  3  (1840). 


CHAPTER  III 
EAKLY  CHINA  TRADE 

Having  in  mind  the  American  vessels  as  they  begin  to 
converge  upon  the  port  of  Canton  from  their  various  routes 
and  with  their  varied  cargoes,  we  may  visuahze  the  early 
trade  at  that  port. 

The  Empress  of  China  arrived  at  Macao  August  23, 
1784,  and  "saluted  the  town."  ^  Having  spent  a  few  days 
in  this  historic  Portuguese-Chinese  port  where  the  French 
and  Swedish  consuls  extended  to  Major  Shaw  and  Captain 
Green  many  courtesies,  the  Ernpr-ess  proceeded  to  WKam- 
poa,  twelve  miles  below  Canton  and  anchored  in  the  river 
where  all  the  foreign  ships  were  required  to  discharge  and 
receive  their  cargoes.  The  Americans  remained  ^our 
months,  setting  sail  from  Whampoa  December  28,  1784. 
A  few  weeks  later  the  Pallas,  a  chartered  ship  already  re- 
ferred to,  departed  for  New  York  with  the  second  cargo 
under  the  care  of  Thomas  Randall,  Shaw's  partner.  T%e 
two  vessels  carried  880,100  pounds  of  tea.  \ 

The  following  table,  which  can  be  regarded  as  only 
approximately  accurate  since  exactness  was  never  a  quality 
of  the  early  Canton  trade  reports,  is  a  fair  index  of  'the 
relative  growth  of  the  trade  before  the  War  of  1812.  -In 
comparing  American  with  British  ships  and  cargoes  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  average  tonnage  of  the  American 
vessels  was  probably  less  than  half  that  of  the  British,  arid 
the  American  cargoes  of  tea  contained  a  larger  proportion 
of  the  cheapest  grades. 

It  will  be  noted  from  the  table  that  the  American  trade 
was  characterized  by  the  most  astonishing  fluctuations  both 
in  the  number  of  vessels  visiting  Canton  and  in  the  quan- 
tity of  their  outward  cargoes.    These  fluctuations  reveal  the 

44 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE 


45 


American,  British,  and  Continental  Clearances  and  Expoktations  of* 
Tea  at  Canton,  Seasons  1784-5  to  1810-11* 


Clearances 

Export  of  Tea  in 

lbs. 

Season 

Amer- 
ican 

British 

Conti- 
nental 

American 

British 

Continental 

1784-5 

2 

14 

16 

880,100  i 

-    10.583.628* 

16,551,000 

178.5-6 

1 

18 

12 

695,000  - 

13.480.691 

15,715,900 

1786-7 

5 

27 

9 

1,181,860 

20.610,919 

10,165,160 

17S7-8 

2 

29 

13 

750.900 

22,096,703 

13,578,000 

178S-9 

4 

27 

11 

1,188,8(K) 

20.141.745 

9,875.900 

1789-90 

14 

21 

7 

3.093.209 

17.991.032 

7.174,200 

1790-1 

3 

25 

7 

743,100 

22.369.620 

2,291,560 

1791-2 

3 

11 

9 

1.863.200 

13.185.467 

4.431,730 

1792-3 

6 

16 

13 

1,538,400 

16.005,414 

7,864,800 

1793-4 

7 

18 

5 

1.974.130 

20,728,705 

3,462,800 

1794-5 

7 

21 

7 

1.438,270 

23,733,810 

4,138,930 

1795-6 

10 

15 

4 

2,819,600 

19,370,900 

2.759.800 

1796-7 

13 

23 

3 

3,450.400 

36,904,200 

2.515,460 

1797-8 

10 

17 

5 

3.100,400 

29.934,100 

2.714,000 

1798-9 

13 

16 

6 

5,674,000 

16.795,400 

4.319.300 

1799-0 

18 

14 

4 

5.665.067 

26,585.337 

1,577,066 

1800-1 

23 

19 

7 

4.762.866 

29.772.400 

3,968,207 

1801-2 

31 

25 

1 

5,740.734 

38.479.733 

185.533 

1802-3 

20 

38 

12 

2,612.436 

35.058.400 

5.812.266 

1803-4 

13 

44 

•> 

2,371.600 

31.801,333 

2.132.666 

1804-5 

31 

38 

3 

8,546,800 

28,506.667 

3,318.799 

1805-6 

37 

49 

4 

11,702,800 

22.810,533 

1.809.466 

1806-7 

27 

58 

8,464,133 

32,683.066 

1,534,267 

1807-8 

31 

51 

2 

6,408,266 

25.347.733 

1,144,266 

1808-9 

6 

54 

— 

1,082,400 

26.335,446 

none. 

1809-10 

29 

40 

— 

9.737,066 

26,301,066 

none. 

1810-11 

12 

34 

— 

2,884,400 

27,163,066 

none. 

*Table  rearranged  from  Melburn's  Oriental  Commerce,  vol.  2.  p.  486  (First 
Ed.),  These  statit^tics.  being  based  on  seasons  rather  than  upon  years,  and 
being  taken  from  Canton  reports,  cannot  be  made  in  every  case  to  correspond 
with  such  departures  and  returns  from  American  ports  as  are  available.  They 
are,  however,   the  most  complete   set  of  figures  known   for   this   period. 

experimental  and  speculative  character  of  the  beginnings 
of  the  trade.  In  the  season  of  1789-90  fourteen  vessels  took 
away  from  Canton  more  than  three  million  pounds  of  tea. 
Such  heavy  imports  into  the  United  States  produced '  a 
glutted  market  and  the  following  year  there  were  only  three 
vessels  and  the  outward  cargoes  from  Canton  amounted  to 
only  about  one  fourth  of  those  of  the  previous  year.  The 
recovery  of  the  trade  which  immediately  followed  is  to  be 
explained  by  the  reexportations  of  tea  from  the  United 
States  to  Europe  which  followed  the  establishment  of  a 


46  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

system  of  drawbacks  in  the  American  customs.  During 
the  remainder  of  the  period  the  American  trade  at  Canton 
was  influenced  immediately  and  directly  by  the  extent  to 
which  it  was  possible  for  the  Americans  to  engage  in  the 
European  trade  during  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Every  varia- 
tion of  the  political  conditions  in  Europe  and  the  American 
relation  to  them  was  directly  registered  in  the  amount  of 
tea,  per  season,  exported  from  Canton  in  American  vessels. 
American  policy  in  Canton  was  therefore  primarily  con- 
cerned with  keeping  open  the  supplies  of  tea  and  the  ave- 
nues of  trade. 

With  these  facts  in  mind  it  is  of  primary  interest  to 
note  the  conditions  under  which  the  trade  at  Canton  was 
being  conducted. 

Macao,  Whampoa  and  Canton 

All  foreigners  in  China  were  strictly  confined  to  three 
localities;  Macao,  the  old  Portuguese  leasehold  under  the 
simultaneous  government  of  both  the  Portuguese  and  the 
Chinese;  Whampoa,  the  anchorage  in  the  Canton  River, 
twelve  miles  below  the  city  where  foreign  vessels  were  re- 
quired to  anchor  and  from  which  they  were  not  permitted 
to  depart  until  the  issuance  of  the  final  'grand  chop'  indi- 
cating that  every  requirement  of  the  Chinese  authorities 
had  been  complied  with;  and,  the  'factories'  or  'hongs* 
outside  the  city  wall  at  Canton. 

Macao  had  three  functions  in  trade.  It  was  the  base 
from  which  the  Portuguese  conducted  their  commercial 
operations,  and  also  the  base  for  a  large  part  of  the  smug- 
gling operations  in  which  all  of  the  foreign  merchants  joined 
impartially.  The  city  was  an  outpost  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment where,  exclusively,  the  permits  to  the  foreign  ships 
to  go  to  Whampoa  were  issued.  Every  foreign  vessel  had  to 
approach  Canton  through  Macao.  The  third  function  of 
Macao  was  to  afi"ord  a  resort  to  the  foreigners  from  Chiton 
in  the  summer  months,  in  times  of  illness,  or  whenever  their 
conduct  at  Canton  was  obnoxious  to  the  Chinese.    Macao 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE 


47 


48  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

was,  for  example,  the  refuge,  though  by  no  means  the  sole 
residence,  of  the  foreign  missionaries.  Foreign  women  who 
came  to  China  were  permitted  to  reside  only  at  Macao. 
The  colony  was  governed  by  Portugal  much  in  the  same 
way  that  Manila  was  governed  by  Spain,  or  as  Batavia  or 
Calcutta,  respectively,  were  governed  except  as  modified 
by  the  tenacious  jurisdiction  insisted  upon  by  the  Chinese 
who  had  never  relinquished  their  sovereignty.  During  the 
summer  the  foreigners  from  Canton  sustained  at  Macao  a 
highly  developed,  ceremonious  and  luxuriant  social  life 
dominated  by  the  British  and  resembling  the  social  life  of 
Calcutta  and  Madras.  In  1832  Edmund  Roberts  reported 
that  the  city  enjoyed  the  reputation  of  being  -  "one  of  the 
most  immoral  places  in  the  world" — a  statement  not  sup- 
ported by  other  testimony.  The  Americans  entered  upon 
this  social  life  in  proportion  as  their  means  and  manners 
allowed.  Until  wealth  crowned  their  labors  their  part  in 
it  was  small. 

Whampoa  was  the  second  barrier  to  Canton.  The  river 
was  not  navigable  to  large  vessels  above  the  anchorage, 
and  the  factories  could  not  have  accommodated  either  all 
the  foreign  population  or  all  the  trade.  The  sailors,  of 
whom  there  were  at  the  height  of  the  season  from  two  to 
three  thousand,  lived  on  the  ships  at  Whampoa  and  visited 
Canton  only  in  small  groups;  they  were,  however,  allowed 
to  go  ashore  at  the  anchorage  where  settlements  had  grown 
up  which  doubtless  merited  the  reputation  which  Roberts 
assigned  to  Macao.  Provision  was  also  made  at  Whampoa 
for  the  repair  and  refitting  of  the  foreign  vessels.  The  lively 
and  varied  scene  at  the  anchorage  never  failed  to  impress 
the  foreigner  on  his  first  visit  to  China.  It  was  the  subject 
of  numberless  descriptions  and  not  a  few  paintings. 

The  first  stage  of  the  commercial  operations  began  at 
Whampoa.  The  vessel  paid  its  port  charges — which  in  the 
case  of  the  American  vessels  was  usually  about  $4000 — a 
sum  which  fell  heavily  upon  the  smaller  craft  for  the  pay- 
ments were  not  graduated  to  vessels  below  400  tons.  A 
linguist  and  a  comprador,  if  not  already  obtained  at  Macao, 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  49 

must  be  taken  at  Whampoa.  The  hong  merchant  who  was 
to  transact  the  business  of  the  vessel  at  Canton  was  also 
secured.  He  immediately  had  the  cargo  transferred  to 
smaller  craft  and  taken  to  Canton  where  it  was  sold  or 
bartered  for  the  return  cargo.  The  hong  merchant  paid 
all  the  inward  and  outward  duties.  The  master  of  the 
vessel  was  thus  reheved  of  all  responsibility  except  the 
care  of  his  ship  and  the  control  of  his  crew,  and  the  super- 
cargo had  only  to  follow  his  goods  to  Canton,  indicate  his 
choices  of  commodities  for  the  return  voyage  and  then 
watch  carefully  that  he  did  not  get  cheated.  Trading  with 
China  thus  became  the  simplest  of  transactions  in  which 
the  comfort  of  the  trader  was  disturbed  only  by  the  thought 
that  it  was  quite  impossible  for  him  to  know  the  extent  to 
which  his  payments  for  government  dues  and  services  ren- 
dered were  extortions  unwarranted  by  law  or  evaded  by  his 
competitor. 

The  factories  were  long  narrow  buildings  of  two  or  three 
stories  in  height  and  extending  back  towards  the  city  wall. 
Goods  were  landed  at  small  docks  and  carried  across  a  park 
or  parade  ground  to  the  front  of  the  factories  which  were 
divided  into  sections  perpendicularly  with  storage  rooms, 
offices  on  the  lower  floor  and  living  quarters  above  for  the 
commission  agents,  supercargoes  and  guests.  Factory  and 
residence  space  was  rented  from  the  merchants  who  owned 
the  hong.  Every  foreigner  coming  to  Canton  had  to  be 
guaranteed  by  some  one  of  the  hong  merchants,  usually  the 
one  who  transacted  the  business  of  the  voyage.  Foreigners 
were  not  permitted  to  enter  the  city  nor  were  they  allowed 
to  leave  the  factory  grounds  either  by  land  or  water  except 
under  very  limited  conditions.  They  could  not  walk  in  the 
country;  they  were,  theoretically,  denied  the  use  of  boats-; 
but  on  occasion,  with  a  suitable  Chinese  guide  and  pro- 
tector, they  might  visit  the  flower-gardens  at  Fati  on  the 
other  side  of  the  River.  The  foreigners  were,  in  fact,  vol- 
untary prisoners. 

By  the  Chinese  Government  the  trade  was  limited  to 
the  hong  merchants,  usually  about  a  dozen  in  number,  who 


50  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

paid  highly  for  their  privilege  and  in  turn  became  surety  for 
the  good  conduct  of  the  foreigners.  These  merchants  were 
organized  into  a  *co-hong'  for  concerted  action  in  fixing 
prices,  for  mutual  protection,  and  for  the  management  of 
the  trade.  Some  of  the  hong  merchants  became  very 
wealthy;  others  experienced  frequent  financial  reverses  due 
either  to  the  enmity  of  the  government  officials  who  levied 
tribute  or  to  their  own  native  instinct  for  speculation  and 
gambling. 

Back  of  the  co-hong  stood  the  provincial  officials,  the 
chief  of  whom  was  the  Viceroy,  representing  the  Emperor. 
Each  official  had  purchased  his  way  to  the  position  he 
occupied  and  then  recouped  himself  from  the  trade.  The 
Imperial  Government  had  only  two  concerns:  that  an  ever 
increasing  amount  of  revenue  be  forwarded  to  Peking;  and, 
that  the  foreigner  be  so  'soothed'  and  controlled  so  that 
foreign  nations  would  have  no  opportunity  of  acquiring  any 
foothold  in  the  Empire,  or  of  advancing  a  mile  further  in 
the  direction  of  the  capital.  The  obligation  resting  iipon 
the  provincial  government  therefore  was  to  keep  Peking 
satisfied  and  at  the  same  time  to  levy  from  the  trade  as 
much  tribute  as  it  would  bear.  The  powers  of  the  Viceroy 
were  very  broad.  His  method  of  governing  the  foreigner 
was  through  the  co-hong.  He  could  make  or  break  the 
Chinese  merchant,  fining,  removing,  even  banishing  him. 
The  foreigner,  in  turn,  as  already  indicated,  was  absolutely 
in  the  hands  of  the  hong  merchant  from  the  day  his  vessel 
came  to  anchor  at  Whampoa  until  he  had  his  return  cargo 
on  board.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment the  system  was  nearly  nigh  perfect.  The  Government 
in  no  way  officially  recognized  the  presence  of  the  foreigner 
and  admitted  him  to  no  direct  intercourse,  and  yet  the 
Government  controlled  the  trader  as  only  despots  can.  The 
ruination  of  the  hong  merchant  involved  the  ruination  of 
the  foreigner  to  whom  the  hong  was  always  in  debt  until 
the  return  cargo  was  safely  on  board  at  Whampoa.  The 
foreigner  had  little  choice  but  to  submit. 

There  was,  on  the  other  hand,  a  recognition  of  the  fact 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  51 

that  injustice  to  the  foreigner  and  encroachments  upon  such 
of  his  rights  as  he  had  not  voluntarily  surrendered,  would 
lead  to  irritation  and  trouble.  The  key-note  therefore  of 
the  relationship  between  the  Chinese  and  the  foreigners 
was  accommodation.  This  word  occurs  with  great  fre- 
quency in  the  literature  of  the  time.  It  became  of  obvious 
advantage  to  everyone  concerned  that  all  relationships  be 
managed  in  such  a  way  as  to  insure  harmony,  which  is 
another  favorite  Chinese  word. 

The  last  resorts  of  the  Imperial  officials  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  their  will  upon  the  foreigners  were  to  stop  the  trade 
and  then,  if  necessary,  to  cut  off  communications  with 
Whampoa  and  Macao,  thus  effecting  the  complete  impris- 
onment of  the  traders.  Since  the  government  recognized 
no  distinction  between  nations  and  might  visit  the  sins  of 
one  merchant  upon  the  entire  body  of  traders  by  stopping 
the  trade,  a  certain  solidarity  of  public  opinion  developed 
which  imposed  upon  each  individual  trader  the  obligation 
to  accept  the  decisions  of  the  majority. 

Conditions  of  American  Trade 

Solidarity  of  interest  transcending  national  lines  was, 
however,  modified  by  certain  stern  facts.  When  a  British 
vessel  came  to  Whampoa,  although  compelled  to  submit  to 
the  uniform  port  and  trade  regulations,  it  came  under  the 
shadow  of  the  East  India  Company — a  very  powerful  or- 
ganization. Until  the  dissolution  of  the  Company  mo- 
nopoly in  1834  the  British  merchant  came  to  Canton  only 
by  leave  of  the  Company  and  remained  only  so  long  as  he 
acted  in  conformity  with  Company  discipline.  While  these 
regulations  and  restraints  operated  greatly  to  restrict  lib- 
erties both  personal  and  commercial,  and  handicapped  the 
British  merchants  in  competition  with  Americans,  they  also 
bound  them  together  with  the  protection  of  a  mighty  com- 
mercial organization  at  their  back.  And  back  of  the 
Company  was  the  British  Government  which  was  vitally 
interested  in  its  success.     The  Company,  in  a  variety  of 


52  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ways,  could  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  Chinese  and  if 
a  trial  of  strength  became  necessary,  the  East  India  Com- 
pany with  its  resources  and  reserves  was  in  a  far  better 
position  than  the  individual  American  merchant,  to  meet 
a  strike  with  a  boycott.  The  Chinese  Government  professed 
entire  indifference  as  to  whether  the  trade  continued  or  not, 
but  the  foreign  trade  of  China,  by  the  time  the  American 
arrived,  was  so  much  a  part  of  the  economic  fabric  of  many 
parts  of  the  Empire  that  the  Government  would  have  found 
the  expulsion  of  the  foreign  trader  very  difficult.  The  East 
India  Company  dominated  the  foreign  colony  at  Canton. 
It  could  not,  however,  count  upon  such  support  from  the 
Americans  as  the  British  residents  were  compelled  to  give. 
The  individual  American  traders,  far  more  than  their  Brit- 
ish competitors,  required  that  the  harmonious  relations  of 
the  trade  be  continued  from  day  to  day.  Disturbances 
meant  relatively  greater  losses  to  Americans  for  their  re- 
serves were  less,  and  long  continued  disturbance  of  the 
trade  would  mean  ruin. 

This  condition  was  somewhat  modified  as  the  Americans 
came  to  build  up  strong  and  well  capitalized  commi'ssion 
houses  and  mercantile  establishments,  and  as  the  trade 
came  into  the  hands  of  a  few  wealthy  firms,  but  it  was 
modified  only  in  degree.  The  Americans  could  not  afford 
to  be  very  self-assertive  or  to  meet  the  arrogance  of  the 
Chinese  with  arrogance  of  their  own.  This  peculiar  situa- 
tion of  the  Americans  controlled  their  conduct,  and  made 
them,  unlike  so  many  of  their  brother  pioneers  on  the  con- 
tinental frontiers  of  America,  a  peculiarly  peace-seeking 
folk. 

Furthermore,  the  Americans  immediately  upon  their 
entrance  into  the  China  trade,  became  very  deeply  involved 
in  credit  transaction  with  the  hong  merchants.  The  Chi- 
nese were  easily  able  to  bring  to  Canton  a  larger  stock  of 
tea  than  the  foreigners,  all  of  whom  suffered  from  the  lack 
of  a  suitable  and  adequate  medium  of  exchange,  could  take 
away.  Notwithstanding  the  stringent  prohibitions  of  the 
government  the  hong  merchants  disposed  of  large  amounts 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  53 

of  their  surplus  goods  to  the  Americans  on  credit.  True, 
this  surplus  was  usually  what  was  left  after  the  Company 
had  made  its  selection,  and  was  inferior,  but  neither  the 
Americans  or  the  Continentals  who  consumed  the  tea  were 
such  connoisseurs  of  tea  as  were  the  British,  and,  besides, 
the  Americans  could  sell  cheaply.  These  credit  accounts  i 
which  were  entirely  dependent  upon  the  good  will  of  the' 
Chinese,  were  an  additional  incentive  to  peace. 

The  Americans  came  to  occupy  a  middle  position  in 
both  the  trade  and  politics  of  Canton.     On  the  one  hand 
were  their  British  brethren  with  whom  their  interest  in 
the  continuance  of  the  trade  with  the  minimum  of  exaction 
and  interference  was  identical,  and  on  the  other  hand  were 
the  Chinese  merchants  whose  good  will  and  prosperity  were 
matters  of  the  utmost  concern  to  the  Americans.    Through- 
out the  pre-treaty  days  in  China  these  three  groups — Eng- 
lish, American  and  Chinese — constituted  the  only  important 
elements  in  the  situation.     The  representatives  of  other 
foreign  nations,  now  less,  now  more  in  number,  counted  for 
little.    In  every  issue  between  the  foreigner  and  the  Chinese\ 
the  important  question  was  whether  the  Americans  would  \ 
find  it  most  to  their  profit  to  stand  with  the  English  or  with   ■ 
the  Chinese.     Indeed,  this  alignment  continued  long  afters 
the  signing  of  the  foreign  treaties,  and  underlay  American  J 
political  as  well  as  trade  policy  for  a  century.    Sometimes 
the  Americans  stood  with  the  British  for  concerted  action, 
but  when  the  concerted  action  proposed  by  the  British 
would  have  a  tendency  to  weaken  the  Chinese  merchants, 
or  when  the  British  adopted  policies  directly  inimical  to 
the  American  trade,  the  Americans  were  disposed  to  sup- 
port the  Chinese.     In  the  face  of  British  arrogance  and 
aggression  the  Chinese  and  Americans  were  allies. 


"•&&' 


The  Americans  and  the  British 

As  may  have  already  been  inferred,  the  relation  of  the 
Americans  to  the  Chinese  at  Canton  was  only  half  the  prob- 
lem.   There  was  also  the  relation  of  the  Americans  to  the 


54  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

representatives  of  the  other  nations.  The  international 
relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire  were  often  second  in  im- 
portance to  the  international  relations  of  the  foreigners  in 
China. 
1  The  Empress  of  China  arrived  at  Canton  at  a  time  when 
I  the  Continental  European  trade  was  on  the  wane.  Portu- 
gal retained  a  shadow  of  her  former  greatness  at  Macao, 
and  Spain,  dwelling  indolently  at  Manila,  carried  on  some 
trade  with  China  by  way  of  the  Pacific  and  South  America, 
but  neither  of  these  nations  was  aggressive  at  Canton.  The 
"Imperialists,"  i.e.,  the  Germans,  still  retained  a  company 
but  it  was  in  charge  of  a  Scotchman  who  was  daily  expect- 
ing instructions  to  close  out  the  business.  French  trade 
also  was  in  a  precarious  situation.  There  was  no  French 
company  at  Canton  although  a  consul  remained,  and  the 
trade  was  being  carried  on  by  private  merchants  and  the 
personal  assistance  of  the  king.  Sweden  and  Denmark  were 
represented  only  by  a  few  private  traders  who  derived  no 
small  part  of  their  profit  by  smuggling  tea  into  England. 

During  the  seasons  from  1784  to  1790  the  total  number 
of  foreign  vessels  at  Canton  was:  Portuguese,  about  14; 
Spanish,  8;  Imperialists,  0;  Swedish,  9;  Danish,  12;  French, 
10.  In  the  same  period  the  Dutch  had  28;  the  English, 
106  Company  and  97  'country'  ships;  and  the  Americans 
had  28. 

Major  Shaw  reported  that  the  Netherlands,  operating 
from  Batavia  as  a  base  through  the  Dutch  East  India  Com- 
pany, was,  next  to  England,  in  the  best  commercial  position 
at  Canton.  But  the  Netherlands  trade  labored  under  the 
handicap  of  a  Company  monopoly  and  was  soon  to  fall  foul 
of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  It  was  never  an  important  factor 
in  China  after  the  Americans  appeared  and  within  a  few 
years,  until  the  restoration  of  peace  in  Europe,  the  Ameri- 
cans inherited  practically  all  of  it. 

To  Great  Britain  the  British  East  India  Company  es- 
tablishment at  Canton  was  the  outpost  of  a  commercial 
empire  which  had  been  steadily  advancing  across  Asia  and 
into  the  Pacific  since  the  Seven  Years'  War  when  France 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  55 

had  been  practically  eliminated  from  India.  To  China 
England  was  bringing  the  accumulated  experience  of  sev- 
eral decades  in  dealing  with  Oriental  trade  and  politics,  and 
the  advantages  of  a  'half-way'  station  in  India  to  which 
the  English  in  China  could  appeal  thus  avoiding  the  delay 
incident  to  communication  with  London. _  Major  Shaw  re- 
corded  in  his  journal  the  opinion  formed  on  the  spot  that 
Great  Britain  apparently  had  the  intention  of  monopolizing 
the  trade  of  China.  The  Americans  feared  that  the  Lord 
Macartney  Embassy  to  Peking  (1793)  had  for  its  secret 
object  the  securing  of  some  monopolistic  or  exclusive  trade 
advantages  from  the  Chinese.  As  early  as  1816,  when  the 
Lord  Amherst  Mission  to  Peking  was  being  projected  it 
was  common  talk  among  the  Americans  at  Canton  that 
ultimately  the  English  would  "take  possession  of  some  place 
and  make  an  establishment  to  suit  their  own  purposes  in 
spite  of  the  Chinese"  ^ — an  expectation  which  was  realized 
twenty-five  years  later  in  the  occupation  of  Hongkong. 

The  Americans  appeared  at  Canton  lacking  almost 
every  advantage  which  had  belonged  to  the  nations  already 
established  in  the  trade.  Between  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
and  China  by  way  of  the  Indian  Ocean  there  was  hardly 
a  single  safe  port  of  refuge  or  of  refreshment  where  the 
Americans  might  let  down  an  anchor  without  permission 
of  Great  Britain  or  of  some  European  power.  Furthermore, 
while  the  other  traders  in  case  of  difficulty  might  fall  back 
on  supplies  and  support  relatively  near  at  hand,  at  Macao, 
Manila,  Batavia,  or  India,  there  was  between  the  Ameri- 
cans at  Canton  and  their  sole  base  of  supplies  a  voyage  of 
at  least  three  and  perhaps  six  months.  In  addition  to  these 
handicaps  was  the  inexperience  and  the  lack  of  capital 
which  characterized  the  initial  adventures. 

The  Americans  needed  friends;  they  could  not  afford  to 
have  any  enemies.  At  Canton  they  inherited  the  friendly 
interest  of  those  European  powers  which  had  looked  with 
favor  upon  the  American  War  of  the  Revolution.  The 
E7npress  of  China  was  introduced  to  Macao  and  Canton 
by  French  traders,^  some  of  whom  had  fought  under  Ad- 


56  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

miral  Grasse  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  and  the  Dutch  were 
equally  friendly.  The  officials  of  the  British  East  India 
Company  were  also  personally  very  cordial  to  Major  Shaw 
on  his  first  visit,  but  subsequently  qualified  their  friendli- 
ness upon  orders  from  the  Company.  ''It  is  true,"  wrote 
Shaw,  "that  the  Court  of  Directors  in  their  instructions  to 
the  supercargoes  the  present  season,  have  enjoined  it  upon 
them  to  use  every  endeavor  to  prevent  the  subjects  of 
Great  Britain  from  assisting  or  encouraging  in  any  shape 
the  American  commerce."  This  was  to  the  Americans  a 
very  serious  matter  as  the  Tory,  Phineas  Bond,  fully  real- 
ized when  he  wrote  to  Lord  Carmarthen  from  America  in 
December,  1787:  "A  very  little  matter  by  way  of  check 
would  unhinge  the  trade  and  completely  damage  all  the 
plans  of  those  engaged  in  it."  ^  So  long  as  the  Americans 
had  reason  to  fear  the  English  as  something  more  than 
commercial  competitors  in  a  perfectly  free  field,  that  is, 
until  after  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812,  there  was  little 
friendliness  between  the  Americans  and  the  English  in 
China.  However,  policy  and  wisdom  required  the  use  of 
forbearance.  As  Ebenezer  Townsend  wrote,  apologetically, 
upon  his  arrival  at  Macao  in  1798,  after  he  had  made  his 
ceremonial  call  upon  the  commodore  of  the  English  ships 
at  Typa:*^  'T  suppose  we  were  under  no  obligation  to  call 
on  the  Englishmen,  but  it  is  the  practice." 

The  Americans,  notwithstanding  the  embarrassments 
due  to  the  previous  political  activities  of  the  European 
powers  in  the  East  and  the  growing  jealousy  of  the  British, 
had  certain  advantages  in  their  youth,  their  small,  less 
costly  and  more  easily  managed  vesselsftheir  freedom  from 
all  suspicion  as  plotters  against  the  Chinese  Empire,  and 
I  their  position  of  political  neutrals  in  the  European  conflicts. 
In  the  ten  years  from  the  season  of  1788-9  the  amount  of 
tea  exported  from  Canton  in  other  than  British  and  Ameri- 
can vessels  declined  from  eleven  to  one  and  one-half  million 
pounds.  The  European  trader  practically  disappeared. 
Meanwhile  the  American  trade  from  Canton  direct  to  Eu- 
rope and  indirectly  through  America  mounted  apace.     In 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  57 

1803  more  than  half  of  the  tea  imported  to  America  was 
reexported  to  Europe^ 

The  character  of  the  American  trade  in  the  period  just 
preceding  the  War  of  1812  may  be  illustrated  from  the 
claims  submitted  by  a  New  York  firm  against  the  Danish 
Government  in  consequence  of  the  capture  of  some  Ameri- 
can vessels  by  Danish  privateers  about  1810.  The  claim 
for  one  vessel  was  listed  as  follows:^ 

Value  of  ship  in  Spanish  dollars $25,000.00 

Goods  shipped  in  Canton  belonging  to  Min- 

turn  and  Champlin   9,851.07 

Cotton  shipped  at  New  York  for  Gothenburg     $4,038.46 

Freight  of  same :  24,706  @  6c 1,482.36 

Insurance  on  4,088  @  10% 403.80  5,924_.62 

Amount  of  freight  of  tea  on  board  belonging 

to  Chinese  merchants  at  Canton,  as  per 

freight  list  and  agreement,  which  would 

have  become  due  had  the  ship  arrived  at 

Gothenburg     38,309.87 

Demurrage  $80  per  day 33,280.00 

Court  charges,  etc 5,000.00 


$117,365.56 


Capt.  Eldridge's  Adventure — 

Invoice  cost  at  Canton   $3,270.92 

■  Insurance  @  6%   196.26 

Insurance — New   York   to   Gothenburg    @ 

121/2% 408.87 

Freight— Canton  to  N.  Y.  and  Gothenburg       1,050.00 

Interest  on  same  for  2  years  @  6% 490.50  5,416.55 

Trimmage  on  goods  belonging  to  Chinese  @ 

5% 1,915.40 


$124,697.61 


In  the  items  of  the  claim  by  the  same  company  for 
another  ship  which  had  been  similarly  captured  we  find: 

"Amount    of    the    cost    of   tea    belonging   to 

Houqua  as  per  invoice $58,005.00 

Premium  of  insurance  of  same  to  N.  Y.  @ 

10%  6,455.00 

Interest  on  cost  of  same  in  Canton  @  15%) ,  .  8,700.75 

Commission  in  New  York,  5% 3,222.50 

$76,373.25 


58  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

In  the  same  cargo  with  Houqua's  consignment  was  one 
from  Consequa,  another  hong  merchant,  for  $32,009. 

From  the  above  exhibit,  which  appears  not  to  have  been 
exceptional,  we  note  the  extent  to  which  the  Chinese  mer- 
chants were  trading  with  Europe  by  way  of  America,  and 
also  have  som_e  insight  into  the  relation  of  the  American 
merchants  to  both  the  Oriental  and  the  Continental  trade. 
The  cargo  of  the  ship  Nimrod,  landed  in  1811  and  sold  in 
Copenhagen  about  September,  1814,  consisted  of  sugar, 
coffee,  almonds,  cream  of  tartar,  blue  and  yellow  nankeens, 
nutmegs,  cloves,  mace,  cassia  and  nankeens.  Out  of  the 
same  cargo  casks  of  rice  and  Buenos  Aires  hides  were  sold 
at  Kiel.  In  short  the  Americans  were  collecting  from 
China,  the  Indian  and  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  from  South 
America,  assortments  of  commodities  and  then  sending 
them  to  Europe  by  transshipment  from  Atlantic  ports,  and 
were  levying  toll  in  the  form  of  profit,  commissions  and 
freight,  at  every  stage  of  the  journey.  These  claims  also 
reveal  how  precarious  were  the  conditions  under  which  the 
trade  was  being  conducted.  The  firm  submitting  the 
claims  had  become  practically  insolvent  because  of  the  cap- 
ture of  their  vessels  by  Danish  privateers. 

The  Human  Element  in  the  Trade 

The  human  element  in  the  early  American  relations 
with  China  was  so  very  important  that  it  is  worth  while  to 
seek  a  clear  understanding  of  it  both  on  the  Chinese  and 
on  the  American  side. 
/  The  Chinese  official  was  uniformly  and  habitually,  dis- 
honest. The  first  American  ship  to  come  to  anchor  at 
Whampoa  was  met  with  demands  for  "sing-songs"  for  the 
hoppo,  that  is,  for  presents  to  the  customs  officer;  no  vessel 
was  ever  free  from  such  demands  until  the  inspectorate  of 
maritime  customs  under  foreign  supervision  was  extended 
to  all  the  ports  after  the  treaties  of  1858.  Chinese  and 
foreigners  alike,  therefore,  lived  in  an  atmosphere  which 
reeked  with  bribery,  and  in  which  within  certain  broad 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  50 

limits,  law  went  to  the  highest  bidder.  The  American 
merchant  had  merely  to  charge  up  these  items  as  a  part 
of  the  cost  of  doing  business.  These  charges  were  so 
manipulated  that  it  was  often  difficult  to  divide  with  cer- 
tainty what  went  to  the  officials  and  what  was  retained  by 
the  hong  merchant  who  in  graft  as  well  as  in  trade  became 
the  intermediary.  Nor  is  it  easy  to  assert  with  confidence 
where  the  fines  imposed  by  the  mandarins  were  merely 
exactions  and  where  they  were  justified.  For  example,  the 
owner  of  the  ship  Lion  of  New  York,  was  charged  $2000 
in  1816  for  a  fine  "imposed  by  the  Hoppo  for  suspicion  of 
smuggling  on  board  ship"  which  Kinqua,  the  hong  mer- 
chant, advised  the  agent  to  pay  without  complaint.*^  In 
general,  it  would  appear  that,  after  all  port  charges  and 
regular  duties  had  been  settled,  the  merchants  according 
to  established  custom,  paid  additional  charges  for  the 
privileges  of  smuggling. 

It  would  be  surprising  to  find  in  an  atmosphere  of  so 
much  dishonesty  that  the  standard  of  commercial  integrity 
was  high.  Opinions  differed  widely  as  to  the  righteousness 
of  the  commercial  codes  at  Canton.  Major  Shaw,  himself 
a  man  of  the  highest  character,  pronounced  the  commercial 
standards  of  the  hong  merchants  as  good  as  those  anywhere, 
not  overlooking  the  fact  that  the  hong  merchants  were  the 
better  for  being  carefully  watched.  Shaw's  partner,  Thomas 
Randall,  complained  bitterly  '^^  of  the  dishonesty  of  the 
Chinese  and,  indeed,  complaints  were  very  common.  In 
the  instructions  to  a  supercargo  in  1815  we  read  that 
"Consequa  is  a  liberal  Chinese,  but  involved  in  debt.  Bab- 
oon you  must  not  have  anything  to  do  with."  And  the 
supercargo  when  making  his  report  the  following  year  re- 
marked: "It  is  unfortunately  the  case  here  that  there  is 
no  man  to  be  relied  upon  but  Houqua  and  he  has  too  much 
business."  Houqua,  it  was  asserted,  charged  more  but  he 
was  reliable  both  as  to  time  and  as  to  quality.  Indeed, 
Houqua's  character  was  so  well  known  in  America  that 
teas  bearing  his  chop  sold  at  superior  prices. ^^ 

As  for  the  character  of  the  Americans,  again  accounts 


60  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

differ.  Probably  no  generalization  for  more  than  a  very 
brief  number  of  years  could  safely  be  made.  In  the  track 
of  Shaw  and  Randall  came  a  few  adventurers,  some  by  way 
of  India,  some  from  the  Northwest  coast,  who  were  not  to 
be  trusted.  As  late  as  1815  it  as  asserted  that  only  Perkins 
and  Company,  whose  agent  was  the  young  John  P.  Cushing, 
and  Philip  Ammidon  were  reliable.  As  typical  of  the 
unigue_[30sition  of  confidence  which  Cushing  had  already 
attained  not  only  among  the  Americans  but  also  among 
the  Chinese  we  may  cite  a  contract  between  an  American 
supercargo  and  a  hong  merchant  in  which  the  latter  agreed 
to  sell  "500  chests  of  new  Hyson  tea  to  be  put  on  board 
ship  Lion  at  Whampoa  at  my  risk  and  expense  within  two 
months  from  this  time,  said  Law  to  pay  me  the  market 
price.  ...  If  the  quality  and  price  cannot  be  agreed  be- 
tween said  Law  and  myself  .  .  .  Mr.  J.  P.  Cushing's  opin- 
ion shall  be  binding."  ^- 

In  the  estimation  of  the  British  merchants  the  commer- 
cial character  of  the  Americans  was  low  ^'^  but  this  estimate 
comes  from  men  who  were  feeling  acutely  the  increasing 
competition  of  the  American  trade.  With  the  establish- 
ment of  regular  commission  houses  at  Canton  whose  com- 
mercial relations  were  continuous  from  year  to  year,  the 
quality  of  the  Americans  appears  to  have  steadily  improved 
until  the  adventurer  without  reputation  to  maintain  or 
character  to  lose  was  all  but  eliminated. 

The  character  of  the  trade,  the  conditions  at  once  des- 
potic and  yet  lawless,  demanded  the  general  acceptance  of 
a  conventional  code — it  would  not  have  passed  for  scrupu- 
lous honesty  outside  of  Asia — which  would  regulate  con- 
tacts and  prevent  conflicts.  If  it  be  admitted  that  neither 
foreigner  nor  hong  merchant  was  more  honest  than  ex- 
pediency demanded,  it  must  be  remembered  that  at  least 
a  moderate  degree  of  honesty  in  every  community  is  essen- 
tial to  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  peace  was  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  Chinese  and  foreigner  alike.  A 
disturbance  of  the  peace  was  the  cardinal  sin  for  it  meant 
a  diminution  of  profits. 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  61 

The  personal  relations  of  the  Chinese  and  Americans 
_came  to  be  those  of  mutual  respect  and  even,  in  many  cases, 
of.  affection. ^^  The  Americans  were,  for  the  most  part, 
Yankees  who  had  been  reared  in  the  ignorance  of  a  color 
question,  and  who  came  to  China  directly  and  not,  as  the 
other  foreigners,  through  India  and  Malaya,  where  the  for- 
eigner had  asserted  a  color  supremacy  and  the  native  had 
accepted  it.  The  Chinese  are  by  nature  wholly  unlike  the 
Malay  or  the  natives  of  India,  in  that  they  demand  by 
their  personal  dignity  and  willingness  to  resort  to  methods 
of  non-intercourse,  the  respect  of  those  who  deal  with 
them.  The  Americans  were  willing  from  the  outset  to 
grant  this  respect;  the  other  foreigners  were  not.  The 
Americans  were  thus  again  left  in  a  preferred  position  in 
the  regard  of  the  Chinese  and  at  a  time  when  personal 
relationship  counted  for  so  much.  They  were  able  to 
capitalize  this  good  will  and  make  it  yield  dividends. 

So  long  as  the  American  merchant  in  China  met  his 
foreign  competitor  unaccompanied  by  the  strong  arm  of  a 
European  government,  the  American  held  the  advantageous 
position.  The  moment  the  foreign  government  intervened 
the  American  was  placed  under  a  handicap,  for  while  per- 
sonal relations  counted  with  the  Chinese  in  times  of  peace, 
in  the  face  of  the  threat  of  force,  the  Chinese  with  rare 
exceptions  yielded  to  his  threatener.  Perhaps  it  is  not  too 
much  to  conclude  that  American  interests  in  China  were 
never  again  in  such  good  shape  as  they  were  between  1825 
and  1840  when  all  the  foreign  merchants  were  compelled 
to  compete  with  each  other  in  seeking  peace  and  good  will, 
while  the  Chinese  Government  held  the  whip  hand  over 
them.  To  be  sure  the  Americans,  as  the  others,  were  com- 
pelled to  submit  to  a  certain  amount  of  injustice,  but  the 
injustice  which  the  Americans  suffered  from  the  Chinese 
in  the  days  of  the  early  trade  was  as  nothing  to  the  injustice 
which  the  Americans  suffered  later  when  their  competitors 
brought  to  China  their  armies  and  their  navies  to  support 
their  often  arrogant  and  unjust  pretensions.  American 
trade  in  China  owes  something  of  its  liberties  to  the  force 


62  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  British,  French,  Russian,  German  and  Japanese  arms, 
but  when  the  balance  is  struck  it  is  found  that  in  the  ag- 
gressions of  other  powers  upon  China  the  Americans  have 
lost  far  more  than  they  have  received. 

Major  Samuel  Shaw 

One  item  only  remains  to  be  treated  in  reviewing  the 
position  of  the  early  American  trader  at  Canton — the  rela- 
tion of  the  American  Government  to  its  citizens  in  CJbuiLa. 

The  China  trade  of  the  United  States  at  the  outset  was 
recognized  as  valuable,  was  heavily  protected  and  practi- 
cally subsidized.  This  system  did  not  disappear  until  1832 
wEen  duties  on  tea  were  removed.  But  to  the  East  India 
merchant  who  lived  in  the  East  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  could  offer  no  protection  or  assistance.  Upon 
his  return  from  his  first  voyage  Major  Shaw  made  a  report 
of  the  conditions  at  Canton  and  the  prospects  for  American 
trade  to  John  Jay,  "the  Honorable,  the  Minister  of  the 
United  States  for  Foreign  Affairs"  of  the  Continental  Con- 
gress. Acting  upon  the  recommendation  of  Jay  the 
Congress  "elected"  Shaw  to  the  position  of  consul  "at 
Canton  in  China."  The  election  was,  however,  more  of  a 
tribute  to  Major  Shaw,  personally,  than  an  effort  to 
promote  the  trade.  Shaw  had  a  distinguished  record  in 
the  Revolution.  "Although  neither  salary  nor  perquisites 
are  annexed  to  it,"^*^  wrote  Jay  to  Shaw,  "yet  so  distin- 
guished a  mark  of  confidence  and  esteem  of  the  United 
States  will  naturally  give  you  a  degree  of  weight  and  re- 
spectability which  the  highest  personal  merit  cannot  very 
soon  obtain  for  a  stranger  in  a  foreign  land." 

Major  Shaw  regarded  the  appointment  conscientiously 
as  an  opportunity  to  render  a  public  service  and  made  two 
subsequent  extensive  reports  as  consul  in  which  he  freely 
placed  his  knowledge  of  the  trade  at  the  disposal  of  any 
interested  fellow  citizen.^*'  By  President  Washington  Shaw 
was  reappointed  and  he  continued  to  serve  until  his  death 
in  1794.    Thomas  Randall,  Shaw's  partner  and  vice-counsel, 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  63 

also  made  an  elaborate  report  to  Alexander  Hamilton, ^^ 
with  special  reference  to  the  use  of  specie  in  the  trade. 

The  next  consul  was  Samuel  Snow  of  Providence  who, 
like  Shaw,  had  first  gone  to  Canton  as  a  supercargo  ^^  and 
then  returned  to  establish  a  commission  agency.  Snow  ar- 
rived in  China  toward  the  end  of  1799  '^^  and  remained 
about  four  years,  becoming  the  first  really  resident  consul. 
He  did  not  interpret  his  duties  so  broadly  as  Shaw  had 
done,  confining  himself,  largely,  to  the  care  of  distressed 
seamen  and  semi-annual  reports  of  the  vessels  and  cargoes 
that  entered  and  cleared.  Snow  left  Canton  at  the  end  of 
1804,  turning  over  the  duties  of  his  ofiice  to  Edward  Car- 
rington  of  Providence  who  succeeded  to  the  position  of 
consul  in  1806.  Carrington  served  for  about  two  years  after 
which  the  office  was  vacant  until  1814.  The  post  was,  how- 
ever, considered  of  some  importance,  for  in  1811  George 
E,  Coles  wrote  to  Mrs.  Dolly  Madison:  "Dear  Cousin: 
.  .  .  While  I  was  in  Philadelphia  some  of  the  friends  of 
B.  C.  Wilcocks,  with  whom  I  became  slightly  acquainted, 
requested  me  to  recommend  him  as  a  fit  person  to  be  made 
consul  for  Canton  in  China."  ^^  Wilcocks  received  the 
appointment  just  before  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812  and 
served  for  about  seven  years.  Throughout  this  period  and, 
indeed,  until  1854,  the  consul  was  merely  a  merchant  whose 
only  compensation  was  the  fees  of  the  office,  the. dignity 
of  the  position,  and  such  information  as  to  the  business 
transactions  of  his  competitors  as  would  become  available 
fo  him  because  of  his  access  to  official  reports. 

No  provision  whatever  was  made  to  obtain  for  the  con- 
sulate the  services  of  an  interpreter.  Indeed,  the  American 
trade  at  Canton  was  conducted  for  more  than  forty-five 
years  before  there  was  even  one  American  citizen  there 
who  could  read,  write,  understand  or  speak  Chinese  with 
any  certainty.  So  keenly  did  Wilcocks  feel  this  deficiency 
of  the  Americans  at  Canton,  as  well  as  their  need  for  a 
resident  physician,  that  in  1818  he  offered,  at  his  own  ex- 
pense, to  educate  a  suitable  young  man  to  become  an  inter- 
preter for  the  consulate.^^    He  proposed  to  pay  his  expenses 


64  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

at  the  Anglo-Chinese  school  at  Malacca  which  the  mis- 
sionary William  Milne  had  established,  and  suggested  that 
a  young  physician  would  be  the  most  useful.  Permission 
thus  to  make  use  of  this  school  had  been  secured  through 
Dr.  Robert  Morrison,  whose  missionary  career  in  China 
had  been  begun  at  the  American  consulate  under  Edward 
Carrington. 

The  American  share  in  the  inauguration  of  Dr.  Mor- 
rison's famous  missionary  labors  is  worthy  of  note  as  sup- 
plying another  indication  of  the  difference  between  the 
attitude  of  the  British  and  the  Americans  towards  the 
Chinese.  Dr.  Morrison  had  been  refused  permission  to 
take  passage  from  London  for  China  in  an  East  India  Com- 
pany ship  and  therefore  came  to  the  United  States  in  1807. 
From  New  York,  May  12,  1807,  Morrison  sailed  for  China, 
carrying  a  letter  from  Secretary  of  State  Madison  to  Con- 
sul Carrington  "requesting  him  to  do  all  that  he  can,  con- 
sistently with  the  interests  of  his  country"  ^-  to  assist  the 
missionary.  For  several  months  after  his  arrival  in  China 
Morrison  lived  in  the  factory  of  Mr.  Carrington  and  was 
known  as  an  American  because  he  did  not  dare  to  acknowl- 
edge his  British  citizenship.  The  British  had  brought  from 
India  a  policy  which  involved  the  withholding  from  the 
Chinese  such  benefits  of  the  western  world  as  would  enable 
them  to  meet  the  foreigners  on  equal  terms.  The  Ameri- 
cans, from  the  earlier  days,  never  shared  in  such  a  policy, 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Shaw's  Journal  Is  incomparably  the  best  contemporary  American 

source  for  the  beginnings  of  American  trade  in  China. 

2.  "Embassy  to  the  Eastern   Courts  of  Cochin-China,   Siam,   and 

Muscat,"  by  Edmund  Roberts  (New  York,  1837),  p.  1G5. 

3.  William  Law  Papers  (New  York  Pub.  Lib.  Mss.)  Letter  written 

by  Law  to  N.  Y.  correspondents,  Nov.  21,  181(5. 

4.  3  Dip.  Cor.  pp.  767-8,  Sept.  1,  1785,  John  Jay  to  Continental 

Congress,  recommending  that  Jefferson  at  Paris  be  instructed 
to  express  the  appreciation  of  the  American  Government  for 
the  courtesies  shown  to  Major  Shaw  at  Canton.  For  the  inter- 
esting subsequent  correspondence  which  took  place  in  Paris, 
see  Americanistes  et  Frangais  a  Canton  au  XVIIP  Siecle,  by 


EARLY  CHINA  TRADE  65 

Henri  Cordier,  in  Journal  de  la  Societe  des  Americanistes  de 
Paris  (Paris,  1898).  M.  de  Vergennes,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  seized  the  opportunity  thus  afforded  to  protest  against 
the  protective  measures  inimical  to  French  commerce  which 
had  been  adopted  by  various  American  states. 

5.  Letters  of  Phineas  Bond. 

6.  Voyage  of  the  Neptune. 

7.  Pitkin's  "Commerce  of  the  U.  S."  (1816). 

8.  William  Law  Papers. 

9.  Ihid. 

10.  Alexander  Hamilton  Papers,  Vol.  12,  pp.  1551ff;  Aug.  14,  1Y91, 

Randall  to  Hamilton   (Lib.  of  Congress). 

11.  William  Law  Papers. 

12.  Ihid. 

13.  See,  for  example,  Majoribank's  testimony,  Sessional  Papers,  1821, 

Vol.  7. 

14.  Hunter's    "Fan   Kwae"    embodies    the   prevailing   spirit   of   the 

Americans  towards  the  Chinese. 

15.  3  Dip.  Cor.  p.  769,  Jan.  30,  1786,  Jay  to  Shaw. 

16.  Appendices,  Shaw's  Journal. 

17.  Alexander  Hamilton  Papers  (see  supra,  Note  10.). 

18.  Kimball's  East  India  Trade  of  Providence. 

19.  Canton  Consular  Letters. 

20.  Madison  Papers,  June  10,  1811,  George  E.  Coles  to  Mrs.  D.  P. 

Madison  (N.  Y.  Pub.  Lib.). 

21.  Misc.  Letters  (Dept.  of  State)  July  4,  1818,  C.  J.  Ligersoll  to 

J.  Q.  Adams. 

22.  "Memoirs  of  the  Life  and  Labors  of  Robert  Morrison"  (2  vols. 

London  1849),  Vol.  1,  p.  106ff. 


Uaceu\  G  C 


1  4-  '  '^ 


PART  II 
THE   FIRST  TREATY  WITH  CHINA 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA 

/   The  early  American  policy  in  Asia,  meaning  merely  the    ' 

/policy  of  early  Americans  for  there  was  no  other  policy,  was 

I  purely  negative  in  its  origins.    It  appeared  only  when  there 

ywas  opposition  or  obstruction  to  the  trade.     Where  trade 

was  free  there  was  no  policy.    Where  there  was  a  policy  its 

weight  was  in  direct  ratio  to  the  desire  of  the  Americans 

for  the  trade. 

There  never  was  an  American  political  policy  in  the 
Indian  Ocean.  The  trade  was  either  free  or  was  open  to 
Americans  on  equal  or  on  more  favorable  terms  than  those 
enjoyed  by  their  competitors,  England  took  possession  of 
the  Isle  de  France  in  1810.  The  War  of  1812  destroyed 
the  trade  with  British  India,  and  the  tariff  of  1816  put  a 
curb  on  its  reestablishment.  Economic  necessity — the  gen- 
eral poverty  of  the  States  and  the  need  for  Indian  produce — 
had  forced  the  Americans  into  the  Indian  Ocean  trade,  and 
the  steady  growth  of  wealth  and  industry  in  the  United 
States  reduced  the  necessity  for  such  adventures.  The 
profits  which  at  the  beginning  had  been  steadier  and  more 
certain  than  those  in  the  China  trade,  declined  and  suffered 
in  the  competition  with  British  produce.  The  United 
States  had  little  produce  to  send  to  India  and  as  for  specie, 
it  yielded  a  better  return  at  Canton.  Furthermore,  the 
China  trade  had  the  advantage  of  the  protection  and  as- 
sistance of  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  The 
term  'East  India  trade'  came  more  and  more  to  mean  the 
Canton  trade. 

Because  there  had  been  opposition  and  obstruction  to 
the  American  trade  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  there  had  been  a 
policy  in  those  regions.    However,  it  was  the  purely  nega- 


70  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

tive  one  of  keeping  the  trade  routes  and  the  markets  open. 
The  Americans  declined  to  be  excluded  from  the  Northwest 
coast  and  would  have  opposed  any  curtailment  of  their 
rights  at  Honolulu  had  any  measures  of  obstruction  been 
adopted.  But  the  fur  trade  ceased  to  be  a  factor  in  the 
Far  Eastern  trade  after  1820.  The  whale  fisheries  entered 
the  North  Pacific  but  they  did  not  immediately  create  a 
new  link  in  the  chain  of  commerce  with  Asia.  By  the  fur 
trade  Americans  had  been  taught  to  look  upon  the  Pacific 
Ocean  and  the  Sandwich  Islands  in  relation  to  the  Asiatic 
4rade  ^  but  it  was  not  until  the  settlement  of  the_Pacific 
Coast  of  the  United  States,  the  development  of  Shanghai 
and  the  opening  of  Japan,  that  American  policy  in  Asia 
came  again  to  include  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Meanwhile 
American  policy  in  the  Far  East  merely  meant  the  policy 
^of  the  Americans  at  Canton. 

'J]he  Americans  at  Canton  had  but  one  desire — to  keep 
the  trade  open  to  Americans  on  terms  as  favorable  as,  or 
more  favorable  than,  those  enjoyed  by  their  competitors 
who  were  chiefly  British.  A  brief  review  of  the  trade  from 
the  close  of  the  War  of  1812  until  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
between  the  British  and  the  Chinese  in  1839  is  therefore 
in  order. 

Review  of  Trade:   1815-1839 

The  period  is  characterized  by  three  facts:  the  consoli- 
dation of  commerce  in  the  hands  of  a  very  few  wealthy 
firms  and  commission  houses ;  the  establishment  of  a  system 
of  exchange  by  which  bills  on  London  were  substituted  for 
specie;  and  the  introduction  of  manufacti^red  goods,  first 
British  and  then  American,  which  altered  the  relations  of 
the  Americans  to  the  China  trade  and  made  them  begin  to 
regard  China  as  a  limitless  market  in  which  to  sell  rather 
tKan  as  a  limited  market  in  which  to  buy. 

The  earliest  American  trade  at 'Cant'on  had  been  con- 
ducted by  supercargoes  who  travelled  with  the  vessels.  The 
next  step  in  commercial  organization  was  the  establishment 
of  permanent  firms  which  either  dealt  on  commission  or 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    71* 

represented  directly  some  mercantile  house  the  headquar- 
ters of  which  was  in  the  United  States.  Shaw  and  Randall 
beginning  as  supercargoes,  established  a  firm  to  engage  in 
commission  business,  as  well  as  in  the  transaction  of  their 
personal  ventures.  The  Columbia  and  the  Lady  Washing- 
ton  when  setting  out  for  the  Northwest  coast  were  con- 
signed to  Shaw  and  Randall.  This  firm,  however,  was  soon 
dissolved  because  of  the  death  of  Shaw,  and  seems  never 
to  have  thoroughly  established  itself.  Samuel  Snow  of 
Providence  who  succeded  Shaw  as  consul  established  him- 
self in  Canton  about  1800  as  a  resident  commission  agent, 
presumably  giving  special  attention  to  the  requirements  of 
the  Providence  merchants.  He,  also,  had  begun  as  a  super- 
cargo on  the  Ann  and  Hope  of  Providence  in  1795.  Thomas 
H.  Perkins  and  Company  of  Boston  established  a  branch  in 
1803,  in  charge  of  John  P.  Cushing,  a  youth  of  sixteen. 
This  firm,  while  primarily  transacting  the  Perkins  business, 
also  engaged  in  a  commission  trade.  B.  C.  Wilcocks  of 
Philadelphia  became  a  resident  commission  agent  and  in 
time  became  the  third  American  consul.  Daniel  Stansbury 
of  Baltimore  became  agent  for  the  New  York  firm  of 
Minturn  and  Champlin.  Nicholas  G.  Ogden  and  Cornelius 
Sowle  represented  John  Jacob  Astor.  Philip  Ammidon  with 
Providence  connections,  and  Samuel  Russell  of  Middle- 
town,  Connecticut,  who  had  begun  commercial  life  as  a 
supercargo  out  of  Providence  appeared  as  residents  at 
Canton.  Thus  tlie  commercial  life  of  the  American  com- 
munity developed. 

Gradually  the  supercargo  disappeared  from  the  Ameri- 
can vessels  and  his  work  was  done  by  the  resident  commis- 
sion agent.  One  hears  very  little  of  supercargoes  after 
1815.  Following  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812  further  or- 
ganization and  differentiation  of  the  trade  took  place.  The 
firm  of  Samuel  Russell  and  Company,  of  which  the  partners 
were  Russell  and  Ammidon,  Edward  Carrington,  Cyrus 
Butler,  and  B.  and  T.  C.  Hoppin  of  Providence,  was  formed 
in  December,  1818,  the  two  first  named  being  designated 
to  represent  the  firm  in  Canton  for  five  years.^    At  the  end 


72  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  this  period  the  firm  was  reorganized  under  the  name  of 
Russell  and  Company,  with  the  approval  and  help  of  the 
house  of  Perkins,  which  retired  from  Canton  three  years 
later.  The  Russell  house  was  further  consolidated  by  the 
incorporation  of  some  smaller  firms  and  came  to  occupy  a 
financial  position  in  China  comparable  with  that  of  the 
famous  British  firms.  For  many  years  it  handled  only  a 
commission  business  although  many  of  the  partners  acting 
as  individuals,  were  also  merchants.  Olyphant  and  Com- 
pany at  Canton  was  organized  in  1828  out  of  the  ruins  of 
the  firm  of  Thomas  H.  Smith  by  D.  W.  C.  Olyphant  who 
had  served  an  apprenticeship  in  New  York,  Baltimore,  and 
then  in  Canton  as  the  supercargo  and  agent  of  Smith. -"^  This 
firm  came  to  occupy  a  position  second  only  to  that  of  Rus- 
sell and  Company,  until  Augustine  Heard,  leaving  the  Rus- 
sell firm,  established  the  house  which  long  bore  his  name. 
The  only  other  important  firm  was  that  of  W.  S.  Wetmore. 
It  is'  significant  that  out  of  the  much  larger  number  of 
American  merchants  who  came  to  and  departed  from  Can- 
ton, only  these  firms,  Russell,  Olyphant,  Heard  and  Wet- 
more,  survived  the  competition  of  decades.  Some,  like 
John  C.  Cushing,  retired  with  wealth ;  others  failed  grandly 
and.  left  only  pitiful  derelicts. 

/  The  effect  of  this  consolidation  of  American  in_terests 
was  to  stabilize  business,  and  to  increase  the  influence  of 
the  surviving  merchants  in  their  dealings  with  both  the 
Chinese  and  with  the  other  foreigners.  "'~~ 

The  establishment  of  a  system  of  exchange,  by  which 
bills  on  London  were  substituted  for  specie,  came  before 
1830  as  a  result  of  the  increased  commercial  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  England,  and  the  growth 
of  the  opium  trade. 

A  part  of  the  American  trade  with  China  was  financed 
from  London  even  before  1800.  Shortly  after  1815  Ameri- 
can merchants  began  to  buy  British  manufactured  goods, 
chiefly  cottons,  in  the  English  market,  and  to  take  them  to 
China  where  they  were  able  to  sell  them  cheaper  than  the 
East  India  Company."*    Agents  of  the  Company  complained 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    73 

that  the  American  goods  were  not  only  of  mferior  quality, 
even  those  which  had  been  rejected  by  the  Company  in 
London,  but  that  the  Americans  even  went  so  far  as  to 
adopt  a  'chop'  (trade-mark)  so  closely  representing  that 
of  the  Company  as  to  deceive  the  purchaser.  These 
charges  could  hardly  be  controverted.  The  effect  of  this 
trade  in  British  manufactured  goods  was  to  make  London 
a  clearing  house  for  a  considerable  amount  of  European 
and  China  trade  which  had  formerly  been  settled  either  in 
Canton  or  Europe  by  payments  of  specie.  Meanwhile  the 
opium  trade  from  India  to  China  increased  to  the  point 
where  China  was  consuming  more  foreign  produce  than  the 
value  of  the  tea,  silks,  etc.,  which  the  foreigner  was  taking 
out  of  China.  China  settled  the  balance  against  her  in 
silver.  The  Empire  had  becf)me,Jb^^mean§.,^Q£.jQp,ium,  a  j 
buying  iiioic  iliaii  a  selling  nation.  More  and  more  the 
Amei'icans  came  to  Canton  not  with  specie  but  with  bills 
on  London  which  they  disposed  of  in  return  for  their  out- 
ward cargoes.  In  other  words,  by  taking  out  Chinese 
produce,  and  settling  the  account  in  London,  they  helped 
the  Chinese  to  adjust  the  balance  of  trade.  Importation 
of  specie  from  America  was  reduced  80  per  cent  in  the  years 
1831-40,  over  the  previous  decade.^ 

The  influence  of  this  new  development  of  the  trade  was 
in  the  direction  of  the  identification  of  American  and  Brit- 
ish interests  in  China.  There  was,  however,  a  check  on  this 
influence. 

The  import  of  foreign  merchandise  in  American  vessels 
into  China  reached  its  highest  point  in  1825  when  it  was 
valued  at  nearly  $5,500,000.  In  that  year  the  value  of  the 
domestic  produce  sent  from  the  United  States  to  China  was 
$160,000  although  three  years  before  the  sum  had  ap- 
proached half  a  million.  In  1826  the  invoices  show  the 
beginning  of  the  exportation  to  China  of  American  cottons 
to  the  extent  of  about  $15,000.'^  This  trade  in  American 
domestics  increased  steadily  and  in  ten  years  had  risen  to 
$170,000.  In  1838  it  passed  the  half  million  dollar  mark. 
Meanwhile  the  Americans  were  bringing  away  from  China 


^ 


74  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

less  and  less  nankeens  and  silks,  and  were  also  taking  less 
and  less  British  manufactured  goods  into  China. 

American  domestics,  coarse  grades  of  white  and  printed 
cottons,  grew  in  popularity  and  successfully  met  the  British 
competition.  In  nine  months  from  October  1,  1842,  to  July 
1,  1843,  the  United  States  exported  to  China  domestic 
produce  to  the  value  of  more  than  $1,700,000,  and  two  years 
later  passed  the  two  million  dollar  mark;  meanwhile  the 
Americans  had  reduced  their  importations  of  British  and 
European  produce  into  China  to  less  than  $200,000.  True 
the  Americans  were  still  taking  from  China  very  much  more 
produce  than  they  were  bringing  to  it ;  in  the  decade  ending 
with  1840  the  imports  into  China  amounted  to  not  quite 
$13,000,000  and  the  exports  from  China  were  $61,000,000. 
But  the  Americans  had  had  a  glimpse  of  Asia  as  a  market 
for  American  manufactured  goods,  and  that  glimpse  in- 
fluenced the  policy  of  Americans  and  guided  the  formation 
of  the  policy  of  their  government.'^ 

After  1840  American  policy  in  Asia  was  always  directed 
with  an  eye  to  the  future — to  the  day  when  Americans 
would  supply  the  seemingly  limitless  markets  of  the  East. 
Meanwhile  the  doors  to  these  markets  must  be  kept  open. 
Tins  was  as  much  the  policy  of  Americans  in  1840  as..iLwas 
American  policy  eighty  years  later. 

One  other  fact  of  the  trade  development  may  be  men- 
tioned although  its  importance  at  the  time  was  greatly 
overestimated.  At  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812  the  Ameri- 
cans resumed  their  China  trade  with  a  rush.  The  volume 
of  trade,  exports  and  imports  together,  mounted  from 
$7,000,000  to  about  $19,000,000  in  four  years.  In  the  sea- 
son 1817-8  the  gross  amount  of  the  American  imports  and 
exports  at  Canton  actually  exceeded  those  of  the  British 
East  India  Company,  while  the  American  tonnage  em- 
ployed was  18,000  as  compared  with  21,000  for  the  British. 
But  the  Americans  were  speculating  and  paid  dearly.  The 
tonnage  employed  in  the  decade  ending  with  1840  showed 
an  actual  decrease  over  that  in  the  previous  decade.  The 
total  British  trade  in  1830  was  $43,000,000  as  compared 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    75 

with  $3,500,000  for  the  Americans;  in  1840  the  American 
exports  to  and  imports  from  China  were  only  $7,000,000. 
It  is  obvious  that  American  commercial  relations  with  China 
were  valued  not  so  much  because  of  their  present  returns  as 
for  their  future  possibilities. 

With  these  facts  as  to  the  growth  of  the  trade  in  mind 
we  pass  to  a  consideration  of  the  relation  of  the  American 
Government  to  its  citizens  in  China  from  1800  until  the 
beginning  of  the  agitation  for  a  treaty,  i.e.  after  the  dis- 
solution of  the  East  India  Company  monopoly  in  1834. 

Relation  of  United  States  Government  to  American 
Citizens  in  China 

The  consul  was  not  an  imposing  functionary.  The  com- 
mon affairs  of  the  American  community  were  usually 
ordered  in  what  was  really  a  'town  meeting'  over  which  the 
consul,  as  a  courtesy,  was  asked  to  preside.  The  rights  of 
the  minority  were  amply  safeguarded  in  these  meetings,  for 
the  jndividual  was  subject  to  no  law  save  that  of  expedi- 
ency. The  consul  administered  the  estate  of  the  dead,  dis- 
ciplined mutinous  sailors  and  cared  for  such  of  them  as 
could  not  care  for  themselves,  but  he  lacked  even  the  au- 
thority to  demand  accurate  trade  reports  from  the  captains 
and  supercargoes.  "The  secret  manner  of  transacting  busi- 
ness at  Canton,"  wrote  Samuel  Snow  to  Secretary  of  State 
Pickering  (November  9,  1800)  in  response  to  a  request  for  a 
trade  report,  ''made  it  almost  impossible  to  obtain  any 
accurate  knowledge  of  the  cargoes  in  the  common  way. 
.  .  .  On  that  account  my  note  to  the  different  captains 
bordered  as  closely  on  a  demand  as  the  nature  of  the  thing 
would  admit  of,  and  the  reports  have  come  in  more  full 
than  I  had  even  expected  myself."  The  only  emoluments  of 
the  consular  office  were  the  fees  which,  up  to  1836,  had 
rarely  exceeded  $500. 

The  relation  of  the  consul  to  the  Chinese  authorities 
abounded  in  absurdities.  They  called  the  consul  the  chief 
'tai-pan'  (supercargo).    Theoretically  they  did  not  recog- 


76  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

nize  him  at  all,  and  yet  actually  they  looked  to  hhn  to 
exercise  over  his  countrymen  as  despotic  a  control  as  any 
Chinese  ofl&cial  similarly  placed  would  not  hesitate  to  em- 
ploy. The  chairman  of  the  Select  Committee  of  the  East 
India  Company,  and  the  French  consul,  unlike  the  American 
official,  did  possess  very  extensive  powers  both  judicial  and 
executive.  To  complicate  matters  still  more  the  Chinese, 
reasoning  from  the  analogy  of  their  own  governmental 
practice,  assumed  as  a  matter  of  course  that  the  American 
officials,  like  their  own,  were  corrupt  and  dependent  for 
advancement  and  wealth  upon  methods  such  as  their  own 
officials  uniformly  employed.  Furthermore  the  consul 
shared  the  contempt  with  which  the  Chinese  authorities 
looked  upon  all  traders.  The  Chinese  regarded  men  who 
would  desert  their  homes  and  the  tombs  of  their  ancestors 
to  reside  in  a  foreign  land  for  the  purposes  of  trade  as  singu- 
larly degraded.  A  Chinese  merchant,  similarly  placed, 
would  at  once  be  violating  the  law  and  forfeiting  all  privi- 
leges of  protection  from  his  government. 

The  insecurity  of  the  Americans  during  the  trying  period 
before  1815  led  them  to  petition  Congress  for  ^  more 
efficient  consular  establishment.* 

The  petition  stated: 

"The  consul  of  the  United  States  residing  here  has  not  the  means 
of  being  sufficiently  useful  to  his  countrymen  with  their  intercourse 
with  the  Chinese  Government,  and  of  supporting  the  dignity  of  the 
flag  of  which  he  has  charge;  in  consequence  of  which  it  frequently 
happens  that  impositions  are  placed  upon  the  memorialists  that  are 
avoided  by  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nations  whose  representa- 
tives have  the  means  to  oppose  with  firmness  and  effect  the  first 
attempts  which,  if  successfully  repelled,  are  seldom  renewed ;  but  when 
once  a  new  imposition  has  been  submitted  to,  it  is  considered  an  estab- 
lished custom,  and  demanded  as  a  right  from  the  nation  that  has 
yielded." 

*Thc  date  of  this  petition,  which  is  found  in  the  first  volume  of  Canton 
Consular  Letters,  is  unknown.  From  the  signatures  attached  to  it,  it  would 
appear  that  it  could  not  have  l)een  later  than  1815  and  it  may  have  beeu  pre- 
pared as  early  as  1S()<;.  Dr.  IJobert  Morrison,  who  embarked  for  Cliina  from 
New  York  in  the  spring  of  1807,  mentions  the  movement  then  under  way  to 
secure  better  protection  for  the  consul  at  Canton,  and  two  years  later  President 
Jefferson  received  an  application  from  .fudge  A.  B.  Woodward  wlio  wished  a 
commission  to  represent  the  United  States  diplomatically  In  China,  with  power 
to  negotiate  a  treaty.* 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    77 

The  petitioners  asked  for  a  consul,  unconnected  with  the 
trade,  at  a  salary  of  $3,000  and  residence.  They  also  urged 
the  appointment  of  an  experienced  physician  to  care  for 
the  sailors,  with  the  liberty  to  engage  in  private  practice. 
Allowances  were  also  requested  to  "pay  for  a  linguist  or  for 
the  cost  of  translating  documents. 

To  this  appeal  there  appears  to  have  been  no  response 
from  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

The  nearest  to  an  official  opinion  on  American  policy  at 
this  time  is  to  be  found  in  the  correspondence  of  Thomas 
Jefferson,  at  the  time  of  the  Embargo.  The  incident  also 
throws  some  light  on  the  conditions  under  which  its  China 
trade  in  those  days  was  conducted.  A  Chinese  merchant, 
then  in  New  York,  wished  to  return  to  China  while  the 
embargo  was  in  operation.  He  appealed  to  President  Jef- 
ferson, even  going  to  Washington  to  see  him.  The  President 
wrote  to  Albert  Gallatin,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  enclos- 
ing a  blank  passport  for  the  vessel  which  the  Chinese  mer- 
chant agreed  to  provide  for  himself,  saying:  '-^ 

"I  enclose  Mr.  Madison's  letter  which  contains  everything  I  know 
on  the  subject.  I  consider  it  a  case  of  national  comity,  and  coming 
within  the  views  of  the  first  section  of  the  first  embargo  act.  The 
departure  of  this  individual  with  good  disposition  may  be  the  means 
of  making  our  nation  known  advantageously  at  the  source  of  power 
in  China,  to  which  it  is  otherwise  difficult  to  convey  information." 

A  few  weeks  later  President  Jefferson  wrote  with  refer- 
ence to  the  same  matter: 

"The  opportunity  hoped  from  that,  of  making  known  through  one 
of  its  own  characters  of  note,  our  nation,  our  circumstances  and  char- 
acter, and  of  letting  that  government  understand  at  length  the  differ- 
ence between  us  and  the  English,  and  separate  vis  in  its  policy,  ren- 
dered that  measure  a  diplomatic  one,  in  my  view,  and  likely  to  bring 
lasting  advantage  to  our  merchants  and  commerce  with  that  country." 

This,  the  first  expression  of  opinion  from  so  high  a 
source,  correctly  stated  a  policy  with  reference  to  China 
which  remained  fundamental  in  American  dealings  with 
China  long  into  the  future,  although  it  showed  few  results 
for  at  least  another  half  century.     It  was  difficult  for  the 


78  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Chinese  to  differentiate  between  the  two  English-speaking 
nations,  and  consequently  the  English  and  the  Americans 
were  accustomed  to  bear  each  other's  sins. 

Unhappily  President  Jefferson  was,  in  this  incident,  the 
innocent  victim  of  a  shrewd  hoax.  When  the  New  York 
merchants  picked  up  the  Commercial  Advertiser  of  August 
13,  1808,  they  learned  that  the  distinguished  mandarin  was 
none  other  than  a  dock  loafer  who  had  come  to  the  United 
States  in  a  recent  ship  from  China.  Their  displeasure  was 
still  further  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  vessel  on  which 
he  had  returned  to  China  the  day  before  was  the  Beaver, 
belonging  to  their  enterprising  competitor,  John  Jacob 
Astor. 

The  merchants  officially  protested  to  President  Jef- 
ferson. The  Commercial  Advertiser  made  it  the  sub- 
ject of  an  acid  editorial.  In  a  public  letter  Astor  defied 
the  protestants  offering  to  prove  that  the  President  had  not 
been  deceived.  However,  the  ship  did  belong  to  Astor,  and 
Picqua,  the  so-called  mandarin,  probably  had  no  more  influ- 
ence in  Peking  than  did  his  ambitious  patron.  Meanwhile 
the  Beaver  was  able  to  get  in  an  extra  voyage  to  Canton, 
while  other  American  ships  were  tied  up  by  the  unpopular 
embargo.  Astor  was  reported  to  have  made  no  less  than 
$200,000  by  the  voyage.^" 

After  the  resignation  of  B.  C.  Wilcocks  in  1821  the  con- 
sular office  was  filled  only  in  a  haphazard  way  until  the 
appointment  of  Peter  W.  Snow  of  Providence,  son  of  the 
second  consul  (1835).  One  consul  died  shortly  after  his 
appointment;  his  successor  served  less  than  two  years  owing 
to  the  failure  of  the  firm  with  which  he  was  connected,  and 
the  third  appointee  in  the  interim,  although  holding  the 
appointment  for  ten  years,  never  lived  during  that  time  at 
Canton.  In  fact,  during  the  first  fifty  years  of  American 
trade  relations  with  China,  the  total  terms  of  service  ren- 
dered by  regularly  appointed  consuls  continuously  resident 
at  Canton  was  only  fourteen  years.  In  the  intervals  the 
duties  of  the  office  were  discharged,  if  at  all,  by  some  mer- 
chant  who   was   either  delegated   by   the   person   holding 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    79 

the  office  or  who  voluntarily  assumed  the  responsibili- 
ties. 

That  the  American  Government  was  not,  however,  en- 
tirely unconscious  of  the  presence  of  its  citizens  in  China, 
or  regardless  of  the  value  of  the  trade,  is  evident  from  the 
fact  that  at  various  times  naval  protection  was  proposed. 
As  a  result  of  the  depredations  of  the  French  privateers  and 
naval  vessels,  the  United  States  ship  Congress  was  sent  to 
the  Far  East  in  May,  1800.^^  This  vessel  reached  Batavia 
and  cruised  in  .the  Straights  of  Sunda  for  two  months.  She 
offered  homeward  convoy  to  fifteen  American  merchant- 
men. In  1815  the  United  States  sloop  Peacock  was  sent  to 
the  East  Indies  to  protect  American  shipping  and  to  prey 
upon  the  British  trade.  She  also  reached  Batavia  and  cap- 
tured four  English  merchantmen,  all  after  the  declaration 
of  peace,  but  never  reached  Canton.  Four  years  later  the 
Congress,  fitted  out  to  protect  the  China  trade  from  pirates 
and  to  afford  a  practice  cruise,  dropped  anchor  at  Lintin 
(November  3,  1819),  some  forty  miles  below  the  mouth  of 
the  Canton,  or  Pearl  River.  The  Chinese  authorities 
promptly  refused  to  allow  the  frigate  to  be  supplied  with 
provisions,  and  through  the  hong  merchants  issued  a 
demand  to  the  consul  that  the  Congress  leave  immediately. 
This  was  the  customary  Chinese  method  for  dealing  with 
visits  of  foreign  naval  vessels.  Only  three  years  before  H. 
M.  S.  Alceste,  attached  to  the  Lord  Amherst  Embassy,  had 
been  similarly  treated  and  had  defied  the  Chinese,  forcing  its 
way  up  to  Whampoa.  Captain  Henley  of  the  Congress 
would  have  liked  to  do  the  same,  but  greatly  to  the  relief 
of  the  American  merchants  he  restrained  himself.  Had  he 
disobeyed  the  orders  of  the  mandarins  the  American  trade 
would  probably  have  been  stopped.  There  is  no  more 
certain  index  to  the  character  of  the  policy  of  Americans  in 
Canton  at  that  time  than  the  fact  that  the  presence  of  an 
American  naval  vessel  was  an  embarrassment. 

Although  Captain  Henley  was  hospitably  entertained  at 
the  factories  when  he  went  up  to  Canton  in  a  merchant 
vessel  he  was  made  to  feel  that  his  official  services  were  not 


80  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

desired.  In  the  spring,  when  he  offered  to  convoy  the 
American  vessels  down  through  the  Straits  the  offer  was 
decUned  by  the  merchants  and  captains  who  feared  that  such 
assistance  would  be  offensive  to  the  Chinese. 

Subsequently  on  several  occasions  American  naval 
vessels  visited  the  mouth  of  the  river.  By  the  Chinese 
authorities  they  were  always  ordered  away,  and  by  the 
Americans  they  were  welcomed  only  with  apprehensions. 
Thf^  Amoriran  had  no  desire  whatever  for  a  'gun-boat' 
^)hcy;  it  could  only  create  ill  feeling  among  the  Chinese, 
and  it  would  interfere  with  the  trade. 

We  may  now  review  the  policy  of  the  American  mer- 
chants in  meeting  the  irritations  which  arose  out  of  the 
contacts  with  other  foreign  powers  at  Canton,  and  out  of 
the  impositions  of  the  Chinese  authorities. 

Relations  with  the  Portuguese  and  English 

The  Portuguese  Governor  of  Macao  in  1803  was  unwill- 
ing to  admit  the  American  consul  to  residence  at  Macao 
during  the  summer  months,  an  awkward  and  discriminating 
action,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  no  foreigner  was  allowed  to 
remain  at  Canton  after  the  close  of  the  trade.* 

The  Americans  solved  the  difficulty  by  violating  the  rule 
of  the  Chinese,  making,  doubtless,  a  few  presents  to  the 
officials,  and  living  at  the  factories  during  the  summer,  until 
the  Macao  authorities  were  persuaded  to  extend  a  freer 
hospitality.  Major  Shaw,  the  first  American  consul,  had 
established  the  precedent  by  spending  the  summer  of  1787 
at  Canton  with  the  supercargo  of  the  Columbia  and  another 
American.  Indeed  the  Americans  seem  never,  at  that  time, 
to  have  been  very  careful  about  such  rules.  Captain  Cleve- 
land reports  with  reference  to  this  custom  of  moving  to 
Macao  in  the  summer:  "This  routine  has  of  late  years  been 
broken  by  the  disregard  of  etiquette  and  the  established 
seasons  on  the  part  of  the  Americans  who,  coming  and 

*Tlier('  was  no  trciily  Ix'twcon  tbo  IJtiitcd  States  and  Portugal  at  that  time. 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    81 

going  all  the  year  round,  have  inverted  all  the  ancient  rules 
of  doing  business  at  Canton.'  - 

The  troubles  with  the  British  authorities  were  much 
more  serious  both  for  the  Americans  and  for  the  English. 
As  early  as  the  season  of  1804-5  the  first  clash  came  over 
the  desertion  of  British  seamen  to  American  ships,  and  the 
British  insistence  on  the  right  of  search.  Desertion  in  those 
days  was  a  very  serious  matter,  for  there  was  no  ready 
labor  supply  at  Canton  from  which  to  draw  to  fill  the  vacant 
place.  An  Indiaman  required  a  crew  of  about  130,  and  it 
was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  British  captains  would  view 
with  indifference  the  escape  of  their  men  to  American  ships, 
sometimes  with  the  active  solicitation  of  the  American  cap- 
tain and  the  promise  of  higher  wages  and  a  bonus.  Captain 
Cleveland  states,  in  describing  a  voyage  he  fitted  out  from 
Canton  to  the  Northwest  coast  of  North  America  in  1799: 
"Most  of  my  men  were  deserters  from  the  Indiamen;  and 
they  were  generally  the  worst  of  a  bad  lot."  To  this  practice 
was  added  the  claims  of  the  British  war-ships  which  came  to 
Canton  each  year  to  convoy  the  returning  East  India  Com- 
pany fleet,  of  the  right  to  take  from  American  ships  any  of 
the  crew  who  were  unable  to  give  indisputable  proof  of  their 
American  citizenship,  and  in  case  of  necessity,  to  take  them 
anyway. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  year  1804  H.  M.  SS.  Caroline  and 
Grampus  began  to  search  American  ships  and  when  they  left 
Chinese  waters  carried  two  American  seamen  with  them, 
despite  the  protests  of  Carrington.  The  commander  of  the 
Caroline  replied  to  the  consul's  protest: 

"In  reply  to  your  letter  of  yesterday,  requesting  the  dischage  of 
three  men  from  His  Britannic  Majesty's  ship  under  my  command, 
calling  themselves  subjects  of  the  United  States  of  America,  to  which 
you  sign  yourself  consular  agent : — 

"I  am  to  inform  you  that  all  such  solicitations  must  be  made  to  the 
Lords  of  the  Admiralty  in  England,  as  without  orders  from  them  no 
man  can  be  discharged  by  a  Captain  of  the  British  Navy." 

These  passages  between  the  Americans  and  the  British, 
in  which  the  fault  was  by  no  means  exclusively  on  one  side, 


82  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

continued.  In  November,  1807,  the  Topaz  of  Baltimore  was 
boarded  by  British  naval  forces  at  Whampoa,  and  the  cap- 
tain of  the  Topaz  was  shot.  The  ship  was  seized,  her  specie 
confiscated,  and  the  ship  was  sent  to  Bombay  as  a  prize,  on 
the  ground  that  the  Topaz  had  been  engaged  in  piracy  off 
the  coast  of  South  America. 

The  American  brig  Rambler  of  Boston,  a  letter  of  marque 
vessel,  captured  the  English  Arabella  of  Calcutta,  in  1814, 
and  in  distress  was  forced  to  put  in  at  Macao  with  her 
prize.  The  captain  of  the  Rambler  directed  the  prize  to  be 
anchored  under  the  guns  of  the  Portuguese  fort,  whereupon 
the  Governor  of  Macao  ordered  her  to  leave  the  harbor, 
although  she  was  without  provisions  and  proper  ballast.  In 
the  course  of  the  dispute  a  Portuguese  crew  took  the 
Arabella  out  and  anchored  her  near  the  British  fleet. 
The  British  forthwith  took  possession  of  the  vessel.  Consul 
Wilcocks  complained  bitterly  to  James  Monroe,  Secretary 
of  State,  not  merely  at  the  ''flagrant  outrage"  committed 
by  Robert  O'Brien,  Esq.,  commander  of  H.  M.  S.  Doris,  and 
of  the  "pusillanimous  conduct  of  the  Governor  of  Macao" 
but  also  of  the  fact  that  the  Portuguese  had  been  permitting 
the  British  officers  to  live  at  Macao  whence  they  had  gone 
out  to  attack  many  American  ships. 

The  Chinese  took  a  hand  in  the  quarrel  between  the 
Americans  and  the  British,  demanding  that  the  superintend- 
ent of  the  East  India  Company  send  away  H.  M.  S.  Doris, 
after  she  had  chased  an  American  ship  up  to  Whampoa  and 
captured  her  there  at  the  anchorage.  The  Doris  had  also 
captured  an  American  ship,  the  Hunter,  off  the  Ladrone 
Islands  and  brought  her  to  Chinese  waters  as  a  prize. 
When  the  superintendent  replied  that  he  had  no  authority 
over  the  English  men-of-war  and  could  not  order  them 
away,  the  Chinese  ordered  the  servants  away  from  the  Eng- 
lish factories,  and  threatened  to  stop  the  trade.  The  Eng- 
lish, in  turn,  withdrew  from  Canton,  and  in  the  end  the 
Chinese  gave  way.  In  the  agreement  between  the  Chinese 
and  the  English  in  which  this  controversy  was  settled,  it 
was  stipulated  that  in  the  future  the  Americans  should  not 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    83 

be  permitted  to  dispose  of  prize-goods  in  the  Canton  market. 
This  provision  was  inserted  because  both  the  Rambler  and 
the  Jacob  Jones,  another  American  letter  of  marque,  had 
brought  to  Canton  no  less  than  $10,000  in  specie,  forty 
chests  of  opium,  and  some  piece  goods,  all  captured  from 
English  ships,  and  with  the  loot  purchased  outward  cargoes. 
While  American  trade  with  Canton  was  all  but  paralyzed 
during  the  War  of  1812,  nevertheless  a  system  of  parole  was 
established  in  1814  by  which  American  sailors  were  returned 
to  the  consul  by  the  captain  of  H.  M.  S.  Doris,  on  condition 
that  they  would  promise  not  to  take  up  arms  against  the 
English  navy.  Meanwhile  the  displeasure  of  the  Chinese 
at  the  British  disregard  of  their  port  regulations  operated  to 
the  benefit  of  the  Americans. 

Relations  with  the  Chinese  Government 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  trouble  with  the  English 
in  1804  the  Americans  realized  that  there  were  only  two 
possible  sources  of  protection  for  them ;  their  own  govern- 
ment, or  the  Chinese,  and  they  knew  full  well  that  no  help 
was  possible  from  the  United  States  naval  forces.  There- 
fore Carrington  wrote  to  Captain  Ratsey  of  H.  M.  Brig 
Harrier,  October  14,  1805: 

"Should  the  demand  which  I  have  made  to  you  not  be  complied 
with,  I  shall  make  a  formal  representation  and  appeal  to  the  Chinese 
Government  of  this  unprecedented  and  outrageous  violence  against 
the  rights  of  nations." 

There  being  no  satisfactory  response  to  this  demand, 
Carrington  called  together  the  American  merchants,  super- 
cargoes and  captains,  and  laid  the  case  before  them.  As  a 
result  of  this  meeting  a  formal  representation  was  drawn  up 
and  signed  by  the  consul  and  twenty-seven  other  Americans. 
It  was  addressed  to  "His  Excellency,  John  Tuck,  Governor 
of  tne  Province  of  Canton."  The  acknowledgements  of  and 
concessions  to  Chinese  authority  which  were  made  in  this 
document  were  an  expression  of  the  fundamental  principle 


84  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

which  guided  the  American  merchants  in  their  dealings  with 
the  Chinese  for  the  next  fifteen  or  more  years,  and  which 
at  least  some  of  the  American  merchants  at  Canton,  even 
after  the  opening  of  the  five  ports  in  1844,  were  slow  to 
discard.  After  reciting  the  facts  with  reference  to  the  con- 
troversy with  Captain  Ratsey,  and  stating  that  if  the 
English  officer  carried  out  his  threat  to  come  to  Whampoa 
and  search  American  ships  anchored  there,  the  American 
captains  had  decided  to  repel  his  visits  with  force  of  arms, 
if  necessary,  the  representation  further  stated: 

"The  Tindersigned  further  respectfully  represent  to  your  Excel- 
lency that  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  have  for  many  years 
visited  the  city  of  Canton  in  the  pursuit  of  honest  commerce,  that 
their  conduct  during  the  whole  period  of  intercourse  has  been  regu- 
lated by  a  strict  regard  and  respect  for  the  laws  and  usages  of  this 
Empire,  as  well  as  the  general  law  of  nations,  and  that  by  their 
fidelity  in  trade,  and  their  peaceable  demeanor,  the  most  perfect  har- 
mony, confidence,  and  good  understanding  has  ever  been  maintained 
between  the  subjects  of  this  country  and  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  from  which  has  flowed  a  very  extensive  and  rapidly  increasing 
commerce,  mutually  advantageous  and  honorable  to  both  parties ; 

"That  by  the  ancient  and  well  established  laws  and  usages  of  all 
civilized  nations,  the  persons  and  property  of  friendly  foreigners 
within  the  territory  and  jurisdiction  of  a  sovereign  and  independent 
Empire,  are  under  the  special  protection  of  the  government  thereof, 
and  any  violence  or  indignity  ofl^ered  to  such  persons  or  to  the  flag 
of  the  nation  to  which  they  belong,  is  justly  considered  as  done  to  the 
government  within  whose  territory  the  outrage  is  committed; 

"That  by  the  same  law  of  nations,  the  civil  and  military  agents 
of  the  government  are  strictly  prohibited  from  assuming  any  authority 
whatever  within  the  territory  of  the  other  nor  can  they  seize  the  per- 
son of  the  highest  state  criminal,  who  may  have  eluded  the  justice  of 
their  own! 

"How  great,  then,  is  the  outrage  and  indignity  which  has  been 
committed  in  the  port  of  Canton,  upon  the  citizens  and  the  national 
character  of  the  United  States!  .  .  .  The  undersigned,  therefore,  with 
the  highest  respect  and  deference,  pray  your  Excellency  to  exercise 
that  power  and  justice  with  which  you  are  clothed,  as  well  as  to  cause 
the  American  seamen  to  be  restored,  as  also  to  secure  them  from  any 
aggression  of  the  kind  in  the  future  within  the  territory  of  China, 
which  they  presume,  unquestionably  extends  to  the  seas  which  bound 
its  shores." 

It  is  difficult  to  know  whether  this  memorial,  with  its 
sweeping   concessions   as   to    the   jurisdiction   of   Chinese 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    85 

authority,  was  ever  seen  by  the  Governor  of  the  province. 
Carrington  wrote  to  James  Madison,  November  25,  1805: 

"As  the  Chinese  Government  does  not  recognize  foreign  ministers 
or  consuls,  I  consider  it  advisable  to  join  the  American  merchants 
residing  at  Canton,  and  the  supercargoes  and  the  commanders  of  the 
American  ships,  with  me  in  the  representation  ;  hoping  it  would  have 
the  desired  influence  with  the  several  security  merchants  to  encourage 
them  to  present  the  same  to  their  government,  and  give  our  complaints 
their  full  force." 

At  any  rate,  the  hong  merchants  replied  that  their  gov- 
ernment would  not  take  cognizance  of  disputes  between 
foreigners  although  they  arose  within  Chinese  territory,  a 
principle  which,  however,  China  did  not  follow  consistently. 
Nevertheless  it  is  quite  likely  that  the  Chinese  authorities 
were  entirely  familiar  with  the  contents  of  the  memorial, 
and  fifteen  years  later,  in  accordance  with  it  as  well  as  with 
their  own  desire,  they  claimed  jurisdiction  over  the  Ameri- 
can ships  at  Whampoa  in  the  Terranova  case. 

It  could  hardly  be  expected  that  this  policy  of  non-inter- 
course upon  which  the  Chinese  Government  insisted,  would 
work  out  exclusively  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  foreigners, 
and  there  were  not  a  few  occasions  when  the  fictitious  ar- 
rangements were  brushed  aside  by  the  Chinese  themselves. 
A  Philadelphia  merchant  sued  Houqua,  the  famous  hong 
merchant,  in  a  Pennsylvania  court  for  failure  to  keep  his 
engagements  in  1818  as  to  the  quality  of  tea  and  obtained  a 
judgment  for  $25,000.  How  the  defendant  was  represented 
in  this  suit  or  by  what  means  the  judgment  was  collected 
is  not  known. ^"  The  plaintiff,  however,  was  shortly  after 
the  trial  revealed  as  a  notorious  smuggler  who  became  insol- 
vent, owing  the  government  more  than  three  quarters  of  a 
million  dollars  in  duties. 

Several  of  the  hong  merchants  were  reported  to  have 
been  in  much  embarrassment  because  of  the  extent  to  which 
they  had  supplied  the  American  traders  on  credit.  Houqua, 
afterwards  so  friendly  to  some  American  firms,  was  at  that 
time  extensively  involved  in  these  transactions  and  learned 
to  become  more  discriminating  in  his  extensions  of  credit. 


86  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

One  merchant,  Consequa,  who  was  reported  to  have  lost 
$1,000,000  in  credit  transactions  with  Americans,  even  went 
so  far  as  to  address  a  memorial  to  "His  Excellency,  James 
Madison,  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  or  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States  for  the  time  being."  He 
stated  that  he  had  been  led,  after  years  of  extensive  dealings 
with  the  Americans,  to  give  them  long  credits,  although  it 
was  against  the  laws  of  the  Empire.  While  trade  was  flour- 
ishing he  had  heard  no  complaints,  and  the  losses  had  not 
been  greater  than  he  could  well  bear,  but  more  recently  he 
had  had  many  unhappy  experiences  with  the  American 
traders.  Some  of  the  Americans,  he  stated,  had  not  only 
declined  to  pay,  offering  frivolous  excuses,  but  had  even 
applied  the  capital  to  other  branches  of  their  business. 
Consequa  recites:  ^* 

"When  such  debtors  come,  or  reside  in  China,  they  cannot  claim 
the  aid  of  the  laws  of  the  imperial  dynasty  on  their  behalf.  They 
[the  laws]  prohibit  such  confidence  as  he  [Consequa]  has  placed  in 
the  subjects  of  the  United  States,  and  he  would  not  presume  to  avow 
to  the  chief  of  a  great  nation,  that  he  has  infringed  the  laws  of  his 
own  empire,  but  in  the  full  consciousness  that  he  has  been  guilty  of 
no  disloyal  or  injurious  act  or  intention  toward  it,  whilst  to  honorable 
minds  he  thinks  his  China  would  be  strengthened  by  this  circumstance 
[business  with  foreigners]. 

"He  does  not  presume  to  solicit  your  Excellency's  protection  and 
consideration,  but  in  so  far  as  may  be  in  accord  with  justice  and  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  they  being  so  far  and  so  greatly  celebrated 
for  their  equal  protection  of  the  rich  and  the  poor,  and  for  their 
dealing  equal  measure  to  their  citizens  and  to  those  of  aliens,  but  he 
does  ask  for  your  protection  and  countenance  in  asserting  and  claim- 
ing his  rights  in  conformity  to  your  laws  and  where  an  appeal  to 
courts  of  justice  becomes  necessary,  that  the  forms  and  proceedings 
which  have  lieen  devised  for  the  security  of  man,  may  not  be  allowed 
to  be  wrested  to  his  injury,  a  perversion  to  which  the  best  are  liable." 

Consequa  appointed  a  representative  to  present  his 
petition,  and  supplied  him  with  the  necesssary  proofs  and 
papers  to  show  his  losses. 

Terranova  Incident 

This  policy  of  submitting  to  Chinese  authority  found 
its  most  famous  expression  in  the  well  known  "Terranova 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    87 

case."  ^^  Francis  Terranova,  an  illiterate  Italian  seaman 
from  the  Emily,  of  Baltimore,  was  accused  at  the  beginning 
of  the  season  of  1821  of  having  caused  the  death  of  a  boat- 
woman  who  had  come  up  to  the  Emily  to  trade  with  the 
sailors.  The  consul  attempted  to  settle  the  matter  by  the 
offer  of  a  liberal  payment  to  the  relatives  of  the  boat-woman 
but  the  captain  of  the  Emily  took  matters  into  his  own 
hands  and,  backed  by  the  majority  of  the  American  commu- 
nity, was  disposed  to  fight  the  case.  The  Chinese  assumed 
jurisdiction  and  although  the  Americans  were  persuaded 
that  the  sailor  was  not  guilty,  and  that  the  Chinese  could 
not  be  trusted  to  give  a  fair  trial,  yielded.  The  unfortunate 
sailor  was  tried  by  Chinese  authorities  on  board  the  Emily, 
found  guilty,  and  the  Americans  were  ordered  to  surrender 
him  for  punishment.  The  Americans  demurred,  the  trade 
was  stopped,  the  ship's  security  merchant,  who  owed  large 
sums  to  Americans,  was  arrested,  and  the  Americans  found 
themselves  confronted  by  a  necessity.  The  holding  of  the 
security  merchants  might  mean  the  financial  ruin  of  his 
American  creditors.  Terranova  was  surrendered,  and  a  few 
days  later  he  was  strangled,  notwithstanding  promises  to 
the  contrary  and  notwithstanding  the  provision  of  Chinese 
law  making  manslaughter  punishable  only  by  a  small  fine.^^ 
Before  the  sailor  was  taken  from  the  Emily  a  group  of 
American  merchants  drew  up  a  statement  of  the  case  and 
presented  it  to  Houqua  to  give  to  the  Chinese  authorities. 
In  it  they  said:  '^'^ 

"We  consider  the  case  prejudiced.  We  are  bound  to  submit  to 
your  laws  while  we  are  in  your  waters,  be  they  ever  so  unjust.  We 
will  not  resist  them.  You  have  followed  your  ideas  of  justice,  and 
have  condemned  the  man  unheard.  But  the  flag  of  our  country  has 
never  been  disgraced.  It  now  waves  over  you.  It  is  no  disgrace  to 
submit  to  your  power,  surrounded  as  you  are  by  overwhelming  force, 
backed  up  by  a  great  Empire.    You  have  the  power  to  compel  us." 

This  bombastic  declaration,  amazing  as  it  would  seem, 
issued  by  any  group  of  Americans,  is  still  more  remarkable 
when  one  remembers  that  those  who  signed  it  were  among 
the  most  fearless  sea-captains  and  pioneers  that  the  United 


88  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

States  had  ever  produced.  It  shows  how_coni]3letely  the 
Chinese  held  the  foreigners  in  their  power  by  means,  of  the 
one  w'eapon — stopping  the  trade.  But  it  shows  more  than 
that.  It  reflects  the  opinion  of  the  day  in  American  history 
when  'national  honor'  was  far  more  loosely  defined  than  it 
is  today.  JMore  than  twelve  years  later  the  North  American 
Review,  in  commenting  on  the  incident,  said: 

"But  as  a  question  in  the  law  of  nations  and  casuistry,  it  would 
bear  an  argument  whether  the  United  States  could  rightfully  go  to 
war  against  the  Chinese  for  administering  their  own  laws  on  persons 
voluntarily  coming  within  their  jurisdiction." 

And  in  the  treaty  concluded  with  Siam  in  1833,  and  ratified 
by  the  Senate  two  years  later  it  was  agreed:  "Merchants 
of  the  United  States  trading  in  the  Kingdom  of  Siam  shall 
respect  and  follow  the  laws  and  customs  of  the  country  in 
all  points."  It  is  hardly  to  be  doubted  that  the  decision  of 
the  Americans  in  submitting  to  Chinese  jurisdiction  in  the 
Terranova  case,  represented  fairly  accurately  the  state  of 
American  public  opinion  on  the  rights  of  Americans  in 
China. 

A  few  weeks  later  the  English  reversed  the  Terranova 
precedent  in  the  case  of  some  sailors  who  were  accused  of 
killing  some  Chinese  in  a  melee.  The  British  authorities 
declined  to  surrender  the  sailors,  but  previous  to  1821,  they 
had  yielded  to  Chinese  jurisdiction  in  many  similar  in- 
stances.^^ 

The  next  two  decades  of  the  history  of  American  rela- 
tions with  China  mark  a  gradual  displacement  of  this  policy 
of  submission  by  one  more  in  harmony  with  the  rising  power 
of  the  young  nation.  Indeed,  as  one  observes  the  rising  tide 
of  national  consciousness  in  the  American  traders  after 
1822,  one  is  reminded  of  the  conversation  recorded  by  Major 
Shaw,  the  first  American  consul  at  Canton,  in  his  journal 
during  his  first  visit. ^"  After  Shaw  had  concluded  a  certain 
bargain  with  a  Chinese,  the  haggling  having  extended  over 
several  days,  the  merchant  asked: 

"You  arc  not  Englishman?" 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    89 

"No." 

"But  you  speak  English  word,  and  when  you  first  come, 
I  can  no  tell  difference;  but  now  I  understand  very  well. 
When  I  speak  Englishman  his  price,  he  say  *So  much, — take 
it, — let  alone.'  I  tell  him,  'No,  my  friend,  I  give  you  so 
much.'  He  look  at  me — 'Go  to  hell,  you  damned  rascal; 
what!  you  come  here — set  price  my  goods?'  Truly,  Massa 
Typan,  I  see  very  well  you  no  hap  Englishman.  All  China- 
man very  much  love  your  country." 

"Thus  far,"  writes  Shaw,  "it  may  be  supposed  the  fel- 
low's remarks  pleased  me.  Justice  obliges  me  to  add  his 
conclusion:  'All  men  come  first  time  China  very  good 
gentlemen,  all  same  you.  I  think  two  three  times  more  you 
come  Canton,  you  make  all  same  Englishman  too.'  " 

This  prophecy  was  never  entirely  fulfilled,  for  the  Ameri- 
cans found  that  their  policy,  while  not  always  flattering  to 
national  vanity  and  often  differing  widely  from  the  spirit  of 
those  other  American  pioneers  who  fought  their  way  across 
the  American  continent,  was  very  profitable  in  China,  and  a 
useful  means  of  obtaining  special  favors. 

During  the  entire  period  before  the  treaty  of  1844,  the 
Americans  in  Canton  were  left  entirely  without  instructions 
?roni  the  (invernment  of  the  United  States.  No  official 
comment  was  ever  made  on  tlie  Tefranova  case.  In  1822 
President  Monroe  gave  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Emperor 
of  China  to  an  American  merchant,  and  John  Quincy  Adams, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Viceroy  of 
Canton,-"  Neither  letter,  so  far  as  is  known,  was  ever 
accepted. 

BIBLIOGEAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Floyd  Report  on  Oregon,  Reports  of  Committees  45  :16-2 ;  Annals 

of  Congress,  17-2,  pp.  398 ;  418,  423,  58S-6. 

2.  "Personal    Reminiscences,    with    Recollections    of    China,"    hy 

Robert  Bennett  Forbes  (3d  ed.,  Boston,  1892).  The  addenda 
gives  many  details  of  the  organization  and  history  of  Russell 
and  Company. 

3.  "Sketch  of  the  Life  of  D.  W.  C.  Olyphant,"  by  Rev.  Thatcher 

Thayer  (New  York,  1852);  Hunter's  "Fan  Kwae";  Barrett's 
"Old  Merchants  of  New  York." 


90  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

4.  Sessional  Papers  (1821)  Vol.  7. 

5.  "Foreign  Commerce  of  the  United  States,"  by  J.  Smith  Hoinans 

(New  York,  1857),  table,  p.  181. 

6.  Hunt's  Merchants  Magazine,  Vol.   11   (July-Dec.,  1844),  table, 

p.  55. 

7.  Trade  statistics  for  the  period  before  1840;  Pitkin;   Seybert's 

Statistical  Annals  of  the  U.  S. ;  an  exhaustive  analysis  in  Ses- 
sional Papers,  1821,  Vol.  7,  and  in  Parliamentary  Papers,  1830, 
Vols.  5  and  6,  in  which  the  American  trade  is  somewhat  exag- 
gerated for  the  purpose  of  making  a  case  against  the  East 
India  Company  monopoly ;  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  July  1,  1840,  H.  Doc.  248,  26-1 ;  see  also  H.  Doc.  35, 
27-3;  and,  Hunt's  Merchants  Magazine. 

8.  Madison  Papers  (Lib.  of  Congress),  Vol.  XXXV,  May  27,  1809, 

A.  B.  Woodward  to  Madison. 

9.  Jefferson  Papers  (Lib.  of  Congress),  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  July 

25,  and  Aug.  15,  1808. 

10.  Barrett's  "Old  Merchants  of  New  York,"  Vol.  3,  pp.  6-10. 

11.  Paullin's  "American  Naval  Vessels  in  the  Orient." 

12.  Shaw's  Journal;  and,  "Voyages,"  by  Richard  J.  Cleveland,  New 

York,  1855,  p.  72;  China  Beview,  Vol.  5,  p.  152. 

13.  Niles'  Register,  April  23,  1825. 

14.  Canton  Consular  Letters  (approximate  date,  1815). 

15.  H.  Doc.  71,  26-2,  Nov.  1,  1821,  Wilcocks  to  Adams. 

16.  Miscellaneous  Notices,  by  Sir  Geo.  T.  Staunton,  London,  1822, 

1850,  pp.  409-10. 

17.  NortJi  American  Review,  Oct.,  1834,  pp.  58-68. 

18.  See  "International  Relations  with  the  Chinese  Empire,"  by  H. 

B.  Morse,  London,  1910,  Vol.  1,  pp.  99-107,  for  a  complete  list 
of  the  cases  of  homicide  in  which  the  foreigners  were  accused 
by  the  Chinese. 

19.  Shaw's  Journal,  p.  199. 

20.  J.  Q.  Adams  Memoirs,  Philadelphia,  1875,  Vol.  6,  p.  491. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR 

In  the  conclusion  of  the  first  American  treaty  with  China, 
two  series  of  actions  converge:  on  the  one  hand  the  policy 
ofjthe  Americans  in  China  towards  both  Chinese  and  Brit- 
ish ;  and,  on  the  other,  the  slowly  awakening  interest  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  in  Chinese  affairs.  Until 
very  shortly  before  the  decision  to  negotiate  a  treaty  the 
one  had  very  little  relation  to  the  other. 

Before  1840  the  American  Government  assumed  towards 
its  citizens  resident  in  China  an  attitude  not  very  dissimilar 
to  that  taken  by  the  Chinese  towards  their  own  emigres: 
Let  them  shift  for  themselves.  The  merchants  in  Canton, 
thus  left  to  themselves,  and  not  at  all  protesting  at  the 
policy  of  the  government,  adopted  a  course  in  which  they 
had  perfected  themselves — that  of  conciliation — and  in  the 
main  thev  prospered.  From  the  execution  of  Terranova  to 
the  beginning  of  1839  the  annals  of  Chinese- American  rela- 
tions were  quite  uneventful. 

Just  as  in  all  frontier  communities,  so  at  Canton,  men 
possessed  influence  or  not  according  to  their  abilities.  Wil- 
cocks,  Ammidon,  Russell  and  Cushing  were  acknowledged 
leaders.  In  the  third  decade  of  the  century  Cushing  was 
credited  with  having  been  the  most  influential  of  all 
foreigners  among  the  Chinese. 

Taking  advantage  of  a  rice  famine  in  Canton  in  1825, 
and  utilizing  his  intimate  friendship  with  the  hong  mer- 
chant Houqua,  Cushing  secured  a  reduction  in  the  tonnage 
dues  on  ships  laden  with  rice  coming  to  Canton.  Whereas 
other  ships  had  to  pay  the  full  tonnage  tax,  ranging  from 
$3000  to  $6000,  whether  full  or  empty,  "rice-ships"  were  to 
pay  only  about  $1150.     After  1833  these  were  admitted 

91 


92  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

entirely  free.  This  arrangement  was,  to  the  Americans 
especially,  a  substantial  benefit  because  they  had  an  even 
greater  difficulty  than  the  English  in  finding  cargoes  for 
import  which  could  be  absorbed  in  the  Chinese  market,  and 
also  because  the  regular  tonnage  dues  fell  heaviest  on  the 
smallest  ships,  and  the  Americans  at  that  time  were  still 
employing  relatively  small  vessels.^ 

The  dissolution  of  the  East  India  Company  monopoly 
caused  a  ripple  in  the  tide  of  American  affairs,  but  hardly 
more.  The  removal  of  the  overshadowing  'Company'  made 
way  for  the  rise  and  the  increased  prestige  of  independent 
firms,  an  advantage  which  some  of  the  American  firms  were 
in  a  position  to  seize.  In  the  fresh  competition  which  fol- 
lowed the  advent  of  many  new  firms  and  individuals,  the 
Americans  fared  well,  having  gone  through  their  period  of 
financial  difficulties  ten  years  earlier.  The  Lord  Napier 
incident  caused  a  brief  stopping  of  the  trade,  which  the 
Americans  accepted  with  their  accustomed  complaisance.* 

The  national  antipathies  which  had  separated  the 
Americans  and  the  English  during  so  much  of  the  earlier 
period  were  mitigated  as  American  houses  dealt  in  English 
manufactured  goods,  and  as  banking  relations  became  more 
intimate.  From  the  dissolution  of  the  Company  until  1839 
the  relations  between  the  English  and  Americans  were  un- 
usually cordial.    Their  interests  were  much  the  same. 

The  dissolution  of  the  East  India  Company  monopoly 
(1834)  due  in  part  to  the  extraordinary  success  of  the  inde- 
pendent American  merchants  was  ominous  for  the  continu- 
ance of  peaceful  relations  between  England  and  China.  The 
dissolution  of  the  monopoly,  the  release  of  individual  mer- 

*Lord  Napier  arrived  in  rhina  in  July,  1834.  with  a  royal  eomniission  as 
chief  superinteiiileiit  of  British  trade.  It  was  e.xpeeted  that  he  would  take  the 
place  of  the  former  chairman  of  the  Select  Comndttee  of  the  lOast  India  Com- 
pany, as  the  representative  ofheer  of  the  British  Government,  and  that  he  would 
also  exercise  some  enlarged  .iudicial  and  executive  powers  which  liad  not  lielonged 
to  the  agents  of  the  East  India  Company.  The  numner  of  his  coming  to  China 
was  sadly  bungled  and  the  Chinese  refused  to  receive  him,  at  length  .stopping 
the  trade  to  force  his  retirement  to  Macao.  Lord  Napier  died  at  Macao,  October 
11,  18.S4.-- 

Sir  fJeorge  T.  Staunton.^  formerly  fhairman  of  the  Select  Committee  of  the 
East  India  Company,  stated  :  "Lord  Napier,  owing  to  the  unfortunate  omission 
of  our  government  to  apply  for  and  ol)tain  from  the  Chinese  authorities  in  due 
time  his  formal  recognition,  .  .  .  had  no  otlicial  station  or  i)ublic  privilege  in 
China  whatsoever." 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR    93 

chants  from  the  thrall  of  the  Company  restrictions,  and 
the  greatly  increased  competition  for  the  trade,  also  in- 
creased the  points  of  irritation  between  the  English  and  the 
Chinese.  Most  ominous  was  the  fact  that  under  the  new 
arrangements,  affronts  offered  to  the  merchants  were  no 
longer  to  be  considered  merely  as  difficulties  of  a  trading 
company.  They  became  national  insults.  The  blunder  of 
the  English  foreign  office  in  the  manner  of  sending  out  Lord 
Napier  created  a  bad  situation.  The  subsequent  policy  of 
Captain  Charles  Elliot,  English  superintendent  of  trade, 
wavering  as  he  did  between  a  desire  to  keep  the  trade  going 
and  to  vindicate  national  honor,  encouraged  the  Chinese  in 
the  opinion  that  the  mastery  of  the  situation  lay  with  China 
just  as  it  had  in  the  past  when  she  was  able  so  completely 
to  control  the  merchant^]  by  stopping  the  trade. 

Another  factor  which  operated  against  the  continuance 
of  peaceful  relations  was  China's  fear  of  England.  The 
Chinese  Government  had  not  been  unmindful  of  British 
aggression  in  India,  Burmah,  the  Malay  Peninsula,  and  the 
archipelago.  The  Manchu  dynasty  was  conscious  of  the  fact 
that  it  was  really  alien  to  China,  and  that  it  was  unpopular 
with  large  numbers  of  people,  as  was  proved  by  the  increas- 
ing number  of  insurrections.  The  Peking  Government 
feared  that  the  English  might  effect  a  coalition  with  rebel- 
lious spirits  within  the  Empire  to  displace  the  Manchus. 
Above  these  general  causes  of  distrust  andirritation  lay 
the  immediate  facts  that  each  year  the  exportations  of  specie 
to  pay  for  the  opium  were  increasing,  and  the  Chinese 
economists  could  see  in  this  only  the  gradual  impoverish- 
ment of  the  Empire,  while  the  demoralizing  effect  of  opium 
smoking  was  everywhere  apparent.  The  opium  trade  re- 
ceived a  new  impetus  in  1836  when,  for  a  few  months,  it  was 
reported  and  confidently  believed  that  the  trade  was  to  be 
legalized.  After  a  brief  debate  the  Imperial  Government 
decided  against  legalization,  and  instead  demanded  the  ex- 
pulsion from  Canton  of  nine  foreigners,  at  least  one  of  whom 
was  American;  but  the  foreigners  remained.  The  traders 
became  bolder  from  month  to  month,  not  only  increasing 


94  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  sales  along  the  coast  but  bringing  the  drug  again  to 
Whampoa,  and  even  to  Canton.  The  government  accord- 
ingly stiffened  its  opposition  and  a  conflict  became  inevit- 
able.* In  1838  the  Imperial  Government  determined  to 
destroy  the  opium  trade,  seizing  the  opportunity  to  effect 
at  one  stroke  a  moral  reform,  establish  an  important 
economic  regulation,  and,  by  no  means  incidentally,  to 
curb  the  growing  power  of  the  foreigners  in  South  China. 
While  it  had  always  been  the  fond  hope  of  the  Ameri- 
cans, from  the  beginnings  of  their  relations  with  the  Chinese 
Government,  so  to  conduct  themselves  as  to  win  a  preferred 
place  in  Chinese  estimation,  as  far  as  the  government 
was  concerned,  the  policy  had  not  been  successful.  _Before 
the  officials  all  foreigners  were  alike,  and  the  Americans, 
because  of  their  close  similarity  to  the  English,  were  often 
confused  or  identified  with  the  latter  to  a  point  which 
effectually  thwarted  the  American  effort  to  maintain  good 
will.  The  fact  that  the  Chinese  officials  assumed  the  Ameri- 
can share  in  the  opium  trade  to  be  very  much  larger  than  it 
was,  added  to  the  difficulty  and  made  it  certain  that  when- 
ever the  Chinese  assumed  the  aggressive,  the  English-speak- 
ing people  would  share  alike  the  displeasure  of  the  Chinese. 

Foreigners  Imprisoned  in  the  Factories 

On  December  12,  1838,  the  Chinese  attempted  to  execute 
a  Chinese  opium  dealer  in  the  public  square  in  front  of  the 
factories,  almost  directly  under  the  American  flag.  Some 
American  and  British  residents  interfered  and  the  execution 
took  place  outside  the  factory  boundaries.  After  the  execu- 
tion a  "large  and  desperate  mob  was  raised  by  the  impru- 
dence and  folly  of  a  small  number  of  English  and  American 
young  men,"  to  borrow  the  phrase  of  the  American  consul 
in  his  official  report.  The  mob,  which  numbered  7000  or 
8000,  was  dispersed  by  the  Chinese  authorities  and  shortly 
afterward  Captain  Elliot  appeared  with  about  120  men 
hastily  collected  from  the  ships  at  Whampoa."* 

The  Chinese  persisted.    Late  in  the  afternoon,  February 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR    95 

26,  1839,  when  most  of  the  foreigners  were  absent  from  the 
factories  taking  their  recreation,  twenty  mandarins  and  a 
hundred  soldiers  brought  another  native  opium  dealer  into 
the  square  and  executed  him  without  opposition.  The 
reason  given  was  "that  all  foreigners  who  are  engaged  in  the 
traffic  of  this  prohibited  article  may  witness  the  dreadful 
punishment  inflicted  on  the  natives  for  their  violation  of 
the  laws  of  the  Empire." 

"The  execution,"  writes  the  American  consul,  "is  consid- 
ered by  the  foreigners  a  direct  and  positive  insult."  At  the 
suggestion  of  Captain  Elliot,  and  after  consultation  with  the 
French  and  Dutch  consuls  who  agreed  on  common  action, 
Consul  Snow,  in  protest,  hauled  down  the  American  flag. 
"I  have,"  he  reported,  "on  deliberation,  concluded  not  to  set 
mine  again  until  receipt  of  orders  from  you  (Secretary  of 
State)  to  that  effect,  or  circumstance  should  make  it  proper 
to  do  so."  ^ 

Three  weeks  later,  March  18,  Commissioner  Lin  who  had 
arrived  from  Peking  with  the  most  explicit  orders  to  destroy 
the  opium  trade,  issued  an  ultimatum  to  the  foreigners. 
Charging  them  with  ingratitude,  he  pointed  to  the  receiving 
ships  at  Lintin  which  had  been  repeatedly  ordered  r.way, 
asserted  that  he  had  the  names  of  the  foreign  opium  mer- 
chants, and  demanded  that  every  chest  on  the  store-ships  be 
surrendered.  He  gave  three  days  in  which  to  reply,  and 
promised  to  stop  at  no  half-way  measures.  He  also  de- 
manded that  the  foreigners  give  bonds  that  they  would 
bring  no  more  opium  to  China  and  would  concede  to  the 
Chinese  Government  the  right  to  punish  violations  "with 
the  extreme  penalty  of  the  law."  '^  Consul  Shaw  reported 
the  request  for  the  opium  as  a  'just  demand.'  Commissioner 
Lin  believed  that  he  held  in  his  hand  a  still  invincible 
weapon — the  power  to  stop  the  trade.  "Let  our  ports  once 
be  closed  against  you,"  he  declared,  "and  for  what  profit  can 
your  several  nations  any  longer  look?  Yet  more:  our  tea  and 
rhubarb,  seeing  that,  should  you  foreigners  be  deprived  of 
them,  you  therein  lose  the  means  of  preserving  life,  are 
without  stint  granted  to  you  for  transportation,  year  by 


96  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

year,  beyond  the  seas.  Favors  never  have  been  greater." 
Consequently  when  the  foreigners  attempted  parleys  and 
promised  compromises  he  stopped  the  trade  (March  22). 
Five  days  later  the  compradores  and  coolies  were  withdrawn 
from  the  factories  and  the  following  day,  all  the  streets,  ex- 
cept one,  leading  to  the  square,  were  walled  up.  The  for- 
eigners became  prisoners ;  soldiers  surrounded  them  on  land, 
and  war  junks  cut  off  their  access  to  the  river. 

All  the  foreigners  acting  together  notified  Lin,  March 
25,  that  the  settlement  of  the  opium  question  was  to  be  left 
entirely  with  the  various  consuls  and  national  representa- 
tives. Consul  Snow  therefore  entered  with  fear  and  trem- 
bling upon  duties  never  delegated  to  him  by  his  government 
and  never  contemplated  in  his  commission.  So  far  as  the 
American  merchants  were  concerned,  the  consul  was  put 
forward  for  the  time  as  suited  their  convenience,  and  as  a 
matter  of  equal  convenience,  later  discarded.^ 

Snow's  not  very  simple  problem  was  to  disentangle 
American  from  British  affairs  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
Chinese.  Fortunately  for  him,  as  well  as  for  the  American 
merchants  concerned.  Captain  Elliot,  whose  policy  was  to 
keep  the  foreigners  united  against  the  actions  of  Lin,  was 
disposed  to  assume  full  responsibility  for  the  Indian  opium 
in  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  and  it  was  surrendered  to 
him.  Two  duties  remained  for  Snow:  to  prove  to  Lin  that 
the  Americans  were  not  concerned  in  the  trade  to  an  equal 
extent  with  the  English ;  and  to  settle  the  disputed  question 
of  the  nature  of  the  bond  which  should  be  given  in  the  future 
as  a  pledge  of  total  abstinence  from  opium  trading  by 
American  merchants.  He  positively  refused  to  sign  the 
bond  proposed  by  Lin,  referring  the  question  to  Washing- 
ton, in  this  matter  acting  in  concert  with  the  Dutch,  and 
with  the  approval  of  the  merchants.  Eventually  the 
Americans  accepted  the  bond  in  a  very  modified  form.  The 
task  of  making  clear  the  American  share  in  and  attitude 
towards  the  opium  trade  in  general  was  more  difficult,  but 
two  weeks  after  the  imprisonment  had  begun  in  earnest,  he 
was  able  to  report  to  the  State  Department :    "The  Govern- 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR    97 

ment  is  satisfied,  I  think,  that  no  opium  is  grown  in  our 
country;  that  the  Americans  in  the  future  will  not,  under 
any  circumstances,  engage  in  the  trade."  '■* 

The  next  question  facing  the  Americans  was  whether 
the  concert  of  action  hitherto  maintained  with  the  other 
nations,  should  be  continued.  The  delivery  of  the  opium 
was  progressing  rapidly,  and  the  port  was  to  be  opened  May 
5,  to  permit  passage  to  INIacao  for  those  who  desired  it. 
Captain  Elliot  proposed  that  the  foreigners,  acting  together, 
should  now  turn  the  tables  on  the  Chinese  and  withdraw 
from  Canton  to  Macao,  thus  stopping  the  trade  on  their 
side,  as  Lin  had  stopped  it  for  the  Chinese.  The  English 
had  tried  such  a  policy  before  and  it  had  been  successful. 
It  was  argued  that  this  was  a  suitable  time  to  convince  the 
Chinese  that  they  were  quite  as  dependent  on  the  trade  as 
were  the  foreigners.^" 

But  the  American  merchants  *  were  of  a  different  mind. 
From  the  day  when  the  English  withdrew  from  Canton 
the  foreign  nations  went  their  separate  ways,  and  fortu- 
nately or  unfortunately,  according  to  the  point  of  view, 
each  nation  was  compelled,  individually,  to  assume  for  its 
actions  the  responsibility  which  the  Americans,  at  least,  had 
been  hitherto  more  or  less  disposed  to  ignore  or  shift. 

''The  British  residents,"  wrote  Commander  George  C. 
Read  (May  28)  of  the  U.  S.  East  India  Squadron  which 
had  arrived  at  Macao  a  month  earlier,  "are  evidently 
displeased  with  the  course  our  countrymen  have  adopted."  ^^  • 

The  displeasure  of  the  English  did  not  continue  long  for 
it  was-soon  discovered  that  the  presence  of  the  Americans 
at  Canton  was  of  very  great  assistance  to  the  English  in 
getting  out  the  cargoes  which  had  been  piling  up  during  the 
winter. 

An  American  merchant,  then  the  manager  of  Russell  and 
Company,  many  years  afterward  stated,  in  language  which 
no  doubt  faithfully  reflects  the  policy  of  the  Americans: 
"When  the  English  left  Canton,  Elliot  himself  personally 
begged  Russell  and  Company  to  follow  his  countrymen, 

*For  the  American  share  in  the  opium  trade  see  Chapter  vi. 


98  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

saying,  'If  your  house  goes,  all  will  go,  and  we  shall  soon 
bring  these  rascally  Chinese  to  terms.'  I  replied  that  I  had 
not  come  to  China  for  health  or  pleasure,  and  that  I  should 
remain  at  my  post  as  long  as  I  could  sell  a  yard  of  goods  or 
buy  a  pound  of  tea;  that  we  Yankees  had  no  queen  to 
guarantee  our  losses,  etc.  Elliot  replied  that  he  would  soon 
make  Canton  too  hot  for  us."  ^- 

For  the  next  few  months  the  Americans  did  a  land-office 
business.  Freights  between  Hongkong  and  Canton  were 
higher  than  from  Hongkong  to  America,  and  the  Americans 
carried  the  goods  in  and  out  for  the  English,  sometimes 
going  through  the  formality  of  evading  the  law  by  loading 
ships  with  English  goods  at  Hongkong,  taking  them  over  to 
Manila,  and  bringing  them  back  to  Canton  without  break- 
ing bulk.  Every  sort  of  vessel  that  could  float  was  pressed 
into  service  including  not  a  few,  it  may  be  feared  of  the 
idle  English  fleet  now  transferred  to  American  ownership  in 
very  informal  ways,  and  in  no  way  entitled,  according  to 
American  maritime  law,  to  fly  the  American  flag.^^ 

The  gentleman  above  quoted  wrote  that  afterwards 
Captain  Elliot  said  to  him  at  Macao:  "My  dear  Forbes, 
the  Queen  owes  you  many  thanks  for  not  taking  my  advice 
as  to  leaving  Canton.  We  have  got  in  all  our  goods,  and  got 
out  a  good  supply  of  teas  and  silk.  If  the  American  houses 
had  not  remained  at  their  posts,  the  English  would  have 
gone  in.  I  had  no  power  to  prevent  them  from  going.  Now 
the  trade  of  the  season  is  over,  and  a  large  force  at  hand,  we 
can  bring  the  Chinese  to  terms." 

The  momentous  events  of  the  three  following  years,  so 
far  as  they  concern  Anglo-Chinese  relations,  can  be  narrated 
with  brevity.  The  Chinese  took  the  offensive,  ordering  the 
English  from  Macao  whither  they  had  retreated  from  Can- 
ton. The  latter  in  turn,  moved  to  Hongkong,  living  for  a 
time  on  shipboard,  but  gradually  forming  a  settlement  on 
the  island.  A  blockade  of  the  river  was  established  by  the 
English  the  next  year  (June  28,  1840),  after  the  season's 
trade  had  been  cared  for,  and  the  trade  was  reopened  the 
the  following  year  for  a  few  weeks  to  take  care  of  the 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR    99 

accumulated  produce.  So  far  as  Canton  was  concerned,  the 
war  ended  May  27,  1841.  Fifteen  months  later,  August  29, 
1842,  the  Treaty  of  Nanking  was  signed.  The  following 
year,  October  8,  1843,  a  supplementary  treaty  which  in- 
cluded important  additional  items,  as  well  as  a  tariff,  was 
signed  at  the  Bogue. 

The  Americans  Petition  Congress 

In  order  to  bring  the  narration  of  other  events  important 
to  the  Americans  in  China  up  to  1844,  when  the  American 
treaty  was  negotiated,  it  is  necessary  to  review  the  request 
of  the  American  merchants  to  Congress  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  commercial  agent ;  the  condition  of  public  senti- 
ment in  the  United  States;  and  the  action  of  Commodore 
Kearny  in  securing  the  assent  of  the  Chinese  to  "most- 
favored-nation"  treatment  for  the  Americans. 

After  the  English  had  left  Canton  the  Americans  ad- 
dressed a  memorial  to  Congress  (May  25,  1839)  explaining 
the  American  share  in  the  opium  trade,  asking  for  the 
appointment  of  a  commercial  agent  to  be  sent  to  China  to 
negotiate  a  commercial  treaty,  and  asking  also  for  the  dis- 
patch to  Chinese  waters  of  a  suitable  naval  force  for  the 
protection  of  American  lives  and  property.^'* 

The  memorial,  after  summarizing  the  cause  of  the  ag- 
gressive measures  adopted  by  Commissioner  Lin,  proposed: 

"We  would,  therefore,  with  all  deference  and  respect  express  our 
opinions  that  the  United  States  Government  should  take  immediate 
measures;  and,  if  deemed  advisable,  to  act  in  concert  with  the  gov- 
ernments of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Holland,  or  either  of  them, 
in  their  endeavors  to  establish  commercial  relations  with  this  empire 
upon  a  safe  and  honorable  footing,  such  as  exists  between  all  friendly 
powers;  and  by  direct  appeal  to  the  Imperial  Government  at  Peking, 
to  obtain  a  compliance  with  the  following  among  other  important 
demands :" 

These  demands  included:  (1)  Permission  for  foreign 
envoys  to  reside  near  the  court  at  Peking  with  the  usual 
diplomatic  privileges.  (2)  Promulgation  of  a  fixed  tariff. 
(3)  A  system  of  bonding  warehouses,  or  some  regulations 


100  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

for  the  transshipment  of  goods  for  reexport.  (4)  Liberty  of 
trading  at  other  port  or  ports  in  China.  (5)  Compensation 
for  losses  caused  by  stoppage  of  legal  trade  and  guarantees 
for  the  future.  And  the  further  provision  (6)  "That  until 
the  Chinese  laws  are  distinctly  made  known  and  recognized, 
the  punishment  for  wrongs  committed  by  foreigners  upon 
the  Chinese,  or  others,  shall  not  be  greater  than  is  appli- 
cable to  the  like  offenses  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
or  England;  nor  shall  any  punishment  be  inflicted  by 
the  Chinese  authorities  upon  any  foreigner,  until  the 
guilt  of  the  party  shall  have  been  fairly  and  clearly 
proved." 

When  this  memorial  was  prepared  the  opium  had  been 
surrendered  to  Captain  Elliot  who  had  thus  become  respon- 
sible for  the  payment  for  it,  and  the  drug  had  been  de- 
stroyed. The  English  had  withdrawn  from  Canton  and  it 
was  evident  that  they  would  soon  begin  hostilities.  It  was 
also  assumed,  for  it  had  been  a  matter  of  discussion  for 
years,  that  when  the  peace  had  once  been  broken  it  would 
not  be  restored  until  other  ports  in  China  had  been  opened 
to  trade,  and  some  assurances  had  been  given  as  a  basis  for 
stable  diplomatic  relations.  On  other  matters  as  well  the 
time  was  fast  approaching  for  a  general  settlement.  The 
memorial  pointed  out  that  the  recent  action  of  the  authori- 
ties had  been  indiscriminate  and  unjust  in  that  it  had  made 
no  effort  to  differentiate  between  the  innocent  and  the 
guilty,  and  had  shown  scant  regard  for  facts  and  evidence. 
The  present  action  of  the  Chinese  Government  must  be 
resented  or  in  a  short  time  all  foreign  trade  would  be  driven 
out.  In  conclusion  the  Americans  express  the  'candid  con- 
viction' that  the  appearance  of  a  naval  force  from  the 
United  States,  England  and  France  upon  the  coast  of  China 
would,  without  bloodshed,  obtain  from  the  government 
proper  acknowledgments  and  treaties.  The  significant  fea- 
tures of  the  memorial  were:  absence  of  bitterness  towards 
the  Chinese;  proposals  for  joint  action  with  England;  and 
the  confident  expectation  that  peaceful  measures  would 
suffice. 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR  101 

The  Americans  had  taken  their  imprisonment  with  good 
humor.  There  had  been  some  alarm  at  the  outset  of  the 
confinement  but  the  intentions  of  Lin  soon  appeared  ag- 
gressive only  in  the  sense  that  he  was  determined  to  enforce 
a  policy  of  non-intercourse.  He  intended  no  bodily  harm  to 
the  Americans.  Prisoners  they  certainly  were  but  the  sup- 
plies, while  nominally  cut  off,  were  actually  smuggled  in 
each  night,  and  one  of  those  confined  afterwards  reported 
that  the  prisoners  suffered  more  during  their  confinement 
from  over-eating  and  lack  of  exercise  than  from  want  of 
any  necessity  of  life.^''*  The  arrival,  late  in  April,  of  Com- 
mander Read  with  the  Columbia  and  John  Adams  at  Macao, 
had  been  an  assurance  to  the  entire  community,  and  yet  the 
Americans  had  felt  so  much  better  able  to  handle  the  situa- 
tion at  Canton,  unassisted,  that  the  consul  had  asked  Read 
to  delay  coming  to  Canton  until  after  the  affair  was 
settled.i« 

"It  would  be  a  fete  gratifying,  I  doubt  not,"  wrote  the  Chaplain 
of  the  Squadron,  "to  all  the  officers  of  our  ship  from  the  highest  to 
the  lowest  to  force  the  Bogue,  and  to  demand  without  delay  the 
Americans  now  held  within  their  premises  at  Canton.  But  the  ap- 
prehension is  that,  as  their  numbers  are  comparatively  so  small  and 
a  mob  of  a  numerous  populace  is  ever  so  ready  to  do  the  bidding  of 
the  reckless  and  the  abandoned,  our  approach  might  be  attended  with 
danger  from  the  rabble  at  Canton.  The  authorities  themselves  have 
said,  all  that  they  have  to  do  for  the  destruction  of  those  now  within 
their  power  is  to  allow  the  mob  to  do  their  wishes.  And  there  may  be 
truth  in  all  this,  as  there  is  a  general  impression  among  the  lower 
classes  of  the  Chinese  at  Canton  that  the  foreign  factories  are  filled 
with  the  precious  metals,  and  that  the  plunder  were  well  worth  the 
sacrifice  of  the  heads  of  a  few  'foreign  devils'  that  have  the  custody 
of  it." 

Probably  the  sudden  appearance  of  the  American  naval 
vessels  had  a  more  important  influence  in  dissuading  Com- 
missioner Lin  from  occupying  Macao  in  such  a  way  as  to 
prevent  the  English  from  carrying  out  their  plans  to  with- 
draw to  that  city  as  soon  as  the  opium  was  delivered,^" 

It  was  not  so  much  the  action  of  the  Chinese  as  that  of 
the  British  which  moved  the  Americans  to  ask  for  a  com- 
missioner to  negotiate  a  treaty.     Left  to  themselves,  the 


102  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Americans  would  have  been  content  with  the  old  arrange- 
ments or  at  least  they  would  not  have  moved  to  change 
them.  They  were  even  entirely  willing — provided  the  mer- 
chants of  other  nations  would  agree  to  a  similar  course — to 
forego  the  opium  trade,  as  the  price  of  their  future  safety 
and  comfort.  Indeed  they  would  have  welcomed  the  end 
of  the  opium  traffic,  for  its  suppression  would  mean  better 
markets  for  American  produce.  But  now  that  the  house  of 
cards  was  tumbling,  and  the  benevolent  despotism  under 
which  they  had  been  living  was  in  the  way  of  being  altered, 
they  not  unnaturally  wished  the  United  States  to  be  repre- 
sented in  the  coming  settlement. 

Congress  Becomes  Interested 

When  Congress  took  up  the  discussion  of  the  Anglo- 
Chinese  War  in  1840,  American  public  opinion  was  better 
prepared  than  at  any  time  previously  to  express  itself.  The 
commercial  interest  in  China,  while  still  confined  to  the 
Atlantic  seaboard,  had  broadened.  Whereas  twenty-five 
years  before  the  steady  drain  of  specie  caused  by  the  trade 
had  created  popular  prejudice  against  it,  now  the  growth  of 
manufacturing  in  the  North  which  looked  to  the  South  for 
supplies  of  raw  cotton,  tended  to  arouse  a  general  interest  in 
the  markets  of  China.  The  reports  of  the  American  mis- 
sionaries who  had  already  been  at  work  in  China  for  a 
decade  had  stimulated  in  the  United  States  an  ever  grow- 
ing philanthropic  interest  in  the  Empire  and  their  reports 
on  the  evils  of  the  opium  trade  were  a  powerful  factor  in 
shaping  public  opinion.  The  American  people  were  also 
alert  to  find  in  the  conflict  merely  another  phase  of  world- 
wide British  aggression  with  which  they  had  been  made 
familiar  in  the  War  of  1812,  the  memory  of  which  was  still 
green.  The  tumultuous  events  of  1839  at  Canton  were  fol- 
lowed in  the  United  States  with  lively  interest. 

Early  in  January,  1840,  the  memorial  of  the  American 
merchants  at  Canton  asking  for  naval  protection  and  the 
appointment  of  a  commissioner  to  negotiate  a  treaty  was 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR  103 

presented  to  the  House  by  Abbott  Lawrence  of  Massa- 
chusetts.^* 

A  resolution  *  passed  in  the  House  February  7,  1840, 
asking  the  President  for  information  "respecting  the  condi- 
tion of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  doing  business 
during  the  past  year  in  China;  the  state  of  the  American 
trade  with  that  country;  and  the  interests  of  the  people 
and  commerce  of  the  United  States,  as  affected  by  the  recent 
measures  of  the  Chinese  Government  for  the  suppression  of 
the  contraband  or  forcible  introduction  of  opium  into  China. 
Also  whether  the  British  Government  had  given  notice  to 
that  of  the  United  States  of  a  purpose  to  blockade  the  ports 
of  China,  or  of  other  hostile  intentions  towards  that 
Government."  ^^ 

In  April  a  large  group  of  Boston  and  Salem  merchants 
and  ship  owners  interested  in  the  China  trade,  apparently 
fearing  that  Congress  might  be  spurred  to  precipitate  action, 
also  memorialized  Congress,  urging  caution.  They  submit- 
ted some  additional  information  and  expressed  the  fear  that 
while  the  attention  of  the  Chinese  Government  was  engaged 
in  the  war  the  usual  efforts  to  suppress  the  pirates  along  the 
coast  would  be  neglected,  and  that  American  shipping, 
which  was  usually  slightly  armed  and  carried  on  with  small 
crews,  would  be  endangered.  They  therefore  approved  the 
request  of  their  correspondents  in  China  for  an  American 
naval  force  in  Chinese  waters.  But  beyond  taking  this 
action,  they  hoped  that  the  government  would  proceed  with 
great  deliberation.  They  would  even  deprecate  giving  to 
any  naval  commander  any  powers  to  interfere  in  the  conflict 
between  England  and  China,  or  to  enter  into  any  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  Chinese.  "The  result  of  more  than  one 
attempt,"  they  stated,  "of  our  British  neighbors  to  improve 
their  position  with  the  Chinese  has  been  upon  each  occa- 
sion the  imposition  of  further  restraint  upon  all  foreigners 
and  such,  we  believe,  would  follow  any  negotiations  on  the 
part  of  the  Americans  based  upon  the  established  usages 
among  other  nations."  -^    This  memorial,  signed  as  it  was 

*  Report  submitted  February  25,  1840. 


104  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

by  many  who  had  already  spent  years  in  China,  expressed 
the  wisdom  of  age  as  compared  with  the  wisdom  of  youth, 
and  the  advice  was  accepted.  The  East  India  Squadron, 
under  Commodore  Kearny,  was  dispatched  to  China,  but  no 
further  step  was  taken. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  in  this  memorial  the  inference 
that  the  British  aggression  in  China,  so  far  from  being  re- 
garded as  an  opportunity  by  the  Americans,  was  really 
looked  upon  as  an  embarrassment. 

Public  sentiment  in  the  United  States  at  the  time  was 
clearly  reflected  in  the  following  episode  in  the  House 
(March  16,  1840)  when  Caleb  Cushing  rose  to  interrogate 
the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  and  to 
correct  some  'misapprehensions'  which  appeared  to 
exist  abroad  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  United  States  in 
China.-i 

After  recalling  the  fact  that  he  had  proposed  the  resolu- 
tion calling  upon  the  President  for  information  with  refer- 
ence to  China,  and  that  the  memorial  of  the  Canton  mer- 
chants had  been  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  he  said: 

"I  am  somewhat  disturbed  to  learn,  through  the  intelligence 
brought  by  the  Great  Western,  that  these  movements  here  are  con- 
strued in  England  as  indicating  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the 
American  Government  'to  join  heart  and  hand  with  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, and  endeavor  to  obtain  commercial  treaties  from  the  au- 
thorities in  China.'  Now  as  for  myself,  I  wish  to  say  that  this  is  a 
great  misconception,  if  it  be  not  #  wilful  perversion,  of  what  is  con- 
templated here.  I  have,  it  is  true,  thought  that  the  present  contin- 
gency,— when  the  Americans  in  Canton,  and  they  almost  or  quite 
alone,  have  manifested  a  proper  respect  for  the  laws  and  public 
rights  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  in  honorable  contrast  with  the  out- 
rageous misconduct  of  the  English  there, — and  when  the  Chinese 
Government,  grateful  for  the  upright  deportment  of  the  Americans, 
has  manifested  the  best  possil)le  feeling  toward  them, — I  have  thought 
that  these  circumstances  aiforded  a  favorable  opportimity  to  en- 
deavor to  put  the  American  trade  with  China  on  a  just  and  stable 
footing  for  the  future. 

*'But  God  forbid  that  I  should  entertain  the  idea  of  cooperating 
with  the  British  Government  in  the  purpose,  if  purpose  it  has,  of 
upholding  the  base  cupidity  and  violence  and  high-handed  infraction 
of  all  law,  human  and  divine,  which  have  characterized  the  operation 
of  the  British,  individually  and  collectively,  in  the  seas  of  China. 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR  105 

...  I  trust  that  the  idea  will  no  longer  be  entertained  in  England 
that  she  will  receive  aid  or  countenance  from  the  United  States  in 
that  nefarious  enterprise." 

Thus  began  the  myth  in  the  United  States,  at  a  time 
when  the  Americans  at  Canton  were  riding  rough-shod  over 
Commissioner  Lin's  embargo  on  English  trade,  and  smug- 
gling the  English  cargoes  for  the  season,  both  in  and  out 
of  the  port,  that  the  American  in  China  was  an  angel  of 
light.  This  complacency  is  entirely  comparable  with  the 
contemporaneous  misrepresentations  in  England  of  Chinese 
ethics  and  foreign  poUcy. 

Within  a  year  three  reports  were  laid  before  Congress; 
a  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  February  25,  1840,  a  re- 
port of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  the  China  trade, 
July  1,  1840,-^  and  a  supplementary  report  of  the  Secretary 
of  State,  January  25,  1841,--^  the  last  in  response  to  a  request 
of  John  Quincy  Adams,  chairman  of  the  House  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations,  for  ''copies  of  all  documents  in  the 
Department  of  State  or  other  departments,  showing  the 
origin  of  any  political  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Empire  of  China;  the  first  appointment  of  a  consul 
to  reside  at  or  near  Canton;  whether  such  consul,  or  any 
subsequently  appointed,  has  ever  been  received  or  recog- 
nized in  that  capacity;  and  the  present  relations  between 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  that  of  the  Celes- 
tial Empire." 

These  three  reports  and  the  two  memorials  above  dis- 
cussed comprise  a  documentary  history  of  American  rela- 
tions with  China,  giving  in  great  detail  the  Terranova 
incident  of  1821,  and  the  events  of  1839. 

Public  sentiment  ran  strongly  to  disapproval  of  the  Brit- 
ish action.  It  is  notable  that  this  opinion  was  by  no  means 
confined  to  religious  and  philanthropic  circles,  but  that  it 
extended  to  commercial  interests.  ''China  has  a  perfect 
right  to  regulate  the  character  of  her  imports,"  -^  asserted 
a  writer  in  Hunt's  MercJiants  Magazine.  The  leading 
article  in  the  same  magazine  for  January,  1841,  had  pointed 
out  that  while  the  importations  of  opium  from  India  into 


106  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

China  had  created  a  favorable  condition  for  English  com- 
merce, it  had  not  been  beneficial  to  Americans.  There  was 
a  general  feeling  that  the  extinction  of  the  opium  trade 
would  help  the  commercial  interests  of  the  United  States,  as 
well  as  the  moral  and  physical  welfare  of  China.  American 
and  Chinese  interests  were  in  this,  as  well  as  in  other  points, 
identical. 

The  attitude  of  John  Quincy  Adams  on  the  China  ques- 
tion is  especially  worth  noting  for  several  reasons.  He  had 
been  Secretary  of  State  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of 
Terranova,  and  while  he  had  refrained  from  expressing  an 
opinion  on  the  action  of  the  Americans,  he  had  been  made 
familiar  with  an  aspect  of  Chinese-American  relations  little 
understood  or  appreciated  by  those  who  were  discussing  the 
question  in  1840-43.  He  was  also  the  chairman  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  at  the  same  time  he  was  inti- 
mately acquainted  with  the  Boston  and  Salem  merchants. 
A  clue  to  the  way  Adams'  mind  was  working  is  to  be  noted 
in  his  remarks  on  presenting  for  a  third  time  (December  16, 
1840)  his  resolution  asking  for  the  supplementary  report  on 
the  state  of  American  political  relations  with  the  Celestial 
Empire.  He  recounted  an  incident  "■''  which,  although  not 
then  made  public,  should  be  noted  here.  Snow  had  reported, 
after  the  English  had  withdrawn  from  Canton,  and  while 
the  Americans  were  enjoying  such  unbounded  prosperity 
through  their  almost  complete  monopoly  of  the  trade,  and 
were  in  more  or  less  conflict  with  the  Chinese  authorities 
over  the  signing  of  the  bond,  and  the  importation  of  British 
goods : 

''Correspondence  with  this  government  is  exceedingly  troublesome, 
for  the  replies  to  the  Commissioner's  edicts  are  seen  by  the  Kwang- 
Chow-foo  (Prefect)  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  any  error  that  may 
be  made  in  the  translation,  as  any  imguarded  expression  would  bring 
him  into  certain  trouble.  The  reply,  of  which  I  now  send  you  a  copy, 
was  returned  by  this  officer,  requesting  that  I  add  an  expression  of 
gratitude  for  all  favors  bestowed  upon  me  by  the  great  Emperor,  and 
likewise  a  hope  for  the  continuation  of  the  Celestial  dynasty's  trade 
with  my  nation,  placing  the  Celestial  dynasty  about  an  inch  higher 
on  the  paper  than  my  nation,  thereby  admitting  their  superiority.  I 
declined  doing  either,  and  sent  it  as  originally  written.     These  trifles 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR  107 

serve  to  show  their  determination  never  to  permit  a  foreign  nation  to 
presume  to  an  equality  with  their  own." 

This,  thought  Adams,  was  the  'true  ground'  of  the  war 
then  raging  between  Great  Britain  and  China — 'this  boasted 
superiority  above  every  nation  on  earth.'  Without  going 
into  a  discussion  of  the  objects  and  causes  of  the  English 
war  with  China,  it  must  be  recognized  that  whatever  may 
have  been  the  immediate  issues,  Adams  was  right  as  to  the 
fundamental  instability  of  any  relationship  where  English- 
men— or  Americans — were  called  upon  to  submit  their  lives 
and  property  unreservedly  to  a  despotism,  however  benevo- 
lent that  despotism  might  ordinarily  be  in  practice, 

Adams  made  a  careful  study  of  both  the  American  Gov- 
ernment reports  and  the  EngUsh  blue  books  on  the  situation 
in  China,-**  and  in  December,  1841,  in  a  lecture  before  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  he  said: 

"The  fundamental  principle  of  the  Chinese  Empire  is  anti-com- 
mercial. ...  It  admits  no  obligation  to  hold  commercial  intercourse 
with  others.  It  utterly  denies  the  equality  of  other  nations  with  itself, 
and  even  their  independence.  It  holds  itself  to  be  the  center  of  the 
terraqueous  globe,  equal  to  the  heavenly  host,  and  all  other  nations 
with  whom  it  has  any  relations,  political  or  commercial,  as  outside 
tributary  barbarians  reverently  submissive  to  the  will  of  its  despotic 
chief.  It  is  upon  this  principle,  openly  avowed  and  inflexibly  inain- 
tained,  that  the  principal  maritime  nations  of  Europe  for  several 
centuries,  and  the  United  States  of  America  from  the  time  of  their 
acknowledged  independence,  have  been  content  to  hold  commercial  in- 
tercourse with  the  Empire  of  China. 

'Tt  is  time  that  this  enormous  outrage  upon  the  rights  of  human 
nature,  and  upon  the  first  principle  of  the  rights  of  nations  should 
cease.  .  .  . 

"This  is  the  truth,  and,  I  apprehend,  the  only  question  at  issue 
between  the  governments  and  nations  of  Great  Britain  and  China. 
It  is  a  general,  but  I  believe  altogether  mistaken  opinion  that  the 
quarrel  is  merely  for  certain  chests  of  opium  imported  by  British 
merchants  into  China,  and  seized  by  the  Chinese  Government  for 
having  been  imported  contrary  to  law.  This  is  a  mere  incident  to  the 
dispute;  but  no  more  the  cause  of  war,  than  the  throwing  overboard 
of  the  tea  in  the  Boston  harbor  was  the  cause  of  the  North  American 
Revolution. 

"The  cause  of  war  is  the  kotow! — the  arrogant  and  insupportable 
pretensions  of  China,  that  she  will  hold  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  rest  of  mankind,  not  upon  terms  of  equal  reciprocity,  but  upon 
the  insulting  and  degrading  forms  of  relation  between  lord  and  vas- 
sal." ''■ 


108  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"The  excitement  of  public  opinion  and  feeling  by  the 
delivery  of  this  lecture,"  Adams  recorded  in  his  journal, 
"far  exceeds  any  expectation  that  I  had  formed."  Dr.  John 
Palfry,  editor  of  the  North  American  Review,  declined  to 
print  it  as  an  article  in  the  magazine. 

Rev.  Peter  Parker,  M.  D.,  the  first  American  medical 
missionary  to  China,  visited  the  United  States  at  this  time 
and  was  very  actively  engaged  in  arousing  and  educating 
public  opinion  on  the  China  question.  He  laid  the  matter 
before  President  Tyler  and  was  frequently  in  touch  with 
John  Quincy  Adams.  In  March,  1841,  he  urged  that  the 
United  States  extend  its  good  offices  to  mediate  between 
England  and  the  Celestial  Empire.  Subsequently  Parker 
asked  Adams  if  he  would  consider  the  position  of  commis- 
sioner to  China,  to  which  the  latter  replied  that  he  might, 
if  the  offer  came  from  authorized  quarters,  but  he  thought 
that  a  formal  mission  at  that  time  (June  2,  1842)  was  inex- 
pedient.-^ 

Commodore  Kearny's  Most-Favored-Nation  Agreement 

Six  weeks  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking, 
between  England  and  China,  Commodore  Kearny,  being 
under  the  impression  that  the  treaty  had  not  yet  been  con- 
cluded, addressed  the  following  letter  to  the  Governor  of 
Canton:  """^ 

"The  undersif^ned  is  desirous  that  the  attention  of  the  Imperial 
Government  might  be  called  with  respect  to  the  commercial  interests 
of  the  United  States,  and  he  hopes  that  the  importance  of  their  trade 
will  receive  consideration,  and  their  citizens,  in  that  matter,  be  placed 
upon  the  same  footing  as  the  merchants  of  the  nation  most  favored." 

A  week  later  Kiying  replied : 

Decidedly  it  shall  not  be  permitted  that  American  merchants  shall 
come  to  have  merely  a  dry  stick  (that  is,  their  interests  shall  be  at- 
tended to).  I,  the  Governor,  will  not  be  otherwise  disposed  than  to 
look  up  to  the  heart  of  the  great  Emperor  in  his  compassionate  regard 
towards  those  men  from  afar,  that  Chinese  and  foreigners  with  faith 
and  justice  may  be  mutually  united,  and  forever  enjoy  reciprocal 
tranquillity,  and  that  it  be  granted  to  each  of  the  resident  merchants 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR  109 

to  obtain  profit,  and  to  the  people  to  enjoy  life  and  peace,  and  uni- 
versally to  participate  in  the  blessings  of  great  prosperity,  striving  to 
have  tlie  same  mind." 

Commodore  Kearny  returned  to  Macao  in  January, 
1843,  after  a  cruise  to  Manila,  and  heard  rumors  that  only 
English  vessels  would  be  allowed  to  trade  in  the  newly 
opened  ports.  In  a  private  conversation  Admiral  Sir 
Thomas  Cochrane  told  him  that  "the  other  nations  must 
look  out  for  themselves."  Kearny  therefore  took  opportun- 
ity, while  communicating  with  the  Governor  about  the 
settlement  of  some  claims,  to  urge  the  necessity  for  most- 
favored-nation  treatment  to  Americans  in  China.  The 
Governor,  under  the  misapprehension  that  Kearny  had 
authority  to  settle  the  matter  for  the  United  States,  replied 
that  it  was  only  necessary  for  him  to  await  the  arrival 
of  the  commissioners  from  the  Emperor  to  make  an  agree- 
ment with  reference  to  the  trade  "and  when  some  plan  is 
adopted,  then  a  personal  interview  may  be  held  with  your 
honor,  the  commodore,  and  face  to  face,  the  relation  of  the 
two  countries  may  be  arranged,  and  the  same  reported  to 
the  Emperor." 

The  American  officer  thought  he  detected  in  the  reply  of 
the  Governor  an  assumption  of  superiority  for  China  as 
compared  with  the  United  States  and  therefore  replied,  dis- 
claiming that  the  United  States  would  come  to  China  in  the 
attitude  of  begging  a  favor. 

"The  commodore  also  avails  of  this  communication  again  to  say," 
he  went  on,  "that  what  His  Imperial  Majesty  grants  to  the  traders 
from  other  countries,  his  own  sovereign  will  demand  for  his  mer- 
chants." 

Kearny  therefore  urged  the  appointment  of  commis- 
sioners to  negotiate  a  treaty.  To  this  the  Governor  replied, 
withdrawing  a  little  from  his  former  cordiality,  and  assuring 
the  commodore  that  anything  so  formal  as  a  treaty  was 
quite  unnecessary. 

On  September  20,  1843,  the  consular  agent  at  Canton 
notified  the  Secretary  of  State  ^°  that  the  trade  had  been 


110  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

thrown  open  to  all  foreigners  on  an  equal  footing.  He 
stated:  "Our  countrymen  have  now  all  the  privileges 
granted  to  the  British,  and  the  feeling  of  the  Government 
and  people  of  China  continues  favorably  disposed  towards 
Americans." 

Credit  for  persuading  the  Chinese  to  open  the  ports  to 
all  nations  on  equal  terms  was  claimed  by  the  English  Pleni- 
potentiary, Sir  Henry  Pottinger,^^  but  a  subsequent  discov- 
ery at  Canton  placed  the  matter  in  a  different  light.  The 
Chinese  text  of  Article  VIII  of  the  English  treaty  of  1843, 
when  translated  back  into  English,  was  found  to  be  some- 
what different  from  the  original  English  text.  It  contains 
the  following  explanation : 

"Formerly  the  merchants  of  every  foreign  nation  were  permitted 
to  trade  at  the  single  port  of  Canton  only,  but  last  year  it  was 
agreed  at  Nanking,  that  if  the  Emperor  should  ratify  the  treaty,  the 
merchants  of  the  various  nations  of  Europe  should  be  allowed  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  four  ports  of  Foochow,  Ningpo,  Amoy  and  Shanghai  for 
the  purposes  of  trade,  to  which  the  English  were  not  to  make  any 
objections.  .  .  ."  ^ 

From  this  it  seems  clear  that  neither  to  Sir  Henry  Pot- 
tinger  nor  to  Commodore  Kearny,  but  to  the  Chinese  them- 
selves belongs  the  credit  of  having  opened  their  ports  freely 
to  other  nations. 

In  the  light  of  subsequent  history  this  fact  becomes 
especially  interesting  for  the  most-favored-nation  clause,  as 
applied  to  China  became  what  is  really  the  foundation  of 
the  more  widely  famed  "open-door"  policy.  This  policy, 
while  obviously  to  the  advantage  of  the  Americans,  was, 
equally  clearly,  the  deliberate  choice  of  the  Chinese  them- 
selves. The  Chinese  have  adopted  a  similar  policy  repeat- 
edly in  more  recent  times. 

This  promise  of  most-favored-nation  treatment,  the  in- 
troduction of  which  into  Chinese  international  affairs  in 
the  form  of  an  iron-bound  treaty  agreement,  is  due  pri- 
marily to  Commodore  Kearny,  became  in  practice  something 
far  more  than  a  block  by  which  the  door  to  commercial 
privileges  could  be  held  open.    The  clause  had  not  been  in- 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR  111 

serted  in  the  Treaty  of  Nanking  but  it  did  appear  in  the 
British  Supplementary  Treaty  of  1843,  negotiated  a  few 
months  after  Kearny  left  China,  and  it  has  been  included  in 
every  subsequent  treaty  engagement  with  a  foreign  Power. 
The  open  door  of  equal  commercial  opportunity,  which  it 
guaranteed,  was  one  thing,  and  entirely  desirable  for  China, 
but  quite  different  was  the  fact  that  it  became  a  device  by 
which  every  nation  thereafter  could  secure  for  itself  any 
privilege  which  had  been  extorted  by  some  other  Power 
from  China  by  force,  or  tricked  from  her  by  fraud,  without 
having  to  assume  the  moral  responsibility  for  the  method 
by  which  the  concession  had  been  obtained. 

Usually  in  after  years  when  China  took  a  hand  in  the 
international  game  she  must  play  alone,  against  the  entire 
and  united  company  of  Powers,  a  trick  taken  by  her  most 
unscrupulous  opponent  counted  equally  for  the  benefit  of 
all. 

The  Mission  Created 

After  the  news  of  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking 
had  been  received.  President  Tyler  (December  30,  1842) 
addressed  to  Congress  a  special  message  written  by  Daniel 
Webster,  Secretary  of  State,  dealing  at  length  with  the  sit- 
uation in  the  Sandwich  Islands  and  in  China.  The  message 
summarized  the  reports  of  the  opening  of  new  Chinese  ports 
to  British  commerce  but  expressed  ignorance  as  to  whether 
these  ports  would  also  be  open  to  the  trade  of  other  nations. 
It  noted  that  the  American  trade  while  subject  to  great 
fluctuations,  had  reached  as  much  as  $9,000,000  annually, 
and  would  doubtless  be  greatly  increased  by  means  of 
access  to  the  new  ports. 

"Being  of  the  opinion,"  said  the  message,  "that  the  commercial 
interests  of  the  United  States  connected  with  China  require  at  the 
present  time  a  degree  of  vigilance  such  as  there  is  no  agent  of  this 
government  on  the  spot  to  bestow,  I  recommend  to  Congress  to  make 
appropriation  for  the  compensation  of  a  commissioner  to  reside  in 
China,  to  exercise  a  watchful  care  over  the  concerns  of  American  citi- 
zens, and  for  the  protection  of  their  persons  and  property,  empowered 
to  hold  intercourse  with  the  legal  authorities  and  ready,  under  in- 


112  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

structions  from  his  government,  should  such  instructions  become 
necessary  and  proper  hereafter,  to  address  himself  to  the  high  func- 
tionaries of  the  Empire,  or  through  them  to  the  Emperor  himself."  ** 

The  President's  message  proposed  a  resident  commis- 
sioner, continuously  attending  to  the  commercial  and  diplo- 
matic affairs.  The  report  on  the  proposed  action  by  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  presented  January  24, 
1843,^^  was  much  less  specific  proposing  an  appropriation  of 
$40,000  to  enable  the  President  to  accomplish  that  object, 
without  deeming  it  necessary  to  designate  the  specific  rank 
or  character  of  the  agents  whom  he  may  employ  for  that 
purpose,  or  more  especially  to  limit  the  contingent  expenses 
which  may  occur  in  the  process  of  its  accomplishment." 
This  latter  provision  aroused  the  suspicions  of  many  who 
did  not  have  great  confidence  in  President  Tyler,  .and  the 
report  was  passed  (March  3,  1843),  in  an  amended  form 
providing  that  no  person  should  be  employed  in  the  mission 
for  more  than  $9,000,  exclusive  of  outfit,  and  that  no  agent 
should  be  appointed  without  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.^^ 

Even  this  arrangement  was  not  satisfactory  to  every  one. 
Senator  Benton  strenuously  objected  to  the  mission  as 
being  "wholly  personal  and  invented  for  the  indemnification 
to  one  person,  for  vacating  his  place  for  the  benefit  of 
another.  I  repeat  it,"  cried  Benton,  "the  mission  is  not 
created  for  the  country  but  invented  for  one  man ;  and  he  is 
now  waiting  to  take  it,  and  to  go  up  and  bump  his 
head  nineteen  times  against  the  ground  in  order  to  pur- 
chase the  privilege  of  standing  up  before  his  Celestial 
Majesty." 

Senator  Benton's  remark  referred  to  the  rumor  that 
Edward  Everett,  then  minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James, 
was  to  be  appointed  to  the  mission,  thus  creating  a  place  in 
London  for  Daniel  Webster  who  was  about  to  resign  as 
Secretary  of  State.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  facts  at 
the  base  of  the  rumor,  and  Webster  denied  in  a  personal 
letter  to  Everett  that  there  was  any  basis  for  it,  the  selection 
of  Edward  Everett  for  the  mission  was  evidence  of  the 


THE  AMERICANS  AND  THE  ANGLO-CHINESE  WAR  113 

extreme  importance  which  was  now  attached  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  suitable  diplomatic  relations  with  China. 

"It  is  not  intended,"  wrote  Webster  to  Everett,  March  10,  1843," 
"to  dazzle  the  Emperor  by  show,  nor  soothe  him  by  presents ;  still  the 
mission  should  be  respectable,  and  the  commissioner  should  have  the 
means  proper  and  necessary  to  carry  forward  the  undertaking?.  .  .  . 
Mr.  Adams  came  to  see  me  yesterday.  He  feels  the  greatest  anxiety 
that  you  should  undertake  the  China  mission  which  he  regards  as  a 
most  important  affair." 

But  Everett  declined  the  nomination,  and  the  post  was 
given  to  Caleb  Cushing  of  Newburyport,  Massachusetts,  a 
member  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  and  a  warm 
supporter  of  President  Tyler.  Senator  Benton,  a  bitter 
partisan  in  the  opposition  to  the  President,  described  Cush- 
ing ^^  as  one  who  had  been  three  times  rejected  in  one  day 
upon  nomination  for  the  position  of  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  and  said  of  him : 

"He  had  deserted  his  party  to  join  Mr.  Tyler.  He  worked  for 
him  in  and  out  of  the  House,  and  even  deserted  himself  to  support 
him — as  in  the  two  tariff  bills  of  the  current  session;  for  both  of 
which  he  voted,  and  then'  voted  against  them  when  vetoed." 

A  member  of  the  House  described  him  as  the  man  who 
"had  voted  for  every  bill  and  then  justified  every  veto." 
"Cushing  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  was  forty-four 
years  old,  and  had  served  in  the  House  as  a  Whig  since 
1834.  He  was  the  son  of  a  Newburyport  ship  owner,  an 
amazingly  brilliant  lawyer,  and  probably  as  familiar  with 
the  questions  with  which  he  would  have  to  deal  in  China  as 
any  man  who  could  have  been  selected  from  public  life.  The 
secretary  of  the  mission  was  Daniel  Webster's  son,  Fletcher. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Forbes'    "Personal    Reminiscences,"    p.    338;    Hunt's   American 

Merchants,  Vol.  1,  p.  64;  Hunter's  "Fan  Ivwae,"  p.  100;  Ses- 
sional Papers,  1830,  Vol.  6,  p.  377. 

2.  Morse's  "International  Relations,"  Vol.  1,  pp.  118-44,  gives  a  full 

account  of  the  Napier  incident. 

3.  Staunton's  Miscellaneous  Notices,  p.  16. 

4.  Chinese  Repository,  Vol.  5,  July,  1836,  pp.  138-144. 


114  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

5.  H.  Doc.  119:2G-1,  Dispatch  No.  17,  March  5,  1839. 

6.  Ibid. 

7.  Op.  cit..  No.  18,  Mar.  22. 

8.  Op.  cit,  No.  19,  Apr.  19. 

9.  Ihid. 

10.  Op.  cit.  No.  20,  May  13. 

11.  Captains'  Letters  (Navy  Dept.)  May  28,  1839,  No.  101. 

12.  Forbes'  "Reminiscences,"  p.  149. 

13.  Ihid.,  pp.  151,  155. 

14.  H.  Doc.  40:26-1. 

15.  "China  and  the  China  Trade,"  by  R.  B.  Forbes  (Boston,  1844) 

p.  49. 

16.  "The  Flag  Ship,"  by  Fitch  W.  Taylor,  New  York,  1840.     (2  vols.) 

Vol.  2,  pp.  110-11. 

17.  H.  Doc.  119:26-1,  No.  21,  May  22,  1839. 

18.  H.  Jour.    (26-1)   p.  189;   VIII  Cong.   Globe,  p.   109;   H.   Doc. 

40:26-1. 

19.  H.  Jour.  26-1,  p.  368;  H.  Doc.  119:26-1. 

20.  H.  Jour.  26-1,  p.  781 ;  H.  Doc.  170  :26-l. 

21.  VIII  Cong.  Globe,  26-1,  p.  275. 

22.  H.  Doc.  119:26-1;  H.  Doc.  248:26-1;  H.  Doc.  71:26-2;  H.  Jour. 

26-2,  p.  46. 

23.  H.  Doc.  71 :26-2. 

24.  Hunt's  Merchants'  Magazine,  March,  1843,  p.  205. 

25.  H.  Doc.  119:26-1,  Dispatch  25,  Sept.  25,  1839. 

26.  John  Quincy  Adams  Memoirs,  Vol.  11,  p.  30. 

27.  Chinese  Repository,  Vol.  9,  May,  1842,  p.  281. 

28.  "Life  and  Letters  of  the  Rev.  and  Hon.  Peter  Parker,  M.  D.," 

by  Stevens  and  Marwick  (Boston  and  Chicago,  1896)  pp.  182-5, 
220-1 ;  Adams  Memoirs,  Vol.  10,  pp.  444-5. 

29.  S.   Doc.   139:29-1;   The  Kearny  correspondence  at   Canton  was 

published  with  great  fullness  in  this  document. 

30.  Canton  Consular  Letters,  Vol.  3. 

31.  Littell's  Living  Age,  Vol.  4,  p.  387,  quoting  an  address  made  by 

Sir  Henry  Pottinger. 

32.  Chinese  Repository,  Vol.  12,  Mar.,  1844,  p.  145.     (This  article, 

as  it  appears  in  the  treaties  published  by  the  Chinese  Mari- 
time Customs,  is  translated  still  differently).  See  also  S.  Ex. 
Doc.  67:28-2,  Gushing  to  Calhoun,  Aug.  26,  1844. 

33.  H.  Doc.  35  :27-3  gives  this  message  in  fuller  form  than  Richard- 

son, including  the  most  recent  trade  statistics. 

34.  H.  Report  93:27-3. 

35.  V.   Statutes  at  Large,  24-28  Cong.  Vol.   15,  p.   624;  H.   Rept. 

93:27-3.     XII  Cong.  Globe,  pp.  323,  325,  391. 

36.  Webster  Papers  (Lib.  of  Congress). 

37.  Benton's  "Thirty  Years'  View."    Vol.  2,  p.  514. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  AMERICAN  SHARE  IN  THE  OPIUM  TRADE 

As  has  already  been  intimated  the  Americans  entered  the 
opium  trade  at  an  early  day.  They  carried  the  drug  to 
China  from  both  Turkey  and  India.  "Among  the  produc- 
tions of  Turkey,  and  Egypt,"  reads  an  old  consular  trade 
report  from  Smyrna,  "there  are  many  that  would  answer 
well  for  the  internal  consumption  of  the  United  States,  or 
for  their  foreign  expeditions."  ^  Opium  was  mentioned  as 
an  article  which  might  be  shipped  to  India  with  profit,  but 
the  Americans  quickly  learned  that  the  growing  market  for 
opium  was  farther  East.  The  American  trade  in  Turkey 
opium  began  as  early  as  1805,  perhaps  earlier,  when  three 
American  brigs,  two  from  Philadelphia  and  one  from  Balti- 
more, cleared  from  Smyrna  with  the  drug.  In  that  year  the 
Americans  took  out  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  cases  and 
fifty-one  boxes  of  the  drug. 

Turkey  and  India  Opium 

The  trade  with  Turkey  increased,  though  not  very 
rapidly,  during  the  first  three  decades  of  the  century.  Ves- 
sels from  Boston  and  Salem  appeared  in  1806,-  and  there 
had  been  one  from  New  York  the  previous  year.  Th^ 
American  shipping  returns  for  the  year  1823  show  the  clear- 
ance of  18  vessels:  12  of  Boston;  1  of  Salem;  1  of  Duxbury; 
3  of  Baltimore  and  1  of  Philadelphia.  The  following  year 
there  were  17  vessels,  14  of  which  were  from  Boston.  They 
carried  1651  cases  of  opium.  The  largest  amount  of  this 
drug  reported  as  exported  from  Smyrna  in  any  one  year 
before  1830  was  1741  cases  and  chests.  Complete  figures  are 
more  difficult  to  obtain  after  1828  for  shortly  before  that 

115 


116  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

time  the  Turkey  trade  was  shifted,  in  part,  to  Constanti- 
nople. That  the  trade  was  profitable  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  one  of  the  special  agents  employed  by  the  United 
States  at  that  time  to  study  trade  conditions  with  Turkey 
with  a  view  to  effecting  a  treaty  with  the  Empire,  reported 
that  opium  would  probably  prove  to  be  one  of  the  most 
profitable  items  in  the  trade. 

Direct  voyages  from  Turkey  to  China  were  not  common 
after  the  first  few  years.  The  opium  was  either  shipped 
directly  to  American  ports  and  then  transshipped  to  China 
after  subtracting  the  amount  necessary  for  the  American 
market,  or  else  it  was  transferred  to  China-bound  vessels  in 
English  ports.  Sometimes,  however,  the  cargoes  were  trans- 
shipped from  one  vessel  to  another  at  sea  near  Gibraltar.^ 

In  China  the  Turkey  opium  was  not  so  highly  valued  as 
that  from  India.  It  sold  for  less  and  was  sometimes  used 
in  the  adulteration  of  the  higher  priced  product.  It  is 
quite  impossible  to  determine  with  any  precision  the 
amounts  of  Turkey  opium  which  were  delivered  in  China, 
for  the  smuggling  was  great.  The  earliest  figures  from 
Canton  show  the  following  importations:  Season  1805-6, 
102  chests;  1806-7,  180  chests;  1807-8,  150  chests.  It  is 
asserted  by  one  who  traded  in  it  extensively  that  from  1827 
to  1830  the  Americans  disposed  of  from  twelve  to  fourteen 
hundred  piculs  annually."*  Whatever  the  amount,  the 
Americans  were  thoroughly  identified,  in  the  minds  of  the 
Chinese,  with  Turkey  opium.''  When  the  survivors  of  the 
wrecked  bark  Swida  were  taken  to  Canton  in  1839  and  had 
an  interview  with  the  commissioner,  one  of  them  reported: 

"He  [tlie  commissioner]  asked  the  names  of  the  places  from 
whence  the  diiferent  kinds  of  opium  were  brought  and  requested  me 
I  Dr.  Hill]  to  write  them  down  for  him,  which  I  did.  On  mentioning: 
Turkey,  he  asked  if  it  did  not  belong-  to  America,  or  form  a  part  of 
it  and  seemed  a  good  deal  astonished  on  being  told  that  it  was  nearly 
a  month's  sail  distant." 

The  Americans'  share  in  the  importation  of  opium  from 
India  is  even  more  difficult  to  determine.  American  ships 
carried  cargoes  freely  from  British  India  to  Canton,  and  in 


THE  AMERICAN  SHARE  IN  THE  OPIUM  TRADE  117 

these  consignments  opium  eventually  appeared.  At  the 
time  of  the  surrender  of  the  opium  to  Commissioner  Lin  in 
1839,  out  of  a  total  of  20,283  chests,  there  were  in  the  pos- 
session of  Americans  1540  chests  consigned  to  English  firms. 
None  of  this  consignment  was  from  Turkey,  but  the  Ameri- 
cans had  about  fifty  cases  of  Turkey  opium  which  they  did 
not  deliver.'' 

At  no  time  did  the  American  importation  of  opium  form 
a  very  considerable  share  either  of  the  total  import  of  the 
drug  or  of  the  total  amount  of  American  imports,  although 
it  was  reported  in  a  Boston  newspaper  (1839)  that 
the  American  interest  in  the  "opium  affair  at  Canton" 
amounted  to  a  million  and  a  quarter  dollars.  This,  how- 
ever, may  have  been  an  exaggeration.  In  the  season  1818-9, 
the  Americans  are  credited  with  importing  807  chests  of 
Turkey  opium  alone,  almost  twenty  per  cent  of  the  total 
import  of  the  drug,  but  this  was  exceptional.  Before  1840 
Americans  usually  received  on  consignment  in  Canton,  or 
carried  in  American  vessels  not  more  than  one  tenth  of  the 
total  importations  of  opium,  amounting  in  value  some  years 
to  slightly  more  than  one  tenth  of  the  total  American  im- 
portations to  China." 

In  the  year  1800,  in  response  to  an  Imperial  edict,  both 
the  East  India  Company  and  the  Chinese  Co-hong  ceased 
to  handle  the  drug,  and  after  1809  the  hong  merchants  were 
required  to  give  bond  that  each  ship  secured  by  them  car- 
ried no  opium  when  it  came  up  to  the  Whampoa  anchorage. 
The  trade  was,  however,  carried  on  by  the  independent 
merchants  openly  in  disregard  of  the  edicts  and  with  the 
connivance  of  the  Chinese  port  authorities,  until  about  1821 
when  the  Chinese  Government  again  assumed  a  menacing 
attitude.  From  that  time  on  "receiving  ships"  were 
anchored  at  Lintin,  forty  miles  down  the  bay,  and  the 
transactions  were  for  the  most  part  confined  to  the  delivery 
of  the  opium  to  the  receiving  ships  by  the  inbound  vessels. 
The  trade  was  gradually  extended  from  Lintin  by  the  dis- 
patch of  small  sailing  vessels  up  and  down  the  coast.  The 
American  flag  flew  over  one  or  more  of  these  receiving  ships, 


118  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

probably  without  interruption,  from  1821  until  the  readjust- 
ment in  the  trade  caused  by  the  beginning  of  the  opium  war. 
From  these  receiving  ships  was  transacted  other  business, 
such  as  the  sale  of  ship's  supplies  and  the  sale  of  enough 
rice  to  empty  vessels  to  enable  them  to  come  to  Whampoa  as 
'rice  ships'  thus  entering  under  the  reduced  port  charges, 
but  the  most  lucrative  part  of  the  trade  was  in  opium.  The 
owner  of  the  American  receiving  ship  at  Lintin  from  1830 
to  1832  stated  that  he  had  made  there  a  sufficient  fortune 
to  enable  him  to  leave  China,  as  he  then  thought,  for  good. 
His  explanation  of  his  role  as  opium  trader  was 

"I  shall  not  go  into  any  argument  to  prove  that  I  considered  it 
right  to  follow  the  example  of  England,  the  East  India  Company,  the 
countries  that  cleared  it  (opium)  for  China,  and  the  merchants  to 
whom  I  always  have  been  accustomed  to  look  up  to  as  exponents  of 
all  that  was  honorable  in  trade." 

He  then  mentions  four  firms,  two  of  Boston,  one  of  Salem 
and  one  of  New  York.^ 

However,  the  leading  American  merchant  at  Canton, 
John  P.  Cushing,  discontinued  dealing  in  opium  after  the 
edict  of  1821,  perhaps  influenced  to  do  this  by  his  good 
friend  Houqua.    Cushing  left  Canton  in  1828. 

The  Americans  were  far  more  deeply  involved  in  the 
opium  trade  at  that  time  than  appears  from  any  statistics. 
The  existence  of  the  trade  itself  conferred  on  them  a  direct 
commercial  benefit,  for  it  reduced  the  necessity  for  the  im- 
portation of  specie  by  the  substitution  of  bills  on  London. 
Opium  was  sold  in  ever  increasing  quantities,  and  the 
Americans,  as  well  as  the  English  and  other  foreigners,  used 
the  bills  thus  obtained  in  place  of  specie  to  purchase  their 
return  cargoes.  In  this  phase  of  the  opium  trade  the 
Americans,  all  of  them,  benefited  as  much  as,  or  more  than, 
the  other  traders.  As  the  supply  of  furs  began  to  diminish, 
after  1820,  and  while  the  American  cotton  trade  was  in  its 
infancy,  the  increased  importation  of  opium  from  whatever 
country  and  by  whomever  transported,  was  a  very  impor- 
tant consideration.  The  system  was  vicious  and  short- 
sighted economically,  as  the  merchants  afterwards  came  to 


THE  AMERICAN  SHARE  IN  THE  OPIUM  TRADE  119 

see.  The  consumption  of  opium  demoralized  the  producing 
and  consuming  powers  of  China,  led  to  greatly  increased 
importation  of  specie,  and  the  ill-will  of  the  people,  but 
when  the  capital  of  the  American  merchants  was  still  rela- 
tively small,  and  the  supply  of  acceptable  specie  limited, 
the  opium  trade,  like  slaves  and  distilleries,  entered  into  the 
foundation  of  many  American  fortunes. 

It  is,  therefore,  the  more  remarkable  that  when  the 
Chinese  Government  had  clearly  made  up  its  mind  to  de- 
stroy the  trade,  there  was  so  little  effort  made  by  the 
American  merchants  in  China,  or  by  their  correspondents 
at  home,  to  effect  its  legalization.  It  is  also  notable  that 
at  least  one  American  firm,  that  of  Talbot,  Olyphant  and 
Company  of  New  York  (Olyphant  and  Company  of  Can- 
ton), abstained  entirely  from  the  direct  opium  trade. 

Conflicts  with  Chinese — the  Pledge 

Probably  the  most  potent  check  on  the  growth  of  the 
American  opium  trade  was  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that 
its  existence  was  a  constant  menace  to  the  maintenance  of 
harmonious  relations  with  the  Chinese  Government  for,  as 
has  already  been  explained,  peace  was  to  the  Americans 
the  supreme  virtue.  More  than  twenty  years  before  the 
advent  of  Commissioner  Lin  at  Canton,  the  Americans  had 
been  made  to  feel  the  dangers  of  the  opium  traflSc  to  peace- 
ful trade. 

The  ship  Wabash  (Captain  C.  L.  Gantt)  of  Baltimore, 
arrived  in  China  May  22,  1817,  with  $7000  in  specie  and 
some  opium.  The  vessel  was  boarded  by  pirates,  the  chief 
mate  and  some  of  the  crew  murdered  or  drowned,  and  the 
vessel  looted.  In  making  a  report  of  the  affair  to  the 
Governor,  Consul  Wilcocks  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
that  "in  enumerating  the  loss  I  was  careful  not  to  mention 
the  opium."  But  his  precautions  were  in  vain  for  when 
the  pirates  were  arrested  some  of  the  opium  was  found  in 
their  possession.  ''The  latter  circumstance,"  wrote  Wil- 
cocks, "occasioned  not  a  little  disgust  on  the  part  of  the 


120  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Viceroy."  However,  the  Viceroy  sent  a  communication  to 
the  acting  Hoppo  (Customs  officer),  who  in  turn  communi- 
cated it  to  the  hong  merchants,  to  give  to  the  American 
consul,  who  was  to  report  to  the  President  of  the  I"^nited 
States  of  America  what  steps  had  been  taken  to  apprehend 
and  punish  the  pirates. 

This  was  followed  by  the  first  official  notification  ad- 
dressed directly  to  the  Americans  on  the  subject  of  opium. 
It  was  sent  by  the  hong  merchants  to  Wilcocks,  and  read 
as  follows:^ 

"May  He  be  Highly  Promoted: 

"We  approach  to  inform  you  that  foreign  opium,  the  dirt  used  in 
smoking,  has  long  been  prohibited  by  an  order  received;  it  is  not 
allowed  to  come  to  Canton;  if  it  is  presumptuously  brought,  the 
moment  it  is  discovered,  it  will  immediately  involve  the  security  mer- 
chant; and  the  cause  of  the  said  vessel  bringing  the  dirt  for  smoking 
to  Canton  will  also  assuredly  be  examined  into ;  and  a  prosecution 
begun  which  will  impede  her  departure.  The  consequences  are  ex- 
ceedingly important.  We,  being  apprehensive  that  the  foreign  mer- 
chants of  your  honorable  country  who  come  to  Canton  to  trade,  may 
not  all  fully  know  the  hindrance  arising  from  bringing  it  to  Canton, 
do  therefore  especially  prepare  a  letter  to  inform  you. 

"Benevolent  Brother,  to  write  a  letter  immediately  back  to  your 
country  and  tell  these  things  to  your  honorable  country's  president, 
that  all  the  ships  which  come  to  Canton  may  be  caused  to  know  that 
Opium,  the  dirt  used  in  smoking  is  an  article 

THE  CELESTIAL  EMPIEE 

prohibits  by  an  order  received  from  the  Son  of  Heaven,  and  hereafter, 
most  positively,  they  must  not  buy  it  and  bring  it  to  Canton. 

"If  they  bring  it,  the  moment  we  examine  into  it  and  find  it  out, 
certainly  we  will  not  dare  to  be  security  for  the  said  ship,  and  more- 
over will  assuredly  report  it  fully  to  the  Great  Officers  of  the  Gov- 
ernment who  will,  according  to  law,  investigate  and  prosecute.  De- 
cidedly you  will  not  dare  to  conceal  the  affair  for  those  (who  import 
it)  and  thereby  bring  guilt  on  ourselves.  The  trade  of  the  said  ship 
will  assuredly  be  impeded  by  the  smoking  dirt  and  when  seeking  to 
repeat,  it  will  be  a  difficult  thing  (for  the  persons  concerned)  to  find 
it  availing. 

"Do  not  say  that  we  did  not  speak  soon  enough. 

"We  pray  you,  Benevolent  Brother,  to  write  a  letter  immediately 
and  tell  these  things.  It  will  be  fortunate  if  you  do  not  view  it  as  a 
commonj)lacc  affair,  and  so  delay,  and  cause  future  impediments. 

"To  Mr.  Wilcocks,  Benevolent  Brother,  for  his  perusal, 

"We,  Younger  Brothers,  commonly  called — "  (eleven  names). 

John  Quincy  Adams,  as  Secretary  of  State,  replied  to 
Wilcocks : 


THE  AMERICAN  SHARE  IN  THE  OPIUM  TRADE  121 

"The  Communicatron  from  the  Co-lioiijj:  merchants  to  yourself 
has  been  pubhshed  {Nalional  Re<juter,  1S18)  agreeably  to  the  wishes 
of  those  merchants." 

Iji  1821  a  quarrel  between  the  various  Chinese  officials 
and  the  Terranova  case  dragged  once  more  the  opium 
smuggling  into  the  Ught  of  day.  The  practice  of  the  British, 
American  and  Portuguese  ships  was  exposed  in  a  proclama- 
tion from  the  Viceroy.^"  The  guilt  of  the  Americans  was 
mitigated,  observed  the  Viceroy,  "because  they  had  no  king 
to  rule  them,"  but  all  foreigners  were  warned  that  the 
opium  smuggling  must  stop.  Wilcocks  was  ordered  by  the 
hong  merchants,  at  the  request  of  the  Viceroy,  to  investi- 
gate each  American  ship  personally  and  put  a  watch  on  her, 
to  see  that  she  contained  and  disposed  of  no  opium.  The 
Robinson,  an  American  vessel,  was  to  be  forbidden  to  come 
to  the  port  again  and  the  Emily,  of  Baltimore,  to  the  crew 
of  which  the  unfortunate  Terranova  had  belonged,  was  to 
have  half  her  cargo  confiscated,  and  she  also  was  to  be 
forbidden  the  port.  At  length  the  Viceroy  agreed  to  remit 
the  confiscation  of  half  of  the  cargo  of  the  vessels,  but  re- 
marked in  an  edict  to  the  hong  merchants : 

'*As  to  one  of  the  four  ships,  viz.,  Cowpland's  (the  Emily  of  Balti- 
more) it  contained  merely  about  a  thousand  catties  of  foreign  tin, 
worth  scarcely  anything — and  it  paid  for  port  charges  iipwards  of  one 
thousand  four  hundred  taels,  from  which  it  appears  that  the  said 
vessel  came  for  no  other  purpose  but  to  sell  opium — Infinitely 
Detestable. 

"Rightly  did  Heaven  send  down  punishment,  and  cause  Francis 
Terranova  to  commit  a  crime  for  which  he  was  strangled.  This  ship 
should  be  punished  more  severely.  Only  as  the  other  ships  have  had 
clemency  extended  to  them,  and  the  value  of  the  cargoes  given  back, 
I  shall  remit  the  sentence  on  all  equally,  and  shall  deal  with  it  as  with 
the  others  to  inflict  a  light  punishment. 

"In  one  word 

THE  CELESTIAL  EMPIRE 

permits  tea,  rhubarb,  etc.,  to  be  sold  to  keep  alive  the  people  of  the 
said  nations.  Those  persons  who  are  annually  kept  alive  thereby  are 
more  than  ten  thousand  times  ten  thousand.  How  substantial  a  favor 
is  this !  Yet  these  foreigners  feel  no  gratitude ;  nor  wish  to  render  a 
recompense;  but  smuggle  in  prohibited  opium,  which  flows  and  poisons 
the  land. 


122  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"When  the  conduct  is  referred  to  the  heart,  it  must  be  disgusted. 
When  referred  to  the  reason,  it  is  contrary  to  it. 

"In  broad  day,  on  earth,  there  is  the  Royal  Law.  In  Hades  after 
death  are  gods  and  demons.  These  foreign  ships  pass  an  innnense 
ocean,  go  through  gales  of  wind,  boisterous  seas  of  unknown  dangers, 
entirely  preserved  by  the  condescending  protection  of 

THE  CELESTIAL  GODS 

and  therefore  thcj^  should  hereafter  rouse  themselves  to  a  zealous 
reflection — to  bitter  recompense — to  reformations — and  alter  their 
inhuman  unreasonable  conduct — and  they  will  receive  forever  the 
gracious  bounty  of 

THE  CELESTIAL  EMPIRE." 

It  was  as  a  result  of  the  effective  measures  taken  by  the 
Chinese  and  the  dangers  which  the  hong  merchants  now 
incurred  by  giving  a  bond  for  ships,  that  the  opium  business 
was  removed  from  Canton  and  Whampoa  to  receiving  ships 
at  Lintin. 

That  the  crisis  of  1839  had  been  brought  on  by  the 
opium  trade  was  clearly  and  frankly  recognized  by  the 
American  merchants  when  they  addressed  to  Congress  their 
memorial  asking  for  a  commissioner  and  a  treaty.  The 
memorialists  made  an  honest  statement  of  the  condition 
of  the  traffic,  drawing  especial  attention  to  the  fact  that 
while  it  had  been  carried  on  by  smuggling  the  Chinese 
officials,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest,  had  shared  in  the 
accompanying  bribery,  large  amounts  of  opium  having  been 
delivered  at  Lintin  directly  to  boats  carrying  the  flags  of 
the  high  officials,  the  chief  customs  officer  and  even  the  gov- 
ernor. The  Americans  pointed  out  that  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment possessed  ample  power  to  control  the  trade  and 
was  now  adopting  a  somewhat  inconsistent  and  unjust 
method  in  that  it  was  proceeding  first  not  against  its  own 
subjects,  but  against  the  foreigners.  This  was  a  character- 
istic method  of  Chinese  procedure. 

Before  addressing  the  memorial  to  Congress  most  of  the 
Americans  at  Canton  had  signed  a  "voluntary  pledge"  to 
abstain  from  the  trade  in  the  future.  In  this  pledge  the 
other  foreign  merchants  had  joined,  and  it  is  clear  from  the 
spirit  of  the  memorial  that  the  /Vmericans,  at  the  time  they 


THE  AMERICAN  SHARE  IN  THE  OPIUM  TRADE  123 

signed  it,  supposed  that  the  foreign  opium  trade  of  China 
was  definitely  finished. 

"Whether  we  view  the  subject  in  a  moral  and  philanthropic  light," 
stated  the  memorialists,  "or  merely  as  a  commercial  proposition,  we 
are  extremely  desirous  to  see  the  importation  and  consumption  of 
opium  in  China  entirely  at  an  end."  " 

In  subsequent  years  the  vision  of  their  signatures  to 
this  pledge  to  the  Chinese  and  this  memorial  to  Congress 
must  have  plagued  the  signers  not  a  little,  though  it  did 
not  prevent  them  from  evading  and  even  openly  violating 
the  promises  they  had  made.  The  British  and  the  Parsee 
merchants  were  the  first  to  forget  their  promises,  and  the 
Americans  were  not  long  in  yielding  to  the  demands  of 
competition  in  a  trade  of  which  opium  had  become  an 
integral  part,  but  there  is  little  doubt  but  at  the  time  of 
signing  these  documents  the  Americans  were  perfectly 
sincere. 

However,  three  days  after  signing  of  the  pledge,  Com- 
mander George  C.  Read  of  the  U.  S.  Frigate  Columbia  re- 
ported to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  from  Macao:  ^- 

"There  is  yet  much  opium  on  board  the  English  vessels  now  lying 
in  the  roads  of  this  place,  which  will  never  be  returned  to  the  country 
from  whence  it  came.  A  sale  of  it  must  be  made  here  on  the  coast, 
and  I  shall  not  be  surprised  to  hear  of  its  being  smuggled  under 
American  colors.  If  such  illicit  commerce  should  be  persisted  in,  and 
vessels  should  be  detected  in  the  act,  notwithstanding  all  the  diffi- 
culties and  dangers  to  which  it  would  expose  the  foreigners  at  Canton, 
I  feel  that  I  should  be  justified  in  seizing  them,  but  what  to  do  with 
them  afterwards  would  be  a  question  of  serious  consideration,  and 
merely  to  drive  them  off  the  coast  would  be  to  permit  return.  But  I 
trust  there  are  none  among  them  so  wicked." 

The  opium  trade  began  again  almost  immediately  after 
the  surrender  of  the  twenty  thousand  chests,  but  the 
Americans  for  a  time  kept  their  pledge.  One  of  the  signers 
of  the  memorial  to  Congress,  then  the  superintendent  of 
Russell  and  Company,  writing  five  years  later  said:^^ 

"The  trade  was  carried  on  .  .  .  we  believe,  entirely  by  the  British 
• — the  Americans  having  retired  from  it  as  soon  as  they  found  it  to 
their  interests  to  do  so,  fearing  that  it  would  embarrass  their  regular 


124  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

business,  and  knowing  that  they  woviUl  be  witliin  the  power  of  the 
local  authorities  of  Canton,  while  the  British  were  out  of  their  reach 
at  Macao  and  at  Hongkong." 

On  two  subsequent  occasions  Consul  Snow  reported  to 
the  State  Department'"*  that  so  far  as  he  knew  there  was 
not  an  American  in  China  in  any  way  engaged  in  the  trade. 


Commodore  Kearny's  Action 

In  response  to  the  request  of  the  Americans  in  Canton  for 
Naval  protection  (presented  to  Congress  January  9,  1840), 
Connnodore  Lawrence  Kearny  was  dispatched  to  China  in 
command  of  the  East  India  Squadron  with  orders  to  pro- 
tect Americans,  and  also  to  take  action  against  any  Ameri- 
cans who  might  have  entered  the  opium  trade.  He  found 
upon  his  arrival,  April,  1842,  only  two  years  after  the  pledge 
had  been  given,  evidence  not  to  be  doubted  *"'  that  Captain 
Read's  fears  had  been  well  grounded.  The  American  flag 
w^as  being  used  extensively  to  cover  opium  smuggling,  and 
American  citizens,  as  individuals,  if  not  as  firms,  were  ac- 
tively engaged  in  the  trade. 

Immediately  after  his  arrival  Kearny  requested  the 
American  vice  consul  at  Canton,  who  was  afterwards  shown 
to  be  implicated  in  the  smuggling,  to  have  published  the 
following  letter:^*' 

"Sir: — The  Hongkong  Gazette  of  the  24th  instant  contains  a 
shipping  report  in  which  is  the  name  of  an  American  vessel  engaged 
in  carrying  opium, — therefore  I  beg  you  will  cause  to  be  made  known 
with  equal  publicity,  and  also  to  the  Chinese  authorities  by  the  trans- 
lation of  the  same,  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does  not 
sanction  'the  smuggling  of  opium'  on  this  coast  under  the  American 
flag  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  China.  Difficulties  arising  therefrom 
in  respect  to  the  seizure  of  any  vessels  by  the  Chinese,  the  claimants 
certainly  will  not  under  my  instructions  find  support,  or  any  inter- 
position on  my  part  after  the  publication  of  this  notice." 

The  publication  of  this  notice  was  greeted  with  derision 
by  the  English  ^"^  and  lost  some  of  its  force  when  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Canton,  a  few  days  later  addressed  the  hong  mer- 
chants: 


THE  AMERICAN  SHARE  IN  THE  OPIUM  TRADE  125 

"I  find,  on  examination,  that  the  Americans  have  acted  in  a 
manner  most  hjglily  respectful  and  obedient.  Their  vessels  hitherto 
engaged  in  the  conmierce  of  Canton,  have  always  been  confined  to 
the  legitimate  and  honorable  trade,  and  never  concerned  with  the 
carrying'  of  opium." 

Kearny  set  about  with  earnestness  to  protect  the  Ameri- 
can flag  from  the  stain  of  further  opium  smuggling,  but 
received  little  cooperation  from  the  consular  officer.  He 
remained  on  the  China  coast  for  more  than  a  year,  and 
just  before  he  left  actually  arrested  the  Ariel,  taking  away 
her  papers  and  sending  her  to  Macao.  To  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  (May  19,  1843)  he  wrote  from  Amoy: 

"The  American  flag  is  now  the  only  cover  for  this  illicit  trade,  Sir 
Henry  Pottinger  having  issued  a  proclamation  against  it;  and  the 
English  craft  having  been  turned  away  from  the  rivers,  has  placed 
the  Americans  in  a  peculiarly  advantageous  position,  as  freighters, 
under  the  flag  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

"With  regard  to  the  Ariel,  I  have  taken  her  papers  and  colors 
from  her;  and  I  have  obliged  her  master  to  discharge  the  whole  of  her 
cargo  here,  and  then  he  is  to  return  to  Macao.  Her  papers  are  en- 
dorsed by  me  in  a  manner  which  will  render  them  unavailable,  and 
are  returned  sealed  to  the  consulate.  Were  it  not  for  the  risk,  I  would 
send  her  to  the  United  States;  but  she  capsized  once  or  twice  in  Bos- 
ton hai'bor  before  she  sailed,  and  is  now  a  dangerous  vessel.  Should 
I  fall  in  with  any  sea-worthy  vessels  of  her  character,  I  shall  send 
them  home,  that  their  case  may  be  properly  decided  by  the  laws,  of 
which  the  owners,  as  well  as  the  consular  establishment  of  the  United 
States,  seem  to  have  been  clearly  regardless  in  making  transfers  that 
are  illegal.  These  sham  sales  are  well  known,  by  which  our  national 
character  is  daily  losing  ground,  and  will  so  continue  to  do  while  the 
public  consular  duties  are  confined  to  merchants  whose  interests  are  so 
deeply  involved  in  the  transactions  before  cited." 

But  the  only  ground  Kearny  could  find  on  which  to 
arrest  the  Ariel  was  not  that  she  was  an  opium  smuggler, 
but  that  her  ownership  was  vested  nominally  in  a  man 
professing  American  citizenship,  yet  who  had  not  been  in 
the  United  States  for  at  least  six  years.  The  Ariel  quickly 
resumed  trade  again.  She  had  been  built  and  sent  to  China 
expressly  for  that  purpose. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  legality  of  the  transfer 
by  which  the  fleet  of  American  opium  smugglers  appeared 
in  Chinese  waters  under  other  than  their  real  ownership, 


126  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  interested  parties  had  not  been  inattentive  to  the  status 
of  United  States  law  on  the  subject  of  smugghng  opium 
into  China,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  following  incident. 

Commodore  Foxhall  A.  Parker,  commanding  the  East 
India  Squadron,  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Bombay  in  the 
latter  part  of  1843  and  there  take  on  board  the  newly 
appointed  American  commissioner  and  convey  him  to 
China.  In  his  orders  was  the  following  item,  substantially 
the  same  as  Kearny's  instructions  three  years  before :  ^  ^ 

"You  will  take  all  occasions  to  impress  upon  the  Chinese  and  their 
authorities  that  one  great  object  of  your  visit  is  to  prevent  and  punish 
the  smuggling  of  opium  in  China  either  by  Americans,  or  by  other 
nations  under  cover  of  the  American  flag,  should  it  be  attempted." 

While  Parker  was  lying  in  the  harbor  waiting  for  the 
arrival  of  Gushing,  Fletcher  Webster,  Secretary  of  the  Mis- 
sion, arrived  from  Boston  as  a  passenger  on  the  brig 
Antelope.  The  vessel  having  disembarked  her  passenger, 
proceeded,  under  the  nose  of  the  U.  S,  East  India  Squadron, 
to  load  opium  for  China.  Whereupon  Parker  looked  up 
his  instructions  and  tried  to  look  up  the  American  law  on 
the  subject.  He  reported  (November  27,  1843)  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy : 

''I  cannot  find  any  law  which  will  authorize  my  interfering  to 
prevent  or  punish  smuggling  by  Americans  or  others  in  foreign  coun- 
tries. The  only  course  that  appears  proper  for  me  to  pursue  is  not  to 
interfere  in  their  favor,  should  they  be  taken  by  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties. 

"The  schooner  Zephyr,  of  Boston,  sailed  from  this  port  a  few  days 
ago  for  China,  loaded  with  ojjium,  and  the  brig  Antelope,  also  of 
Boston,  is  now  up  for  a  freight  of  opium  only,  for  the  same  place. 

"You  will  oblige  me  by  sending  particular  instructions  on  this 
subject." 

But  no  instructions  ever  came.  This  episode  ended  any 
efforts  on  the  part  of  the  American  naval  officers  to  prevent 
opium  smuggling. 

The  American  builders  of  the  opium  clippers  had  also 
not  overlooked  the  fact  that  these  vessels  could  look  to  no 
American  authority  for  protection.    In  the  first  place  they 


THE  AMERICAN  SHARE  IN  THE  OPIUM  TRADE  127 

were  built  to  outsail  any  other  ships  afloat,  and  they  did. 
In  the  second  place  they  were  heavily  armed.  The  Ante- 
lope, for  example,  carried  two  guns  on  each  side,  besides  a 
"Long  Tom"  amidships.  Boarding  pikes  were  arranged  in 
great  plenty  on  a  rack  around  the  main-mast,  and  the  large 
arms  chest  on  the  quarter  deck  was  well  supplied  with 
pistols  and  cutlasses.  "We  were  fully  prepared,"  wrote  one 
of  the  officers,  "for  a  brush  with  the  rascally  Chinese  and 
determined  not  to  be  put  out  of  our  course  by  one  or  two 
Mandarin  boats."  ^^ 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  "Smyrna  Consular  Letters,"  Vol.  1,  enclosvire  in,  Wm.  Steward, 

April  25,  1803,  to  Secretary  of  State. 

2.  Smyrna  Letters. 

3.  Forbes'  "Reminiscences,"  p.  124;  Sessional  Papers  (1830)  Vol.  G, 

testimony  of  Joshua  Bates,  p.  378. 

4.  Forbes'  "China  Trade,"  p.  27. 

5.  Chinese  Repositoy,  Vol.  8,  Jan.  1840,  p.  486. 

6.  Hunter's  "Fan  Kwae,"  p.  14G. 

7.  Niles'  Register,  Oct.  12,  1839,  p.  112,  quoting  Boston  Transcript ; 

Morse's  International  Relations,  Vol.  1,  pp.  206-11. 

8.  Forbes'  "Reminiscences,"  p.  145. 

9.  Canton  Consular  Letters,  Vol.  1,  Sept.  23,   1817,  Wilcocks  to 

Secretary  of  State. 

10.  S.  Wells  Williams'  "Middle  Kingdom,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  379  ff;  H. 

Doe.  71:26-2. 

11.  H.  Doc.  119  :26-l,  p.  31 ;  H.  Doc.  40 :26-l. 

12.  Captains'  Letters  (Navy  Dept),  May,  1839,  No.  101. 

13.  Forbes'  "China  Trade,"  p.  50. 

14.  Canton  Consular  Letters,  Vol.  3,  Sept.  23,  1839,  Jan.  11,  1840. 

15.  S.  Doc.  139  :29-l.    The  mere  fact  that  these  reports  from  Kearny 

were  published  is  an  indication  of  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States. 

16.  Chinese  Repository,  Vol.  11,  April,  1842,  p.  259. 

17.  Canton  Register,  April  5,  1842. 

18.  East  India   Squadron  Letters    (Navy   Dept.),   Feb.   27,   1843,— 

Sept.  25,  1845,  p.  36. 

19.  Lubbock's  "China  Clippers,"  p.  26 ;  Clark's  "Clipper  Ship  Era," 

p.  58. 


CHAPTER  VII 

PEEPAKATION  FOK  THE  GUSHING  MISSION 

In  preparing  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with  China  the 
United  States  was  at  a  distinct  disadvantage  as  compared 
with  Great  Britain,  the  only  formidable  commercial  rival, 
for  the  American  Government  was  without  any  large  store 
of  accumulated  wisdom  and  precedents  for  dealing  with 
Oriental  states.  Before  making  the  Treaty  of  Nanking 
Great  Britain  had  already  concluded  trade  agreements  or 
political  treaties  with  nearly  every  native  state  of  Africa 
and  Asia  with  which  the  Western  World  was  in  contact. 
England  was  therefore  merely  extending  her  elaborate  and 
closely  integrated  commercial  system  to  include  one  more 
outpost.  The  appropriation  of  Hongkong  for  a  military, 
naval  and  trade  base  was,  for  example,  but  the  newest 
application  of  a  policy  of  commercial  expansion  the  tech- 
nique for  which  had  been  maturing  for  a  century.  The 
United  States,  in  contrast,  had  entered  into  treaty  relations 
with  only  two  Asiatic  states  and  in  these  instances  the 
American  efforts  had  been  casual,  unrelated  to  any  general 
policy,  a;nd  unproductive  of  much  experience  which  could 
be  turned  to  account  in  securing  a  treaty  with  China. 
However,  a  brief  review  of  the  mission  of  Echnund  Roberts 
-to  Cochin  China,  Siam,  and  Muscat  in  1832-4  is  important 
not  merely  to  complete  a  chapter  of  American  history  but 
also  because  the  Roberts  Mission  did  have  some  slight 
influence  on  the  preparations  for  the  Gushing  Mission. 

The  Edmund  Roberts  Mission 

Edmund  Roberts  of  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  was 
a  merchant  and  a  supercargo  ^  who  had  risen  to  the  rank  of 

128 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     129 

ship  owner  only  to  lose  what  little  he  had  accumulated  by 
"bare-faced  robbery  under  .the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees," 
to  use  his  own  description  of  the  process  by  which  his  prop- 
erty had  been  appropriated  and  his  fortunes  ruined.  For  a 
number  of  years  he  had  engaged  in  fruitless  efforts  to  re- 
habilitate himself  but  with  little  success.  In  1823  he  was 
appointed  United  States  Consul  at  Demarara.  Four  and 
a  half  years  later  he  was  a  supercargo  on  an  American  vessel 
at  Zanzibar  where  he  was  subjected  to  vexatious  delays  and 
impositions  by  the  officers  of  the  Sultan  of  Muscat.  To 
his  Highness  he  addressed  a  letter  complaining  that  Ameri- 
can vessels  were  not  being  received  upon  equal  terms  with 
those  of  England,  He  invited  the  Sultan  to  enter  into 
correspondence  with  the  American  Government  and  sug- 
gested that  he  offer  to  make  a  treaty  with  the  United  States. 
Roberts  did  not  fail  to  point  out  to  the  Sultan  that  the 
United  States  "can  never  come  in  contact  with  your  High- 
ness as  the  English  Government  will,  sooner  or  later,  for 
it  is  contrary  to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  to 
own  colonies  out  of  their  proper  territory.  Acts  of  this  kind 
have  been  the  cause  of  more  devastating  war  than  any  or 
all  the  other  outrages  put  together." 

The  Sultan  was  so  impressed  with  the  representations 
of  Roberts  that,  although  he  did  not  wholly  comply  with 
his  requests,  he  did  ask  the  American  supercargo  to  procure 
for  him  some  bombs  and  shells  with  which  to  drive  out  the 
Portuguese,  and  enjoined  Roberts  to  keep  the  matter  secret 
from  the  English. 

Roberts  on  this  voyage  probably  penetrated  the  Orient 
no  farther  than  Bombay.  Immediately  upon  his  return  to 
the  United  States  he  took  up  with  Levi  Woodbury,  senator 
from  New  Hampshire,  the  suggestion  which  had  evidently 
been  in  his  mind  at  Zanzibar,  viz.,  "that  considerable  benefit 
would  result  from  effecting  treaties  with  some  of  the  native 
powers  bordering  on  the  Indian  Ocean." 

Meanwhile  the  British  Governor  General  of  India  suc- 
ceeded in  making  a  treaty  with  Siam  in  1826.  While  the 
negotiation  of  this  treaty  was  in  process  John  Shellaber, 


130  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

United  States  Consul  at  Batavia,  sought  a  commission  to 
negotiate  treaties  with  some  of  the  independent  native 
sovereigns  near  Java,  having  particularly  in  mind  a  treaty 
with  Siam.^ 

The  report  of  the  plundering  of  the  pepper  ship  Friend- 
ship of  Salem  by  the  natives  of  Quallah  Battoo  on  the 
northwest  coast  of  Sumatra  in  1830  roused  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  to  action.  Meanwhile  Edmund  Rob- 
erts, with  the  persistence  which  was  his  most  conspicuous 
characteristic,  had  been  pressing  his  suggestion  upon  Levi 
Woodbury  who  became  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  the  Jack- 
son administration.  In  1831  Shellaber  came  home  from 
Batavia  on  leave  and  renewed  the  proposition  which  he  had 
made  six  years  before.  Shellaber  returned  to  his  post  the 
next  year  supposing  that  he  w^as  to  be  designated  to  the 
mission  which  was  then  decided  upon  but  Roberts,  backed 
by  his  influential  friend  Woodbury,  received  the  appoint- 
ment January  26,  1832.  The  government  directed  the 
U.  S.  S.  Potomac,  the  sloop  Peacock,  and  the  schooner 
Boxer,  to  undertake  an  expedition  against  the  natives  of 
Quallah  Battoo,^  and  at  the  request  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, Roberts  was  made  a  special  agent  of  the  United 
States  to  meet,  confer,  treat,  and  negotiate  with  the  kings 
of  Siam  and  Cochin  China.  He  was  assigned  to  the  Pea- 
cock where  he  was  entered  on  the  rolls  as  "secretary  to  the 
commander."  The  reason  given  for  the  creation  of  this 
somewhat  equivocal  and  ignominious  role  was  secrecy,  but 
it  is  difficult  to  resist  the  conclusion  that  it  was  a  fair  index 
of  the  importance  of  the  mission  in  the  estimation  of  the 

"'"^  government.  The  salary  was  fixed  at  $1200,  and  only  after 
pleadings  by  Roberts  was  it  increased  to  $1500.  During 
part  of  the  outward  voyage  the  special  agent  was  compelled 
to  sleep  on  the  gun  deck  of  the  Peacock — an  indication,  per- 
haps, of  the  prevailing  customary  scorn  of  naval  officers  for 

*v^       civilians. 

From  the  outset  the  Department  of  State  appears  to 
have  been  far  more  interested  in  securing  a  treaty  with 
Japan  and  set  about  collecting  the  necessary  information. 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     131 

Some  of  this  was  secured  from  Shellaber,  who  as  consul  at 
Batavia  had  been  familiar  with  the  Dutch  trade  at  Naga- 
saki, and  some  of  it  came  from  unknown  sources.  Before 
Roberts  left  the  United  States  in  1832  the  State  Depart- 
ment was  in  possession  of  a  large  part  of  the  information 
about  Japan  on  which  the  Perry  expedition  twenty  years 
later  was  based.  A  commission,  similar  to  those  already 
issued  for  Cochin  China  and  Siam,  to  negotiate  with  Japan 
was  issued  to  Roberts  July  6,  1832. 

The  subject  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Oriental  des- 
pots presented  some  embarrassments  peculiar  to  a  republi- 
can government.  In  submitting  an  outline  program  for 
the  proposed  negotiations  Shellaber  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  State : 

"I  beg  leave  to  suggest  that  there  be  no  expression  in,  the  letters 
(from  the  President)  to  these  sovereigns  (of  Siam,  Cochin  China  and 
Japan),  or  credentials  of  the  mission,  that  may  lead  those  people  to 
think  that  the  United  States  is  a  republic.  Those  despots  would  af- 
fect to  become  alarmed  at  an  intercourse  with  the  United  States  as 
free  as  it  is,  if  they  come  at  the  knowledge  of  its  peculiar  government 
through  its  own  official  papers." 

From  the  Rev.  Robert  Morrison,  the  famous  British 
missionary  and  sinologue  of  the  East  India  Company  at 
Canton,  to  whom  Roberts  had  written  soliciting  advice  as 
to  the  proper  manner  to  approach  such  potentates,  Roberts 
had  received  some  instructions  which  were  valuable  and  are 
especially  interesting  as  coming  from  one  who  had  a  real 
sympathy  for  the  Asiatic,  a  thorough  knowledge  of  his 
ways,  and  had  also  been  the  Chinese  secretary  and  inter- 
preter of  the  unsuccessful  Lord  Amherst  Embassy  to  Peking 
in  1816.  The  advice  was  to  avoid  vague  pretexts  and  spe- 
cial excuses,  and  to  approach  the  kings  directly  and  boldly 
as  the  representative  of  an  independent  people  who  would 
have  nothing  to  do  with  ''kowtowing."  The  relationship  to 
be  established  must  be  reciprocal,  not  that  of  lord  and 
vassal.  Roberts  was  warned,  however,  not  to  make  himself 
"too  cheap"  in  the  negotiations;  he  was  to  be  kind  and 
courteous,  but  to  insist  on  "some  little  formalities."  A 
little   display   and   show   of  clothing,    Morrison   thought, 


132  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

would  have  a  certain  weight  and  create  a  favorable  im- 
pression. 

Roberts  advised  the  Department  of  State  that  "in  ne- 
gotiations with  the  Asiatics  all  apparent  acknowledgment 
of  inferiority  which  precedes  the  signature  to  letters  such 
as  'your  humble  servant'  would  be  construed  all  too  liter- 
ally by  the  potentates  of  Asia  and  ought  therefore  to  be 
avoided  in  drafting  the  letters  from  President  Jackson. 

The  considerations  raised  by  Shellaber,  Morrison  and 
Roberts  required  careful  thought  but  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  decided,  while  not  flaunting  its  republi- 
canism, nevertheless,  not  to  conceal  its  true  colors.  The 
letters  from  President  Jackson  carried  by  Roberts  in  1832 
did  not  obscure  the  fact  that  Andrew  Jackson  was  "Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States"  and  the  unbending  salutation 
"Great  and  Good  Friend"  fairly  throbbed  with  a  repub- 
licanism such  as  the  despots  of  Asia  had  never  envisaged 
in  their  worst  dreams. 

Secretary  of  State  Livingston  even  went  so  far  as  to  de- 
cide not  to  send  any  presents  with  Roberts,  but  at  the 
latter's  earnest  solicitation  this  decision  was  reversed.  The 
list  of  the  gifts  included:  100  rifles,  100  muskets,  100  sets 
of  infantry  accouterments,  2  heavily  gold-mounted  swords, 
2  full  length  mirrors,  10  pairs  of  lamps,  250  yards  of  car- 
peting, 5  pairs  of  stone  statues  for  the  king  and  officials 
of  Siam;  and  2  pairs  of  glass  lamps,  a  sword,  a  rifle  and  a 
pair  of  pistols,  a  silk  flag  and  a  map  of  the  United  States, 
and  a  set  of  the  gold,  silver  and  copper  coins  of  the  United 
States,  for  the  Sultan  of  Muscat.  A  steam  engine  mounted 
on  a  "highly  polished  rail  car"  and  a  "railroad  12  feet  in 
diameter  which  can  be  screwed  to  the  floor  of  the  room" 
was  also  included  in  the  purchases,  but  owing  to  a  delay  in 
the  shipments  this  unusual  present  appears  never  to  have 
reached  its  intended  recipient. 

The  Potomac  sailed  for  Quallah  Battoo  in  advance  of 
the  Peacock  and  when  the  latter  reached  Anjier  Roads  the 
expedition  to  Sumatra  had  been  completed.  Roberts  was 
therefore  free   to  devote  himself  directly   to   the  gentler 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     133 

methods  of  diplomacy.  After  securing  the  services  of  J.  R. 
Morrison,  as  interpreter,  the  Peacock  set  sail  from  Macao 
for  the  coast  of  Cochin  China.  The  Boxer,  which  had  been 
intended  for  the  use  of  the  mission  in  approaching  the 
shallow  harbors,  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  the  Peacock  found 
it  impossible  to  approach  closely  to  Hue.  Contact  with 
the  local  officials  was  established  farther  down  the  coast, 
but  Roberts  met  with  obstacles.  The  Cochin  Chinese  im- 
mediately raised  questions  of  etiquette  and  the  kowtow, 
and  the  American  envoy  refused  to  yield.  The  Peacock 
departed  for  Siam  in  disgust.  At  Bankok  the  reception 
was  all  that  could  be  desired,  and  a  treaty  was  concluded 
March  30,  1833.  The  linguistic  difficulties  of  the  negotia- 
tions are  evident  in  the  fact  that  the  text  of  the  treaty 
was  in  four  languages — English,  Chinese,  Portuguese  and 
Siamese. 

The  Roberts  treaty  with  Siam,  when  compared  with  the 
British  treaty  of  1826,  shows  no  notable  differences.  By  it 
American  vessels  secured  a  very  great  reduction  in  the 
measurement  dues  such  as  the  British  had  already  secured. 
There  were  to  be  no  import  or  export  duties,  and  freedom 
of  trade  without  governmental  interference  was  stipulated. 
There  was  no  slightest  suggestion  of  extraterritorial  con- 
cessions. From  the  American  treaty,  however,  was  omitted 
certain  provisions  which  had  been  included  in  the  British 
treaty  defining  the  procedure  and  penalties  in  cases  of  man- 
slaughter. 

Roberts  attempted  to  secure  the  legalization  of 
the  opium  trade  which  had  been  prohibited  in  the 
British  treaty,  but  at  the  last  minute  this  Valuable 
and  highly  profitable'  article  was  placed  in  the  list  of 
contrabands. 

At  Batavia  Roberts  received  from  Secretary  of  State 
Livingston  a  letter  again  instructing  him  to  proceed  to 
Japan,  but  Roberts  decided  that  such  an  expedition  at  that 
time  would  be  impractical.  The  terms  of  service  on  the 
Peacock  were  soon  to  expire,  and  Roberts  was  without 
funds   to  provide   for  the   Shogun  presents  which   would 


134  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

stand  comparison  with  those  sent  annually  by  the  Dutch. 
The  wind  was  fair  for  Muscat  and  the  Peacock  took  ad- 
vantage of  it.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  American  Gov- 
ernment had  any  real  interest  in  that  part  of  the  Mission 
which  was  however  very  near  to  Roberts'  heart  because 
of  his  previous  experience  at  Zanzibar. 

A  treaty  with  the  Sultan,  the  first  commercial  treaty 
he  had  ever  signed,  was  concluded  September  21,  1833.  It 
provided  for  a  reduction  of  duties  from  seven  and  one-half 
per  cent  on  both  exports  and  imports  to  a  single  five  per 
cent  charge  to  be  levied  merely  on  such  goods  as  were 
landed.  There  was  to  be  no  export  duty  and  no  pilotage 
charge.  The  treaty  also  contained  a  most-favored-nation 
clause.  Extraterritoriality  was  stipulated  to  the  extent  that 
the  American  consul  was  to  be  the  exclusive  judge  of  all 
disputes  and  suits  in  which  American  citizens  were  en- 
gaged with  each  other.  Six  years  later  the  British  Govern- 
ment made  a  treaty  with  the  Sultan  which  included  the 
advantages  gained  under  the  American  treaty  and  added  to 
them  amplified  extraterritorial  concessions. 

The  treaties  with  Siam  and  Muscat  were  duly  ratified 
by  the  Senate  and  in  March,  1835,  Roberts  was  commis- 
sioned to  exchange  their  ratifications.  He  was  also  directed 
to  resume  the  negotiations  with  Cochin  China  and  then 
to  proceed  to  Japan.  His  compensation  was  increased  to 
$4,400  a  year  but  his  request  for  an  increase  in  rank  was 
not  granted.  He  exchanged  the  ratifications  as  planned  but 
at  Bankok  contracted  a  disease  which  made  his  efforts  to 
get  into  communication  with  the  authorities  at  Cochin 
China  fruitless,  and  as  his  illness  increased  it  became  neces- 
sary to  hurry  on  to  Macao  where  he  died  June  12,  1836. 
The  untimely  death  of  Roberts  brought  to  an  end  the  pro- 
posed mission  to  Japan. 

Webster  Consults  the  Merchants 

The  omission  of  China  from  the  program  of  Edmund 
Roberts  on  both  the  first  and  the  second  missions  is  signifi- 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     135 

cant.  Neither  Roberts  or  Shellaber  had  urged  a  treaty  with 
China  and  there  had  been  no  demand  for  it  among  the 
China  merchants. 

As  soon  as  Congress  had  approved  of  the  proposed 
China  mission  in  1843,  and  before  it  was  known  who  would 
be  the  commissioner,  Daniel  Webster  sent  a  circular  letter 
to  most  of  the  American  merchants  resident  in  Boston, 
Salem,  New  York  and  elsewhere,  engaged  in  the  China 
trade,  inviting  suggestions.  This  letter  received  from 
many  persons  very  careful  attention  and  the  replies  to  it 
are  the  best  sources  of  information  as  to  the  attitude 
of  the  American  merchants  towards  the  trade  at  that 
time. 

It  is  significant  that  only  one  reply  even  mentions  the 
subject  of  opium.^    This  firm  wrote : 

''It  is  most  likely  that  the  Chinese  Government  will  urge  the  Com- 
missioner to  interpose  the  authority  of  his  office  to  prevent  the  par- 
ticipation of  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  the  opium  trade.  But 
we  conceive  it  would  be  extremely  impolitic  to  assume  any  engage- 
ments whatever  concerning  this  traffic  that  would  require  for  their 
fulfillment  the  restraining,  controlling,  or  influencing  of  our  citizens 
in  any  degree.  They  have  always  been  more  or  less  engaged  in  the 
trade  and  probably  always  will  be,  however  repugnant  it  unques- 
tionably is  to  justice  and  humanity.  We  believe  that  ultimately  the 
Emperor  will  find  it  necessary  to  legalize  the  traffic  under  the  im- 
position of  heavy  duties." 

Seven  Boston  firms  and  individual  merchants  united  in 
a  joint  reply  to  Webster's  request.  This  letter  was  pre- 
pared by  John  M.  Forbes,  a  partner  in  the  firm  of  Russell 
and  Company  who,  though  then  a  resident  in  the  United 
States,  had  served  his  apprenticeship  in  China. ^  This  com- 
munication made  the  following  recommendations: 

(1)  The  Mission  should  be  accompanied  by  a  respectable  fleet, 
because  many  of  the  Chinese  are  now  under  the  impression  that  the 
United  States  has  only  two  naval  vessels. 

(2)  No  presents,  as  such,  should  be  sent,  lest  the  Chinese  should 
call  them  tribute.  But  this  ought  not  to  prevent  some  tactful  repre- 
sentations of  friendship.  "The  Chinese  look  upon  us  as  friends,  but 
they  have  a  great  fear  of  encroachment  by  other  foreign  nations,  and 
if  we  could,  in  a  quiet  way,  without  infringing  upon  the  courtesies 


136  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

due  to  Great  Britain,  contribute  anything  to  the  means  of  defense 
against  further  aggression  it  would  open  the  eyes  of  the  Emperor  to 
the  value  of  an  alliance  with  us,  more  than  the  prospect  of  increasing 
their  trade  a  hundred  fold." 

(3)  The  Mission  will  find  it  necessary  first  to  stop  at  Macao  but 
possibly  it  ought  to  go  on  to  Canton,  or  preferably  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Pei-ho. 

(4)  The  Provincial  authorities  at  Canton  should  be  informed  in 
advance  of  the  coming  of  the  Mission,  and  should  be  notified  that  it 
will  proceed  to  the  North. 

(5)  Two  interpreters  will  be  necessai-y.  Dr.  Peter  Parker  is 
recommended. 

(6)  The  commissioner  must  be  warned  that  the  Chinese  will  be 
disposed  to  contest  every  point.  An  appeal  to  arms  may  be  necessary, 
and  it  will  be  well,  if  possible,  to  folloto  the  English  in  making  a 
treaty.  If  the  English  do  not  go  to  Peking,  the  American  minister 
must  exercise  "infinite  caution"  about  going  there.  "All  experience 
in  Chinese  affairs  shows  that  no  foreign  nation  ever  yet  gained  any 
disputed  point  by  peaceful  negotiation." 

The  letter  closes  with  some  general  advice.  The  signers 
assume  that  the  United  States  is  not  prepared  to  enjorce 
the  reception  of  an  envoy,  or  the  making  of  a  treaty. 
Nevertheless  the  opportunity  is  such  that,  although  the 
Americans  already  enjoy  all  the  privileges  possessed  by  the 
English,  it  may  be  possible  to  secure  by  treaty  what  other- 
wise would  be  enjoyed  only  by  the  sufferance  of  the  Chi- 
nese. However,  it  would  be  well  not  to  become  involved 
in  any  questions  of  diplomacy  in  such  a  way  as  to  lose  the 
privileges  which  are  already  enjoyed.  In  conclusion  the 
merchants  give  the  cautious  advice,  born  of  half  a  century 
of  experience,  'Tf  our  Envoy  does  not  see  his  way  to  suc- 
ceed, let  him  do  nothing;  let  him  wait  the  proper  time  to 
act,  and  if  his  patience  fail,  let  him  be  authorized  to  return 
home,  leaving  some  member  of  his  mission  as  Charge  to 
wait  an  opening." 

Many  of  the  other  replies  to  Webster's  letter  mentioned 
that  a  merchant  should  not  be  chosen  as  commissioner, 
because  of  the  low  esteem  in  which  merchants  were  held  by 
the  Chinese.  Among  the  grievances  mentioned  which  the 
commissioner  must  seek  to  correct  were  the  delay  and 
method  of  settling  claims,  especially  those  against  the  in- 
solvent hong  merchants,  excessive  tonnage  dues,  the  cor- 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     137 

ruption  of  the  customs  house  officials,  and  the  arbitrary 
stopping  of  the  entire  trade.* 

A  memorandum  note,  in  the  archives  of  the  State  De- 
partment,' countersigned  by  President  Tyler,  shows  the 
following  list  of  furnishings  with  which  the  Mission  was 
to  be  provided :  a  set  of  best  charts,  and  if  possible  a  globe ; 
a  pair  of  6-shooting  pistols,  rifles,  etc.;  model  of  war- 
steamer;  model  of  a  steam  excavator;  Daguerreotype  ap- 
paratus ("it  can  be  purchased,  perhaps,  in  France") ;  some 
approved  works  on  fortification,  gunnery,  ship-building, 
military  and  naval  strategy,  geology,  chemistry,  and  the 
"Encyclopedia  Americana";  a  telephone,  spy-glass,  barom- 
eter, and  thermometer;  and  some  useful  articles  made  of 
India  rubber.  Against  the  item  "a  model  of  a  locomotive 
steam  engine,  and  a  plan  of  railroad,  is  the  pencilled  nota- 
tion: "Will  require  too  much  time  to  prepare.    J.  T." 

Instructions  to  Gushing 

The  official  instructions,  prepared  by  Secretary  of  State 
Webster,  to  guide  the  actions  and  negotiations  of  the  first 

*0n  March  22,  1843,  Levi  Lincoln,  collector  of  the  port  of  Boston,  trans- 
mittod  to  Daniel  Webster,  at  the  latter's  request,  the  following  list  of  the  prin- 
cipal  Boston   and    Salem    houses  aiid   individuals  engaged   in    the   China   trade : 

William    Appleton    &    Co.  Boston 

J.   L.    Gardner   &   Co.  " 

J.  M.  Forbes  " 

Daniel    C.   Bacon  " 

Daniel   P.    Parker  " 

Bryant.   Sturgis  &  Co.  " 

J.  J.  Dixwell  « 

Minot  and  Hooper  " 

F:  W.  Macondray  " 

Alfred    Richardson  " 

Joseph  Peabddy  Salem 
Stephen   C.  Phillips  " 

David   A.   Neal   &  Bros.  " 

David  Pingree  " 

Michael  Shepard  &  Co.  " 

On  March  24,  1S43,  .T.  S.  Hone,  assistant  collector  of  the  port  of  New  York, 
transmitted  the  following  names   for  New  York  : 

N.  L.  &  G.  Griswold 
Talbot,   Olyphant   &  Co. 
Howland  &   Aspinwall 
Grinnell.     Minturn     &    Co. 
Gary  &  Co. 
Gordon  &  Talbot 
Boornian,  Johnston  &  Co. 
Alfred    A.   Low. 
Goodhue  &  Co. 

Presumably  letters  were  addressed  to  all  of  these  firms,  inviting  suggestions, 
though  not  all  of  them  appear  to  have  replied. 


138  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

American  commissioner  constitute  the  first  ofl&cial  declara- 
tion of  American  policy  for  China. ^ 

The  primary  object  of  the  Mission  was  to  be  "to  secure 
the  entry  of  American  ships  and  cargoes  into  these  ports 
[Amoy,  Ningpo,  Foochow  and  Shanghai,  which  had  been 
opened  to  English  trade  by  the  treaty  of  Nanking,  August 
25,  1842]  on  terms  as  favorable  as  those  which  are  en- 
joyed by  English  merchants."  As  to  the  manner  of  the 
negotiations  the  instructions  were  very  explicit.  Gushing 
was  to  use  the  greatest  tact  towards  the  Chinese  in  allaying 
'Hheir  repulsive  feelings  towards  foreigners."  "Your  con- 
stant aim,"  stated  the  instructions,  "must  be  to  produce  a 
full  conviction  in  the  minds  of  the  Government  and  the 
people,  that  your  mission  is  entirely  pacific ;  that  you  come 
with  no  purposes  of  hostility  or  annoyance;  that  you  are 
a  messenger  of  peace,  sent  from  the  greatest  Power  in 
America  to  the  greatest  Empire  in  Asia,  to  offer  respect  and 
good  will  and  to  establish  the  means  of  friendly  inter- 
course." In  this  connection  the  Commissioner  was  in- 
structed to  make  very  clear  that  the  American  Government, 
so  far  from  supporting  its  citizens  in  smuggling  of  any  sort, 
would  relinquish  all  jurisdiction  over  such  traders  and  "will 
not  interfere  to  protect  them  from  the  consequences  of  their 
own  illegal  conduct." 

Another  method  suggested  to  prove  the  friendly 
intent  of  the  Americans,  was  to  point  out  the  contrasts 
between  the  United  States  and  England. 


"It  cannot  he  wrong  for  you  to  make  known,  where  not  known, 
that  the  United  States,  once  a  country  subject  to  Enghmd,  threw  off 
the  subjection  years  af?o,  asserted  its  independence  sword  in  hand, 
established  that  independence  after  a  seven  years'  war,  and  now  meets 
England  upon  equal  terms  upon  the  ocean  and  upon  the  land.  The 
remoteness  of  the  United  States  from  China,  and  still  more  the 
fact  that  they  have  no  colonial  possessions  in  her  neighborliood,  will 
naturally  lead  to  the  indulgence  of  a  less  suspicious  and  more  friendly 
feeling  than  may  have  been  entertained  towards  England,  even  before 
the  late  war  between  England  and  China.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  immense  power  of  Ejigland  in  India  must  be  regarded  by  the 
Chinese  Government  with  dissatisfaction,  if  not  with  some  degree 
of  alarm.    You  will  take  care  to  show  strongly  how  free  the  Chinese 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     139 

Government  may  well  be  from  all  jealousy  arising  from  such  causes 
towards  the  United  States." 

On  the  other  hand  dishing  was  warned  not  to  adopt 
any  manner  which  could  in  any  way  be  interpreted  as 
placing  him  in  the  category  of  'tribute-bearer,'  where  Lord 
Macartney,  the  Dutch  commissioner,  and  Lord  Amherst 
had  been  classified  by  the  Chinese  in  1793,  1795,  and  1816, 
respectively.  "You  will  signify  to  all  Chinese  authorities 
and  others,"  read  the  instructions,  ''that  it  is  deemed  to  be 
quite  below  the  dignity  of  the  Emperor  of  China  and  the 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America  to  be  concerning 
themselves  wiih  such  unimportant  matters  as  presents  from 
one  to  the  other;  that  the  intercourse  between  the  heads 
of  two  such  governments  should  be  made  to  embrace  only 
great  political  questions,  the  tender  of  mutual  regard,  and 
the  establishment  of  useful  relations." 

A  secondary  object,  quite  subordinate  to  the  first,  was 
to  reach  the  Emperor  at  Peking.  The  instructions  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  capital  of  the  empire  were  to  be  used  as  a  lever 
for  securing  the  primary  object  of  the  mission,  rather  than 
to  be  considered  as  constituting  a  primary  purpose.  "It  is, 
of  course,  desirable  that  you  should  be  able  to  reach  Peking 
and  the  Court,  and  the  person  of  the  Emperor.  .  .  .  The 
purpose  of  seeing  the  Emperor  must  be  persisted  in  as  long 
as  may  be  consistent  and  proper."  The  commissioner  was 
accordingly  instructed  very  carefully,  in  case  he  reached 
Peking,  not  to  perform  the  kotow,  on  the  double  ground 
that  it  would  compromise  the  independence  of  the  United 
States  before  the  Chinese,  and  that  it  would  be  a  violation 
of  religious  principles.  'You  will  represent  to  the  Chinese 
authorities,  nevertheless,  that  you  are  directed  to  pay  to 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  the  same  marks  of  respect  and 
homage  as  are  paid  by  your  government  to  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Russia,  or  any  other  of  the  great  Powers 
of  the  world." 

In  consonance  with  these  instructions,  and  as  still  further 
evidence  that  the  American  Government  wished  to  keep 
its    hands  entirely  clean  of  the  opium  trade,  the  commis- 


140  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

sioner  received  (June  12,  1843)  from  Mr.  Legare,  who  had 
succeeded  Webster  as  acting  Secretary  of  State,  positive 
instructions  to  investigate  the  charge  that  the  newly  ap- 
pointed consul  at  Canton  "is  likely  to  be  associated  in 
business  with  a  firm  avowedly  engaged  in  the  opium  trade," 
and  if  the  charge  was  proved,  unless  the  consul  would  agree 
to  resign  voluntarily,  to  remove  him  immediately.  No  re- 
port was  ever  rendered  by  Gushing  on  this  duty,  nor  was 
one  ever  officially  asked  for.  According  to  all  the  evidence 
now  available  it  would  appear  that  the  charge  was  entirely 
well  founded,  although  it  may  have  been  true,  until  after 
the  visit  of  Gushing,  that  only  some  of  the  individual 
partners,  rather  than  the  firm  itself,  were  directly  engaged 
in  the  trade. 

In  addition  to  his  instructions  Gushing  carried  two 
letters  signed  by  President  Tyler,  and  addressed  to  the 
Emperor  of  Ghina,  one,  "a  full  power,"  authorizing  Gushing 
"to  sign  any  treaty  which  may  be  concluded"  between  the 
commissioner  and  the  Emperor's  authorized  representative ; 
the  other  "a  letter  of  credence  to  the  Emperor,  to  be  com- 
municated or  delivered  to  the  Sovereign  in  such  manner 
as  may  be  most  convenient  or  agreeable  to  His  Majesty  to 
receive  it." 

Something  of  mystery  attaches  to  these  letters.  The 
former,  containing  the  "full  power"  is  brusque,  stiff  and 
ungracious.  It  contains  one  paragraph  beginning — "The 
Ghinese  love  to  trade  with  our  people,  and  to  sell  them  tea 
and  silk,  for  which  our  people  pay  silver,  and  sometimes 
other  articles" — which  was  certain  to  be  regarded  by  the 
Ghinese  authorities  as  either  a  studied  insult  to  the  Em- 
peror, who  never  demeaned  himself  to  recognize  as  a  con- 
sideration the  profits  of  mere  merchants,  or  as  a  colossal 
breach  of  good  manners  by  uncouth  barbarians.  The  other 
letter,  briefer,  is  very  different  in  tone  and  literary  style.* 

*TIiis  second  letter  is  probably  the  one  referred  to  in  a  communication  from 
Cusliing  to  the  State  Department  (June  27.  1843)  after  Webster's  resignation 
in  whicli  the  conmiissioner  encloses  "a  draft  prepared  by  Mr.  Webster  of  tb(! 
President's  letter  to  tlie  I^inperor  of  China.  Please  submit  it  to  .Mr.  I'psliur  for 
the  approval  of  tb(>  President  and  liimself.  It  was  .Mr.  Webster's  phiu  to  have 
it  copied  in  an  ornamental  form  and  placed  in  a  suitable  bo.\."  » 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     141 

The  other  letter,  the  one  which  the  commissioner  upon 
his  arrival  presented  to  show  the  authority  vested  in  him 
to  conclude  a  treaty,  and  usually  ascribed  to  Webster,  was 
more  likely  prepared  by  Mr.  Upshur,  and  might  have  been 
a  serious  handicap  to  Gushing  in  his  initial  efforts  to  estab- 
lish cordial  relations  with  the  Chinese  Government.  It 
was,  in  part,  as  follows: 

"I,  John  Tyler,  President  of  the  United  States  of  Amei'iea — which 
states  are:  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island, 
Connecticut,  Vermont,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Dela- 
ware, Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Georgia, 
Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Ohio,  Louisiana,  Indiana,  Mississippi,  Illinois, 
Alabama,  Missouri,  Arkansas,  and  Michigan — send  you  this  letter 
of  peace  and  friendship,  signed  by  my  own  hand. 

"I  hope  your  health  is  good.  .  .  . 

"Now,  my  words  are,  that  the  governments  of  two  such  great 
countries  should  be  at  peace.  It  is  proper,  and  according  to  the  will 
of  Heaven,  that  they  should  respect  each  other  and  act  wisely.  I 
therefore  send  to  your  Court  Caleb  Cushing,  one  of  the  wise  and 
learned  men  of  this  country.  On  his  first  arrival  in  China,  he  will 
enquire  after  your  health.  He  has  then  strict  orders  to  go  to  your 
great  city  of  Pekin,  and  there  to  deliver  this  letter.  He  will  have  with 
him  secretaries  and  interpreters. 

".  .  .  Our  Minister,  Caleb  Cushing,  is  authorized  to  make  a  treaty 
to  regulate  trade.  Let  it  be  just.  Let  there  be  no  unfair  advantage 
on  either  side.  .  .  .  We  shall  not  take  the  parf  of  evil-doers.  We 
shall  not  uphold  them  that  break  your  laws.  Therefore,  we  doubt  not 
that  you  will  be  pleased  that  our  messenger  of  peace,  with  this  letter 
in  his  hand,  shall  come  to  Pekin,  and  there  deliver  it ;  that  your  great 
officers  will,  by  your  order,  make  a  treaty  with  him  to  regulate  affairs 
of  trade — so  that  nothing  may  happen  to  disturb  the  peace  between 
China  and  America.  Let  the  treaty  be  signed  by  your  own  Imperial 
hand.  It  shall  be  signed  by  mine,  by  the  authority  of  our  great  coun- 
cil, the  Senate." 

While  the  style  and  tone  of  this  letter  was  hardly  in 
keeping  with  the  instructions  as  to  tact  and  courtesy, 
nevertheless  the  veiled  threat,  implied  in  the  conclusion, 
was  fully  in  harmony  with  the  policy  already  fixed.  The 
last  instruction  to  Gushing  was: 

"Finally,  you  will  signify,  in  decided  terms  and  a  positive  manner, 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  find  it  impossible 
to  remain  on  terms  of  friendship  and  regard  with  the  Emperor,  if 
greater  privileges  or  commercial  facilities  should  be  allowed  to  the 
subjects  of  any  other  Government  than  should  be  granted  to  the  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States." 


142  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Caleb  Gushing  Goes  to  Macao 

The  Ghina  Mission  as  finally  organized  consisted  of 
Caleb  Gushing,  Commissioner;  Fletcher  Webster,  Secre- 
tary; Dr.  E.  K.  Kane,  afterwards  known  for  his  Arctic  ex- 
plorations, Surgeon;  and  a  gi'oup  of  young  men  who  went 
on  their  own  charges,  "supplying  dignity  and  importance 
to  the  occasion,"  as  Webster  described  it.  The  commis- 
sioners official  costume  consisted  of  the  "uniform  of  a 
major-general,  with  some  slight  additions  in  the  way  of 
embroideries,"  a  showiness  much  deprecated  by  some  plain 
Americans. ^*^  The  Mission  arrived  at  Macao  February  24, 
1844,  on  the  Brandywine,  and  Gushing  established  "his 
miniature  court  in  the  house  of  a  former  Portuguese  Gov- 
ernor, creating  a  profound  sensation  by  the  novelty  and 
magnitude  of  his  Mission,  as  well  as  by  his  attractive  per- 
sonal qualities."  ^^ 

On  arrival  Gushing  added  to  his  staff  Rev.  E.  G.  Bridg- 
man,  D.  D.,  and  Rev.  Peter  Parker,  M.  D.,  who  had  been 
in  China  since  1830  and  1834  respectively,  as  joint  Chinese 
secretaries.  Later  S.  Wells  Williams  also  assisted  in  the 
Chinese  correspondence.  This  was  a  somewhat  reassuring 
move,  for  these  men  had  a  better  knowledge  of  the  language 
than  any  other  Europeans  in  Canton  at  the  time,  and  also 
a  better  understanding  of  Chinese  etiquette  and  modes  of 
thought,  and  the  history  of  preceding  American  relations 
with  China.  In  addition  to  these  qualifications  they  were 
well  known  to  the  Chinese.  Dr.  Parker  had  won  their  re- 
spect and  confidence  by  his  hospital,  and  Dr.  Bridgman  had 
been  so  honored  by  former  Commissioner  Lin  as  to  have 
been  invited  to  come  to  him  for  a  special  conference  early 
in  1839  with  a  view  to  securing  his  advice  and  good  offices 
in  mitigating  the  acute  difficulties  which  grew  up  over  the 
surrender  of  the  opium. 

Dr.  Bridgman  was  also  made  official  chaplain.  Gushing 
wrote  to  the  New  York  Commercial  Advertiser:  ^- 

"The  newspapers  will  have  informed  you  that  Dr.  Eritlf):nian  and 
Dr.  Parker  are  joint  interpreters.    It  ought  to  be  understood  in  addi- 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  GUSHING  MISSION     143 

tion  that  Dr.  Bridgman  is  chaplain  of  the  legation  in  title  and  in  fact. 
I  have  deemed  it  essential  to  have  religious  services  perfoi-med  at  the 
residence  of  the  legation  every  Lord's  day  and  shall  adhere  to  this 
practice  so  long  as  my  mission  lasts." 

Two  months  after  Cushing's  arrival  ^^  an  American 
merchant  of  Canton  wrote: 

"Your  townsman,  Mr.  Gushing,  is  quietly  living  at  Macao,  pre- 
paring, as  he  says,  to  go  to  Peking.  When  at  Macao  I  had  the  honor 
of  seeing  much  of  his  excellency  (Gushing)  who  has  spurs  on  his 
heels,  and  mustachios  and  imperial,  very  flourishing !  Although  I 
like  the  man,  I  most  heartily  wish  he  were  anywhere  else  but  here  and 
am,  as  well  as  evei-y  other  American  merchant  here,  in  great  fear.  As 
Americans  we  are  now  on  the  very  test  terms  possible  with  the 
Ghinese;  and  as  the  only  connection  we  want  with  Ghina  is  a  com- 
mercial one,  I  cannot  see  what  Mr.  Gushing  expects  to  do.  He  cannot 
make  us  better  off — and  a  very  few  of  his  important  airs  will  make 
us  hated  by  the  Ghinese,  and  then  we  lose  all  the  advantages  we  now 
have  over  the  English ;  and  though  I  believe  Mr.  G.  to  be  as  honest 
as  the  most  of  politicians,  yet  I  fear  for  the  sake  of  being,  as  he 
hopes,  put  face  to  face  with  Taoukwang  (Emperor)  he  will  sacrifice  his 
countrymen  and  the  good  will  of  the  Ghinese  and  lose  all." 

The  question  raised  by  the  American  merchant  was 
pertinent.  What  could  Gushing  do  that  had  not  already 
been  done?  The  English  were  disposed  to  treat  with  de- 
rision both  the  American  and  the  French  missions,  the 
coming  of  which  had  already  been  announced.  The  London 
Times,  in  an  article  which  was  discussing  the  British  Sup- 
plementary Treaty  of  1843,  said:^** 

"This  treaty  is  looked  upon  in  the  East  as  the  most  signal  triumph 
of  the  British  plenipotentiary,  for  it  renders  nugatory  all  the  attempts 
of  the  French  and  American  diplomatic  missions  lately  sent  with  such 
pomp  to  the  Ghinese  coast.  Laughter  has  already  begun  at  the  ap- 
pearance of  two  ambassadors  sent  thither  before  it  was  known  that 
they  would  be  received,  in  order  to  gain  a  purpose  which  was  granted 
before  they  appeared.  They  now  have  no  grounds  for  negotiation 
and  must  return  to  their  own  country  in  order  to  be  laughed  at  at 
home  and  abroad." 

The  situation  was,  indeed,  quite  unlike  that  in  which  the 
American  merchants  in  Canton,  immediately  after  six 
weeks  imprisonment  in  the  spring  of  1839,  had  been  led  to 
petition  Congress  to  send  out  a  commissioner  to  effect  a 
commercial  treaty. 


144  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  three  sources  of  information  for  Edmund  Roberts  are:     The 

Roberts  Papers  in  the  Department  of  State;  the  Roberts  Papers 
in  the  Library  of  Congress  (Mss.  Div.) ;  and  "Embassy  to  the 
Eastern  Courts  of  Cochin  China,  Siam  and  Muscat,"  by 
Roberts  himself,  and  published  posthumously  (New  York, 
1837).  The  book  is  the  least  satisfactory  of  these  sources  be- 
cause the  Department  of  State  raised  objections  to  its  publica- 
tion, and  to  comply  with  its  wishes  as  regards  secrecy,  particu- 
larly as  to  the  plans  for  a  treaty  with  Japan,  a  great  deal  of 
information  was  suppressed.  A  partial  report  of  his  first  mis- 
sion was  printed  in  the  Congressional  Globe. 

2.  Batavia  Consular  Letters,  Vol.  1,  Feb.  27,  1826. 

3.  Paullin's  "American  Naval  Vessels  in  the  Orient." 

4.  Text    of    the    letters    which    are    identical    to    each    sovereign, 

Robert's  "Embassy,  etc.,"  p.  204. 

5.  Miscellaneous  Letters   (Dept.   of  State),  N.  &  G.   Griswold   to 

Webster,  May  13,  1843. 

6.  Op.  cit.     Forbes  to  Webster,  April  29,  1843;  see  also  "Letters 

and  Recollections  of  John  Murray  Forbes,"  Vol.  1,  p.  115. 

7.  Misc.  Letters  (Dept.  of  State),  April  11,  1843. 

8.  S.  Doc.  138:28-2;  Webster's  Works,  Vol.  6,  i)p.  4G7-9. 

9.  China  Dispatches,  Vol.  1. 

10.  Niles'  Begister,  July  15,  1843,  p.  .308. 

11.  S.  Wells  Williams'  "Life  and  Letters,"  p.  126. 

12.  Niles'  Register,  August  3,  1844,  p.  363. 

13.  Ihid.,  Sept.  21,  1844,  p.  36. 

14.  Ihid.,  Feb.  10,  1844,  p.  369. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUvSHING 

In  taking  up  the  discussion  of  the  contribution  of  Caleb 
Cushing  to  the  body  of  American  policy  in  Asia  we  are 
again  reminded  of  the  fact  that  this  policy  at  any  given 
date  might  more  correctly  be  described  as  the  policy  of 
Americans — a  descrimination  which  need  not  be  entirely 
limited  to  American  foreign  policies  in  Asia. 

Before  the  advent  of  Cushing  at  Macao  in  1844,  there 
had  been  a  sharply  defined  policy  in  China,  It  was  the 
policy  of  the  American  residents  fully  approved  and  sup- 
ported by  the  opinion  of  the  merchants  in  the  United  States 
who  were  engaged  in  the  China  trade  and  shipping.  This 
policy  had  grown  up  out  of  the  economic,  geographical  and 
political  necessities  of  the  situation.  The  Americans  had 
had  no  other  choice  than  to  seek  peace  and  pursue  it. 
Whether  they  would  have  adopted  a  different  course  had 
China  been  a  part  of  the  mainland  of  the  western  hemi- 
sphere is  a  purely  speculative,  though  interesting,  question. 
The  success  which  had  attended  the  policy  adopted  was, 
at  any  rate,  a  sufficient  justification.  There  had  been  some 
complaints  of  injustice  and  of  discrimination  but  they  had 
been  few  and  on  the  whole  one  could  not  claim  that  the 
secondary  commercial  position  occupied  by  the  Americans 
at  Canton  in  1844,  or  the  fluctuating  and  uncertain  growth 
of  the  trade  in  the  preceding  twenty-five  years  was  in  any 
way  due  to  that  policy. 

In  the  United  States  during  this  period  the  fullest  ex- 
pression of  policy  towards  the  entire  East  India  trade  had 
comprised  nothing  more  than  the  demand  for  most-favored- 
nation  treatment.  Within  a  decade,  however,  there  had 
grown  up  a  public  sentiment  against  the  opium  trade.    One 

145 


146  AIMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

detects  also  in  the  discussions  of  the  Anglo-Chinese  War 
the  beginnings  of  a  tone  of  resentment  at  Chinese  arrogance. 
To  the  growing  restiveness  of  Americans  at  the  exclusive 
policy  of  the  Government  of  China  the  American  mis- 
sionaries were  making  important  contributions,  as  the  pages 
of  the  Chinese  Repository  clearly  reveal.  China  must 
'bend  or  break,' ^  remarked  the  missionaries  in  1840;  the 
missionaries  had  never  been  able  really  to  establish  them- 
selves under  the  existing  regime. 

Daniel  Webster  in  his  instructions  to  Cushing  may  be 
said  to  have  officialized  existing  public  sentiment.  One  does 
not  find  that  in  these  instructions,  fine  as  they  are  in  diction 
and  spirit,  Webster  had  made  any  contribution  to  the  body 
of  policy.  He  asked  primarily  for  most-favored-nation 
treatment  in  matters  of  trade.  To  Caleb  Cushing  ex- 
clusively was  reserved  the  privilege  and  credit  of  working 
out  a  method  by  which  the  Americans,  whose  geographical 
and  political  relations  to  China  must  continue  to  be  utterly 
different  from  those  of  the  British,  might  still  enjoy  similar 
privileges. 

The  Negotiations 

The  political  situation  when  Cushing  reached  Macao, 
February  24,  1844,  was  as  follows:  (1)  By  two  treaties, 
that  of  Nanking  (1842),  and  that  of  the  Bogue  (1843), 
England  had  secured  a  peace  with  China  granting,  in  ad- 
dition to  $21,000,000  and  the  cession  of  Hongkong,  the 
opening  of  four  additional  ports,  the  liberty  to  appoint 
consuls  to  each  of  them,  abolition  of  all  monopolies,  a 
uniform  published  tariff,  equality  between  officials  of  cor- 
responding rank  of  the  two  countries,  and  an  assent  in 
general  terms  to  complete  extraterritoriality.  (2)  By  the 
action  of  the  Chinese  Government,  confirmed  in  a  written 
promise  to  Commodore  Kearny,  and  executed  by  an  Im- 
perial e(Uct,  the  ports  had  been  thrown  open  to  the  trade 
of  all  nations  upon  equal  terms.  Moreover,  the  Americans 
were  on  the  full  tide  of  their  greatest  prosperity,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  clipper  ship  era,  highly  popular  by  com- 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  147 

parison  with  the  English  among  the  Chinese,  and  not  at 
all  eager  to  have  conditions  disturbed  by  the  introduction 
of  diplomatic  questions  which,  even  if  settled  entirely  to 
the  liking  of  the  Americans,  could  not  make  business  any 
better. 

Nor  was  the  American  Mission  welcomed  by  the  Chinese 
Government.  The  preceding  October,  in  obedience  to  in- 
structions from  Washington,  Paul  S.  Forbes,  the  newly 
appointed  consul  at  Canton,  had  both  formally  and  in- 
formally conveyed  to  Kiying,  the  Imperial  Commissioner 
and  Governor  General  of  Kwang-tung  and  Kwangsi,  that 
the  American  Mission  was  on  its  way,  only  to  be  met  with 
the  reply:  ''Why  go  to  Peking  when  the  Imperial  Com- 
missioner is  already  at  Canton,  and  when  the  Americans 
have  already  been  given  all  the  advantages  in  trade  which 
have  been  conceded  to  the  English?"  In  the  formal  reply 
to  the  oflficial  notification  from  Forbes,  Kiying  had  stated :  - 

''The  August  Emperfl^,  compassionating  people  from  afar,  cer- 
tainly cannot  bear  that  the  American  Minister  by  a  circuitous  route 
should  go  to  Peking,  wading  through  over-flowing  difficulties.  The 
Consul  ought,  therefore,  to  intercept  and  stop  the  American  Pleni- 
potentiary from  repairing,  in  every  respect  unnecessary,  to  the  Im- 
perial Court." 

This  unwillingness  and  even  fear  on  the  part  of  the 
Chinese  for  a  foreign  envoy  to  proceed  to  Peking  was  to 
become  the  lever  in  the  hands  of  Gushing,  for  the  negotiat- 
ing of  the  treaty.  However,  the  concession  of  this  point  at 
the  outset,  would  have  embarrassed  all  further  negotiations. 
Even  before  the  arrival  of  the  Brandywine  at  Macao  a 
general  order  to  the  members  of  the  mission  and  the  officers 
and  crew  of  the  frigate  had  been  issued,  cautioning  every- 
one to  be  most  discreet  in  answer  to  any  questions,  and 
always  to  assert  that  the  destination  of  the  mission  was 
Peking. 

Three  days  after  the  arrival  at  Alacao  (February  27), 
Gushing  addressed  a  formal  letter  to  the  acting  Governor 
General  at  Canton,  Kiying  having  found  it  convenient  to 
retire  to  Peking,   casually  mentioning  the  fact  that  the 


148  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

American  Plenipotentiary  "finds  himself  under  the  neces- 
sity of  landing  at  Macao  and  remaining  there  a  few  weeks, 
until  the  Brandijwine  shall  have  taken  on  provisions  and 
made  other  preparations  to  enable  her  to  continue  her 
voyage  to  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho."  Gushing,  therefore, 
availed  himself  of  the  first  opportunity,  in  pursuance  of 
orders  from  his  government,  to  inquire  solicitously  after  the 
health  of  the  Emperor,  and  he  addressed  his  inquiry  to  the 
Governor  because,  as  Gushing  was  careful  to  state,  he  was 
'the  nearest  high  functionary  of  the  Ghinese  Government.' 
The  plenipotentiary  intimated  that  an  immediate  answer 
to  his  inquiry  would  be  most  acceptable. 

Then  followed  a  parley  ^  which,  save  for  the  fact  that  it 
is  raised  to  diplomatic  dignity,  was  otherwise  not  at  all 
dissimilar  to  a  thousand  daily  passages  in  any  bazaar  in 
Asia  for  forty  centuries.  This  correspondence  with  the 
acting  Governor,  explained  Gushing,  in  a  later  dispatch  to 
the  State  Department,  "not  only  proves  to  have  had  the 
advantage  of  having  settled  many  things,  and  thus  prepared 
the  way  for  the  negotiations  with  Kiying,  but  it  has  had 
the  further  advantage  of  enabling  me  to  say  all  the  harsh 
things  which  needed  to  be  said,  and  to  speak  to  the  Ghinese 
Government  with  extreme  plainness  and  frankness,  in  a 
degree  which  would  have  been  inconvenient,  if  not  inad- 
missible, in  immediate  correspondence  with  Kiying." 

Governor  Ghing  allowed  Gushing's  letter  to  go  un- 
answered for  three  weeks,  and  then  replied  that  it  "evinces 
respectful  obedience,  and  politeness  exceedingly  to  be 
praised.  The  Emperor  is  well  and  enjoying  a  happy  old 
age,"  wrote  Ghing  and  added  pointedly,  "and  is  at  peace 
with  all,  both  far  and  near."  This  touch  was  evidently  to 
show  the  American  envoy  that  the  government  had  not 
overlooked  the  fact  that  the  American  Mission  arrived  in 
a  frigate.  The  Governor  then  took  occasion  to  explain 
to  Gushing  a  few  points  in  Ghinese  diplomatic  etiquette 
and  law.  It  was  not  customary  for  envoys  to  proceed  to 
Tientsin  unless  they  were  invited.  There  were  no  linguists 
there,  and  no  commissioners  empowered  to  receive  them. 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  GUSHING  149 

Even  Sir  Henry  Pottinger,  the  English  plenipotentiary, 
after  he  had  signed  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  had  been  forced 
to  return  to  Canton  to  negotiate  the  commercial  agreement 
such  as,  the  Governor  assumed,  the  Americans  were  alone 
interested  in.  The  Governor  further  reminded  Gushing 
that  nearly  six  months  ago  the  American  consul  at  Canton 
had  been  informed  that  it  would  be  useless  for  the  Ameri- 
can envoy  to  go  to  Tientsin.  And  as  for  a  treaty,  the 
Governor  reasserted  that  such  an  agreement  was  quite 
unnecessary.  The  nations  were  at  peace,  the  tariff  had  been 
settled,  and  ''already  has  your  nation  been  bedewed  with 
its  advantages."  The  Emperor  had  issued  orders  to  soothe 
and  stop  the  Americans  at  Macao.  'Tt  is  useless  with 
lofty,  polished  and  empty  words  to  alter  these  unlimited  ad- 
vantages." Nevertheless,  if  Gushing  insisted,  the  Governor 
would  again  memorialize  the  Emperor  on  the  subject. 
Meanwhile,  for  the  Americans  to  proceed  to  the  North 
without  Imperial  permission  would  "put  an  end  to  civility." 

Gushing  promptly  acknowledged  the  Governor's  letter, 
and  regretted  the  impasse  to  which  they  seemed  already  to 
have  come.  As  for  himself,  he  was  under  orders  to  proceed 
to  Peking.  He  was  sorry  that  the  Imperial  Government 
had  neglected  to  have  a  commissioner  waiting  in  the  South 
to  receive  him  for  it  was  quite  possible  that  commercial,  as 
distinguished  from  political  and  diplomatic  questions,  might 
be  settled  there  as  well  as  anywhere.  But  the  most  serious 
obstacle,  in  Cushing's  opinion,  was  the  fact  that  he  was, 
obviously,  quite  unable  to  discuss  these  two  questions  of 
the  right  to  proceed  to  the  Pei-ho  and  the  necessity  of  a 
treaty  with  any  one  save  the  Imperial  Commissioner  him- 
self. 

Ching  replied,  rather  more  promptly  than  before,  that 
he  would  memorialize  the  Emperor,  and  as  for  himself,  he 
could  not  take  upon  his  shoulders  "to  commence  move- 
ments which  may  eventuate  in  the  loss  of  the  invaluable 
blessings  of  peace." 

Thus,  in  the  first  engagement,  the  American  envoy  had 
won  a  point;  the  Emperor  was  to  be  memorialized. 


150  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  correspondence,  notwithstanding  these  obvious  and 
acknowledged  disabilities  of  the  correspondents,  continued. 
Ching  notified  Gushing  (April  12)  that  no  commissioner 
had  yet  been  appointed,  and  that  the  Americans  would  be 
notified  when  the  appointment  was  made.  Gushing  replied 
the  next  day  by  sending  the  Brandy  wine  up  to  Whampoa, 
only  twelve  miles  from  Ganton,  "on  a  visit,  for  a  few  days, 
of  courtesy  and  civility."  The  commander  of  the  frigate 
carried  the  matter  a  little  further  by  proposing  a  suitable 
exchange  of  salutes,  and  by  inviting  himself  to  visit  the 
Governor  at  his  yamen  in  the  city  of  Ganton.  Ghing,  evi- 
dently alarmed,  and  yet  with  the  customary  show  of 
Ghinese  oflacial  bravado,  ordered  the  Brandy  wine  to  return 
to  IVIacao,  and  remarked  rather  tartly,  that  the  visit  of  such 
a  formidably  armed  vessel  was  a  strange  exhibition  of  cour- 
tesy, and  had  a  very  war-like  bearing. 

Meanwhile  Gushing  continued  the  unofficial  correspond- 
ence. He  reviewed  the  situation  and  ventured  to  give  the 
Governor  a  little  instruction  in  the  rules  of  international 
courtesy.  A  refusal  to  receive  envoys  is,  among  Western 
nations,  considered  as  "an  act  of  national  insult  and  a  just 
cause  for  war."  The  analogy  between  the  course  pursued 
with  Sir  Henry  Pottinger  and  the  one  the  Ghinese  were 
seeking  to  adopt  with  him,  would  hardly  be  complete  until 
the  Americans  had  fought  a  war  with  Ghina,  and  had  oc- 
cupied one  of  the  islands  off  the  Ghinese  coast.  He  re- 
minded the  Governor  that  the  season  w^as  already  passing, 
that  he  had  already  waited  a  long  time,  that  no  Imperial 
Gommissioner  had  even  been  appointed,  and  that  he  did 
not  intend  to  be  held  at  Ganton  until  the  favorable  season 
for  sailing  to  the  North  had  passed  with  the  changing  of 
the  monsoon.  This  drew  an  immediate  reply  from  Ghing 
that  Kiying  had  been  appointed  as  Imperial  Gommissioner 
and  would  arrive  at  Ganton  in  due  time. 
^  The  second  engagement  of  mighty  words,  supported  by 
N^^the  movements  of  the  Brandy  wine,  had  resulted  in  another 
victory  for  the  Americans. 

Gushing  pursued  the  advantage.    He  chose  to  feel  that 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  151 

he  had  been  grossly  insulted,  and  that  the  national  honor 
of  the  Americans  had  been  affected.  However,  Gushing 
"suspends  all  resentment"  for  the  time  being,  and  hoped 
that  "suitable  reparation  will  be  made  in  due  time."  "I 
commit  myself,"  he  wrote  solemnly,  "to  the  integrity  and 
honor  of  the  Chinese  Government;  and  if,  in  the  sequel, 
I  shall  prove  to  have  done  this  in  vain,  I  shall  then  consider 
myself  the  more  amply  justified,  in  the  sight  of  all  men, 
for  any  determination  which,  out  of  regard  for  the  honor 
of  the  United  States,  it  may  be  my  duty  to  adopt  under 
such  circumstances."  The  next  day  he  notified  the  Gov- 
ernor that  the  St.  Louis  and  Perry  which  had  unfortunately 
been  detained  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  would  soon  arrive, 
and  that  the  American  Government  had  decided  to  enlarge 
the  fleet  in  Chinese  waters  by  the  addition  of  the  Pacific 
Squadron  which  was  also  soon  to  arrive. 

The  addition  of  the  Pacific  Squadron  to  Cushing's  fleet 
had  been  suggested  to  the  President  before  Cushing's  de- 
parture from  the  United  States,  and  Gushing  had  again 
proposed  it  in  a  dispatch  to  the  State  Department  before 
his  arrival  in  China.  Other  dispatches  show  that  Gushing 
had  been  greatly  annoyed  that  during  these  early  negotia- 
tions there  had  not  been  a  larger  naval  force  at  his  com- 
mand. It  is  not  impossible  that  had  the  fleet  been  adequate 
and  suitably  provided  with  vessels  of  light  draught,  such 
as  are  necessary  for  the  approach  to  Tientsin,  he  might 
already  have  sailed  to  the  North.  If  so,  it  was  a  happy 
mischance  that  detained  him  at  Macao. 

Ching  stated  (May  4)  that  Kiying  had  already  left 
Peking,  was  travelling  with  incredible  speed,  and  might  be 
expected  at  Canton  on  the  fifth  of  June. 

The  interval  before  the  arrival  of  Kiying  was  devoted 
to  still  further  threats,  mingled  with  courteous  correspond- 
ence. The  Imperial  edict  making  known  the  appointment 
of  Kiying  mentioned  the  fact  that  the  LTnited  States  had 
never  gone  through  the  form  of  paying  tribute  to  the  Em- 
peror, and  made  clear  that  Gushing  had  the  choice  between 
remaining  at  Macao  and  securing  the  desired  treaty,  or 


152  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

going  to  Tientsin  and  failing  to  get  it.  The  appointment 
of  Kiying  was  taken  by  the  Americans  as  a  favorable  sign 
for  Kiying  had  negotiated  the  English  treaties,  had  been 
much  in  contact  with  the  foreigners,  and  was  greatly  re- 
spected for  his  breadth  of  view,  as  well  as  for  his  urbanity. 
Therefore  Gushing  agreed  to  defer  the  discussion  of  the  pro- 
posed trip  to  the  North,  and  although  still  complaining  of 
the  inconveniences  to  which  he  had  been  subjected,  settled 
down  to  wait  for  Kiying.  The  latter  wrote  to  him  (June  9) : 
'Tn  a  few  days  we  shall  take  each  other  by  the  hand,  and 
converse,  and  rejoice  together  with  indescribable  delight." 
The  American  commissioner  appeared  to  have  won  in  the 
first  skirmish  of  wits. 

A  not  unimportant  factor  in  the  successful  conclusion 
of  these  first  stages  in  the  negotiations  had  been  the  fact, 
made  clear  unofficially  in  the  beginning  by  Dr.  Peter  Parker, 
in  whom  the  Chinese  had  great  confidence,  and  later  by 
Gushing  in  the  correspondence,  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment had  no  desire  to  dismember  Ghina  or  to  possess  any 
part  of  her  territory. 

The  actual  negotiations  of  the  treaty  with  Ghina  were 
simple,  Kiying  was  eager  to  conclude  them  before  the 
arrival  of  the  French  plenipotentiary,  whose  approach  had 
been  announced,  and  the  Americans  had  already  prepared 
a  draft  of  the  document  which  they  desired  to  have  signed. 
Kiying  arrived  at  the  temple  of  the  Lady  of  Mercy,  just 
outside  Macao,  on  June  17.  The  next  few  days  were  given 
to  the  customary  visits  of  ceremony.  Then  the  commis- 
sioners delegated  to  their  subordinates  the  task  of  conferring 
together,  and  on  July  3,  the  treaty  was  signed. 

In  submitting  his  project  of  the  proposed  treaty,  Gush- 
ing had  written  to  Kiying: 

"In  drawing:  up  these  minutes,  I  haA^e  not  looked  to  the  side  of  the 
United  States  ak)ne.  1  felt  that  it  would  not  be  honorable,  in  dealing 
with  your  Excellency,  to  take  a  partial  view  of  the  subject.  I  have 
inserted  a  multitude  of  provisions  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit 
of  China.  In  a  word  I  have  sought  to  present  this  draft  of  a  treaty 
which,  as  already  intimated,  shall  be  in  all  parts  alike  just  and  honor- 
able to  China  and  tlie  United  States," 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  153 

The  Immediate  Application  of  the  Principles 
OF  the  Treaty 

An  incident  at  Canton  before  the  arrival  of  Kiying  had 
threatened  to  embarrass  the  negotiations,  and  the  ready 
wilHngness  of  the  Americans  to  respect  the  prejudices  of  the 
Chinese  had  doubtless  left  a  favorable  impression.  The 
mission  had  been  supplied  as  a  part  of  its  equipment  with 
a  flag-staff  which  was  intended  for  erection  over  the  Lega- 
tion, but  when  Cushing  established  himself  at  Macao  it  was 
impracticable  to  set  it  up.  owing  to  the  objection  of  the 
Portuguese  authorities.  The  flag-staff  was  therefore  turned 
over  to  the  American  consul  at  Canton,  and  placed  in  front 
of  the  consulate.  The  staff  was  surmounted  with  an  arrow 
for  a  weather-vane  which  caused  great  alarm  to  the  people 
of  the  city.  To  its  mysterious  influence  was  ascribed  the 
serious  drought  then  prevailing  in  Canton,  and  some  also 
found  in  the  arrow  a  symbol  of  approaching  war  between 
the  United  States  and  China.  At  length  a  Chinese  mob 
broke  into  the  factory  grounds,  cut  the  halyards,  damaged 
the  staff  and  sought  to  remove  the  arrow.  The  Americans 
defended  the  staff  and  repulsed  the  mob  with  fire-arms. 
The  next  day  a  second  mob  collected.  Of  such  incidents  are 
wars  sometimes  born,  but  in  this  case  the  American  consul 
agreed  to  remove  the  arrow.^ 

The  episode  was  sufficient  to  illustrate  the  insecurity 
of  the  foreigners  at  Canton,  however  many  treaties  they 
might  negotiate.  Shortly  after  the  removal  of  the  obnoxious 
weather-vane  a  mob  attacked  some  Americans  who,  in 
defending  themselves,  accidentally  killed  a  Chinese — Hsii 
A-man.  Governor  Ching,  who  had  himself  been  negligent 
in  providing  protection  from  the  mob,  demanded  that  the 
Americans  surrender  the  murderer.  The  matter  was  re- 
ferred to  Cushing  and  Kiying.  The  former  refused  to  de- 
liver the  man,  ordered  the  calling  of  a  jury  of  Americans, 
and  the  trial  of  the  case  according  to  American  law.  The 
jury  rendered  a  verdict  of  acquittal  on  the  ground  of  self- 
defense.     Kiying  accepted  the  settlement.     Subsequently, 


154  A^IERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

though  not  as  a  part  of  the  judicial  action  in  the  case,  the 
family  of  Hsli  A-man  received  some  money  from  the  Amer- 
icans."' This  incident  again  illustrated  the  danger  to  which 
the  foreigners  in  Canton  were  exposed,  and  was  the  means 
of  securing  from  the  authorities  the  promise  of  better  pro- 
vision for  the  protection  of  the  factories — a  promise  which 
was  never  fulfilled. 

The  Canton  rabble,  incited  ])y  minor  officials  and  the 
literati,  were  in  an  angry  mood  which  boded  ill  for  the 
future.  Kiying  confessed  his  great  difficulty  in  controlling 
the  people  of  the  city  and  explained  to  Cushing  that  the 
English  had  created  a  great  deal  of  ill-will.  'T  have  heard," 
he  wrote,  ''that  usually  the  citizens  of  Canton  have  respected 
and  liked  the  officers  and  people  of  the  United  States,  as 
they  were  peaceable  and  reasonable;  that  they  (the  Ameri- 
cans) would,  even  when  there  was  a  cause  of  difference, 
endeavor  to  accommodate  the  matter,  which  is  very  unlike 
the  English." 

Cushing  seized  upon  the  Hsii  A-man  affair  to  establish  a 
precedent  in  the  matter  of  jurisdiction  over  Americans 
accused  by  Chinese,  and  to  demonstrate  the  principle  of 
extraterritoriality,  as  it  was  incorporated  in  the  new  treaty. 
He  also  used  it  as  an  argument  to  have  placed  in  the 
treaty  very  clear  stipulations  that  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment must  assume  the  responsibility  for  the  protection  of 
Americans. 

Before  the  American  commissioner  returned  to  the 
United  States  an  occasion  arose  in  which  Kiying  called  upon 
the  Americans  for  a  demonstration  of  good  faith,  and  re- 
ceived it.  Before  the  treaty  had  been  made  two  American 
ship-builders,  Emery  and  Frazer,-  had  leased  some  land  op- 
posite Hongkong,  on  the  north  side  of  the  harbor,  for  a 
ship-yard.  Kiying  called  Cushing's  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  treaty  did  not  provide  for  the  leasing  of  land  by 
foreigners  at  this  place  and  asked  for  his  good  offices  in 
securing  the  removal  of  the  ship-yard.  It  was  evident  that 
the  Chinese  feared  that  this  lease-hold  might  some  day 
become  the  base  for  another  foreign  settlement.     Cushing 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  155 

therefore,  advised  the  Americans  to  relinquish  their  loca- 
tion, securing  for  them  six  months  in  which  to  find  another 
one.    To  this  Emery  and  Grazer  agreed. 

The  primary  object  of  the  Mission  had  been  accom- 
plished in  the  signing  of  the  treaty.  The  fulfillment  of  the 
secondary  purpose,  the  visit  to  Peking  and  the  delivery  of 
the  President's  letter  to  the  Emperor,  greatly  troubled 
Gushing.  Shortly  after  the  arrival  of  Kiying  at  Macao  in 
June,  Gushing  had  formally  waived  the  right  to  go  to 
Peking,  provided  the  treaty  was  signed,  but  had  made  a 
reservation,  viz.,  that  if  in  the  future  any  other  envoy  was 
received  at  Peking,  the  Americans  should  have  a  similar 
privilege.  At  the  time  he  made  this  concession  to  the 
Ghinese  he  supposed  that  he  was  on  very  safe  ground  for 
he  knew  that  the  French  plenipotentiary  was  approaching, 
and  he  assumed  that  as  a  matter  of  course,  France  would 
demand  the  reception  of  its  envoy  at  the  Court.  After 
the  treaty  was  signed,  but  before  the  arrival  of  the  French 
Mission,  Gushing  secured  from  Kiying  a  promise  to  deliver 
the  President's  letter  to  the  Emperor,  and  later  transferred 
it  to  the  Ghinese  commissioner  with  suitable  ceremony. 

Greatly  to  Gushing's  surprise  the  French,  upon  their 
arrival,  communicated  to  him  that  they  had  no  instruc- 
tions to  insist  upon  a  visit  to  Peking  except  in  extraordinary 
circumstances.  Gushing,  on  the  other  hand,  felt  that  his 
instructions  to  proceed  to  Peking  were  ''peremptory."  True 
the  treaty  had  been  obtained,  but  there  seems  to  have  been 
the  fear  in  Gushing's  mind  that  the  failure  to  carry  out  the 
remainder  of  his  instructions  might  be  counted  to  his  dis- 
credit upon  his  return  to  the  United  States,  and  he  there- 
fore made  his  explanations  for  not  going  to  the  Capital  the 
subject  of  several  passages  in  his  dispatches.  His  principal 
argument  was  that  a  visit  to  Peking  would  have  delayed, 
if  not  imperilled,  the  negotiations  for  the  treaty,  and  now 
that  the  treaty  had  been  signed,  he  considered  that  the  best 
interests  of  the  mission  would  be  served  by  his  immediate 
return  to  the  United  States  where  he  could  supplement  by 
personal  explanation,  anything  which  might  be  lacking  in 


156  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

his  dispatches  to  secure  the  immediate  ratification  of  the 
treaty.  Incidentally  the  appropriation  which  had  been 
made  for  the  expenses  of  the  mission  was  entirely  ex- 
hausted. He  therefore  appointed  Commander  Foxhall  A. 
Parker  as  Charge,  with  power  to  attend  to  any  diplomatic 
questions  which  might  arise,  while  Dr.  Peter  Parker,  the 
medical  missionary,  assumed  the  responsibility  of  acting  as 
official  interpreter  without  salary.  Cushing  embarked  on 
the  Perry  August  24,  1844. 

One  other  object  of  the  mission,  an  object  mentioned  in 
no  instructions,  remained  unaccomplished.  Shortly  after 
the  signing  of  the  treaty  Cushing  offered  to  Kiying  some 
models  of  guns  and  some  books  on  military  and  naval 
tactics,  and  fortifications,  delicately  expressing  the  opinion 
that  such  information  might  be  of  value  to  China  in  the 
future.  The  Chinese,  however,  were  not  ready,  even  after 
their  humiliating  military  defeats,  to  concern  themselves 
with  the  trappings  of  modern  militarism,  and  Kiying  replied 
politely  declining  the  gifts,  expressing  the  conviction  that 
peace  for  China  was  assured,  and  adding:  "If  at  a  future 
day  there  be  occasion  to  use  them,  then  we  ought  to  request 
your  Honorable  Nation  to  assist  us  with  the  strength  of 
its  arm." 

Throughout  the  entire  negotiations  the  relations  be- 
tween Cushing  and  Kiying  bore  all  the  outward  marks  of 
extreme  cordiality  and  good  feeling.  The  latter  in  his  fare- 
well letter  to  the  American  envoy  wrote : 

"I  present  my  compliments  and  wishes  that  wherever  you  go 
happiness  may  attend  you,  and  that  day  by  day  you  may  advance  in 
promotion." 

Imagine  then  the  amazement  of  Cushing  and  of  the 
other  Americans  as  well,  when  a  few  months  later  a  copy 
of  Kiying's  memorial  report  to  the  Emperor  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  foreigners  and,  when  translated,  was  found  to 
contain  the  following: 

"The  original  cojjy  of  the  Treaty  presented  by  the  said  Barbarian 
Envoy,  contained  forty-seven  stipuhitions.     Of  these  some  were  diffi- 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  157 

cult  of  execution,  others  were  foolish  demands,  whilst  several  of  the 
most  important  points  of  the  Treaty  were  omitted  on  the  list.  The 
sense  of  it  was,  moreover,  so  meanly  and  coarsely  expressed,  the  words 
and  sentences  were  so  obscure,  and  there  was  such  a  variety  of  errors, 
that  it  was  next  to  impossible  to  point  them  out. 

"We  clearly  pointed  out  whatever  was  comprehensive  to  reason,  in 
order  to  dispel  their  stupid  ignorance,  and  to  put  a  stop  to  (delusive) 
hopes,  whilst  expatiating  with  strictness  upon  the  most  binding  of  the 
statutes,  while  we  were  obliged  to  polish  those  passages  which  were 
scarcely  intelligible,  so  as  to  render  the  sense  somewhat  more  obvious, 
in  order  to  remove  all  ambiguity ;  and  only  after  four  times  altering 
the  copies,  we  adopted  (the  paper)." 

Kiying  also  pointed  out  to  the  Emperor  that  in  the 
article  in  the  treaty  which  purported  to  grant  to  the  Ameri- 
cans the  privileges  of  renting  property  in  the  five  ports  he 
had  inserted  a  qualifying  clause  which  made  the  renting  of 
such  property  dependent  upon  the  willingness  of  the  neigh- 
bors to  receive  foreigners. 

This  report  gives  a  fair  intimation  of  what  was  to  come 
in  the  next  fifteen  years  when  Chinese  officials,  sometimes 
friendly  to  foreigners  and  sometimes  not,  but  always  intent 
on  retaining  the  favor  of  an  ill-informed  and  anti-foreign 
Emperor,  attempted  to  transact  the  international  affairs 
of  the  Chinese  Empire.  As  for  the  concession  in  the  article 
of  the  treaty  securing  the  rights  of  renting  property,  it  soon 
became  evident  that  Cushing,  in  his  excess  of  amiability,  had 
permitted  himself  to  be  completely  hoodwinked  by  the  wily 
Kiying. 

The  only  known  contemporaneous  Chinese  account  of 
the  negotiation  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  is  the  following:  ® 

"The  English  desired  that  leaders  of  all  nations  should  report  to 
them  first,  and  then  x^ay  duties ;  but  the  French  and  Americans  indig- 
nantly exclaimed: — 'We  are  no  dependencies  of  England  nor  have  we 
been  "treacherous  and  lying." '  On  this,  some  American  ship-of-war 
entered  port,  and  a  few  mont\  later,  some  Frenchmen  too.  Both 
of  them  submitted  letters,  begging  to  pay  tribute,  and  to  be  allowed 
to  express  their  devotion  at  an  interview.  They  also  requested  to  be 
allowed  to  leave  their  ships  in  the  South,  whilst  the  tribute-envoys 
and  a  small  suite  went  overland  to  Peking ;  for  they  wished  to  make 
some  confidential  suggestions  and  to  assist  us." 


158  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Superior  Advantages  of  the  Gushing  Treaty 

In  conducting  the  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  for  the 
first  American  treaty,  Gushing  had  the  double  advantage  of 
the  experience  of  the  English  and  the  good  will  of  the 
Ghinese.  Sir  Henry  Pottinger  had  been  the  pioneer.  His 
efforts  had  been  incorporated  in  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  the 
Treaty  of  the  B.ogue,  and  the  Regulations  for  Trade  which, 
while  first  promulgated  by  the  Ghinese  alone,  were  signed 
by  both  the  Ghinese  and  the  English  commissioners,  and  in- 
corporated as  a  part  of  the  treaty  agreement  between  the 
two  nations.  Before  Gushing  began  the  negotiations  lead- 
ing up  to  the  American  Treaty  of  Wanghia  the  arrangements 
of  the  English  with  the  Ghinese  had  been  subjected  to  a 
w^orking  test  in  which  their  weakness  as  well  as  their 
strength  had  been  revealed.  Of  even  greater  advantage  to 
the  American  negotiations  was  the  fact  that  the  Ghinese, 
while  bitterly  resenting  the  defeats  they  had  suffered  at  the 
hands  of  the  English,  had  already  come  to  see  the  advantage 
of  having  the  good  will  of  other  Western  nations.  While 
not  fully  understanding  the  benefits  which  would  come  to 
them  later  from  having  admitted  into  their  international 
relationship  a  strong  nation  whose  national  interests  in 
Ghina  coincided  at  many  points  with  Ghinese  national 
well-being,  nevertheless  the  Ghinese  were  not  altogether  un- 
conscious of  the  probable  effects.  This  is  evident  from  the 
fact  that  even  before  signing  the  Treaty  of  Nanking  in  1842 
they  had  determined  to  throw  open  the  trade  on  equal  terms 
to  all  nations. 

The  Ghinese,  notwithstanding  their  show  of  bravado  at 
the  approach  of  Gushing  at  Macao,  had  been  cowed  by 
their  defeat.  The  American  commissioner,  had  no  English 
war  preceded  his  efforts,  might  have  perfected  arrangements 
in  which  the  position  of  the  Americans  in  Ghina  would  have 
been  slightly  bettered.  Gertainly  the  Americans  in  Ganton 
in  the  summer  of  1839,  after  Commissioner  Lin  had  begun 
direct  communications  with  the  American  consul,  thought 
so.    Possibly  had  the  United  States  joined  in  a  naval  dem- 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  159 

onstration  on  the  coast  of  China  with  England  and  France, 
as  the  memorial  of  the  Canton  merchants  (May  25,  1839) 
to  Congress  had  advised,  some  sort  of  diplomatic  relations 
between  China  and  the  Western  powers  might  have  been 
established.*  But  that  such  sweeping  concessions  as  the 
English  had  obtained,  aside  from  the  indemnity  and  the 
cession  of  Hongkong,  could  have  been  secured  otherwise 
than  as  a  result  of  military  victory  over  the  Chinese,  is  not 
to  be  thought  of.  These  concessions,  obtained  for  the  Eng- 
lish by  force  of  arms,  became  freely  the  possession  of  the 
Americans.  On  the  other  hand,  had  the  Americans  chosen 
to  regard  the  attack  on  the  American  flag-staff  at  Canton  in 
June,  1844,  as  a  cause  for  war,  they  could  have  doubtless,  on 
the  conclusion  of  war,  exacted  any  terms  they  liked  from 
the  Chinese  Government.  It  became  ingloriously,  yet  very 
profitably,  the  role  of  the  United  States  pacifically  to  follow 
England  to  China  in  the  wake  of  war,  and  to  profit  gTeatly 
by  the  victories  of  British  arms. 

There  had  been,  however,  no  alternative  for  the  United 
States,  save  that  of  continuing  the  American  trade  in  China 
without  a  treaty,  and  that  would  have  meant  trade  under 
the  aegis  of  England.  So  far  as  China  was  concerned,  while 
Caleb  Cushing  won  several  additional  concessions  from 
China,  and  won  them  by  a  method  hardly  to  be  distinguished 
from  intimidation,  nevertheless  the  treaty  with  the  Ignited 
States  was  an  anchor  to  windward  for  the  Empire.  In  so  far 
as  the  Chinese  Government  was  conscious  of  what  was  being 
achieved,  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  may  be 
described  as  a  brilliant  stroke  of  diplomacy.  The  subse- 
quent history  of  China's  international  relations,  with  the 
United  States  eliminated,  would  have  been  quite  different 
from  what  it  actually  was. 

It  ought  to  be  added,  as  a  preface  to  the  comparison  of 
the  British  and  American  treaties,  that  the  LTnited  States 
had  an  advantage  over  the  English  in  the  ability  of  its 

*The  Memorial  of  R.  B.  Forbes  and  others,  11.  Doc.  40  :26-l,  had  expressed 
in  conclusion,  the  "candid  conviction  that  the  appearance  of  a  naval  force  from 
the  United  States,  England  and  France  upon  the  coast  of  China,  would,  without 
bloodshed,  obtain  from  this  Government  such  acknowledgments  and  treaties,  etc." 


160  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

commissioner.  As  a  negotiator  and  a  writer  of  legal  docu- 
ments Sir  Henry  Pottinger  was  no  match  for  the  clever 
New  England  lawyer.  In  estimating  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia 
an  effort  ought  to  be  made  to  put  one's  self  in  the  place  of 
the  Chinese  and  seek  to  determine  the  extent  in  which  the 
document  was  fair  and  just  to  the  Empire.  Such  an  esti- 
mate, however,  must  not  detract  from  the  credit  due  to  the 
negotiator  in  whose  hands  were  placed  the  commercial  and 
political  interests  of  the  United  States.  Caleb  Cushing  was 
charged  with  making  the  best  possible  terms  for  his  client. 
That  is  to  say,  he  was  to  make  a  treaty  which  would  give 
)  to  American  commercial  interests  in  China  the  best  possible 
opportunities  for  the  prosecution  of  their  growing  trade  in 
the  face  of  British  competition.  No  one  can  deny,  after  a 
comparison  of  the  documents,  that  in  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia 
those  interests  were  extremely  well  served. 

The  Superior  Advantages  of  the  Cushing  Treaty 

As  a  basis  for  the  conduct  of  trade  the  American  treaty 
was  greatly  superior  to  the  English  agreements,  made  by 
Sir  Henry  Pottinger ;  so  superior  that  it  became  immediately 
the  model  for  the  French  treaty,  negotiated  a  few  weeks 
later,  and  also  for  the  treaty  with  Norway  and  Sweden, 
signed  March  29,  1847.  The  superior  provisions  of  the 
American  treaty  also  immediately  won  the  approval  of  the 
English  and  were  largely  used  by  them.  Indeed  the  Cushing 
treaty  became  the  basis  of  China's  international  relations 
until  it  was  superseded  in  1858  by  the  treaties  of  Tientsin. 

From  the  English  treaties  the  Americans  already  enjoyed 
the  following  concessions:  (1)  The  opening  of  four  addi- 
tional ports,  and  the  rights  of  residence  in  these  ports  for  the 
transaction  of  business.  (2)  The  right  of  equality  in  con- 
sular and  diplomatic  intercourse.  (3)  A  lowering  of  the 
tonnage  dues  to  less  than  one  tenth  of  what  had  formerly 
been  jjaid,  and  a  reduction  of  duties,  confirmed  by  a  pub- 
lished tariff,  of  from  one  half  to  seven  eighths  of  the  former 
charges.     (4)  The  abolition  of  all  monopolies,  such  as  the 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  161 

co-hong.  (5)  Sweeping  concessions  of  extraterritorial 
rights.  On  the  other  hand,  by  means  of  the  "most-favored- 
nation"  clause  in  the  Treaty  of  the  Bogue  (Article  8)  the 
English  inherited  many  additional  advantages  secured  from 
the  Treaty  of  Wanghia.  Sir  John  Francis  Davis,  who  suc- 
ceeded Sir  Henry  Pottinger,  as  British  Minister  and  Super- 
intendent of  Trade,  acknowledged  the  following:  "^  (1) 
Merchant  ships  might  remain  two  days  at  any  one  of  the 
five  ports  without  paying  duties,  provided  they  did  not  dis- 
charge any  cargo.  (2)  Having  paid  tonnage  duties  ships 
could  go  to  another  port  without  having  to  pay  such  duties 
a  second  time.  (3)  Having  landed  cargo  and  having  paid 
the  duties,  they  could  reship  it  to  another  port  and  enter 
it  without  duty  by  means  of  a  customs  house  certificate. 

(4)  Permission  was  obtained  for  the  employment  of  Chinese 
as  teachers  for  the  foreigners  and  for  the  purchase  of  books. 

(5)  It  was  stipulated  that  the  treaty  might  be  reconsidered 
for  purposes  of  revision  after  twelve  years  from  the  date  of 
the  American  treaty. 

The  first  three  of  the  above  items  obviously  made  for 
greater  flexibility  in  the  division  of  the  foreign  trade  be- 
tween the  newly  opened  ports,  especially  in  the  early  years 
when  the  trade  possibilities  of  each  port  were  being  ex- 
plored. They  also  opened  the  door  part  way  for  a  coasting 
trade  between  the  treaty  ports  in  foreign  vessels.  The  Eng- 
lish had  expected  that  Hongkong  would  serve  at  once  as  a 
bonded  warehouse  for  their  entire  China  trade,  and  also  as 
a  distributing  point.  These  provisions  were  ingenious  de- 
vices of  Cushing's  by  which  the  Americans  could  secure 
advantages  such  as  the  British  had  expected  to  obtain  by 
the  cession  of  territory. 

The  permission  to  employ  Chinese  teachers  and  purchase 
Chinese  books,  while  of  general  advantage  to  the  merchants 
and  to  the  foreign  governments  in  that  it  made  possible  the 
development  of  a  competent  staff  of  interpreters  and  ad- 
visers, was  also  of  peculiar  advantage  to  the  missionaries 
who  hitherto  had  been  able  to  study  the  Chinese  language 
and  literature  only  surreptitiously. 


162  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  American  article  providing  for  the  revision  of  the 
treaty  after  twelve  years,  which  was  also  incorporated  into 
the  French  treaty  a  few  weeks  later,  and  on  which  the 
Powers  rested  their  claims  for  the  negotiation  of  new  treaties 
in  1856,  will  be  discussed  subsequently  more  in  detail. 

Extraterritoriality 

The  doctrine  of  extraterritoriality  received  amplijfication 
and  greater  precision  of  statement  in  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia. 
Owing  to  Chinese  reluctance  to  grant  it,  or  to  objections  in 
England  to  the  doctrine,  Pottinger  had  not  included  it  in 
either  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  or  that  of  the  Bogue.  The 
only  mention  of  the  concession  was  in  the  Regulations  of^  ) 

Trade,   ArHplp  1.*^  of  yvhirih^pad-  ' 

"Reg'anHnor  the  punishment  of  Eng:lish  criminals,  the  English 
Government  will  enact  the  laws  necessary  to  attain  that  end  and 
the  Consul  will  be  empcvwered  to  put  them  into  force:  and  regarding 
the  punishment  of  Chinese  criminals,  these  will  be  tried  and  punished 
by  their  own  laws,  in  the  way  provided  for  by  the  correspondence 
which  took  place  at  Nanking  after  the  concluding  of  the  peace." 

From  the  phrasing  of  this  article  it  is  clear,  even  though 
there  were  no  other  proof,  that  the  doctrine  in  substance, 
even  though  not  included  in  the  treaty,  had  been  one  of  the 
concessions  obtained  by  Sir  Henry  Pottinger  as  a  fruit  of  the 
English  victory.^ 

The  correspondence  referred  to  was  never  made  public* 
The  rights  of  extraterritoriality  in  the  American  treaty 
were  defined  in  two  articles. 

"Article  XXI.  Subjects  of  China  who  may  be  guilty  of  any 
criminal  act  towards  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  shall  be  arrested 
and  i)uiiishcd  by  the  Chinese  authorities  according  to  the  laws  of 
China;  and  citizens  of  the  United  States  who  may  commit  any  crime 

*In  th(>  final  instructions  issued  by  Lord  Palniorston  to  Cliarlos  Elliot."  tlio 
concession  of  (•xtrnlcnitoriMlil.v  was'  outlined  in  Art.  VII  of  the  .substitute 
articles  which  wi-re  to  be  inserl'ed  in  the  proposed  treaty  with  Chin;i  in  case  the 
liritish  representatives  were  unable  to  s<'cure  the  cession  to  (ireat  Hritain  of 
any  islands,  i^'roni  the  facts  of  the  final  settlement  it  may  therefore  be  inferred 
that  in  1X4'2  the  (^hinese  Government  jireferred  to  cede  lloiij;kons  rather  than 
to  jirant  extraterritoriality.  It  would  also  ajipenr  as  thonf;h  Lord  I'almerston 
refiarded  the  possession  oi"  a  military  and  administrative  base  on  the  coast  of 
("liiiia  as.  at  least  iu  part,  a  substitute  for  the  concession  of  extraterritorial 
jirivlegcs. 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  GUSHING  163 

in  China  shall  be  tried  and  punished  only  by  the  Consul,  or  other 
public  functionary  of  the  United  States,  thereto  authorized,  according 
to  the  laws  of  the  United  States  .  .  ." 

And 

"Article  XXV.  All  questions  in  regard  to  rights,  whether  of 
property  or  person,  arising  between  citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  China,  shall  be  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of,  and  regulated  by 
the  authorities  of  their  own  Government." 

And  this  article  also  adds: 

"And  all  controversies  occurring  in  China  between  the  citizens  of 
the  United  States  and  the  subjects  of  any  other  Government  shall  be 
regulated  by  the  treaties  existing  between  the  United  States  and 
such  Governments,  respectively,  without  interference  on  the  part  of 
China." 

A  provision  which  had  not  been  legalized  before. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  extraterritorial  pro- 
visions of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  were  not  inserted  at  the 
demand  of  the  American  merchants.  The  Forbes  memorial 
(May  25,  1839)  which  had  outlined  what  seemed  to  the 
American  merchants  important  in  a  possible  treaty,  asked 
for  something  very  much  less  than  Gushing  secured.  The 
sixth  article  of  the  memorial  read: 

"That  until  the  Chinese  laws  are  distinctly  made  known  and 
recognized,  the  punishment  for  wrongs  committed  by  foreigners  upon 
the  Chinese,  or  others,  shall  not  be  greater  than  is  applicable  to  the 
like  oilense  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States  or  England;  nor  shall 
any  punishment  be  inflicted  by  the  Chinese  authorities  upon  any 
foreigner,  until  the  guilt  of  the  party  shall  have  been  fairly  and 
clearly  proven." 

Gushing  made  the  general  subject  and  the  precise  stipu- 
lation of  extraterritoriality  in  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  the 
matter  of  a  long  and  detailed  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of 
State,  John  G.  Galhoun,^''  in  which  the  reasons  for  the  con- 
cession are  explained  in  detail.  The  most  immediate  reason 
was  that  such  a  concession  had  already  been  made  to  the 
English .    Gushing  wrote : 

"I  found  that  Great  Britain  had  stipulated  for  the  absolute  exemp- 
tion of  her  subjects  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Empire,  while  the 


164  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Portuguese  attained  the  same  object  through  their  own  local  juris- 
diction at  Macao.  And  in  addition  to  all  the  other  considerations 
affecting  the  question,  I  reflected  how  ignominious  would  be  the  con- 
dition of  Americans  in  China,  if  subjected  to  local  jurisdiction, 
whilst  the  English  and  Portuguese  among  them  were  exempt  from  it." 

Starting  with  this  fact,  or  possibly  seeking  to  underlay 
the  concession  already  obtained  with  substantial  legal  and 
ethical  principles,  Gushing  found  them  in  the  character  of 
the  relations  which  China  had  sustained  towards  Western 
nations,  and  in  the  more  conspicuous  incidents  of  the  past, 
particularly  the  Terranova  case,  where  such  a  provision  as 
he  inserted  into  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  would  have  served 
better  the  ends  of  justice. 

While  China  could  not  be  classified  with  the  Moham- 
medan States  where  the  doctrine  of  extraterritoriality  had 
long  been  applied,  on  the  ground  that  China,  like  them,  was 
uncivilized,  the  Empire  could  be  placed  with  them  as  a 
State  which  did  not  recognize  the  'law  of  nations.'  This 
was  proved,  wrote  Gushing,  by  the  following  facts:  The 
Chinese  attempt  to  apply  Chinese  law  to  visiting  foreign 
war  vessels ;  their  authorities  have  subjected  foreign  consuls 
to  personal  restraint;  they  disregard  the  flag  of  truce;  and 
they  demand,  at  Court,  the  kowtow.  The  states  of  Christ- 
endom, said  Gushing,  as  distinguished  from  the  Mohamme- 
dan and  pagan  states,  have  many  of  the  qualities  of  a 
confederated  republic. 

"How  different  is  the  condition  of  things  out  of  the  limits  of 
Christendom!  From  the  greater  part  of  Asia  and  Africa  individual 
Christians  are  utterly  excluded,  either  by  the  sanguinary  barbarism  of 
the  inhabitants,  or  by  their  phrenzied  bigotry,  or  by  the  narrow- 
minded  policy  of  their  governments;  to  their  courts  the  ministers  of 
Christian  governments  have  no  means  of  access  except  by  force  and  at 
the  head  of  fleets  and  armies;  as  between  them  and  us,  there  is  no 
community  of  ideas,  no  common  law  of  nations,  no  interchange  of 
good  oflSces;  and  it  is  only  during  the  present  generation  that  treaties, 
most  of  them  imposed  by  force  of  arms  or  by  terror,  have  begun  to 
bring  down  the  great  Mohammedan  and  Pagan  Oovernments  into  a 
state  of  inchoate  peaceful  association  with  Christendom. 

"To  none  of  the  governments  of  this  character,  as  it  seemed  to  me, 
was  it  safe  to  commit  the  lives  and  libei'ties  of  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States." 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  GUSHING  165 

This  argument  derived  its  most  impelling  force  from 
the  Terranova  case  *  in  1821,  which  had  been  such  a  trav- 
esty on  justice. 

It  would  appear,  however,  that  the  significance  of  this 
carefully  drawn  provision  of  the  Gushing  treaty  is  to  be 
found  in  Cushing's  purpose  in  this  matter,  as  in  reexporta- 
tion and  the  coasting  trade,  to  secure  for  the  x-Ymericans 
guarantees  of  actual  most-favored-nation  treatment  without 
the  acquisition  of  a  military  and  naval  base  like  Hongkong. 
Extraterritoriality  was  in  a  measure,  as  Lord  Palmerston 
seems  to  have  recognized  in  1839,  a  substitute  for  the  perma- 
nent occupation  of  territory. 

The  profound  and  brilliant  legal  mind  of  the  American 
commissioner  found  in  this  complex  legal  question  of  per- 
sonal versus  territorial  jurisdiction  a  subject  entirely  to  his 
taste,  and  the  result,  as  defined  in  the  two  articles  of  the 
Treaty  of  Wanghia,  was  to  Gushing  a  matter  of  no  little 
pride. 

Responsibility  Placed  on  the  Chinese 

Another  superiority  of  the  American  treaty  which  was 
subsequently  acknowledged  and  adopted  by  the  English, 
was  in  the  locating  of  responsibility  for  the  collection  of 
duties.  Here  again  Gushing  was  applying  his  general  policy. 
The  second  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking  stipulated  as  a 
duty  of  the  Consul  "to  see  that  the  just  dues  and  other  dues 
of  the  Chinese  Government,  as  hereinafter  provided  for,  are 
duly  discharged  by  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  subjects."  In 
the  Treaty  of  the  Bogue  England  assumed  additional 
responsibilities  to  assist  the  Chinese  Government  in  the 
suppression  of  smuggling.  This  provision  was  an  inherit- 
ance from  the  days  before  the  treaties,  and  even  from 
before  the  dissolution  of  the  East  India  Company  monopoly 

*  V.  K.  Wollington  Koo.  in  his  exposition  of  the  Status  of  Aliens  in  China, 
although  examining  all  of  the  other  cases  of  the  alleged  homicide  by  foreigners 
which  he  finds  entirely  unjustifiable  as  a  basis  for  the  doctrine  of  extraterri- 
torialitv.  unfortunately  omits  all  discussion  of  the  Terranoya  case,  perhaps  the 
worst  exhibition  of  the  exercise  of  Chinese  jurisdiction  oyer  foreigners,  and 
certainly  the  most  compelling  argument  among  Americans  for  the  provision  m 
the  Treaty  of  Wanghia. 


166  AIMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

at  Canton,  when  the  Chinese  authorities  were  accustomed 
to  hold  the  EngUsh  superintendent  responsible  for  the  con- 
duct of  his  countrymen.  To  the  Chinese,  accustomed  as 
they  were  to  having  all  merchants  secured  by  a  guarantor, 
the  British  provisions  were  a  satisfactory  arrangement. 
They  might  also  be  considered  as  a  correlative  proposition 
to  the  doctrine  of  extraterritoriality,  since  it  was  over  the 
payment  of  dues  and  duties  that  the  offenses  of  foreigners 
were  most  likely  to  arise.  But  in  practice  it  made  the 
foreign  government  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  the 
Chinese  customs  laws,  and  it  became  therefore  very  dis- 
tasteful. 

"Under  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,"  writes  a  British  historian,  "the 
British  consuls  were  to  assist  the  Chinese  in  the  enforcement  of  the 
reg-uhitions ;  the  only  result  of  this  was  to  penalize  British  subjects 
who  were  fined  by  their  own  consuls  for  offenses  which  other  foreigners 
committed  with  impunity."  " 

That  the  English  were  not  unwilling  to  adopt  the  pro- 
visions of  the  American  treaty  with  reference  to  smuggling 
must  be  evident  from  the  following  letter  from  Sir  Henry 
Pottinger  to  Kiying,  October  11,  1843,  in  answer  to  a  com- 
plaint from  the  latter  that  men  from  an  English  vessel  had 
landed  on  the  Chinese  coast  outside  any  treaty  port  and 
distributed  hand  bills  announcing  that  they  had  'woolens, 
miscellaneous  articles,  opium  in  large  and  small  balls,  etc.,' 
for  sale.^- 

"I  have  more  than  ten  times  p.reviously  explained  to  your  Excel- 
lency and  the  other  high  Chinese  officers,  that  the  great  and  final 
remedy  for  this  disobedience  and  evil  rests  in  the  hands  of  the  local 
authorities;  and  I  am  most  happy  to  observe  that  the  remedy  was 
applied  on  this  occasion.  I  allude  to  the  people  of  the  country  being 
carefully  restrained  from  dealing  or  holding  intercourse  with  the 
vessels.     If  this  rule  be  only  rigidly  enforced,  the  object  is  gained." 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  this  letter  was  written  more  than 
six  months  before  the  negotiations  of  the  Treaty  of 
Wanghia  began,  and  the  principle  here  laid  down  by  the 
British  Minister  is  the  one  incorporated  in  the  American 
treaty,  viz.,  Chinese  authorities  must  do  their  own  policing. 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  167 

,The  Treaty  of  Wanghia  completely  freed  the  consul  from 
responsibility  in  this  matter,  by  stipulating  (Article  13)  that 
the  duties  should  be  paid  in  cash,  either  in  sycee  silver,  or 
in  foreign  currency.  Perhaps  in  the  long  run  it  was  better 
that  China  should  not  delegate,  or  be  allowed  to  delegate, 
the  responsibility  which  properly  belonged  to  the  Empire  as 
a  sovereign  state,  for  the  enforcement  of  its  own  laws,  but 
the  immediate  effect  of  the  provision  was  merely  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  evaded  responsibility  for 
the  smuggling  carried  on  by  its  citizens.  The  Gushing  treaty 
was,  in  practice,  the  smugglers'  delight,  conferring  even 
more  extended  privileges  in  that  regard  than  did  the  pos- 
session of  Hongkong. 

The  American  treaty  definitely  specified  that  communi- 
cations to  Peking  might  be  made  not  only  through  the 
medium  of  the  imperial  Commissioner  at  Canton  (Article 
31)  but  also,  when  necessary,  through  the  Governor  General 
of  the  Liang  Kwang,  or  that  of  the  Liang  Kiang.  This 
provision  also  was  made  use  of  by  the  English  officials,  ten 
years  later,  when  the  Imperial  Commissioner  obstinately 
refused  to  see  them. 

Divergence  from  British  Policy 

A  comparison  of  the  American  and  the  British  treaties 
also  shows  a  marked  divergence  of  the  policies  between  the 
two  Western  powers  towards  China. 

Both  in  the  text  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  and  in  the 
annexed  tariff,  opium  is  specifically  mentioned  as  contra- 
band, and  any  opium  smuggler  is  made  liable  to  arrest  and 
to  the  penalty  of  confiscation  for  both  cargo  and  the  vessel 
detected  in  carrying  it.    The  text  was  (Article  33) : 

''Citizens  of  the  United  States  who  shall  attempt  to  trade  clandes- 
tinely with  such  of  the  ports  of  China  as  are  not  open  to  foreign 
commerce,  or  who  shall  trade  in  opium  or  any  other  contraband 
articles  of  merchandise,  shall  be  subject  to  be  dealt  with  by  the 
Chinese  Government  without  being  entitled  to  any  countenance  or 
protection  froni  that  of  the  United  States ;  and  the  United  States 
will  take  measures  to  prevent  their  flag  from  being  abused  by  the 


168  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

subjects  of  other  nations  as  a  cover  for  the  violation  of  the  laws  of 
the  Emiiire." 

Thus,  until  the  treaty  of  1858,  when  this  article  was 
omitted,  the  name  of  the  United  States  was  technically  clear 
of  any  complicity  in  the  opium  trade,  although  slight  pro- 
vision was  ever  made  by  the  United  States  to  prevent  the 
abuse  of  the  American  flag  either  by  its  own  citizens  or  those 
of  other  nations.  American  citizens  engaged  in  smuggling 
violated  the  treaty,  yet  the  United  States  never  assumed 
any  responsibility  to  prevent  or  punish  such  violations  un- 
less complaint  was  brought  by  the  Chinese,  and  such  action 
the  Chinese  were  very  reluctant  to  take.  The  result  was 
that  smuggling  greatly  increased.  The  only  difference  be- 
tween the  policy  of  the  United  States  and  that  of  England, 
in  practice,  w^as  in  the  extent  of  the  participation  in  the 
smuggling. 

A  more  marked  divergence  of  policy  is  to  be  found  in 
the  stipulations  conferring  on  foreigners  the  rights  of  resi- 
dence in  treaty  ports,  and  in  the  measures  adopted  for  their 
protection.  The  Treaty  of  the  Bogue  (Article  7)  provided 
that  in  the  treaty  ports  "ground  and  houses  .  .  .  shall  be 
set  apart  by  the  local  officers,  in  communication  with  the 
consul"  for  the  residence  of  foreigners.  For  their  protec- 
tion the  English  depended  upon  the  naval  station  and  gar- 
rison at  Hongkong,  and  also  upon  the  right  secured  by 
treaty,  to  station  a  war  vessel  at  each  port.  The  Treaty  of 
Wanghia  (Article  17)  mentioned  "churches,  cemeteries  and 
hospitals"  as  well  as  residences,  and  stated:  "The  local 
authorities  of  the  two  governments  shall  select  in  concert 
sites  for  the  foregoing  objects,  having  due  regard  for 
the  feelings  of  the  people  in  the  location  thereof."  And 
Article  19  made  it  obligatory  upon  the  Chinese  Government 
to  "defend  them  (the  Americans)  from  all  insult  or  injury 
of  any  sort  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese." 

The  'setting  apart'  of  sites  for  foreign  settlement,  as 
provided  for  in  the  English  treaty,  looked  towards  the 
establishment  of  'foreign  settlements'  and  the  granting  of 
'concessions'  which  are  now  so  numerous  and  which  have 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  169 

so  seriously  intrenched  upon  the  integrity  of  Chinese  ter- 
ritory and  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation.  The  presence  of 
the  war  vessels  looked  towards  the  gun-boat  policy,  the 
intimidation  of  local  officials  and  even  the  quasi-protection 
of  smugglers.  The  American  provision  for  the  'selection' 
of  sites,  and  for  the  placing  of  responsibility  for  their  pro- 
tection upon  the  Chinese,  pointed  in  the  very  opposite 
direction — the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  China  and 
the  support  of  its  sovereignty.  The  difference  was  this: 
England  was  approaching  China  through  the  old  world, 
through  India  and  other  Oriental  countries,  where  every 
precedent  was  in  favor  of  the  policy  she  was  laying  down; 
the  United  States  was  approaching  China  as  one  independ- 
ent nation  to  another,  and  the  negotiations  were  in  the 
hands  of  Yankees  who  recognized  no  color  line  and  prided 
themselves  that  they  yielded  to  no  race  prejudice.  The 
provision  for  churches  and  hospitals,  moreover,  recalls  the 
fact  that  Cushing  was,  at  Macao,  entirely  in  the  hands  of 
missionaries  who  were  his  only  interpreters,  and  bears  wit- 
ness to  the  ascending  missionary  interest  in  China  which  in 
later  years  increased  so  much  faster  than  the  commercial 
interest. 

Again,  however,  the  theory  and  the  practice  of  the 
Americans  were  not  the  same.  Actually  the  Americans 
adopted  the  'foreign  settlement'  plan  of  residence, — where- 
ever  the  English  established  it — and  probably  half  of  the 
irritation  growing  up  between  the  Americans  and  the 
Chinese  authorities  in  subsequent  years  was  over  the  efforts 
of  the  Americans  to  secure  residences  where  'due  regard  to 
the  feelings  of  the  people  in  the  location  thereof  gave  the 
Chinese  authorities  a  cover  for  refusing  them.  The  lack  of 
American  war  vessels  in  Chinese  ports  also  permitted  the 
growth  of  not  a  few  claims,  often  small  but  exceedingly  irri- 
tating, which  might  have  been  avoided  had  the  Americans 
depended  less  upon  Chinese  protection  and  more  upon  show 
of  force.  Moreover  in  practice  the  Americans,  unable  to 
claim  the  protection  of  American  war  vessels,  found  their 
defense  under  the  British  flag. 


170  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Disrco;ar(ling  p;eneral  principles,  and  viewing  the  treaties 
in  the  light  of  the  actual  situation  which  confronted  the 
enervated  and  tottering  Chinese  dynasty  in  its  efforts  to 
control  its  foreign  guests,  the  English  treaties  were,  aside 
from  the  opium  question,  more  beneficent  towards  China 
than  was  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia,  although  the  latter  may 
have  been  more  benevolent.  Furthermore  the  next  ten 
years  were  to  show  that  the  English  Government  was  much 
better  prepared  than  the  United  States  to  live  up  to  the 
few  obligations  which  the  foreigners  had  assumed  towards 
the  Chinese.  The  United  States  was  in  the  Treaty  of 
Wanghia  putting  on  for  the  first  time  some  of  the  garments 
of  imperialism,  only  to  find  that  the  nation  itself  had  not 
at  all  grown  up  to  such  ample  vestments. 

It  was  a  difficult  road  upon  which  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia 
set  the  feet  of  the  still  immature  and  undeveloped  power  of 
the  western  hemisphere.  Even  before  its  boundaries  had 
been  pushed  westward  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  the  United 
States  was  placed  in  competition  with  older  Powers,  the  pur- 
poses and  policies  of  which  were  avowedly  different  from 
those  of  the  United  States.  In  this  rivalry  of  nations  new 
considerations  of  national  honor  and  dignity  must  certainly 
prompt  the  United  States  to  new  policies  and  actions.  For 
a  comfortable  relationship  between  merchants  whose  con- 
trolling purpose  had  been  always  to  manage  and  accommo- 
date matters  to  avoid  disturbance  of  the  trade,  was  substi- 
tuted treaty  obligations,  violations  of  which  became  affronts 
to  national  dignity.  For  the  newly  created  consular  and 
diplomatic  and  judicial  positions  which  the  treaty  called  for, 
the  United  States  had  only  a  parochially-minded  Congress 
to  furnish  the  appropriations  and  the  'spoils  system'  to  sup- 
ply the  officials.  The  appointment  of  faithful  party  poli- 
ticians, usually  wholly  untrained  in  consular  work  and 
entirely  inexperienced  in  the  problems  of  international  rela- 
tions in  Asia,  unable,  even  if  willing,  to  look  forward  to 
promotion  in  the  same  service  for  meritorious  work,  opened 
the  doors  to  dangers  both  of  omission  and  commission.  It 
was  a  perilous  path  on  which  the  United  States  could  not 


THE  POLICY  OF  CALEB  CUSHING  171 

long  proceed  successfully  without  altering  many  habits  of 
action  both  at  home  and  abroad.  The  policy  of  Caleb  Gush- 
ing was  to  be  guide. 

BIBLIOGKAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Chinese  Repository,  May,  1840,  p.  2. 

2.  China  Dispatches.     Vol.  1,  Mar.  2,  1844,  Gushing  to  Upshur. 

3.  The  Cushing  dispatches   were  published  almost  complete  in   S. 

Docs.   67  and  58 :28-2,  the  latter  containing  the  author's  ex- 
tended discussion  of  extraterritoriality. 

4.  China  Dispatches,  Vol.  2,  May  25,  1844,  Cushing  to  Upshur. 

5.  Chinese  Repository,   Vol.   15,  June,  1846,  p.  306.     It  has  been 

stated,  erroneously,  that  a  payment  of  money  entered  into  the 
settlement  of  the  Hsii  A-man  affair. 

6.  Chinese  Account  of  the  Opium  War:  Pagoda  Library,  No.  1 

(1888),  E.  H.  Parker  (translator)  p.  76. 

7.  Davis'  "China,  During  the  War  and  Since  the  Peace,"  2  vols. 

Vol.  2,  p.  86. 

8.  Koo's  "Status  of  Aliens  in  China,"  pp.  132ff. 

9.  Corres.  Relative  to  Affairs  in  China,  1839-41 ;  Private  and  Con- 

fidential, printed  for  the  sole  use  of  the  Cabinet,  Dispatch  No. 
1,  Feb.  20,  1840,  Palmerston  to  Elliot. 

10.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  58  :28-2,  Disp.  No.  97. 

11.  A.  J.  Sargent's  "Anglo-Chinese  Commerce  and  Diplomacy,"  p. 

148. 

12.  Accounts    and    Papers — China — 40,    1847,    Orders,    Ordinances, 

etc.,  concerning  China. 


PART  III 
A  PERIOD  OF  CONFUSION 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION 

The  Treaty  of  Wanghia,  marking  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  Far  Eastern  poHtics,  came  at  the  begin- 
ning of  a  period  characterized  by  great  confusion  in  Asia, 
Europe  and  America.  Within  a  generation  the  Chinese  , 
Empire  was  to  pass  through  the  Taiping  Rebellion,  the 
greatest  civil  war  the  world  has  ever  known.  The  Empire 
of  Japan  was  likewise  to  experience  a  thorough,  though  relaj 
tively  bloodless,  revolution  resulting  in  a  great  change  of 
political,  economic  and  industrial  structure.  Great  Britain 
was  in  the  struggles  of  educational,  industrial,  constitutional 
and  fiscal  reform,  accompanied  by  the  mtroduction  of  Free 
Trade,  great  increase  in  manufacturing,  and  the  extension 
of  a  commercial  empire ;  it  was  the  age  of  Palmerston.  On 
the  Continent  confusion  was  confounded  in  revolution  and 
still  more  confounded  by  the  entrance  of  Russia  as  a  factor 
in  the  politics  of  both  the  East  and  the  West.  Europe  was 
too  engaged  in  domestic  problems  to  look  far  beyond  the 
borders  of  the  continent  and  thus  Great  Britain  and  the 
L'nited  States  were  left  almost  alone  to  contest  for  the  mar- 
kets of  the  world.  This  contest  was  real  but  the  United 
States  was  badly  handicapped  because,  far  more  than  its 
commercial  rival,  the  United  States  was  in  confusion.  The 
conflict  between  the  free  and  the  slave  states,  accompanied 
by  a  great  westward  thrust  to  reach  and  hold  the  Pacific 
Coast  and  to  round  out  both  northern  and  southern  boun- 
daries, was  to  issue  in  the  American  Civil  War — itself  the 
great  test  as  to  whether  American  republicajiism  would  be 
able  to  endure.  •» 

American  policy  in  Asia  was  fabricated,  in  the  midst  of 
this  confusion  and  was  directly  related  to  it.    In  1840  the 

175 


176  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

American  Government  first  faced  the  question  of  framing  a 
policy  for  Asia.  A  preliminary  sketch  of  the  structure  was 
finished  in  1844  in  the  Gushing  treaty  with  China.  Within 
the  next  twenty-five  years,  notwithstanding  the  succession 
of  changes  in  the  administration  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  the  break-up  of  political  parties,  and  the 
ominous  conflict  of  civil  war,  the  nation  had  completed  the 
drawings  from  the  sketch  which  came  from  the  hand  of 
Caleb  Cushing,  and  could  claim  a  well-rounded,  well-con- 
sidered foreign  policy  for  Asia  which  successive  generations 
had  only  to  apply.  The  creation  of  such  a  policy  in  such  a 
period  was  a  notable  achievement. 

The  International  Situation 

The  preeminent  characteristic  of  the  period  was  the 
shortening  of  distances.  Communications  became  quicker 
and  cheaper;  it  was  as  though  the  globe  suddenly  con- 
tracted to  a  quarter  of  its  former  size.  Clearly  defined 
boundaries  in  the  West,  and  in  the  East  as  well,  became 
matters  of  supreme  importance  whereas  they  had  been  ig- 
nored in  previous  generations  when  time  itself  was  the  great 
boundary.  Following  rapidly  upon  the  clipper  ship  with  its 
quicker  and  cheaper  transportation  came  the  extended  de- 
velopment of  steam  motive  power,  the  transcontinental  rail- 
way lines  and  the  transoceanic  steamers,  and  then  with  the 
introduction  of  the  overland  and  submarine  telegraph,  the 
earth  contracted  again.  These  inventions  were  accompanied 
by  the  perfection  of  labor  saving  machinery  and  the  multi- 
plication of  the  uses  of  steam  power  in  manufacturing. 
Forthwith  arose  the  question  of  markets  for  surplus  prod- 
uce. Thus  the  entire  Far  Eastern  question  as  related  to 
the  West  suffered  intensification  and  violent  changes. 

British  foreign  policy  as  viewed  from  the  United  States 
was  alarming.  While  England  was  steadily  consolidating 
her  Indian  Empire  by  the  annexation  of  Gwalior,  Sind,  the 
Punjab,  Nagpur,  Berar,  Hyderabad,  Tanjore.  the  Carnatic, 
Oudh,  Burmah  and  Labuan,  it  was  confidently  expected 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  177 

by  Americans  in  the  East  that  it  was  only  a  question  of  time 
when  Great  Britain  would  extend  her  empire  beyond  Hong- 
kong to  include  other  portions  of  the  Chinese  Empire  as 
well  as  parts  of  the  Japanese  islands.  England  under 
Palmerston  was  apparently  girding  herself  both  industrially 
and  politically  to  capture  and  hold  the  markets  of  Asia.  To 
the  American  people,  to  those  in  the  South  who  grew  cotton, 
to  those  in  the  North  who  manufactured  it,  to  the  mer- 
chants and  ship-owners  who  carried  it  to  Asia  and  were  just 
awaking  to  the  boundless  markets  which  might  be  open,  the 
program  of  Great  Britain  was  formidable  and  perilous. 
Perhaps  these  apprehensions  would  never  have  greatly  in- 
fluenced American  foreign  policy  in  the  East,  had  they  not 
been  intensified  by  the  activities  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
western  hemisphere,  for  after  all  American  commercial 
interests  there  were  still  small.  The  British  program  in 
North  America,  however,  was  squarely  before  the  entire 
American  people.  It  involved  questions  of  boundary  and  of 
strategic  defense ;  furthermore  it  touched  their  pride.  Eng- 
land sought  to  break  down  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Twice  within  ten  years  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  appeared  to  be  moving  toward  war,  once  over  the 
northern  boundary,  and  again  over  the  control  of  the 
Isthmus.  Even  before  Caleb  Gushing  went  to  Macao  the 
British  flag  had  been  hoisted  over  the  Sandwich  Islands 
and  only  the  disavowal  of  the  act  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  averted  an  ominous  contest.  Oregon,  California, 
Mexico,  Central  America,  the  Sandwich  Islands,  China, 
Japan — these  were  all  for  the  Americans  either  wholly  or 
partly  problems  of  the  Pacific,  and  taken  collectively  they 
created  a  body  of  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  which, 
because  of  the  territorial  and  industrial  questions  involved, 
became  related  even  to  the  transcending  issue  of  slavery. 
American  policy  in  Asia  was  a  more  important  theme  in 
national  politics  in  the  decade  which  preceded  the  American 
Civil  War  than  it  became  again  until  the  occupation  of  the 
Philippine  Islands  in  1898.  The  American  people  were 
moving  westward  and  that  portion  of  the  world  which,  when 


178  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

viewed  from  London  and  Paris  was  called  the  Far  East,  had 
become  to  the  Americans  not  the  East  at  all  but  the 
Farthest  West. 

A  mere  catalogue  of  the  places  and  dates  along  the 
Pacihc  seaboard  would  suffice  to  make  vivid  the  associa- 
tion of  American  domestic  problems  and  American  foreign 
policy  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East  between  the  Anglo- 
Chinese  War  and  1870.* 

The  two  other  foreign  powers  with  which  the  United 
States  would  have  to  deal  in  Asia  were  France  and  Russia. 
Neither  of  these  powers  at  first  exerted  themselves  in  any 
way  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  Americans,  yet  their 
presence  added  to  the  complexity  of  the  political  situation, 
and  the  manner  and  time  of  their  entrance  should  be  noted. 

Immediately  following  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Wanghia,  France  negotiated  a  treaty  with  China  which  was 
similar  in  its  general  outlines  to  the  American  treaty,  yet 
with  one  significant  addition.  This  treaty,  supplemented 
by  an  imperial  rescript,  secured  to  France  a  somewhat  vague 
yet  virtual  protectorate  over  all  Roman  Catholic  mission- 
aries and  their  Chinese  converts.  This  concession  was  to 
become  the  cornerstone  of  French  policy.    France  was  com- 

*1S43  :  Lord  George  Paulet  seizes  Sandwich  Islands;  the  United  States  fails 
to  join  Great  Britain  and  France  in  promise  never  to  take  possession  of  the 
Islands.' 

1S44  :  Treaty  of  Wanghia — United  States  and  China.  Whitman  coloniza- 
tion expedition  to  Oregon. 

l.S4r)  :  Fremont  exploring  expedition  to  California.     Annexation  of  Texas. 

1840  :  "Fifty-four-forty-or-hght"  dispute  with  (Jreat  Britain  terminates  in 
settlement  of  Oregon  question  l)y  division  of  territory  at  4!)th  Parallel.  Ameri- 
can  occupatifin   of   Monterey,   Mexican    capital   of  Ciilifornia. 

1S4<;  :  Outbreak  of  war  with  Mexico.  Treaty  with  New  (iranada  (Colom- 
bia) granting  to  the  United  States  the  right  of  communication  by  any  form 
across  the  Isthmus  of  I'anama.  in  return  for  which  the  United  States  guaran- 
tees the  neutrality  of  the  route  and  establishes  a  iirotectorate  over  it  in  the 
interest  of  New  (iranada. 

1847  :     Discovery   of  gold  in  California. 

1848  :  Treaty  of  peace  with  Mexico,  making  the  Uio  Grande  the  southern 
boundary  of  the  United  States.  Authorization  of  surveys  for  a  transcontinental 
railroad' and  also  for  a  transisthmian  canal.  Beginning  of  agitation  for  steam 
navigation  of  the  Pacific. 

l.S4!i  :  I'irst  American  treaty  with  Sandwich  Islands  which  follows  immedi- 
ately on    I''n'nch    intervention  at   Ilonolnhi. 

185(1:  Conlract  between  Panama  Itailroad  Company  and  rolombian  Govern- 
ment, and  very  serious  dispute  with  (ireat  Bi'itain  over  island  of  Manzauillo. 
CTavton-Bulwer   treaty. 

18r)l  :      Decision   to   make   a    treaty   with   .lapan. 

185.3:      (Jadsdeii    Purchase. 

1854:  First  treaty  between  United  States  and  .lapan.  Attempted  annexa- 
tion of  Sandwich    Islan<ls. 

185(i  :      Temporary    recognition    of    Rivas-Walker    government    in    Nicaragua. 

18(i7  :  Alaska  Purchase.  IMrst  proposal  to  open  Korea.  Seward  favors  in 
certain  contingencies  annexation   of  Sandwich   IsUuuls. 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  179 

mitted  to  the  political  support  of  Roman  Catholic  missions 
which  were  in  turn  to  become  the  agency  of  French  terri- 
torial, political  and  economic  expansion  in  the  Far  East.- 
The  Russian  Emperor  sent  Nicholai  Muravieff  as  Gov- 
ernor General  to  the  Russian  possessions  in  eastern  Siberia 
in  1847.^  The  steps  by  which  this  energetic  official  estab- 
lished and  consolidated  the  Russian  position  in  Siberia  and 
North  China^ — the  building  of  Petropavlovsk  on  Kamchatka 
in  1849,  the  founding  of  Nicholaievsk  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Amur  in  1850,  the  expedition  down  the  Amur  in  the  same 
year,  the  founding  of  Blagoveschensk  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Ussuri  in  1858,  and  the  treaty  of  Aigun  of  the  same  year  in 
which  the  Russians  were  given  the  exclusive  right  with  the 
Chinese  to  the  navigation  of  the  Amur,  Sungari  and  Ussuri 
rivers — were  quite  unnoticed  by  the  Americans  but  were 
not  overlooked  by  the  British  who  were  closely  watching 
every  southward  movement  of  Russia  into  Asia.  By  the 
entrance  of  Russia  into  the  political  and  commercial  arena 
of  the  Far  East  four  foreign  powers — Great  Britain,  the 
United  States,  France  and  Russia — came  into  direct  rela- 
tions with  each  other  thus  making  Asiatic  politics  often 
merely  a  phase  of  the  politics  of  the  western  world. 

Multiplication  of  American  Interests  in  China 

With  the  tremendous  expansive  movement  of  the  United 
States  the  development  of  American  interests  in  China 
synchronized  almost  exactly.  American  ship-owners  in  the 
China  trade  in  the  fifth  and  sixth  decades  of  the  nineteenth 
century  profited  fabulously  by  the  enormous  freight  rates 
at  the  time  of  the  blockade  of  Canton  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Anglo-Chinese  War  in  1840,  and  by  the  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  British  trade  at  that  time.^  By  the  perfection  of  the 
American  type  of  clipper  ship,  which  appeared  about  1840, 
they  were  able  for  a  time  almost  to  monopolize  the  trans- 
portation of  tea  even  to  England,  for  they  could  carry  larger 
cargoes  and  deliver  the  tea  in  shorter  time  and  in  fresher 
condition  than  could  their  competitors.    The  rush  from  the 


180  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Atlantic  Coast  to  California  after  the  discovery  of  gold 
created  incredibly  high  freight  and  passenger  rates  for  a 
voyage  which  carried  the  ship  outward  more  than  half  way 
towards  China.  Thus  the  outward  voyage  which  under 
ordinary  circumstances  was  unremunerative  because  of  the 
lack  of  cargoes  became  even  more  profitable  than  the  return 
voyage.  The  abolition  of  the  British  navigation  laws  in 
1850  gave  the  Americans,  temporarily,  a  still  further  advan- 
tage which  they  were  well  prepared  to  improve.  The  Cri- 
mean War  withdrew  a  large  amount  of  European  tonnage 
for  transport  service,  and  again  the  Americans  profited. 

American  trade  at  Shanghai  *  grew  with  rapidity.  This 
new  port  was,  on  the  one  hand,  nearer  to  the  Pacific  Coast 
and  to  San  Francisco,  and  on  the  other,  nearer  to  the  actual 
silk-growing  and  tea-producing  districts  of  China  than  was 
the  old  port  of  Canton.  Furthermore,  Shanghai,  as  a  foreign 
community,  started  de  novo  without  the  traditions  which 
had  grown  up  at  Canton.  The  Americans  were  not  a  tradi- 
tion-loving people,  and  especially  was  this  true  when  the 
backwash  from  San  Francisco  harbor  began  to  pour  its 
stream  of  derelict  Americans  on  to  the  China  coast.  Yet 
even  among  the  more  law-abiding  residents,  Canton  came 
to  be  looked  upon  as  a  pestilential  spot  from  which  it  was 
well,  as  rapidly  as  possible,  to  transfer  both  residence  and 
relations  with  the  Chinese.  Shanghai  breathed  a  freer  air 
in  which  life  was  in  every  way  more  comfortable.  For  the 
Americans  it  seemed  especially  desirable  because  it  was 
less  overshadowed  than  Canton  by  the  British  settlement 
of  Hongkong. 

The  Treaty  of  Wanghia  and  the  subsequent  imperial 
edicts  of  religious  toleration  had  also  opened  the  way  for 
greatly  increased  missionary  work,  and  the  American 
Protestant  Churches  were  the  most  energetic  and  aggres- 
sive in  the  extension  of  Protestant  missions  in  the  open 
ports.     From  the  days  of  Dr.  Robert  Morrison  down  to 

*So  rapidly  rtid  Aniorican  trade  at  Shansliai  grow  after  it  once  started  that 
in  tlie  year  ending  Sei)teinl)er  .SO,  1S3.'{.  altlumgli  tliere  liad  been  02  American 
vessels  as  compared  with  94  British  vessels,  (lie  total  American  tonnage  was 
41,501  as  compared  with  35,610  for  the  British.^ 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  181 

1851  there  had  been  a  total  of  150  Protestant  missionaries 
to  arrive  in  China.  Of  this  number  15  had  come  from  the 
Continent,  47  from  England,  and  88  from  the  United 
States.*^ 

American  interests  in  China,  therefore,  in  the  period 
after  1850  are  seen  to  be  both  enlarged  and  multiplied  over 
what  they  had  been  in  the  pre-treaty  days.  Down  to  the 
time  of  the  first  treaty  little  mattered  save  the  preservation 
of  undisturbed  commercial  relationships.  Now  this  com- 
merce had  grown  immensely  and  had  taken  very  deep 
root  in  at  least  one  other  port.  In  addition  the  missionaries 
had  come  in  large  numbers  to  every  open  port  and  their 
advent  marked  the  beginning  in  the  United  States  of  a  phil- 
anthropic, and  also  a  sentimental  interest  in  China  which 
operated  strongly  in  the  formation  of  American  public 
opinion.  Its  immediate  effect  on  the  American  policy  in 
China  was  greatly  to  increase  the  demand  for  a  further 
opening  up  of  the  country.  The  impatience  of  the  mis- 
sionary often  exceeded  that  of  the  trader.  To  these  two 
interests,  one  commercial  and  the  other  philanthropic,  was 
now  being  added  a  third — a  political  interest. 

The  problems  of  Asia  as  viewed  by  the  Western  world 
ceased  to  be  purely  commercial;  they  became  political. 
Had  the  Anglo-Chinese  War  (1839-42)  been  settled  by  a 
purely  commercial  treaty  the  Far  Eastern  question  might 
have  remained  for  a  time  a  commercial  one,  but  England 
planted  at  Hongkong  an  outpost  of  the  India  Empire,  which 
had  already  been  advancing  by  easy  stages  from  Penang  and 
Singapore.  The  British  occupation  of  Hongkong  compelled 
all  other  foreign  nations  from  that  time  onward  to  deal  with 
Asia  as  a  political  problem.  It  was  the  delusion  of  some 
American  statesmen  in  the  eighties  and  nineties  that  the 
United  States  need  recognize  no  political  problem  in  Asia, 
that  American  interests  in  the  East  were  purely  commercial, 
but  this  assumption  avoided  plain  facts.  Caleb  Cushing 
negotiated  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  in  1844  with  one  eye  on 
the  political  establishment  of  Great  Britain  at  Hongkong. 
Commodore  Perry  in  1853-54  did  not  even  make  a  commer- 


182  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

cial  treaty  with  Japan,  but  he  staked  out  a  political  program 
which  failed  of  adoption  through  no  timidity  of  its  author, 
and  notwithstanding  its  failure  had  its  influence  on  subse- 
quent policy.  The  struggle  of  the  Americans  to  secure 
Shanghai  as  an  international  rather  than  a  British  port,  at 
the  very  time  Perry  was  in  the  East,  was  more  political  than 
commercial.  The  relations  of  the  Western  powers  to  the 
Taiping  Rebellion,  and  the  relations  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  Russia  and  the  United  States  in  the  negotiations  of 
the  treaties  of  Tientsin  in  1858  were  very  far  from  being 
purely  commercial.  The  'cooperative  policy'  and  the  entire 
course  of  the  first  ten  years  of  American  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Japan  were  controlled  by  political  considerations. 
The  first  American  efforts  to  open  Korea  were  of  the  same 
character. 

The  distinction  between  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
and  the  policy  of  other  powers  in  Asia  in  this  period  is  not 
that  the  American  policy  was  purely  commercial  while  the 
others  were  political,  but  that  the  American  policy,  although 
political,  followed  diplomatic  rather  than  military  channels. 
Military  proposals  were  not  lacking  from  the  American 
representatives  in  the  East ;  they  even  issued  at  times  from 
the  Department  of  State,  but  with  very  few  exceptions  these 
proposals  failed  of  execution  and  did  not  result  in  the  occu- 
pation of  territory.  American  policy  was  preeminently  the 
policy  of  Americans.  As  will  be  elaborated  in  the  following 
pages  it  was  a  composite  into  the  making  of  which  went  a 
great  variety  of  proposals,  official  and  unofficial,  some  bel- 
ligerent, others  most  pacific,  but  all  directed  towards  secur- 
ing for  American  interests  in  Asia  a  diplomatic  equivalent 
for  Hongkong  and  what  the  British  possession  stood  for, 
viz.,  territorial  occupation  of  Asia  by  Western  powers. 

By  the  Americans  it  was  foreseen  that  some  day  their 
trans-Pacific  commerce  would  be  very  great.  This  expecta- 
tion reacted  on  American  policy  in  the  Far  East  in  two 
ways.  In  the  first  place  it  made  the  Americans  increasingly 
alert  to  see  that  no  other  power  should  take  any  step  which 
would  later  become  a  handicap  to  American  interest;  that  is 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  183 

to  say,  it  helped  to  confirm  an  open  door  policy.  But  it  did 
more.  It  raised  questions  of  how  this  expected  great  com- 
merce with  Asia  might  in  future  years  receive  adequate 
protection.  It  sent  the  Americans  into  the  Pacific  to  look 
for  harbors,  to  Japan  for  more  open  ports,  and  to  Formosa . 
for  coal  mines  which  were  deemed  a  necessity  for  the  success 
of  steam  navigation.  This  alertness  and  this  search,  this 
planning  for  the  future,  which  then  seemed  so  sure  and  so 
welcome  to  the  cotton  growers  and  manufacturers  alike, 
immediately  put  the  United  States  in  the  way  of  interna- 
tional collisions  of  grave  import,  for  were  not  the  Ameri- 
cans setting  out  upon  a  path  already  well-trodden  by  Eng- 
land? and  Russia?  and  France?  and  did  not  the  closed  ports 
of  Japan  lie  directly  in  the  way? 

A  brief  reference  to  details  will  make  more  intelligi- 
ble the  force  of  this  situation  as  it  was  felt  in  the  United 
States  a  few  years  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Wanghia. 

As  early  as  May,  1848,  T.  Butler  King,  of  the  Committee 
on  Naval  Affairs,  introduced  into  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives a  report  recommending  steam  navigation  from  the 
United  States  to  the  Sandwich  Islands  and  China.^  He 
exhibited  an  exhaustive  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  the 
American  trade.  While  the  United  States  and  England 
were  then  great  competitors  he  argued  that  the  English 
imports  contained  one  element  of  decay,  viz.,  opium,  and  he 
expressed  the  opinion  that  England  would  in  the  future  be 
very  dependent  upon  the  United  States  for  the  raw  material 
for  her  cotton  trade  with  China.  The  American  trade,  he 
asserted,  was  therefore  in  a  far  more  favorable  potential 
position.  It  had  already  been  proved  that  the  Americans 
could  meet  English  competition  in  cheap  cotton  goods,  and 
it  merely  remained  for  the  American  manufacturer  to  study 
more  carefully  and  adapt  his  fabrics  more  to  the  wants  and 
tastes  of  the  Chinese  people.  In  spite  of  the  growing  pro- 
duction of  cotton  in  India,  Mr.  King  felt  assured  of  the 
American  cotton  market  in  China  if  only  the  transportation 
problem  could  be  solved.    He  said : 


184  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"Certainty  and  rapidity  of  intercourse  only  are  wanted  to  bring 
these  two  great  nations  [China  and  the  United  States]  nearer  to.acther, 
to  give  them  a  more  perfect  knowledge  of  each  other,  develop  their  re- 
sources and  build  up  a  commerce  more  extensive  than  has  probably 
ever  heretofore  existed  between  two  nations.  The  improved  condition 
of  our  relations  with  that  country  under  the  new  treaties,  and  the 
extension  of  our  territorial  possessions  to  the  Pacific  have  placed  it 
in  our  power  tdtimatehj  to  communicate  with  China  almost  as  rapidly 
as  we  now  do  with  Europe.  To  accomplish  this,  however,  we  must 
extend  telegraphic  wires  across  the  continent,  and  establish  a  line 
of  steamers  from  San  Francisco,  or  Monterey,  to  Shanghai  and 
Canton." 

Mr.  King  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  line  of 
steamers  had  already  been  established  from  New  York  to 
Havana  and  Panama,  and  that  there  was  already  a  govern- 
ment mail  line  up  the  California  coast  from  the  Isthmus  to 
the  Columbia  River.  Lieutenant  M.  F.  Maury  of  the  Naval 
Observatory  submitted  a  report  which  was  attached  to  the 
document  showing  that  because  of  the  'great  circle  route' 
to  the  East,  the  United  States  had  already  taken  a  step  of 
three  thousand  miles  on  its  way  toward  China.  He  pointed 
out  that  the  steamer  route  from  Panama  by  way  of  the 
'great  circle'  was  1200  miles  shorter  to  China  than  the 
route  formerly  taken  by  way  of  the  Sandwich  Islands.  New 
Orleans,  by  this  new  route,  was  actually  3000  miles  nearer 
China  than  Panama  was  by  way  of  Honolulu,  and  from 
Monterey  to  Japan  was  not  as  far  as  from  Panama  to  the 
Sandwich  Islands. 

The  proposed  steamer  line  to  China  was  not  suffered  to 
be  forgotten.  John  P.  Kennedy,  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in 
the  closing  days  of  the  Pierce  administration,  reporting  to 
the  Senate  in  response  to  request  (February  10,  1853),^ 
urged  the  necessity  of  such  a  line  of  steamers  without  delay, 
either  by  direct  agency  of  the  government,  or  by  the  en- 
couragement of  individual  enterprise.  Kennedy  drew  atten- 
tion to  the  need  of  coal  which  would  be  created  if  such 
steamers  were  established.  He  recommended  the  establish- 
ment of  coal  deposits  on  some  of  the  islands  in  the  Pacific, 
stating  that  at  that  time  the  United  States  did  not  possess 
a  single  coal  depot  for  the  supply  of  naval  steamers  in  either 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  185 

the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific  oceans.  He  proposed  a  plan  by 
which  he  thought  such  depots  could  be  supplied  in  the 
Pacific  at  little  cost,  by  means  of  the  development  of  an 
outward  trade  to  China  in  tobacco  and  an  inward  trade  from 
the  Pacific  islands  in  guano.  He  suggested  with  reference 
to  the  tobacco  trade: 

"The  use  of  opium  in  China  has  been  the  great  cause  of  preventing 
the  extension  of  commerce  into  that  country,  while  at  the  same  time, 
many  believe,  it  has  almost  entirely  shut  out  the  lights  and  advantages 
of  Christianity.  If,  by  any  means  that  our  government  shall  employ, 
a  trade  between  us  and  China  shall  be  opened,  there  is  reason  to 
suppose  that  our  tobacco  will  be  generally  received  there  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  this  poisonous  drug.  This  article,  now  so  abundantly  pro- 
duced in  our  tobacco-growing  states,  will  then  become  the  pioneer  of 
our  trade,  and  open  the  way  for  our  manufactures  of  cotton,  wool, 
and  particularly  of  cutlery  and  other  manufactures  of  iron — in  which 
latter  articles  the  trade  between  Great  Britain  and  China  is  now  very 
large. 

"These  two  articles,"  thought  Kennedy,  "of  tobacco  and  guano, 
would  alone,  without  other  commodities,  afPord  the  means  of  opening  a 
rapid  and  profitable  intercourse  with  China.  The  product  of  tobacco 
would  be  increased  in  a  measure  corresponding  to  the  increased  de- 
mand of  the  two  hundred  millions  of  Chinese  consumers,  and  thus 
our  national  wealth  would  be  greatly  augmented." 

The  proposal  for  the  steamship  line  remained  in  abey- 
ance, but  the  Perry  expedition  was  already  on  its  way  to 
secure  the  coal  supply. 

Commissioners  and  Consuls 

Notwithstanding  the  recognition  of  the  growing  impor- 
tance of  American  affairs  in  the  East,  they  suffered  neglect. 
That  their  importance  was  recognized  may  be  seen  in  the 
Perry  expedition ;  that  they  were  neglected  is  proven  by  the 
records  of  the  consulates  and  the  legation  in  China.  There 
were  fits  and  starts ;  brilliant  efforts  and  then  lapses.  Con- 
tinuity was  lacking.  It  would  even  appear  as  though  the 
Americans,  while  well  equipped  to  initiate  things  effectively 
in  Asia,  were  either  by  temperament  or  by  the  constitu- 
tional structure  of  their  government,  incapable  of  seeing 
them  through. 


186  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

President  Tyler  had  lost  no  time  in  recommending  that 
Congress  make  suitable  provision  for  the  establishment  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  China,  and  for  carrying  out  the 
purposes  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia.'^  He  asked  for  the  crea- 
tion of  the  position  of  permanent  commissioner,  the  enact- 
ment of  legislation  for  the  establishment  of  extraterritorial 
authority,  and  the  replacement  of  the  old  and  objectionable 
merchant-consul  system  by  an  adequately  manned  consular 
establishment  independent  of  trade.  The  first  of  these 
recommendations  was  acted  on  immediately  although  a 
salary  was  fixed  at  a  rate  too  low  to  support  the  commis- 
sioner in  decency;  the  second  duty  remained  in  abeyance 
until  1848  and  was  then  delegated  to  wholly  incompetent 
hands;  while  the  merchant-consul  system  lingered  until 
1854,  and  then  was  partially  replaced  by  consular  establish- 
ments which  were  in  a  few  respects  better  but  in  most 
respects  even  worse. 

Early  in  1845  Alexander  H.  Everett  of  Massachusetts 
was  appointed  commissioner  to  China  at  a  salary  of  $5,000, 
and  Dr.  Peter  Parker  was  named  as  secretary  and  interpre- 
ter, Everett  was  charged  with  'the  general  superintendence 
of  the  spirit  of  the  treaty/  and  instructed  to  cultivate  the 
good  will  of  the  Chinese  Government  and  people.  He  was 
under  the  embarrassment,  however,  of  being  quite  without 
authority  to  exercise  judicial  or  executive  functions  under 
the  extraterritorial  grant. 

"It  cannot  be  pretended,"  read  his  instructions  from  James 
Piichanan,  "that  one  of  our  consuls  at  the  five  ports  could  try  and 
l)unish  an  American  citizen  for  murder  or  any  other  crime.  What 
is  then  to  be  done?  Shall  a  citizen  jruilty  of  mvn-der  or  other  high 
crime  pass  unpunished?  Independently  of  the  other  evil  results  of 
such  an  impunity,  nothing  would  more  exasperate  the  Chinese  than  to 
witness  such  a  s])ectacle.  .  .  .  They  never  could  be  made  to  under- 
stand that  we  had  not  violated  the  treaty."  ^^ 

The  President,  therefore,  directed  that  an  accused  party 
be  sent  home  for  trial. 

It  speaks  well  for  the  character  of  the  community  at 
Canton  that  there  were  no  occasions  where  it  was  necessary 
to  fall  back  on  this  executive  order.    The  Americans  did  not 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  18? 

begin  to  enter  and  settle  in  numbers  at  the  other  open  poits 
until  after  the  consular  courts  had  been  created  in  1848. 
The  great  difficulties  came  later  when  laws  were  ample  but 
consuls  were  lacking  or  ineffective,  and  there  was  so  little 
provision  for  the  enforcement  of  such  judgments  as  came 
from  the  consular  courts. 

The  'destitute  condition  of  the  consular  establishments' 
was  made  the  subject  of  a  dispatch  by  Commissioner 
McLane  in  1854.  The  facts  reported  at  that  time  may  be 
taken  as  typical  of  conditions  for  most  of  the  period  before 
1860,  and  some  of  the  reported  deficiencies  were  not  cor- 
rected for  half  a  century.  The  consulate  at  Ningpo  was  in 
charge  of  Rev.  D.  B.  McCartee,  a  medical  missionary  who 
received  no  salary,  was  allowed  no  funds  for  expenses  other 
than  stationary,  had  no  office  quarters  other  than  the  mis- 
sion building,  and  exercised  no  judicial  functions.  A  new 
consul  had  arrived  a  Ningpo.  His  salary  for  judicial  services 
was  one  thousand  dollars ;  for  the  balance  of  his  emolument 
he  had  to  depend  upon  consular  fees  which  were  next  to 
nothing.  He  was  unable  to  speak  the  language  and  had  no 
allowances  for  an  interpreter.  He  lived  with  "rigid 
economy"  but  nothing  could  "be  more  disreputable  and 
derogatory  to  the  dignity  and  honor  of  the  country  than  the 
condition"  in  which  he  was  placed.  The  Foochow  consulate 
was  in  the  hands  of  a  merchant  who  had  been  appointed 
acting  consul  by  no  other  authority  than  that  of  his  prede- 
cessor who  also  had  been  an  acting  consul.  The  regularly 
appointed  consul  was  on  his  way  but  upon  arrival  at  his  post 
his  condition  would  be  no  less  forlorn  than  that  at  Amoy. 
There  was  little  or  no  American  trade  at  these  ports,  but 
extraterritoriality  prevailed  and  made  them  the  resort  of 
outlaws  who  either  were  American  citizens  or  claimed  their 
immunities.  The  newly  appointed  consul  at  Shanghai, 
whose  remuneration  consisted  only  of  $1000  a  year  for  his 
judicial  services  and  his  fees,  was  living  in  a  seamen's  board- 
ing-house or  hotel.  He  was  without  means  to  secure  an 
office  or  a  'respectable  domestic  establishment  and  subsist- 
ence.'    He  was  dependent  upon  the  British  consulate  and 


188  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

upon  merchants  for  the  loan  of  tlie  services  of  in- 
terpreters. 

In  contrast  to  this  condition  Mr.  McLane  pointed  to  the 
British  establishment  which  consisted  of  a  Minister  with 
secretary  and  interpreter  at  $30,000,  and  five  well  manned 
consular  offices  at  a  cost  of  $10,000  each.^^ 

The  United  States  paid  dearly  in  loss  of  prestige  for 
these  economies.  The  opening  of  the  new  ports  and  the 
boundless  expectations  for  the  new  trade  drew  from  the  four 
quarters  of  the  globe  a  crowd  of  adventurers  who  had  no 
other  trade  or  profession  than  to  live  by  their  wits.  They 
were  of  the  type  which  gave  the  reputation  to  the  usual 
pioneer  community  of  the  western  continent.  Then  came 
the  discovery  of  gold  in  California,  followed  by  the  rush  and 
the  failure  of  most  of  the  gold-seekers.  Luckless  adventur- 
ers drifted  out  to  Shanghai ;  and  the  deserting  sailors  in  San 
Francisco  harbor  were  'shanghaied'  and  when  they  reached 
Shanghai  they  promptly  deserted  again,  scattered  up  and 
down  the  coast,  and  attempted  to  live  as  best  they  could  off 
the  country. 

Those  were  wild  days  in  the  open  ports — uncomfortable 
for  all,  and  for  the  Chinese  terrifying.  The  reports  of  the 
American  consuls  and  the  dispatches  of  the  commissioners 
abound  in  accounts  of  the  scandals,  crimes,  and  atrocities  of 
these  derelicts.  Commissioner  Humphrey  Marshall,  for 
example,  reported  in  1853  as  follows:  ^- 

"There  are  now  in  this  port  (Shanghai)  at  least  one  hundred  and 
fifty  sailors  ashore,  men  of  all  nations,  who  go  into  the  Chinese  city 
and  drink  and  riot  and  brawl,  daily  and  nightly.  They  presume  to 
defy  all  law,  because  they  have  tried  the  jail  and  find  that  they 
cannot  be  confined  in  it.  No  other  punishment  has  been  inflicted  upon 
them  yet  besides  confinement.  They  liave  no  money  from  which  to 
collect  a  fine.  I  earnestly  request  the  President  to  give  the  authority 
to  lease  a  lot  of  ground  in  this  vicinity  on  which  to  erect  a  jail  with 
a  yard  attached  thereto,  in  which  sailors  may  have  air  and  exercise, 
and  that  Congress  shall  be  urged  to  make  an  appropriation  for  the 
purpose  of  erecting  a  jail  thereon.  The  marshal  can  reside  in  the 
tenement,  and  the  fines  and  forfeitures  will  probably  pay  for  a  guard 
to  attend  the  premises. 

"The  United  States  having  assumed  jurisdiction  over  their  own 
citizens   in  Diina,  are  expressly  bound  to  compel  them  to  keep  the 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  189 

peace,  and  this  cannot  be  done  as  long  as  there  is  no  phice  to  confine 
the  delinquents  in,  except  a  loathsome  hole  inhabited  by  the  foulest 
lepers,  and  in  itself  so  weak  that  a  man  of  American  energies  can 
kick  his  way  out  in  a  few  minutes." 

These  ruffians  may  have  been  deficient  in  character  but 
they  did  not  lack  initiative.  Many  of  them  joined  the  mih- 
tary  or  naval  service  of  the  Taipings  or  of  the  Imperialists, 
defying  the  proclamations  of  the  representatives  of  their 
government  who  ordered  them  to  desist.  Others  enlisted  in 
the  opium  smuggling.  Some  entered  the  coolie  trade.  Still 
others  engaged  in  the  business  of  'convoying.'  * 

By  no  means  all  of  these  foreigners  were  Americans,  but 
even  many  of  those  who  were  not  found  it  convenient  to 
claim  citizenship  in  a  country  which  was  entirely  without 
jails,  without  sufficient  naval  vessels  to  prevent  the  abuse 
of  its  flag,  and  possessed,  at  least  in  some  cases,  of  indulgent 
consular  officials  who  could  be  induced  to  give  an  approval, 
tacit  or  otherwise,  to  the  fraudulent  transfer  of  ship's 
papers,  and  to  practices  in  plain  violation  both  of  the  treaty 
and  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  The  situation  was  at 
once  disgraceful  to  the  American  reputation  and  dangerous 
to  the  entire  foreign  community,  for  the  depredations  of 
these  individuals  created  ill-will  and  wrath  among  the 
Chinese  which  might  any  day  lead  to  the  gravest  conse- 
quences for  all.^* 

The  failure  of  Congress  to  make  adequate  provision  for 
consuls  and  for  jails  was  by  no  means  the  worst  of  the 
situation.  Even  the  commissionership  suffered.  A  brief 
summary  of  the  way  in  which  the  position  of  commissioner 
was  filled  before  1858  will  be  sufficient. 

Alexander  H.  Everett,  the  first  commissioner,  was  ap- 
pointed March  13,  1845,  but  owing  to  illness  did  not  reach 
China  until  nineteen  months  later  (October  29,  1846)  and 
he  died  in  China  the  following  June.    Everett  was,  perhaps, 

*The  prevalency  along  the  coast  of  piracy  which  the  Chinese  Government, 
distracted  by  the  Taipings  and  other  rebels,  was  unable  to  suppress,  led  to  the 
development  of  a  system  of  protection  for  the  native  junks  which  was  furnished 
by  foreigners,  unofficially,  and  which  was  paid  for  by  the  junk  owners.  At  first 
the  payments  were  made  willingly,  but  as  abuses  crept  in  the  conveying  sys- 
tem degenerated  into  nothing  less  than  blackmail  and  piracy. '^ 


190  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  ablest  commissioner  ever  appointed,  and  the  only  experi- 
enced diplomat.  He  had  served  as  private  secretary  to 
John  Quincy  Adams  when  the  latter  was  Minister  to  Russia, 
had  remained  for  a  time  in  the  diplomatic  service,  and  had 
been  at  one  time  IMinister  at  Madrid.  However,  he  was  in 
China  too  short  a  tmie  to  render  any  important  service.  His 
successor,  John  W.  Davis,  was  appointed  January  3,  1848, 
and  arrived  in  China  in  August.  Thus,  from  the  time  of  the 
signing  of  the  treaty  of  Wanghia  until  the  middle  of  1848 — 
four  years — there  was  in  China  a  regularly  appointed  com- 
missioner for  only  eight  months.  Before  Everett's  arrival, 
Commodore  James  Biddle,  to  whom  Everett  had  delegated 
his  powers,  acted  as  commissioner,  and  after  the  death  of 
Everett,  Dr.  Peter  Parker,  secretary  of  the  legation,  served 
as  commissioner  until  the  arrival  of  Davis. 

John  W.  Davis  was,  by  profession,  a  physician.  He  had 
served  three  terms  in  the  House  of  Representatives  from 
Indiana,  and  had  been  elected  Speaker  of  the  House  in 
1845.  After  his  return  from  China  he  became  governor  of 
Oregon  Territory;  he  was  also  the  presiding  officer  of  the 
National  Democratic  Convention  at  Baltimore  in  1852.  He 
retired  from  China  in  May,  1850,  after  a  residence  of  a  little 
less  than  two  years.  It  became  extremely  difficult  to  find 
another  to  take  his  place.  The  position  was  offered  to  a 
lawyer  from  Tennessee  who  accepted  it  and  then  declined 
when  he  found  that  he  would  be  unable  to  live  on  $2000  a 
year  in  China,  as  he  had  hoped,  thus  saving  $4000  a  year  out 
of  his  salary.  It  was  offered  to  another  who  accepted  and 
then  declined  also  because  of  the  salary.  To  still  a  third  it 
was  offered  only  to  be  declined.  In  his  annual  message, 
December  2,  1851,  President  Fillmore  reported:  ^^ 

"The  ojSfico  of  commissionor  to  Cliina  remains  unfilled.  Several 
persons  have  been  appointed  and  the  place  has  been  offered  to  others, 
all  of  whom  have  declined  its  accei)tance  on  the  j^round  of  the  inade- 
quacy of  the  compensation.  The  annual  allowance  by  law  is  $6000  and 
there  is  no  provision  for  any  outfit.  I  earnestly  reconnuend  the  con- 
sideration of  this  subject  to  Conj^ress.  .  .  .  China  is  understood  to  be 
a  country  in  which  living  is  very  expensive,  and  I  know  no  reason 
why  the  American  commissioner  sent  thither  should  not  be  placed,  in 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  191 

regard  to  compensation,  on  an  equal  footing  with  ministers  who  repre- 
sent this  country  at  the  courts  of  Europe." 

In  August,  1852,  the  post  was  offered  to  Humphrey  Mar- 
shall of  Kentucky,  Congress  having  not  heeded  the  Presi- 
dent's request  that  the  salary  be  increased,  and  Marshall 
accepted,  reaching  China  in  January,  1853.  Meanwhile  the 
duties  of  the  office  of  commissioner  had  been  discharged  by 
the  secretary.  Dr.  Parker,  who  had  resigned  his  position  as 
a  missionary  and  was  supplementing  his  meagre  salary  of 
$2500  by  private  practice  as  a  physician. 

Humphrey  Marshall  was  a  graduate  of  the  United  States 
Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  a  lawyer  by  profession, 
who  had  served  two  terms  in  Congress  from  Kentucky, 
After  returning  to  the  United  States,  he  was  again  elected 
to  Congress  for  one  term.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War 
he  became  a  Brigadier  General  in  the  Confederate  service.^*' 
Marshall's  service  in  China  covered  slightly  more  than  a 
year. 

Robert  M.  McLane,  who  succeeded  Marshall,  arrived  in 
China  in  March,  1854,  and  left  the  following  December.  He 
was  the  son  of  Lewis  McLane  who  had  served  as  Secretary 
of  State  for  a  year  under  President  Jackson  and  had  been 
senator  from  Delaware,  and  LTnited  States  Minister  to  Eng- 
land. The  son  had  been  a  student  at  West  Point,  and  was  a 
lawyer  by  profession.  He  had  served  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives for  two  terms.  Subsequently  he  held  the  im- 
portant diplomatic  posts  of  Minister  to  Mexico  (1859-60) 
and  Minister  to  France  ( 1885-89). i' 

After  the  departure  of  McLane  from  China,  Dr.  Parker, 
as  usual,  became  Charge,  but  within  a  few  months  it  became 
necessary  for  him  to  return  to  the  United  States  for  reasons 
of  health.  In  his  absence  Commodore  Joel  Abbot,  com- 
manding the  LTnited  States  Squadron  on  the  China  station, 
was  delegated  ''to  meet  any  emergencies  that  may  arise."  ^^ 

In  June,  1855,  S.  Wells  Williams,  an  unordained  mis- 
sionary who  had  gone  to  China  in  1834  to  take  charge  of 
the  printing  press  of  the  American  Board  of  Commissioners 
for  Foreign  Missions,  was  notified  of  his  appointment  as 


192  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

secretary  and  interpreter  of  the  legation,  at  a  salary  of 
S2500.*  Dr.  Williams  had  acted  as  interpreter  for  Commo- 
x'^dore  Perry  in  the  Japan  expedition.  A  few  weeks  later 
(September  5,  1855)  Dr.  Parker  was  appointed  commis- 
sioner under  the  new  diplomatic  law  of  March  1,  1855,  at  a 
salary  of  $15,000.t  Dr.  Parker  reached  China  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  following  year  and  served  for  about  twenty 
months,  retiring  by  his  own  choice,  when  William  B.  Reed, 
a  Pennsylvania  lawyer,  was  appointed  to  China  with  the 
title  of  envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary. 
In  the  midst  of  these  conditions  of  confusion — in  the 
United  States,  in  England,  on  the  Continent,  and  in  China 
— the  policy  of  the  Cushing  treaty  was  put  to  its  first  tests. 
This  policy  was,  in  a  word,  to  occupy  no  portion  of  Asia  as 
a  military  or  naval  base  and  to  depend  entirely  upon  the 
pledges  of  the  Chinese  Government,  It  soon  developed  that 
American  interests  were  to  be  exposed  to  danger  at  two 
points;  the  aggressions  and  pretensions  of  other  treaty 
powers  threatened  to  curtail  the  privileges  granted  to 
Americans  under  the  treaty;  and,  the  Chinese  provincial 
authorities,  the  local  gentry  and  rabble,  sometimes  sup- 
ported by  the  Imperial  Government  at  Peking,  were  un- 
willing in  many  cases  to  make  effective  the  rights '.accorded 
by  treaties  to  which  China  was  an  unwilling  party.  These 
tests  revealed  a  fallacy  in  the  Cushing  policy.  The  policy 
rested  upon  the  false  assumption  that  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment was  not  only  possessed  of  the  utmost  good  will  towards 
the  Americans,  but  that  it  was  also  strongly  centralized  and 
able  to  enforce  its  commands  upon  the  provinces;  further, 
that  China  was  strong  enough  to  resist  the  pressure  which 
the  other  treaty  powers  were  able  to  exert  by  means  of  mili- 
tary force,  and  would  protect  the  Americans  in  the  enjoy- 
ments of  the  rights  which  the  Empire  had  granted. 

So  long  as  foreign  powers  in  China  were  competing  for 
►( 

that 

offices 

frequei 

look     upf 

Washington."  ■" 

t'J'hc  following  year  the  salary  was  i-cduccd  to  $12,000  whore  it  has  remained 
ever  since. 


THE  FAR  EAST  BECOMES  A  POLITICAL  QUESTION  193 

preferred  position,  and  so  long  as  the  Chinese  of  the  open 
ports  resented  the  presence  of  the  foreigners,  the  Treaty  of 
Wanghia  was  of  only  nominal  value.  i 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  simplest  method  of  folkiwiny  through  in  greater  detail  the 

policy  of  the  United  States  in  these  particulars  is  to  read  the 
historical  sections  under  the  appropriate  headings  to  be  found 
in  the  index  of  Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law.  Copious 
extracts  from  the  official  documents  will  be  found  there. 

2.  Journal  des  operations  diplomatiques  de  la  Legation  frangaise  en 

Chine,  redige  par  J.  M.  Callery  (Macao,  1845);  "Cambridge 
Modern  History,"  Vol.  XI,  pp.  811-2. 

3.  Morse's    "International   Rel.    of   the   Chinese   Empire,"   Vol.   1, 

chap.  19. 

4.  Forbes'  "Personal  Reminiscences,"  p.  151. 

5.  H.  Doc.  123  -.33-1,  p.  374 ;  see  also  Morse,  Vol.  1,  pp.  342-3. 

6.  Chinese  Repository,  Vol.  20,  p.  520. 

7.  H.  Repts.  596,  30-1. 

8.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  49  :32-2. 

9.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  58  :28-2. 

10.  China  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Apr.  15,  1845  (Dept.  of  State).     All 

of  the  instructions  to  Everett  are  printed  in  J.  B.  Moore's 
Works  of  James  Buchanan,  Vol  6. 

11.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  22  :35-2,  pp.  165-167. 

12.  H.  Doc.  123  :33-l,  p.  224. 

13.  Morse,  Vol.  1,  pp.  406-8. 

14.  H.  Doc.  123  :33-l,  p.  167 ;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  22  :35-2,  pp.  422,  437,  625, 

732,  823 ;  H.  Jour.  34-1,  p.  1048 ;  H.  Misc.  Docs.  2  :35-l ;  H.  Ex. 
Doc.  68:35-2. 

15.  Richardson's  Messages,  Vol.  5,  p.  122. 

16.  Poore's  "Political  Register,"  p.  524. 

17.  Ihid.,  p.  516. 

18.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  22  :35-2,  p.  609. 

19.  S.  Wells  Williams'  "Life  and  Letters,"  pp.  235-6. 


CHAPTER  X 

SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  SHANGHAI  LAND  QUESTION 

The  British,  American  and  French  treaties  with  China 
left  open  for  further  discussion  a  most  important  principle 
as  to  the  way  in  which  the  foreigners  should  occupy  lands  in 
the  open  ports.  In  pre-treaty  days  at  Canton  the  foreigners 
had  all  lived  together  in  the  restricted  area  of  the  factories 
where  each  individual  or  firm,  regardless  of  nationality, 
rented  from  the  hong  merchants  who  were  the  owners.  The 
British  Treaty  of  the  Bogue  (1843)  provided  that  under  the 
new  regime  in  the  five  ports  "grounds  and  houses  .  .  .  shall 
be  set  apart  by  the  local  officers  in  communication  with  the 
consul."  The  American  treaty  merely  stated  that  the  local 
officers  of  the  two  governments  "shall  select,  in  concert,  the 
sites"   for  residences,   churches,   cemeteries  and  hospitals. 

How  then  were  the  foreigners  to  live  in  the  open  ports? 
Were  they  to  continue  the  practice  of  residing  together  as  of 
old  at  Canton  in  a  single  international  settlement  set  apart 
for  their  use;  or,  were  they  to  scatter,  each  resident  inde- 
pendently, with  the  consent  of  his  consul  and  the  local 
Chinese  official,  selecting  such  residence  as  his  fancy  pre- 
ferred ;  or,  were  the  nationals  of  each  treaty  power  to  estab- 
lish their  own  national  settlement,  thus  forming  in  each 
open  port  a  series  of  national  concessions?  When  viewed  in 
the  light  of  subsequent  history  it  is  seen  that  this  question 
involved  one  of  the  most  funrlamental  principles  in  the 
relations  of  China  with  the  treaty  powers.  A  single  inter- 
national settlement  in  each  port  involved  a  degree  of  inter- 
national cooperation  among  the  treaty  powers  such  as  had 
no  precedent.  The  scattering  of  the  foreign  residents 
among  the  Chinese  residences  was  open  to  the  gravest 
objections,  sanitary,  commercial  and  social.    To  the  Chinese 

194 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  SHANGHAI  LAND  QUESTION  195 

also  this  was  objectionable  because  the  foreigner  was  exempt 
from  Chinese  laws.  On  the  other  hand  the  creation  of 
separate  national  settlements  was  likely  to  bring  the  treaty 
powers  into  collision  with  each  other  and  with  China  be- 
cause of  the  most-favored-nation  clause.  In  each  port  there 
was  naturally  a  most  favored  site  for  business  purposes, 
determined  by  the  contour  of  the  land  and  its  accessibility 
to  the  best  anchorage.  If  any  single  nation  were  to  occupy 
this  most  favored  site  the  other  nations  might  invoke  the 
most-favored-nation  clause  in  their  own  treaties,  and  de- 
mand admission.  The  question  came  to  an  issue  very  soon 
after  the  opening  of  Shanghai  to  trade. 

Early  Americans  in  Shanghai 

The  first  American  resident  at  Shanghai  was  Henry  G. 
Wolcott,  representing  Russell  and  Company.  Relying  on 
the  Imperial  rescript  which  had  extended  the  privileges 
granted  to  the  British  to  all  foreigners  he  had  gone  to  the 
new  port  even  before  Caleb  Cushing  had  reached  Macao  to 
negotiate  the  American  treaty.  In  the  course  of  time  Wol- 
cott desired  to  lease  a  piece  of  land  and  went  to  the  taotai 
(Prefect  or  Intendent  of  Circuit)  to  have  the  lease  sanc- 
tioned.^ This  official  replied  that  he  had  already  entered 
into  an  agreement  with  the  British  consul,  Captain  G. 
Balfour,  that  all  land  within  certain  boundaries,  which  in- 
cluded the  site  which  Wolcott  desired,  was  to  be  leased  only 
through  the  agency  of  the  British  consul.-  Wolcott  then 
addressed  himself  to  Captain  Balfour  and  was  given  permis- 
sion to  secure  the  land  on  conditions  similar  to  those  enjoyed 
by  British  subjects.  The  lease  was  immediately  effected 
but  complications  arose.  Wolcott  paid  a  visit  to  the  South 
in  December,  1845,  and  when  he  returned  he  carried  a  com- 
mission granted  to  him  by  Commodore  Biddle,  then  acting 
commissioner,  as  "acting  American  Consul"  for  Shanghai. 

Wolcott  immediately  erected  a  flagstaff  and  proceeded  to 
fly  the  American  flag  as  suited  his  consular  dignity.  Captain 
Balfour  formally  protested  to  both  Wolcott  and  the  taotai, 


196  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

requesting  the  latter  to  prevent  use  of  the  United  States  flag 
in  the  British  settlement.  Meanwhile  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  extended  its  authority  over  the  port  to  the  extent 
of  issuing  certain  port  regulations  which  W'olcott  was  very 
reluctant  to  accept.  Affairs  at  Shanghai  had  evidently 
reached  a  condition  which  was  never  contemplated  in  the 
American  treaty  which  had  been  signed  eighteen  months 
before.^ 

The  British  claim  at  Shanghai  had  arisen  in  a  very 
natural  way.  By  Imperial  rescript  the  taotais  at  the  various 
open  ports  had  been  ordered  to  consult  with  the  consuls  of 
the  treaty  powers  and  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements 
by  which  the  foreigners  of  all  nations  could  establish  them- 
selves. The  only  consul  at  Shanghai  was  Captain  Balfour, 
and  this  official  naturally  exercised  himself  to  care  for 
British  interests.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Bal- 
four, who  had  come  from  India  where  all  precedent  was  on 
his  side,  ever  considered  the  possibility  of  anything  but  a 
series  of  national  concessions  at  Shanghai.  The  taotai  con- 
ferred with  him  and  in  November,  1845,  issued  a  proclama- 
tion in  which  it  was  agreed  that  ''the  ground  north  of  the 
Yang  King  Pang  and  south  of  the  Lekea  Chang  (two 
creeks)  should  be  rented  to  English  merchants  for  erecting 
their  buildings  and  residing  thereon."  This  tract  of  land, 
lying  outside  the  city  wall  and  fronting  on  the  best  anchor- 
age, was  the  most  favorable  location  for  foreign  residence 
and  business.  The  taotai  further  agreed  in  the  proclama- 
tion, so  it  is  believed,  that  no  other  than  the  British  flag 
should  be  hoisted;  "that  no  part  of  the  ground  should  be 
rented  to  other  than  British  subjects  through  and  by  the 
British  consul;  and,  that  all  Chinese  dwellings  thereon 
should  be  as  speedily  as  possible  removed,  and  that  no  other 
Chinese  dwellings  be  permitted."  While  the  claim  was 
established  in  a  very  natural  way  there  is  no  reason  to  sup- 
pose that  the  Imperial  Government  had  the  remotest  inten- 
tion of  granting  any  exclusive  rights  to  the  British  at 
Shanghai,  and  the  concession  was  certainly  in  conflict  with 
the  spirit  and  intention  of  the  American  treaty  which  had 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  SHANGHAI  LAND  QUESTION  197 

been  signed  before  the  taotai  had  issued  his  procla- 
mation. 

Commodore  Biddle  on  his  way  to  Japan  in  June,  1846, 
stopped  at  Shanghai  and  conferred  with  both  Wolcott  and 
Balfour.  The  latter  explained  to  him  that  the  British 
municipal  and  port  regulations  had  been  established  to 
prevent  anarchy  in  the  new  settlement,  the  growing  trade  of 
which  required  some  sort  of  ordered  government.  The  com- 
modore advised  Wolcott  to  recognize  the  port  regulations 
which  were  obviously  so  necessary,  but  not  to  pull  down  the 
American  flag.  But  Wolcott  represented  a  Canton  firm  in 
which  the  old  pre-treaty  traditions  of  conciliation  and  com- 
promise were  very  strong.  He  not  only  accepted  the  port 
regulations  but  also  pulled  down  the  flag. 

A  truce  was  thus  established  which  continued  until  Feb- 
ruary, 1848,  when  the  captain  of  the  American  ship  Mon- 
tauk  came  into  collision  with  some  additional  port  regula- 
tions which  had  been  issued  the  preceding  year.  The 
American  captain  insisted  upon  the  right  to  fire  a  morning 
and  an  evening  gun.  The  British  consul  claimed  that  this 
was  a  violation  of  the  regulations  and  called  upon  the  taotai 
to  forbid  it.  The  Americans,  now  considerably  increased  in 
numbers  over  the  time  when  Wolcott  had  made  his  surren- 
der, replied  that  they  did  not  consider  themselves  subject 
to  any  port  regulations  which  had  not  been  approved  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States.  Both  the  British  and 
the  Americans  appealed  the  case  to  the  representatives  of 
their  respective  governments  at  Hongkong  and  Canton. 
Sir  John  Davis,  the  British  minister,  did  not  sustain  the 
contention  of  the  British  consul.  The  issue  was  thus  post- 
poned, though  only  for  a  few  months. 

Shortly  afterwards  J.  Alsop  Griswold,  the  regularly  ap- 
pointed American  consul,  and  also  a  member  of  Russell  and 
Company,  came  to  Shanghai  and  raised  his  flag  in  the  Brit- 
ish settlement,  presumably  at  the  same  location  where  Wol- 
cott had  pulled  it  down  two  years  before.  The  British  con- 
sul made  his  objections,  but  the  flag  remained. 

The  issue  was  again  raised  early  in  1849  when  the  French 


198  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

consul  secured  from  the  taotai  an  area  for  a  French  settle- 
ment between  the  English  settlement  and  the  city  wall.  In 
this  new  area  the  arrangements  as  to  leasing  land  were  to  be 
similar  to  those  in  the  British  settlement,  viz.,  that  the  per- 
son desiring  to  lease  should  first  apply  to  the  French  consul. 
Consul  Griswold  immediately  protested,^  writing  to  the 
taotai  (April  11,  1849)  as  follows: 

"There  is  nothing  in  the  said  treaties  which  gives  any  foreign 
representative  a  right  to  claim,  or  renders  it  incumbent  on  you  to 
grant,  particular  districts  to  one  nation,  excluding  the  people  of  other 
countries,  except  by  consent  of  the  consuls  to  whom  the  grant  is 
made.  .  .  .  On  July  14,  1846,  your  predecessor  offered  land  which 
includes  the  grant  now  made  to  the  French  to  the  United  States 
citizens.  This  tender  was  waived  for  the  time  being  as  Mr.  Wolcott 
considered  it  open  for  further  discussion." 

Griswold  also  pointed  out  to  the  taotai  that  to  make  such 
grants  to  foreigners  would  alienate  the  sympathy  of  the 
gentry  for  miles  around.  The  British  consul  also  protested 
against  the  provision  that  to  secure  land  in  the  French  con- 
cession the  subjects  of  other  nations  would  have  to  act 
through  the  French  consul,  although  this  provision  in  the 
French  grant  had  been  copied  from  the  grant  made  to  Cap- 
tain Balfour.*  Thus  the  British  and  American  consuls  as- 
sumed a  united  front  and  both  issued  proclamations  to  their 
nations  informing  them  that  the  protection  of  the  respective 
flags  would  be  given  to  land  wherever  situated.** 

To  United  States  Commissioner  Davis  at  Macao,  Gris- 
wold wrote: 

"If  wo  are  now  to  admit  the  principles  of  these  grants,  and  demand 
a  similar  one,  it  could  only  be  given  in  a  very  unfavorable  position, 
and  the  majority  of  our  citizens  who  come  hereafter  would  find  it  to 
their  interest  to  locate  themselves  near  the  rest  of  their  countrymen, 
and  thus  come  within  the  English  and  French  concessions,  renderijig 
the  one  we  may  obtain  of  little  avail,  and  leaving  us  in  the  power 
of  the  Chinese  and  foreign  representatives  to  restrict  us  to  the 
allotment  however  vinsuitable  it  may  prove  for  business  purposes." 

In  this  letter  Griswold  reviewed  the  history  of  the  con- 
troversy and  pointed  out  that  the  conditions  had  materially 

♦Morse  states:  "The  same  rule  had  been  inserted  in  the  agreement  for  the 
Englisli  sottU'iiKMit,  hut  it  had  not  hoen  acted  on," — a  very  inadequate  statement 
of  what   actiiiilly  haupciicd.'' 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  SHANGHAI  LAND  QUESTION  199 

changed.  When  the  original  grant  was  made  to  the  English 
there  were  no  other  consuls  in  Shanghai.  Now  there  were 
four.  Captain  Balfour  had  insisted  upon  exclusive  juris- 
diction because  of  the  necessity  of  preserving  order.  Now 
the  various  governments  were  in  a  position  to  cooperate  in 
this  matter.  Griswold  thought  that  there  was  little  to  fear 
from  the  present  French  and  English  consuls,  but  the 
claims  to  which  they  held  might  make  difficulty  at  some 
future  date.  He  stated  that  he  had  never  recognized  the 
British  claims  and  that  he  had  never  had  any  trouble  in 
securing  all  the  land  the  Americans  wanted.  But  he 
thought  that  the  time  had  come  to  protest,  not  only  against 
the  grants  themselves,  but  also  against  the  idea  of  putting 
consuls  in  control  of  them. 

American  Protests  Against  Exclusive  Concessions 

Immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  the  report  from  Gris- 
wold, Commissioner  Davis  took  up  the  matter  with  Sen, 
the  Viceroy  at  Canton,  drawing  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  concession  to  France  at  Shanghai  violated  Article  17  of 
the  Treaty  of  Wanghia,  which  provided  for  the  residence 
of  Americans  at  the  five  ports.    Davis  wrote : 

"How  can  these  immunities  be  enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  if  all  the  eligible  situations  for  the  above  mentioned 
objects  have  been  ceded  to  other  nations  and  that,  too,  long-  before 
they  have  occasion  to  occupy  them?  Disclaiming  any  desire  to 
abridge  the  right  granted  by  China  to  other  nations  by  treaty,  I  must 
protest  against  this  and  all  other  acts  of  a  subordinate  officer  of  the 
Chinese  Government  vphich  is  intended  to  abrogate  the  rights 
guaranteed  to  American  citizens  by  treaty,  and  while  we  look  to  His 
Imperial  Majesty  for  the  fulfillment  of  Treaty  stipulations  with  us, 
we  must  regard  as  a  nullity  any  act  of  his  subordinate  officers  which 
comes  in  conflict  with  our  rights  under  the  treaty." 

The  Chinese  High  Commissioner,  between  two  fires, 
agreed  that  the  local  authorities  at  Shanghai  had  no  right 
to  make  such  agreements  but  as  the  discussion  with  Davis 
proceeded  Sen's  views  came  to  be  tempered  with  notions  of 
expediency.     The  American   commissioner   remained   un- 


200  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

moved,  and  at  length  Sen  intimated  that  he  could  see  no 
good  reason  to  repudiate  the  conditions  in  which  affairs  had 
been  placed  by  the  grants  to  the  English  and  the  French, 
and  he  hoped  that  the  Americans  would  be  content  to  have 
a  distinct  quarter  set  apart  for  them  elsewhere.  Thus  the 
matter  rested  for  a  few  months,  and  then  Davis  wrote  to 
Sen  that  he  had  decided  to  postpone  the  settlement  of  the 
concession  matter  until  some  definite  case  arose.* 

The  American  consul  himself  soon  presented  an  oppor- 
tunity to  have  the  case  reviewed.  He  purchased  ground 
inside  the  British  concession,  settled  the  terms  with  the 
owners  of  the  land,  and  presented  his  conveyance  for  the 
seal  of  the  intendant  and  for  registration  at  the  consulate 
of  the  United  States,  without  in  any  way  recognizing  the 
right  of  the  British  consul  to  interfere  in  the  transaction. 
His  deed  was  examined,  sealed,  and  registered,  apparently 
without  question ;  and  the  matter  of  the  'concession'  to  the 
use  of  the  British  merchants  exclusively  seemed  to  have 
received  a  practical  solution,  consistent  with  the  rights  and 
claims  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States.  But  without 
the  knowledge  of  the  United  States  consul  the  taotai  had 
submitted  the  deeds  of  Mr.  Griswold  to  the  British  consul 
for  his  approval. 

In  the  spring  of  1852,  Mr.  Roundy,  an  American  citizen, 
purchased  land  within  the  British  concession,  and  ]Mr. 
Cunningham,  the  vice-consul  of  the  United  States,  sent  in 
the  conveyance  to  be  examined  and  sealed  by  the  taotai 
and  returned  for  registration  at  the  consulate  of  the  United 
States.  The  official  informed  the  vice-consul  that  the  deed 
must  be  submitted  to  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  consul,  and 
must  be  registered  in  his  office.  This  the  vice-consul 
promptly  and  firmly  refused  to  do;  and  thereupon  threat- 
ened the  taotai  that  if  he  did  not  perform  his  duty  within 
forty-eight  hours  communications  between  the  authorities 

*This  pnssaso  l)otvv{'»'ii  Davis  :in<l  Son,  in  wliich  thp  roprpscntativc  of  tlu; 
American  (jovcrnnient  is  seen  to  be  ur^inj;  (ho  Cliinoso  V'icoroy.  witli  iiidilTorcnt 
suoeoss,  to  oiiforco  tlio  rij,'hts  of  C'liiiia  iindor  the  treaty,  is  illustrative  of  tli(> 
anoniolous  situation  ci-oatcd  by  tlio  faot  that  tlie  nianagoniont  of  the  foroi.mi 
affaifs  of  the  ("hinoso  lOmiiiro  woi'o  ontrustod  to  a  viceroy  who  was  stationed  at 
Canton,     Son  was  little  interested  in  what  happened  at  Shanghai, 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  SHANGHAI  LAND  QUESTION  201 

of  the  United  States  and  China  at  Shanghai  would  be 
closed.  The  taotai  returned  the  deeds  with  the  seals  prop- 
erly affixed  (March  16). 

The  same  day  Cunningham  issued  a  proclamation  to 
the  American  residents  of  Shanghai  drawing  their  attention 
to  the  fact  that  purchases  of  land  within  Shanghai  or  its 
neighborhood  could  be  effected  according  to  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  with  the  Chinese  officers  through  the  American 
consulate  without  the  intervention  in  any  manner  of  any 
other  foreign  consul.  The  right  had  been  uniformly  main- 
tained by  the  United  States  authorities,  stated  the  consul, 
and  in  the  correspondence  just  closed  had  been  fully  ac- 
knowledged by  the  taotai.'^ 

By  this  very  energetic  action  the  question  was  disposed 
of  so  far  as  the  Chinese  Government  was  concerned.  A 
week  later,  Consul  Alcock,  March  23,  1852,  in  a  private 
letter  to  Cunningham  wrote  very  gracefully  with  reference 
to  the  proclamation: 

"I  am  glad  of  an  opportunity  of  saying  that  I  by  no  means  con- 
demn your  circular,  though  it  must  give  rise  to  some  difficulty  in 
readjusting  the  terms  of  a  joint  location  of  foreigners  recognizing  no 
common  law,  authority,  or  jurisdiction. 

"I  should  consider  myself  very  unworthy  of  the  trust  confided  to 
me  as  the  representative  of  the  British  Government  here,  if  I  desired 
any  exclusive  advantage  to  the  prejudice  of  any  foreigner,  and  still 
less  of  an  American  citizen." 

Nevertheless  the  British  consul  felt  it  to  be  his  duty 
to  enter  an  official  protest  to  the  proclamation  of  Cunning- 
ham in  which  the  British  claims  were  repudiated.  This 
protest,  with  the  explanatory  papers  was  referred  to  the 
British  minister  at  Hongkong,  and  by  him  it  was  referred 
to  the  Foreign  Office.  This  question  reached  London  for 
settlement  at  the  time  when  the  Perry  expedition  was  on 
its  way  to  Japan  and  American  influence  in  the  Far  East 
was  becoming  a  factor  in  international  affairs.  The  clouds 
which  foreshadowed  the  approach  of  the  Crimean  War  were 
already  gathering  over  Europe  and  the  American  people 
inclined  to  friendliness  with  Russia.     Great  Britain  could 


202  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

not  well  afford  to  add  fuel  to  the  fires  which  had  been 
kindled  in  Oregon  and  in  Nicaragua  a  few  years  before 
where  the  Americans  had  sometimes  assumed  a  very  bel- 
ligerent attitude.  How  much  these  considerations  weighed 
in  the  decision  it  is  impossible  to  say,  but  at  any  rate  the 
Foreign  Office  decided  to  recognize  the  American  contention 
at  Shanghai. 

The  Municipal  Code 

The  following  May  (1853),  Consul  Alcock  advised  Cun- 
ningham that  "Her  Majesty's  Government  have  no  desire 
whatever  to  assert  either  exclusive  right  or  jurisdiction  over 
the  unappropriated  land."  Alcock  thereupon  submitted  a 
draft  code  of  municipal  regulations  which,  if  accepted 
jointly  by  the  consuls  and  the  taotai  and  then  approved 
by  the  home  governments  of  the  treaty  powers,  would  have 
the  effect  of  converting  the  grant  originally  made  to  Cap- 
tain Balfour  into  a  grant  for  the  use  of  all  foreigners  under 
the  joint  control  and  supervision  of  the  consuls  and  the 
taotai. 

This  draft  code  was  immediately  submitted  to  U.  S. 
Commissioner  Marshall  who  suggested  a  number  of  amend- 
ments which  were  incorporated.  He  objected  to  the  pro- 
vision that  the  British  consulate  site,  a  tract  of  about  thirty 
acres,  should  be  exempt  from  taxation,  and  in  the  final 
draft  of  the  regulations  it  was  provided  that  "any  land  here- 
after acquired  by  the  governments  of  France  and  the  United 
States  of  America"  were  to  be  exempted  from  the  regula- 
tions, but  that  all  such  lands,  the  British  included,  would 
"bear  their  share  of  the  public  burdens." 

Marshall  also  objected  to  the  provision  which  required 
the  intervention  of  the  consul  in  the  transfer  of  land  from 
one  foreigner  to  another,  and  he  found  the  stipulation 
that  a  Chinese  proprietor  might  be  compelled  to  part  with 
his  land  at  a  price  to  be  fixed  by  the  consul  and  the  taotai 
to  be  'subversive  of  justice.'  In  one  other  respect  he  pro- 
posed to  curb  the  power  of  the  consuls  by  lodging  the 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  SHANGHAI  LAND  QUESTION  203 

authority  to  determine  the  extension  of  roads,  the  building 
of  wharves,  etc.,  in  a  committee  appointed  by  the  tax- 
payers. 

In  some  respects  the  most  notable  change  suggested  by 
Marshall,  the  more  remarkable  because  he  was  a  South- 
erner and  might  have  been  expected  to  possess  some  color 
prejudices,  was  in  the  provision  which  would  have  excluded 
the  Chinese  from  living  within  the  bounds  of  the  foreign 
settlement.  This  regulation  he  believed  to  be  "wholly  ob- 
jectionable as  creating  invidious  distinctions  against  the 
Chinese,  and  exercising  exactly  the  spirit  of  exclusiveness 
towards  them  which  we  now  complain  of  when  exercised 
towards  ourselves.  It  cannot  be  sound  policy  to  segregate 
the  populations,  and  instead  of  prohibiting  the  settlement 
of  Chinese  among  the  foreigners,  it  should  be  invited.  .  .  . 
Prejudices  will  only  give  way  before  long-continued  pleas- 
ant social  intercourse,  and  I  anticipate  great  effect  to  be 
produced  by  inviting  the  Chinese  gentlemen  to  live  among 
the  Americans  and  the  English."  The  regulations  as  finally 
adopted  did  not  exclude  the  Chinese,  merely  specifying  very 
carefully  the  kind  of  houses  which  coUld  be  erected,  with  a 
view  to  safeguarding  the  settlement  from  nuisances.  While 
the  admission  of  the  Chinese  to  the  settlement  in  years  to 
come  did  not  always  add  to  the  comfort  of  the  foreigners, 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  city  thus  created  and  governed 
exercised  a  profound  influence  on  China,  just  as  the  Ameri- 
can commissioner  predicted. 

The  most  significant  feature  of  the  proposed  regulations 
was  the  definite  and  repeated  acknowledgment  of  Chinese 
sovereign  rights  to  the  land.  The  Chinese  Government  was 
to  receive  a  small  annual  tax,  and  deeds  were  to  be  sealed  by 
the  Chinese  authorities.  While  the  foreigners  were  to  be 
permitted  to  form  a  municipal  government  of  their  own,  the 
source  of  the  authority  by  which  this  was  to  be  accomplished 
was  the  Chinese  Government.  The  rights  of  China  as  well 
as  of  the  foreigners  were  protected. 

The  importance  of  this  question  to  American  interests 
on  the  China  coast  was  considered  by  Commissioner  Mar- 


204  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

shall  to  be  very  great  politically  as  well  as  commercially. 
He  pointed  out  to  Secretary  of  State  Marcy: 

"It  may  be  considered  a  matter  of  importance  to  tlie  fjovernynent, 
as  connected  with  the  future  rehition.s  of  Shanjihai  with  the  Western 
terminus  of  a  Pacific  railroad;  for  I  have  no  bind  of  a  doubt  that 
Shanghai  is  destined  to  become  the  greatest  city  of  Easteim  Asia, 
and  most  intimately  of  all  connected  with  America.  These  regula- 
tions will  have  a  direct  effect  upon  her  future  fortunes." 

Final  Settlement  of  a  Vexed  Question 

The  final  settlement  of  the  land  question  and  the  incep- 
tion of  a  municipal  government  along  the  lines  which  had 
been  approved  by  the  Chinese  authorities  and  the  several 
governments  concerned  was  reported  to  Secretary  of  State 
IVIarcy  by  Commissioner  McLane  in  July  of  the  following 
year.^ 

"This  system,"  wrote  McLane,  "is  now  in  full  operation,  and  it  is 
respected  by  all.  I  think  it  has  the  necessary  strength  to  command 
that  respect  when,  from  any  cause,  it  may  cease  to  be  voluntarily 
rendered.  .  ,  . 

"These  arrangements,  are  of  a  very  comprehensive  character, 
securing  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  the  foreign  settlement  at 
Shanghai,  and  the  lives,  property  and  commercial  privileges  of  our 
people;  while  they  render  it  impossible  for  any  foreign  power  to 
obtain  an  undue  ascendancy. 

"The  land  regulations,  signed  by  the  ministers  of  the  three  treaty 
powers,  renounce  the  pretensions  heretofore  set  up  by  Great  Britain 
and  France  to  the  exclusive  enjoyment  of  certain  concessions  made  to 
them  respectively  by  the  local  authorities  of  China,  and  all  foreigners 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  their  respective  consuls  enjoy  the  same 
privileges ;  the  concurrent  and  joint  action  of  the  consuls  and  the 
local  authorities  of  China  having  established  a  fundamental  basis 
on  which  the  rights  and  privileges  of  all  are  firmly  planted." 

While  the  Shanghai  land  question  has  been  treated  here 
as  though  it  were  an  isolated  episode  in  the  international 
relations  of  China,  the  full  significance  of  it,  both  as  related 
to  the  relations  of  China  with  the  powers  and  also  to  the 
development  of  American  policy  in  the  Empire  can  only  be 
appreciated  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  final  settlement 
of  the  question  was  being  undertaken  at  the  time  when  there 
were  also  up  for  discussion  two  other  matters  of  the  highest 


SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  SHANGHAI  LAND  QUESTION  205 

importance;  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  Taiping 
rebels,  and,  the  question  of  the  payment  of  duties  at  Shang- 
hai after  the  capture  of  the  city  by  the  rebels, — a  situation 
which  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  foreign  inspector- 
ate of  the  Chinese  maritime  customs. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  most  extended  and  coherent  account  of  the  early  history  of 

the  Shanghai  kind  question  is  to  be  found  in  the  Marshall 
Correspondence.  H.  Doc.  123:33-1,  Dispatch  No.  23,  July  20, 
1853.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  this  document  is  followed  in 
the  ensuing  narrative.  See  also  Historic  Shanghai,  by  C.  A. 
Montalto  de  Jesus,  pp.  38-43. 

2.  Chinese  Repository,  June,  1849,  p.  332. 

3.  China  Dispatches,  Vol.  4. 

4.  China  Dispatches,  Vol.  5,  Davis  to  Secy,  of  State,  May  21,  1849. 

5.  Morse,  Vol.  1,  p.  349. 

6.  Chinese  Repository,  June,   1849. 

7.  Morse,  Vol.  1,  p.  349. 

8.  McLane  Correspondence,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  22  :35-2,  p.  123. 


CHAPTER  XI 
HUMPHEEY  MAESIIALL  AND  THE  TAIPING  EEBELLION 

The  personal  character  of  so  much  of  the  American 
policy  in  Asia  is  well  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Humphrey 
Marshall.  Marshall  had  been  chosen  for  the  post  only  after 
it  had  been  formally  offered  to  three  others  and  informally 
proposed  to  even  more  and  by  all  declined.  He  was  not 
admirably  fitted  for  the  duties  of  diplomacy;  he  was  auto- 
cratic, dictatorial,  pitifully  vain,  and  gifted  with  singular 
capacities  for  controversy,  yet  intellectually  he  was  an  able 
man.  In  those  days  communication  with  China  was  so  slow 
that  the  commissioner  could  never  hope  to  receive  precise 
instructions,  and  Marshall,  because  of  the  ignorance  of 
Washington  as  to  the  rapid  turn  of  events,  and  because  the 
Pierce  administration  was  just  entering  upon  office,  was  left 
largely  to  his  own  devices.  Yet  it  happened  that  his  term  of 
service  coincided  with  what  must  be  regarded  as  one  of  the 
two  or  three  most  critical  years  of  the  last  century  in  the 
history  of  China.  It  fell  therefore  to  the  lot  of  Marshall, 
uninstructed,  unaided,  and  even  unappreciated,  to  make  a 
most  important  contribution  to  American  policy.  To  Mar- 
shall the  United  States  owed  the  (Uscovery  of  the  truth  that 
the  weakness,  or  dissolution,  of  China,  was  a  matter  of  na- 
tional concern  to  the  United  States,  and  that  the  true  policy 
of  the  American  Government  must  be  to  strengthen  and  sus- 
tain the  Chinese  Government  against  either  internal  dis- 
order or  foreign  aggression. 

In  1853  the  Cushing  policy  to  consign  American  inter- 
ests to  the  protection  of  China  as  a  sovereign  power  was  in 
immanent  danger  of  shipwreck,  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Government  of  China  was  threatened  with  dissolution  in 
the  Taiping  Rebellion.     Boldly,  alone,  in  the  face  of  con- 

206 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  207 

trary  instructions  and  popular  opinion,  Marshall  laid  down 
the  second  plank  in  the  platform  of  American  policy — "the 
highest  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved  in  sus- 
taining China/' 

The  Taiping  Rebellion  must  be  reckoned  as  one  of  the 
most  important  wars  of  the  nineteenth  century  when  meas- 
ured by  the  number  of  people  whose  destinies  were  involved, 
the  loss  of  life — S.  Wells  Williams  gave  the  estimate  that 
fully  20,000,000  lives  were  destroyed  ^ — and  by  the  princi- 
ples of  action  adopted  by  the  foreign  powers.  The  success 
of  the  Taipings  would  have  meant  the  destruction  of  the 
Manchu  Government  and  the  separation  of  the  great  empire 
into  parts.  The  break-up  of  the  empire  in  the  middle  of 
the  last  century  could  have  resulted  within  a  few  years  in 
nothing  short  of  the  dismemberment  of  China  by  foreign 
powers. 

Growth  of  the  Rebellion 

Like  other  popular  revolutionary  movements,  the  rebel- 
lion grew  out  of  the  political,  economic  and  social  condi- 
tions of  the  day.  There  was  increasing  corruption  in  and 
consequent  increasing  hatred  of  the  Manchu  Government. 
Its  defeat  in  the  Anglo-Chinese  War  had  proved  the  Impe- 
rial power  to  be  a  hollow  sham,  unable  to  repel  the  foreigner, 
unable  to  stop  the  opium  trade,  impotent  also  to  control  its 
own  soldiery.  The  advance  of  the  foreign  trader  and  mis- 
sionary within  the  empire  had  been  accompanied  by  dis- 
integrating influences  upon  the  old  religions  and  customs. 
China  was  ripe  for  revolution,  the  fuel  piled  high  awaiting 
only  the  torch  in  the  hand  of  some  aggressive,  popular  and 
able  leader.  That  leader  proved  to  be  Hung-Siu-tshuen,  a 
native  of  a  village  thirty  miles  from  Canton,  who  had  moved 
to  the  Province  of  Kwangsi  to  become  a  school  teacher. 

Hung-Siu-tshuen  was  a  four-times  disappointed  aspirant 
at  the  triennial  examinations  at  Canton.  In  1829,  at  the 
age  of  sixteen,  and  then  successively  in  1833,  1837,  and 
1843  he  had  come  down  to  the  provincial  city  from  his 
village  where  his  record  as  a  scholar  had  been  exceptional, 


208  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

only  to  fail  in  the  higher  examinations.  He  was  defeated, 
so  he  believed,  by  corrupt  officials.  But  Hung  was  more 
than  a  defeated  candidate ;  he  was  a  pathological  case  such 
as  one  would  not  be  surprised  to  find  in  India,  but  in  stoical, 
common-sense  China,  is  most  unusual — a  sort  of  Chinese 
Mahomet,  or  Mad  Mullah,  After  his  third  attempt  at  the 
examinations  he  returned  home  in  great  depression  of  spirit 
and  sank  into  a  delirious  illness  which  is  reported  to  have 
lasted  forty  days.  During  this  brief  period,  though  never 
subsequently  so  far  as  is  known,  he  became  subject  to 
cataleptic  fits,  and  in  his  deliriums  had  visions  of  a  more  or 
less  religious  nature.^ 

While  at  Canton  in  1837  he  had  purchased  some  tracts — 
"Good  Words  to  Exhort  the  Age" — from  Liang  A-fah,  their 
author,  a  colporteur  of  the  London  Missionary  Society. 
These  tracts  "consisted  of  sixty-eight  short  chapters  upon 
common  topics,  selected  from  the  Bible."  He  took  them 
home  but  when  he  discovered  that  they  advocated  Chris- 
tianity, he  put  them  aside  as  teaching  a  forbidden  subject. 
Ten  years  later,  upon  the  recommendation  of  his  brother- 
in-law,  he  read  them  and  thought  that  he  found  in  their 
pages  a  clue  to  the  meaning  of  the  visions  which  had  come 
to  him  in  his  illness.  He  accepted  the  doctrine,  added  to  it 
as  necessary  to  support  his  fanatical  fancies,  announced 
himself  as  the  brother  of  Jesus  Christ,  interpreted  the  phrase 
Kingdom  of  God  to  mean  China,  proclaimed  his  mission  and 
began  to  exhort  people  to  adopt  Christianity  as  he  under- 
stood and  construed  it  with  the  meagre  assistance  of  Liang 
A-fah's  tracts.  The  next  year  in  company  with  some  dis- 
ciples, he  went  to  the  mountains  of  eastern  Kwangsi,  and 
two  years  later,  having  heard  of  the  Rev.  Issachar  J. 
Roberts,  an  American  Baptist  missionary  at  Canton,  he  left 
disciples  in  charge  of  the  preaching,  and  journeyed  to  Can- 
ton to  enroll  himself  as  a  pupil  of  Roberts. 

Roberts "  appears  in  the  early  records  of  American  mis- 
sionary work  in  Canton  as  an  extremely  aggressive,  and 
somewhat  uncouth  southerner,  who  labored  with  fanatical 
zeal.    The  extent  of  his  influence  on  Hung  may  not  have 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  209 

been  very  great,  for  the  latter  remained  with  him  only  two 
months,  not  long  enough  to  win  Roberts'  confidence  to  the 
point  where  the  missionary  was  willing  to  receive  him  into 
the  church,  and  yet  Hung  seems  to  have  remembered  Rob- 
erts with  respect  for  in  1853,  when  the  Taipings  were  estab- 
lished in  Nanking,  he  sent  for  his  old  teacher  to  come  to 
Nanking  "to  assist  in  establishing  the  truth."  Roberts  was 
unable  to  accept  this  invitation,  perhaps  because  the  Ameri- 
can commissioner  sternly  forbade  it,'*  and  because  of  the 
difficulty  in  reaching  the  Taiping  capital.  But  soon  after 
1800  Roberts  spent  fifteen  months  at  Nanking  where  he 
lived,  invested  with  yellow  robes  and  a  crown,  in  a  house 
suitably  furnished  and  provided  by  the  Taiping  emperor. 

The  course  of  the  rebellion  from  the  return  of  Hung 
from  his  visit  to  Roberts  in  1846,  can  be  sketched  here  only 
briefly.  At  first  it  amounted  only  to  a  religious  movement, 
the  establishment  of  "Associations  for  Worshipping  God," 
in  the  villages  of  Kwangsi.  These  associations  were  re- 
garded as  treasonable,  since  only  the  emperor  could  worship 
God.  Hung,  however,  proved  a  popular  leader,  drew  about 
him  some  able  lieutenants,  and  as  the  movement  grew  in 
popularity,  and  as  the  opposition  of  the  government  in- 
creased, it  took  on  more  and  more  the  dimensions  of  a 
political  and  military  as  well  as  religious  campaign.  Its 
cardinal  purpose  became  the  expulsion  of  the  Manchus. 
Its  military  successes  were  due  to  its  able  leadership,  its 
fanatical  enthusiasm,  rigid  discipline,  and  to  the  rottenness 
of  Peking  military  affairs. 

Sweeping  up  over  the  mountains  north  of  Kwangsi  into 
Hunan  and  Kiangsi,  gathering  the  discontented  and  des- 
perate as  the  successful  armies  passed  by,  the  Taipings 
reached  the  Yangtze  at  the  end  of  1852,  and,  traveling  down 
the  river,  captured  Nanking  in  March,  1853.  By  this  time 
Hung  seems  fully  to  have  realized  the  strength  which  his 
religious  vagaries  could  lend  to  his  political  ambitions,  and 
the  orders  handed  down  to  his  subordinates  were  now  issued 
in  the  form  of  'revelations.'  The  Taipings  crossed  the 
Yangtze  and  marched  northward  towards  Peking,  reaching 


210  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

a  place  only  twenty  miles  from  Tientsin,  and  also  spread- 
ing westward  through  the  adjoining  provinces.  But  they 
were  soon  forced  to  retire,  not  so  much  because  of  defeats 
suffered  as  because  of  over-extended  lines,  too  far  removed 
from  the  base  which  had  been  established  on  the  Yangtze. 
At  Nanking,  Hung  was  proclaimed  by  his  army  Emperor 
of  the  Tai  (Great)  Ping  (Peace)  Chao  (Dynasty) — hence 
the  term  Taiping,  which  the  Europeans  adopted  for  the 
rebellion — and  settled  down  to  perfect  his  organization  and 
court,  the  master  of  almost  the  entire  Yangtze  Valley  from 
below  Nanking  westward  six  hundred  miles  to  Ichang. 

The  Dilemma  Presented  to  the  Foreigners 

The  phenomenal  success  of  the  rebels,  and  the  quasi- 
Christian  character  of  the  movement  began  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  world.  The  Roman  Catholic  missionaries, 
whose  influence  in  France  was  paramount,  were  always 
opposed  to  the  rebels  because  of  their  iconoclastic  practices 
and  their  Protestant  doctrines,  but  the  Protestant  mission- 
aries, for  the  most  part,  hailed  the  movement  with  enthusi- 
asm, believing  that  they  saw  returning  to  them  the  bread 
which  they  had  for  years  been  casting  on  the  waters.  The 
glowing  accounts  of  the  rebellion  which  reached  England 
and  America  through  missionary  channels  created  a  strong 
public  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  Taipings.  By  many  they 
were  looked  upon  as  a  rising  Christian  power  in  the  pagan 
East  destined  to  become  the  providential  agency  in  the 
conversion  of  Asia.  The  movement  attracted  the  interest, 
also,  of  the  foreign  governments  and  of  the  foreigners  in 
China  engaged  in  trade.^ 

The  relation  between  the  foreign  powers  and  the  Chinese 
Government  was  rapidly  reaching  a  critical  stage  in  1853 
when  the  Taipings  were  in  the  flood-tide  of  their  first 
successes.  The  grievances  of  the  foreigners  were,  briefly: 
(1)  The  mercantile  community,  especially  the  English,  was 
thoroughly  discontented  with  the  commercial  privileges  of 
the  treaties.    Hongkong,  as  a  commercial  center,  had  been 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TATPING  REBELLION  211 

an  indifferent  success.  Amoy,  Foochow  and  Ningpo  had 
been  disappointments.  There  was  a  general  feeling  that 
nothing  less  than  the  complete  opening  of  China  to  foreign 
trade  would  be  satisfactory,  (2)  The  failure  to  secure  the 
legalization  of  the  opium  trade  was  irritating  to  those  en- 
gaged in  it,  casting  over  them  the  evil  reputation  of  smug- 
glers although  the  trade  was  openly  connived  at  by  the 
Chinese  officials.  (3)  The  Chinese  had  been  able,  while 
keeping  the  letter  of  the  treaty  to  render  nugatory  many 
of  its  provisions  both  as  to  trade  and  diplomatic  intercourse. 
The  city  of  Canton  remained  implacable,  its  gates  closed,  its 
populace  sullen  and  insulting,  its  governor  general  who  was 
also  the  viceroy  delegated  to  conduct  the  foreign  relations 
of  the  Empire,  incommunicado  so  far  as  the  foreign  min- 
isters were  concerned.  Viceroy  Yeh,  acting  under  orders 
from  Peking  as  was  afterwards  revealed,  absolutely  refused 
to  hold  personal  interviews  with  the  ministers,  (4)  The 
reign  of  the  new  Emporer  who  had  ascended  the  throne  in 
1850  was  seen  to  be  marked  by  a  pronounced  anti-foreign 
feeling,  (5)  The  Chinese  Government  had  shown  a  dis- 
position to  evade  the  settlement  of  claims  due  to  infractions 
of  the  treaty  and  to  lack  of  protection  offered  to  foreigners. 

Both  the  Americans  and  the  English  were,  by  1853, 
agreed  that  the  treaties  of  1842-4  must  be  revised.  Not- 
withstanding differences  of  opinion  in  matters  of  detail  the 
foreigners  were  being  drawn  together  by  the  obvious  fact 
that  the  Chinese  had  no  intention  whatever,  except  under 
strong  compulsion,  of  revising  the  treaties  at  all,  much  less 
of  making  large  concessions  to  either  the  governments  or 
the  commercial  interests. 

To  this  list  of  general  grievances  were  added  in  1853  the 
disturbances  of  trade  at  Canton  and  Shanghai  arising  from 
the  disorders  of  the  Rebellion.  The  Imperial  Government 
was  showing  itself  to  be  utterly  unable  to  maintain  order, 
and  this  fact  was  brought  home  to  the  foreigners  with 
peculiar  force  when,  September  7,  1853,  Shanghai  itself  was 
wrested  from  the  imperial  control  by  a  band  of  rebels.  For 
months  the  question  had  been  arising  whether,  in  the  face 


212  AMERICA>^S  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  these  facts,  it  would  not  be  the  part  of  wisdom  for  the 
foreign  powers  to  turn  to  the  Taipings,  recognize  them,  give 
them  the  necessary  support  in  return  for  guarantees  of 
friendly  treatment  thereafter,  and  seize  the  opportunity  to 
do  away  with  the  troublesome  Manchu  dynasty. 

"I  hope  Tien-Teh"  (the  rebel  chief),  wrote  a  member  of 
the  house  of  Russell  and  Company  at  Shanghai  to  Hum- 
phrey Marshall  March  13,  1853,*^  "will  be  successful  and 
upset  the  present  dynasty.  We  cannot  be  worse  off ;  and  he 
is  said  to  be  a  liberal  man."  This  expression  is  fairly 
characteristic  of  the  prevailing  public  sentiment  although 
some  of  the  conservatives  were  more  hesitant.  The  North 
American  Review  carried  an  article  (July,  1854,  p. 199)  on 
the  rebellion  in  which  the  advantages  to  foreigners  of  a 
breaking  up  of  China  were  pointed  out  in  the  following 
paragraph : 

"Unwittingly  to  himself  [Tien-Teh]  perhaps,  he  will  teach  us 
where  to  introduce  the  wedge,  where  to  rest  the  lever ;  and  it  will  not 
be  many  years  ere  we  find  European  influence,  hitherto  so  powerless 
in  the  high  exclusive  walls  of  the  palace  of  Peking,  operating  with 
wonderful  force  at  the  courts  of  a  score  of  kingdoms,  petty  in  com- 
parison with  the  great  aggregate  of  which  they  once  formed  a  part, 
and  all  jealous  of,  if  not  divided  against,  each  other." 

President  Pierce  in  his  annual  message  December  5, 
1853,  appears  to  have  had  such  a  hope.    He  said : 

"The  condition  of  China  at  this  time  renders  it  probable  that  some 
important  changes  will  occur  in  that  vast  Empire  which  will  lead  to 
a  more  imrestricted  intercourse  with  it.  The  commissioner  to  that 
country  who  has  been  recently  appointed  is  instructed  to  avail  himself 
of  all  occasions  to  open  and  extend  our  commercial  relations,  not  only 
with  the  Empire  of  China,  but  with  other  Asiatic  nations."  ' 

It  was  very  generally  believed  that,  quite  aside  from  the 
fact  of  whether  the  rebellion  would  be  a  benefit,  its  success 
was  assured.  "I  think  I  may  safely  say,"  wrote  Marshall  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  April  28,  1853,  ''that  from  all  I  can 
learn  the  Government  of  China  is  fully  employed  by  the 
rebels,  and  that  any  day  may  bring  forth  the  fruits  of  suc- 
cessful revolution,  in  the  utter  overthrow  of  the  existing 
dynasty."  ^    Five  weeks  later  he  addressed  to  the  Secretary 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  213 

of  State  a  request  for  specific  instructions  as  to  the  policy  to 
be  pursued  in  case  the  further  success  of  the  rebels  raised  the 
question  as  to  whom  the  customs  dues  should  be  paid.  This 
inquiry  was  especially  pertinent  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it 
was  the  policy  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to 
recognize  de  facto  governments.'* 

Washington  was  entirely  without  information  such  as 
would  enable  the  government  to  issue  specific  instructions  to 
Marshall.  The  favorable  opportunity  offered  by  the  rebel- 
lion for  the  foreign  powers  to  advance  their  interests  was 
pointed  out  to  the  Department  of  State  by  the  British  min- 
ister, and  its  obvious  yet  superficial  advantages  were  recog- 
nized. That  was  the  'heydey  of  the  filibuster'  in  American 
foreign  policy,  characterized  by  no  fine  moral  distinctions  or 
sense  of  duty  towards  weak  yet  sovereign  states,  but  China 
was  too  far  away  for  American  filibustering.  The  British 
desired  American  cooperation  in  the  Far  East,  but  President 
Pierce  and  Secretary  of  State  Marcy  were  wary.  In  June, 
1853,  Marcy  wrote  to  Marshall  that  he  had  been  apprised 
that  Great  Britain  intended  to  avail  itself  of  the  present  con- 
ditions in  China  to  obtain  'increased  facilities  of  intercourse,' 
not  exclusively  for  its  own  subjects,  but  for  all  nations.  It 
had  been  suggested  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  send  to  its  commissioner  such  instructions  as  would 
"empower  him  to  take  such  a  course  in  conjunction  with 
H.  M.  Plenipotentiary  as  will  be  calculated  to  turn  to  the 
best  account  the  opportunity  offered  by  the  present  crisis  to 
open  the  Chinese  Empire  generally  to  the  commercial  enter- 
prise of  all  the  civilized  nations  of  the  world." 

"The  end  proposed  commends  itself  to  the  approval  of 
che  President,"  wrote  Marcy,  who  requested  Marshall  to  do 
what  he  could  in  that  direction,  remembering  that  the  treaty 
stipulations  must  be  respected  and  the  settled  American 
policy  of  non-interference  in  the  contests  which  arise  be- 
tween the  people  and  their  rulers  must  be  observed.  Marcy 
suggested  that  without  departure  from  these  rules  of  con- 
duct it  might  be  possible  to  do  much  in  such  a  crises  "as  does 
or  may  exist  in  China  to  cause  an  abandonment  of  the 


214  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

unwise  restrictions  imposed  by  China  upon  foreign  inter- 
course." However,  without  knowing  what  course  the  British 
authorities  might  deem  it  expedient  to  take  in  furtherance 
of  the  object  in  view,  the  President  "does  not  enjoin  upon 
you  cooperation  but  only  cordial  relations  and  free  confer- 
ence with  them."  ^^ 

Marshall  received  no  further  instructions  on  the  subject 
but  the  opportunist  policy  of  Marcy  may  be  judged  from  the 
instructions  to  McLane,  the  newly  appointed  commissioner. 
McLane  was  vested  'with  large  discretionary  powers'  be- 
cause of  the  disturbance  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion.  If  China 
should  be  divided  and  several  governments  organized, 
McLane  was  to  present  himself  to  each  as  the  diplomatic 
representative  of  the  United  States  and  make  such  treaties 
as  he  thought  wise.^^ 

Marshall  Becomes  Suspicious  of  British  Designs 

The  policy  of  the  British  Government  which  had  been 
vaguely  outlined  to  Marcy  by  the  British  minister  in  Wash- 
ington assumed  in  China  what  appeared  to  Marshall  to  be 
sinister  aspects.    On  May  30  he  reported  to  Marcy:  ^- 

"The  British  minister  has  been  to  Nanking.  His  interpreter  has 
revisited  it  since  the  departure  of  Sir  George  Bonham  for  Honkong. 
He  goes  to  find  out  'what  the  rebels  are  about,'  and  his  intercourse 
with  their  camp  and  their  princes  has  served  to  awaken  in  his  bosom 
the  warmest  sympathy  in  their  cause!  The  long  articles  in  the  late 
numbers  of  the  North  CJilna  Herald  are  attributed  to  Mr.  Meadow's 
pen.  His  position  in  the  legation  of  Great  Britain,  his  fluency  in 
speaking  and  writing  the  Chinese  language,  lend  every  op])ortunity 
of  assuming  the  protectorate  of  tJte  young  power  to  Great  Britain,  at 
least  so  far  as  to  mould  its  first  steps  to  suit  the  policy  of  that  govern- 
ment. The  vigilance  of  England  will  be  nothing  strange  to  commu- 
nicate to  the  Secretary  of  State.  The  apprehension  I  have  is,  that 
Great  Britain  may  obtain  the  opening  of  a  western  Chinese  port 
(iidand)  from  the  new  Emperor  at  Nanking,  and  the  right  to  navigate 
the  Yangtse  Kiang  closed  to  foreign  commerce  beyond  the  existing 
port  of  entry.  I  dp  not  doubt  that  with  that  view  her  war  with 
Burmah  has  been  waged  and  her  Indian  Empire  extended.  The 
portage  from  the  Irrawaddy  to  the  Yangtse  Kiang  is  very  short  [sic]. 
I  suggest  these  considerations  to  you  frankly,  because  they  seem  to 
me  to  point  out  the  propriety  of  preparation  to  assume  the  part  the 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  215 

United  States  mvy  find  it  politic  to  take  in  face  of  an  event  now  so 
likely  as  the  dismemberment  of  the  empire." 

Six  weeks  later  rumor  had  it  that  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment had  asked  for  assistance,*  and  that  the  Czar  of  Russia 
had  already  promised  the  necessary  aid. 

"Her  assistance,"  wrote  Marshall,  "would  probably  end  in  passing 
China  imder  a  Russian  protectorate,  and  in  the  extension  of  Russian 
limits  to  the  Hoangho,  or  the  mouth  of  the  Yangtse;  or,  it  may  be, 
when  circumstances  and  policy  shall  favor  the  scheme,  in  the  parti- 
tion of  China  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia.  The  interference 
of  the  Czar  would  readily  suppress  the  rebellion,  by  driving  the  rebels 
from  the  great  highways  of  commerce,  and  from  the  occupation  of 
the  towns  on  the  seaboard.  Whatever  might  be  the  ultimate  com- 
pensation demanded  by  Russia  for  this  timely  service,  China  could 
not  resist  its  collection."  " 

Marshall  then  went  on  to  say,  with  a  wisdom  which 
stood  the  test  of  time : 

"I  think  that  almost  any  sacrifice  should  be  made  by  the  United 
States  to  keep  Russia  from  spreading  her  Pacific  boundary,  and  to 
avoid  her  coming  directly  to  interference  in  Chinese  domestic  affairs; 
for  China  is  like  a  lamb  before  the  shearers,  as  easy  a  conquest  as  were 
the  provinces  of  India.  Whenever  the  avarice  or  the  ambition  of 
Russia  or  Great  Britain  shall  tempt  them  to  make  the  prizes,  the  fate 
of  Asia  will  be  sealed,  and  the  future  Chinese  relations  with  the 
United  States  may  be  considered  as  closed  for  ages,  imless  noiv  the 
United  States  shall  foil  the  vmtoward  result  by  adopting  a  sound 
policy." 

The  Commissioner  adds  a  concluding  sentence  which 
may  be  taken  as  his  summary  of  what  he  conceived  to  be 
the  true  American  policy  in  the  Far  East. 

"It  is  my  opinion  that  the  highest  interests  of  the  United  States 
are  involved  in  sustaining  China — maintaining  order  here,  and  gradu- 
ally engrafting  on  this  worn-out  stock  the  healthy  principles  which 
give  life  and  health  to  governments,  rather  than  to  see  China  become 
the  theatre  of  widespread  anarchy,  and  ultimately  the  prey  of  Euro- 
pean ambition." 

While  Marshall  did  not  again  allude  to  the  dangers  of 
Russian  aggression,  his  fears  possibly  having  been  aroused 

♦On  May  6,  1853,  Commodore  Perry  was  asked  by  the  Shanghai  officials  to 
assist  in  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion.'* 


216  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

by  a  false  rumor,  he  immediately  began  to  turn  his  atten- 
tion to  measures  which  would  thwart  any  sinister  designs 
which  might  be  entertained  by  England.  His  course  was 
clear.  In  the  face  of  the  prevailing  sympathy  for  the  Tai- 
pings,  a  sympathy  which  reached  even  from  the  United 
States  and  which  prompted  severe  criticism  of  him  when  his 
policy  became  known,  and  in  the  face  of  contrary  instruc- 
tions from  his  government,  Marshall  set  himself  to  do  every- 
thing he  possibly  could  to  support  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment. For  the  moment  this  was  not  much.  He  had  quar- 
relled with  Commodore  Perry  who  was  then  wholly  preoccu- 
pied with  his  expedition  to  Japan,  and  Perry  had  withdrawn 
from  all  cooperation  with  him.  The  capture  of  Shanghai  by 
rebel  bands  on  the  7th  of  September,  however,  precipitated  a 
situation  in  which  Marshall  proceeded  to  apply  his  policy  of 
upholding  the  Imperial  authority  with  all  the  limited  means 
at  his  disposal.  The  action  of  the  Britsh  authorities  in  the 
weeks  immediately  following  the  fall  of  the  city  seemed  to 
Marshall  to  confirm  his  fears.  We  are  thus  led  to  a  consid- 
eration of  the  different  policies  of  the  American  and  the 
English  authorities  after  the  fall  of  Shanghai  both  in  the 
payment  of  the  customs  dues  and  in  the  protection  of  the 
foreign  settlement. 

The  walled  city  of  Shanghai  came  into  the  possession  of 
a  band  of  rebels,  who  professed  more  or  less  close  connec- 
tion with  the  Taipings,  on  the  7th  of  September,  1853.  The 
customs  house  which  was  in  the  foreign  settlement  was 
attacked  by  the  rabble  who  took  advantage  of  the  disorder 
to  loot.  That  evening  the  British  authorities,  declaring  that 
a  condition  of  anarchy  existed,  placed  a  guard  over  the  cus- 
toms house,  and  also  at  the  bridges  over  the  Yang  King 
Pang,  the  creek  which  flowed  between  the  walled  city  and 
the  foreign  settlement.  In  the  placing  of  these  guards  the 
Americans  were  not  consulted. 

The  flight  of  the  officers  of  the  Imperial  Customs  from 
their  post  of  duty  immediately  created  the  question  of 
whether  the  foreigners  ought  to  be  expected  to  continue  to 
pay  customs  dues,  and  if  they  were  to  pay  them,  how  and 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  217 

to  whom  they  could  be  paid.  Upon  these  points  there  was 
at  once  a  difference  of  opinion.  Merchants  argued  that  as 
the  Imperial  Government  was  no  longer  discharging  its 
obligation  to  protect  them,  and  was  not  even  supplying 
customs  officials  to  receive  the  dues,  they  ought  to  be  re- 
lieved of  the  obligation  of  paying.  Others,  among  whom 
Marshall  was  most  conspicuous,  argued  that  the  foreigners 
were  by  no  means  relieved  of  such  an  obligation,  and  that 
if,  through  the  failure  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  pro- 
tect them,  any  foreigners  suffered  loss,  the  treaty  provided 
that  the  foreigners  might  make  claims  for  the  losses  sus- 
tained, and  collect  from  the  government.  If  on  the  other 
hand,  the  foreigners  repudiated  the  Imperial  Government 
by  refusing  to  pay  the  duties,  Marshall  arg-ued  that  certainly 
they  would  have  no  grounds  for  claims  against  the  gov- 
ernment. 

The  day  following  the  fall  of  the  city  Mr.  Rutherford 
Alcock  and  Mr.  Edward  Cunningham,  the  British  consul 
and  American  vice  consul,  held  a  conference  and  agreed  to 
issue  orders  to  their  nationals,  respectively,  stating  that 
during  the  absence  of  the  Imperial  customs  officers,  they, 
the  consuls,  would  collect  the  duties  for  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, according  to  the  treaties.  There  was,  however,  a 
difference  between  the  methods  to  be  employed.  The  Eng- 
lish consul  required  only  that  the  merchants  deposit  at  the 
consulate  promissory  notes  which  were  to  be  held,  pending 
the  decision  of  the  Foreign  Office  in  London,  as  to  whether 
the  British  merchants  were  actually  to  redeem  the  notes. 
It  was  freely  predicted  that  the  Foreign  Office  would  decide 
against  the  Chinese  Government  and  that  the  notes  would 
be  returned,  as  in  fact  they  were,  a  year  later.  The  xAmeri- 
cans  on  the  other  hand  were  ordered  to  pay  their  duties  at 
the  consulate  in  specie.  The  American  merchants,  by  the 
decree  of  the  American  consul,  who  was  firmly  supported 
by  the  American  Commissioner,  were  thus  placed  under  a 
severe  handicap  with  reference  to  their  British  competitors. 
The  one  paid  duties  in  notes  of  doubtful  value;  the  other 
paid  in  cash.    A  still  further  element  of  confusion  was  in- 


218  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

jected  into  the  situation  by  the  fact  that  the  merchants 
of  nations  unrepresented  by  consuls  in  Shanghai,  recognized 
no  obligations  whatever  to  pay  the  duties  when  there  were 
no  officers  to  collect  them.  In  fact  the  very  day  that  Alcock 
and  Cunningham  issued  their  orders,  the  Prussian  ship 
Adler  departed,  merely  recording  a  simple  guarantee  that 
the  duties  would  be  paid  in  case  they  were  required  at  some 
future  date — very  different  from  a  promissory  note,  and 
wholly  different  from  cash  payments.  Subsequently  other 
ships  of  nations  unrepresented  by  consuls  departed  without 
even  a  promise  to  pay. 

The  British  authorities  then  took  the  position  that  the 
Imperial  authorities  should  not  be  permitted  to  resume  the 
collection  of  the  customs  until  the  Imperial  authorities  had 
retaken  the  walled  city.  However,  the  British  authorities 
had  also  declared  that  the  foreign  settlement  must  remain 
in  strict  neutrality  in  the  conflict  between  the  rebels  and 
the  Imperialists,  and  that  no  troops,  not  even  Imperial 
troops,  should  be  permitted  to  enter  the  foreign  settlement. 
At  the  same  time  the  foreigners  in  the  settlement  were 
known  to  be  not  merely  openly  sympathizing  with  the 
rebels  in  the  city,  but  also  to  be  supplying  them  with  am- 
munition, Marshall,  on  the  other  hand,  recognized  the 
establishment  of  a  new  imperial  customs  house  although  it 
proved  to  be  only  some  old  junks  moored  in  the  river  below 
the  foreign  settlement. 

The  Americans  again  protested  against  the  unequal 
burdens  placed  upon  them  by  Marshall's  decisions,  but  INIar- 
shall  stubbornly  refused  to  yield,  asserting  that  the  treaty 
was  still  in  force,  and  that  if  they  suffered  losses  the  Chinese 
Government  would  be  liable  for  damages. 

Probably  realizing  that  sooner  or  later  an  explanation  to 
the  State  Department  would  be  required  for  this  ruling 
which  was  so  ruinous  to  American  merchants,  Marshall 
made  his  reasons  the  subject  of  a  long  dispatch.'^  The 
American  Commissioner's  controlling  motive  was  to  thwart 
what  appeared  to  him  to  be  the  aggressive  designs  of  Great 
Britain. 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  219 

"I  believe  that  were  Great  Britain  assured,"  he  wrote,  "tliat  the 
United  States  would  not  interfere  in  behalf  of  China,  she  would  seize 
and  hold  this  city  permanently,  and  thus  command  the  valley  of  the 
Yangtse — the  richest  probably  in  the  world.  I  believe  she  will  yet 
do  it,  unless  she  shall  be  advised  that  such  usurpation  would  provoke 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  to  whom  such  a  coup 
d'etat  would  be  a  national  calamity." 

In  support  of  this  conviction  Marshall  submitted  some 
facts  in  addition  to  those  which  have  already  been  enu- 
merated. The  British  Government,  he  maintained,  with  the 
cooperation  of  the  French,  were  at  that  moment  exercising 
the  rights  of  sovereignty  on  Chinese  territory,  and  without 
sufficient  excuse  or  reason.  Not  only  was  the  foreign  settle- 
ment being  guarded  by  their  marines  at  a  time  when  a  guard 
seemed  to  him  so  unnecessary  that  he  had  requested  no  aid 
from  the  American  naval  force  then  in  the  harbor,  but  they 
had  actually  halted  the  Imperial  commander-in-chief  as  he 
came  into  the  settlement  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  foreign 
authorities.  Twice  a  Chinese  customs  boat  had  been  driven 
from  the  anchorage  in  front  of  the  foreign  settlement  by 
British  men-of-war.  Recently  British  H.  M.  S.  Hermes  at 
Amoy  had  'drifted'  in  between  the  vessels  of  the  Imperials 
and  the  rebel  forces  during  an  engagement  at  a  time  when 
the  Imperialists  seemed  to  be  on  the  point  of  victory.  He 
also  had  observed  that  British  subjects  were  in  communica- 
tion with  the  rebel  forces  at  Nanking.  Recently  a  British 
subject,  bearing  a  letter  from  the  Taiping  authorities  in 
Nanking,  when  arrested  by  the  Imperial  troops  as  a  spy  and 
returned  to  the  British  consul  for  punishment,  had  been  dis- 
missed under  the  purely  nominal  bail  of  $200. 

"These  examples,"  wrote  Marshall,  "of  incidents  daily  occurring  in 
China  will  serve  to  place  you  in  possession  of  the  tendency  of  att'airs 
in  China,  and  to  prove  that,  though  neutrality  may  be  the  profession 
of  Great  Britain,  and  the  aim  of  the  Foreign  Office,  the  practice  of 
the^uhlic  authorities  among  the  Chinese  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  is  another  policy  in  view." 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  truth  of  Marshall's  allega- 
tions as  to  the  intent  of  the  British  authorities  in  China  in 
1853,  the  American  policy  as  actually  applied  was  twofold: 


220  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

immediately,  to  support  the  Imperial  authority;  and,  to 
continue  to  recognize  the  sovereignty  of  China;  and  to  do 
this  for  the  ultimate  purpose  of  helping  China  to  maintain 
her  integrity — to  prevent  the  dismemberment  which  seemed 
so  probable  in  event  of  the  success  of  the  rebellion.  The 
practical  application  of  Marshall's  policy  is  to  be  seen  in  his 
handling  of  the  Shanghai  customs  question. 

Shall  Shanghai  Become  a  Free  Port? 

The  issue  was  this:  Should  the  port  of  Shanghai,  dur- 
ing the  occupation  of  the  city  by  rebels  and  the  absence  of 
not  only  Imperial  customs  officers  but  also  of  Imperial 
military  protection,  be  considered  a  free  port?  In  other 
words  was  the  port  of  Shanghai  to  become,  at  least  for  the 
time  being,  a  port  such  as  Hongkong  had  always  been  under 
the  British  administration?  Favoring  an  affirmative  answer 
to  this  question  were  the  mercantile  communities  regardless 
of  nationality,  while  the  British  consul,  Mr.  Rutherford 
Alcock,  not  caring  to  assume  the  responsibility,  referred  the 
matter  to  the  Foreign  Office,  meanwhile  accepting,  as  al- 
ready described,  qualified  promissory  notes  from  British 
merchants  in  payment  of  customs  dues.  This  action,  while 
not  definitely  declaring  the  port  open,  so  far  as  British  mer- 
chants were  concerned  did  in  effect  leave  the  port  open,  and 
yet  in  such  a  way  that  the  British  treaties  were  not  violated. 
Against  this  plan  of  an  open  port  was  the  American  author- 
ity as  represented  in  the  proclamation  of  the  consul,  sup- 
ported by  the  approval  of  the  commissioner.* 

In  the  face  of  the  repeated  protest  of  the  American  mer- 
chants Marshall  held  his  ground.  Replying  to  a  second  pro- 
test of  October  31,  he  declared:  ^'^ 

"It   is   my   purpose    to    perform,   punctiliously,    every    obligation 
assumed  by  the  United  States  under  the  treaty,  and  to  refrain  from 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  221 

embarrassing  the  public  administration  of  Chinese  affairs  by  throwing 
unnecessary  obstacles  in  the  way.  No  precedent,  no  example  furnished 
by  other  powers,  will  induce  me  to  forego  the  faithful  and  honest 
execution  of  our  jolain  international  obligations." 


Marshall  Forces  Dissolution  of  Provisional  System 

Marshall's  position,  however,  became  increasingly  diffi- 
cult to  maintain.  The  ships  of  non-treaty  powers  continued 
to  go  free.  On  the  4th  of  November,  Vice-consul  Cunning- 
ham at  Shanghai  addressed  a  letter  to  the  taotai,  pointing 
out  that  on  a  certain  day  two  vessels  had  left  the  port,  one 
American  and  one  Austrian :  the  former  paid  duties  accord- 
ing to  the  provisional  rules,  while  the  latter  departed  abso- 
lutely free.  Cunningham  asserted  that  such  a  situation  was 
in  violation  of  the  most-favored-nation  clause  in  the  Treaty 
of  Wanghia,  and  demanded  that  the  Americans  be  placed  on 
the  same  footing  as  the  subjects  of  those  nations  whose  ships 
were  going  free. 

When  informed  of  this  action  the  American  Commis- 
sioner, who  was  then  in  the  South  vainly  seeking  an  inter- 
view with  Viceroy  Yeh,  replied,  intimating  that  as  it  was 
the  duty  of  China  to  insist  on  her  rights  at  Shanghai  under 
the  treaties  with  England  and  France  and  that  if,  after 
ample  opportunity  to  reestablish  control,  China  continued 
to  concede  free  entry  and  clearance,  or  the  payment  of  dues 
in  promissory  notes  the  redemption  of  which  depended  upon 
the  will  of  the  British  Government,  then  the  American 
Government  would  demand  as  a  right  under  the  treaty  that 
American  ships  also  go  free.  Meanwhile  Viceroy  Yeh 
seemed  in  no  way  to  appreciate  the  battle  which  Marshall 
had  undertaken  at  Shanghai  in  defense  of  the  Imperial 
revenues,  and  Marshall  became  convinced  that  the  bold 
policy  which  he  had  adopted  in  September  was  not  bold' 
enough.  It  had  not  brought  the  other  foreign  nations  into 
line,  and  it  had  placed  upon  the  American  merchants  an 
insuperable  handicap.  Therefore  on  the  4th  of  January, 
1854,  he  addressed  an  authorization  to  Vice-consul  Cun- 
ningham to  change  his  policy  immediately  and  "to  clear 


222  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

American  ships  without  taking  any  note  of  the  duties  what- 
ever, without  requiring  any  port  clearance,  and  in  all  re- 
spect treating  Shanghai  as  a  free  port."  In  conclusion  Mar- 
shall wrote:  ^^ 

"I  congratulate  you  that,  by  the  strict  pursuit  of  our  national 
duty,  we  are  in  a  position,  without  violating  a  treaty  stipulation  or 
giving  just  offense  in  any  quarter,  to  assert  all  our  national  rights  and 
to  maintain  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  on  the  footing  of  the 
most-favored  nation,  without  loss  from  any  unjust  discrimination 
being  possible,  under  any  regulation  whatever,  made  or  to  be  made 
by  others." 

The  purpose  of  the  American  Commissioner  was  two- 
fold: to  help  the  American  merchants  out  of  what  was  be- 
coming an  impossible  situation ;  and  to  force  the  hand  of  the 
British  authorities,  for  under  the  new  order  it  was  the  Brit- 
ish commercial  interests  which  were  placed  under  a  handi- 
cap; while  the  American  ships  went  free,  the  British  ships 
were  still  required  to  deposit  the  promissory  notes  and  it 
was  not  yet  definitely  known  that  they  would  not  some  day 
become  payable.    Marshall's  policy  was  successful. 

Marshall  was  superseded  as  commissioner  when  the 
Pierce  administration  entered  office,  and  he  left  China  on 
March  13,  1854,  before  the  arrival  of  his  successor,  Robert 
M.  McLane,  Meanwhile  the  confusion  at  Shanghai  had 
become  very  great  and  the  British  plenipotentiary.  Sir  John 
Bowring,  had  had  a  correspondence  with  the  secretary  of  the 
Shanghai  British  Chamber  of  Commerce,  in  which  was  to  be 
observed  a  great  change  in  the  tone  and  temper  of  the 
British  authorities.    McLane  reported:  ^^ 

"The  undisguised  hostility  expressed  towards  the  rebels  is  a  new 
feature  in  the  intercourse  which  has  heretofore  taken  place,  either 
between  the  superior  and  inferior  British  authorities  themselves,  or 
between  either  of  them  and  the  Chinese  authorities." 

A  month  later  McLane  reported :  ^'^  that  he  had  been  in 
communication  with  Sir  John  Bowring  and  that  the  latter 
had  expressed  the  desire  to  see  *him  personally  before  he 
attempted  to  open  up  communications  with  the  Chinese 
Empire,  and  had  expressed  the  further  desire  for  'hearty 
cooperation'  in  the  progress  of  events  in  China.    Notwith- 


HUMPHREY  MARSHALL  AND  TAIPING  REBELLION  223 

s  Landing  the  sympathy  for  the  rebels  which  still  persisted 
among  an  ill-informed  public  in  England  and  America,  the 
events  in  China,  and  a  fuller  knowledge  of  the  rebel  move- 
ment itself  which  rapidly  degenerated  after  its  establish- 
ment in  Nanking,  settled  effectively  the  question  of  the 
recognition  of  the  Taipings.  Towards  the  Taiping  Rebel- 
lion the  Government  of  the  L^nited  States  pursued  its  set- 
tled policy  of  non-intervention  in  the  affairs  of  other 
nations.  In  its  instructions  to  its  commissioners  it  followed 
exactly  a  policy  of  neutrality,  taking  the  ground  that  China 
must  settle  her  own  troubles.  Applying  again  the  principle 
that  China  was  a  sovereign  state,  Secretary  of  State  Marcy 
advised  Dr.  Parker  in  1855  ^^  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  had  no  right  to  restrain  its  citizens  from  intro- 
ducing munitions  of  war  into  the  five  ports,  even  when  it 
was  known  that  they  were  intended  for  the  rebels.  On  the 
other  hand  American  citizens  in  China  who  did  not  remain 
neutral  in  the  conflict,  must  understand  that  they  forfeited 
all  right  to  the  protection  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  all  right  to  claims  for  redress. 

In  addition  to  this  both  McLane  and  Parker  in  their 
effort  to  secure  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  dis- 
cuss supplementary  articles  and  the  revision  of  the  treaty 
hinted  broadly  ^-  that  if  the  Imperial  Government  would 
not  listen  to  them,  they  might  turn  to  the  rebels.  This, 
however,  was  a  mere  threat  and  the  strict  neutrality  de- 
clared by  the  American  Government  was  in  fact  moderated 
by  an  increased  benevolence  on  the  part  of  the  commis- 
sioners towards  the  Empire.  The  British  policy  was  similar, 
and  as  for  the  French,  their  dislike  of  the  Taipings  had 
always  been  apparent. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  administration  of  President 
Buchanan  (1857),  Lord  Napier,  then  British  Minister  at  \ 
Washington,  in  the  course  of  the  conferences  between  the  \ 
United  States  and  China  which  preceded  the  negotiations 
for  the  revision  of  the  treaties  with  China,  left  with  Secre- 
tary of  State  Cass  a  memorandum  on  British  policy  in  China 
in  which  is  found  an  official  statement  of  what  had  become 


224  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  British  poHcy  with  reference  to  the  more  fundamental 
'  questions  of  the  integrity  of  China, 

Lord  Napier  wrote : "  "The  dissolution  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
and  the  separation  of  its  provinces  could  not  fail  to  be  accompanied 
by  the  interception  of  communications,  the  diminution  of  wealth,  the 
destruction  of  industry,  by  all  the  calamities  which  check  the  Powers 
of  production  and  consumption.  Such  a  result  would  be  most  preju- 
dicial to  Great  Britain  both  in  reference  to  our  exportation  to  China, 
and  to  our  importation  of  tea,  which  is  at  once  a  source  of  revenue 
and  a  necessary  of  life." 

Thus,  more  than  three  quarters  of  a  century  ago,  the 
two  great  nations  most  interested  in  the  trade  of  China, 
reasoning  wholly  from  the  grounds  of  national  self-interest, 
reached  the  conclusion  that  the  Chinese  Empire  ought  not 
to  be  dissolved. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Williams:     "Middle  Kingdom,"  Vol.  2,  p.  624. 

2.  Hamberg:     "The  Visions  of  Hung-Siu-tshuen." 

3.  Cordier:     "Histoire  des  Relations  de  la  Chine,"  Vol.  1,  p.  169; 

China  Dispatches,  Vol.  3,  June  2,  1846;  Vol.  5,  Feb.  7,  1849 
(Dcpt.  of  State). 

4.  Marshall  Corres.,  pp.  183,  185;  Brine's  Taiping  Rebellion,  pp. 

295-8. 

5.  British   Parliamentary   Papers,    1870,    Vol.    LXIX,    Corres.    re- 

specting Inland  Residence  of  English  Missionaries  in  China, 
p.  10. 

6.  Marshall  Corres.,  p.  96. 

7.  Richardson's  Messages,  Vol.  5,  p.  210. 
'vS:     Marshall  Corres.,  p.  102. 

^f.  Hid,,  p.  168. 

''■-10.  China  Instructions,  June,  1853  (Dept.  of  State). 

11.  McLane  Instructions,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  39  :36-l. 

12.  Marshall  Corres.,  pp.  168-9. 

13.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34 :33-2,  Disp.  No.  11,  May  6,  1853. 

14.  Marshall  Corres.,  p.  204. 

15.  IJAd.,  p.  290. 

16.  Il>id.,  p.  261. 

17.  lUd.,  p.  313. 
^_18.  IJAd.,  pp.  366-7. 

\  19.     McLane  Corres.,  p.  3. 
--20.     llnd.,  p.  23. 
"   '  21.     C)iina  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Oct.  .5,  1855. 

22.     McLane  Corres.,  p.  145;  Parke,r  Corres.,  p.  945. 
"^723.     Notes  from  the  British  Legation,  Vol.  34,  Apr.  3,  1857  (Dept. 
of  State). 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONEK  McLANE 

The  service  of  Robert  M.  McLane  as  Commissioner  to 
China  was  brief — only  nine  months  long — but  important. 
To  him  belongs  the  distinction  of  having  devised  a  settle- 
ment of  the  vexed  question  of  the  Shanghai  customs  which 
was  in  line  with  the  ideas  of  his  predecessor  whose  policy  he 
approved,  and  it  also  fell  to  his  lot  to  make  some  new  and 
rather  startling  adventures  in  policies  of  his  own. 

His  instructions  ^  which  may  be  taken  as  the  policy  of 
the  Pierce  administration  in  China  were  specific  only  in  the 
fact  that  they  recommended  cooperation  with  the  other 
treaty  powers.  It  was  a  timid  cooperation  which  Marcy 
proposed,  quite  unlike  the  'cooperative  policy'  of  Seward  ten 
years  later,  but  it  was  significant  as  an  indication  of  the 
turning  tide  in  American  foreign  policy.  The  old  aloofness, 
and  particularly  the  old  hatred  and  suspicion  of  Great  Brit- 
ain and  all  her  works  was  passing.  Every  year  the  choice  for 
the  American  and  the  British  governments  in  the  Far  East 
between  working  with  or  against  one  another  was  presenting 
itself.    Cooperation  seemed  the  course  of  wisdom.   ^^ 

The  Inspectorate  of  Maritime  Customs 

In  the  settlement  of  the  Shanghai  customs  question 
McLane  immediately  assumed  leadership.  On  February  9, 
1854,  the  British,  French  and  American  consuls  at  Shanghai 
had  united  in  recognizing  a  new  Imperial  customs  house 
which  was  established  at  Soochow  Creek,  and  the  collection 
of  dues  by  the  Imperial  authorities  began  forthwith.  The 
three  consuls,  at  the  suggestion  of  McLane,  prepared  a  full 

225 


226  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

report  *  of  the  situation  as  it  had  developed  from  September 
7th,  for  submission  to  their  governments  with  a  view  to 
some  final  settlement.^ 

The  situation  at  Shanghai  by  no  means  cleared  up  with 
the  recognition  of  the  reestablished  customs  house.  The 
old  Chinese  maritime  customs  service  was  disintegTating  in 
sheer  rottenness.  The  city  had  not  been  retaken  by  the 
Imperial  authorities,  and  the  corruption  of  the  officials 
at  the  customs  house  was  such  that  merchants  were  still 
able  to  evade  the  payment  of  duties.  To  meet  this  situa- 
tion the  taotai  notified  the  consuls,  March  25,  that  by  order 
of  the  governor  general,  the  collection  of  Shanghai  outward 
customs  would  be  transferred  to  the  interior  until  such 
time  as  peace  was  restored.  To  this  order  the  foreign  gov- 
ernments immediately  objected  as  a  violation  of  the  treaties. 
R.  C.  Murphy,  the  newly  arrived  American  consul,  joined 
with  the  British  and  French  consuls,  with  the  full  approval 
of  McLane,  in  a  joint  communication  to  the  taotai  notifying 
him  that  they  would  not  sanction  the  change  in  the  manner 
of  collecting  the  outward  customs.^  Nevertheless  the  cus- 
toms house  on  Soochow  Creek  was  abandoned  by  the 
Chinese  on  May  9.  Shanghai  became  completely  what  it 
had  been  partially  for  many  months — a  free  port.  Thus  the 
Imperial  Government  was  entirely  deprived  of  revenue  from 
the  port  of  Shanghai  at  a  time  when  the  empire  was  in  the 
throes  of  rebellion,  when  the  Imperial  coffers  were  sadly 
depleted,  and  the  dynasty  was  in  the  utmost  danger  of  dis- 
solution. 

Meanwhile  it  had  become  clear  that  it  was  for  the  best 
interests  of  the  foreigners,  in  the  choice  between  the  rebels 
and  the  Imperialists,  to  support  and  fortify  the  latter.  The 
most  obvious  step  which  could  be  taken,  in  the  interest  of 
protecting  the  Imperial  revenues,  and  also  for  the  sake  of 

*Thr(ui};Iiout  Micliic's  Mcoouiit  of  the  Shnnsiliai  customs  question  (The  Eng- 
lishman in  Cliina),  he  gives  Kntheifiird  Alcocl<  the  credit  for  leadership  among 
tile  consuls,  and  sees  only  inconsistency  in  the  course  adopted  by  the  Aniei'icans. 
lie  states,  however,  that  the  American  action  in  declaring  for  a  free  port  forced 
the  dissolution  of  the  "provisional  system"  which  had  been  operative  so  far  as 
th(!   Americans   and    lOnglish    were    concerned. 

Morse  also  fails  to  make  clear  the  reasons  for  the  course  adopted  by  the 
Americans. 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       227 

4J 


maintaining  uniformity  at  the  five  ports  in  the  collection'oi 
customs,  was  to  devise  some  plan  by  which  the  corruption 
in  the  Shanghai  customs  service  might  be  eliminated,  and 
the  collection  of  dues  restored. 

On  the  21st  of  June,  in  an  interview  with  E-liang,  the 
Viceroy  and  Governor  General  of  the  Liang  Kiang  Prov- 
inces, in  which  Shanghai  was  situated,  Commissioner 
McLane  outlined  a  plan  by  which  full  power  "should  be 
given  to  the  superintendent  of  customs  at  Shanghai  to  enter 
into  and  conclude  an  arrangement  with  the  consuls  of  the 
three  treaty  powers  for  the  administration  of  the  customs 
house  at  this  port  hereafter  on  a  permanent  basis."  ^  It 
called  for  the  reestablishment  of  the  customs  house  at  Soo- 
chow  Creek,  under  the  immediate  direction  of  a  board  of 
foreign  inspectors.  To  this  plan  the  viceroy  agreed.  On  the 
29th  of  June  the  three  consuls  and  the  taotai  at  Shanghai 
had  a  conference  in  which  the  latter  formally  confessed  his 
inability  to  secure  customs  house  officials  of  sufficient 
probity,  vigilance  and  knowledge  of  foreign  languages  for  the 
effective  administration  of  the  customs.  He  expressed  the 
conviction  that  the  only  solution  of  the  problem  lay  in 
securing  the  services  of  foreigners  who,  having  been  care- 
fully selected,  should  be  appointed  by  the  taotai  as  his  rep- 
resentatives for  the  collection  of  the  customs.  It  was  fur- 
ther agreed  that  a  suitable  establishment  could  be  effected 
with  one  or  more  foreigners  acting  under  the  taotai  as  in- 
spectors of  customs,  supplemented  by  a  staff  of  both  foreign 
and  Chinese  subordinates.  The  expenses  of  the  new  system 
could  be  met  out  of  the  customs  revenues.  The  consuls,  on 
their  part,  agreed  to  select  and  nominate  to  the  taotai,  one 
for  each  consul,  suitable  candidates  for  the  board  of  inspec- 
tors. 

To  safeguard  the  new  system  from  the  evils  of  the  old 
one,  these  foreign  inspectors  were  to  be  protected  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  Chinese  Government  was  to  be  pro- 
tected on  the  other,  by  an  arrangement  that  any  charges 
of  exaction,  corruption,  neglect  of  duty  or  misconduct  might 
be  made  to  the  consuls,  and  trials  of  the  accused  inspector 


228  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

would  be  held  before  a  mixed  court  in  the  presence  of  the 
consuls  and  the  taotai.  The  inspectors  would  be  liable  to 
dismissal  only  by  this  process.  All  subordinates  would  hold 
office  during  good  behavior,  and  subject  to  dismissal  only 
upon  recommendation  from  the  inspectors. 

It  was  further  stipulated  in  the  agreement  between  the 
taotai  and  the  consuls  that  the  records  of  the  new  customs 
house  would  be  kept  in  both  Chinese  and  English,  and  that 
an  armed  revenue  cutter  under  a  foreign  master  would  be 
secured.* 

In  the  view  of  both  the  American  State  Department  and 
the  British  Foreign  Office,  the  mode  of  selection  of  the 
inspectors  was  objectionable  in  that  the  candidates  were  to 
be  nominated  by  the  consuls.  This,  it  was  thought,  ap- 
proached too  closely  towards  making  the  foreign  consuls 
responsible  for  the  efficient  conduct  of  the  customs  office. 
In  the  reorganization  of  the  foreign  inspectorate  under  the 
treaties  of  1858,  this  provision  was  eliminated,  and  thus 
China  was  incidentally  saved,  as  it  proved,  from  an  invasion 
by  the  American  spoils  system. 

The  foundations  were  thus  laid  in  1854,  all  the  treaty 
powers  heartily  cooperating,  for  the  foreign  inspectorate  of 
Chinese  Maritime  Customs  as,  with  elaborations,  it  exists 
today.  Fundamentally  the  necessity  for  it  grew  out  of  the 
provision  of  the  American  Treaty  of  Wanghia  (1844)  which 
had  thrown  the  entire  burden  for  the  collection  of  its  cus- 
toms from  foreigners  upon  the  Imperial  Government.  This 
provision  of  the  American  treaty,  as  has  been  elsewhere 
pointed  out,  had  placed  upon  the  Chinese  Government  the 
responsibility  for  the  existence  of  smuggling,  and  had  also 
placed  at  a  disadvantage  the  British  merchants  who  were 
compelled  to  pay  duties  through  the  British  consuls.    The 

*The  credit  for  this  plan  has  always  \)ovn  claimed  for  Mr.  Rutherford  Alcock. 
On  the  other  hand,  Coinniissioner  ISlcLane  who,  unlike  his  predecessor,  was  a 
very  modest  man,  makes  no  special  claim  for  credit  in  llie  nnitter  altliough  he 
<loes  report  tlie  fact,  already  noted,  that  he  iirt'seiited  the  idan  personally  to 
I'Mlang  and  secured  his  approval.  Hut  the  American  merchants  who  protested 
against  the  foreign  inspectoia te  two  jears  later  stated  that  the  system  had  heen 
estal>lishe(l  "chiefly  at  the  suggestion  and  by  tiie  efl'orts  of  the  Hon.  Mr. 
McLane."  It  is  tlu'refore  pi'oliable  that  to  AIcLane  Ix'longs  the  credit  of  having 
<h'vised  the  general  ])lan  and  initiate<l  it,  while  to  Alcock,  as  the  senior  consul 
in  Shanghai  iind  as  obviously  the  best  litted  to  do  it,  fell  the  work  of  drawing 
up   the  details  of  the  agreement." 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       229 

new  system,  providing  a  way  out  of  the  difficulty  for  the 
English,  was  broadly  in  harmony  with  the  principle  of  the 
American  treaty  which  had  come  to  be  adopted  by  all  treaty 
powers,  and  was  effective. 

So  effective  was  it  that  the  American  merchants  in 
Shanghai  in  1856  and  again  in  1858,  at  the  time  of  the 
revision  of  the  treaties,  protested  against  it,  and  petitioned 
for  its  removal,  but  the  protests  went  unheeded  by  the 
American  representatives  who  expressed  the  opinion  that 
instead  of  removing  it,  the  system  should  be  extended  to 
cover  the  other  open  ports,  as  well  as  Shanghai,  an  action 
which  was  taken  in  the  revision  of  the  treaties  in  1858.*^ 

The  board  of  inspectors  consisted  of  Thomas  Francis 
Wade,  who  was  loaned  from  the  British  consulate  in  Shang- 
hai, Arthur  Smith,  nominated  by  the  French  consul,  and 
Lewis  Carr,  an  American.  Of  these  three  Mr.  Wade  alone 
understood  Chinese,  or  was  experienced  in  China,  and  upon 
him  fell  the  duties  of  organizing  the  new  service.  Three 
years  later  Mr.  Carr  absented  himself  from  duty  for  a  long 
period.  Meanwhile  the  American  consul,  Mr.  Murphy, 
went  home  on  leave  of  absence,  having  first  secured  from 
the  taotai  a  promise  that  the  latter  would  hold  open  the 
position  for  someone  to  be  nominated  by  Murphy.  The 
result  was  that  the  position  remained  vacant  for  a  long 
time  although  Dr.  Parker,  then  Commissioner,  had  a  nom- 
inee whom  he  wished  to  place  in  the  position.  American 
influence  in  the  newly  developed  inspectorate  was,  therefore, 
never  great,  the  American  incumbent  of  the  board  being 
neither  useful  nor  ornamental.  The  situation  was  an  illus- 
tration, often  repeated,  of  how  ill  prepared  was  the  United 
States  to  assume  responsibilities  in  China,  however  friendly 
American  policies  and  principles  might  be.  On  the  resigna- 
tion of  Mr.  Wade,  Horatio  N.  Lay,  of  subsequent  Lay- 
Osborn-Flotilla  fame,  was  appointed,  and  he  in  turn  was 
superseded  by  Robert  Hart  whose  distinguished  services  for 
China  became  so  well  known.  The  Americans  in  China 
complained  bitterly  of  the  disappearance  of  American  influ- 
ence in  the  foreign  inspectorate.    The  fault  lay  solely  with 


230  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  American  Government  which,  though  repeatedly  im- 
portuned to  provide  for  student  interpreters  and  a  large 
staff  of  consular  officers  to  meet  the  growing  opportunities 
and  responsibilities  of  the  United  States  in  China,  had 
ignored  the  requirements  of  the  situation. 

McLane  Settles  the  American  Claims 

Having  disposed  of  the  question  of  the  payment  of  cus- 
toms dues,  McLane  turned  his  attention  to  the  equally  per- 
plexing and  disturbing  question  of  the  disposal  of  the  com- 
plicated claims  for  duties  due  from  Americans  since  the 
establishment  of  the  'provisional  rules'  of  September  19, 
1853.  According  to  the  treaty  the  method  for  settling  this 
matter  would  have  been  for  the  taotai  to  bring  a  complaint 
in  the  consular  court  which  would  have  come  up  to  McLane 
for  official  review  in  his  capacity  as  supreme  judge,  but  the 
commissioner  proposed  an  alternative,  viz.,  that  all  the 
parties  concerned  should  submit  the  matter  to  him  as  a 
'mediator,'  agreeing  to  abide  by  his  decision.  Both  the 
merchants  and  the  Chinese  officials  were  willing  to  accept 
this  alternative  proposal. 

While  McLane  had  the  matter  under  review  Lord  Clar- 
endon ordered  Sir  John  Bowring  to  have  cancelled  the 
promissory  notes  deposited  by  the  English  merchants  on  the 
ground  that  ''the  obligation  on  the  part  of  British  subjects 
to  pay  duties  to  the  Chinese  Government  depends  upon 
the  fulfillment  by  the  Chinese  Government  of  its  obligation 
to  afford  protection  to  British  commerce  and  upon  the 
ability  of  the  Chinese  authorities  to  collect  the  duties  accru- 
ing to  their  Government."  This  order  from  the  Foreign 
Office  was  embarrassing  to  Bowring  who  was  then  planning 
a  joint  expedition  with  McLane  to  the  Pei-ho  to  secure  new 
treaties.  If  the  English  were  to  cancel  their  notes  and  the 
Americans  were  to  pay  the  duties,  the  English  would  be  in 
an  awkward  position  before  the  representatives  of  the 
Emperor,  in  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty.  McLane  recog- 
nized the  difficulty  of  his  brother  plenipotentiary,  and  was 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       231 

willing  to  defer  his  award  as  long  as  posible  to  enable 
Bowring  to  bring  the  Foreign  Office  into  line  with  the  policy 
which  he  and  McLane  had  adopted.  On  the  other  hand, 
McLane  did  not  feel  that  Lord  Clarendon's  contention  was 
sound  owing  'to  the  peculiar  relations  established  between 
the  Chinese  authorities  and  the  authorities  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  Ignited  States'  during  the  year  of  the  disturbance 
at  Shanghai.  McLane  also  recognized  the  injustice  of 
penalizing  the  American  merchants  for  their  good  faith  and 
in  the  settlement  he  mitigated  the  penalty  by  allowing  the 
Chinese  one  third  of  the  amount  claimed,  deducting  a  third 
for  losses  which  the  Americans  had  suffered  through  the 
disturbance  of  the  trade,  and  a  third  for  the  increase  in  the 
value  of  the  specie  which  had  occurred  since  the  'provisional 
rules'  became  operative.  Both  merchants  and  taotai  ac- 
cepted this  award. 

But  the  question,  even  then,  was  not  disposed  of.  About 
three  weeks  before  McLane  rendered  his  award,  Secretary 
of  State  Marcy  reached  a  conclusion  similar  to  that  of  Lord 
Clarendon's  and  ordered  that  the  American  notes  also  be 
cancelled.  When  this  order  reached  Dr.  Parker  in  January, 
1855,  he  was  greatly  disturbed.  It  did  not  seem  to  him 
possible  that  satisfactory  explanations  could  be  made  to 
the  Chinese  for  the  reversal  of  McLane's  decision.  He 
therefore  wrote  to  the  department  explaining  the  situation, 
and  at  the  same  time  ordered  Consul  Murphy  to  return  the 
notes  to  the  merchants,  but  to  take  in  return  the  agreements 
that  in  case  the  United  States  Government  reversed  its 
decision,  they  would  make  payments  in  good  faith.  At  the 
same  time  he  instructed  Consul  Murphy  to  explain  the 
matter  to  the  taotai,  and  in  case  the  latter  protested  the 
action,  to  cancel  the  notes  immediately  and  thus  to  conclude 
the  business.  The  taotai,  however,  was  willing  to  wait 
patiently.  In  due  time  the  State  Department,  having 
received  more  complete  information,  and  having  referred 
the  matter  to  Caleb  Gushing,  then  Attorney  General,  de- 
cided that  the  award  made  by  McLane  as  a  mediator  could 
not  be  reversed,  and  the  amount  awarded  was  ordered  paid. 


232  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

And  to  the  everlasting  credit  of  the  American  merchants — 
the  same  men  who  were  then  trying  to  have  the  foreign 
inspectorate  abolished — the  money  was  paid  without  further 
protest  or  discussion. 

Treaty  Revision 

McLane's  primary  efforts  in  China  were  directed  towards 
securing  from  the  Imperial  Government  some  important 
modifications  of  the  Gushing  treaty.  In  this  as  well  as  in  the 
customs  matter  he  was  following  a  policy  which  had  been 
initiated  by  his  predecessor. 

In  July,  1853,  when  Marshall  had  been  so  impressed  with 
the  danger  of  either  Russian  or  British  intervention,  he  had 
outlined  to  Marcy  a  very  bold  policy  which  he  had  never 
been  able  to  carry  out  because  Gommodore  Perry  had  been 
unable,  and  also  unwilling,  to  cooperate  with  him.*^  Mar- 
shall had  proposed  "an  interference  by  the  United  States  to 
quiet  and  tranquilize  Ghina."  His  plan  was  to  proceed  to 
Peking,  convince  the  Emperor  of  the  friendly  purposes  of 
the  United  States  and  then  to  offer  the  support  of  the 
American  military  and  naval  forces  to  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment in  return  for  certain  concessions  which  he  outlined  as 
follows:  amnesty  to  all  rebels  who  might  be  willing  to 
return  to  loyalty  to  the  Manchus;  freedom  of  religious  opin- 
ion and  worship ;  complete  opening  of  the  empire  to  trade ; 
and  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  with  treaty 
powers  through  a  department  of  foreign  affairs. 

'Tt  would  only  be  intervention  in  vindication  of  the 
rights  of  the  American  citizens,"  urged  Marshall,  ''an  inter- 
vention promised  in  the  President's  inaugural  address,* 
wherever  the  citizen  might  of  right  be  when  the  power  is 
involved." 

*Iii  Iiis  inaugural  address.  March  4,  1858.  President  Pierce  had  said:  "The 
rights  wiiich  belong  to  a  nation  ar<'  not  ahme  to  be  regarded,  but  those  which 
pertain  to  every  citizen  in  his  individual  capacity,  at  home  and  abroad,  must 
be  sacre<lly  maintained.  So  long  as  lie  c;in  discern  every  .star  in  its  place  upon 
that  ensign,  without  wealtli  to  purcliase  for  him  preferment  or  title  to  secure 
for  him  place,  it  will  be  his  privilege,  and  must  be  his  acknowledged  right,  to 
stand  unabashed  even  in  the  presence  of  |)rinces,  with  a  proud  consciousness 
that  lie  is  himself  one  of  a  nation  of  sovereigns  and  that  he  cannot  in  legitimate 
pursuit  wander  so  far  from  home  that  tlie  agent  whom  he  shall  leave  behind 
in  the  iilace  which  I  now  occupy  will  not  see  that  no  rude  hand  of  power  or 
tyrannical  passion  is  Taid  Upon  him  with  impunity."® 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       233 

Marshall's  proposal  never  received  the  approval  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States.  It  is  probable,  how- 
ever, that  he  would  have  undertaken  at  least  that  part  of  his 
program  which  involved  going  to  the  Pei-ho  and  demand- 
ing admission  to  the  Court  of  Peking,  had  he  been  able  to 
command  the  services  of  a  naval  vessel.  Commodore  Aulick, 
and  Commodore  Perry  who  succeeded  to  the  command  of 
the  China  Squadron  shortly  after  Marshall's  arrival  in 
China,  thwarted  every  effort  made  by  Marshall  to  go  to  the 
Pei-ho.  Perry  dissented  strongly  from  the  wisdom  of  such 
an  expedition,  feeling  that  it  would  in  all  probability  pro- 
duce only  unfriendly  feelings.  As  for  intervening  on  behalf 
of  the  Imperial  Government  against  the  Taipings,  he  was 
opposed  to  it,  sympathizing  rather  with  the  rebels.'* 

Viceroy  Yeh  refused  to  meet  McLane  upon  his  arrival 
in  China  in  the  spring  of  1854,  as  he  had  evaded  a  meeting 
with  Marshall  the  previous  year. 

"The  archives  of  our  legation,"  wrote  McLane,  April  26,  "present 
a  very  humiliating  view  of  our  past  relations  with  China ;  the  inso- 
lence of  Chinese  officials  having  rendered  intercourse  between  the 
two  countries  most  unsatisfactory.  It  is  difficult  to  understand 
whether  this  be  the  result  of  an  incorrigible  antipathy  on  the  part  of 
the  Chinese  towards  foreigners,  or  a  refined  and  cunning  policy,  by 
which  they  maintained  non-intercourse  and  at  the  same  time  non- 
resistance."  ^" 

Sir  John  Bowring  immediately  proposed  that  the  two 
powers  join  in  a  naval  demonstration  against  Canton  for 
the  purpose  of  compelling  Yeh  to  receive  them.  McLane 
'strenuously  resisted'  this  proposal  because  the  British  naval 
forces  in  the  Far  East  were  then  occupied  with  the  Crimean 
War,  and  he  was  of  the  opinion  that  Bowring  would  be 
impotent  to  carry  through  such  a  policy  in  case  of  failure 
at  Canton. 

McLane  abruptly  terminated  his  correspondence  with 
Yeh  and  departed  for  the  North.  At  Foochow  he  failed  to 
see  the  Governor  General  although  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia 
specified  him  as  one  of  the  three  means  of  communication 
with  Peking.    At  Shanghai  McLane  found  the  city  under  the 


234  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

joint  protection  of  the  English,  French  and  American  naval 
forces,  the  Imperial  authority  not  having  been  restored 
,since  the  fall  of  the  city  the  previous  year.  In  June  he  paid 
'^a  visit  to  the  rebel  capital  at  Nanking  and  became  thor- 
oughly convinced  that  the  success  of  the  Taipings  would  in 
no  way  benefit  the  foreign  powers.  On  the  basis  of  his 
observations  he  formulated  a  policy  not  very  dissimilar  from 
that  of  Marshall's  the  preceding  year.  He  proposed  to 
enlarge  the  'protectorate  character'  of  the  existing  treaty. 

"Could  this  government  be  made  to  understand  and  acknowledge," 
wrote  McLane  to  Marcy,  June  14,  1854,  "the  true  state  of  its  relations 
with  foreign  nations,  it  would  not  be  difficult,  even  at  this  time  and 
in  the  face  of  the  prevailing  disorder,  to  adjust  existing  difficulties 
and  greatly  enlarge  our  commercial  intercourse.  To  accomplish  this 
result,  whether  the  empire  be  governed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  the  rul- 
ing dynasty,  or  by  those  who  are  now  conducting  the  revolutionary 
movement,  it  is  necessary  to  enlarge  the  powers  and  duties  which  de- 
volve on  the  United  States  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  both  to  enforce 
the  stipulations  of  the  same  and  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  their  flag, 
when  used  as  a  cover  to  the  violation  of  the  laws  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire. Without  su'ch  an  exercise  of  power  on  our  part,  it  will  be  quite 
impossible  to  maintain  the  honor  and  integrity  of  our  flag,  or 'avoid 
those  collisions  which  the  weakness  and  corruption  of  the  Chinese 
authorities  render  inevitable.  As  a  consideration  for  such  enlarge- 
ment of  the  protectorate  character  of  the  existing  treaty,  the  interior 
should  be  opened  to  us,  where  we  would  extend  the  moral  power  of 
our  civilization,  and  the  material  power  necessary  to  protect  the  lives 
and  property  of  our  people."  " 

A  few  days  after  writing  the  above  letter  McLane  had 
an  interview  with  E-liang,  the  Viceroy  of  the  Liang  Kiang 
Provinces,  not  far  from  Shanghai.  In  this  interview  E-liang 
complained  of  the  conduct  of  the  Americans  in  China  and 
stated  that  the  failure  of  the  foreign  powers  to  recognize  the 
reestablished  authority  of  the  Imperial  Government  at 
Shanghai  had  been  a  great  embarrassment  to  the  govern- 
ment. He  also  complained  that  the  foreigners  had  been 
supplying  the  rebels  with  ammunition  and  aiding  them  in 
other  ways.  McLane  in  turn  pointed  out  how  Marshall's 
policy  of  requiring  the  American  merchants  to  continue 
the  payment  of  duties  at  Shanghai  had  been  an  evidence  of 
the  good  will  of  the  American  Government,  and  then  pro- 
ceeded to  unfold  his  plan  for  some  'supplemental  articles' 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       235 

to  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia.  This  projet,  which  was  subse- 
quently submitted  in  writing,  explains  very  clearly  what 
McLane  meant  by  the  enlargement  of  the  'protectorate 
character'  of  the  existing  treaty,^ - 

In  brief,  McLane  proposed  that  the  United  States  would 
engage  to  exert  its  power  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  its  flag,  or 
the  violation  of  the  treaty  by  its  citizens  if,  in  return,  the 
Chinese  Government  would  enlarge  the  commercial  privi- 
leges of  the  United  States.  McLane  rested  his  demand  that 
the  Emperor  appoint  a  commissioner  to  treat  with  him,  not 
upon  the  revision  clause  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia,  but  upon 
the  fact  that  'grave  cause'  existed  for  the  revision  of  the 
treaty.*  The  grave  cause  was  the  fact  that  the  treaty  was 
now  in  abeyance  at  Shanghai  where  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment was  unable  to  discharge  its  obligations  to  protect 
American  citizens,  and  that  the  government  was  further 
unable  to  protect  the  trade  of  Americans  at  Shanghai  with 
the  interior.  McLane's  argument  was  that  in  as  much  as 
the  Chinese  could  not  protect  the  trade,  the  American  Gov- 
ernment should  be  allowed  to  do  it.  McLane  then  warned 
E-liang  that  if  the  Emperor  refused  to  appoint  a  commis- 
sioner to  negotiate  with  him  the  United  States  might  feel 
authorized  to  turn  to  the  Taipings.f 

*  According  to  the  provision  of  Art.  34  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia,  negotia- 
tions for  the  revision  of  the  treaty  might  come  up  at  the  end  of  twelve  years 
(i.  e.,  in  1856).  The  treaty  also  stated:  "its  provisions  shall  not  be  altered 
without  grave  cause." 

t  McLane's  proposals  in  detail  were  :  1.  Americans  to  be  admitted  to  any 
port,  city  or  harbor  on  the  Yangtze  or  its  tributaries,  provided  that  duties  on 
imports  are  first  paid  at  Shanghai,  and  that  outward  cargoes  also  pay  duties  at 
Shanghai. 

2.  For  and  in  consideration  of  the  rights  and  privileges  granted  to  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  it  is  further  provided  and  stipulated  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  shall  at  once  take  active  and  efficient  means 
to  enforce  upon  their  citizens  the  prompt  payments  of  the  duties  prescriljed  in 
the  Treaty  of  Wanghia,  and  said  Government  of  the  United  States  further 
agrees  to  prevent,  liy  the  interposition  of  their  own  authorities,  any  of  their 
citizens  from  abusing  their  flag  as  a  cover  for  the  violation  of  the  laws  of  the 
Empire,   or  of  the  treaty. 

But  McLane  did  not  intend  to  be  caught  in  the  assumption  of  such  an  obli- 
gation in  any  way  that  might  in  the  future  embarrass  the  trade.  He  therefore 
added:  "For  and*  in  as  much  as  this  additional  obligation  is  incurred  by  the 
(Jovernment  of  tin-  I'nited  States,  in  consideration  of  the  before  mentioned  privi- 
leges granted  to  their  citizens,  it  is  further  provided  that  if  similar  rights  and 
advantages  sliould  at  aiiv  time  be  granted  or  conceded  by  Cliina  to  any  other 
nation  or  nations,  without  this  formal  obligation  being  incurred  by  such  nation 
or  naticms.  then  in  such  case  the  Government  of  the  United  States  shall  at 
once  be  released  from  the  obligation  herel)y  entered  into,  and  shall  enjoy  said 
enlarged  advantages  as  fullv  and  as  absolutely  as  such  other  nation  or  nations." 
.S.  Citizens  of  the  United  States  to  be  allowed  to  go  anywhere  in  China,  to 
worship  as  they  pleased,  and  to  enjoy  accommodations  for  houses,  places  of 
business,  hospitals  and  churches  and  cemeteries,  just  as  now  at  the  five  ports.'^ 


236  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  extraordinary  proposal  that  the  Chinese  Empire  be 
opened  ahiiost  without  restriction  to  Americans  in  return  for 
the  assumption  of  responsibility  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  the 
American  flag,  an  obligation  already  assumed  in  the  existing 
treaty,  and  for  further  assumption  of  responsibility  to  aid  in 
the  prevention  of  smuggling,  an  obligation  which  Great 
Britain  had  freely  assumed  in  her  treaties  of  1842-3,  was 
actually  forwarded  to  Peking,  although  McLane  was  noti- 
fied that  it  was  sent  only  to  Yeh  at  Canton, 

In  commenting  on  McLane's  visit  and  demands  E-liang 
addressed  a  memorial  to  the  throne.* 

"Thanks  to  the  favor,"  read  E-liang-'s  report  of  what  McLane  had 
said,  "of  his  Celestial  Majesty,  by  which  the  five  ports  are  open  to 
trade,  we  have  been  enabled  to  steep  ourselves  in  advantage.  Of  late 
years,  however,  the  river  comraunications  have  become  impassable 
(owing  to  the  rebellion)  and  the  losses  hence  sustained  by  the 
merchants  have  determined  us  to  request  that  his  Majesty  be  entreated 
graciously  to  permit  us  to  trade  along  the  Yangtze  River.  The 
merchandise  we  bring  up  the  river  we  will  ourselves  escort  and  protect. 
If  (your  excellency)  will  not  do  me  the  honor  to  make  a  representation 
for  me  to  this  effect  to  the  throne,  I  shall  be  obliged  to  proceed  to 
Tientsin. 

"Your  slave  told  him  authoritatively  (as  his  official  superior)  that 
the  treaty  under  which  the  five  ports  were  open  to  trade,  being  that 
to  which  the  Imperial  assent  had  been  received  with  reference  in  the 
24th  year  of  Tau  Kwang  (1844),  it  became  the  duty  of  all  alike, 
native  and  foreigner,  officials  and  people,  to  observe  it  obediently  for 
evermore.  It  was  besides  clearly  laid  down  in  the  treaty  that  'no 
state  shall  hereafter  send  a  minister  to  China  to  raise  separate  (or 
fresh)  discussions.'  f  The  request  now  preferred,  being  at  variance 
with  the  original  treaty,  could  not  well  be  conveyed  to  your  Majesty." 

E-liang  made  a  fairly  accurate  report  of  McLane's  other 
requests  and  then  commented  on  his  quid  pro  quo  proposal 
as  follows : 

*This  iiH'iiiorial  was  snbsiMnicntly  found  in  tlio  Viceroy's  yamon  at  Canton 
in  January,  l,sr)S,  when  tlic  British  occupiod  tho  city,  and  was  translated,  alonjj 
witli  many  otli(>r  similar  documents,  liy  Thomas  Wa(h>  of  the  British  Mission. 
It  was  not  phtced  in  the  hands  of  tlie  American  lOnvoy.  Mr.  Heed,  for  some 
unex))huned  reason,  until  after  lie  had  neiiotiated  and  sisned  th(>  Treaty  of 
Tientsin.  Mr.  Keed  staled  in  a  speecli  before  thr  IMiiliKlelphia  Board  of  Trade, 
May  .'51,  ISfiO,  that  liad  he  known  of  this  report  when  he  was  negotiating  the 
Treaty  of  Tientsin,  he  mi^ht  have  been  less  siood-njitured  in  his  dealings  with 
the  ('hinesr'  commissioners,  and  he  even  intimated  that  h<'  might  have  joined 
with    the  allies,    in    the  <l<'slruet  ion    of   the   T;iku   forts. '^ 

t  K-liang  is  (juoting  the  clause  in  Art.  .'{4  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia,  which 
reads:  "and  no  in<liviihnil  State  of  tlie  United  States  can  appoint  or  send  a 
minister  to  China   to  call   in  question  tho  provisions  of  the  same." 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       237 

"lie  also  handed  in  a  communication  in  very  obscure  phraseology, 
characters  in  which  had  been  taken  to  signify  what  they  did  not 
properly  mean.  On  the  whole  it  differed  nothing?  from  the  langua{?e 
he  had  employed  except  in  the  addition  that  if,  on  representation 
made  to  the  throne,  he  should  be  honored  by  (your  Majesty's)  assent 
to  his  requests,  it  would  behoove  him,  of  course,  to  assist  China  in 
completely  removing  her  cause  of  disquiet.  .  .  . 

"It  is  the  veiy  humble  opinion  of  your  slave,  that,  in  as  much  as 
the  American  barbarians,  heretofore  accounted  so  submissive,  have 
taken  advantage  of  the  present  conjuncture  to  press  their  demands, 
reliance  is  surely  not  to  be  placed  on  their  cooperation,  though  they 
promise  it,  in  the  restoration  of  order." 

E-liang  also  observed  that  the  French  and  English  would 
probably  want  something  if  any  concessions  were  made  to 
the  Americans. 

This  report  of  E-liang's  drew  from  the  throne  an  order 
that  McLane  must  return  to  Canton,  and  that  it  would  be 
Yeh's  duty  to  forestall  the  American  commissioner's  malice, 
and  to  address  him  'authoritatively  in  peremptory  language.' 

To  the  student  of  American  policy  in  China  the  most 
notable  feature  of  McLane's  projet  is  the  fact  that,  while 
contemplating  the  opening  of  the  entire  country  to  Ameri- 
can trade,  it  departed  entirely  from  the  principles  laid 
down  in  the  Gushing  treaty  that  China  alone  must  enforce 
her  own  laws  and  also  protect  the  Americans  within  her  X 
borders.  These  departures  from  existing  American  policy 
were  entirely  unauthorized,  and  no  comment  was  ever  made 
on  them  by  Marcy, 

A  few  weeks  after  the  close  of  the  correspondence  with 
E-liang  in  which  McLane  had  served  notice  that  he  would 
press  his  demands  at  the  Pei-ho,  the  American  commissioner 
received  instructions  from  Washington  to  aid  Sir  John 
Bowring  in  the  renewal  of  the  British  treaties  which  was 
due,  according  to  the  English  interpretation  of  the  American 
treaty,  on  the  29th  of  August  of  that  year.* 

♦The  Treaty  of  Nanking  had  lieon  signed  August  29.  1S42.  The  Treaty  of 
the  Bogue.  the  following  year,  had  contained  a  most-fa vored-nation  clause. 
The  American  treaty  stipulated  that  "inasmuch  as  the  circumstances  of  the 
several  ports  of  China  open  to  foreign  commerce  are  diflferent.  experience  may 
show  that  considerable  modifications  are  requisite  in  those  parts  which  relate 
to  commerce  and  navigation  ;  in  which  case  the  two  Governments  will  at  the 
expiration  of  twelve  years  from  the  date  of  said  convention,  treat  amicably 
concerning  the  same.  .  .  ."  It  was  on  the  strength  of  these  facts  that  Great 
Britain  rested  the  claim  for  a  revision  of  the  treaties — a  claim  which  Yeh  at 
Canton  promptly  rejected. 


238  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Bowring  had  suffered  from  Yeh  treatment  very  similar 
to  that  which  had  been  administered  to  Marshall  and 
McLane,  and  at  length  formally  notified  Yeh  that  he  would 
seek,  in  company  with  the  American  Minister,  the  revision 
of  the  treaties  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho. 

McLane  and  Bowring  Go  to  the  Pei-ho 

The  British  Minister,  unlike  McLane,  was  under  very 
specific  and  well  considered  instructions  from  his  govern- 
ment as  to  just  what  he  should  ask  for  in  the  treaties.* 

The  proposals  were  much  more  moderate,  as  well  as 
more  detailed,  than  those  which  McLane  had  presented  to 
E-liang.  Beside  them  the  pro  jet  of  the  American  Commis- 
sioner was  ill-considered  and  rash.  It  is  at  this  point  that 
the  inherent  weakness  of  the  American,  as  contrasted  with 
the  British,  diplomatic  establishment  in  China  becomes  con- 
spicuously apparent.  Bowring  had  been  in  China  for  many 
years;  McLane  only  a  few  months.  Lord  Clarendon  had 
been  studying  the  relations  between  Great  Britain  and 
China  from  an  exceptional  point  of  observation  for  m-ore 
than  a  score  of  years.  President  Pierce  and  Secretary  of 
State  Marcy  had  very  recently  come  into  office,  and  so  little 
did  they  know  of  the  actual  situation  in  China  that  McLane 
was  not  only  without  detailed  instructions  covering  such 
points  as  Clarendon  had  outlined  to  Bowring,  but  McLane's 
projet  when  reported  to  Washington,  failed  to  draw  any 
word  of  criticism  or  of  caution.  McLane  enjoyed  to  the 
"/fullest  extent  the  confidence  of  the  administration  and,  had 
'  he  not  insisted  on  the  acceptance  of  his  resignation  because 
of  ill  health,  he  would  have  been  returned  to  China  the 

*ThP8e  points  wore:  1.  Access  to  all  of  China,  or,  failing  this,  free  naviga- 
tion of  the  Yangtze  as  far  as  Nangldng  and  the  opening  of  .some  more  ports  on 
the  coast.  2.  Legalization  of  the  opium  trade.  3.  Abolishment  of  internal  or 
transit  dues  on  goods  imported  from  foreign  countries,  or  destined  to  lie 
exjiorted  to  foreign  countries.  4.  Provision  for  the  effectual  suppressioTi  of 
piracy  along  the  coast.  5.  Kegulation  of  the  emigration  of  OhiTu^se  laborers, 
ti.  Permanent  and  honorable  residence  of  a  diplomatic  representative  of  the 
British  Crown  af  Peking;  or,  if  this  could  not  be  obt.iined,  then  provision  for 
habitual  correspondence  between  the  British  and  the  Chinese  authorities  at  the 
capital.  7.  Provision  for  ready  int(>rcourse  between  the  British  representative 
in  China  and  the  governor  of  any  province  where  the  representative  might  be 
residing.  8.  In  the  revised  treaty  the  English  versioa  alone  to  be  the  authori- 
tative text. 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       239 

following  year  to  take  up  the  negotiations  where  he  had 
dropped  them. 

On  November  3  Commissioner  McLane  and  vSir  John 
Bowring  had  an  interview  in  a  tent  near  the  Hae  Kow  Forts 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho,  with  Tsung  Lun,  an  Imperial 
Commissioner  of  inferior  rank.  It  had  been  intended 
originally  that  the  French  Minister,  M.  de  Bourboulon, 
should  accompany  them  to  the  Pei-ho,  but  an  accident 
to  the  French  war  vessel  in  which  he  was  to  go  made  it 
impossible.  He  therefore  sent  Count  Kleskowsky  of  the 
French  legation,  as  his  representative.  The  French  officer 
was  the  guest  of  the  American  Commissioner  on  board  the 
U.  S.  war  steamer  Powhatan. 

In  the  interview  of  November  3,  Bowring  did  not  submit 
an  outline  of  the  changes  in  the  treaty  which  he  desired. 
McLane  on  the  contrary  added  to  his  pro  jet  a  great  many 
details  which  had  been  omitted  from  the  outline  submitted 
to  E-liang.  The  entire  negotiations  came  to  nothing.  The 
envoys  were  told  to  go  back  to  Canton,  there  to  wait  for  an 
answer  from  the  Emperor.  It  was  already  evident  from  the 
tone  of  Tsung  Lun's  comments,  that  the  Emperor  was  will- 
ing to  grant  none  of  the  important  points  proposed  by 
McLane.  The  result  of  the  expedition  was  that  the  de- 
mands of  two  of  the  treaty  powers  had  been  successfully 
denied  by  the  Imperial  authorities,  and  the  meanness  of 
their  reception  in  the  tent  interview  was  a  clear  indication 
that  the  Government  of  China  would  never  willingly  treat 
with  the  foreign  powers  on  terms  of  diplomatic  equality.^'^ 

Tsung  Lun  and  his  associate  made  complete  reports  to 
the  Emperor  on  the  meeting  with  the  foreign  envoys,  one 
of  Tsung  Lun's  comments  being:  ^^  "The  English  barbar- 
ians are  .  .  .  full  of  insidious  schemes,  uncontrollably  fierce 
and  imperious.  The  American  nation  does  no  more  than 
follow  their  direction." 

McLane  returned  from  the  Pei-ho  in  November  in  no 
mood  for  temporizing.  After  submitting  a  full  report  to  the 
President  he  outlined  the  following  possible  courses  of 
action:  ^^     (1)  To  adhere  to  the  former  policy  of  awaiting 


240  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

developments,  preserving  strict  neutrality  between  the 
rebels  and  the  Imperialists,  and  protecting  American  inter- 
ests as  far  as  possible  with  the  United  States  naval  forces 
then  on  the  coast.  (2)  To  aid  the  Imperial  forces  in  sup- 
pressing the  rebellion,  or,  (3)  for  the  President  to  address 
a  letter  to  the  Emperor  pointing  out  that  China  had  violated 
her  treaty  with  the  United  States,  this  letter  to  be  presented 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  by  two  sloops  of  war  and  a 
steamer.  In  case  the  Emperor  will  not  accede  to  the  de- 
mand to  open  up  friendly  diplomatic  intercourse  with  the 
United  States  to  secure  the  settlement  of  these  pending 
questions,  and  the  revision  of  the  treaty,  then  McLane  pro- 
posed more  vigorous  action. 

"I  would  recommend,"  he  wrote,  "that  the  Pei-ho  and  the  Yangtze 
Iviang,  as  well  as  the  River  Min  and  the  Whampoa  Reach  be  placed 
under  blockade  by  the  united  forces  of  the  three  treaty  powers- 
Great  Britain^^  France  and  the  United  States — and  so  held  until  the 
commercial  privileges  of  buying  from  and  selling  to  all  persons  in 
China,  without  limitation  or  restraint,  is  respected,  and  all  the  other 
treaty  stipulations  recognized  and  enforced,  where  the  authority  of 
the  Imperial  Government  is  paramount." 

McLane  felt  that  to  pursue  the  first  of  these  policies  was 
futile,  and  he  did  not  believe  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  would  favor  the  second.  He  heartily  recom- 
mended the  joint  blockade. 

To  this  recommendation  Secretary  of  State  Marcy  re- 
plied in  a  letter  of  instructions  which  reached  China  long 
after  McLane  had  left,^^  that  "the  President  will  have 
serious  objections  to  uniting  with  Great  Britain  and  France 
in  what  you  call  the  aggressive  policy — that  is  the  bringing 
together  a  united  naval  force  of  the  three  powers  in  order 
to  obtain  the  revision  of  the  treaties  with  China,  securing 
larger  commercial  privileges  by  intimidation,  or  possibly  by 
force.  .  .  ." 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

VI."  S.  Ex.  Doc.  39:3G-1. 

2.     McLane    Corres.,    S.    Ex.    Doc.    22:35-2,    May    4,    '54;    see    also 
Michie's  "The  Englishman  in  China,"  Vol.  1,  p.  149;  Morse, 

Vol.  2,  pp.  19-88. 


THE  POLICY  OF  COMMISSIONER  McLANE       241 

3.  McLane  Corros.,  pp.  33-39. 

4.  11ml..  p.  112. 

5.  Michie,  Vol.  1,  p.  152;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  22:35-2,  p.  908. 

6.  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  22:35-2,  p.  908;  S.  Ex.  Doc  30:36-1,  p.  530. 

7.  Marshall  Corres.,  p.  205. 

8.  Eichardson's  Messages,  Vol.  5,  pp.  199-200. 

9.  Marshall  Corres.,  pp.  18-24,  25,  85,  132-5,  352. 
10^  McLane  Corres.,  pp.  21-2. 

"    Ilnd.,  p.  54. 
Ilkh,  pp.  143  ff. 

13.  Ihid.,  p.  147. 

14.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  30:30-1,  p.  452;  Reed's  speech  (pamphlet),  p.  IG. 

15.  For  complete  account  of  the  Pei-ho  exi)edition,  see  Disp.  No.  20, 

McLane  Corres.,  p.  285  ff. 
1 G.     S.  Ex.  Doc.  30 :36-l,  p.  478. 

17.  McLane  Corres.,  pp.  287-292. 

18.  China  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Feb.  2G,  1855. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE 

While  the  opening  of  Japan  by  Commodore  Perry  in 
1854  came  as  a  direct  result  of  American  trade  expansion, 
the  causes  which  produced  it  were  not  so  simple  as  those 
which  led  to  the  Cushing  Mission.  In  1844  American  rela- 
tions with  the  Far  East  were  almost  exclusively  with  China; 
in  1853  they  were  not  only  with  China  but  also  with  the 
entire  North  Pacific  Ocean. 

Japan  and  Early  Pacific  Trade 

The  rapid  growth  of  the  Northwest  Coast  fur  trade  had 
brought  Japan  for  a  few  years  within  the  interest  of  Ameri- 
cans, yet  without  leading  to  any  definite  results.  The 
Lady  Washington  (Captain  Kendrick)  and  the  Grace 
(Captain  Douglas)  visited  a  southern  port  of  Japan  in  1791 
in  an  effort  to  dispose  of  sea-otter  peltries,  on  their  way  to 
Canton,  but  the  Japanese  had  refused  to  trade  with  them. 
This  visit  and  refusal  made  so  little  impression  that  they 
were  almost  immediately  forgotten  by  Americans,  few  of 
whom  aside  from  the  crews  of  the  vessels  appear  to  have 
known  of  it.^ 

In  1807  the  Eclipse  of  Boston,  chartered  by  the  Russian- 
American  Company  at  Canton  for  Kamchatka  and  the 
Northwest  Coast,  and  carrying  several  British  sailors  who 
had  been  induced  to  desert  from  Company  ships  at  Wham- 
poa,  visited  Nagasaki  and  was  peacefully  captured  by  the 
Japanese,  supplied  freely  with  water  and  permitted  to  de- 
part. The  Eclipse  entered  the  Japanese  port  under  the 
Russian  flag  which  the  Dutch  superintendent  advised  them 
to  haul  down  because  the  Japanese  had  been  so  enraged 

242 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         243 

by  the  conduct  of  Russian  officers  in  Sakhalen  the  previous 
year.2  ^^  ^j^g  close  of  the  War  in  1812,  the  new  vigor  of 
Aiiierican  trade  expansion  is  registered  in  the  proposition 
made  by  Commodore  Porter  to  Secretary  of  State  Monroe 
to  send  an  expedition  to  Japan.  A  frigate  and  two  sloops 
of  war  were  proposed  for  the  enterprise  but  nothing  was 
done  about  it.^  Porter,  during  the  war,  had  occupied  Madi- 
son Island  in  the  South  Pacific,  November,  1813,  building  a 
fort  which  he  manned  with  four  guns.  A  month  later  he 
was  compelled  to  surrender  to  Commodore  Hillyar  of  the 
British  navy  near  Valparaiso.  Porter  eventually  made  his 
way  back  to  New  York  where  he  arrived  in  the  summer  of 
1815.  His  proposal  to  open  Japan  may  be  said  to  have 
marked  the  high  tide  of  American  interest  in  the  Pacific 
until  1830.^ 

Another  series  of  approaches  to  Japan  were  made 
through  Batavia.  In  1797  the  Eliza  (Captain  Stewart)  re- 
ported as  belonging  to  New  York,  and  carrying  the  Ameri- 
can flag,  appeared  at  Nagasaki.  Captain  Stewart  repre- 
sented himself  as  the  agent  of  the  Dutch  East  India  Com- 
pany of  Batavia,  and  in  some  way  effected  an  exchange  of 
cargo.  The  following  year  the  Eliza  returned,  secured 
another  cargo,  but  had  the  misfortune  to  strike  a  rock  in 
Nagasaki  harbor  and  was  compelled  to  remain  in  port  until 
the  next  season.  In  1799  the  Eliza  sailed  away  with  its 
cargo,  but  it  did  not  go  to  Batavia.  Four  years  later  the 
vessel  returned,  still  under  the  American  flag,  but  from 
Bengal.  Meanwhile  both  the  Dutch  and  the  Japanese  had 
become  aware  that  the  Eliza  was  really  employed  by  the 
British  in  an  effort  to  create  a  British  trade  with  Japan, 
and  the  vessel  was  refused  a  cargo.  Captain  Stewart  was 
an  Englishman  and  the  vessel,  while  it  may  have  been  built 
in  America  and  sold  in  the  East,  probably  was  entirely  with- 
out legal  right  to  fly  the  American  flag.'^ 

The  first  genuinely  American  vessel,  after  the  Lady 
Washington  and  the  Grace,  to  enter  Japan  was  the  Franklin 
(Captain  Devereaux)  of  Boston,  owned  by  the  Perkinses 
and  James  Dunlap.    The  Franklin  arrived  at  Batavia  from 


244  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Boston  ill  April,  1799,  and  was  immediately  engaged  by  the 
East  India  Company  to  take  the  place  of  the  annual  Dutch 
ship  to  Nagasaki,  an  American  vessel  being  chosen  because 
of  its  neutral  character.  This  was  the  first  ripple  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars  in  Asia.  Captain  Devereaux  was  in- 
structed to  hoist  the  Dutch  pennant  "as  if  you  were  a 
Dutch  ship"  as  soon  as  he  came  in  sight  of  Japan.  The 
instructions  also  contained  one  order  which  throws  light  on 
the  cause  of  Japanese  exclusiveness,  harking  back  to  history 
nearly  two  centuries  old. 

"All  the  books  of  the  people  and  officers,  particularly  religious 
books,  must  be  put  in  a  cask  and  headed  up  [upon  approaching' 
Japan]  ;  the  officers  from  shore  will  put  their  seals  upon  the  cask,  and 
take  it  on  shore,  and  on  the  departure  of  the  ship,  will  bring  it  on 
board  without  having  opened  it." 

The  Franklin  remained  about  four  months  in  Nagasaki 
harbor,  and  reached  Batavia  again  December  18,  1799.*^ 
In  1801  the  Margaret  (Captain  Samuel  Derby)  of  Salem, 
secured  the  contract  for  the  East  India  Company  voyage, 
and  similar  voyages  were  made  in  1802,  1803,  1806,  1807 
and  1809,  after  which  the  Dutch  factory  at  Nagasaki  was 
left  without  word  from  the  outside  world  until  near  the 
close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  when  the  British  made  a 
second  unsuccessful  effort  to  take  up  the  trade.  In  view  of 
the  fact  that  these  American  vessels  were  compelled  to  hoist 
the  Dutch  flag  when  in  Japanese  waters,  one  wonders 
whether  the  American  flag  was  actually  shown  at  Nagasaki 
after  1791. 

Edmund  Roberts  and  Japan 

The  part  of  the  program  of  Edmund  Roberts  in  1832 
which  included  Japan  has  already  been  alluded  to.  From 
the  inauguration  of  the  Roberts  Mission  the  idea  of  making 
a  treaty  with  Japan  appears  to  have  grown  rapidly  into 
favor  with  the  American  Government.  At  the  request  of 
the  Department  of  State  John  Shellaber,  United  States  Con- 
sul at  Batavia,  prepared  outlines  of  a  program  of  treaty- 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE        245 

making  in  the  East  which  included  many  suggestions  about 
Japan.'  He  advised  that  an  attempt  to  make  at  least  some 
sort  of  an  agreement  with  the  Empire  would  probably  meet 
with  success.  Previous  missions  had  failed,  he  thought, 
"owing  to  the  jealous  fears  entertained  by  the  Japanese  Em- 
perors that  those  powers  would  sooner  or  later,  if  any  inter- 
course was  opened,  interfere  with  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Empire,  attempt  to  subvert  its  Government  and  probably 
make  a  conquest  of  the  country.  I  allude  more  especially 
to  England  and  Russia."  Shellaber  pointed  out  that  the 
Americans  would  be  free  of  all  suspicion,  and  predicted  that 
in  three  or  four  years  a  trade  would  grow  up  with  a  tonnage 
of  5000,  amounting  to  $300,000.  At  least,  thought  the  con- 
sul, the  mission  could  secure  in  Japan  a  resort  for  American 
whale  ships.  Shellaber  strongly  recommended  that  the  pro- 
posed expedition  should  be  carried  in  a  merchant  rather 
than  a  national  vessel. 

A  few  weeks  after  Edmund  Roberts  departed  from  Bos- 
ton in  the  Peacock  a  commission  was  issued  to  him  (June 
26,  1832)  to  go  to  Japan,  but  no  mention  was  made  in  it  of 
securing  a  treaty.*^  Four  months  later  (October  28,  1832) 
Secretary  of  State  Livingston  wrote  to  Roberts  again,  stating 
that  the  government  had  in  contemplation  a  separate  mis- 
sion to  that  empire,  but  authorizing  Roberts,  in  case  the 
prospects  seemed  favorable,  ''to  fill  out  one  of  the  letters  of 
credence"  and  go  to  Japan.  He  was  however  cautioned  to 
go  in  a  merchant  vessel,  having  the  Peacock  only  as  a  con- 
voy. The  Peacock  was  to  wait  outside  for  a  favorable 
development  of  the  negotiations.^  Roberts  found  it  im- 
practicable, owing  to  lack  of  funds,  to  carry  out  the  sugges- 
tion of  Livingston,  but  he  reported  from  Batavia,  June  22, 
1833:  i« 

"I  have  no  doubt  from  information  obtained  from  merchants  of 
the  first  respectability  in  this  place  that  by  judicious  management 
all  the  principal  ports  in  Japan  would  be  thrown  open  to  the  American 
trade.  The  Americans  are  the  only  people  who  can  proliably  effect 
this.  The  Portuguese  and  Spaniards  are  by  law  of  the  Emi)ire  for- 
ever excluded,  and  the  unprincipled  conduct  of  Captain  Pellew  of  the 
Phaeton  in  ISOS  in  the  liarbor  of  Nagasaki,  has  caused  the  Japanese 


246  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Government  to  reject  every  overture  which  has  been  made  to  them 
since  that  time  by  the  British.  During  the  hist  European  war  several 
American  ships  were  chartered  here  for  the  Dutch  factory  at  Decima, 
and  met  with  no  difficulty  on  account  of  the  flag." 

Upon  Roberts'  return  from  his  first  mission  he  made  a 
report  to  Secretary  of  State  McLane  (May  12,  1834)  in 
which  he  stated  that  the  Dutch,  owing  to  their  jealousy  of 
Americans,  "whom  they  fear  as  their  only  rivals,"  had  mis- 
represented the  character  of  the  Japanese  for  their  own 
ends.  He  believed  the  Japanese  to  be  free  from  every  pre- 
judice that  would  prevent  Americans  from  trading  with 
them,  and  suggested  that  the  way  to  the  trade  with  Korea 
and  northern  China  would  be  open  in  case  a  treaty  were 
made  with  Japan. 

By  means  of  other  investigations  and  unknown  sources 
the  Department  of  State  was  advised  that  the  proposed 
approach  to  Japan  ought  to  be  made  in  a  national  ship,  that 
it  should  be  made  at  some  port  other  than  Nagasaki,  pre- 
ferably nearer  the  seat  of  government,  and  that  while 
general  trade  would  not  at  first  be  permitted,  it  seemed 
probable  that  a  beginning  might  be  made.  Presents  to  the 
Emperor  should  accompany  the  envoy.* 

In  view  of  the  success  which  had  attended  the  first 
Roberts  mission,  apparently  all  thought  of  a  special  mission 
to  Japan  was  abandoned,  and  when  Roberts  sailed  again  to 
exchange  ratifications  of  the  treaties  of  Muscat  and  Siam, 
he  was  commissioned  to  resume  the  negotiations  with 
Cochin  China  and  then  to  proceed  with  all  secrecy  to  Japan 
in  the  Peacock.  The  death  of  Roberts  at  Macao  in  1836 
brought  this  enterprise  to  an  end. 

Visit  of  the  Morrison,  1837 

The  next  American  effort  to  unlock  the  gates  of  Japan 
was  a  private  one  undertaken  by  the  firm  of  Olyphant  and 
Company  of  Canton  in  1837.    The  Olyphant  firm  had  come 

*Tliis  information  was  secured  in  answer  to  a  list  of  ten  questions  and  was 
contributed  liv  some  American  who  had  been  a  resident  at  the  Dutch  factory 
perhaps  in   1S07  or  1809." 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         247 

to  occupy  a  unique  place  in  the  commercial  life  of  Canton 
because  of  the  refusal  of  the  firm  to  deal  in  opium  and 
because  of  the  hearty  support  to  the  Protestant  missionaries 
afforded  not  only  by  D.  W.  C.  Olyphant  the  founder,  but 
also  by  the  younger  partners.  Indeed  it  had  been  in  part 
due  to  Olyphant  that  the  first  American  missionaries,  Rev. 
E.  C.  Bridgman  and  Rev.  Edwin  Stevens,  were  sent  to 
China  in  1830.^^  As  the  Olyphant  firm  prospered,  the  sup- 
port to  the  missionaries  increased  and  widened.  In  1835 
the  firm  had  made  it  possible  for  Medhurst  and  Stevens  to 
make  a  voyage  of  missionary  exploration  northward  along 
the  coast  in  the  brig  Huron.  The  results  of  this  voyage  so 
encouraged  the  firm  that  they  had  the  Himmaleh  built  in 
the  United  States  at  a  cost  of  $20,000  and  fitted  out  for  a 
cruise  of  missionary  trade  and  exploration  in  the  Malay 
archipelago  and  Japan  Sea.  The  Himmaleh  took  on  Rev. 
Edwin  Stevens  of  the  American  Board  and  G.  Tradescant 
Lay,  agent  of  the  British  and  Foreign  Bible  Society  and 
started  southward.  There  was  no  opium  or  firearms  in  the 
cargo.  The  voyage  proved  abortive,  owing  in  part  to  the 
death  of  Stevens  in  Singapore  in  January,  1837.  The  Him- 
maleh returned  to  Canton,  was  loaded  with  tea  and  dis- 
patched to  the  United  States. 

The  voyage  of  the  Morrison,  while  not  directly  related  to 
the  previous  experiments  of  the  Himmaleh,  is  to  be  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  that  experience.  The  Morrison,  be- 
longing to  Olyphant  and  Company,  and  named  after  the 
famous  missionary,  arrived  in  China  too  late  in  the  spring 
of  1837  to  secure  a  return  cargo.  The  vessel  must  therefore 
lay  over  a  season,  and  C.  W.  King,  one  of  the  Olyphant 
partners,  only  twenty-eight  years  old,  proposed  to  occupy 
the  idle  time  with  a  voyage  of  exploration  to  Japan  similar 
to  that  undertaken  by  the  Himmaleh  to  Borneo  and  Celebes. 
There  were  at  that  time  at  Macao  seven  shipwrecked  Jap- 
anese sailors,  three  from  the  Northwest  coast  who  had 
reached  China  by  way  of  London,  and  four  who  had  been 
brought  in  from  the  Pacific  by  way  of  Manila.  King  decided 
not  to  wait  for  the  return  of  the  Himmaleh  but  rather  to 


248  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

proceed  at  once  to  Japan  to  repatriate  the  Japanese,  and  to 
seize  the  opportunity  to  open  up  negotiations  for  missionary- 
work  and  for  trade.  The  Morrison  was  unarmed,  and  the 
party  included  S.  Wells  Williams,  missionary  printer  of  the 
American  Board,  Rev.  Peter  Parker,  M.  D.,  of  the  Mission- 
ary Ophthalmic  Hospital  at  Canton,  and  Rev.  Charles  Gutz- 
laff  who  had  recently  entered  the  service  of  the  British 
Government  as  interpreter.  Gutzlaff  joined  the  expedition 
at  Lew  Chew,  Napa,  to  which  point  he  was  conveyed  in  the 
British  sloop  of  war  Raleigh. 

The  Morrison  reached  the  Bay  of  Yedo  in  July,  1837, 
anchored  at  Uraga,  and  declared  the  purpose  of  the  visit. 
It  was  also  contemplated  to  offer  the  Japanese  a  teacher, 
i.e.,  a  missionary,  if  they  were  willing  to  receive  him.  The 
authorities  refused  to  have  any  dealings  with  the  Morriso7i, 
ordered  her  away  and  then  opened  fire  upon  the  vessel  from 
the  forts.  A  second  effort  was  made  at  Kagoshima  to  open 
up  communications  with  the  authorities,  but  a  second  time 
the  vessel  was  fired  on.  None  of  the  Japanese  sailors  were 
landed. 

Mr.  King  wrote  a  book — "The  Claims  of  Japan  and 
Malaysia  upon  Christendom,  exhibited  in  notes  of  voyages 
made  in  1837  from  Canton  in  the  ship  Morrison,  and  the 
brig  Himinaleh,  under  the  direction  of  the  owners" — in 
which  he  urged  the  American  Government  to  take  up  the 
insult  to  the  American  flag  and  to  demand  a  treaty.  S. 
Wells  Williams  returned  to  Macao  much  impressed  with 
the  superior  strength  and  culture  of  the  Japanese,  and  an- 
ticipated that  'a  war-like  attempt  upon  the  nation'  would 
be  attended  with  'fatal  influences.'  He  immediately  under- 
took, with  the  aid  of  the  Japanese  sailors,  the  study  of  the 
language  with  a  view  to  laying  the  foundations  for  future 
missionary  work.^^  While  the  voyage  of  the  Morrison  had 
no  immediate  result,  it  may  be  said  that  from  the  time  of 
its  visit  to  Japan,  the  subject  of  opening  up  the  country  was 
never  suffered  to  drop  out  of  sight. 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         249 

Revival  of  American  Interest  in  Japan 

A  'full  power'  to  treat  with  the  Japanese  authorities 
was  issued  to  Caleb  Gushing,  at  his  suggestion,  August  15, 
1844.'^  The  Secretary  of  State  in  forwarding  the  letter 
remarked  that  'little  probability  exists  of  expecting  any 
commercial  arrangement  with  that  country.'  This  authority 
did  not  reach  Gushing  before  he  returned  to  the  United 
States. 

In  less  than  three  weeks  after  the  publication  of  the 
Gushing  correspondence  on  the  Ghina  treaty,  Zedoc  Pratt, 
of  New  York,  introduced  a  resolution  in  the  House  calling 
for  immediate  measures  to  effect  commercial  arrangements 
with  the  Empire  of  Japan  and  the  Kingdom  of  Korea  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  important  ''to  the  general  interests 
of  the  United  States  that  a  steady  and  persevering  effort 
should  be  made  for  the  extension  of  American  commerce, 
connected  as  that  commerce  is  with  the  agriculture  and 
manufactures  of  our  country."  This  resolution  expressed 
the  confident  hope  that  another  year  would  not  elapse  before 
the  American  people  would  "be  able  to  rejoice  in  the  knowl- 
edge that  the  'star-spangled  banner'  is  recognized  as  an 
ample  passport  and  protection  for  all.  .  .  ."  The  resolu- 
tion, however,  passed  unnoticed.^ ^ 

The  whale  ship  Manhattan  (Gaptain  Mercator  Gooper) 
of  Sag  Harbor,  had  visited  the  Bay  of  Yedo  April  17,  1845, 
with  a  number  of  shipwrecked  Japanese  sailors  and  had  been 
very  kindly  treated  although  not  permitted  to  remain  more 
than  a  few  days.  When  the  Manhattan  left  she  carried 
some  Japanese  stowaways  who  had  seized  the  opportunity 
thus  offered  to  go  abroad  to  study  the  western  world.^^ 

Alexander  H.  Everett,  the  first  American  Gommissioner 
to  Ghina  under  the  new  treaty,  who  sailed  for  Ghina  early  in 
June  1845,  carried  a  commission  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with 
Japan,  and  Gommodore  Biddle,  who  had  been  ordered  to 
convey  Everett  to  Ghina  in  the  U.  S.  S.  Columbus,  also  had 
instructions  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Bancroft,  per- 
mitting him  to  make  a  visit  to  Japan  in  case  Everett  did 


250  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

not  decide  to  accompany  him.  The  new  commissioner  be- 
came ill  on  the  voyage  to  Rio  Janeiro.  He  was  compelled 
to  return  and  did  not  reach  China  until  October,  1846. 
Meanwhile  Commodore  Biddle,  to  whom  Everett  had  dele- 
gated his  duties,  proceeded  to  China,  exchanged  ratifica- 
tions of  the  treaty  and  then  moved  on  up  the  coast  to 
Shanghai  where  he  found  that  Henry  G.  Wolcott  had 
already  begun  to  ship  American  cotton  goods  to  Japan 
through  the  Chinese  merchants. 

Commodore  Biddle,  with  the  Columbus  and  the  Vin- 
cennes,  anchored  in  the  Bay  of  Yedo  July  20,  1846,  and 
inquired  politely  whether  the  Government  of  Japan  was 
willing  to  open  its  ports  to  Americans  and  to  make  a  treaty. 
The  Japanese  firmly  refused.  The  conversations  were 
seriously  handicapped  by  lack  of  suitable  interpreters,  and 
the  commodore's  visit  was  marred  by  an  incident  which 
otherwise  might  have  been  avoided.  While  Biddle  was 
about  to  go  on  board  a  Japanese  junk  to  receive  the  formal 
answer  of  the  government,  a  Japanese  soldier  either  struck 
or  pushed  him.  Biddle  had  not  been  expected  by  the 
Japanese  officials  and  there  were  none  ready  to  receive  him. 
Profuse  apologies  were  afterwards  offered  and  Biddle  stated 
that  he  would  be  satisfied  with  whatever  punishment  for 
the  soldier  the  Japanese  law  provided.  The  reply  to  Bid- 
die's  request  for  the  opening  of  trade  was  an  anonymous 
communication  ordering  him  to  go  away  and  never  return.^'' 

The  magnanimous  conduct  of  Commodore  Biddle  ap- 
pears to  have  been  misinterpreted  by  the  Japanese  as 
weakness  and  lack  of  dignity.  Accounts  of  the  insult,  mag- 
nified and  misunderstood,  spread  not  only  throughout 
Japan,  but  even  to  the  Lew  Chews  and  the  Americans  were 
made  to  appear  as  having  accepted  an  insult  with  com- 
placency. It  was  believed  that  Biddle's  visit  left  matters 
in  a  'less  favorable  position'  than  before.  Before  the  report 
of  Biddle's  visit  reached  Washington,  a  second  commission 
had  been  issued  to  Everett  to  replace  the  one  he  had  given 
to. Biddle,  but  Everett  did  not  live  to  carry  out  the  plans 
of  his  government.^  ^ 


ATXmPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         251 

From  tlye  year  1846  the  subject  of  a  treaty  with  Japan 
came  more  and  more  to  engage  the  attention  of  Americans. 
With  the  increase  of  American  shipping  at  Shanghai,  and 
the  increase  of  the  whale  fisheries  in  the  North  Pacific,  a 
larger  number  of  vessels  were  coming  into  Japanese  waters. 
The  shores  of  Japan  were  largely  uncharted,  and  rough 
weather  was  not  uncommon.  There  were  not  a  few  wrecks. 
On  June  8,  1846,  Senator  Dix  of  New  York  presented  in  the 
Senate  a  memorial  signed  by  presidents  of  marine  insurance 
companies,  ship-builders  and  steam-engine  manufacturers, 
proposing  a  mission  to  Japan. ^■' 

The  treatment  of  shipwrecked  American  sailors  in  Japan 
became  one  of  the  important  influences  which  kept  the 
subject  alive.  In  May,  1846,  the  whaler  Lawrence  of  Pough- 
keepsie  (Captain  Baker)  was  wrecked  and  eight  of  the 
crew  reached  shore.  These  survivors  met  with  varied  treat- 
ment, some  of  which  was  very  severe.  After  seventeen 
months'  imprisonment  they  were  turned  over  to  the  Dutch 
factory  and  sent  to  Java  on  a  Dutch  merchantman.  They 
had  been  in  captivity  when  Commodore  Biddle  was 
anchored  in  the  Bay  of  Yedo.  In  February,  1848,  the  whale 
ship  Lagoda  (Captain  John  Brown)  of  New  Bedford  struck 
a  shoal  in  the  Japan  Sea  and  was  wrecked.  The  survivors 
reached  Matsumai  and  were  transferred  to  Nagasaki  where 
they  were  carefully  confined.  Information  of  their  im- 
prisonment reached  United  States  Commissioner  John  W. 
Davis  at  Canton,  through  the  Dutch  consul,  and  Commo- 
dore David  Geissinger  ordered  Commander  James  Glynn, 
January  31,  1849,  to  proceed  to  Nagasaki  in  the  Preble  to 
rescue  them.  "You  will  be  careful,"  read  Glynn's  instruc- 
tions, "not  to  violate  the  laws  or  customs  of  the  country,  or 
by  any  means  prejudice  the  success  of  any  pacific  policy  our 
government  may  be  inclined  to  pursue."  His  conduct  was 
to  be  'concihatory  but  firm.'  Glynn  experienced  some  diffi- 
culty in  effecting  the  release  of  the  prisoners  who  had  been 
very  badly  treated.  Had  the  American  Government  been  in 
a  mood  for  reprisals  or  war,  the  treatment  of  the  Lagoda 
survivors  would  have  afforded  sufficient  excuse.     Early  in 


252  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

January,  1851,  three  more  Americans  who  had  found  their 
way  into  Japan  were  repatriated  through  the  Dutch 
factory.^" 

The  cruel  treatment  to  which  the  Americans  in  Japan 
were  at  times  subjected  is  to  be  accounted  for  by  the 
fact  that  the  Japanese  authorities,  perhaps  because  of 
the  increasing  numbers  of  Americans  who  appeared  in 
Japan,  had  come  to  entertain  suspicions  that  the  Ameri- 
cans were  sending  spies  into  the  empire  with  sinister 
motives. 

Other  factors  contributing  to  the  creation  of  pubhc 
opinion  in  regard  to  the  opening  of  Japan  had  their  origin 
within  the  United  States. 

China  and  the  East  generally  were  rapidly  coming  to  be 
looked  upon  as  the  great  future  market  for  American  prod- 
uce, especially  manufactured  cottons.*  -^  The  consequent 
new  interest  in  Asia  included  Japan  and  Korea  as  well  as 
China.  The  effort  of  A.  H.  Palmer  of  New  York,  director 
of  the  American  and  Foreign  Agency,  which  carried  on  a 
business  as  commission  agents  in  the  foreign  trade,  espe- 
cially for  steam  vessels  and  machinery,  were  so  extensive, 
so  thorough,  and  so  persistent  as  to  warrant  special  notice. 
Palmer  began  a  systematic  study  of  the  markets  of  Asia  as 
early  as  1839.  He  would  appear  to  have  been  father  to  that 
characteristically  American  method  of  commercial  conquest 
by  circularization.  His  circulars  were  spread  broadcast 
through  Asia,  from  the  shores  of  eastern  Africa  to  Japan. 
In  the  five  years,  1842-7,  he  sent  no  less  than  fourteen  such 
communications  to  Nagasaki,  slipping  them  into  Japan  by 
means  of  the  good  offices  of  the  Dutch  factory,  if  indeed  they 
ever  went  any  farther.  Palmer  made  a  careful  study  of 
every  possible  market,  giving  especial  attention  to  the  politi- 
cal aspects  of  the  questions  involved  and  was,  presumably, 
the  best  informed  American  on  the  subject  in  1852.  He 
prepared  at  various  times  between  1846  and  1849  a  number 

*Unfortunately  no  careful  study  of  the  growth  of  American  trade  with  China 
in  this  neriod  has  been  made.  The  evidence  for  this  statement  meets  one,  how- 
ever, throughout  the  British  and  American  documents,  some  of  which  are  cited 
subsequently. 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         253 

of  reports  for  the  Department  of  State,  one  of  which  was 
addressed  directly  to  President  Polk  (January  10,  1848). 
Palmer  even  prepared  a  plan  for  a  mission  and  went  so  far 
as  to  submit  a  draft  of  a  letter  to  be  sent  by  PresidAit  Taylor 
to  the  Emperor.  He  proposed  that  the  Gushing  treaty  of 
1844  should  serve  as  a  model  for  a  treaty.  Palmer  was 
afterwards  described  by  ex-Secretary  of  State  Clayton  as 
'entitled  to  more  credit  for  getting  up  the  Japan  Expedi- 
tion, than  any  other  man  I  know  of.'  -^ 

Meanwhile  others  were  approaching  the  problem  from 
still  another  angle.  The  application  of  steam  navigation  to 
the  trans-Pacific  routes  by  American  vessels  met  with  the 
almost  insuperable  obstacle  of  lack  of  coal  supplies.  Steam 
navigation  on  the  coast  of  China  had  been  attempted  with 
success  during  the  Anglo-Chinese  War,  and  had  been  taken 
up  for  mercantile  purposes,  but  the  coal  was  brought  out 
from  England  and  was  very  expensive.  The  voyage  across 
the  Pacific  was  more  extended  between  coaling  stations  than 
any  part  of  the  voyage  from  England  to  China.  The  needs 
of  American  shipping  companies  were  imperative.  Japan 
was  believed  to  have  large  supplies  of  coal,  and  her  ports  in 
the  days  of  uncertain  steam  navigation  were  absolutely  es- 
sential to  the  proposed  line  of  American  trans-Pacific 
steamers.-^ 

The  settlement  of  the  Pacific  Coast  by  Americans,  and 
especially  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California  yielded  added 
argument  for  steam  navigation  of  the  Pacific.  Then  came 
the  agitation  for  an  Isthmian  canal,  the  first  proposal  for 
which,  apparently,  was  born  in  the  brain  of  Captain  Ken- 
drick  on  the  Northwest  coast  before  1790.  As  early  as  1826 
A.  H.  Palmer  secured  from  the  Republic  of  Central  America 
a  concession  for  a  canal,  and  went  to  London  to  interest 
British  capital  in  the  venture.-^  In  1852  the  building  of  the 
trans-Isthmian  railroad  and  the  establishment  of  a  line  of 
steamers  up  the  Pacific  Coast  to  San  Francisco  and  the 
various  projects  for  a  transcontinental  railroad  from  the 
Mississippi  to  either  San  Francisco  or  San  Diego  served  to 
oring  the  whole  question  of  American  relations  in  the  Pacific 


254  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

and  in  Asia  more  directly  to  the  attention  of  Americans 
than  ever  before. 

The  various  expansive  movements,  political  and  mili- 
tary as  well  as  commercial,  which  characterized  the  fifth  and 
sixth  decades  of  the  last  century  of  American  history,  all 
created  an  atmospheric  condition  favorable  to  still  further 
adventures.  The  times  were  quite  different  from  those 
when  Edmund  Roberts  was  sent  out  to  Asia  in  1832  as  a 
ship's  clerk,  or  even  when  Gushing  went  to  Macao, 

Before  passing  to  the  Perry  Expedition  we  may  appro- 
priately review  briefly  the  course  of  events  in  Japan  in  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

European  Powers  and  Japan 

Thoughtful  Japanese  had  been  made  increasingly  aware, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  policy  of  exclusion  was  costly  to 
Japan  and  on  the  other,  that  the  day  was  rapidly  approach- 
ing when  the  policy  could  not  be  sustained  before  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Western  nations.  To  go  back  no  further  than 
the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Japan  had  already 
felt  the  impact  of  advances  from  both  Russia  and  England, 
and  had  been  repeatedly  warned  by  Holland. 

Russia  had  made  herself  an  uncomfortable  neighbor. 
In  1804  Captain  Krusenstern  had  appeared  at  Nagasaki  to 
take  up  the  negotiations  which  had  been  begun  by  Lieuten- 
ant Laxman  in  1792.  Laxman  had  passed  a  winter  on  the 
northern  coast  of  the  island  of  Yezo,  and  visited  both  Hako- 
date and  Nagasaki.  He  had  been  given  a  paper  authorizing 
Russian  vessels  to  enter  Nagasaki  harbor.  With  Krusen- 
stern came  Resanoff,  a  special  envoy,  and  some  shipwrecked 
Japanese  sailors  who  had  been  driven  ashore  on  the  coast 
of  Siberia.  Resanoff  asked  for  the  opening  of  Japan  to 
Russian  trade.  The  Japanese  refused.  In  the  years  1806 
and  1807  Krusenstern,  in  retaliation  for  the  refusal,  sent 
two  small  vessels  to  ravage  the  coast  of  Sakhalin  and  Iturup. 
The  next  year  a  Japanese  explorer  went  northward  and 
ascertained  for  the  first  time,  so  far  as  the  Japanese  were 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         255 

concerned,  that  Sakhalen  was  an  island  rather  than  a 
peninsula  of  the  mainland.-^  In  1811  Captain  Golownin,  in 
the  sloop  of  war  Diana,  surveyed  the  Kurile  Islands  and 
was  made  a  prisoner  by  the  Japanese.  He  and  several  other 
officers  were  kept  in  Japan  as  prisoners  for  several  years. 
Some  of  the  Japanese  improved  the  opportunity  to  learn 
the  Russian  language.  In  1849  Nevelskoi,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Count  Muravieff,  had  explored  Sakhalen  and  estab- 
lished a  Russian  port  at  Dui.-*^  Meanwhile  the  Russians 
had  for  many  years  maintained  a  diplomatic  and  ecclesias- 
tical establishment  in  Peking  and  in  1850,  by  the  con- 
vention of  Kuldja,  had  established,  themselves  in  a  more 
favorable  position  in  China.    Japan  feared  Russia. 

Nor  had  the  advances  of  England  in  Asia  passed  unno- 
ticed among  the  Japanese.  In  1808  Captain  Pellew  in  H.  M. 
S.  Phaeton,  which  had  already  terrorized  American  shipping 
at  Canton,  sailed  into  Nagasaki  harbor  in  search  of  Dutch 
merchantmen  and  threatened  to  burn  the  Japanese  and 
Chinese  junks  if  not  supplied  with  provisions  and  water. -^ 
The  supplies  were  forthcoming  and  the  Phaeton  left 
abruptly  while  the  Japanese  were  planning  a  trap.  The 
visit  of  Captain  Pellew  had  revealed  to  the  Japanese  that 
the  morale  of  the  army  was  at  low  ebb;  as  a  result  of  the 
humiliation  administered  by  the  British  captain,  several 
Japanese  officers  committed  hari-kari.  Five  years  later  Sir 
Stamford  Raffles  of  Singapore  fame  had  attempted  to  open 
trade  with  the  Japanese,  but  the  Dutch  director  at 
Deshima  *  refused  to  recognize  the  English  rule  in  Java  and 
threatened  to  expose  the  British  intrigue  to  the  Japanese. 
Raffles  sent  Dr.  Ainslie,  a  physician,  with  the  expedition 
and  he  was  permitted  to  remain,  being  known  as  an  Ameri- 
can. The  attempt  to  open  trade  for  British  merchants  came 
to  nothing  and  soon  afterwards  Java  was  returned  to  the 
Netherlands.  In  1818  Captain  Gordon  of  the  British  navy 
in  a  trading  brig  of  65  tons  entered  the  Bay  of  Yedo  from 
Okhotsk.     He  was  well  treated  but  failed  to  attain  his 

♦Deshima  is  a  siiiall  island  close  to  tke  shore  in  Nagasaki  harbor,  where  the 
Dutch  E.  I.  Company  factory  was  located. 


256  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

object.  The  outcome  of  the  Anglo-Chinese  War  (1839-42) 
created  a  profound  impression  in  Japan.  In  1845  H.  M. 
frigate  Saviarang  visited  Nagasaki,  and  in  1849,  five  weeks 
after  the  Preble  had  left  Nagasaki,  the  British  surveying 
ship  Mariner  visited  both  Uraga  and  Shimoda,  making 
surveys. 

The  French  admiral  Cecille  appeared  in  Japan  in  1846 
shortly  after  Commodore  Biddle  left. 

The  Dutch  trade  at  Deshima  was  not  in  a  flourishing 
condition  at  any  time  in  the  nineteenth  century.  The  chief 
profit  was  made  out  of  the  copper  which  was  taken  from 
Japan  to  Java  and  there  coined  and  circulated  at  a  rate 
above  its  intrinsic  value.  During  the  Napoleonic  wars  the 
Dutch  East  India  Company  became  extinct  and  the  Dutch 
Government  took  over  the  Nagasaki  trade  in  1817.  Ten 
years  later  the  trade  was  turned  over  to  a  new  company  but 
in  1829  it  was  returned  to  the  government  as  being  un- 
profitable. The  trade  connection  was  retained  by  the 
Netherlands  for  sentimental  and  political  rather  than  for 
commercial  reasons.  In  1844  William  II  of  the  Netherlands 
addressed  to  the  Shogun  a  personal  letter  in  which  he  cited 
the  Anglo-Chinese  War  and  stated  "The  future  of  Japan 
causes  us  much  anxiety."  The  king  explained  how  the 
sovereigns  of  Europe  after  the  Napoleonic  wars  had  opened 
to  their  subjects  every  channel  of  trade  with  a  view  to  the 
preservation  of  peace.  He  explained  how  the  introduction 
of  steam  navigation  had  shortened  distances  and  said  that  a 
nation  which  continued  to  remain  in  seclusion  could  not 
avoid  the  hostility  of  other  nations.  He  feared  that  a  dis- 
aster such  as  had  recently  come  to  China  was  threatening 
the  Japanese  Empire.  Although  the  Japanese  had  issued  a 
mandate  in  1842  ordering  kindly  treatment  for  all  foreign 
vessels  in  distress,  the  Shogun  replied  to  the  king  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  change  a  policy  of  seclusion  which 
was  in  accord  with  'ancestral  law.'  Japan  refused  to  make 
a  treaty  with  the  Netherlands.-^  The  Dutch  agents  at 
Deshima  kept  the  Japanese  informed  as  to  the  progress  of 
political  events  in  the  outside  world.    In  1850  they  notified 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         257 

the  Japanese  authorities  that  the  governor  general  of  India 
had  secured  permission  to  attempt  to  make  a  treaty  with 
Japan,  and  when  the  Americans  arrived  in  1853  the  Jap- 
anese were  well  informed  of  their  approach  as  well  as  of  the 
outcome  of  the  recent  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico. 

While  the  official  policy  of  the  Tokugawa  Government 
remained  unaltered,  Nagasaki  was  rapidly  becoming  a  source 
of  much  enlightenment  to  the  Japanese,  and  new  educa- 
tional impulses  were  making  themselves  felt.  A  European 
form  of  drill  was  adopted  for  the  army  and  the  Japanese 
were  learning  the  art  of  modern  ship-building.  The  science 
of  western  medicine  was  also  introduced.  Deshima  became 
a  window  which  not  only  disclosed  a  view  but  also  let  in  no 
inconsiderable  amount  of  light. 

Meanwhile  the  political  position  of  the  Shogun's  Gov- 
ernment had  been  steadily  disintegrating.  Japan  had  never 
been  less  able  to  repel  an  attack  from  a  foreign  nation  than 
in  1853,  while  the  foreign  nations  had  never  been  so  well 
prepared  to  make  one.  Another  situation  favored  the  pro- 
posed American  expedition  to  Japan :  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Russia  were  becoming  occupied  with  the  Crimean 
affairs  leaving  the  Pacific  for  the  moment  more  to  the 
Americans  than  it  had  ever  been  before,  or  would  be  again 
for  many  decades. 

In  1851,  after  the  return  of  the  Preble  to  the  United 
States,  interest  in  Japan  reached  a  high  point.  Com- 
mander James  Glynn,  at  the  request  of  the  President,  sub- 
mitted in  writing  his  opinion  that  a  commercial  treaty  with 
Japan  could  not  be  long  delayed.  A  port  in  Japan  was,  he 
thought,  absolutely  necessary  for  the  proposed  line  of  trans- 
Pacific  steamers,  and  he  recommended  that  suitable  efforts 
be  made  ''if  not  peaceably,  then  by  force."  Glynn,  however, 
counselled  that  the  approach  to  Japan  be  made  on  equal 
terms,  as  to  any  European  Power.  "It  may  be  desirable," 
he  remarked,  "on  some  future  occasion  to  justify  ourselves 
before  the  world  in  the  measures  used  towards  Japan  besides 
mere  argument  or  entreaty."     He  recommended  that  no 


258  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

complaints  for  past  offenses  should  be  made  and  that  the 
British  and  Dutch  governments  should  be  conciliated. 

Accepting  completely  this  wise  advice,  Secretary  of  State 
Webster  issued  a  commission  to  Commodore  J.  H.  Auhck 
(June  10,  1851),  commanding  the  U.  S.  China  Squadron,  to 
proceed  to  Japan  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  a  treaty. 
The  commission  was  never  executed  because  of  the  illness 
of  Aulick  and  also  because  of  charges  lodged  against  him 
from  which  he  was  subsequently  cleared  by  the  Navy  De- 
partment, but  too  late  to  admit  him  to  the  Japan  Expedi- 
tion. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Morison :    "Maritime  History  of  Massachusetts,"  p.  182. 

2.  Archibald  Campbell :     "A  Voyage  Around  the  World,"  pp.  28-9. 

3.  DeBow's  Review,  Vol.  13,  p.  560. 

4.  Capt.  D.  Porter :    "Journal  of  a  Cruise  in  the  Pacific  in  1812-14" ; 

Callahan :  "American  Relations  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far 
East,"  pp.  25-29. 

5.  Richard    Hildreth :      "Japan    as    It    Was    and    Is,"    pp.    446-7. 

Hildreth  cites  Sir  Stamford  Raffles,  and  also  a  pamphlet  by 
Hagendorp,  published  in  Boston,  1800,  to  prove  that  the  Eliza 
was  an  English  enterprise. 

6.  Hist.  Col.  of  Essex  Institute,  Vol.  2,  pp.  287  ff.,  p.  166;  Hildreth, 

p.  456. 

7.  Batavia  Consular  Letters,  Vol.  1,  May  30,  July  1,  Aug.  12,  1831. 

8.  Edmund  Roberts  Papers  (Lib.  of  Congress). 

9.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  59:32-1,  p.  63. 

10.  Roberts  Papers  (Dept.  of  State). 

11.  Ihid. 

12.  "Memoirs  of  Robert  Morrison,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  87,  127-8,  165,  386, 

404,  458. 
V-13.  For  full  account  of  the  Morrison  visit  see:  "Journal  of  the 
Perry  Expedition  (1853-4)"  in  Trans,  of  the  Asiatic  Society 
of  Japan,  Vol.  37,  Part  I  (1910)  p.  11;  Bibliography  of  the 
Voyage  of  the  Morrison,  in  Chinese  Repository,  Vol.  6,  (1837) ; 
"Claims  of  Japan  and  Malaysia  upon  Christendom,"  2  vols. ; 
and  "Journal  of  an  Expedition  from  Singapore  to  Japan,"  by 
P.  Parker  M.  D. ;  Hildreth,  p.  491  ff;  "Life  and  Letters  of 
Peter  Parker,"  by  Stevens  and  Marwick. 

14.  China  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Aug.  15,  1844. 

15.  H.  Doc.  138  :28-2. 

16.  H.   Doc.   96 :29-2,   p.   28,   gives   an   account   of  the  visit   of  the 

Manhattan ;  see  also  Nitobe's  Intercourse  between  the  United 
vStates  and  Japan. 

17.  China  Dispatches,  Vol.  3;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  59  :32-l,  pp.  64  ff. 

18.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  59:32-1,  p.  69. 


ATTEMPTS  TO  OPEN  JAPAN  TO  TRADE         259 

19.  H.  Doc.  9G  :29-2,  p.  33. 

20.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  59:32-1,  gives  extended  account  of  these  incidents; 

Preble  correspondence  also  published  separately  as  H.  Ex.  Doc. 
84  :31-1. 

21.  See  Clive  Day :     "Hist,  of  Amer.  Commerce,"  pp.  498-514  for  a 

convenient  summary. 

22.  H.  Doc.   96:29-2;   S.   Misc.   Docs.   80:30-1;   Natl.   Intelligencer, 

Sept.  G,  1849;  H.  Misc.  Docs.  10:33-2. 

23.  H.  Rep.  569  :30-l,  May  4,  1848 ;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  49  :32-2. 

24.  S.  Misc.  Docs.  80:30-1,  p.  66  fif;  H.  Rept.  439  :31-1. 

25.  Stead:    "Japan    by   the    Japanese,"    pp.    149-50;    Hildreth,   pj). 

446-7. 

26.  Stead,  p.  150. 

27.  W.  G.  Aston :  Tram,  of  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan,  Vol.  VII,  1879. 

28.  D.  C.  Greene :    Trans,  of  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan,  Vol.  XXXIV, 

Part  IV,  pp.  110  £f. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

COMMODOEE  PEEEY'S  POLICY 

The  first  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Japan 
was  attended  by  many  circumstances  dissimilar  from  those 
which  governed  the  making  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia. 
While  Gushing  was  negotiating  at  Macao  there  was  already 
a  large  American  trade  with  China  which  must  not  only  be 
protected  but  also  left  undisturbed ;  there  was  a  strong  and 
well-defined  mercantile  tradition  as  to  what  constituted 
sound  policy.  There  were  other  foreign  powers,  particularly 
Great  Britain  and  France,  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  the 
negotiator  was  a  lawyer,  and  China  had  just  emerged  from 
disastrous  war.  In  Japan  it  was  different:  there  was  no 
trade  to  protect,  no  traditions  to  be  reckoned  with,  and  no 
other  foreign  power  to  embarrass  the  proceedings;  and 
although  he  was  enjoined  to  use  only  peaceful  methods,  the 
negotiations  were  in  the  hands  of  a  naval  officer.  There 
were  also  important  differences  in  the  temper  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  in  1853  as  compared  with  1844.  Within  the 
decade  the  United  States  had  pushed  its  way  across  the 
continent  to  the  Pacific  Coast,  and  by  means  of  a  successful 
war  had  extended  its  boundaries  to  the  Rio  Grande. 

The  policy  of  Commodore  Perry  for  the  Pacific  Ocean 
and  for  Asia  may  properly  be  discussed  from  three  points  of 
view:  the  instructions  from  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  which  guided  Perry;  the  negotiations  of  1853  and 
1854  at  Yedo  and  the  resulting  treaty;  and  the  policy  of 
Perry  himself  as  it  appeared  in  his  dispatches  and  subse- 
quent utterances.  We  have  again  to  remember  that  initial 
American  policies  in  Japan,  as  in  China,  were  largely  per- 
sonal. They  were  framed  by  not  more  than  three  or  four 
people  and  executed  by  only  one — Commodore  Perry. 

260 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  261 

Instructions 

The  instructions  for  the  Japanese  Expedition  underwent 
a  distinct  development  before  they  were  issued  in  their 
final  form  to  Commodore  Perry.  The  first  set  of  instruc- 
tions had  been  drafted  by  Secretary  of  State  Webster  and 
given  to  Commodore  Aulick  June  10,  1851.^  They  were 
similar  in  tone  to,  though  not  so  complete  as,  those  given  to 
Caleb  Gushing  eight  years  before.  Perhaps  the  most  signifi- 
cant feature  was  the  omission  of  all  reference  to  the  insults 
which  had  been  offered  to  the  American  flag  and  the  indig- 
nities and  cruelties  suffered  by  American  citizens  and 
officers  in  the  Morrison,  Biddle,  Lagoda,  and  other  affairs. 
Webster's  policy  was  to  ignore  these  affronts  and  to  start 
anew  with  no  thought  of  reparations  or  apologies.  The 
Webster  instructions  dwelt  most  upon  the  necessity  of  secur- 
ing supplies  of  coal  in  order  that  steam  navigation  of  the 
Pacific  might  be  established.  "We  should  make  another 
appeal,"  wrote  Webster,  ''to  the  sovereign  of  that  country 
to  ask  him  to  sell  to  our  steamers  not  the  manufactures  of 
his  artisans,  or  the  results  of  the  toil  of  his  husbandmen,  but 
a  gift  of  Providence  deposited  by  the  Creator  of  all  things 
in  the  depths  of  the  Japanese  islands  for  the  benefit  of  the 
human  family."  Beyond  the  securing  of  coal  supplies, 
Aulick  was  authorized  to  secure  a  treaty,  if  possible,  similar 
to  those  with  Muscat,  Siam  and  China  in  which  protection 
for  shipwrecked  and  distressed  sailors  would  be  stipulated, 
and  'one  or  more'  ports  opened  to  trade.  The  accompany- 
ing letter  from  President  Fillmore  to  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
written  by  Webster,  asked  for  "friendly  commercial  inter- 
course and  nothing  more." 

For  the  delivery  of  the  letter  and  the  support  of  the 
negotiations  Aulick  would  have  at  his  disposal  on  the  China 
station  a  very  modest  fleet,  the  steamer  Susquehanna  and 
two  sloops  of  war,  the  Plymouth  and  the  Saratoga.  It  was 
not  even  certain  that  all  of  these  could  be  spared  from  the 
China  coast  for  an  expedition  to  Japan. 

The  instructions  issued  to  Perry  by  Acting  Secretary  of 


262  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

State  C.  M.  Conrad,  November  5,  1852,  were  quite  different 
in  tone  and  more  explicit  in  details.^  Perry  had  accepted 
the  appointment  to  the  Expedition  with  some  reluctance, 
and  having  consented  to  the  appointment,  appears  to  have 
been  given  a  large  freedom  in  planning  the  methods  by 
which  it  was  to  be  carried  out.  Owing  to  the  illness  of 
Webster,  Perry  was  permitted  to  draft  his  own  instructions 
which  were,  of  course,  submitted  to  the  Department  of 
State  for  revision  and  approval.^  Whether  any  revision 
actually  took  place  may  best  be  judged  by  comparing  the 
instructions  as  signed  by  Conrad  with  other  statements  of 
Perry  in  which  his  ideas  of  Far  Eastern  policy  were  un- 
folded. At  any  rate  the  spirit  of  Webster  had  departed 
from  the  Perry  instructions. 

While  the  objects  of  the  expedition  as  stated  by  Webster 
were  left  practically  unchanged — protection  for  distressed 
American  sailors,  one  or  more  ports  to  be  opened  to  trade, 
and  the  right  to  purchase  coal — the  Japanese  were  described 
as  a  'weak  and  semi-barbarous  people'  whose  conduct 
towards  shipwrecked  sailors  had  brought  them  into  the 
category  of  those  nations  which  "may  justly  be  considered 
as  the  common  enemy  of  mankind."  The  duty  of  protecting 
Americans  who  navigated  those  seas  was  one  "that  can  no 
longer  be  deferred."  "While  it  is  true,"  read  the  instruc- 
tions, "that  every  nation  undoubtedly  has  the  right  to  deter- 
mine for  itself  the  extent  to  which  it  will  hold  intercourse 
with  other  nations,  the  exercise  of  such  a  right  imposes 
duties  which  cannot  justly  be  disregarded."  The  disregard 
of  the  duty  to  care  for  distressed  seamen  was  intolerable. 
The  instructions  contained  a  very  significant  paragraph  in 
which  the  relations  of  the  United  States  to  Japan  were  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  the  respective  position  of  the  two 
nations  on  the  Pacific  Ocean — the  first  comprehensive  state- 
ment of  the  basis  of  an  American  policy  for  the  Pacific. 
This  paragraph  read : 

"Recent  events — the  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam,  the  acquisi- 
tion and  rapid  settlement  by  this  country  of  a  vast  territory  on  the 
Pacific,  the  discovery  of  gold  in  that  region,  the  rapid  communication 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  263 

established  across  the  Isthmus  which  separates  the  two  oceans — have 
practically  brought  the  countries  of  the  east  in  closer  proximity  to 
our  own ;  althoufih  the  consequences  of  these  events  have  scarcely 
begun  to  be  felt,  the  intercourse  between  them  has  already  greatly  in- 
creased and  no  limits  can  be  assigned  to  its  future  extension." 

More  significant  than  the  statement  of  the  objects  to  be 
obtained  were  the  methods  to  be  employed.  At  the  time  the 
instructions  were  issued  it  was  expected  that  the  fleet  would 
consist  of  five  steamers  and  six  or  more  sailing  vessels — by- 
far  the  largest  American  fleet  that  had  ever  appeared  in 
Eastern  waters.  This  formidable  fleet  was  to  be  used  as  a 
'persuader,'  to  use  the  word  of  President  Fillmore  many 
years  later.  It  was  assumed  that  "arguments  or  persuasion 
addressed  to  this  people,  unless  they  are  seconded  by  some 
imposing  manifestation  of  power,  will  be  utterly  unavail- 
ing." Perry  was  instructed  to  proceed  to  some  point  on 
the  coast  of  Japan  with  his  whole  force,  to  assure  the 
Japanese  of  the  friendly  feelings  of  the  United  States,  but 
to  bring  up  the  cases  of  the  Morrison,  the  Lagoda  and  the 
Lawrence,  and  to  explain  to  the  authorities  that  the  United 
States  desired  'positive  assurance'  that  in  the  future  such 
insults  and  indignities  would  not  be  repeated. 

These  desires  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  were  to 
be  supported  with  explanations  that  in  the  United  States 
religion  is  free  and  that  Japan  need  have  no  fear  that  the 
American  Government  would,  as  the  older  European  nations 
had  done  two  centuries  before,  seek  to  interfere  with  the 
religion  of  Japan.  Perry  was  also  to  disarm  the  fears  and 
prejudices  of  the  Japanese  by  explaining  that  the  United 
States  was  quite  separate  from  and  very  independent  of 
Great  Britain  whose  recent  war  with  China  had  been  alarm- 
ing to  Japan.  The  Japanese  were  to  have  explained  to  them 
that  Japan  and  the  United  States  had  become  neighbors 
across  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  that  the  choice  lay  with  the 
Japanese  as  to  whether  the  two  nations  should  be  friendly 
neighbors.  "The  President  desires  to  live  in  peace  and 
friendship  with  the  Emperor" ;  but  "no  friendship  can  long 
exist  between  them  unless  Japan  should  change  her  policy 


264  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

and  cease  to  act  towards  the  people  of  the  United  States  as 
if  they  were  her  enemies," 

If  such  arguments  did  not  secure  any  relaxation  of  the 
policy  of  exclusion,  or  even  any  assurance  of  humane  treat- 
ment for  seamen,  Perry  was  instructed  to  "change  his  tone, 
and  to  inform  them  in  the  most  unequivocal  terms  that  it  is 
the  determination  of  this  government  to  insist  that  here- 
after all  citizens  or  vessels  of  the  United  States  that  may 
be  wrecked  on  their  coasts  or  driven  by  stress  of  weather  into 
their  harbors  shall,  so  long  as  they  are  compelled  to  remain 
there,  be  treated  with  humanity;  and  that  if  any  acts  of 
cruelty  should  hereafter  be  practiced  upon  citizens  of  this 
country,  whether  by  the  government  or  the  inhabitants  of 
Japan,  they  will  be  severely  chastised." 

It  is  obvious  that  such  instructions  admitted  of  very 
wide  latitude  in  interpretation  and  therefore,  although 
Perry  was  "invested  with  large  discretionary  powers"  he  was 
cautioned  to  bear  in  mind  that  he  was  to  avoid  all  provoca- 
tion. The  mission  was  to  be  pacific  in  character  and  was 
not  to  resort  to  force  unless  in  self-defense  "in  the  protec- 
tion of  the  vessels  and  crews  under  his  command,  or  to 
resent  an  act  of  personal  violence  offered  to  himself  or  to 
one  of  his  officers."  The  President,  Perry  was  reminded, 
had  no  power  to  declare  war. 

A  new  letter  from  President  Fillmore  to  the  Emperor,  a 
revision  of  the  Webster  letter  which  had  been  given  to 
Aulick,  written  by  Edward  Everett,  was  entrusted  to  Perry. 
It  was  broadly  similar  to  yet  more  imperative  than  the 
Webster  letter,  specifying  friendship,  commerce,  access  to 
coal  and  provisions,  and  protection  for  distressed  sailors  as 
the  objects.  As  for  the  last  mentioned  the  letter  stated, 
"we  are  very  much  in  earnest  about  this."  It  was  also  sug- 
gested that  Japan  might,  if  not  yet  wholly  willing  to  aban- 
don the  policy  of  exclusion,  at  least  try  the  experiment  of  a 
suspension  of  the  policy  for  five  or  ten  years,  making  a 
treaty  which  would  be  terminable  at  the  end  of  a  given 
period. 

The  Perry  Expedition,  like  that  of  Edmund  Roberts,  and 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  265 

unlike  the  Gushing  and  the  proposed  Auliek  missions, 
carried  a  generous  supply  of  presents  for  the  Emperor, 
including  a  small  steam  engine  such  as  had  been  ordered  for 
Roberts,  and  suggested  for  Gushing. 

Negotiations  and  Treaty 

The  Japan  Expedition,  greatly  reduced  as  to  size,  con- 
sisting of  only  two  steamers  and  two  sloops  of  war,  anchored 
in  the  Bay  of  Yedo  off  Uraga  on  July  8,  1853,  and  remained 
in  the  bay  nine  days.^  Having  in  mind  the  firing  on  the 
Morrison  in  1837,  and  the  kidnapping  of  the  Russian  Cap- 
tain Golownin  in  1811,  Perry  ordered  the  decks  to  be  cleared 
for  action  and  the  guns  shotted  as  the  squadron  sailed  up 
the  bay.^  The  fleet  w^as  anchored  with  a  view  to  possible 
attack  and  never  for  one  moment  during  either  the  first 
or  the  second  visit,  were  either  officers  or  crews  permitted  to 
remove  themselves  so  far  from  the  vessels  that  they  could 
not  have  been  protected  by  the  guns. 

Perry  adopted  a  policy  of  magnifying  his  own  office  and 
dignity  which  was  fully  in  accord  with  the  experience  gained 
by  Edmund  Roberts,  Caleb  Gushing  and  Commodore  Bid- 
die,  He  permitted  no  friendly  approaches  by  minor  officials 
and  surrounded  himself  with  a  majesty  which  the  Oriental 
always  recognizes  and  appreciates. 

To  orders  to  retire  and  go  to  Nagasaki  the  commodore 
was  deaf;  efforts  to  place  the  fleet  under  the  guard  of 
Japanese  boats  and  soldiers  were  met  by  the  assertion  that 
if  the  Japanese  authorities  did  not  remove  the  guards  he 
would  remove  them  by  force;  and  when  the  Japanese  be- 
came evasive  about  receiving  the  President's  letter,  Perry 
threatened  that  if  a  suitable  person  was  not  appointed  to 
receive  the  documents  he  would  go  ashore  with  a  sufficient 
force  and  deliver  them  himself.  While  the  Japanese  were 
considering  this  threat  Perry  ordered  surveying  boats,  well 
manned  and  armed,  to  begin  surveys  of  the  bay  and  harbor, 
being  careful  not  to  go  outside  the  range  of  the  guns.  When 
requested  to  withdraw  these  surveying  boats,  Perry  refused. 


266  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Indeed  the  Mississippi,  the  flag-ship,  was  sent  still  farther 
up  the  bay  in  the  direction  of  Yedo  and  the  surveys  of  the 
approach  to  the  capital  were  extended.  The  commodore 
explained  that  these  surveys  were  necessary  because  he 
intended  to  return  in  the  spring  with  a  'larger  force.' " 

The  Japanese  were  notified  that  if  the  President's  letter 
to  the  Emperor  were  not  duly  received  and  replied  to,  he 
would  consider  his  country  insulted  and  would  ''not  hold 
himself  accountable  for  the  consequences."  Before  such 
threats  and  intimidation  the  Japanese  could  not  well  do 
otherwise  than  yield,  and  the  letter  was  received  with  suit- 
able ceremony  on  shore,  Perry  delivering  it  to  "the  Prince 
of  Idzu,  first  counsellor  of  the  Emperor  and  his  coadjutor, 
the  Prince  of  Iwami."  Perry  was  then  ordered  to  depart 
but  instead  of  obeying  he  immediately  ordered  the  whole 
squadron  to  .get  under  way  in  the  direction  of  Yedo,  and  in 
the  Mississippi  Perry  went  to  within  seven  miles  of  the 
city.  Mindful  of  his  instructions,  however.  Perry  paused 
just  short  of  the  point  where  his  movements  might  be 
regarded  as  provocation,  and  retired  from  Japanese  waters, 
having  notified  the  Japanese  that  he  would  return  in  the 
spring  with  a  larger  force  to  receive  an  answer  to  the  Presi- 
dent's letter  and  the  proposals  for  a  treaty. 

Before  his  return  Perry  had  established  a  depot  with 
large  supplies  of  coal  at  Napa,*  on  the  island  of  Great  Lew 
Chew,  and  had  directed  Commander  John  Kelly  of  the 
Plymouth  to  proceed  to  the  Bonin  group  of  islands,  and 
formally  take  possession  of  the  Baily  islands  in  the  name  of 
the  United  States.  This  mission  was  accomplished  October 
30,  1853,  the  principal  island  being  named  'Hillsborough' 
and  the  port  christened  'Newport,'  according  to  Perry's 
directions.  That  these  islands  had  been  named  and  claimed 
for  Great  Britain  by  Captain  Beechy  in  1827  in  no  way  dis- 
turbed the  commodore. 

The  report  of  the  first  visit  of  the  American  expedition 
to  Japan,  as  well  as  the  tenor  of  some  of  Perry's  dispatches 

*Tlio  si)ollinK  is  variod  :  tho  .Tiipanosp  uow  spt'U  it  Naba,  The  Great  Lew 
Chew  is  called  Okinawa  (Great  Napa). 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  267 

had  a  somewhat  disturbing  effect  in  Washington  where  the 
Pierce  achninistration  had  succeeded  that  of  Filhnore  since 
Perry's  departure  for  the  East.  By  direction  of  the  Presi- 
dent, Secretary  of  the  Navy,  J.  C.  Dobbin,  immediately 
cautioned  Perry  again  that  his  mission  was  to  be  one  of 
merely  peaceful  negotiation  and  that  no  violence  must  be 
resorted  to  except  for  self-defense  J 

The  fleet,  somewhat  enlarged,  but  not  so  large  as  had 
been  originally  planned  by  the  Fillmore  administration, 
returned  to  the  Bay  of  Yedo  February  13,  1854.  The  Jap- 
anese Government  had  decided  to  meet  the  returning  expe- 
dition with  conciliation,  but  the  policy  proposed  was  to 
prevent  as  far  as  possible  the  approach  of  the  Americans  in 
the  direction  of  Yedo.  Perry,  on  the  other  hand,  was  deter- 
mined to  advance  beyond  the  anchorage  at  Uraga  where  the 
negotiations  of  the  preceding  summer  had  taken  place. 
When  the  Japanese  attempted  to  draw  him  back  to  Kami- 
kura  for  a  conference,  he  asserted  that  he  intended  to  go  to 
Yedo.  A  compromise  was  effected  by  which  the  conference 
was  held  at  Yokohama,  which  is  less  than  twenty  miles 
from  Yedo  (Tokio).^ 

The  reply  to  the  President's  letter  contained  the  surpris- 
ing and  significant  statement  ''for  us  to  continue  attached 
to  the  ancient  laws,  seems  to  misunderstand  the  spirit  of 
the  age."  The  Japanese  were  willing  to  open  the  port  of 
Nagasaki  to  the  Americans  under  very  stringent  regulations 
similar  to  those  under  which  the  Dutch  and  Chinese  trade 
had  been  conducted,  and  they  also  proposed  to  open  a 
second  port  to  the  Americans  at  the  end  of  five  years.  They 
were  also  prepared  to  give  promises  as  to  the  reception  of 
shipwrecked  sailors.  However,  they  stipulated  that  what- 
ever Americans  came  to  Japan  should  be  subjected  to 
restraints  which  amounted  to  little  less  than  imprisonment. 
Perry  thereupon  increased  his  demands:  he  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  Nagasaki  where  traditions  as  to  the 
treatment  of  foreigners  might  always  operate  as  an  embar- 
rassment to  intercourse,  just  as  similar  traditions  at  Canton 
were  even  then  causing  trouble.  He  asserted  that  he  desired 


268  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

a  treaty  similar  to  that  existing  between  the  United  States 
and  China  and  that  he  desired  the  opening  of  no  less  than 
three  ports  immediately  and  two  more  within  a  short  time. 
He  intimated  that  if  Japan  did  not  make  these  concessions 
the  United  States  might  decide  to  send  still  more  ships  as 
well  as  more  stringent  instructions.  Notwithstanding  the 
clashes  of  opinion  the  negotiations  proceeded  with  cordiality 
and  courtesy,  and  the  treaty  was  signed  March  31,  1854. 

The  treaty  presented  a  singular  contrast  to  the  methods 
by  which  it  had  been  obtained,  so  much  of  a  contrast  that 
one  is  justified  in  finding  the  actual  American  policy  in  the 
treaty  and  in  minimizing,  as  so  many  have  done,  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  method.  Perry  was  so  sure  of  the  harmless- 
ness  of  the  treaty  and  even  of  its  direct  benefit  to  Japan 
that  he  felt  able  to  disregard  the  customary  methods  of 
American  diplomacy.  On  the  other  hand  one  cannot  help 
but  feel  that  in  the  art  of  negotiation  the  Japanese  had 
surpassed  the  naval  diplomat. 

The  Japanese  had  offered  to  open  Nagasaki  on  terms 
similar  to  those  endured  by  the  Dutch.  Perry  had  shown 
them  the  Gushing  treaty  with  China  and  demanded  three 
ports  immediately — either  Uraga  in  Hondo  or  Kagoshima 
in  Kyushu ;  Matsumai  in  Yezo ;  and  Napa  in  the  Lew  Chews 
— with  the  promise  of  two  more  ports  at  a  later  date.  By 
the  treaty  the  Americans  were  allowed  to  enter  Hakodate,  a 
smaller  town  but  a  better  harbor  near  Matsumai,  and 
Shimoda  on  the  southern  coast  of  Hondo  not  far  from  the 
Bay  of  Yedo.  Shimoda  was  entirely  without  value  as  a 
port  of  trade  and  the  harbor  also  was  of  less  utility  than 
was  supposed  by  Perry.  Napa  was  ignored  in  the  treaty 
and  Perry  came  to  the  conclusion  before  he  left  China  that 
the  Lew  Chews  were  really  more  closely  related  to  China 
than  to  Japan.  Permanent  residence  for  Americans  at  either 
of  the  two  strictly  Japanese  ports  was  not  contemplated  in 
the  treaty  although  a  consul  was  permitted  to  reside  at  the 
inaccessible  Shimoda.  While  those  who  temporarily  visited 
these  ports  were  not  to  be  subjected  to  such  humiliating 
surveillance  as  the  Japanese  had  at  first  proposed,  the  trade 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  269 

was  to  be  on  a  cash  basis,  specie  in  exchange  for  ship-sup- 
plies, and  was  to  be  supervised  exclusively  by  the  govern- 
ment officials.  In  fact  the  treaty  was  hardly  more  than  a 
shipwreck  convention,  the  necessities  of  distressed  mariners 
being  amply  provided  for.  It  bore  no  resemblance  to  and 
could  stand  no  comparison  with  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia. 

The  treaty  contained,  however,  a  most-favored-nation 
clause  and  there  was  one  very  significant  omission.  Perry 
had  asked  for  no  extraterritorial  rights  whatever.  It  has 
been  claimed  and  there  is  no  reason  to  question  the  assertion 
that  the  absence  of  such  a  provision  was  due  to  Dr.  S.  Wells 
Williams  who  accompanied  the  expedition  as  Chinese  inter 
prefer.^  Williams  had  had  an  opportunity  to  watch  th 
operation  of  extraterritoriality  in  China  and  was  firmly  per- 
suaded that  it  was  such  an  evil  as  a  strong  nation  ought  not 
to  force  upon  a  weak  one.  Perry  also  was  familiar  with 
the  situation  in  China  and  was  apparently  willing  to  agree 
with  Williams  without  question.  It  is  in  the  omission  of 
this  provision  in  the  Japanese  treaty  that  the  true  character 
of  Perry  is  to  be  read.  He  would  bluster,  threat-en,  even 
intimidate,  but  he  would  not  assume  the  responsibility  of 
inflicting  a  possible  evil  on  the  Japanese. 

The  treaty  quite  failed  to  grant  access  to  the  supplies 
of  coal  which  had  been  the  very  first  object,  in  the  minds 
of  many,  for  the  expedition.  Hakodate  was  far  removed 
from  the  route  of  trans-Pacific  travel,  and  even  before  Perry 
left  Japan  he  acknowledged  in  a  separate  agreement  with 
the  Japanese  that  coal  could  not  be  procured  at  Shimoda.^" 

Having  pointed  out  the  relatively  small  part  of  Perry's 
original  demands  which  had  been  granted,  and  the  inten- 
tional omission  of  extraterritorial  rights  which  the  foreigner 
in  China  had  already  come  to  regard  as  too  useful  to  be 
dispensed  with,  we  must  however  return  to  the  fact  that 
the  treaty  had  been  obtained  without  firing  a  shot,  and  that 
it  left  no  rancor.  It  was  in  fact  what  its  language  claimed — 
a  treaty  of  friendship.  It  was  far  more  friendly  to  Japan 
than  the  Cushing  treaty  was  to  China.  It  would  not  be 
fair,  however,  to  award  the  credit  for  the  treaty  exclusively 


270  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

to  the  Americans.  Perry  departed  in  entire  ignorance  of  the 
extent  to  which  he  had  been  aided  by  circumstances  and 
influences  within  the  Empire,  and  he  did  not  Hve  to  realize 
the  extent  to  which  his  visit  had  intensified  the  struggle 
already  begun  and  not  to  be  finished  until  the  office  of  the 
Shogun  and  feudalism  were  both  abolished.^  ^ 

Perry's  Proposals  for  Far  Eastern  Policy 

Viewed  as  a  step  in  the  development  of  American  policy 
in  Asia  the  treaty  of  1854,  considered  by  itself,  presents 
some  puzzling  questions.  When  compared  with  the  Gushing 
treaty  with  China  ten  years  earlier  it  would  appear  to  have 
been  a  backward  step,  and  this  notwithstanding  the  great 
display  of  force  which  had  attended  the  negotiations.  If 
we  were  to  limit  our  examination  to  the  treaty  itself.  Perry 
would  seem  to  have  been  badly  outwitted  by  the  Japanese 
or,  at  the  moment  when  he  might  have  gathered  in  the  fruits 
of  peaceful  victory,  to  have  been  stricken  with  indecision 
and  weakness.  He  had  secured  very  little.  It  is  not  fair, 
however,  to  stop  with  a  comparison  of  the  treaties.  The 
policy  of  Commodore  Perry  was  much  broader  and  far  more 
aggressive  than  is  indicated  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  The 
Perry  Expedition,  viewed  as  a. whole,  marks  something  new 
in  policy  when  compared  with  that  of  Caleb  Cushing  at 
Macao.  Cushing  had  devoted  himself  exclusively  to  the 
protection  of  American  mercantile  interests  in  China;  Perry 
felt  that  he  was  laying  the  foundations  for  an  American 
commercial  empire  in  Asia  and  on  the  Pacific.  Indeed, 
Perry  appears  to  have  been  the  first  American  in  official 
position  to  view  not  merely  the  commercial  but  also  the 
.political  problems  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific  as  a  unity. 
\  Perry  looked  into  the  future  and  considered  American 
commercial  interests  in  the  Far  East  from  the  standpoint 
of  a  naval  strategist.  There  must  be  an  ample  number  of 
ports  of  refuge,  trade  bases,  and  even  points  from  which 
protection  might  be  afforded  in  case  of  war  with  some 
European  power. 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY 


271 


=  -2 


^Z 


272  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"It  is  idle  to  suppose,"  wrote  Perry  after  his  return  to  the  United 
States,  "that  because  the  policy  of  the  United  States  has  hitherto 
been  to  avoid  by  all  means  possible  any  coalition,  or  even  connection 
with  the  political  acts  of  other  nations,  we  can  always  escape  from 
the  responsibilities  which  our  growing  wealth  and  power  must  inevi- 
tably fasten  upon  las.  The  duty  of  protecting  our  vast  and  rapidly 
growing  commerce  will  make  it  not  only  a  measure  of  wisdom  but 
of  positive  necessity,  to  provide  timely  preparation  for  events  which 
must,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  transpire  in  the  east.  In  the 
development  of  the  future,  the  destinies  of  our  nation  must  assume 
conspicuous  attitudes ;  we  cannot  expect  to  be  free  from  the  ambitious 
longings  of  increased  power,  which  are  the  natural  concomitants  of 
national  success."  ^ 

He  looked  forward  to  the  time  when  there  would  be  on 
the  Pacific  and  in  Asia  a  large  number  of  American  'settle- 
ments/ which  'would  be  offshoots  from  us  rather  than, 
strictly  speaking,  colonies.'  These  commercial  settlements, 
as  he  termed  them,  which  he  thought  ought  not  to  be  forti- 
fied because  fortification  would  arouse  the  antagonism  of 
European  nations,  would  'be  vitally  necessary  to  the  con- 
tinued success  of  our  commerce  in  those  regions.' 

In  one  of  his  dispatches  he  went  even  so  far  as  to  speak 
of  the  necessity  of  extending  the  'territorial  jurisdiction'  of 
the  United  States  beyond  the  limits  of  the  western  conti- 
nent. "I  assume,"  he  wrote,  "the  responsibility  of  urging 
the  expediency  of  establishing  a  foothold  in  this  quarter  of 
the  globe,  as  a  measure  of  positive  necessity  to  the  sustain- 
ment  of  our  maritime  rights  in  the  east."  ^^ 

Perry  designated  three  points  where  he  wished  to  see  a 
beginning  made.  They  were  the  Bonin  Islands,  Great  Lew 
Chew,  and  Formosa.  He  also  intimated  that  the  United 
States  ought  to  extend  its  "national  friendship  and  protec- 
tion" to  Siam,  Cambodia,  Cochin  China,  parts  of  Borneo  and 
Sumatra,  and  many  of  the  islands  of  the  eastern  archipel- 
ago.^^ No  American  before  his  time,  and  few  after  it,  ever 
had  such  an  extensive  ambition.  Herein  lies  the  explana- 
tion of  the  inadequacies  of  the  treaty  with  Japan.  Perry 
believed  that  he  was  taking  but  the  first  step  in  a  very  large 
program  which  in  its  entirety  could  be  realized  only  by 
degrees.  A  treaty  of  friendship  with  Japan  was  but  a  detail 
in  this  program. 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  273 

Commodore  Perry  left  us  in  no  doubt  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  pohcy  he  would  have  liked  to  pursue.  On  the  out- 
ward voyage  from  the  United  States  he  evolved  a  plan  which 
he  laid  before  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  great  detail. ^^' 
He  would  occupy  the  Lew  Chew  Islands  ''for  the  accommo- 
dation of  our  ships  of  war  and  for  the  safe  resort  of  mer- 
chant vessels  of  whatever  nation."  This,  he  thought, 
"would  be  a  measure  not  only  justified  by  the  strictest  rules 
of  moral  law,  but  what  is  also  to  be  considered  by  the  laws 
of  stern  necessity." 

Perry  was  looking  forward  to  a  time  when  the  United 
States  would  be  engaged  in  a  decisive  contest  with  Great 
Britain  for  the  control  of  the  Pacific.     He  wrote: 

"When  we  look  at  the  possessions  on  the  east  of  our  great  maritime 
rival,  England,  and  of  the  constant  and  rapid  increase  of  their  forti- 
fied ports,  we  should  be  admonished  of  the  necessity  of  prompt 
measures  on  our  part.  By  reference  to  the  map  of  the  world  it  will 
be  seen  that  Great  Britain  is  already  in  possession  of  the  most  im- 
portant points  in  the  East  India  and  China  seas,  and  especially  with 
reference  to  the  China  seas.  .  .  .  Fortunately  the  Japanese  and  many 
other  islands  of  the  Pacific  are  still  left  untouched  by  this  uncon- 
scionable government;  and  some  of  them  lay  in  a  route  of  a  great 
commerce  which  is  destined  to  become  of  great  importance  to  the 
United  States.  No  time  should  be  lost  in  adopting  active  measures 
to  secure  a  sufficient  number  of  ports  of  refuge.  And  hence  I  shall 
look  with  much  anxiety  for  the  arrival  of  the  Poxvliatan  and  the  other 
vessel  to  be  sent  me." 

In  reply  to  the  above  described  proposal  Secretary  of 
State  Everett  replied  for  the  President,  February  15,  1853, 
approving  the  occupation  of  the  principal  ports  of  the  Lew 
Chews,  which  were  assumed  to  belong  to  Japan,  in  case  ports 
could  not  be  obtained  in  Japan  proper  without  resort  to 
force.^°  Everett  however  cautioned  Perry  to  take  no  sup- 
plies without  paying  for  them  and  to  ''make  no  use  of 
force,  except  in  the  last  resort  for  defense,  if  attacked,  and 
for  self-preservation." 

On  his  first  visit  to  Japan,  Perry  made  Great  Lew  Chew 
the  rendezvous  for  his  squadron  and  successfully  negotiated 
for  a  coal  depot  at  Napa  which  had  the  best  harbor.  Dur- 
ing the  following  autumn  he  kept  one  or  more  of  the  vessels 


274  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  the  fleet  stationed  there  constantly,  and  just  before  his 
return  to  Japan  he  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
(January  25,  1854)  reaffirming  his  intention  of  placing 
Great  Lew  Chew  under  the  American  flag.    He  wrote : 

"It  is  my  intention,  should  the  Japanese  Government  refuse  to 
negotiate,  or  to  assign  a  port  of  resort  for  our  merchant  and  whaling 
ships,  to  take  under  surveillance  of  the  American  flag  upon  the 
ground  of  reclamation  for  insults  and  injuries  committed  upon 
American  citizens,  this  island  of  Great  Lew  Chew,  a  dependency,  of 
the  empire,  to  be  held  under  restraint,  until  the  decision  of  my  govern- 
ment shall  be  known,  whether  to  avow  or  disavow  my  acts."  " 

To  this  declaration  Secretary  of  State  Dobin  replied 
(May  39,  1854)  after  consultation  with  President  Pierce, 
that  the  project  was  'embarrassing.' 

"The  President,"  he  stated,  "is  disinclined,  without  the  authority 
of  Congress,  to  take  and  retain  possession  of  an  island  in  that  distant 
country,  particularly  unless  more  urgent  and  potent  reasons  demanded 
it  than  now  exist.  If,  in  the  future,  resistance  should  be  offered  and 
threatened  it  would  be  rather  mortifying  to  surrender  the  island,  if 
once  seized,  and  rather  inconvenient  and  expensive  to  maintain  a 
force  there  to  retain  it."  ^* 

The  President  hoped  that  the  contingency  of  occupation 
would  not  arise.  In  these  words  of  hesitation  and  caution 
the  President  appears  to  have  had  in  mind  Perry's  warning 
that  in  case  the  necessary  preliminary  steps  at  the  Lew 
Chews  were  not  taken  immediately  "the  Russians,  or 
French,  or  probably  the  English"  would  anticipate  the  de- 
sign.   Perry  had  urged  that 

"though  it  does  not  belong  to  the  spirit  of  our  institutions  to  extend 
our  dominion  beyond  the  sea,  positive  necessity  requires  that  we 
should  protect  our  commercial  interests  in  this  remote  part  of  the 
world,  and  in  doing  so,  to  resort  to  measures,  however  strong,  to  coun- 
teract the  schemes  of  powers  less  scrupulous  than  ourselves." 

Perry's  plans  embraced  also  the  Bonin  Islands  which  lay 
about  five  hundred  miles  south  of  Japan  and  in  the  direct 
path  of  navigation  between  Honolulu  and  Shanghai.  Be- 
fore advancing  upon  Japan  at  all  Perry  personally  visited 
these  islands  and  purchased  for  the  Navy  Department  a 
"suitable  spot  for  the  erection  of  offices,  wharves,  coal-sheds, 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  275 

etc."  ^"  at  Port  Lloyd  on  Peel  Island.  Four  months  later, 
by  Perry's  order,  Commander  Kelly  of  the  Plymouth  took 
formal  possession  of  the  southern  group  of  islands  which 
had  been  named  Baily's  Islands  by  Captain  Beechey  of 
H.  M.  S.  Blossom,  in  1827,  but  which  Perry  rechristened 
Coffin  Islands  in  honor  of  an  American,  Captain  Coffin,  who 
had  visited  the  islands  four  years  earlier  than  Beechey.^^ 
Perry  defended  this  action  as  well  as  his  other  hostile  acts 
on  his  first  visit  to  Japan  on  the  ground  that  it  was  necessary 
to  work  on  the  fears  of  the  rulers  of  Japan.  He  did  not, 
however,  disguise  his  satisfaction  at  having  secured  an 
important  port  of  refuge  for  the  trans-Pacific  trade  about 
which  he  was  so  optimistic. 

This  unceremonious  and  brusque  appropriation  of  a 
portion  of  the  Bonin  Islands  was  not  permitted  to  pass 
unchallenged  by  Great  Britain.  While  Perry  was  lying  at 
Hongkong  and  gathering  his  forces  for  the  second  visit  to 
Japan,  Sir  John  Bonham,  British  Superintendent  of  Trade, 
was  directed  by  Lord  Clarendon  to  interview  Perry  and 
obtain  an  explanation.  The  approach  to  the  subject  was 
tactful  and  conciliatory  as  was  suited  to  the  occasion  when 
the  Crimean  War  was  in  progress  and  the  Russian  Admiral, 
Count  Pontiatin,  was  in  Chinese  waters  and  very  friendly 
with  Commodore  Perry.  Perry  set  up  a  counter  claim  to 
the  islands,  resting  it  on  the  double  ground  that  Captain 
Coffin  had  preceded  Captain  Beechey  to  the  island  by  at 
least  three  years,  and  on  the  fact  that  since  1830  a  group  of 
settlers  from  the  Sandwich  Islands,  in  which  the  Americans 
outnumbered  the  British  two  to  one,  had  lived  at  Port 
Lloyd.^^  Perry  put  forward  his  contention  in  a  conciliatory 
spirit  and  suggested  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  ought  to  cooperate  rather  than  to  oppose  one  another 
in  the  establishment  of  trans-Pacific  steam  navigation. 
Perry  had  in  mind  for  the  islands  the  creation  of  a  free  port 
which  would  be  very  similar,  in  matters  of  trade,  to  Hong- 
kong. 

In  reporting  Bonham's  inquiry  to  V/ashington,  Perry 
reaffirmed  his  general  policy.    He  stated : 


276  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"I  shall  in  no  way  allow  of  any  infringement  upon  our  national 
rights;  on  the  contrary,  I  believe  that  this  is  the  moment  to  assume 
a  position  in  the  east  which  will  make  the  power  and  influence  of 
the  United  States  felt  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  greater  importance  to 
those  rights  which,  among  eastern  nations,  are  generally  estimated 
by  the  extent  of  the  military  force  exhibited." 

The  conciliatory  spirit  in  which  the  Japanese  authorities 
met  Perry  on  the  occasion  of  his  second  visit  to  the  Bay  of 
Yedo  put  an  entirely  new  face  on  the  situation  and  robbed 
Perry  of  most  of  the  reasons  for  his  previously  declared 
policy.  The  Bonin  Islands  were  forgotten,  and  when  Japan 
in  1862  proposed  to  assert  a  claim  to  them  which  antedated 
by  centuries  the  claims  of  both  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  both  powers  relinquished  all  pretensions  to 
the  islands,  which  were,  in  fact,  worthless.  Perry  concluded 
a  'compact'  with  the  king  of  the  Lew  Chews  (July  11,  1854) 
a  few  months  after  signing  the  treaty  with  Japan,  and  the 
document  was  duly  ratified  by  the  Senate  a  few  days  after 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty  with  Japan.--  This  compact 
treated  the  Lew  Chews  as  entirely  independent  of  both 
Japan  and  China  and  merely  secured  protection  of  ship- 
wrecked sailors,  and  the  opening  of  Napa  as  a  port  of  sup- 
plies and  trade.  When,  in  1872,  Japan  reasserted  her  claim 
to  the  islands  the  United  States  merely  stipulated  that 
Japan  should  become  directly  responsible  to  the  United 
States  for  the  maintenance  of  such  rights  for  Americans  as 
the  islands  had  conceded  by  treaty  to  the  United  States. 

When  the  American  squadron  was  being  dispersed  after 
the  second  visit  to  Japan,  Perry  ordered  two  vessels  to 
Manila  and  to  Formosa.  The  object  in  visiting  the  latter 
point  was  to  investigate  the  persistent  reports  that  ship- 
wrecked American  sailors  were  held  in  captivity  on  the 
islands  and  also  to  investigate  the  reported  coal  mines.  No 
sailors  were  found,  but  coal  of  good  quality  and  in  abun- 
dance was  discovered.  No  active  steps  were  taken  at  the 
time  but  upon  Perry's  return  to  the  United  States  he  recom- 
mended that  "the  United  States  alone  should  take  the 
initiative"  in  "this  magnificent  island."  -^  We  shall  hear 
more  of  this  project  in  the  next  chapter. 


COMMODORE  PERRY'S  POLICY  277 

We  have  now  before  us  two  distinct,  though  not  always 
distinctly  separated,  proposals  for  American  policy  in  Asia. 
On  the  one  hand  is  the  policy  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia 
which  rcpufliated  the  idea  of  territorial  occupation  of  Asiatic 
territory  and  sought  to  find  sufficient  protection  for  Ameri- 
can interests  in  international  law  and  treaties.  On  the 
other,  we  have  the  policy  of  Perry  which,  while  no  less 
peaceful  as  to  ultimate  purpose,  was  based  on  the  assump- 
tions that  some  such  territorial  occupation  as  the  British 
had  accomplished  at  Hongkong  was  essential  to  the  protec- 
tion of  American  interests,  and  that  to  secure  concessions 
the  Asiatic  states  must  be  intimidated.  Between  the  two 
policies  we  find  Humphrey  Marshall  and  Robert  M.  McLane 
wavering,  seeking  to  sustain  and  build  up  the  sovereign 
power  of  China  to  a  point  where  it  would  in  fact  be  able 
to  assume  effectively  the  obligations  of  the  Gushing  treaty, 
and  yet  proposing  military  and  naval  intervention  in  the 
Taiping  Rebellion  for  the  purpose  of  throwing  the  entire 
Chinese  Empire  open  to  the  trade  of  all  nations.  It  now 
becomes  our  interesting  duty  to  trace  the  fate  of  these  two 
policies  in  the  course  of  the  next  fifteen  years.  What  atti- 
tude President  Pierce  and  Secretary  of  State  Marcy  would 
have  taken  in  the  face  of  a  violent  issue  requiring  a  definite 
choice  between  these  policies  it  is  difficult  to  say.  It  is, 
however,  quite  clear  that  the  surrender  of  Japan  to  the 
peaceful  demands  of  Commodore  Perry  in  1854  was  a  more 
important  factor  in  the  determination  of  American  policy 
in  Asia  than  any  positive  conviction  enunciated  by  the 
American  Government.  The  policy  of  Pierce  and  Marcy, 
while  inclining  towards  that  of  Webster  and  Gushing,  was 
really  opportunist. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  S.  Ex.  Doe.  59  ;32-l,  p.  80. 

2.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34 :33-2. 

3.  Griffis :     "Perry,"  p.  303. 

4.  The  primary  sources  of  importance  for  the  Perry  Expedition  are: 

the  Perry  Correspondence,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34  -.33-2 ;  ''Journal  of  the 
Perry  Expedition   (1853-4),"  by  S.  Wells  Williams,  Trans,  of 


278  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Asiatic  Soc.  of  Japan,  Vol.  XXXVII,  Part  II,  1910;^'Japan 
and  Around  the  World,"  by  J.  W.  Spalding;  "Matthew  Cal- 
braith  Perry,"  by  Wm.  Elliot  Griffis;  "Perry's  Japan,"  by 
Francis  L.  Hawks;  and  "Narrative  of  the  Japan  Expedition," 
published  as  H.  Ex.  Doc.  97 :33-2. 

5.  Spalding,  p.  143. 

6.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34 :33-2,  pp.  43  ff. 

7.  Ihid.,  p.  57. 

8.  Ihid.,  pp.  116  ff. 

9.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  vii.  •* 

10.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34:33-2,  p.  161. 

11.  "History  of  Japan  from  1853  to  1869,"  Kinse  Shiriaku,  translated 

by  E.  M.  Satow;  "Progress  of  Japan,  1853-71,"  by  J.  H. 
Gubbins ;  "Intercourse  between  the  United  States  and  Japan," 
by  Inazo  Nitobe;  "International  Position  of  Japan  as  a  Great 
Power,"  by  Seiji  G.  Hishida. 

12.  "Narrative  of  the  Japan  Expedition,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  173  ff. 

13.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34:33-2,  p.  81. 

14.  Narrative  of  Jap.  Exp.  op.  cit. 

15.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34 :33-2,  pp.  12-4. 

16.  Ihid.,  p.  15. 

17.  Ihid.,  p.  109. 

18.  Ihid.,  p.  112. 

19.  Ihid.,  p.  39. 

20.  Ihid.,  pp.  66-7 ;  Chas.  Oscar  Paullin :    Z7.  8.  Naval  Institute  Pro- 

ceedings, 1911,  p.  269-70. 

21.  Ihid.,  pp.  80-86. 

22.  Ihid.,  p.  174. 

23.  "Narrative  of  Japan  Exped."    op.  cit. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  POLICY  OF  DR.  PETER  PARKER— FORMOSA 

Dr.  Peter  Parker  had  arrived  in  China  in  1834  as  a 
medical  missionary  under  the  auspices  of  the  American 
Board  of  Commissioners  for  Foreign  Missions.^  He  was  a 
native  of  Massachusetts,  had  been  a  student  at  Amherst 
College  and  had  been  graduated  at  Yale  in  1831,  He 
studied  theology  at  Yale  Divinity  School  and  then  took  a 
course  in  medicine  in  Philadelphia.  He  opened  the 
Ophthalmic  Hospital  at  Canton  the  year  after  his  arrival 
and  thus  became  the  founder  of  medical  missions  in  China. 
The  hospital  won  the  support  of  hong  merchants  and 
foreigners  alike,  and  Dr.  Parker,  who  was  of  amiable  disposi- 
tion, became  a  very  popular  and  trusted  person.  He  was  a 
member  of  the  Morrison  expedition  to  Japan,  and  was  in 
Washington  in  1840  when  the  first  discussions  with  reference 
to  the  Anglo-Chinese  War  took  place.  He  married  a  distant 
relative  of  Daniel  Webster's  while  on  this  visit  to  the  United 
States,  thus  forming  an  alliance  which  made  his  entrance 
into  government  service  especially  easy.  He  acted  as  one  of 
the  interpreters  for  Caleb  Cushing  in  1844,  and  the  next  year 
he  was  appointed  Chinese  secretary  and  interpreter  to  the 
newly  created  legation.  Dr.  Parker  thus  became  the  one 
element  of  continuity  in  the  diplomatic  relations  of  the 
United  States  with  China  during  the  many  replacements 
and  resignations  of  the  following  ten  years  and  he  was  at 
length  appointed  (September,  1855)  Commissioner.  He  was 
the  only  Commissioner  or  Minister  ever  appointed  to  China 
who  could  speak,  read  or  write  the  Chinese  language,  and 
with  two  exceptions  he  was  the  only  person  ever  appointed 
by  way  of  promotion  from  a  subordinate  position  in  the 
diplomatic  service  in  China. 

279 


280  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Dr.  Parker's  service,  which  lasted  less  than  two  years, 
v/as  characterized  by  three  objects:  the  accomplishment  of 
the  revision  of  the  Gushing  treaty;  the  achievement  of  an 
entente  cordiale  with  Great  Britain  and  France  for  the  pur- 
suit of  a  cooperative  policy;  and  the  acquisition  of  the 
island  of  Formosa  for  the  United  States. 


Treaty  Revision — Destruction  of  Barrier  Forts 

The  time  for  the  revision  of  the  treaty  falling  legally  due 
in  1856,  Dr.  Parker  was  supplied  with  full  powers  to  conduct 
the  negotiations  and  was  instructed  to  seek  to  obtain  three 
concessions :  ( 1 )  residence  for  a  diplomatic  officer  at  Peking ; 
(2)  unlimited  extension  of  trade;  (3)  the  removal  of  every 
restriction  to  personal  liberty.-  So  much  impressed  was  the 
American  Government,  in  the  face  of  the  steady  opposition 
of  the  Chinese  to  all  reform  and  even  to  full  comphance 
with  the  treaties,  with  the  necessity  of  cooperation  with 
the  other  treaty  powers,  that  Dr.  Parker  was  authorized 
to  proceed  to  his  post  by  way  of  London  and  Paris  and  to 
confer  with  Lord  Clarendon  and  with  the  French  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  with  a  view  to  the  adoption  of  a  common 
policy  in  China.  He  was,  however,  entirely  without  author- 
ity to  do  more  than  have  conversations.  The  commis- 
sioner's enthusiasm  for  common  action  may  have  been  a 
little  misleading  to  the  British  and  the  French,  encouraging 
them  to  expect  in  the  way  of  cooperation,  very  much  more 
than  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was  prepared  to 
give. 

Of  an  interview  with  Lord  Clarendon,  October  26,  1855,^ 
Dr.  Parker  reported : 

"I  remarked  that  it  being  the  desire  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment that  the  same  concurrent  policy  and  action  which  hitherto  had 
so  happily  characterized  the  three  powers  in  China  should  continue,  I 
was  solicitous  to  see  his  lordship  on  the  subject.  .  .  ." 

In  the  conclusion  of  the  interview  Clarendon  remarked ; 
"I  shall  have  great  pleasure,  on  the  opening  of  Parliament 


THE  POLICY  OF  DR.  PETER  PARKER— FORMOSA    281 

to  speak  of  the  triple  alliance."  Parker  himself  was 
thoroughly  in  favor  of  such  a  formal  arrangement. 

In  Paris  the  American  commissioner  had  a  similar  inter- 
view at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  then  set  out  for 
China  where  he  arrived  in  December,  1855.  He  was  deter- 
mined to  take  "high  ground"  in  securing  the  new  treaty,  but 
Commissioner  Yeh  continued  his  insolent,  unbending  atti- 
tude and  even  refused  to  hold  an  interview  with  Parker. 
The  American  commissioner  demanded  and  threatened,  but 
in  vain.  To  Sir  John  Bowring  and  to  the  French  represen- 
tative Parker  proposed  joint  energetic  action  but  his  pro- 
gram and  his  methods  did  not  commend  themselves  to 
either  of  these  gentlemen,*  Parker  had  apparently  not 
made  a  very  good  impression  in  either  London  or  Paris. 
The  British,  at  least,  had  determined  to  proceed  slowly  and 
run  no  risk  of  a  second  rebuff  such  as  had  been  administered 
to  Bowring  and  McLane  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  in  1854. 

Having  failed  to  see  the  Viceroy  at  Canton  Parker  pro- 
ceeded to  Foochow  where  he  was  able  to  hold  an  interview 
with  the  Governor  General,  to  whom  he  entrusted  for  deliv- 
ery at  Peking  the  letter  from  the  President  to  the  Emperor 
which  contained  the  request  for  treaty  revision.  Some 
weeks  later  this  letter  was  returned  to  the  commissioner, 
the  seals  broken  and  with  other  marks  of  careless  handling 
and  of  disrespect.  Parker  was  directed  to  present  the  letter 
to  Viceroy  Yeh  for  transmission  to  Peking.  The  return  of 
the  letter  Parker  regarded  as  a  national  insult  and  he  would 
have  proceeded  to  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  in  a  war-vessel 
to  demand  explanations  as  well  as  to  open  treaty  negotia- 
tions had  not  an  accident  to  the  San  Jacinto  deprived  him 
of  a  means  of  conveyance. 

In  the  latter  part  of  October  Admiral  Seymour  (British) 

*Cordier  enumerated  the  points  in  Dr.  Parker's  program  of  revision  as:  (li 
residence  of  the  French.  British  and  .Vmcrican  ministers  at  I'eking.  and  the 
residence  of  Chinese  ministers  at  I'aris,  London  and  Wasliington  :  (2)  unlimited 
extension  of  trade;  (8)  universal  liberty  of  opinion  for  the  Chinese;  (4)  reform 
of  the  Chinese  courts  of  justice.  These  were,  presumably,  points  which  Dr. 
Parker  discussed  with  Count  Waleski,  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  when 
in  Paris  in  the  fall  of  18."i.").  They  seem  to  have  Iteen  discussed  also  with  Sir 
John  Bowring.  The  stipulations  for  the  reform  of  tlie  Chinese  courts  of  jus- 
tice, and  for  the  residence  of  Chinese  ministers  in  Paris,  London  and  Washing- 
ton, whicli  were  ridiculed  alike  l)y  contemporaries  and  historians,  were  quite 
unauthorized,  and  in  fact  were  never  presented  to  the  Government  of  China. ^ 


282  AIMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

had  breached  the  walls  of  Canton  as  a  result  of  the  unwill- 
ingness of  Yeh  to  make  the  required  amends  for  an  alleged 
insult  to  the  British  flag  in  the  'Arrow  Affair,'  and  for  a  few 
hours  had  occupied  the  Viceroy's  yamen.  During  the  early 
part  of  November  a  state  of  intermittent  warfare  was  main- 
tained. At  the  request  of  Yeh,  who  declared  that  he  couLi 
no  longer  protect  the  foreigners  of  neutral  nations,  the 
Americans  decided  to  withdraw  from  Canton,  As  Com- 
mander Foote  of  the  American  Navy  was  on  his  way  up  to 
Canton  on  the  15th  of  November  to  escort  the  Americans 
down  the  river,  he  was  fired  on  by  the  Barrier  Forts  which, 
upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  British,  had  been  reoccupied  by 
the  Chinese.  The  next  day  Commodore  James  Armstrong, 
commanding  officer  of  the  American  naval  forces  on  the 
China  station,  ordered  the  destruction  of  the  Barrier  Forts, 
and  within  the  next  two  days  this  was  accomplished.  This 
action  was  hailed  with  delight,  not  only  by  the  Americans 
but  by  the  English  as  well,  for  it  seemed  to  indicate  that  at 
last  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  be  com- 
pelled to  adopt  towards  China  a  more  energetic  policy.  Yeh 
did  not  fail  to  see  the  danger  of  the  situation,  and  on  the 
5th  of  December  rendered  a  complete  apology.^ 

Greatly  stirred  by  these  events  as  well  as  stung  by  the 
rebuffs  of  the  Chinese  authorities,  and  the  recollections  of 
being  called  for  more  than  twenty  years  a  "foreign  devil," 
Dr.  Parker  addressed  to  Marcy  a  comprehensive  dispatch 
(December  12,  1856)  in  which  he  offered  the  most  extensive 
program  yet  proposed  for  the  settlement  of  the  affairs  of 
the  treaty  powers  in  China.    He  suggested : 

"Were  the  three  representatives  of  England,  France  and  America, 
on  presenting  themselves  at  the  Pei-ho,  in  case  of  their  not  being 
welcomed  to  Peking,  to  say,  the  French  flag  will  be  hoisted  in  Corea, 
the  English  again  at  Chusan,  and  the  United  States  in  Formosa,  and 
there  remain  till  satisfaction  for  the  past  and  a  right  understanding 
for  the  future  are  granted ;  but,  being  granted,  these  possessions  shall 
instantly  be  restored,  negotiation  would  no  longer  be  obstructed,  and 
the  most  advantageous  and  desirable  results  to  all  concerned  secured," 

He  admitted  that  such  a  novel  program  should  be  under- 
taken only  as  a  'last  resort.'  ^ 


THE  POLICY  OF  DR.  PETER  PARKER— FORMOSA    283 

The  events  as  well  as  the  recommendations  of  Dr.  Parker 
for  the  occupation  of  Chinese  territory  were  very  disquiet- 
ing to  President  Pierce  and  Secretary  of  State  Marcy. 
There  had  been  reported  in  the  London  papers  another  inci- 
dent in  connection  with  the  occupation  of  Canton  which 
was  equally  disturbing.  It  was  stated  that  the  American 
Consul  at  Hongkong,  James  Keenan,  had  not  only  been 
present  with  the  attacking  British  forces  at  Canton,  but 
that  he  had  actually  carried  the  American  flag  over  the  wall 
into  the  city.  No  mention  of  this  event  had  been  made  in 
the  official  reports  to  the  Department  of  State.  The  Presi- 
dent, while  withholding  severe  censure  from  Commodore 
Armstrong,  did  regard  the  sending  of  the  boat  the  Sa7i 
Jacinto  to  make  soundings  near  the  forts  at  a  time  of  so 
much  disturbance  as  not  a  'discreet  act.'  "From  a  cursory 
reading  of  the  documents  which  have  been  received,"  wrote 
Marcy  to  Parker/ 

"I  think  he  is  inclined  to  regret  that  there  had  not  been  more 
caution  on  the  part  of  our  naval  force  in  the  beginning,  and  more 
forbearance  in  the  subsequent  steps.  The  British  Government  evi- 
dently has  objects  beyond  those  contemplated  by  the  United  States, 
and  we  ought  not  to  be  drawn  along  with  it,  however  anxious  it  may 
be  for  our  cooperation.  The  President  sincerely  hopes  that  you,  as 
well  as  our  naval  commander,  will  be  able  to  do  all  that  is  required 
for  the  defense  of  American  citizens  and  the  protection  of  their 
property,  without  being  included  in  the  British  quarrel,  or  producing 
any  serious  disturbance  in  our  amicable  relations  with  China." 

As  for  the  indiscretion  of  Consul  Keenan,  provided  the 
reports  in  the  London  papers  were  correct,  Dr.  Parker  was 
instructed  to  transmit  to  the  consul  a  letter  removing  him 
from  office.  Keenan  denied  Parker's  authority  and  was 
never  removed. 

Those  were  the  closing  days  of  the  Pierce  administration 
and  the  government  was  disinclined  to  mark  out  a  policy 
in  China  for  the  succeeding  administration.  Dr.  Parker  was 
left  without  further  specific  instructions  as  to  treaty  revi- 
sion, and  the  rumor  that  he  was  to  be  superseded  had 
already  reached  him.  His  impatient  efforts  "to  place  in  the 
crown  of  the  present  administration  the  laurel  of  establish- 


284  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ing  the  United  States  Legation  at  Peking  and  the  material 
extension"  of  American  commerce  with  China  had  come  to 
nothing  except  the  near  approach  to  the  gravest  of  entangle- 
ments in  the  Far  East.  Dr.  Parker,  however,  found  much  to 
occupy  his  attention  in  the  effort  to  establish  an  American 
protectorate  over  Formosa. 

An  American  Protectorate  for  Formosa 

There  were  three  possible  sources  from  which  coal  for 
the  proposed  trans-Pacific  steamship  line  might  be  secured : 
Japan,  the  mainland  of  China,  or  Formosa.  Of  these  three 
Formosa  had,  in  point  of  time,  been  the  first  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  American  authorities  in  China. 

In  1847  officers  of  both  the  British  and  the  American 
navy  made  surveys  of  the  coal  resources  of  Formosa.  Some 
samples  of  the  coal  were  sent  to  the  Navy  Department  for 
analysis,  and  at  about  the  same  time  the  Peninsula  and 
Oriental  Steamship  Company  contracted  with  residents  of 
Formosa  for  7000  tons  of  coal  at  $7  a  ton.  Only  about  300 
tons  were  ever  delivered.  The  Chinese  Government  became 
alanned  at  the  interest  the  foreigners  were  taking  in  the 
island  and  took  possession  of  the  mines,  placing  obstructions 
in  the  way  of  exporting  coal  to  Hongkong. 

In  July,  1849,  the  U.  S.  brig  Dolphin  (Captain  Ogden) 
made  an  expedition  to  Kilung,  Formosa,  for  further  explora- 
tions. Captain  Ogden  was  strongly  dissuaded  by  the  magis- 
trate from  visiting  the  mines,  and  he  contented  himself  with 
securing  some  samples  for  analysis.  The  Chinese  Reposi- 
tory, July,  1849,  in  a  report  of  this  expedition  stated  that 
the  coal  seemed  to  be  better  than  that  which  was  brought 
out  from  Liverpool.    The  editor  remarked : 

"The  existence  of  coal  at  this  accessible  point  and  the  desirable- 
ness of  depending'  less  npon  supplies  brougbt  from  Europe,  will  soon 
induce  the  foreign  antliorities  to  stir  in  the  matter." 

Commodore  Perry's  opinion  on  the  desirability  of  an 
American  protectorate  over  Formosa  has  already  been 
stated. 


THE  POLICY  OF  DR.  PETER  PARKER— FORMOSA    285 

There  was  in  Canton  at  that  time  an  old  friend  of 
Parker's,  Gideon  Nye,  Jr.,  whose  firm  had  recently  failed  for 
a  very  large  sum  of  money.  Nye  was  now  looking  about  for 
ways  to  recoup  his  fortunes.  Formosa  had  been  forced  upon 
Mr.  Nye's  attention  a  few  years  before  when  the  American 
ship  Kelpie,  carrying  his  brother,  had  sailed  homeward  from 
Canton  only  to  be  wrecked  off  the  rocky  coast  of  Formosa, 
and  there  had  been  no  survivors.  For  years  the  rumor  per- 
sisted in  Canton  and  Hongkong  that  the  survivors  had  been 
cast  ashore  on  Formosa,  and  then  captured  and  held  in  slav- 
ery by  some  savage  Formosan  tribe.  Indeed,  one  of  the 
objects  of  the  visit  of  the  Dolphin  to  Formosa  in  1849  had 
been  to  search  for  the  survivors  of  the  Kelpie. 

The  visit  of  Commodore  Perry  to  the  island  in  1854  had 
stimulated  anew  the  interest  of  the  Americans  and  a  com- 
mercial company  consisting  of  an  American  firm,  Robinet 
(a  Peruvian  naval  ofiicer  who  had  become  an  American 
citizen  in  a  somewhat  informal  way)  and  Gideon  Nye,  had 
been  formed  to  exploit  the  trade  from  a  point  called  Ape's 
Hill.  Robinet  and  Nye  made  explorations  and  secured  a 
monopoly  of  the  camphor  trade,  and  the  privilege  of  an 
establishment  at  Takow,  in  return  for  which  the  traders  had 
agreed  to  pay  $100  tonnage  duties  on  each  ship  and  to 
protect  Takow  from  pirates.  Improvements  had  been  made 
to  the  extent  of  $45,000,  and  the  American  flag  had  been 
raised  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  More  recently  the 
natives  had  become  dissatisfied  and  the  traders  had  been 
obhged  to  "threaten  them  with  forcible  measures  if  they 
did  not  act  faithfully."  As  a  result  of  these  measures  the 
American  company  had  become  "pretty  much  independent 
of  the  authorities." 

Nye  and  Robinet,  realizing  that  it  might  be  difficult  to 
secure  the  occupation  of  the  island  by  American  naval 
forces,  and  that  there  were  few  precedents  for  what  they 
desired,  rather  timidly  suggested  that  they  were  perfectly 
willing,  provided  they  were  assured  of  the  approval  and 
protection  of  the  American  Government,  to  set  up  an  inde- 
pendent government  in  Formosa.^ 


286  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Parker  was  very  hospitable  to  the  idea.  Perhaps  he  was 
the  more  eager  because  he  already  knew  that  the  privilege 
of  revising  the  treaty  was  not  to  be  for  him,  and  that  his 
days  in  China  were  already  numbered.  Here  was  the  oppor- 
tunity for  one  grand  stroke.  On  February  12,  1857,  he  wrote 
to  the  State  Department,  enclosing  Nye's  proposition : 

"The  subject  of  Formosa  is  becoming  one  of  great  interest  to  a 
number  of  our  enterprising  fellow-citizens,  and  deserves  more  con- 
sideration from  the  great  commercial  nations  of  the  West  than  it  has 
yet  received;  and  it  is  much  to  be  hoped  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  may  not  shrink  from  the  action  which  the  interests  of 
humanity,  civilization,  navigation  and  commerce  impose  upon  it  in 
relation  to  Tai-Wan,  particularly  the  southeastern  portion  of  it,  at 
present  inhabited  by  savages,  to  whose  depraved  cruelties  we  have 
every  reason  to  believe  many  Europeans,  and  among  them  our  own 
friends  and  countrymen,  have  fallen  victims." 

Parker  drew  attention  to  his  dispatch  of  December  12, 
for  which  there  had  not  yet  been  time  for  an  answer,  and 
solicited  the  earnest  consideration  of  the  President.  The 
more  Parker  meditated  upon  the  subject  of  Formosa,  the 
more  his  imagination  kindled.  Ten  days  after  sending  the 
dispatch  of  February  12,  becoming  impatient  lest  delay 
might  be  fatal  to  the  destinies  of  the  United  States  in 
Formosa,  Parker  hastily  summoned  Commodore  Armstrong 
from  Hongkong  to  Macao  for  a  conference  on  ''this  subject  of 
great  delicacy,  and  it  may  be  of  vast  importance  to  the 
United  States  in  particular  and  to  the  western  nations 
generally."  Parker  wrote  that  he  had  reasons  for  feeling  that 
if  anything  was  to  be  done,  it  must  be  done  quickly.  The 
commodore  came  to  Macao  with  all  speed.  He  had  a 
kindred  spirit  in  the  matter  but  had  been  rendered,  perhaps, 
a  little  more  cautious  by  the  fact  that  no  official  approval 
for  having  destroyed  the  Barrier  Forts  three  months  before 
had  as  yet  been  received.  What  proposition  Parker  brought 
forward  at  the  conference  is  not  stated,  but  its  nature  may 
be  inferred  from  the  memoranda  of  the  conference.*^ 

After  having  read  that  portion  of  Parker's  dispatch  of 
December  12  which  referred  to  Formosa,  Armstrong  agreed 
with  Parker  on  the  following  points :  ( 1 )  the  measure  would 


THE  POLICY  OF  DR.  PETER  PARKER— FORMOSA    287 

be  justified  by  the  acknowledged  principles  of  international 
law;  (2)  the  claims  and  grievances  then  pending  with  the 
Chinese  Government  amply  justified  reprisals;  (3)  Formosa 
was  a  most  desirable  island  and  would  be  particularly  valu- 
able to  the  United  States;  (4)  but  that  its  immediate  occu- 
pation was  impracticable  with  the  present  naval  force,  in 
view  of  the  possibility  that  the  Chinese  Government  might 
oppose  it.  It  was  admitted  "that  in  any  other  country  than 
China  the  measure  would  be  regarded  as  a  virtual  dissolu- 
tion of  avowed  amicable  relations."  The  commodore  agreed, 
however,  that  Parker  had  done  his  duty,  and  if  the  United 
States  failed  to  acquire  the  island,  the  fault  would  not  be 
upon  the  shoulders  of  the  commissioner. 

Parker  followed  his  already  numerous  dispatches  on 
Formosa  with  another  marked  'confidential'  (March  10, 
1857)  in  which  even  more  impatiently  he  urged  action.  He 
had  by  then  forgotten  entirely  that  part  of  his  original 
proposal  which  concerned  the  immediate  restoration  of  the 
island  to  China  the  moment  satisfaction  might  be  obtained. 
Now  he  wrote:  ^^ 

"In  event  of  the  establishment  of  a  line  of  steamers  between 
California,  Japan  and  China,  this  source  of  supply  of  coal  will  be 
most  advantageous.  That  the  islands  may  not  long  remain  a  portion 
of  the  empire  is  possible;  and  in  the  event  of  its  being  severed  from 
the  empire  politically,  as  it  is  geographically,  that  the  United  States 
should  possess  it  is  obvious,  particularly  as  respects  the  great  prin- 
ciple of  the  balance  of  power.'' 

And  then  the  commissioner  surrendered  to  his  imagina- 
tion completely. 

"Great  Britain  has  her  St.  Helena  in  the  Atlantic,  her  Gibraltar 
and  Malta  in  the  Mediterranean,  her  Aden  in  the  Red  Sea,  Mauritius, 
Ceylon,  Penang  and  Singapore  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  Hongkong 
in  the  China  Sea.  If  the  United  States  is  so  disposed  and  can 
arrange  for  the  possession  of  Formosa,  England  certainly  cannot 
object." 

As  to  just  cause  for  occupying  the  island,  Parker,  smart- 
ing under  twenty-five  years  experience  of  being  called  a 
"foreign  devil,"  found  ample  grounds. 


288  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

''If  there  ever  was  a  State  which  has  laid  herself  open  to  just 
reprisals  it  is  China,  'which  has  refused  to  fulfill  a  perfect  obligation 
which  she  has  contracted'  with  the  United  States,  'and  does  not 
permit  them  to  enjoy  rights  which  they  claim'  under  the  solemn 
stipulations  of  treaty;  and  in  event  of  her  persisting  in  this  course, 
it  seems  clear  that,  by  the  acknowledged  principles  of  international 
law,  the  United  States  have  the  right,  if  they  have  the  inclination,  to 
take  Formosa  by  way  of  reprisal  'until  a  satisfactory  reparation 
should  be  made  for  injuries  they  have  sustained.'  See  Wheaton's 
^International  Law,'  p.  362." 

Much  reading  of  international  law  since  the  eye-doctor 
became  the  diplomat  had  made  Dr.  Parker  a  little  mad.  He 
assured  the  Secretary  of  State  that  he  had  made  up  his  mind 
to  exercise  his  'full  powers'  to  revise  the  treaty  and  adjust 
all  claims  and  to  refer  the  matter  to  Washington  for  ap- 
proval or  disavowal,  but  intimated  that  he  had  been  un- 
able to  carry  Commodore  Armstrong  with  the  logic  of  the 
case. 

The  weeks  sped  by,  and  yet  the  commissioner  might 
expect  no  answer  to  even  his  first  dispatch  on  Formosa  for 
at  least  another  couple  of  months.  Meanwhile  the  British 
Admiral  at  Hongkong  applied  to  Robinet  (March  21)  for 
information  about  Formosa,  and  during  the  conversation 
remarked,  "This  island  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  exist  in 
the  hands  of  such  a  people,  which  cannot  control  even  the 
cannibals  of  the  eastern  part,  who  murder  our  wrecked  sea- 
men." Admiral  Seymour  then  asked  Robinet  if  he  had  any 
objection  to  permitting  an  English  naval  officer  to  come  to 
his  establishment  to  live  a  while  and  observe  conditions. 
Robinet  asked  for  time  to  consider  the  matter  and  quickly 
notified  Dr.  Parker.^  ^ 

The  American  commissioner  immediately  addressed  Sir 
John  Bowring  a  solemn  protest  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States  Government  against  England's  taking  possession  of 
Formosa.^  - 

"In  event  of  the  Island  of  Formosa  being  severed  politically  from 
the  Eniinrc  of  China,"  declared  the  commissioner,  "I  trust  to  bo 
able  to  substantiate  a  priority  of  claim  to  it  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States;  first  by  contracts  already  entered  into  with  the  imperial 
authorities  of  the  island  by  citizens  of  the  United  States;  and 
secondly  by  their  actTial  settlement  upon  it  witli  the  consent  of  the 


THE  POLICY  OF  DR.  PETER  PARKER— FORMOSA    289 

Chinese,   over  wliieh   the   United    States   flag   has   been   hoisted    for 
more  than  a  year.  .  .  . 

"I  embrace  this  opportunity  ...  to  acquaint  your  Excellency  that 
it  is  my  full  conviction  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
is  disposed  to  adopt  the  same  policy  in  China  as  is  represented  by 
your  Excellency  to  be  that  of  Great  Britain"  (i.e.,  not  to  establish 
any  exclusive  rights  or  privileges). 

Sir  John  Bowring  replied  immediately,  disavowino;  any 
designs  on  Formosa  and  somewhat  sharply  making  Parker 
a  'distinct'  proposition  for  a  more  pressing  task — the  occu- 
pation by  the  combined  American,  French  and  English 
forces  of  the  city  of  Canton.  Parker  was  quite  unable  to 
accept  such  a  'distinct  proposition'  because  he  had  no  more 
authority  for  it  than  he  had  for  the  then  existing  American 
flag  in  Formosa.  Probably  Bowring  knew  this  when  he 
made  the  proposal.  Parker,  so  intent  on  his  project  in  the 
island,  quite  failed  to  catch  the  twinkle  in  Sir  John's  eye 
when  he  added  to  his  disavowal: 

*T  hear  for  the  first  time,  officially,  that  the  United  States  flag  has 
been  hoisted  for  more  than  a  year  in  that  island.  ...  I  can  assure 
your  excellency  I  see  without  jealousy  or  annoyance  the  extension  of 
American  commerce  in  these  regions,  and  will  cordially  support  your 
excellency  in  the  attempt  to  give  to  it  the  strength  and  security  of 
legality." 

Parker,  apparently  wholly  lacking  a  sense  of  humor, 
hastened  to  show  the  letter  to  Commodore  Armstrong,  and 
expressed  great  satisfaction  that  thus  the  English  minister 
was  on  record  in  the  matter.  Meanwhile  the  commodore 
had  been  reconsidering  his  decisions.  There  were  still  two 
months  before  instructions  could  be  received  from  Washing- 
ton. Armstrong  knew  that  he  was  unable  to  occupy  the 
island  without  express  orders,  but  he  was  able  to  think  of  a 
way  out  of  the  dilemma.  He  proposed  to  Parker  that  he 
was  willing  to  detach  an  officer  from  the  squadron  to  go  to 
Formosa  and  make  another  investigation  for  shipwrecked 
sailors  "with  instructions  to  keep  his  headquarters  and  flag 
at  the  premises  of  our  countrymen,  provided  such  an  ar- 
rangement meets  with  your  approval  and  sanction."  The 
approval  and  sanction  were  not  lacking  and  Parker 
replied:  ^^ 


290  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"I  conceive  that  the  settlement  of  our  countrymen  at  Takow  will 
afford  the  best  facilities  for  makinj^'  tlie  investigation;  and  the  fact 
of  this  officer  being  there  holding-  his  headquarters  and  flag  may  have 
an  important  bearing  on  the  future." 

Disavowal  by  the  American  Government 

To  the  later  and  more  impetuous  proposals  that  he  be 
given  authority  to  complete  the  acquisition  of  Formosa,  Dr. 
Parker  never  even  received  an  answer  from  the  Secretary  of 
State,  but  to  his  original  proposal  that  the  three  powers  join 
in  taking  temporary  possession  of  Korea,  Chusan  and  For- 
mosa, he  did  receive  the  most  unmistakable  reply.  In  the 
closing  days  of  the  Pierce  administration.  Secretary  of  State 
Marcy  wrote  to  Dr.  Parker  that  the  subject  had  already 
been  submitted  to  the  President  by  the  French  Minister  and 
that  the  President  did  not  believe 

"that  our  relations  with  China  warrant  the  last  resort'  you  speak  of, 
and  if  they  did,  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  State.^ 
could  only  be  used  by  the  authority  of  Congress.  The  'last  resort' 
means  war,  and  the  executive  branch  of  this  government  is  not  the 
war-making  power.  .  .  .  For  the  protection  and  security  of  Americans 
in  China  and  for  the  protection  of  their  property,  it  may  be  expedient 
to  increase  our  naval  forces  on  the  China  station,  but  the  President 
will  not  do  it  for  aggressive  purposes." 

In  less  than  a  week  the  Buchanan  administration  came 
into  office,  William  B.  Reed  was  appointed  Minister  to 
China,  and  Dr.  Parker  immediately  dropped  all  preparations 
for  his  expedition  to  Formosa.  The  instructions  to  Minister 
Reed  are  most  explicit,  in  reply  to  all  of  Dr.  Parker's  pro- 
posals and  to  the  ambitions  of  any  Americans  in  China  to 
acquire  territory  at  the  expense  of  the  Empire.^* 

"This  country,  you  will  constantly  bear  in  mind,  is  not  at  war  with 
the  Goveriunent  of  China,  nor  does  it  seek  to  enter  into  that  empire 
for  any  other  purpose  than  those  of  lawful  commerce,  and  for  the 
protection  of  the  lives  and  property  of  its  citizens.  The  whole  nature 
and  policy  of  our  government  must  necessarily  confine  our  action 
within  these  limits,  and  deprive  us  of  all  motives  either  for  territorial 
aggrandizement  or  the  accjuisition  of  political  power  in  that  distant 
region.  .  ,  ,  You  will  not  fail  to  let  it  be  known  to  the  Chinese 
authorities  that  we  are  no  party  to  the  existing  hostilities,  and  have 
no  intention  to  interfere  in  their  political  concerns,  or  to  gain  a  foot- 


THE  POLICY  OF  DR.  PETER  PARKER— FORMOSA    291 

hold  ill  their  country.  We  go  there  to  engage  in  trade,  hut  under 
suitahk^  guarantees  for  its  protection.  The  extension  of  our  com- 
mercial intercourse  must  he  the  work  of  individual  enterprise,  and 
to  this  element  of  our  national  character  we  may  safely  leave  it." 

One  may  close  this  chapter  of  American  history  with  a 
smile,  and  yet  one  is  to  remember  it  as  an  illustration  of  the 
fact  that,  contrary  to  popular  impression,  no  bacillus  has 
ever  been  introduced  into  the  blood  of  Americans  which 
renders  them  immune  to  imperialistic  ambitions  when 
others  have  the  malady  and  when  commercial  conditions 
favorable  for  the  infection  are  present. 

However,  with  the  issuance  of  the  instructions  to  Min- 
ister Reed  in  1857,  the  policy  which  had  been  proposed  by 
Commodore  Perry  came  definitely  to  an  end,  never  to  appear 
again  until  the  day  more  than  forty  years  later  when  Presi- 
dent McKinley  cabled  to  the  American  Commissioners  at 
Paris  to  demand  the  cession  of  the  Philippines  to  the 
United  States. 

Dr.  Parker's  policy  had  not  been  complicated  or  subtle, 
and  requires  no  analysis.  He  belonged  to  the  Perry  school 
of  Asiatic  policy. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Stevens  and  Marwick :  "Life  and  Letters  of  Peter  Parker." 

2.  Parker  Corres.   (puhlished  with  the  McLane  Corres.  in  2  vols.), 

S.  Ex.  Doc.  22  :35-2,  pp.  GIO  ff. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  619. 

4.  Cordier:     "L'Expedition  de  Chine,"  p.  10;   Morse,  Vol.  1,  pp. 

416-7. 

5.  Although  the  incident  is  fully  reported  in  the  Parker  Corres., 

the  simplest  account,  fairly  complete,  is  in  Morse,  Vol.  1,  pp. 
432-3. 

6.  Parker  Corres.,  p.  1083. 

7.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  30 :36-l,  p.  4. 

8.  Parker  Corres.,  pp.  1184,  1211-5. 

9.  Ibid.,  p.  1211-18. 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  1208. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  1246. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  1247-9. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  1250. 

14.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  30 :36-l,  p.  8. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  BUCHANAN  ADMINISTEATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST 

Increase  of  American  Prestige  under  Pierce 

During  the  Pierce  administration  American  prestige  in 
Asia  had  risen  rapidly  to  a  point  of  determining  influence. 
Perhaps  never  again  in  the  nineteenth  century  did  the 
United  States  possess  such  actual  and  potential  influence 
as  in  1855  and  1856.  Not  only  had  the  Americans  opened 
Japan,  an  accomplishment  which  other  nations  had  come  to 
regard  as  impossible  without  hostilities,  but  the  American 
representatives  in  China  had  the  most  important  achieve- 
ments to  their  credit.  The  British  and  the  French  had  been 
led  to  relinquish  their  exclusive  pretensions  at  Shanghai,  the 
Inspectorate  of  Maritime  Customs  under  foreign  direction 
had  been  set  up,  and  the  possibility  of  intervention  in  favor 
of  the  Taiping  rebels  had  been  averted.  All  this  was  fully 
in  accord  with  the  American  policy  to  strengthen  and  sup- 
port the  Imperial  Government  of  China. 

Closer  scrutiny,  however,  reveals  that  for  these  accom- 
plishments the  Pierce  administration  could  claim  little  or  no 
credit.  The  Japan  expedition  had  been  planned,  organized 
and  set  out  under  Fillmore.  The  only  changes  in  the  orig- 
inal plans  had  been  the  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  fleet  to 
be  placed  under  the  command  of  Perry.  Neither  Pierce  nor 
Marcy  made  any  positive  or  constructive  contribution  to 
the  task  of  opening  the  ports  of  Japan.  Marshall,  who  was 
easily  the  outstanding  figure  among  the  American  com- 
missioners, had  been  an  appointee  of  Fillmore  and  had  been 
recalled  by  Pierce.  McLane,  while  in  general  accepting  and 
carrying  out  the  policy  of  Marshall,  had  made  one  import- 
ant personal  contribution — the  idea  of  the  Inspectorate  of 

292 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  293 

Maritime  Customs — but  for  this  the  Pierce  administration 
could  claim  no  credit.  The  step  was  taken  by  McLane  unin- 
structed  from  Washington.  Indeed,  the  American  position 
in  Asia  had  been  magnified  not  at  all  as  a  result  of  any 
instructions  issued  from  the  Department  of  State.  In  part 
it  had  arisen  out  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  European  diplo- 
matic and  military  situation  and  the  Crimean  War.  As  a 
powerful  and  successful  neutral  in  Asia  the  United  States 
not  only  assumed  but  was  assigned  a  position  of  gi'eat 
influence. 

With  the  return  of  peace  to  Europe  Great  Britain  set 
about  not  merely  to  regain  the  place  of  preeminence  which 
had  been  lost  in  Far  Eastern  affairs,  but  also  to  make  an- 
other advance.  These  efforts  coincided  with  the  entrance 
of  the  Buchanan  administration  into  the  American  Govern- 
ment. In  the  next  four  years  we  shall  witness  the  steady 
retirement  of  American  influence  in  Asia.  The  causes  were 
not  simple.  Domestic  problems  in  the  United  States  were 
pressing  closely  upon  the  American  people  and  eclipsing  the 
former  interest  in  the  Orient.  Great  Britain  was  striving  to 
regain  her  former  relative  place  in  China.  And  of  at  least 
equal  importance  was  the  fact  that  the  American  people 
and  the  administration  did  not  prize  or  appreciate  the  vic- 
tories which  had  been  won  in  the  East.  Little  effort  was 
made  to  sustain  what  had  already  been  accomplished,  and 
the  ignorance,  timidity,  and  diplomatic  ineptitude  of  Bu- 
chanan and  Cass  turned  what  little  effort  was  made  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  United  States.  To  this  sweeping  state- 
ment one  exception  must  be  made.  The  Townsend  Harris 
commercial  treaty  with  Japan  in  1858  became  easily  the 
most  brilliant  diplomatic  achievement  of  the  United  States 
in  Asia  for  the  entire  century,  a  feat  indeed  which  has  never 
since  been  equalled,  but  one  has  to  remember  that  Harris 
had  been  instructed  and  sent  to  Japan  under  the  preceding 
administration,  and  no  credit  whatever  for  his  success 
belongs  to  either  Buchanan  or  to  Cass,  nor  in  fact  to  any  one 
save  Harris  alone. 

The  study  of  the  Buchanan-Cass  policy  in  Asia  becomes 


294  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

a  survey  of  the  decay  of  American  influence.  The  two  ques- 
tions of  poHcy  of  the  utmost  importance  were  bequeathed  to 
the  administration  by  Pierce  and  Marcy :  the  decision  as  to 
whether  the  United  States  should  enter  an  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  and  France  for  the  settlement  of  the  Far 
Eastern  question ;  and  the  revision  of  the  treaty.  Without 
attempting  to  point  a  moral  or  to  be  wiser  than  those  whose 
duty  it  was  to  solve  these  puzzles,  let  us  subject  these  prop- 
ositions to  close  analysis. 

Ebbing  Distrust  of  Great  Britain 

The  history  of  the  ebbing  distrust  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  growing  desire  for  the  adoption  of  a  cooperative  policy 
in  China  presents  some  interesting  details.  A  few  incidents 
selected  from  the  period  immediately  after  the  ratification 
of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  will  illustrate  the  strength  of  the 
existing  American  sentiment  against  England. 

Shortly  after  the  ratifications  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia 
were  exchanged  (December  31,  1845)  by  Commodore  James 
Biddle  and  Kiying,  the  latter  sent  a  friend  to  confer  with 
the  American  representative  about  the  difficulties  which 
then  existed  between  Kiying  and  Sir  John  Francis  Davis. 
The  English  plenipotentiary  had  demanded  of  the  Chinese 
viceroy  a  pledge  that  when  the  English  should  restore  the 
island  of  Chusan  and  Kuling-fu,  then  held  as  security  for 
the  payment  of  the  indemnity,  the  Chinese  should  give 
pledge  that  these  islands  should  never  be  ceded  to  any  other 
foreign  nation.  Biddle  advised  Kiying  to  resist  such  a 
demand,  and  seized  the  opportunity  to  point  out  to  Kiying 
how  much  better  off  China  would  be  if  only  she  would  admit 
resident  ministers  to  Peking.  The  commodore  also  pressed 
upon  the  high  commissioner  the  wisdom  of  having  China 
take  up  the  study  of  the  modern  arts  of  war,  in  order  that  in 
the  future  she  might  be  able  to  defend  herself  in  the  con- 
flicts which  Biddle  plainly  foresaw. 

A  month  later  Biddle  wrote  to  Buchanan:  "The  refusal 
(of  the  English)  to  withdraw  these  troops  from  Chusan  is  a 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  295 

clear  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking"  (February  21, 
1846).! 

At  this  interview  with  Commodore  Biddle  the  other  chief 
point  of  irritation  between  the  English  and  the  Chinese  was 
discussed — the  question  of  the  right,  under  the  British 
treaty,  of  entrance  into  Canton.  The  British  demanded  that 
the  gates  of  the  city  be  opened  to  foreigners;  the  Chinese 
absolutely  refused  to  yield  to  the  demand.  They  based  their 
refusal  on  both  the  hostile  temper  of  the  Canton  gentry  and 
populace  and  on  the  Chinese  text  of  the  treaty,  which  it  had 
been  agreed  was  to  be  equally  authoritative  with  the  Eng- 
lish text.  They  explained  that  in  the  Chinese  text  the  word 
used  with  reference  to  the  opening  of  the  city  was  not  the 
Chinese  word  for  'walled  city'  but  the  word  which  should  be 
translated  'port'  or  'mart.'  The  Americans  acquiesced  in 
this  explanation,  and  although  the  American  consul  at 
Canton  made  it  the  subject  of  a  formal  request,  he  did  not 
press  the  matter.*  Commodore  Biddle  advised  Kiying's 
emissary  that  he  considered  that  they  were  perfectly  right 
in  refusing  to  yield  to  Great  Britain  f  in  the  matter.^ 

Four  months  after  his  arrival  in  China  Commissioner 
Everett  reported  a  conversation  between  Dr.  Parker,  secre- 
tary of  the  Legation,  and  a  'high  mandarin.'  ^  The  latter, 
referring  to  the  currently  reported  proposal  of  the  English 
to  open  up  relations  with  China  through  Assam,  had  re- 
marked that  tJie  British  seemed  determined  to  get  posses- 

*  Tbc  Chinese  Repository,  which  was  edited  by  Rev.  E.  C.  Bridgman  and  S. 
Wells  Williams,  two  of  the  best  Chinese  scholars  among  the  foreigners,  stated 
In  a  review  of  this  question  of  entry  into  Canton  (May,  1S49,  p.  276-9)  :  "It  is 
so  local  (this  feeling  about  foreigners  entering  Canton)  that  the  Chinese  com- 
missioners at  Nanking,  having  never  been  at  Canton,  seem  not  to  have  given 
it  a  thought. — at  least  they  did  not  agree  in  plain  terms  that  the  foreigners 
should  enter  its  gates,  or  those  of  any  other  of  the  five  ports,  and  nothing  in 
the  treaty,  nor  in  those  of  the  Bogue,  Wanghai.  or  Whampoa.  can  be  construed 
as  promising  it  even  by  implication.  The  idea  which  a  native  would  derive 
from  reading  these  four  treaties  is  that  foreigners  have  permission  to  reside  at 
the  five  ports,  in  the  jilaces  where  trade  is  carried  on,  the  term  kiatuj  kan,  or 
river's  mouth,  rt-fi-rring  to  the  location  on  shore  where  traders  collect  from 
their  ships  to  barter  and  exchange  their  goods.  Such  places  are  not  neces- 
sarily walled  in,  nor  are  they  called  ching,  i.e.,  citadels  or  walled  cities,  and 
resort  to  the  former  has  no  reference  in, — certainly  does  not  include  ingress  into 
— the  latter.  The  ])hrase  is  varied  in  the  Treaty  of  Whampoa  to  kcni  nhi-fan 
tt  ff'nifj,  i.e.,  seaport,  market  places,  so  as  to  restrict  the  residence  of  French 
citizens  where  trade  is  carried   on." 

t  The  question  of  entry  into  Canton  never  became  an  issue  between  the 
Americans  and  the  Chinese,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  actually  precipi- 
tated hostilities  between  the  Chinese  and  the  English.  For  a  review  of  the 
long  negotiations  over  the  subject  see  Morse.* 


296  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

sion  of  China — "not  perhaps  immediately  but  at  some  future 
time."  Everett  himself  was  so  much  impressed  with  the 
truth  of  this  view  that  a  month  later  he  _  wrote  to 
Buchanan : ^ 

"The  conviction  that  the  British  Government  is  determined  to 
get  possession  of  their  country,  which,  as  I  mentioned  in  a  late  dis- 
patch, was  expressed  to  a  member  of  this  legation  by  one  of  the 
leading  mandarins  at  Canton  some  weeks  ago,  has  been  freely  avowed, 
on  former  occasions,  to  Commodore  Biddle.  ...  It  is  probably  uni- 
vqrsal  among  the  educated  and  well  informed  men  of  the  empire." 

Everett  then  drew  on  his  previous  experience  as  a  diplo- 
mat in  the  courts  of  continental  Europe,  and  proposed  that 
the  United  States  take  the  lead  in  the  formation  of  a  com- 
bination of  Russia,  France  and  the  United  States  to  get 
England  to  agree  to  abstain  from  aggressions  in  China.  No 
comment  on  this  plan  was  forthcoming  from  Washington, 
and  Everett  died  a  few  months  later  (June  28,  1847). 

Dr.  Peter  Parker,  who  became  Charge  upon  the  death 
of  Everett  was  so  convinced  of  the  hostile  intentions  of 
England  in  the  controversy  over  the  opening  of  the  gates  of 
the  city  of  Canton  that  (September  25,  1847)  he  addressed 
a  confidential  dispatch  to  Buchanan,  warning  him  of  the 
'impending  crisis.'  He  stated  that  it  was  common  remark 
among  the  American  merchants  that  in  a  little  while  they 
would  be  paying  duties  through  an  English  customs  house 
at  Canton.  Parker  thought  it  likely  that  within  another 
twelve  or  fifteen  months  the  British  would  place  a  minister 
in  Peking,  and  demand  redress  for  many  grievances.  He 
strongly  urged  upon  the  American  Government  the  neces- 
sity of  taking  action  at  once  to  place  an  American  minister 
in  Peking  'before  the  dismemberment  of  the  empire  is  com- 
menced.' 

The  new  commissioner,  John  W.  Davis,  who  arrived  in 
August  1848,  did  not  share  at  all  the  suspicions  of  his  pre- 
decessors as  to  the  intentions  of  England  and  informed  the 
State  Department  that  the  English  did  not  seem  disposed 
to  make  any  trouble.  The  following  March  he  reported  that 
gome  of  the  Americans  in  Canton  have  been  urging  that  the 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  297 

United  States  join  with  Great  Britain  the  following  month 
in  forcing  the  gates  of  the  city.''  A  year  later  he  sent  a  dis- 
patch which  marked  the  rise,  by  the  side  of  the  old  suspi- 
cions, of  a  new  sentiment  of  cooperation  between  the  English 
and  the  Americans.     He  wrote:  " 

"The  Eiiiilisli  Govenmient  at  Honfrkong  has  dispatched  a  war 
steamer  to  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  with  a  communication  from  the 
court  at  London  to  that  of  this  country,  evidently  with  an  intention, 
if  possihle,  to  open  up  a  direct  intercourse  with  His  Imperial  Majesty. 
Had  there  been  a  suitable  American  vessel  of  war  on  this  station,  I 
should  have  taken  the  responsibility  of  suggesting  to  the  Commander 
a  similar  project  on  our  part,  satisfied  (as  I  stated  in  a  former  dis- 
patch) that  until  our  intercourse  is  directly  with  the  Court  of  this 
country,  we  must  always  labor  under  great  embarrassments  in  all 
diplomatic  relations  and  correspondence." 

A  few  weeks  later  Davis  returned  to  the  United  States, 
and  Dr.  Parker  again  became  Charge.  The  following  year 
Dr.  Parker  sent  a  confidential  dispatch  to  Daniel  Webster, 
who  had  become  for  the  second  time  Secretary  of  State,  in 
which  he  reviewed  at  length  the  political  situation  both  as 
regards  England  and  China,  and  stated :  ^  "To  prevent  the 
necessity  of  any  one  of  these  powers  adopting  coercive 
measures,  it  is  proposed  that  joint  pacific  steps  be  taken  by 
all."  Parker  then  outlined  a  plan  for  the  powers  to  proceed 
simultaneously  to  Peking,  and  jointly  to  insist  upon  placing 
representatives  at  the  capital  with  access  to  the  Imperial 
Court — substantially  the  plan  which  was  actually  adopted 
in  1858.  He  reported  that  Dr.  John  Bowring,  then  British 
consul  at  Canton,  as  well  as  the  French  and  Spanish  repre- 
sentatives, were  interested  in  the  plan.  Bowring  is  reported 
by  Parker  to  have  said  that  if  England  acted  it  would  prob- 
ably be  a  hostile  action,  but  if  the  Western  powers  acted 
conjointly  the  action  might  be  peaceful.  The  drift  of  pub- 
lic sentiment  in  China  may  thus  be  clearly  marked. 
Whereas,  in  1847,  the  American  commissioner  proposed  a 
plan  to  block  England  in  any  aggressions  she  might  be  con- 
sidering, the  new  plan  proposed  to  include  England  in  a 
common  program  for  the  purpose  of  moderating  her  action. 
The  new  policy  was  very  sound. 


298  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Proposals  for  an  Alliance  with  Great  Britain 
AND  France 

The  sticking-point  for  the  Americans  in  the  matter  of 
cooperation  with  the  British  or  any  other  power  in  Asia, 
then  and  always,  was  whether  the  combined  power  thus 
obtained  from  cooperation  would  be  turned  at  some  future 
time  to  the  disadvantage  of  legitimate  American  interests. 
In  1847  Great  Britain  had  made  no  declaration  of  policy 
either  directly  or  obliquely  which  was  to  the  Americans  in 
any  way  reassuring.  Within  the  next  five  years  the  situa- 
tion had  materially  changed.  The  British  had  at  Shanghai 
conceded  every  point  for  which  the  Americans  had  con- 
tended, and  the  British  Government  through  its  representa- 
tives in  Washington  had  made  direct  overtures,  accompanied 
by  a  declaration  of  policy,  for  American  cooperation.  Great 
Britain  assured  the  United  States  that  while  it  sought  the 
complete  opening  of  China  to  trade,  it  would  ask  for  no 
exclusive  advantages  for  itself.  The  reason  for  these  over- 
tures is  obvious  and  was  well  expressed  by  a  great  British 
statesman.  In  the  great  debate  in  the  House  of  Commons 
February,  1857,  on  the  ''Arrow  affair"  and  upon  the  char- 
acter of  British  policy  in  China,  as  a  result  of  which  Parlia- 
ment was  dissolved  and  Palmerston  went  to  the  country  for 
an  approval  of  his  policies,  Disraeli  remarked:  ^ 

"Fifty  years  ago  Lord  Hastings  oifcred  to  conquer  China  with 
20,000  men.  So  great  a  captain  as  the  Marquess  of  Hastings  might 
have  succeeded;  but  since  the  time  when  our  Clives  and  Hastings 
founded  our  Indian  Empire  the  position  of  aft'airs  in  the  East  has 
greatly  changed.  Great  Powers  have  been  brought  into  contact  with 
us  in  the  East;  We  have  the  Russian  Empire  and  the  American 
Repul)lic  there,  and  a  system  of  j^olitical  compromise  has  developed 
itself  like  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe;  and,  if  you  are  not  cautious 
and  careful  in  your  conduct  now  in  dealing  with  China,  you  will 
find  that  you  are  likely  not  to  extend  commerce,  but  to  excite  the 
jealousy  of  powerful  states,  and  to  involve  yourselves  in  hostilities 
with  nations  not  inferior  to  yourselves." 

That  Disraeli  had  not  misread  the  trend  of  events,  and 
that  he  liad  not  been  ill  advised  in  thus  placing  in  associa- 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  299 

tion  the  two  names  of  Russia  and  America  in  Far  Eastern 
policy  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  the  revision  of  the 
treaties  of  1858  the  American  and  the  Russian  ministers 
sustained  to  each  other  relations  which  were  even  more 
intimate  than  those  subsisting  between  Lord  Elgin  and 
Baron  Gros,  although  France  and  England  were  actually 
allied  in  China.  As  early  as  1851  the  American  officials  in 
China  had  been  directed  by  the  State  Department  to  extend 
such  assistance  as  was  possible  to  Russian  subjects  in  China 
and  the  Sandwich  Islands  whenever  it  might  be  necessary.^*' 
Russia  was  studiously  cultivating  American  friendship. 

Great  Britain  could  not  profitably  entertain  the  hostility 
of  too  many  Powers,  and  it  was  plain  that  she  was  in  the 
way  to  acquire  the  active  opposition  of  the  United  States  to 
whatever  she  might  attempt  in  China,  at  the  time  of  the 
revision  of  the  treaties  when  she  needed  cooperation.  On 
the  other  hand  it  was  equally  evident  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  that  cooperation  rather  than  irritating 
conflicts  with  Great  Britain  were  desirable  in  the  face  of  the 
stolid  opposition  of  China  to  all  friendly  advance  from  the 
American  representatives. 

Early  in  1854,  Commissioner  McLane  noted  a  disposition 
on  the  part  of  Sir  John  Bowring  to  seek  the  heartiest  coop- 
eration with  the  United  States  in  the  revision  of  the  treaties. 
Bowring  did  not  possess  the  confidence  of  the  American 
community  in  China,  and  McLane  was  cautioned  by  Marcy, 
May  8,  1854,  not  to  rely  too  much  upon  the  judgment  of  his 
British  colleague.^  ^  McLane  was,  however,  instructed  in 
the  same  letter  to  cooperate,  which  he  did  in  the  joint 
expedition  to  the  Pei-ho  in  November,  1854. 

The  visit  of  Dr.  Peter  Parker,  who  was  a  most  enthusi- 
astic advocate  of  cooperation,  to  London  and  Paris  in  the 
latter  part  of  1855,  has  already  been  referred  to.  The 
failure  of  this  effort  was  due  to  several  reasons:  the  British 
were  not  then  ready  for  an  active  movement  in  China;  Dr. 
Parker  did  not. win  the  confidence  of  Lord  Clarendon;  and 
the  Pierce  administration,  now  drawing  to  a  close  and 
estranged  from  Great  Britain  by  the  objectionable  activities 


300  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  the  British  consuls  and  Sir  John  Crampton  *  in  securing 
enUstnients  for  the  Crinnean  War,  was  hardly  in  a  mood  to 
cooperate  with  England  in  the  Far  East. 

Encouraged  by  the  visit  of  Dr.  Parker  to  London  the 
preceding  year,  by  the  cordial  relations  between  Dr.  Parker 
and  Sir  John  Bowring  after  Dr.  Parker's  return  to  China, 
and  then  by  the  action  of  Commodore  Armstrong  at  the 
Barrier  Forts,  Lord  Clarendon  felt  the  time  opportune,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Buchanan  administration,  to  sound  out 
the  American  Government  on  the  subject  of  an  actual  alli- 
ance of  the  three  treaty  powers — Great  Britain,  France  and 
the  United  States — for  a  revision  of  the  treaties.  Indeed, 
the  matter  seems  to  have  been  taken  up  in  the  closing  days 
of  the  preceding  administration  by  the  French  Minister,  for 
before  Dr.  Parker's  proposal  for  the  occupation  of  territory 
was  received,  President  Pierce  was  already  familiar  with  the 
plan,  and  had  verbally  expressed  his  disapproval. 

On  the  14th  of  March,  1857,  Lord  Napier,  the  British 
Minister  at  Washington,  took  up  with  Secretary  of  State 
Cass  the  request  that  the  United  States  would  grant  that 
"concurrent  and  active  cooperation  which  the  Government 
of  France  has  already  accorded,  and  that  they  will  authorize 
their  naval  and  political  authorities  in  China  to  act  heartily 
in  concert  with  the  agents  of  the  two  allied  powers."  ^-  At 
the  same  time  the  British  Minister  explained  fully  to  the 
United  States  the  intentions  of  Great  Britain  in  China, 
transmitting  a  memorandum  in  which  were  given  the  in- 
structions to  Sir  John  Bowring  for  the  revision  of  the  trea- 
ties, and  the  instructions  which  had  been  issued  to  the  Brit- 
ish naval  forces.  Tlie  plan  contemplated  the  complete 
destruction  of  the  Barrier  Forts,  and,  if  that  were  not  suffi- 
cient, then  the  blockade  of  the  Yangtze  River  as  far  as  the 
Grand  Canal,  and  a  further  blockade  of  the  mouth  of  the 
Pei-ho.  The  instructions  for  the  revision  of  the  treaty 
included:  residence  at  Peking  for  diplomatic  representatives 
of  Foreign  Powers;  extension  of  connnercial  intercourse  with 

♦Thfi  preceding  suiniiicr  tlio  Uritisli  niinistor  in  Washinston  had  l)(>cn  given 
his  passports  by  Marcy  for  liaviiij;  insisted  on  tlie  riglit  to  stir  up  .synipatliy  in 
tbe  United  States  for  England  during  llic  Ciiinean  War. 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  301 

the  coast  and  into  the  interior;  abolition  of  transit  taxes  in 
the  interior;  no  exclusive  privileges  for  Great  Britain.  The 
legalization  of  the  opium  trade  was  not  mentioned. 

The  negotiations  at  Washington  continued  for  a  month. 
March  30  Lord  Napier  forwarded  to  Cass  a  memorandum  to 
be  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  President.  In  this  document 
the  British  plan  for  an  alliance  was  argued  under  the  follow- 
ing points: 

1.  China  will  not  be  able  to  offer  greater  resistance  than  she  did 
in  the  war  of  1842,  for  since  then  she  has  been  worn  down  by  revo- 
lution and  the  financial  resources  of  the  empire  are  exhausted.  On 
the  other  hand  to  the  strength  of  England  is  now  added  that  of 
France. 

2.  "It  is  best  to  'abridge'  the  struggle  as  much  as  possible,  and 
iiot  to  weaken  more  than  necessary  the  Imperial  Government." 

3.  "The  Allied  Powers  have  declared  their  objects  wsich  are 
humane,  honorable,  and  pregnant  with  future  benefits.  They  aim  at 
no  territorial  extension;  their  moderate  and  solitary  demands  are 
comprised  in  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations,  the  enfran- 
chisement of  the  trade,  and  the  regulation  of  duties,  the  suppression 
of  piracy,  and  the  toleration  of  the  Christian  religion." 

As  the  situation  then  stood  four  Powers  had  recognized  the  inter- 
course with  China;  Great  Britain  and  France  were  about  to  make 
war;  Russia  and  the  United  States  were  neutral.  The  Russian 
Minister  in  Washington  had  expressed  the  opinion  that  Russia  would 
not  oppose  the  Allied  Powers  in  China,  but  it  was  the  hope  of  Lord 
Napier  that  the  United  States  would  not  be  content  with  a  position 
similar  to  that  of  Russia.  The  relations  of  the  United  States  with 
China,  he  pointed  out,  were  quite  different  from  the  relations  betvveen 
Russia  and  China. 

"No  country  has  availed  itself  so  extensively  as  the  United  States 
of  the  increased  access  first  opened  up  by  England  in  the  year  1842, 
and  no  country  has  so  much  to  gain  by  a  perfect  emancipation  of  the 
trade.  The  amount  of  business  transacted  by  the  United  States  with 
China  may  still  be  inferior  to  that  in  which  Great  Britain  is  engaged, 
but  it  increases  with  greater  rapidity,  and  is  now  unquestionably 
destined  to  exceed  that  of  all  other  nations  hereafter."  The  United 
States,  therefore,  would  find  it  a  calamity  if  the  ports  of  China  were 
blockaded  for  long. 

While  the  United  States  did  not  recognize  the  existence  of  a 
sufficient  cause  for  war  with  China,  argued  Lord  Napier,  "there  is, 
apparently,  nothing  in  their  political  constitution,  nor  in  the  relations 
of  domestic  parties,  or  in  the  general  temper  of  the  nation,  which 
should  prevent  them  contributing  to  the  success  of  the  common  cause, 
and  the  consolidation  of  the  common  good  by  that  degree  of  pacific 
and  amicable  concurrence  which  would  be  embodied  in  the  following 
measures : 


302  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

(a)   Dei'laration  of  approval  of  the  objects  of  the  Allied  Nations; 

(h)  Appointment  of  a  distini>uished  person  as  Plenipotentiary 
who  should  proceed  to  his  destination  in  a  vessel  of  war  befitting 
the  dignity  of  his  country  and  his  mission;  the  envoy  to  be  empowered 
to  attend  the  movements  of  the  ministers  of  Great  Britain  and 
France,  and  to  visit  London  and  France  to  secure  the  most  recent 
information  about  China  before  proceeding  to  his  post; 

(c)   Increase  of  the  American  squadron  in  the  China  Seas. 

"The  presence  of  an  able  Plenipotentiary,"  continued  Lord  Napier, 
"and  connnander  with  a  competent  force,  acting  even  in  pacific  con- 
currence with  the  agents  of  Great  Britain  and  France  woidd  manifest 
to  the  Chinese  that  our  desires  are  identical,  though  our  measures  may 
be  different,  and  that  the  only  course  left  open  to  them  is  a  frank  and 
unhesitating  accession  to  our  proposals. 

"Finally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  if  the  pending  differences  be 
adjusted  by  the  combined  action  of  the  United  States  with  England 
and  France,  the  beneficial  effects  of  such  an  alliance  will  be  felt 
beyond  the  present  time,  and  the  scene  on  which  it  is  first  exerted. 
The  Chinese  Government  will  know  that  it  had  contracted  weighty 
engagements  of  future  good  conduct  towards  a  confederacy  prepared 
to  enforce  their  rights  by  a  harmonious  cooperation,  and  the  three 
Powers,  fortified  by  the  prestige  of  unanimity  and  success  may  then 
point  their  efforts  to  the  improvement  of  their  relations  with  Japan, 
which  has  been  already  partly  brought  within  the  pale  of  European 
commerce  by  the  unaided  enterprise  of  the  United  States." 

To  this  carefully  worded  proposal  for  an  alliance  of  the 
three  powers  for  the  settlement  of  the  Far  Eastern  question, 
Cass  replied,  April  10,  1857: 

"True  wisdom  .  .  .  dictates  the  observance  of  moderation  and 
discretion  in  our  attempts  to  open  China  to  the  trade  and  intercourse 
of  the  world.  To  be  safe  and  successful  the  effort  must  be  the  work 
of  time,  and  of  those  changes  which  time  gradually  brings  with  it." 

Cass  pointed  out  that,  under  the  Constitution,  Congress 
is  the  war-declaring  power  in  the  United  States  and  that  a 
military  expedition  into  Chinese  territory  could  not  be 
undertaken  without  the  consent  of  the  national  legislature. 
And,  moreover,  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with 
China  did  not  justify  war.  On  the  other  hand,  the  United 
States  would  heed  the  request  for  the  appointment  of  a  new 
plenipotentiary,  but  it  was  clearly  stated  that  the  United 
States  would  not  become  a  party  to  any  treaty  which  might 
be  negotiated  jointly  by  England  and  France  with  China, 
and  that  the  conventional  arrangements  of  the  United  States 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  303 

with   China  would  be  confined   solely  to   the   two  latter 
powers. 

In  May,  1857,  William  B.  Reed  was  appointed  envoy 
extraordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary  to  China  and 
charged  with  the  duty  of  revising  the  treaty. ^^  Accompany- 
ing his  instructions  was  the  Lord  Napier  correspondence  to 
which  his  attention  was  especially  directed : 

"There  seems  to  be  an  entire  unanimity  of  sentiment  and  action," 
wrote  Cass,  "between  Great  Britain  and  France,  extending-  even  to 
armed  cooperation,  and  you  will  find  from  the  papers  annexed  that 
the  United  States  has  been  invited  to  join  the  alliance  and  to  partici- 
pate in  its  hostile  movements.  The  reasons  of  the  President  for 
declining  this  participation  are  sufiiciently  stated  in  the  communica- 
tion to  the  British  minister  already  referred  to,  together  with  hia 
opinions  as  to  the  extent  to  which  the  United  States  may  fairly  co- 
operate with  the  allied  powers  in  China." 

Thus  ended,  so  far  as  the  United  States  was  concerned, 
the  first  efforts  on  the  part  of  another  power  to  secure  an 
alliance  for  the  settlement  of  the  Far  Eastern  question. 
Thus  ended  also  for  more  than  forty  years  any  consideration 
of  the  possibilities  of  actual  hostilities  between  the  United 
States  and  China. 

The  Buchanan  administration,  in  1857,  was  faced  with 
difficult  choices  in  the  Far  East  as  well  as  at  home.  The 
President  could  have  laid  before  Congress  the  facts  that 
China  had  failed  to  observe  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty 
of  Wanghia  (1844).  He  could  have  pointed  out  that  the 
Government  of  China  had  failed  to  protect  the  lives 
and  property  of  American  citizens  in  China  and  that 
failing  in  that,  China  had  evaded  payment  of  claims 
for  reparation.  Diplomatic  correspondence  had  been  im- 
peded, interviews  with  the  Imperial  Commissioner  at  Can- 
ton, and  with  the  Governor  General  at  Foochow  had 
been  repelled,  and  a  letter  of  President  Pierce  to  the 
Emperor  of  China  had  been  treated  with  indignity,  hav- 
ing been  returned  to  the  commissioner  without  answer, 
and  with  broken  seals.  On  the  basis  of  these  facts 
President  Buchanan  might  have  asked  Congress  to  authorize 
a  military  and  naval  expedition  to  China  to  demand  repara- 


304  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

tions.  Had  Congress  yielded  to  this  request  he  might  have 
sought  its  further  approval  for  the  joint  expedition  with 
Great  Britain  and  France.  Two  American  commissioners  in 
China  had  reconnncnded  such  a  course.  Lord  Napier  urged 
it.  The  American  residents  in  China,  for  the  most  part, 
would  have  approved.  But  to  neither  of  these  propositions 
was  it  even  remotely  possible  that  Congress  would  have 
given  its  assent.  Public  opinion  would  have  seen  in  them 
only  a  trick  by  which  England  was  seeking  the  aid  of  the 
United  States  in  her  efforts  to  secure  the  legalization  of  the 
opium  trade. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  could  have  ignored  the  causes  for  war,  which  upon 
examination  proved  to  be  very  slight,  and  could  have  con- 
tinued a  policy  of  conciliation,  waiting  for  time  to  do  its 
work  in  softening  the  prejudices  of  the  Chinese  and  leading 
them  to  see  the  advantages  to  them  of  the  fullest  possible 
harmony  and  cooperation  with  the  United  States.  Such  a 
policy,  within  a  few  years,  would  doubtless  have  met  with 
some  success.  However,  one  large  factor  in  such  a  success 
would  have  been  the  chastisement  which  Great  Britain  had 
already  determined  to  administer  to  China. 

There  had  been  even  a  third  honest  course  open  to  the 
United  States.  It  could  have  said  to  Great  Britain  and 
France  that  while  in  the  approaching  crisis  the  United 
States  would  remain  neutral,  it  would  instruct  its  diplomatic 
officers  in  China  to  abstain  from  pressing  any  claims  on 
China  for  the  revision  of  the  treaty,  and  would  practically 
withdraw  from  the  open  ports  while  the  allied  powers  had  a 
free  hand.  This  course  would  have  been  exceedingly  unsat- 
isfactory to  Great  Britain  whose  good  will  the  United  States 
was  then  seeking  to  cultivate.  England  already  felt  that  in 
the  war  of  1839-42  she  had  really  been  fighting  the  battle  of 
American  as  well  as  British  merchants,  and  that  the  time 
had  come  for  the  ilnited  States  to  share  some  of  the  burdens 
incident  to  the  advantages  its  citizens  in  China  enjoyed.  In 
the  ITnited  States  also  there  would  have  been  an  objection  to 
such  a  policy,  for  still  in  the  opinion  of  many  Great  Britain 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  305 

could  not  be  trusted  in  China  and  required  a  great  deal  of 
watching. 

The  policy  actually  adopted  represented  a  compromise 
at  every  point  and  assigned  to  the  United  States  an  igno- 
minious role.  President  Buchanan  rejected  the  proposal  of 
war  with  China,  but  he  yielded  to  Lord  Clarendon  and  Lord 
Napier  in  that  he  agreed  to  dispatch  to  China  a  plenipoten- 
tiary to  be  present  during  the  hostilities,  with  instructions 
to  press  the  American  claims  for  reparations  and  a  revision 
of  the  treaty  at  any  opportune  time. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  this  decision  was  satis- 
factory to  Great  Britain.  It  involved  the  assent  of  the 
United  States  to  the  plan  of  chastisement  and  thus  fore- 
stalled any  opposition,  such  as  Humphrey  Marshall  had 
made  in  1853,  to  the  English  program  of  operations.  While 
it  placed  upon  Great  Britain  a  burden  of  expense  which  it 
would  have  been  glad  to  share,  yet  it  removed  from  the 
arena  a  power  with  which  England  would  otherwise  have 
had  to  share  the  certain  prestige  of  victory.  In  1858  Great 
Britain  was  preparing  not  merely  to  open  up  China  to  the 
trade  of  the  world,  but  also  to  'claim  her  place  of  priority 
in  the  East,'  ^^  and  there  were  few  regrets  that  the  United 
States  was  unprepared  to  assert  a  similar  claim.  Meanwhile 
an  American  envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  plenipoten- 
tiary was  to  be  dispatched  to  the  other  side  of  the  world  to 
stand  under  the  tree,  with  his  basket,  waiting  for  his  asso- 
ciates above  to  shake  down  the  fruit,  and  he  was  even 
instructed  to  offer  mediation  in  case  those  in  the  tree  be- 
came involved  with  the  owners  of  the  orchard.  Surely  a 
representative  of  the  United  States  never  played  a  more 
inglorious  role  in  international  affairs. 

Instructions  to  William  B.  Reed 

As  long  as  such  a  poUcy  was  to  be  pursued  it  would  have 
been  wise  to  select  an  experienced  diplomat,  but  instead 
President  Buchanan  appointed  his  friend  William  B.  Reed 
of  Pennsylvania.     Reed's  diplomatic  experience  had  been 


306  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

confined  to  a  brief  period  when  at  the  age  of  twenty  he 
served  as  private  secretary  to  Joel  R.  Poinsett,  U.  S.  minis- 
ter in  Mexico  (1825-7).  He  was  a  lawyer  by  profession  and 
and  had  been  active  in  state  politics,  having  been  a  member 
of  the  legislature  and  attorney  general.  For  the  six  years 
previous  to  his  departure  for  China  he  had  been  professor 
of  American  history  in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania.^^ 
Mr.  Reed's  instructions  from  Lewis  Cass  were:  ^^ 

1.  Communicate  freely  with  the  British  and  French  ministers 
and  make  known  to  the  Chinese  that  the  President  believes  that  the 
objects  of  the  Allied  Powers  are  "just  and  expedient."  Confine  your- 
self to  firm  representations  to  the  Chinese,  bearing  in  mind  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  is  not  at  war  with  China,  and 
leaving  to  the  government  to  determine  what  shall  be  the  next  step  in 
case  your  representations  are  fruitless. 

2.  Have  the  same  friendly  relations  with  the  envoy  of  Russia  as 
with  those  of  France  and  England.  Enlist  his  support  for  your 
representations  to  the  Chinese  Government.  "There  is  nothing  in  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  China  which  is  not  quite 
consistent  with  the  pacific  relations  which  are  understood  to  exist 
between  that  empire  and  Russia." 

3.  Make  clear  to  the  Chinese  authorities  that  the  United  States 
seeks  only  the  enlargement  of  opportunities  for  trade,  and  that  it 
desires  neither  territory  nor  to  interfere  in  China's  domestic  affairs. 

4.  The  United  States  does  not  seek  the  legalization  of  the  opium 
trade,  and  will  not  uphold  its  citizens  in  any  efforts  they  make  to 
introduce  the  drug  into  the  covmtry. 

5.  Secure  the  establishment  of  some  basis  of  exchange  which 
will  provide  for  the  recognition  of  the  legal  currency  of  the  United 
States  at  its  true  value  when  offered  in  payment  for  goods. 

6.  Secure  the  enforcement  of  the  existing  treaty  in  the  matter  of 
the  satisfaction  of  claims,  the  right  of  protection  for  the  life  and 
property  of  American  citizens,  and  obtain  modifications  which  will 
permit  to  Americans  the  right  of  residence  in  the  open  ports  without 
interference. 

7.  It  was  also  intimated  that  Mr.  Reed  might  assume  the  role 
of  mediator.  "It  is  possible  even  that  it  fR(>ed's  neutral  position] 
may  be  employed  with  advantage  as  a  means  of  conununication  be- 
tween the  belligerent  parties,  and  tend  in  this  way  to  the  termination 
of  the  war." 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  China  Desp.  Vol.  :}  (Dept.  of  State). 

2.  Ibid.,  Jan.  8,  1846. 

3.  Morse,  Vol.  1,  pp.  377-80. 

4.  China.  Desp.  Vol.  3,  Feb.  28,  1847. 

5.  Ibid..  Apr.  10,  1847. 


BUCHANAN  ADMINISTRATION  AND  THE  FAR  EAST  307 

6.  China  Desp.  Vol.  5,  Mar.  26,  1849. 

7.  China.  Desp.  April  22,  1850. 

8.  China  Desp.  Vol.  6,  Apr.  22,  1851. 

9.  Hansard,  Series  3,  Vol.  CXLIV,'  Feb.  3,  1857-Mar.  21,  1857,  p. 

1836. 

10.  China  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  June  21,  1851. 

11.  Ihid.,  May  8,  1854. 

12.  Notes  from  the  British  Legation,  Vol.  34,  Napier  to  Cass,  Mar. 

14,  30,  1857  (Dept  of  State). 

13.  S.  Ex.   Doc.   30:36-1. 

14.  Walrond's  Letters  and  Journals  of  James,  Eighth  Earl  of  Elgin, 

p.  253;  see  also  pp.  207  and  209  for  similar  clues  to  the  policy 
adopted  by  Lord  Elgin  in  China. 

15.  Twentieth     Century     Bibliographical     Dictionary     of     Notable 

Americans. 

16.  Eeed  Corres.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  30 :36-l,  p.  68. 


PART  IV 
THE  COOPERATIVE   POLICY 


CHAPTER  XVII 
WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN 

William  B.  Reed,  the  first  American  Minister  Plenipo- 
tentiary to  China,  arrived  at  Hongkong  in  November,  1857, 
and  six  months  later  reached  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  in 
company  with  Count  Putiatin,  Baron  Gros  and  Lord 
Elgin,  the  Russian,  French  and  British  envoys  respectively. 
Elgin  and  Gros  had  been  instructed  to  demand  full  repara- 
tions for  insults  and  injuries  including  particularly  the 
hauling  down  of  the  British  flag  on  the  lorcha  Arrow,  a 
vessel  which  had  been  engaged  in  opium  smuggling,  and  the 
murder  of  Abbe  Chapedelaine,  a  French  Roman  Catholic 
missionary  in  Kwangsi,  and  also  to  secure  a  full  revision  of 
the  treaties.  They  had  been  accompanied  to  China  by 
formidable  fleets  of  war  vessels  and  transports  and  were 
fully  prepared  for  hostilities.  The  American  envoy  was  in- 
structed to  secure  "modifications"  of  the  Gushing  treaty, 
and  Putiatin  was  seeking  an  entirely  new  convention 
which  would  admit  Russia  to  the  sea-borne  trade  of  China 
on  the  same  terms  as  those  enjoyed  by  the  other  treaty 
powers.^ 

The  events  from  the  arrival  of  Reed  to  the  beginning  of 
negotiations  at  the  Pei-ho  must  be  summarized  briefly. 
Commissioner  Yeh  at  Canton  refused  to  see  Reed  and 
asserted  that  a  revision  of  the  treaty  was  unnecessary. 
Meeting  with  similar  treatment,  Lord  Elgin  and  Baron  Gros 
turned  matters  over  to  the  allied  naval  authorities  and  the 
bombardment  of  Canton  began  December  28.  A  week  later 
the  city  was  invaded  and  occupied.  Yeh  was  made  prisoner 
and  subsequently  transported  to  Calcutta  where  he  died. 
The  British  and  French  troops  remained  in  occupation  of 
Canton  while  the  allied  envoys,   preceded  by  Reed  and 

311 


312  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Putiatin,  advanced  to  Shanghai.  Notwithstandino;  some 
misunderstandings  with  Lord  Elgin  who  from  the  outset 
assumed  complete  leadership  of  the  allied  expedition,  Reed 
worked  in  cooperation  with  the  allied  envoys.  He  addressed 
a  separate  yet  practically  simultaneous  note  with  the  others 
to  Peking  demanding  a  revision  of  the  treaties  and  approv- 
ing the  demands  of  the  British  and  French.  Notwithstand- 
ing this  effort  to  cooperate,  Mr.  Reed  was  subjected  to  the 
most  pusillanimous  abuse  by  the  Times  correspondent  who 
accompanied  Lord  Elgin,-  and  was  made  to  feel  that  the 
only  cooperation  really  desired  was  one  in  which  Lord  Elgin 
would  dictate  the  movements  and  policy  of  the  combined 
missions.^  The  American  envoy  had  been  assigned  to  an 
impossible  role.  At  Shanghai  he  received  additional  instruc- 
tions from  Secretary  of  State  Cass,  again  cautioning  him  to 
limit  his  cooperation  to  purely  peaceful  measures.  The 
coldness  of  Lord  Elgin  and  the  cordiality  of  Count  Putiatin 
tended  more  and  more  to  separate  the  four  envoys  into 
pairs,  and  the  increasing  intimacy  of  Reed  with  the  Russians 
became  an  additional  annoyance  to  the  British.  At  the 
Pei-ho  Reed  determined  to  adopt  an  independent  course  of 
action.  It  may  be  gravely  questioned  whether  it  was  not 
a  fundamental  error  of  policy  for  the  Americans  to  be  pres- 
ent at  what  was  evidently  intended  to  be  a  hostile  demon- 
stration, but  being  there,  no  other  than  an  independent 
course  of  action  was  consistent  wath  Reed's  instructions,  or 
with  his  self-respect. 

Reed  and  Putiatin  began  negotiations  with  Tan,  an 
Imperial  Commissioner  with  limited  powers,  early  in  May. 
Elgin  and  Gros  refused  to  meet  Tan  on  the  ground  that  his 
powers  were  too  limited.  Tan  reported  that  the  Emperor 
would  concede  the  opening  of  seven  new  ports,  five  on  the 
coast  and  two  in  Formosa,  the  absolute  toleration  of  Chris- 
tianity, a  modification  of  the  tonnage  dues  to  the  advantage 
of  American  bottoms,  and  an  inclusive  most-favored-nation 
clause.  The  opening  of  the  rivers  to  trade  and  the  right  of 
either  occasional  or  permanent  diplomatic  residence  at  Pe- 
king were  absolutely  refused.^ 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  313 

Against  the  advice  of  Lord  Elgin  and  Baron  Gros,  Mr. 
Reed  decided  to  continue  the  conferences  with  the  Chinese 
officials,  although  it  was  definitely  known  that  the  refusal 
of  the  Emperor  to  consent  to  diplomatic  residence  at  or 
visits  to  the  capital,  and  the  refusal  to  open  up  the  rivers, 
left  the  allied  envoys  no  alternative  but  to  proceed  up  the 
river,  using  whatever  force  might  be  required.  On  the  19th 
of  May  S.  Wells  Williams  and  W.  A.  P.  Martin  were  in  the 
midst  of  a  conference  with  some  of  the  subordinate  officers 
of  the  Imperial  Commission  where  articles  of  the  treaty 
were  being  drafted  when  a  note  from  Mr.  Reed  warned 
them  that  the  allied  powers  were  to  bombard  the  forts  the 
following  day.  The  American  minister  instructed  them  to 
discontinue  the  conference. 

Promptly  at  ten  o'clock,  May  20,  the  allies  attacked  the 
Taku  forts  which  offered  only  a  feeble  resistance.  Having 
taken  possession  of  the  forts  within  two  hours,  the  allied 
forces  moved  on  up  the  river, 

Mr.  Reed's  intention  to  withdraw  from  the  scene  of  brief 
conflict  was  not  carried  out.  Indeed,  a  large  number  of 
officers  from  the  squadron  which  was  compelled  to  lay  at 
anchorage  well  off  shore  came  inside  the  river  to  the 
Antelope,  a  small  steamer  which  had  been  chartered  at 
Shanghai  and  attached  to  the  squadron  for  service  in  shal- 
low water,  to  view  the  attack.  Hardly  was  the  struggle  over 
when  Dr.  Williams  received  a  note  from  one  of  the  attaches 
of  the  Chinese  Commission  expressing  the  hope  that  the 
Americans  w^ould  not  withdraw.  And  the  next  day  Count 
Putiatin  and  Mr.  Reed  received  a  formal  request  urging 
them  to  remain  and  follow  the  allied  envoys  up  to  Tientsin. 
Lord  Elgin  also  urged  that  the  neutral  envoys  continue 
their  cooperation  as  far  as  possible.  On  the  29th  of  May 
Lord  Elgin  and  Baron  Gros  proceeded  up  the  river  in  a 
British  vessel  flying  both  the  British  and  the  French  flags, 
and  shortly  after  Count  Putiatin  and  Mr.  Reed  followed 
in  the  Russian  steamer  Amerika,  which  flew  both  the  Rus- 
sian and  the  American  ensigns.  At  Tientsin  the  allied  pleni- 
potentiaries took  up  residence  in  a  large  temple,  while  the 


314  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

neutral  envoys  found  less  commodious  but  more  comfortable 
quarters  together  in  a  private  residence. 

This  advance  of  the  allied  and  neutral  plenipotentiaries 
to  a  point  half  way  between  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  and 
Peking  had  an  immediate  effect  on  the  Imperial  Court. 
Two  commissioners,  Kweiliang,  a  cabinet  minister,  and 
Hwashana.  president  of  the  Board  of  Civil  Office,  with 
powers  which  were  practically  unlimited,  were  at  once  ap- 
pointed to  proceed  to  Tientsin.  Lord  Elgin  met  them  for 
an  interview  on  June  4th,  Baron  Gros  the  following  day,  and 
Mr.  Reed  on  the  7th.  The  negotiations  were  carried  forward 
with  rapidity,  under  the  steady  pressure  of  the  allied  powers. 
The  Russian  treaty  was  signed  on  the  13th,  the  American  on 
the  18th,  the  British  on  the  26th,  and  the  French  the  next 
day.  Before  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  July  the  foreigners 
had  retired  from  Tientsin  and  returned  to  Shanghai. 

The  Treaties  of  Tientsin 

The  negotiations  of  Mr.  Reed  when  compared  either 
wdth  those  of  Caleb  Cushing  at  Macao  in  1844  or  with  those 
of  Lord  Elgin,  were  quite  without  distinction.  The  result- 
ing treaty  lacked  both  in  detail  and  in  thoroughness  what 
were  outstanding  characteristics  of  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia 
and  also  of  the  British  treaty  of  Tientsin.  Just  as  the  ac- 
knowledged superiority  of  the  Cushing  treaty  had  made  it 
the  basis  of  China's  foreign  relations  between  1844  and  1858, 
so  the  Elgin  treaty  became  the  basis  of  the  international 
relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire  for  the  future.  The  priority 
of  Great  Britain  among  the  powers  represented  in  China 
was  established.  The  conspicuous  mark  of  the  Reed  treaty 
was  an  exceedingly  inclusive  most-favored-nation  provision 
which  made  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  the  inheritors 
of  all  that  had  been  won  by  allied  arms,  diplomacy,  and  a 
most  careful  study  of  the  situation. 

Mr.  Reed  at  Tientsin  had  three  tasks  before  him :  the  re- 
vision of  the  treaty;  the  fixing  of  the  new  tariff;  and  the 
settlement  of  American  claims.    These  tasks  were  made  the 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  315 

subjects  of  separate  negotiations,  and  were  settled  in  sep- 
arate agreements.  They  therefore  became  the  natural 
divisions  of  our  study.  First  let  us  consider  the  more  im- 
portant settlements  of  the  treaties  themselves. 

There  had  been  an  entire  unanimity  among  the  powers 
that  first  in  importance  was  the  establishment  of  diplomatic 
representatives  of  the  foreign  powers  at  Peking  with  the 
privilege  of  corresponding  with  the  Imperial  Government 
on  terms  of  perfect  equality.  There  was  little  hope  of  re- 
moving the  causes  of  misunderstanding  and  irritation  be- 
tween the  Imperial  Government  and  the  foreign  powers  so 
long  as  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  powers  were 
held  at  arm's  length  and  treated  as  inferiors.  The  system 
which  made  the  governor  general  of  Canton  the  foreign 
minister  of  China  seemed  wholly  wrong. 

With  the  resumption  of  the  negotiations  at  Tientsin, 
Mr.  Reed  assumed  towards  the  new  commissioners  Kwei- 
liang  and  Hwashana  a  more  decided  and  positive  tone, 
warning  them  that  the  United  States  which  had  persisted  in 
a  peaceful  policy  towards  China  would  not  be  satisfied  in  the 
final  settlement  with  any  terms  which  discriminated  against 
the  Americans.  The  Chinese,  on  the  other  side,  were  con- 
vinced of  the  necessity  of  a  conciliatory  policy.  Although 
still  absolutely  refusing  to  concede  the  right  of  residence  in 
Peking,  they  agreed  to  a  compromise  which  was  written  into 
the  American  treaty  (Articles  4  and  5)  to  the  effect  that  the 
highest  diplomatic  representative  of  the  United  States 
would  not  only  have  the  right  to  correspond  under  seal  with 
the  Privy  Council  in  Peking,  but  that  whenever  business 
required  he  would  have  the  right  of  visit  and  sojourn  in  the 
capital.  By  the  Chinese  this  was  regarded  as  a  great  con- 
cession, and  to  Mr,  Reed  it  seemed  satisfactory.  Wath  him 
agreed  Count  Putiatin  and  Baron  Gros  into  whose  treaties, 
respectively,  similar  provisions  were  incorporated.  These 
stipulations  were  fortified  by  a  further  agreement  that  if  at 
any  time  another  power  secured  the  full  rights  of  residence 
at  Peking,  the  same  privilege  would  inure  to  the  United 
States. 


316  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  fundamental  objection  of  the  Chinese  to  admitting 
the  foreign  ministers  to  Peking  appears  to  have  been  that 
it  would  result  in  a  loss  of  prestige  to  the  Emperor — a  most 
serious  matter  at  a  time  when  the  Empire  was  torn  by 
ominous  rebellion.  Hitherto  only  tribute-bearing  envoys 
had  been  admitted  to  Peking  and  their  visits  had  been  ar- 
ranged in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate  to  the  Chinese  people 
the  manifest  of  supremacy  of  their  emperor  over  all  the 
nations.  There  may  also  have  been  some  fear  of  the  Eng- 
lish, that  their  entrance  into  Peking  might  result  even  in  the 
overthrow  of  the  empire  itself.-'' 

Lord  Elgin,  however,  w^as  insistent  upon  the  stipulation 
for  diplomatic  residence  at  Peking,  regarding  it  as  'far  the 
most  important  matter  gained  by  the  treaty,'  and  even  at 
the  last  moment  he  was  prepared  to  insist  upon  it,  though 
another  show  of  military  strength  might  be  required  to 
force  the  assent  of  the  Emperor.''  In  the  British  treaty  it 
was  stipulated  (Article  3)  that  "the  Ambassador,  Minister, 
or  other  Diplomatic  Agent,  so  appointed  by  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  of  Great  Britain,  may  reside  with  his  family  and 
establishment,  permanently  at  the  capital,  or  may  visit  it 
occasionally,  at  the  option  of  the  British   Government." 

The  other  point  upon  which  Mr.  Reed  at  Taku  had  met 
with  the  firm  resistance  of  the  Imperial  Government,  was 
the  free  navigation  of  the  rivers,  especially  the  Yangtze. 
The  demand  for  this  concession  from  China  had  been  pecul- 
iarly an  American  one.  It  had  first  been  proposed  by  Hum- 
phrey Marshall  in  1853,  and  had  been  in  the  projet  submit- 
ted to  Tsung  Lun  at  the  Pei-ho  in  1854  by  Robert  M. 
McLane.  Dr.  Parker  also  had  been  instructed  to  ask  for  it 
in  1856.  On  the  other  hand,  both  the  British  and  the 
French  had  been  more  cautious  jn  this  point.  Count 
Walewski,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  May  19,  1856,  had 
felt  that  the  proposed  demands  of  Dr.  Parker  were  probably 
more  than  the  Chinese  would  grant  and  nearly  a  year  earlier 
had  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  opening  of  the  Yangtze 
even  as  far  as  Nanking  might  prove  sufficient.  In  similar 
tone  the  instruction  to  Sir  John  Bowring  in  1854  had  only 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  317 

called  for  the  opening  of  the  Yangtze  as  far  as  Nanking/ 
Upon  this  question  of  the  opening  of  the  rivers  of  China  to 
navigation  by  foreign  vessels  there  was  also  a  difference  of 
opinion  in  China.     S.  Wells  Williams  wrote:  ^ 

''I  have  no  doubt,  the  more  I  see  the  entire  bearing  of  the  demand, 
that  the  Chinese  may  just  about  as  well  abdicate  their  independence 
as  allow  the  free  navigation  of  the  Yangtze  River.  If  they  could  be 
induced  to  encourage  their  own  people  to  buy  and  run  foreign 
steamers  and  schooners,  the  desired  advantages  would  be  gained  with- 
out forcing  this  wrong  upon  them.  They  will  have  to  yield,  I  suppose, 
and  with  the  liberty  let  go  for  ever  the  integrity  of  their  own  terri- 
tory to  the  lust  of  gain  and  power  on  the  part  of  those  who  ought 
to  consider  something  of  the  results  of  their  policy." 

Mr.  Rutherford  Alcock,  the  British  consul  at  Shanghai, 
in  a  memorandum  to  Lord  Elgin,  expressed  a  similar 
opinion:  ^ 

"  'The  worthless  character  of  a  numerous  gathering  of  foreigners 
of  all  nations,  under  no  eifective  control,  is  a  public  calamity.  They 
dispute  the  field  of  commerce  with  honester  men,  and  convert  privi- 
leges of  access  and  trade  into  means  of  fraud  and  violence.  In  this 
career  of  license,  unchecked  by  any  fear  of  their  own  governments,  and 
IH'otected  in  a  great  degree  by  treaties,  from  the  action  of  the  native 
authorities,  the  Chinese  are  the  first  and  greatest,  but  by  no  means 
the  only  sufferers.  There  is  no  government  or  nation  of  the  great 
European  family  that  does  not  suffer  in  character,  and  in  so  far  as 
they  have  any  interests  at  stake  in  China,  in  these  also  both  immedi- 
ately and  prospectively.  This  is  the  danger  which  has  long  threatened 
the  worst  consequence  in  widespread  hostility  and  interrupted  trade.' 
Access  to  the  inner  waters  will  increase  the  evil  to  an  enormous 
extent." 

Mr.  Reed  came  rapidly  to  see  the  force  of  these  argu- 
ments and  did  not  press  the  matter  in  the  renewed  negotia- 
tions at  Tientsin.  In  explaining  his  action  to  Cass,  after 
reviewing  the  arguments  already  mentioned,  he  added:  ^^ 

''Besides,  I  could  not  but  feel  that  their  assertion  of  a  right  of 
absolute  sovereignty  over  the  rivers  was  one  that  I,  least  of  all,  had 
a  right  to  question ;  and  whilst  I  might  wish  to  see  them,  as  a  matter 
of  mere  commercial  interest,  allow  the  foreigner  to  go  and  trade  up 
their  rivers  at  pleasure,  yet  they  had  a  perfect  right  to  refuse. 

In  this,  as  in  the  matter  of  residence  at  Peking,  Lord 
Elgin  was  determined.    Almost  at  the  last  minute  before 


318  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

signing  the  British  treaty  the  Chinese  Commissioners  re- 
ceived from  Peking  a  refusal  to  grant  the  right  of  residence 
and  the  expression  of  a  desire,  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor, 
to  defer  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Yangtze  until 
the  rebellion  had  been  suppressed,  Kweiliang  and  Hwa- 
shana  feared  that  their  own  lives  might  be  the  forfeit  if 
they  were  to  sign  away  these  concessions  to  Great  Britain, 
and  they  asked  Count  Putiatin  and  Mr.  Reed  to  take  to 
Lord  Elgin  a  statement  of  the  case,  and  to  urge  him  to  recede 
from  his  demands.*  The  French  treaty  already  drafted  and 
approved,  though  not  signed,  had  not  included  such  an 
unlimited  concession. ^^  The  two  neutral  envoys,  therefore, 
took  the  matter  up  with  Baron  Gros  and  he  ventured  to 
approach  Lord  Elgin  on  the  subject,  yet  with  no  success. 
Lord  Elgin  himself,  in  a  letter  to  his  family,  records  his 
answer  to  Baron  Gros's  intervention:  ^- 

"I  sent  for  the  Admiral;  gave  him  a  hint  that  there  was  a  great 
opportunity  for  England ;  that  all  the  Powers  were  deserting  me  on  a 
point  which  they  had  all,  in  their  original  applications  to  Peking, 
demanded,  and  which  they  all  intended  to  claim  if  I  got  it;  that 
therefore  we  had  it  in  our  power  to  claim  our  place  of  priority  in  the 
East,  by  obtaining  this  when  others  would  not  insist  on  it.  Would 
he  back  me?  .  .  .  This  was  the  forenoon  of  Saturday,  26th.  Tli® 
treaty  was  signed  in  the  evening." 

"The  British  treaty  stipulated.  Article  10,  that  as  soon 
as  peace  had  been  restored  in  the  rebellious  territory,  British 
vessels  should  be  admitted  to  the  Yangtze  as  far  as  Hankow, 
and  that  the  port  of  Chingkiang,  even  then  held  by  the 
Imperial  Government,  should  in  any  event  be  opened  at  the 
end  of  a  year  from  the  signing  of  the  treaty.  The  French 
treaty  called  for  the  opening  of  Nanking  as  soon  as  it  should 
be  recaptured  from  the  rebels.^ ^ 

Closely  associated  with  the  opening  of  the  Yangtze 
was  access  to  the  interior  of  the  Empire.  In  the  earlier 
negotiations  for  the  revision  of  the  treaties,  in  1854 
and  1856,  the  American  representatives  had  proposed  the 
unlimited  opening  of  the  Empire.     The  objections  co  this 

*S.  Wolls  Williams  states  that  the  Imperial  Commissioners  were  told  that 
it  would  be  worse  than  useless  for  Putiatin  and  Reed  to  interfere  in  their 
dealings  with  Lord  Elgin. 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  31^ 

were  similar  to  those  against  the  opening  of  the  rivers  to 
navigation,  and  in  the  American  treaty  of  Tientsin  there  is 
no  reference  to  it.  In  view  of  earher  American  demands, 
Mr.  Reed's  comments  on  provisions  in  the  British  and 
French  treaties  for  travel  in  the  interior  are  interesting. 
He  wrote:  ^"^ 

"This  [access  to  the  interior]  is  provided  for  in  both  the  English 
and  French  treaties,  and,  of  course,  with  its  limitations,  inures  to  us. 
The  provision  of  the  former  ti'eaty  is  very  comprehensive  for,  with 
the  limitation  of  requiring  a  passport,  the  form  of  which  the  consuls 
and  not  the  Chinese  are  to  determine,  any  foreigner  may  go  anywhere 
in  China  'for  pleasure,  or  for  purposes  of  trade,  and  may  hire  vessels 
for  the  carriage  of  his  baggage  or  merchandise."  No  routes  are  speci- 
fied; no  limit  to  the  character  or  amount  of  merchandise  which  may 
be  taken  into  the  interior,  and  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  a  foreigner 
— Englishman,  Frenchman,  Russian,  or  American — from  unloading 
his  ship  load  of  cottons  or,  if  he  happen  to  be  unscrupulous,  of  opium, 

at  Shanghai,  or  ,  when  it  shall  be  opened,  and  carrying  it  in 

one  or  a  fleet  of  junks,  or  small  craft  steamers,  to  the  frontiers  of 
Thibet,  or  by  the  grand  canal  to  Tientsin  and  Peking,  or  in  short,  any- 
where, selling  it  as  he  goes  along.  But  this  is  not  all.  He  carries 
with  him  his  'extraterritoriality';  for  the  article  which  provides  for 
his  transit  in  the  interior  also  provides  for  his  immunity.  'If,'  says 
the  British  treaty,  'he  shall  commit  any  offense  against  the  law,  he 
shall  be  handed  over  to  the  nearest  consul  for  punishment,  but  he 
must  not  be  subjected  to  ill-usage  in  excess  of  necessary  restraint.' 
This  rendered  into  plain  language  means  that  the  foreigner  who  com- 
mits a  rape  or  murder  a  thousand  miles  from  the  sea-board  is  to  be 
gently  restrained,  and  remitted  to  a  consul  for  trial,  necessarily  at  a 
remote  point  where  testimony  could  hardly  be  obtained  or  relied  on. 
These  are  the  abuses  and  dangers  which  this  new  system  of  unlimited 
intercourse  seems  to  foreshadow.  ,  .  ." 

Upon  the  subject  of  extraterritoriality  Mr.  Reed  enter- 
tained very  strong  convictions.  He  did  not  deny  the  neces- 
sity for  such  concessions  as  had  been  obtained  by  Sir  Henry 
Pottinger  in  1842  and  by  Caleb  Gushing  in  1844,  but  he 
found  the  American  abuse  of  the  privileges  had  been  wholly 
disgraceful.     He  wrote:  ^^ 

".  .  .  no  greater  wrong  could  be  done  to  a  weak  nation,  no  clearer 
violation  of  the  letter  and  spirit  of  a  treaty,  than  claiming  exemption 
from  the  local  law  for  our  citizens  who  commit  crime,  and  then  failing 
to  punish  them  ourselves.  We  extort  from  China  'extraterritoriality,' 
the  amenability  of  guilty  Americans  to  our  law,  and  then  we  deny  to 
our  judicial  officers  the  means  of  punishing  them.  There  are  consular 
courts  in  China  to  try  American  thieves  and  burglars  and  murderers. 


320  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

but  there  is  not  a  single  jail  where  the  thief  or  burglar  may  be  con- 
fined. Our  consuls  in  this,  as  in  many  other  particulars,  have  to  ap- 
peal to  the  English  or  French  liberality,  and  it  often  happens  that  the 
penitentiary  accommodations  of  England  and  France  are  inadequate 
to  their  own  necessities,  and  the  American  culprit  is  discharged. 
Hence  it  follows  that  many  claim  the  privilege  of  American  citizen- 
ship, in  order  to  have  the  benefit  of  this  immunity,  and  evei*y  vaga- 
bond Englishman,  Irishman,  or  Scotchman,  any  one  who,  speaking  our 
language,  can  make  out  a  prima  facie  claim  to  citizenship,  commits 
crime  according  to  his  inclination,  secure  that  if  he  is  tried  in  the 
American  courts  there  is  no  power  of  punishment.  .  .  . 

"I  consider  the  exaction  of  'ex-territoriality'  from  the  Chinese,  so 
long  as  the  United  States  refuse  or  neglect  to  provide  the  means  of 
punishment,  an  opprobrium  of  the  worst  kind.  It  is  as  bad  as  the 
coolie  or  opium  trade.  Were  it  not  that  I  have  strong  confidence  that 
when  this  matter  is  fully  understood  Congress  will  apply  the  remedy, 
I  should  be  ashamed  to  put  my  name  to  a  treaty  which  asserts  this 
boasted  privilege  of  'ex-territoriality.'  " 

In  the  revision  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty  bearing  on 
extraterritoriahty  Mr.  Reed  inserted  an  additional  provision, 
as  a  protection  to  China,  by  which  it  became  lawful  for 
Chinese  as  well  as  American  officers  to  arrest  an  American 
citizen,  but  this  slight  alteration  in  the  treaty  could,  by 
itself,  do  little  to  redeem  the  American  name  from  the  dis- 
grace into  which  it  had  fallen  in  the  preceding  decade. 

At  Taku  the  Chinese  Commissioners  had  agreed  to  the 
opening  of  seven  new  ports :  Tai-wan  and  Tam-sui  in  For- 
mosa; Hai-kau  on  the  island  of  Hainan;  and  on  the  main- 
land, Tienpeh  and  Swatow  in  Kwang-tung,  Tsienchow  in 
Fukien,  and  Wanchow  in  Chekiang.^*^  At  Tientsin,  how- 
ever, Kweiliang  and  Hwashana,  for  some  unexplained 
reason,  receded  from  the  previous  liberality  and  would  allow 
Mr.  Reed  only  two  ports,  the  same  to  be  chosen  from  those 
already  mentioned  at  Taku,  Accordingly,  in  the  American 
treaty,  the  only  additional  ports  opened  were  Swatow  and 
Tai-wan.  Lord  Elgin,  who  proposed  to  do  nothing  by 
halves,  although  for  some  strange  reason  he  omitted  Tien- 
tsin from  his  list,  secured  the  opening  of  no  less  than  eleven 
new  ports.  Two  of  these.  Tang-chow  and  Newchwang, 
afforded  outlets  for  Shantung  and  Manchuria,  opening  up  a 
trade  along  the  coast  northwards,  fifteen  hundred  miles 
above  Shanghai.     Incorporated  also  in  the  British  treaty 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  321 

were  reduction  of  tonnage  dues,  and  rights  of  exportation 
which,  in  Mr.  Reed's  judgment,  would  be  likely  to  transfer 
most  of  the  coasting  trade  of  China  from  native  to  foreign 
vessels,  which  were  already  being  preferred  on  account  of 
their  speed,  safety  from  pirates,  insurability  and  cheapness. 
Mr.  Reed  also  believed  that  by  these  regulations  the  small 
American  vessels  on  the  coast  would  have  an  advantage  over 
all  others.  In  these  expectations  his  hopes  were  largely 
realized.  China  was  compelled  to  surrender  not  only  her 
rights  to  the  exclusive  navigation  of  her  rivers,  but  also  to 
open  her  coasting  trade — privileges  which  the  United  States 
had  been  accustomed  to  guard  most  jealously. 

The  nearest  claim  to  distinction  for  the  American  treaty, 
unless  it  be  a  distinction  to  have  abstained  from  demanding 
the  above  mentioned  privileges  of  the  British  treaty,  lay  in 
the  article  granting  religious  toleration,  which  will  be  dealt 
with  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

A  clause  in  Article  1  of  the  American  treaty  stipulated: 
"if  any  other  nation  should  act  unjustly  or  oppressively,  the 
United  States  will  exert  their  good  offices,  on  being  informed 
of  the  case,  to  bring  about  an  amicable  arrangement  of  the 
question,  thus  showing  their  friendly  feelings."  This  be- 
came the  subject  of  much  ironical  comment,  w^hich,  had  the 
clause  been  inserted  by  the  Americans,  would  have  been 
quite  justified  when  one  considers  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  treaty  w^as  signed.  But  this  clause  was  added 
to  the  text  by  one  of  the  assistants  of  Kweiliang  and 
Hwashana.^^  Such  action  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  must 
not,  however,  be  taken  for  more  than  it  was  worth.  Al- 
though it  had  been  a  cardinal  point  in  American  policy 
since  the  days  of  Caleb  Cushing's  negotiations  at  Macao 
and  before,  to  win  just  such  confidence  from  China  as  this 
clause  would  seem  to  indicate,  it  actually  meant  in  1858 
little  more  than  that  the  shrewd  Chinese  diplomat  was  seek- 
ing to  pay  a  compliment  to  the  United  States  and  possibly 
isolate  them  from  the  European  powers.  A  few  months 
later  Mr.  Williams,  then  acting  as  Charge,  wrote  to  Mr. 
Cass:  18 


322  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"It  is  quite  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  rulers  of  China  have 
any  regard  for  one  nation  more  than  another;  that  they  are  more 
friendly,  for  instance,  towards  the  Americans  than  towards  the 
English;  they  may,  perhaps,  fear  the  English  and  Russians  more  than 
they  do  the  Americans,  but  they  would  be  glad  if  none  of  them  ever 
came  near  them." 

It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  the  American  treaty 
of  Tientsin  did  lay  the  basis  for  the  friendship  between 
China  and  the  United  States  which  grew  rapidly  in  the 
next  decade.  Yet  from  the  smashing  blow  which  had  been 
dealt  to  China  in  the  British  treaty  of  1858  no  friend  could 
rescue  her.  Even  had  she  chosen  to  make  a  friend  of  the 
United  States  fourteen  years  earlier,  there  was  little  that 
could  have  been  done  to  save  her.  The  Empire  had  brought 
the  calamity  upon  itself.  China  has  ever  been  the  despair 
of  her  friends.  This  fact,  however,  mitigates  the  responsi- 
bility neither  of  Great  Britain  which  had  acted  with  so  little 
regard  for  the  evil  consequences  of  such  an  opening  up  of 
the  Empire,  nor  of  the  United  States  which  sent  an  envoy  to 
play  the  part  of  Saul  holding  the  coats  of  those  who  com- 
mitted the  assault.  That  China  in  later  years  received 
benefits  from  the  breaking"  down  of  her  walls  of  pride  and 
exclusion  is  undeniable,  but  it  is  equally  undeniable  that 
much  of  the  evil  that  followed  in  its  train  might  have  been 
avoided  had  Lord  Elgin  been  less  possessed  of  the  deter- 
mination to  chastise  an  ancient  Empire  and  to  establish 
once  for  all  the  priority  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Far  East. 

The  Revised  Tariff — Legalization  of  the  Opium  Trade 

In  the  American  Treaty  of  Tientsin  it  was  agreed  that  the 
tariff  annexed  to  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  was  to  continue 
"except  so  far  as  it  may  be  modified  by  treaties  with  other 
nations;  it  being  expressly  stipulated  that  citizens  of  the 
United  States  shall  never  pay  higher  duties  than  those  paid 
by  the  most  favored  nation"  (Article  15).  In  the  treaty 
with  Russia  the  tariff  question  was  covered  merely  by  the 
insertion  of  a  most-favored-nation  agreement.  To  the 
French  treaty  there  had  been  annexed  as  a  provisional  tariff 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  323 

a  schedule  similar  to  the  one  adopted  in  the  French  Treaty 
of  Whampoa  (1844),  with  the  understanding  that  it  would 
be  replaced  by  a  new  tariff  to  be  determined  subsequently 
at  Shanghai.  Lord  Elgin  was  much  more  specific.  In  the 
British  treaty  (Article  26)  it  was  stipulated  that  the  Em- 
peror was  to  delegate  a  high  officer  of  the  board  of  revenue 
to  meet  representatives  of  the  British  Government  at 
Shanghai  for  the  purpose  of  revising  the  tariff  with  a  view 
to  bringing  it  into  harmony  with  a  five  per  cent  ad  valorem 
rate.* 

The  British  treaty  also  included  an  agreement  (Article 
28)  for  the  regulation  of  transit  dues — a  vexed  question 
which  had  caused  a  great  deal  of  irritation  to  merchants  of 
all  nations,  especially  since  the  outbreak  of  the  Taiping 
rebellion  when  local  governments  were  greatly  in  need  of 
additional  revenues.  Mr.  Reed  had  felt  that  it  was  impos- 
sible to  regulate  the  transit  dues  by  treaty/^  but  Lord  Elgin 
was  not  so  easily  satisfied.  He  secured  an  agreement  that  in 
no  case  were  these  dues  to  exceed  two  and  one  half  per  cent 
ad  valorem,  and  that  British  merchants  should  have  the 
right  to  pay  in  one  sum  the  entire  transit  taxes  for  goods 
consigned  inland  (Article  28).  To  have  enforced  this 
article  China  would  have  been  compelled  to  reorganize  the 
entire  fiscal  system  of  the  Empire.  In  practice  the  stipula- 
tion was  the  source  of  perennial  irritation. 

The  Emperor  appointed  Kweiliang  and  Hwashana  who 
had  negotiated  the  treaties  of  Tientsin  to  represent  China 
in  the  tariff  revision  conferences,  but  the  actual  work  was 
done  by  secretaries  and  subordinates  who  conferred  with 
Mr.  Thomas  Wade,  representing  Great  Britain,  and  Dr.  S. 
W^ells  W^illiams  who,  at  the  invitation  of  Lord  Elgin,  was 
delegated  to  represent  the  United  States  informally.  Mr. 
H.  N.  Lay,  formerly  of  the  British  consular  service  and  now 
of  the  Foreign  Board  of  Inspectorate  of  Customs  at  Shang- 
hai, was  also  a  member  of  the  conference. 

*The  tariff  of  1843,  while  imposing  specific  duties,  had  aimed  to  establish 
approximately  a  five  per  cent  ad  valorem  rate.  Since  the  fixing  of  that  schedule 
the  prices  of  various  articles  in  China  had,  for  the  most  part,  fallen,  so  that 
in  1858  many  of  the  specific  duties  were  actually  more  than  five  per  cent 
reckoned  on  an  ad  vaiwem  basis. 


324  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Although  Mr.  Reed  shifted  entirely  to  Lord  Elgin  the 
responsibility  for  the  revision  of  the  tariff  and  for  fixing  the 
specific  rates  for  the  transit  tax,  and  avoided  becoming  a 
party  to  the  negotiations  between  Lord  Elgin  and  the  two 
Chinese  Commissioners,  he  thought  it  well  to  include  the 
tariff,  when  it  was  completed,  in  the  form  of  a  'supplemen- 
tary convention'  which  had  the  force  of  a  treaty.  To  this 
proposal  the  Chinese  assented.-*^  The  general  tendency  of 
the  new  tariff  was  slightly  to  reduce  the  duties  which  had 
previously  been  in  force,  and  the  details  are  relatively  unim- 
portant. More  important  than  the  tariff  itself  was  the  pro- 
vision made  for  the  reorganization  of  the  Foreign  Lispector- 
ate  of  Chinese  Customs,  and  the  extension  of  the  system, 
which  had  hitherto  been  operative  only  at  Shanghai,  to  the 
other  open  ports.  Many  American  merchants  strongly 
objected  to  the  system  for  no  very  apparent  reason  other 
than  that  it  was  effective  and  reduced  the  possibilities  of 
smuggling,  but  Mr.  Reed,  after  careful  investigation,  gave 
his  cordial  assent  to  its  extension. 

The  revised  tariff  was  most  notable  in  that  it  provided 
for  what  had  so  long  been  desired  by  Great  Britain  and  by 
the  foreigners  generally  in  China — the  legalization  of  the 
opium  trade.  The  part  played  by  the  American  envoy  in 
effecting  this  legalization  requires  attention.  The  instruc- 
tions received  by  Mr.  Reed  from  Secretary  of  State  Cass  on 
the  subject  of  the  opium  trade,  while  more  vague  were 
broadly  similar  to  those  which  had  been  given  to"  Caleb 
Cushing  by  Webster.-^ 

"Upon  proper  occasions  you  will  make  known  to  the  Chinese 
officers  with  whom  you  may  have  connmmieation  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  does  not  seek  for  their  citizens  the  legal  estab- 
lishment of  the  opium  trade,  nor  will  it  ui)hold  them  in  any  attempt 
to  violate  the  laws  of  China  by  the  introduction  of  that  article  into 
the  country." 

In  the  first  draft  of  the  proposed  treaty  presented  at 
Taku  there  was  inserted  an  article  'denouncing  and  forbid- 
ding' the  opium  trade  by  American  citizens,--  but  at  Tien- 
tsin this  article  was  withdrawn  and  in  the  treaty  as  signed 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  325 

there  was  no  reference  to  opium.*  Lord  Elgin,  although  he 
had  been  definitely  instructed  to  secure  the  legalization  of 
the  trade,  had  abstained  from  inserting  any  reference  to  it 
in  the  text  of  the  treaty.  Until  the  revision  of  the  tariff, 
therefore,  the  status  of  the  opium  trade  remained  as  it  had 
been  since  the  treaties  of  1842-4.  But  in  the  revised  tariff 
the  trade  in  opium  was  legalized  by  the  following  rule: 

"Opium  will  henceforth  pay  thirty  taels  per  picul  Import  Duty. 
The  importer  will  sell  it  only  at  the  port.  It  will  be  carried  into  the 
interior  by  Chinese  only,  and  only  as  Chinese  property;  the  foreign 
trader  will  not  be  allowed  to  accompany  it.  The  provisions  of  Article 
9  of  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin,  by  which  British  subjects  are  authorized 
to  proceed  into  the  interior  with  passports  to  trade,  will  not  extend 
to  it,  nor  will  those  of  Article  28  of  the  same  Treaty,  by  which  the 
Transit  Dues  are  regulated.  The  Transit  Dues  on  it  will  be  arranged 
as  the  Chinese  Government  see  fit;  nor  in  future  revisions  of  the 
Tariff  is  the  same  rule  of  revision  to  be  applied  to  Opium  as  to  other 
goods." 

While  Mr.  Reed  could  not  be  held  wholly  accountable 
for  the  insertion  of  the  above  rule,  he  not  only  approved  of 
it  but  even  initiated  the  correspondence  with  Lord  Elgin  in 
which  he  recommended  the  legalization  of  the  traffic,  thus 
reversing  himself  and  in  a  measure  violating  the  instructions 
of  his  government.  His  reasons  were  that  between  two  evils 
— the  legalization  of  the  trade,  and  the  existing  open  defi- 
ance of  the  Gushing  treaty  in  which  Americans  were  dealing 
in  the  drug  at  every  port  and  carrying  it  along  the  coast 
under  the  American  flag — legalization  of  the  trade  with 
heavy  duties  and  the  exclusion  of  foreigners  from  the  trans- 
portation and  sale  of  the  drug  in  the  interior  was  preferable. 
It  was  Mr.  Reed's  idea  that  the  Chinese  would,  under  the 
proposed  regulation,  be  better  able  than  formerly  to  restrict 
the  importation  by  fixing  a  high  tariff  and  by  the  control 
of  their  own  merchants.  The  American  Commissioner  was 
debating,  as  related  to  a  drug,  the  old  and  also  modern 
question  of  the  relative  merits  of  ineffective  prohibition  as 
compared  with  high  license  and  regulation.     If  Mr.  Reed 

*In  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  trading  in  opium  had  been  prohibited  to  Ameri- 
can citizens,  and  in  the  annexed  tariff  opium  had  been  included  in  the  list  of 
contraband    articles. 


326  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

was  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  argument  there  is  no  reason 
whatever  to  suppose  that  his  error  was  any  other  than  that 
of  judgment,  and  with  him  stood  many  foreigners  of  long 
experience  in  China  who  could  be  charged  with  no  friendli- 
ness towards  the  opium  trade.  Dr.  Williams  in  a  letter  tb 
his  wife  said:  ^^ 

"By  this  tariff  you  will  perhaps  be  surprised  to  learn  that  opium 
is  legalized  and  pays  thirty  taels  per  picul  as  import  duty.  The 
Chinese  Government  has  yielded  in  its  long  resistance  to  permitting 
this  drug  to  be  entered  through  the  customs  house,  the  opium  war  of 
1840  ending  in  the  Treaty  of  Nanking  has  triumphed,  and  the 
honorable  English  merchants  and  government  can  now  exonerate 
themselves  from  the  opprobrium  of  smuggling  this  article.  Bad  as 
the  triumph  is,  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  the  best  disposition  of  this 
perplexing  question;  legalization  is  preferred  to  the  evils  attending 
the  farce  now  played,  and  throwing  ridicule  on  the  laws  against 
it  by  sending  the  revenue  boats  to  the  opium  hulks  to  receive  a  duty 
or  bribe  from  the  purchaser." 

Although  the  full  correspondence  of  Mr.  Reed  with  ref- 
erence to  the  legalization  of  the  opium  trade  was  not  only 
reported  at  the  State  Department  but  also  published  in 
1860,  the  action  of  the  American  plenipotentiary  seems  to 
have  aroused  no  general  adverse  comment  in  the  United 
States. 

Settlement  of  Claims 

Of  the  two  primary  reasons  which  dispatched  Mr.  Reed 
to  China  in  1857,  the  revision  of  the  treaty  and  the  settle- 
ment of  claims  due  to  American  citizens,  the  latter  was  the 
more  easily  to  be  defended,  and  the  settlement  obtained  pre- 
sented the  brighter  page  in  the  history  of  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  China. 

The  first  official  settlement  of  the  claims  of  American 
citizens  against  the  Government  of  China  was  secured  by 
Commodore  Lawrence  Kearny  in  the  winter  of  1842-3,  and 
amounted  to  about  a  quarter  of  a  million  dollars.-^  These 
claims  had  arisen  out  of  injuries  suffered  by  Americans  at 
the  time  of  hostilities  between  the  English  and  the  Chinese 
in  the  first  Anglo-Chinese  War,  and  also  from  the  depreda- 
tions of  a  mob  at  Canton  in  1842.     Commodore  Kearny 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  327 

made  a  peremptory  demand  for  the  payment  of  the  losses, 
and  the  demand  was  complied  with.  There  was  no  examin- 
ation of  the  claims  with  a  view  to  the  determination  of 
their  value. 

Shortly  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  Treaty 
of  Wanghia,  a  mob  attacked  and  pillaged  the  house  of  the 
Rev.  Issachar  J.  Roberts,  a  missionary  who  subsequently 
became  associated  with  the  Taiping  rebellion.  The  claim 
presented  by  Roberts  was  regarded  as  excessive,  and  an 
award  was  made  by  a  joint  commission  composed  of  Ameri- 
cans and  Chinese.  The  Imperial  High  Commissioner,  how- 
ever, was  unwilling  to  settle.  Commissioner  John  W.  Davis 
in  1848  again  presented  the  claim  to  the  Viceroy  who  again 
refused  to  pay.  Davis  then  referred  the  matter  to  Washing- 
ton with  a  request  for  instructions.  The  Department  of 
State  was  somewhat  in  doubt  as  to  the  strength  of  the 
Roberts  claim,  and  instructed  Commissioner  Humphrey 
Marshall  to  investigate  and  report  as  to  whether  it  and  two 
others  were  "of  such  a  character  as  to  warrant  the  official 
interposition  of  the  government."  -^  Marshall  was  of  the 
opinion  that  the  claim  ought  to  be  enforced,  and  reported 
that  to  enforce  it  he  was  prepared  to  blockade  the  port  of 
Canton,  if  necessary,  "in  fine,  to  collect  the  money  by  any 
means  short  of  war,"  -*^  but  nothing  was  done.  Withhold- 
ing payment  for  duties  was  strongly  urged  by  Commissioner 
Robert  L.  McLane,  as  the  most  effective  method  for  securing 
the  payment  of  the  claims  which,  while  still  not  large,  had 
greatly  increased  by  the  end  of  1854.-'  In  case  the  Chinese 
should  attempt  to  retaliate  by  threatening  to  stop  the  trade 
as  they  had  in  the  old  pre-treaty  days,  he  recommended  that 
the  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  should  be  used  to  sup- 
port the  action  of  the  commissioner.  This  method  of 
coercing  the  Chinese  authorities  was  used  in  several  in- 
stances by  the  various  consuls  without  authority  from  the 
commissioner.  In  January,  1856,  the  consul  at  Shanghai 
reported  that  he  had  collected  a  claim  of  $18,000  by  stop- 
ping intercourse  with  the  taotai  for  two  weeks. -^  At  about 
the  same  time  the  American  consuls  at  Amoy  and  Shanghai 


328  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

threatened  to  use  similar  measures  either  to  collect  claims 
or  to  secure  the  attention  of  the  Chinese  authorities,  but 
this  method  was  promptly  frowned  on  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  and  Dr.  Parker  was  instructed  to  forego 
such  belligerent  methods.-"  The  consuls  were  reluctant  to 
surrender  such  an  effective  weapon  and  the  unauthorized 
action  of  the  American  consul  at  Foochow  in  1857  in  with- 
holding duties. almost  resulted  in  the  declaration  of  Foochow 
as  a  free  port.^"  As  the  time  for  the  revision  of  the  treaty 
drew  near,  the  instructions  from  Washington  were  that  the 
settlement  of  claims  must  not  be  pushed  to  a  point  with 
the  Chinese  authorities  which  would  jeopardize  the  revision 
of  the  treaty. 

A  third  possible  method  for  the  settlement  of  claims  was 
outlined  by  Dr.  Peter  Parker  in  a  confidential  communica- 
tion to  Sir  John  Bowring  at  the  end  of  December,  1856.^^ 
With  reference  to  the  losses  which  had  been  suffered  by  the 
Americans  in  the  British  attack  on  Canton  in  the  preceding 
month,  Dr.  Parker  proposed  that  the  British  Government 
should  assume  these  claims  and  collect  them  from  the  Gov- 
ernment of  China  along  with  those  of  their  own  citizens. 
This  proposal  to  have  the  British  Government  collect 
American  claims  was  promptly  repudiated  by  Lewis  Cass, 
Secretary  of  State,  in  his  instructions  to  Mr.  Reed.^- 

At  the  time  of  the  negotiations  for  the  revision  of  the 
treaty  Mr.  Reed  found  the  Chinese  authorities  at  first  quite 
unwilling  to  admit  the  validity  of  the  claims  of  Americans 
for  losses  suffered  during  the  existing  war.  They  implied 
that  for  these  losses  the  English  were  responsible  and  that 
Great  Britain  rather  than  China  ought  to  make  the  repara- 
tions.-^^ Subsequently  the  Chinese  authorities  sought  to 
place  the  responsibility  entirely  upon  the  local  authorities 
where  the  losses  had  occurred.  This  was  in  accordance  with 
Chinese  law,  or  custom,  for  the  central  government  did  not 
usually  assume  such  responsibility  for  local  affairs.  If  the 
local  Chinese  ojSicials  had  done  wrong,  they  argued,  then 
they  ought  to  make  reparations  out  of  the  local  revenues."^"* 
Mr.  Reed  yielded  to  Kweiliang  and  Hwashana  on  this  point, 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  329 

and  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin  was  signed  without  any  settle- 
ment of  the  claims. 

Immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  however, 
Mr.  Reed  renewed  the  discussion.  At  first  the  commis- 
sioners were  disposed  to  evade  the  matter  but  on  the  2oth 
day  of  June  they  entered  into  an  agreement  for  settlement 
to  "be  considered  as  of  the  same  force  and  virtue  as  if  it  was 
embodied  in  the  treaty."  This  agreement  stipulated  that 
claims  for  indemnity  to  the  amount  of  600,000  taels  should 
be  liquidated  by  deducting  one  fifth  of  all  the  tonnage, 
import  and  export  duties,  which  were  paid  by  American 
ships  at  the  three  ports  of  Canton,  Foochow  and  Shanghai. 
These  deductions  were  to  be  made  by  the  consuls  and  the 
total  amount  was  to  be  reported  by  the  American  minister 
each  year  to  the  Chinese  authorities  until  the  entire  amount 
of  the  claims  had  been  settled. 

Mr.  Reed  was  not  entirely  satisfied  with  this  settlement 
and  therefore  reopened  the  question  a  few  months  later  at 
Shanghai.^"^  First  he  asked  from  the  American  claimants  for 
revised  statements  and  was  able  to  reduce  the  estimated 
damages  from  600,000  to  525,000  taels.  Kweiliang  and 
Hwashana,  not  unwilling  to  do  a  little  bargaining,  then 
agreed  that  if  the  total  amount  would  be  reduced  to  500,000 
taels,  they  on  their  part  would  agree  to  the  issuing  of 
debentures,  300,000  taels  for  Canton,  and  100,000  taels  each 
for  Foochow  and  Shanghai,  and  for  the  gradual  payment  of 
them  out  of  the  customs  revenue  from  American  vessels 
beginning  with  the  following  New  Year  (February  3,  1859). 
Mr.  Reed  then  recommended  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States  that  a  commission  of  two  be  appointed  to  examine 
the  claims  in  detail  and  make  final  awards.  This  recom- 
mendation was  accepted,  approved  by  Congress,  and  the 
commission  appointed. 

One  other  indication  of  the  spirit  in  which  Mr.  Reed 
approached  the  settlement  of  these  claims  is  to  be  found  in  a 
passage  in  his  address  before  the  Philadelphia  Board  of 
Trade  after  his  return  to  the  United  States.  The  claims, 
representing  the  bulk  of  the  total,  which  arose  out  of  the 


330  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

British  attack  upon  Canton  in  1856,  Mr.  Reed  undertook 
to  support  only  with  reluctance.    He  said:  ^^ 

"The  total  amount  of  our  pecuniary  claims  .  .  .  never  amounted 
to  a  million  dollars,  and  did  not  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  amount 
to  more  than  a  fifth  of  that  sum,  for  you  will  recollect  the  bulk  of  our 
claims  are  of  recent  occurrence,  for  loss  of  property  at  the  factories, 
when  the  Chinese  were  defending  their  own  soil,  and  for  which  they 
are  only  responsible  on  the  un-Christian  principle  of  English  and 
American  public,  law,  that  the  assailed  party  always  pays  the  dam- 
ages." 

However,  so  eminent  an  authority  as  John  W.  Foster  re- 
marked, many  years  later,  that  notwithstanding  the  various 
reductions  of  the  claims,  and  the  close  examination  to  which 
they  were  finally  subjected,  "many  of  those  allowed  were  of 
questionable  validity  in  international  law."  ^^ 

The  claims  commissioners  were  Charles  W.  Bradley, 
American  consul  at  Ningpo,  and  Oliver  E.  Roberts,  lately 
of  the  customs  service.  They  began  their  hearings  at 
Macao,  November  10,  1859,  and  the  report  was  submitted 
to  the  American  minister  February  27,  1860.  The  entire 
amount  of  the  awards  totalled  $489,694.78,  thus  leaving  a 
balance  of  about  $220,000  which,  when  paid  by  the  Chinese 
customs  authorities,  was  deposited  in  the  Oriental  Bank  of 
Hongkong.*  ^^ 

♦While  the  fiual  disposition  of  this  surplus  money  was  not  settled  until 
1S85  when,  with  some  fiirtlier  deductions  for  claims  suhsequently  allowed,  the 
surplus  and  accumulated  interest,  amounting  to  $453,400,  was  returned  to  China 
by  the  act  of  Congress,  it  is  of  interest  to  note  various  proposals  whicli  were 
made  in  tlie  interval  for  the  disposition  of  this  money.  When  S.  Wells  Williams 
was  in  Washington  in  1  StiO  he  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  State  an  outline 
for  the  utilization  of  it  in  the  estal)lishnient  of  an  American-Chinese  College 
in  China  in  which  Chinese  students  should  be  instructed  in  Vi'estern  learning, 
and  in  which  American  students  could  receive  sucli  instruction  as  would  fit 
them  for  positions  in  the  consular,  diplomatic,  customs  and  commercial  life  of 
China.  Anson  Burlingame  supported  this  proposition,  and  it  seems  to  have  met 
with  the  ai)i)r()val  of  I'resident  Lincoln.  Congress,  however,  took  no  action  on 
it.  Another  proposal  was  that  the  money  should  he  used  to  build  American 
consulates  and  a  legation  in  China,  l)Ut  this  was  re.iected  on  the  ground  that 
the  moni'y  really  belonged  to  Chiiui.  However,  the  first  money  paid  over  for 
the  purchase  of  the  present  legation  in  Peking  was  taken  from  this  fund, 
though  it  was  afterwards  returned  to  the  fund  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of 
State.  Still  another  proposal  was  tliat  the  money  lie  held  as  a  fund  out  of 
wliich  any  cliiims  arising  in  the  future  might  be  jjaid.  This  also  was  <liscarded 
on  the  ground  tliat  the  (Jovernment  of  Cliina  ought  always  to  be  made  to  feel 
the  direct  responsibility  for  the  settlement  of  any  claims  which  might  arise. 
The  most  notable  proposal,  of  course,  was  that  involving  tlie  creation  of  an 
American-Chinese  College,  for  in  it  was  clearly  foreshadowed  the  system  of 
'indemnity  students'  f<u-  which  i)rovision  was  nuide  at  the  time  of  tlie  return 
of  the  Ho.\er  Indemnity  surphis  nearly  '<()  years  later.-"  The  balance  of  tlie  IS.'iS 
Indemnity  was  returned  hy  act  of  Congress  in  1885,  two  years  after  the  return 
of   the  Japanese   'udemuity. 


WILLIAM  B.  REED  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  TIENTSIN  331 

Thus  was  settled  between  the  United  States  and  China 
a  difficult  problem  ''without  the  utterance  of  a  single  harsh 
word." 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  important  American  sources  for  this  chapter  are:     Reed 

Corres.,  published  in  full  (S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  30:36-1);  Journal 
of  S.  Wells  Williams,  edited  by  F.  W.  Williams  (Journal  of 
the  North-China  Branch  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society,  Vol. 
XLII,  Shanghai,  1911);  W.  A.  P.  Martin:  "A  Cycle  of  Ca- 
thay" ;  Speech  of  Hon.  W.  B.  Reed  at  Board  of  Trade,  Phila- 
delphia, May  31,  1859. 

2.  George  Wingrove  Cooke:  "China,"  p.  380. 

3.  Reed.  Corres.,  pp.  21-22. 

4.  Ihid.,  p.  299. 

5.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  54. 

6.  Walrond:     "Life  and  Letters  of  Lord  Elgin,"  p.  253. 

7.  Cordier:  "L'Expedition  de  Chine,"  p.  11,  p.  8;   Morse:  Vol.   1, 

p.  G72. 

8.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  75. 

9.  Cited   by   Sargent:   Anglo-Chinese   Commerce  and   Diplomacy, 

p.  102. 

10.  Reed  Corres.,  p.  352. 

11.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  77. 

12.  Walrond,  p.  253. 

13.  Reed  Corres.,  p.  385. 

14.  Ihid.,  p.  384. 

15.  Ihid.,  p.  355. 

16.  Ihid.,  p.  311. 

17.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  61;  "Cycle  of  Cathay,"  p.  183. 

18.  Reed  Corres.,  p.  549. 

19.  Ihid.,  p.  358. 

20.  Ihid.,  pp.  442,  493. 

21.  Ihid.,  pp.  8-9. 

22.  "Cycle  of  Cathay,"  p.  184. 

23.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  96. 

24.  S.  Doc.  139:29-1. 

25.  China   Instructions,   Vql.   1,   Sept.   20,   1852    (Dept.   of   State); 

Marshall  Corres.,  p.  223,  July  30,  1853. 

26.  Marshall  Corres.,  pp.  277,  283. 

27.  McLane  Corres.,  p.  458. 

28.  Parker  Corres.,  p.  549. 

29.  Ihid.,  pp.  546,  637,  677. 

30.  Ihid.,  pp.  1162,  1291,  1351,  1420;  Reed  Corres.,  pp.  34,  35,  36,  99. 

31.  Parker  Corres.,  pp.  1098,  1099. 

32.  Reed  Corres.,  pp.  13,  14. 

33.  Ihid.,  pp.  300,  310,  316,  317. 

34.  Ihid.,  pp.  371  ff. 

35.  Ihid.,  pp.  520  ff. 


332  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

36.  Speech  of  William  B.  Reed,  p.  5. 

37.  "American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,"  p.  244. 

38.  Claims  Report :  II.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  29  :40-3. 

39.  Diplomatic  Corres.,  1862,  p.  843;  1864,  p.  346;  1867,  pp.  459,  507; 

1868,  p.  510;  1871,  p.  226;  1872,  p.  136;  1885,  pp.  181,  182.  H. 
Rept.  970:48-1;  see  also  H.  Rept.  113:45-3;  H.  Rept. 
1142 :46-2. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

WAED  AND  TATTNALL— EXCHANGE  OF  KATIFICATIONS 

The  American  Treaty  of  Tientsin  was  approved  by  the 
Senate  and  ratified  by  President  Buchanan  December  21, 
1858.  William  B.  Reed  dispatched  his  resignation  to  the 
President  even  before  he  began  the  negotiations  for  the 
treaty.  To  John  E.  Ward  of  Georgia/  who  had  been  the 
presiding  officer  at  the  convention  which  nominated 
Buchanan  for  the  presidency,^  now  confirmed  as  Minister  to 
China,  was  given  the  task  of  exchanging  the  ratifications. 
Under  normal  circumstances  this  duty  would  not  have  been 
difficult.  The  treaty  and  the  two  supplementary  conven- 
tions covering  the  tariff  and  the  settlement  of  claims  had 
been  approved  by  the  Imperial  Government  before  Mr. 
Reed  left  China,  and  was  already  recognized  as  having  the 
force  of  law.  To  the  Chinese,  unaccustomed  to  the  methods 
of  European  diplomacy,  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  prob- 
ably, did  not  seem  to  be  a  very  important  matter. 

The  Conflict  Renewed 

But  before  Mr.  Ward  had  arrived  in  China  the  impres- 
sion had  become  prevalent  among  the  foreigners  that  China 
would  make  some  efi'ort  to  evade  the  fulfillment  of  the 
treaties,  at  least  so  far  as  concerned  the  permission  for 
diplomatic  residence  in  Peking.  Whether  this  suspicion 
was  well  grounded  in  actual  facts,  or  whether  it  grew  out  of 
the  feeling,  so  widely  prevalent,  that  in  the  affair  at  Taku 
the  Imperial  Government  had  come  off  too  easily,  and  that 
China  had  not  yet  been  sufficiently  chastised,  admits  of 
dispute.    It  is  at  least  clear  that  at  the  beginning  of  1859 

333 


334  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  foreigners,  particularly  the  English  in  China,  were  ex- 
pecting more  trouble. 

Mr.  Ward  reached  Hongkong  in  May,  1859,  and  an- 
nounced his  arrival  to  Frederick  W.  A.  Bruce,  Lord  Elgin's 
brother,  now  British  Minister  to  China,  and  to  M.  de  Bour- 
boulon,  the  French  Minister  who  was  at  Macao.  Wishing, 
however,  to  avoid  complications  with  the  British  Govern- 
ment which  were  threatened  by  the  hostility  of  American 
and  British  sailors  in  the  port,  Mr.  Ward  departed  almost 
immediately  for  Shanghai  where  the  Chinese  Commission- 
ers, Kweiliang,  Hwashana  and  Tan,  who  had  negotiated 
the  tariff  with  Lord  Elgin  a  few  months  before,  were  stay- 
ing. The  American  Minister  addressed  them  a  formal  com- 
munication to  the  effect  that  he  was  in  possession  of  the 
ratified  copy  of  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin  "which  he  has  been 
instructed  to  exchange  at  Peking,"  and  that  he  also  had  a 
letter  from  the  President  to  the  Emperor  which  he  expected 
to  deliver  to  his  Imperial  Majesty.^ 

It  did  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  Mr.  Ward  that  there 
was  nothing  in  the  American  Treaty  of  Tientsin  which 
guaranteed  him  the  right  of  a  personal  audience  with  the 
Emperor,  nor  did  he  realize,  probably,  that  in  raising  such 
a  question,  he  was  directly  stirring  up  a  controversy — the 
right  of  audience  with  the  Emperor — which  involved  the 
most  cherished  Chinese  prejudices.  Even  in  his  assertion 
of  right  to  exchange  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty  in  Peking, 
he  was  on  most  uncertain  ground.  The  American  treaty 
(Article  30)  merely  stipulated  that  the  ratifications  should 
be  exchanged  within  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  signa- 
tures, i.e.,  before  June  18,  1859.  The  place  for  this  ceremony 
was  not  named.  It  is  true  that  the  treaty  also  provided 
that  the  American  Minister  could  go  to  Peking  'whenever 
he  has  business'  but  this  was  safeguarded  by  the  further 
stipulation  that  he  should  not  'request  visits  to  the  capital 
on  trivial  occasions'  (Article  5). 

The  British  treaty  specified  that  the  exchange  of  ratifi- 
cations should  take  place  at  Peking  within  one  year,  and  the 
provision  of  the  French  treaty  was  similar.    But  while  the 


WARD  AND  TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS        335 

American  treaty  was  loaded  down  with  numerous  'most- 
favored-nation'  clauses,  under  them  it  could  not  be  held  that 
the  Americans  had  any  rights  included  in  the  other  treaties 
until  those  treaties  had  been  ratified.  Mr.  Ward  was  there- 
fore clearly  outside  his  rights  in  his  intentions  to  proceed  to 
Peking  to  have  an  audience  with  the  Emperor,  and  the  right 
to  exchange  ratifications  in  Peking  depended  entirely  upon 
whether  such  a  ceremony  was  of  sufficient  importance  to  be 
dignified  by  such  a  settling.  At  Shanghai  Ward  argued  this 
point  with  the  Commissioners  who  at  once  appeared  rather 
reluctant  to  have  him  proceed  to  the  North. 

The  Commissioners  stated  that  they  had  remained  in 
Shanghai  to  complete  some  business  with  Lord  Elgin,  and 
gently  urged  Ward  to  delay  a  while  in  Shanghai.  At  an 
interview  a  few  days  later  they  repeated  their  explanations ; 
they  had  promised  Lord  Elgin  to  remain  in  Shanghai  until 
his  return  from  Hongkong.  He  had  not  returned  but  Mr. 
Bruce  had  been  appointed  in  Lord  Elgin's  stead  and  would 
be  in  Shanghai  in  a  very  short  time.  After  their  business 
with  Mr.  Bruce  was  finished  they  would  go  to  Peking  and 
there  await  the  arrival  of  the  allied  ministers  whose  treaties 
provided  that  the  ratifications  were  to  be  exchanged  in 
Peking.  It  would  be  entirely  agreeable  to  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  have  Mr.  Reed  accompany  the  other  two  minis- 
ters, so  that  the  three  ratifications  might  be  exchanged 
together.  Although  at  first  Mr.  W^ard  had  been  reluctant  to 
consent  to  such  an  arrangement  he  at  length  agreed,  pro- 
vided the  commissioners  would  give  him  a  statement  that 
the  validity  of  the  treaty  would  in  no  way  be  affected  by 
this  delay  in  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications.'* 

From  this  point  onward  in  the  narrative  not  only  are 
nearly  all  the  facts  a  matter  of  dispute,  but  equally  so  is  the 
interpretation  of  such  facts  as  can  be  established.  The 
Chinese  version  of  the  situation  as  it  appears  in  the  official 
dispatches  of  Mr.  Ward  and  in  the  accounts  of  Dr.  S.  Wells 
Williams,  who  was  present  with  the  American  Minister, 
vary  widely  from  the  assertions  which  were  placed  before 
the  British  Government  and  offered  in  England  as  the  justi- 


336  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

fication  of  the  second  Anglo-French  War  with  China  in 
1859-60. 

The  Chinese  explanation  of  the  situation,  which  has 
never  been  systematically  set  forth  in  histories  of  the 
period,  is  as  follows:  When  Mr.  Bruce  arrived  at  Shanghai 
early  in  June  prepared  to  push  to  Peking,  the  Chinese  Com- 
missioners agreed  (June  6)  that  the  ratifications  should  be 
exchanged  in  Peking  but  they  desired  to  have  settled  before 
going  there  certain  matters  with  reference  to  Canton  which 
still  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  English  and  French. 
"But  as  Canton  is  not  yet  restored,"  they  remarked,  "it 
would  seem  that  no  time  should  be  lost  in  arriving  at  a 
satisfactory  decision  regarding  it."  On  the  same  day,  in  a 
separate  communication,  the  Imperial  Commissioners  stated 
that  although  ample  arrangements  for  the  reception  of  the 
British  legation  at  Peking  would  be  made,  the  exchange  of 
ratifications  had  been  assigned  to  them  exclusively.  No 
one  could  act  as  their  substitute.  It  would  be  impossible, 
they  stated  courteously,  for  them  to  reach  Peking  for  at 
least  two  months.-"' 

In  his  reply  to  these  communications,  Mr.  Bruce  im- 
mediately assumed  that  the  Commissioners  were  acting  in 
bad  faith. 

"It  is  with  regret  that  the  undersigned  finds,"  he  stated,  "at  the 
outset  of  a  mission  sent  by  her  Brittanic  Majesty  as  evidence  of  her 
desire  for  peaceful  rehitions,  that  he  is  met,  not  as  he  has  a  right  to 
expect,  with  a  cordial  and  frank  invitation  to  the  capital,  but  with 
delays  and  hesitations  ill-calculated  to  cement  a  good  understanding. 
The  undersigned  will  not,  however,  swerve  in  the  least  from  the  course 
he  has  laid  down  in  his  letter  of  the  18th  ultimo.  He  is  resolved  to 
proceed  forthwith  to  Peking,  there  to  exchange  the  ratifications  of  the 
treaty,  and  to  deliver  in  i^erson  the  letter  intrusted  to  his  charge  by 
his  gracious  sovereign  to  his  Imperial  Majesty,  to  whom  it  is  ad- 
dressed, nor  will  he  quit  the  capital  until  satisfied  that  effect  will  be 
given  without  reserve  to  every  provision  of  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin." 

Mr.  Bruce  then  notified  the  Commissioners  that  Admiral 
Hope,  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  British  naval  forces,  had 
already  started  for  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho,  and  warned 
them  that  upon  the  Chinese  Government  must  rest  the 
entire  responsibility  for  any  trouble  that  might  arise. 


WARD  AND  TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS        337 

The  question  of  fact  is  whether  the  Chinese  Government 
was  actually  sincere  in  its  promise  that  the  British  and 
French  ministers  would  be  received  in  Peking  according  to 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty.  The  Russian  minister,  Nicho- 
las Ignatieff,  who  could  hardly  be  called  an  unbiased  wit- 
ness, but  whose  testimony  in  this  case  seems  clear,  stated 
(July  7) :  « 

".  .  .  prei)arations  bad  been  made  bere  to  receive,  for  tbe  ratifica- 
tions of  tbe  treaties  of  Tientsin,  tbe  plenipotentiaries  of  Amei-ica,  of 
France  and  of  Engbind.  Lodgings  bad  been  arranged,  by  order  of 
the  Emperor,  for  tbe  tbree  embassies." 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  intentions  of  the  Emperor 
as  regards  the  admission  to  Peking,  it  is  evident  that  it  was 
not  the  intention  of  the  Chinese  Government  that  the  allied 
envoys  should  proceed  to  the  capital  by  way  of  the  Taku 
forts  and  the  passage  to  Tientsin  which  had  been  utilized  by 
the  foreigners  the  year  before.  Nor  was  it  the  disposition 
of  the  Chinese  to  permit  the  allied,  envoys  to  be  accompanied 
to  Peking  by  a  large  military  force.  The  treaties  did  not 
specify  that  the  route  must  be  by  way  of  Taku,  and  while 
the  British  treaty  was  silent  on  the  subject,  thr;  American 
treaty  clearly  limited  the  number  of  those  who  might  accom- 
pany the  minister  in  his  visits  to  Peking.  The  Chinese 
maintained  that  it  had  been  the  intention  of  the  Imperial 
Government  to  receive  the  envoys  at  Pehtang,  a  place  about 
ten  miles  north  of  Taku,  on  another  outlet  of  the  river. 
The  Governor  General  of  Chihli  stated  to  Mr.  Ward  that 
he  had  received  orders  from  Peking  to  receive  the  envoys  at 
Pehtang  and  to  facilitate  their  journey  to  Peking.'^ 

S.  Wells  Williams,  a  careful  observer,  and  the  one  among 
all  the  foreign  legations  most  familiar  with  the  Chinese, 
said:  ^ 

"I  am  convinced  that  tbe  intention  of  the  Emperor  and  his  cabinet 
has  been  all  along  in  favor  of  permitting  the  envoys  of  the  three 
powers  to  go  to  bis  capital  to  exchange  their  treaties.  .  .  ." 

In  reply  to  Mr.  Bruce's  communication  stating  that  the 
British  Admiral  with  his  squadron  had  already  proceeded 


338  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

to  the  Pei-ho,  the  Imperial  Commissioners  at  Shanghai 
advised  the  British  minister  to  proceed  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Tientsin  River,  to  "anchor  his  vessel  of  war  outside  the 
bar,  and  then,  without  much  baggage,  and  with  a  moderate 
retinue"  to  proceed  to  the  capital.  Meanwhile  they  would 
notify  the  Peking  officials  of  the  situation,  and  they  ex- 
pressed the  expectation  that  in  view  of  the  peaceful  mission 
on  which  his  excellency  was  bent,  'his  treatment  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  China  will  not  fail  to  be  in  every  way  most 
courteous.'  Mr.  Ward  was  also  invited  'by  the  Commis- 
sioners to  proceed  to  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho. 

"Blood  is  Thicker  than  Water" 

Upon  Mr.  Ward's  arrival  in  the  U.  S.  frigate  Powhatan 
(Commodore  Josiah  Tattnall)  June  21,  he  was  notified  by 
Admiral  Hope  that  the  mouth  of  the  river  had  been  ob- 
structed with  barriers.  The  British  Admiral  had  issued  an 
ultimatum  to  the  authorities  stating  that  unless  they  them- 
selves removed  the  barriers,  he  would  have  it  done,  accord- 
ing to  instructions  received  from  the  allied  envoys.  Mr. 
Ward  thereupon  found  himself  faced  with  a  dilemma  similar 
to  that  which  had  confronted  Mr.  Reed  at  the  same  place 
the  year  before  and  he,  also,  decided  that  he  must  adopt 
an  independent  course  of  action.''  The  American  minister 
sought  to  announce  to  the  Chinese  authorities  his  presence 
and  purpose.  In  this  he  was  unsuccessful  and  the  next  day, 
June  24,  in  company  with  Commodore  Tattnall,  he  setf^ 
in  the  Toeywan,  a  small  chartered  steamer,  for  the  moutn  of 
the  river  with  a  view  to  passing  the  barrier  in  front  of  the 
forts.  It  was  his  intention  to  proceed  until  he  was  stopped, 
but  the  Toeywan  ran  aground  in  a  falling  tide.  The  British 
gun-boat  Plover  came  alongside,  and  warned  the  American 
party  that  they  were  in  danger  of  being  fired  upon.  The 
commanfHng  officer  offered  the  services  of  the  Plover  to 
Commodore  Tattnall,  and  suggested  that  the  party  trans- 
ship to  the  gun-boat,  proposing  that  Tattnall  hoist  the 
American  flag  at  the  Plover's  peak.    This  offer  was  declined. 


WARD  AND  TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS        339 

The  Plover  was  unable  to  pull  off  the  Toeywan,  which  was 
lying  well  inside  the  line  of  the  British  war  vessels.  A 
message  was  sent  to  the  shore  stating  that  the  American 
minister  was  in  the  Toeywan  and  that  he  was  on  his  way  to 
Peking.  The  Chinese  replied  that  passage  by  way  of  the 
river  was  prohibited,  that  there  was  no  officer  present  who 
could  receive  a  communication.  They  stated  that  it  was 
rumored  that  the  Governor  General  of  Chihli  had  been 
instructed  to  meet  the  envoys  at  the  north  entrance  to  the 
river,  some  ten  miles  above.  That  evening  the  Toeywan 
floated  and  dropped  down  below  the  line  of  British  war 
vessels. 

During  the  night  the  British  made  some  ineffectual 
efforts  to  blow  up  the  barrier,  and  the  following  afternoon 
when  the  British  admiral  started  to  ascend  the  river  with 
two  gun-boats  the  forts  opened  fire  and  the  battle  com- 
menced. The  forts  had  been  rebuilt  and  greatly  strength- 
ened since  their  destruction  the  year  before  by  the  allied 
forces,  and  the  English  and  French,  quite  unprepared  for 
so  great  a  resistance,  found  the  battle  going  against  them. 
About  five  o'clock  the  report  reached  Commodore  Tattnall, 
who  with  his  party  was  witnessing  the  fray,  that  Admiral 
Hope  had  been  seriously  wounded.  Then  ensued  the  soon 
internationally  famous  "Blood-is-thicker-than-water"  epi- 
sode. 

During  the  progress  of  the  battle  an  English  officer  in 
charge  of  a  junk  loaded  with  British  troops  who  had  not 
been  ordered  to  advance,  came  on  board  the  Toeywan  for  a 
better  view  of  the  battle.  As  the  struggle  began  to  go 
against  the  allies  he  let  it  be  known,  although  he  did  not 
directly  ask  for  aid,  that  he  wished  to  get  his  junk  up  to  the 
line  of  battle  but  was  unable  to  do  so  on  account  of  the 
strength  of  the  tide.^*^  Commodore  Tattnall  conferred  with 
Mr.  Ward  and  the  latter  gave  his  unqualified  approval  to 
the  suggestion  that  the  Commodore  offer  the  assistance  of 
the  Toeywan  to  tow  up  the  reserves  in  the  junks.  Accord- 
ingly Tattnall  transferred  Mr.  Ward  and  his  suite  to  one  of 
the  barges  still  at  anchor,  and  offered  his  services  to  the 


340  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

officer  of  the  other  barges  to  tow  them  into  action.  The 
offer  was  gladly  accepted. 

When  the  Commodore  reached  the  battle,  knowing  that 
Admiral  Hope  was  wounded,  his  sense  of  the  kinship  of 
Caucasian  blood  got  the  better  of  what  little  sense  of  neu- 
trality had  remained  and,  jumping  into  his  boat,  he  ordered 
the  crew  to  pull  him  away  to  the  Cormorant  where  he  found 
Admiral  Hope  utterly  exhausted  from  his  wound.  In  the 
process  of  coming  alongside  the  British  gun-boat  Tattnall's 
barge  was  struck  by  a  shot  from  the  forts  and  the  coxswain 
was  killed.  While  another  barge  was  being  found  to  return 
the  American  party  to  the  Toeywan,  and  while  Commodore 
Tattnall  was  extending  his  sympathy  to  Admiral  Hope  the 
American  sailors,  by  the  Commodore's  orders,  assisted  their 
British  companions  and  helped  to  serve  the  guns.*  Tattnall 
returned  to  the  Toeywan  and  again  towed  up  some  barges, 
and  later  in  the  evening  when  the  British  stormed  the  forts 
the  Commodore  ran  the  Toeywaii  in  towards  shore  and  took 
a  number  of  British  fugitives  on  board. 

Three  days  later,  "determined  to  leave  no  effort  untried 
to  carry  into  effect  the  strongly  expressed  wishes  of  the 
President"  Mr.  Ward  sent  some  members  of  his  suite  in  the 
Toeywan  to  find  the  other  entrance  to  the  river  to  which  he 
had  been  already  directed.  Meanwhile  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties on  their  own  initiative  communicated  to  Mr.  Ward  that 
the  w^ay  to  Peking  by  way  of  Pehtang  was  open  to  him. 

The  British  and  French  ministers,  immediately  after  the 
battle  at  Taku,  broke  off  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  and 
returned  to  Shanghai,  strongly  urging  Mr.  Ward  to  do  hke- 
wise. 

The  American  Minister  Goes  to  Peking 

Mr.  Ward,  now  relying  on  the  provisions  of  the  Ameri- 
can treaty  alone,  announced  to  the  Chinese  that  he  wished 

♦The  most  reasonable  explanation  of  this  episode  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  struggle  of  the  allied  forces  with  tlie  Chinese  had  assumed  in  the 
eyes  of  both  Tattnall  and  \Var<l.  who  were  Southerners,  the  aspect  of  a  conflict 
of  color.      .\n   eve-witness  of   the   episode  recorded   in  J)is  diary   that   Oonunodore 

Tattnall    finally    exclaimed  :    "Kl 1    is    thielcer    tlian    water"    and    that    he'd    "be 

daiiint'd  if  he'd  stand  by  and  see  white  men  l)utchered  l)efore  his  eyes.  No, 
sir;  old  Tattnall  isn't  that  kind.  sir.  Tliis  is  tlie  cause  of  humanity.  Is  that 
boat  ready?     Tell  the  men  there  is  uo  need  of  side-arms."" 


WARD  AND  TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS        341 

to  proceed  to  Peking  upon  important  business,  viz.,  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty.  In  thus  resting  his  case  he  was 
on  solid  ground,  and  he  met  with  no  opposition  from  the 
Imperial  officers.  However,  his  inexperience  in  China, 
coupled  probably  with  his  unwillingness  to  take  the  advice 
of  Dr.  Williams,  soon  placed  him  in  difficulties  which  a  more 
experienced  diplomat  might  have  avoided.  The  treaty  pro- 
vided that  the  Chinese  authorities  should  arrange  for  the 
conveyance  of  the  minister  to  the  capital — a  provision  which 
they  were  glad  to  comply  with  for  the  manner  of  the  first 
entrance  of  an  American  envoy  to  Peking  was  to  them  an 
important  matter.  Mr.  Ward  should  have  demanded  that 
sedan  chairs  be  provided  for  the  journey,  for  this  was  the 
customary  mode  of  conveyance  for  the  highest  officers  of 
the  government.  Being  ignorant  of  this  fact,  or  not  realiz- 
ing its  importance,  he  consented  that  the  party  be  conveyed 
in  carts.  Thus  the  first  American  envoy  and  his  suite  to 
enter  the  Imperial  capital  proceeded  thither  in  equipages 
similar  to  those  in  which  rode  the  Korean  and  other  tribute- 
bearing  envoys  in  their  periodical  journeys  to  Peking,  and 
to  the  inhabitants  en  route,  as  well  as  to  the  populace  of  the 
city,  the  party  was  represented  as  coming  to  pay  tribute 
to  the  Son  of  Heaven.*^- 

Having  reached  Peking,  Mr.  Ward  made  another  mis- 
take in  immediately  yielding  to  the  desires  of  the  Chinese 
that  the  mission  should  not  go  abroad  in  the  city  until  after 
the  audience  with  the  Emperor.  Furthermore,  although  the 
American  flag  had  been  brought  along,  it  was  not  permitted 
to  be  flown  over  the  temporary  legation  building.  Indeed 
the  American  minister  and  his  suite  were  practically  pris- 
oners, denied  the  privilege  of  going  out  of  the  house,  and 
not  permitted  to  communicate  freely  with  even  the  Russian 
minister.^  ^ 

Aside  from  these  two  criticisms  on  points  which  would 
in  prospect  seem  unimportant  to  one  not  familiar  with 

♦William  W.  Rockhill  states,  although  giving  no  authority  for  the  assertion  : 
"Here  IPehtang]  he  landed  and  was  taken  to  Peking,  part  (if  (he  way  in  carts 
and  part  in  Ijoats;  but  over  t\\o  carts  and  boats  floated  an  ominous  little  yellow 
pennant  with  the  words:  'Tribute-bearers  from  the  United  States.'"  There 
is  no  question   but   that  the  mission  was  so  represented   to  the   Chinese   people. 


342  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

previous  visits  of  embassies  to  Peking,  Mr.  Ward  conducted 
himself  with  credit.  The  Chinese  decHned  to  discuss  the 
matter  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications  until  the  question  of 
the  details  of  the  audience  with  the  Emperor  had  been  fixed. 
The  Imperial  authorities  demanded  a  modified  kotow 
from  Mr.  Ward  when  he  should  be  presented  to  his  Imperial 
Majesty.  Mr.  Ward  replied  wath  firmness  as  well  as  in  a 
characteristically  Southern  manner  that  although  he  was 
willing  to  'bend  the  body  and  slightly  crook  the  right  knee/ 
he  was  accustomed  to  kneel  only  to  God  and  woman/"* 
Although  the  Chinese  persisted,  Mr.  Ward  remained  ada- 
mant on  the  subject  of  the  kotow  and  no  satisfactory  com- 
promise could  be  reached.  In  the  course  of  the  prolonged 
discussion  it  became  apparent  that  the  Emperor  was  really 
more  eager  to  see  the  envoy  than  the  latter  was  to  see  his 
Imperial  Highness.^  ^  At  length  Mr.  Ward,  his  patience 
exhausted,  demanded  that  conveyances  be  provided  for  his 
departure  from  the  capital.  Reluctantly  the  Chinese  agreed, 
and  the  ratifications  were  exchanged  at  Pehtang  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  journey  to  the  coast. 

After  the  exchange  of  ratifications  the  Chinese  brought 
in  an  'American  prisoner'  who  had  been  captured  at  Taku 
in  June.^*'  This  prisoner  had  been  to  the  Chinese  an  evi- 
dence that  in  the  battle  of  Taku  the  Americans  had  joined 
with  the  allies,  and  no  doubt  this  conviction  that  the  Ameri- 
cans had  not  maintained  their  neutrality  had  been  a  great 
obstacle  to  Mr.  Ward's  negotiations  at  Peking.  But  the 
American  prisoner  proved  to  be  a  Canadian  who  had  not 
only  asserted  that  he  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  but 
had  also  told  the  Chinese  that  he  had  been  one  of  a  party  of 
no  less  than  two  hundred  Americans  who  had  joined  in  the 
fight.  The  lack  of  truth  in  these  assertions  was  satisfactorily 
proven  to  the  Chinese  authorities.  Mr.  Ward  then  revealed 
rather  more  kindliness  of  nature  than  the  situation  required 
by  offering  to  take  the  Canadian  to  Shanghai  and  to  restore 
him  to  his  countrymen. 

Immediately  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  ceremonies,  the 
American   envoy  and  his  suite  departed   from   Pehtang, 


WARD  AND  TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS        343 

arriving  at  Shanghai  August  22,  1859.    From  this  place  Mr. 
Ward  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  State:  ^^ 

"The  disastrous  result  of  the  battle  of  the  Pei-ho  has  done  much 
to  unsettle  the  condition  of  things  in  China.  The  whole  manner  and 
bearing  of  the  Chinese  population  towards  the  foreigners  have  been 
changed,  and  the  people  of  this  place  have  been  for  weeks  past  under 
the  painful  apprehension  of  an  outbreak  and  an  attack  upon  the  for- 
eign settlement." 

Late  in  1860  Mr.  Ward  retired  from  China,  hastening 
home  to  take  part  in  the  secession.  The  post  of  United 
States  Minister  in  China  remained  vacant  until  the  appoint- 
ment of  Anson  Burlingame  the  following  year. 

Commodore  Tattnall  received  the  approval  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  for  his  conduct  at  Taku  and  President 
Buchanan,  in  reporting  the  conclusion  of  the  settlement 
with  China,  complacently  stated:  ^^ 

"Our  minister  to  China,  in  obedience  to  his  instructions,  has  re- 
mained perfectly  neutral  in  the  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
France  and  the  Chinese  Empire,  although,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Russian  minister,  he  was  ever  ready  and  willing,  had  the  opportunity 
offered,  to  employ  his  good  offices  in  restoring  peace  between  the 
parties.  It  is  but  an  act  of  simple  justice,  both  to  our  present  minister 
and  his  predecessor,  to  state  that  they  have  proved  fully  equal  to  the 
delicate,  trying,  and  responsible  positions  in  which  they  have  on 
different  occasions  been  placed." 

The  story  of  the  second  Anglo-French  War  with  China 
does  not  require  telling.  In  August,  1860,  the  allied  forces 
landed  at  Pehtang.  Having  captured  the  Taku  forts  they 
advanced  to  Tientsin.  Rapidly  the  allies  forced  their  way 
towards  Peking.  The  Emperor  fled  to  his  hunting  lodge  at 
Jehol.  Early  in  October  the  British  and  French  forces 
reached  the  capital,  sacked  the  Summer  Palace,  and  were 
admitted  without  further  fighting  to  Peking.  The  Summer 
Palace,  already  gutted  of  its  priceless  contents,  was  ordered 
burned  as  a  further  ocular  demonstration  that  the  British 
Government  in  Asia  might  not  safely  be  trifled  with.  In 
the  ensuing  settlements,  additional  indemnity  was  agreed 
to,  the  unreserved  right  of  diplomatic  residence  in  Peking 
was  conceded,  the  French  secured  additional  concessions  for 
the  Roman  Catholic  missionaries,  and  Tientsin  was  added 


344  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

to  the  list  of  open  ports.  Early  in  November  the  allied 
troops  withdrew  from  the  city. 

Beyond  a  doubt  the  great  Empire  of  China  was  now 
opened,  for  ill  and  for  good,  to  the  Western  World. 

Inasmuch  as  the  close  of  the  second  Anglo-French  War 
with  China,  and  the  retirement  of  Ward  as  American  minis- 
ter mark  the  close  of  a  period  in  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  China,  a  brief  summary  is  in  order. 

The  war,  although  it  had  produced  no  effect  whatever 
on  the  great  mass  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  had  shattered  the 
old  system  by  which  the  Peking  Government  had  been  able 
to  transact  the  affairs  of  its  international  relations  through 
the  southern  port  of  Canton.  While  in  retirement  at  Jehol 
the  Emperor  Hienfeng  died  (August  22,  1861).  By  means 
of  a  silent  revolution  within  the  court.  Prince  Kung,  brother 
of  Hienfeng,  and  uncle  of  the  boy  emperor,  Tungshih,  be- 
came president  of  a  newly  created  Board  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Prince  Kung  had  already  come  into  contact  with  the 
foreigners  in  the  negotiations  for  the  ratification  of  the 
treaties  in  1860  and,  while  by  no  means  a  liberal  or  enlight- 
ened statesman,  he  recognized  the  necessity  of  conciliating 
the  determined  foreigners.  Associated  with  the  prince  were 
Kweiliang,  one  of  the  commissioners  who  had  met  the 
foreigners  at  Tientsin  in  1858,  and  Wensiang,  the  ablest 
modern  Chinese  statesman  until  the  rise  of  Li  Hung  Chang. 
At  the  same  time  the  two  dowager  empresses  assumed  the 
regency  and  the  empress  mother  Yehonala,  sometimes  called 
the  Empress  of  the  W^estern  Palace  to  distinguish  her  from 
the  less  able  and  aggressive  Empress  Consort  who  lived  in 
the  Eastern  Palace,  entered  upon  her  remarkable  regime  in 
Chinese  affairs. 

For  the  United  States  also  the  year  1861  marks  many 
important  changes.  Among  the  American  merchants  the 
pre-treaty  traditions  of  old  Canton  had  entirely  disappeared. 
A  new  kind  of  international  trade  competition  had  arisen 
in  which  the  merchants  of  other  nations  could  bring  to  their 
help  a  political  and  military  support  such  as  the  American 
Government  was  quite  unwilling  to  render  to  its  nationals. 


WARD  AND  TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS        345 

The  international  situation,  hitherto  relatively  simple,  with 
France  appearing  as  the  obliging  and  retiring  ally  of  Great 
Britain,  was  changing.  Great  Britain  and  France  were 
falling  apart  as  a  result  of  Palmerston  policies  in  Europe. 
Other  European  nations  were  stirring.  Russia  had  at  length 
come  into  actual  contact  with  the  European  powers  in  the 
Far  East.  Within  the  next  ten  years  six  other  nations, 
Germany,  Portugal,  Denmark,  Spain,  Holland  and  Italy, 
were  to  conclude  treaties  with  China.  In  place  of  the  old 
conciliatory  policies  of  Canton  had  come  an  intense  inter- 
national rivalry  and  trade  conflict  which  the  American  Gov- 
ernment, much  against  its  will,  had  been  forced  to  consider. 
The  United  States  was  not  free  to  select  and  follow  a  policy 
in  accord  with  its  earlier  traditions.  It  must  enter  inter- 
national politics  in  China  or  forfeit  its  place  in  the  trade. 
In  the  treaty  of  1858  the  United  States  had  compromised  its 
traditional  principles  for  the  sake  of  holding  its  place  in  the 
international  competition.  The  treaty  was  not  such  as  Mr. 
Reed  would  have  liked  to  make.  Mr.  Ward  in  China  was 
like  a  lost  soul  not  knowing  to  what  world  he  belonged,  and 
probably  much  more  interested  in  the  developments  of  the 
Secession  than  in  the  task  in  hand. 

That  American  policy  in  China  from  1854  to  1860  did 
not  correctly  express  the  American  people  becomes  very 
evident  when  we  compare  it  with  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  in  Japan  where  the  Americans,  still  following  the 
cooperative  policy,  had  none  the  less  the  acknowledged 
leadership. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  Ward  Correspondence  is  printed,  in  part,  in  S.  Ex.  Doc. 

No.  30:36-1,  in  the  same  volume  with  the  Reed  Correspondence. 

2.  Eoster :  "American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,"  p.  245. 

3.  Ward  Corres.,  p.  575. 
i.     Ihid.,  pp.  577-9. 

5.  Ihid.,  pp.  581-5. 

'■..  Ihid.,  p.  611. 

7.  Ward  Corres.,  p.  593. 

S.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  143 

9.  Ward  Corres.,  p.  586. 


346  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

10.  Williams'  Journal,  pp.  120  ff. 

11.  Private  papers   of  Kear  Admiral    Stephen  Decatur  Trenchard, 

U.  S.  Navy,  ed.  by  Edgar  Stanton  Maclay :  U.  S.  Naval  Insti- 
tute Proceedings,  Vol.  40,  pp.  10.85  ff. 

12.  William   W.   Roekhill:    "Diplomatic   Missions   to   the   Court   of 

China":  Amer.  Hist.  Bevicw,  July,  1S97,  p.  638. 

13.  Williams'  Journal,  pp.  169  if. 

14.  Foster:  "American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,"  p.  250. 

15.  Williams'  Journal,  p.  184. 

16.  Ward  Corres.,  p.  598. 

17.  Ihid.,  p.  618. 

18.  Richardson's  Messages,  Vol.  5,  p.  643  (Annual  Message,  Dec.  3, 

1860). 


CHAPTER  XIX 
THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HAERIS  IN  JAPAN 

Before  considering  the  policy  of  Townsend  Harris  in 
Japan  which  was  being  written  into  a  treaty  engagement  at 
the  very  time  Reed  was  proceeding  to  the  Pei-ho  in  the 
company  of  the  fleets  of  France  and  England,  and  was  being 
applied  at  the  time  Ward  and  Tattnall  were  participating 
in  the  attack  at  Taku  in  1859,  it  will  be  well  to  review  some 
of  the  fundamental  differences  between  China  and  Japan  as 
the  two  nations  faced  the  future  in  1858. 

The  Chinese  Empire,  notwithstanding  the  despotism  of 
the  Manchus,  a  state  religion  and  a  common  classical  litera- 
ture was  conspicuously  lacking  in  unity.  It  was  sprawled 
over  half  a  continent,  divided  by  great  mountain  ranges  and 
deserts,  without  the  means  of  rapid  communication,  speak- 
ing no  common  language,  and  permitting  such  large  degree 
of  provincial  and  local  autonomy  as  greatly  weakened  the 
central  authority.  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  was  small  and 
compact,  had  relatively  easy  communications,  a  common 
spoken  as  well  as  written  language,  and  while  there  was  also 
a  decentralized  government  as  in  China,  yet  the  form  of 
decentralization  was  feudalistic  and  gave  to  the  government 
of  the  Shogun  a  representative  character  which  was  wholly 
lacking  in  China.  The  Shogun  was  compelled  to  take  coun- 
sel with  the  feudal  nobles  who  constituted  a  territorial 
representation  in  the  government.  The  Chinese  adminis- 
tration was  in  the  hands  of  a  mandarinate  recruited  by  an 
impractical  system  of  civil  service :  the  only  form  of  protest 
available  for  the  people  was  either  riot  or  rebellion.  The 
decision  of  the  Shogun  rested  more  nearly  than  that  of  the 
Chinese  Emperor  on  the  will  of  the  people.  Japan,  a  com- 
pact Empire,  possessed  a  very  lively  patriotism  such  as  was 

347 


348  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

impossible  in  decentralized  China  ruled  by  an  alien  dynasty. 
The  Chinese  system  of  government  had  repressed  the  devel- 
opment of  political  leadership,  while  the  Japanese  system 
had  the  effect  of  cultivating  and  encouraging  it.  In  1858 
China  was  without  competent  leaders,  while  Japan  had 
many  of  exceptional  ability.  To  all  these  advantages  in 
favor  of  Japan  must  be  added  the  presence  of  a  military 
spirit  and  tradition  such  as  the  needs  of  a  small  and  secluded 
and  feudalistic  nation  demanded,  and  such  as  China  had  not 
required  and  had  indeed  discouraged.  Japan,  less  exposed 
because  of  her  isolation  and  relative  poverty,  was  vastly 
better  prepared  than  China  in  1858  to  meet  the  onrush  of 
Western  aggression. 

Appointment  of  Townsend  Harris — Instructions  and 
Treaty  with  Siam 

Townsend  Harris  ^  had  been  a  merchant  in  New  York 
City,  distinguished  for  his  public  spirit  and  service.  He  had 
been  president  of  the  Board  of  Education  and  was  "a  sound, 
reliable  and  influential  Democrat."  Giving  up  his  business 
in  New  York  he  sailed  for  San  Francisco  in  May,  1849,  in  a 
vessel  of  which  he  was  part  owner,  and  later  embarked  upon 
a  leisurely  trading  enterprise  in  the  Pacific  and  IncUan 
oceans.  On  Christmas,  1849,  he  was  "at  sea  in  the  North 
Pacific  Ocean";  1850,  at  Manila;  1851,  at  Penang;  1852,  at 
Singapore;  1853,  at  Hongkong;  1854,  at  Calcutta.  His 
enterprises,  while  at  first  successful,  ended  in  failure,  and  in 
1853,  describing  himself  as  a  resident  of  Hongkong,  he 
applied  for  the  position  of  American  consul  at  either  Hong- 
kong or  Canton.-  Notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  influential 
friends  in  the  ITnited  States  he  was  assigned  to  the  consu- 
late at  Ningpo  (August  2,  1854)  an  unimportant  and  trivial 
post  with  a  remuneration  of  $1000  for  judicial  services  and 
such  fees  as  the  slight  American  trade  at  that  port  afforded. 
Harris,  whose  face  was  already  turned  towards  home,  ap- 
pointed a  missionary,  Dr.  D.  C.  Macgowan,  as  acting  consul, 
and  set  out  for  New  York.^    Immediately  upon  his  arrival 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    349 

he  secured  the  interest  of  his  New  York  friends  on  behalf  of 
a  possible  appointment  to  the  newly  created  post  of  consul- 
general  in  Japan.  To  President  Pierce  he  wrote  (August  4, 
1855) :  "I  have  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  social  banish- 
ment I  must  endure  while  in  Japan,  and  the  mental  isola- 
tion in  which  I  must  live,  and  am  prepared  to  meet  it." 
He  stated  that  even  though  he  were  offered  the  choice 
between  the  posts  of  commissioner  to  China  and  consul- 
general  to  Japan,  he  would  ''instantly  take  the  latter." 
His  efforts  were  successful,  and  within  two  weeks  after  his 
arrival  in  New  York,  he  had  received  his  appointment  which 
was  later  confirmed  by  the  Senate. 

Harris  was  a  man  of  urbanity,  character  and  ability. 
While  living  at  Hongkong  he  appears  to  have  won  the  confi- 
dence and  friendship  of  Sir  John  Bowring,  and  to  have 
attracted  the  attention  of  Commodore  Perry.  He  was  also 
a  friend  of  William  E.  Seward,  then  senator  from  New 
York.'*  As  to  convictions  in  Far  Eastern  policy  Harris  ap- 
pears to  have  occupied  a  middle  position  between  Perry  and 
Parker,  on  the  one  side,  and  Cushing  and  the  early  Canton 
traders  on  the  other.  He  thought,  for  example,  the  United 
States  ought  to  acquire  Formosa,  but  he  would  have  had  the 
acquisition  made  by  purchase,  and  so  recommended  in  a 
letter  to  Marcy.-'"' 

To  the  duties  of  the  American  representative  in  Japan 
were  added  those  of  special  agent  to  secure  a  new  treaty 
with  Siam  which  was  to  be  negotiated  while  en  route  to 
Shimoda.  The  motives  of  President  Pierce  in  making  the 
appointment  were  expressed  by  Marcy  (September  12, 
1855)  as  follows:  "The  President  entertained  the  hope  that 
by  your  knowledge  of  Eastern  character  and  your  general 
intelligence  and  experience  in  business  you  would  make  such 
an  impression  upon  the  Japanese  as  would  in  time  induce 
them  to  enter  into  a  commercial  treaty  with  us."  ^  Marcy 
did  not  outline  specifically  the  sort  of  treaty  which  was 
desired  but  referred  him  to  a  draft  of  the  proposed  treaty 
with  Siam,  the  stipulations  of  which  would  be  satisfactory 
for  a  treaty  with  Japan — "at  least  for  a  beginning." 


350  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

In  addition  to  the  written  instructions  Marcy  appears  to 
have  given  some  verbal  ones,  including  the  necessity  for 
securing  extraterritoriality  which  had  not  been  included  in 
either  the  Roberts  treaty  with  Siam  or  the  Perry  treaty  with 
Japan.  Marcy  was  somewhat  apologetic  about  this  stipula- 
tion which,  he  said,  was  necessary  because  the  Senate  would 
not  ratify  a  treaty  in  which  it  was  lacking.* 

The  Roberts  treaty  with  Siam,  while  stipulating  the 
omission  of  all  tariff  duties,  had  been  of  little  value  to 
American  trade  because  the  tonnage  dues — the  only  charge 
for  foreign  trade,  and  exactly  similar  to  those  which  had 
been  included  in  the  preceding  British  treaty — were  so 
excessive  as  to  exclude  practically  all  foreign  trade.  A  few 
years  after  the  signing  of  the  Roberts  treaty  a  system  of 
monopolies  had  been  created  in  Siam  which  had  still  further 
retarded  the  trade.  In  1849  Joseph  Balestier,^  consul  at 
Singapore,  had  been  appointed  a  special  envoy  to  negotiate 
treaties  with  Siam,  Cochin  China,  Borneo,  Subi,  Bally  and 
Lambok  Islands,  as  well  as  with  the  pepper  coast  of  Suma- 
tra. He  was  instructed  to  make  a  new  treaty  with  Siam, 
correcting  the  tonnage  dues  and  securing  the  right  to  ap- 
point a  consul  at  Bankok.  Balestier's  negotiations  had 
come  to  nothing  because  of  his  ill  temper.  The  Siamese 
had  sent  a  message  to  the  American  Government  through 
the  missionaries  and  American  naval  officers  which,  after 
remarking  that  Balestier  was  a  "person  of  much  excitabil- 
ity" said: 

^'Should  the  high  ministers  of  the  United  States  of  America 
appoint  an  officer  hereafter  to  come  here  for  friendly  negotiations  it 
is  requested  that  they  may  appoint  an  efficient,  prudent  and  well  dis- 
posed person,  not  inclined  to  anger,  but  like  Mr.  Roberts." 

American  interests  in  Siam  in  1855  were  largely  mission- 
ary, there  having  been  American  Protestant  missionaries 

*In  a  letter  many  years  later  Harris  stated  :  "The  provision  of  the  treaty 
giving  the  right  of  extraterritorialily  to  all  Americans  in  Japan  was  against 
my  conscience.  In  a  conversation  with  (Jovernor  Marcy.  tlu-  Secretary  of  State 
in  1855,  he  strongly  condcnincd  it  as  an  unjust  interference  with  the  nnmicipal 
law  of  a  country  whicli  no  western  nation  would  tolerate  for  a  moment:  l>ut 
lie  said  that  it  "would  he  impossible  to  have  a  treaty  witli  an  Oriental  nation 
unless  it  contained  that  provision.  The  examples  of  our  treaties  with  Turkey, 
Persia,  and  the  Barbary  Slates  gave  a  precedent  that  the  Senate  would  not 
overlook."  ' 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    351 

there  for  more  than  twenty  years.  Harris  was  therefore 
instructed  to  secure  for  them  the  treaty  right  to  pursue  their 
work  unmolested,  but  he  was  cautioned  that  in  Japan  the 
prejudice  against  missionaries  was  so  great  that  he  would 
probably  not  be  able  to  secure  missionary  liberty. 

The  immediate  occasion  of  this  new  effort  to  make  a 
treaty  with  Siam  was  the  recent  project  of  Great  Britain  for 
a  new  treaty.  Harris  was  cautioned  that  he  might  expect 
to  find  the  Siamese  somewhat  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of 
European  aggression  and  he  was  therefore  instructed  to 
make  clear  the  distinctions  between  the  traditional  foreign 
policies  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  Marcy 
wrote:  ^ 

"It  is  obvious  .  .  .  that  you  will  be  at  no  loss  for  argument  to 
show  the  difference  between  the  foreign  policies  especially  of  this 
countiy  and  Great  Britain.  While  the  latter  is  herself  an  Eastern 
Power  and  as  such  by  the  late  Burmese  war  has  since  become  a  near 
neighbor  to  Siam,  we  covet  no  dominions  in  that  quarter.  It  is 
undoubtedly  in  the  interest  of  Siam  to  be  liberal  in  her  commercial 
policy  towards  the  United  States." 

Harris  proceeded  to  England  and  thence  by  leisurely 
stages  to  India  and  Ceylon  and  was  picked  up  by  the  U.  S. 
frigate  San  Jacinto  at  Penang.^"  The  expedition  arrived  at 
the  anchorage  of  the  Menam  River  April  16,  1856.  At  Ban- 
kok  Mr.  Harry  Parkes  was  just  concluding  the  ratifications 
of  the  British  treaty  which  had  been  negotiated  by  Sir  John 
Bowring,  and  Harris  experienced  no  difficulty  in  effecting  a 
similar  compact  in  which  extraterritoriality  was  granted, 
the  rate  of  import  tariff  fixed  at  3  per  cent,  and  export 
duties  determined  according  to  a  schedule  attached  to  the 
treaty.  Revision  could  be  effected  at  the  end  of  ten  years  at 
the  desire  of  either  party.  Opium  was  to  be  admitted  free 
of  all  duty,  but  could  be  sold  only  to  the  "opium  farmer" 
or  his  agents.  The  Siamese  would  have  been  very  willing  to 
go  very  much  farther  in  their  treaty  with  the  United  States 
had  Harris  not  discouraged  them.  Indeed  they  wished  an 
alliance,  or  protectorate.    Harris  reported:  " 

"In  my  confidential  interviews  with  the  ministers,  they  expressed 
both  fear  and  hatred  of  England.    They  read  in  the  history  of  Burmah 


352  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  fate  that  probably  awaits  them,  and  which  they  consider  only  a 
question  of  time. 

"They  were  most  anxious  to  be  taken  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States.  They  plainly  told  me  that  if  I  would  make  a  treaty 
of  alliance  they  would  give  us  all  we  could  ask,  even  to  a  monopoly 
of  the  trade." 

Upon  leaving  Siam  Harris  appointed  as  consul  Rev. 
Stephen  Mattoon,  a  missionary  who  had  been  there  ten 
years.  The  treaty  was  at  first  an  impetus  to  trade.  Russell 
and  Company  established  a  branch  at  Bankok,  and  other 
American  traders  appeared,  but  the  large  extension  of  the 
open  ports  in  China  after  the  treaty  of  1858  appears  to  have 
curtailed  the  development  of  the  trade  with  Bankok.  Rus- 
sell and  Company  soon  withdrew  its  representative.  There 
was  delay  in  securing  a  suitable  consul  for  the  post;  Con- 
gress made  no  provision  for  a  salary,  and  the  fees  were 
hardly  sufficient  to  cover  the  necessary  boat  hire.  Ameri- 
can relations  with  Siam  did  not  become  important.  How- 
ever the  negotiations  had  given  Harris  some  practice  in 
treaty-making  and  many  of  the  provisions  of  the  treaty 
between  England  and  Siam  appeared  again  in  the  first  com- 
mercial treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  two 
years  later. 

Arrival  of  Harris  in  Japan — Convention  of  1857 

The  San  Jacinto,  after  many  prolonged  delays  due  to 
defective  machinery,  arrived  at  Shimoda  with  Townsend 
Harris  August  21,  1856.  The  consul  general  was  not  wel- 
come. The  Japanese  officials  protested  that  the  Perry  treaty 
did  not  require  them  to  receive  him;  they  asked  him  to 
leave;  they  asked  him  to  write  to  his  government  requesting 
his  recall,  and  they  begged  Commodore  Armstrong  to  take 
him  away ;  all  in  vain.  After  setting  up  a  flagstaff  in  front 
of  the  temple  which  the  Japanese  at  length  placed  at  his 
disposal  for  a  residence,  and  after  landing  the  envoy  with  a 
salute  of  thirteen  guns,  yards  manned,  the  San  Jacmto 
sailed  away  and  left  him — to  be  unvisited  by  any  naval 
vessel  for  fourteen  months.    Harris  was  without  communi- 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    353 

cations  from  the  Department  of  State  for  eighteen  months. 
No  representative  of  the  American  Government  was  ever 
left  more  to  his  own  devices. 

The  treaty  situation  at  that  time  was  as  follows:  ^^ 
Admiral  Sir  James  Sterling  had  concluded  a  convention 
similar  to  Perry's  in  October,  1854.  It  contained  a  most- 
favored-nation  clause  and  also  a  stipulation  for  elementary 
extraterritoriality.  This  treaty  was  as  little  satisfactory  to 
Great  Britain  as  the  Perry  treaty  was  to  Americans,  and  at 
Hongkong  Sir  John  Bowring  had  told  Harris  that  he  had 
received  a  commission  to  proceed  to  Japan  with  a  large 
naval  force  to  demand  and  secure  the  complete  opening  of 
the  empire  to  foreign  trade.  Bowring  had  given  Harris  per- 
mission to  use  this  information  freely  in  his  own  peaceful 
negotiations.  However,  the  disturbances  in  China,  the 
Indian  Mutiny,  and  the  then  unformed  state  of  British 
policy  in  China  were  to  delay  the  expedition  contemplated 
for  Bowring  for  nearly  two  years. 

Twenty  months  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Perry  treaty 
the  Dutch  representative,  Donker  Curtius,  was  able  to 
effect  a  "preliminary  Convention  of  Commerce,"  thus  carry- 
ing out  a  project  which  the  Netherlands  had  tried  to  accom- 
plish in  1844.  Sir  John  Bowring  had  given  to  Harris  a  copy 
of  this  convention.  It  marked  several  notable  advances  in 
concessions  for  foreigners.  In  addition  to  extraterritoriality, 
and  greatly  enlarged  personal  freedom,  the  island  of 
Deshima  at  Nagasaki,  which  had  served  the  Dutch  traders 
at  once  as  a  prison  and  trading  post  for  two  centuries,  was 
to  be  sold  outright  to  the  Netherlands  factory,  thus  estab- 
lishing the  precedent  for  the  sale  of  land  to  foreigners  for 
residence  and  trade.  The  convention  also  mentioned  the 
fact  that  the  Dutch  were  permitted  to  reside  at  Nagasaki. 

The  Netherlands  envoy  secured  a  more  elaborate  com- 
mercial treaty  which  was  signed  January  30,  1856,  eight 
months  before  the  arrival  of  Harris.  This  treaty  permitted 
the  Dutch  to  bring  their  wives  and  children  to  the  open 
ports,  and  there  was  a  stipulation  that  they  should  be 
allowed  "to  practice  their  own  or  the  Christian  religion 


354  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

within  their  buildings."  Import  duties  were  fixed  at  35  per 
cent,  but  the  export  duties  were  left  undetermined.  These 
agreements,  consisting  of  a  treaty,  additional  articles  and  a 
"supplement  to  additional  articles,"  were  not  ratified  when 
Harris  arrived. 

The  Russians  also  had  been  active.  Count  Putiatin, 
who  had  first  appeared  at  Nagasaki  shortly  after  the  con- 
clusion of  Perry's  first  visit  to  the  Bay  of  Yedo,  and  who  had 
vainly  sought  the  cooperation  of  Perry  in  a  joint  expedition 
for  1854,^^  concluded  a  treaty  of  "commerce,  navigation  and 
delimitation"  at  Shimoda,  in  January,  1855.  Aside  from 
opening  three  ports — Nagasaki,  Shimoda  and  Hakodate — 
stipulation  for  the  residence  of  consuls  at  the  two  latter 
places,  and  bilateral  extraterritoriality,  the  convention  fixed 
the  boundaries  of  the  two  nations,  assigning  the  island  of 
Urup  to  Russia,  Iturup  and  the  Kuriles  to  Japan,  and 
leaving  the  two  empires  in  joint  occupation  of  Sakhalin. 
Russia  then  proceeded  to  further  explorations  of  Sakhalin 
and  discovered  coal  mines  which  led  to  Russian  attempts  to 
abrogate  the  joint  possession  of  the  island.^  ^  However,  the 
ratifications  of  the  Putiatin  treaty  were  exchanged  at 
Shimoda  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  Harris.  Japan  was 
probably  even  more  alarmed  at  the  advances  of  Russia  than 
she  was  at  the  Anglo-French  war  with  China. 

Townsend  Harris,  left  alone  at  Shimoda  except  for  the 
companionship  of  his  interpreter,  C.  J.  Heusken,  a  natural- 
ized Hollander  who  had  been  selected  because  Dutch  was 
the  language  of  diplomacy  in  Japan,  proceeded  slowly. 
Shimoda  was  wholly  unsuited  to  either  trade  or  diplomacy. 
It  was  the  seat  of  a  large  stone  quarry,  but  was  without  pro- 
duce suitable  for  export,  and  was  shut  off  from  the  surround- 
ing country  by  almost  impassable  hills.  The  harbor  was 
small  and  had  been  rendered  nearly  useless  by  a  tidal  wave 
which  the  year  before  had  removed  nearly  all  the  "holding 
ground"  from  the  bottom  of  the  bay,  and  had  wrecked  com- 
pletely the  Russian  corvette  Diana.  The  spot  had  obviously 
been  selected  by  the  Japanese  because  of  its  inaccessibility. 
It  was  certainly  not  a  favorable  point  from  which  to  nego- 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    355 

tiate  a  new  treaty  with  Yeclo.  Harris'  first  impression  of 
the  Japanese  officials  was  unpleasant.  While  he  became 
convinced  that  the  common  people  were  ready  to  welcome 
the  foreigner,  he  regarded  the  officials  as  ''the  greatest  liars 
on  earth"  and  told  them  as  much.  And  yet  he  set  out  to 
win  their  confidence  and  good  will  and  so  far  succeeded  as 
to  be  able  to  sign  a  convention  June  17,  1857,  in  which  the 
Japanese  conceded  directly  by  treaty  what  had  by  inference 
from  the  most-favored-nation  clause  of  the  Perry  treaty 
accrued  to  the  Americans  in  the  British,  Russian  and  Dutch 
conventions.  These  concessions  were:  the  opening  of 
Nagasaki  as  a  port  of  call;  the  right  to  have  a  vice  consul 
at  Hakodate;  extraterritoriality  and  the  right  of  residence 
at  Shimoda  and  Hakodate ;  the  privilege  of  paying  for  ship's 
supplies  in  ''goods"  in  case  money  were  not  available;  and 
settlement  of  a  new  basis  for  exchange  which  fixed  the 
value  of  the  Japanese  ichibu*  at  341/0  cents,  whereas  under 
the  Perry  convention  it  had  been  valued  at  a  dollar  in 
silver.  The  cohvention  also  abrogated  the  agreement  of 
the  Perry  treaty  which  had  placed  all  trade  under  the  im- 
mediate supervision  of  the  government,  and  greatly  en- 
larged the  personal  freedom  of  Harris  by  admitting  that 
he  had  the  right  in  his  official  capacity  to  travel  beyond 
the  hmits  of  seven  ri  which  had  been  fixed  in  the  Perry 
treaty.  While  the  new  convention  was  not  as  explicit  as  the 
Dutch  treaty  in  matters  of  commercial  privilege  and  resi- 
dence, it  contained  greater  concessions  than  had  been  ex- 
pected by  the  American  Government  in  1855  when  Secre- 
tary Marcy  had  issued  his  instructions  to  Harris. f 

Harris  at  Yedo 

The  work  of  Townsend  Harris  at  Shimoda  deserves  a 
more  honored  place  in  American  history  than  it  has  re- 
ceived.   His  health  failed  as  his  supplies  became  exhausted, 

*  Ichihu=ohe  hu ;  a   hu  being  a  certain   weight  of  silver  or  gold,  not  a   coin. 

tThe  treaty  was  dul.v  ratified  June  15.  1S5S.  by  advice  of  the  Senate.  It 
has  been  confused  by  at  least  one  British  historian  with  the  amplified  treaty  of 
commerce  of  1858.'= 


356  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

and  his  government  neglected  him.  At  length  he  was  re- 
duced to  little  more  than  a  Japanese  diet  which  nearly  cost 
him  his  life.  He  was  without  medical  attention  when  it 
was  urgently  needed,  and  he  was  ''as  one  may  say  in  a 
prison — a  large  one  it  is  true — but  still  a  prison."  Not- 
withstanding the  handicaps  laid  upon  him  and  the  obvious 
intentions  of  the  authorities  to  thwart  his  purpose,  we  see 
him  entering  the  capital  city  of  Yedo  (November  30,  1857) 
five  and  one-half  months  after  signing  the  convention,  with 
the  promise  that  he  should  be  permitted  to  deliver  in  per- 
son the  letter  from  President  Pierce  to  the  Shogun.  It  was 
an  extraordinary  achievement  in  which  he  had  surrendered 
no  particle  of  the  official  dignity  of  his  position  and  had 
won  his  way  by  argument  and  by  absolute  candor.  The 
contrast  between  Commissioner  Ward's  entry  into  Peking 
and  Consul-General  Harris'  entry  into  Yedo  is  striking.  The 
honor  accorded  to  Harris  was,  however,  a  mark  of  the 
greater  political  astuteness  of  the  Japanese  Government  as 
well  as  of  the  finer  diplomatic  skill  of  the  New  York  mer- 
chant. Yedo  had  read  correctly  the  designs  of  Russia,  while 
Peking,  wholly  deceived,  had  taken  the  Russian  envoy  to 
her  bosom;  the  mere  intimation  of  British  intentions  in 
Japan  had  been  alarming,  while  the  destruction  of  the  Taku 
forts  in  1858  by  the  allied  British  and  French  forces  had 
been  dismissed  by  the  Manchu  Government  with  fatuous 
indifference. 

Harris  was  not  content  at  Yedo  with  the  delivery  of  the 
President's  letter ;  he  had  come  to  make  a  commercial  treaty 
with  the  Shogun 's  government,  and  before  the  end  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1858,  he  had  succeeded  in  securing  the  approval  of 
the  Yedo  officials  to  a  satisfactory  draft. 

The  arguments  which  Harris  used  are  a  clear  revelation 
of  his  policy.^"  Intercourse  with  the  United  States,  he  said, 
should  consist  of  free  commerce  and  diplomatic  representa- 
tion. By  means  of  steam  navigation  California  was  only 
eighteen  days  removed  from  Japan,  and  by  means  of  the 
transcontinental  telegraph  another  hour  would  carry  a  mes- 
sage to  Washington.     ''To  acquire   possessions  in   Asia," 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    357 

stated  Harris,  remembering  the  failure  of  the  American 
Government  to  act  on  the  suggestions  to  acquire  Formosa, 
and  the  denial  of  admission  of  the  Sandwich  Islands  to  the 
United  States  in  1854,  "is  prohibited  by  the  government." 
Not  only  did  the  United  States  have  no  territorial  ambi- 
tions, but  it  was  even  contrary  to  American  policy  to  join 
alliances  with  other  Western  powers  which  had  designs  in 
Asia.  He  mentioned  the  refusal  of  Presidents  Pierce  and 
Buchanan  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and 
France  in  the  existing  war  in  China.  He  warned  Japan  that 
Great  Britain  had  designs  on  Formosa,  and  that  France 
wanted  Korea,  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  if  China  did 
not  now  surrender  to  their  allied  arms,  the  two  Western 
nations  would  probably  divide  China  between  them.* 

"Misfortunes  are  now  threatening  Japan,"  stated  Harris  in  effect, 
"in  consequence  of  the  state  of  things  in  England  and  the  European 
states.  England  is  not  satisfied  with  the  treaty  made  with  Japan 
hy  Admiral  Sir  James  Sterling.  The  English  Government  hopes  to 
hold  the  same  kind  of  intercourse  with  Japan  as  she  holds  with  other 
nations,  and  is  ready  to  make  war  on  Japan,  as  I  will  now  show. 
England  greatly  fears  Russia  will  disturb  her  East  Indian  possessions. 
Quite  lately  England  and  France  united  to  fight  against  Russia  be- 
cause the  latter  was  disposed  to  annex  other  countries.  England  does 
not  want  Russia  to  hold  Sakhalin  and  the  Amur.  England  fears  that 
Russia  will  take  possession  of  Manchuria  and  China.  She  may  then 
attack  the  possessions  of  England  in  the  East  Indies,  and  then  war 
will  break  out  again  between  England  and  Russia.  Should  Russia  do 
as  above  indicated,  it  will  become  very  difficult  for  England  to  defend 
herself,  and  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  defend  herself  successfully 
she  desires  to  take  possession  of  Sakhalin,  Yezo  and  Hakodate. 
Should  England  take  possession  of  these  places,  she  will  send  a  large 
fleet  to  each  place  and  cut  off  communications  between  Petropauloski, 
the  port  of  Kamtchatka  and  Sakhalin.  England  would  rather  have 
possession  of  Yezo  than  Manchuria."  f 

Harris  explained  to  the  Japanese  that  there  would  be  a 
"great  difference  between  a  treaty  made  with  a  single  in- 

*In  making  these  assertions  Harris  was  doubtless  correctly  reflecting  cur- 
rent opinion  among  the  foreigners  in  China  at  the  time  he  passed  through 
Hongkong  on  his  way  from  Bankok  to  Shimoda.  The  dispatches  of  Commodore 
Perry  and  the  proposals  of  Dr.  Parker  for  a  ioint  naval  demonstration  against 
China   for  the  acquisition  of  Formosa,  reflected  a  similar  opinion. 

t  This  is  a  Japanese  version  of  Harris's  argument,  and  some  allowances  may 
be  made  for  misunderstandings  in  the  interpretation  which  was  from  English 
into  Dutch  and  thence  into  Japanese.  That  Harris  spoke  with  so  much  bhint- 
ness  and  so  little  qualification  of  statement  seems  unlikely,  but  that  the  Japa- 
nese had  caught  the  main  points  of  his  argument  seems  very  probable.  Per- 
haps Harris  spoke  with  the  more  confidence  because  of  the  very  free  conversa- 
tions which  he  had  had  with  Sir  John  Bowring  at  Hongkong  in  1856. 


358  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

dividual  unattended,  and  one  made  with  an  envoy  who 
would  bring  fifty  men-of-war  to  these  shores."  He  warned 
them  against  the  evils  of  the  opium  trade,  and  recounted 
what  the  Siamese  had  told  him  of  their  fears  of  Great 
Britain.  He  explained  to  them  the  present  condition  of 
India.  He  even  offered  the  services  of  American  military 
and  naval  officers  and  shipyards,  to  help  Japan  strengthen 
her  defenses,  and  intimated  that  the  United  States  might 
be  willing  to  accept  a  position  as  mediator  in  any  conflicts 
which  Japan  might  have  with  Western  powers.  In  con- 
clusion Harris  argued  that  Japan's  best  safeguard  against 
such  threatened  aggressions  was  to  abandon  entirely  the 
policy  of  seclusion  and  admit  all  nations  freely  to  her  trade, 
thus  making  the  rivalries  of  the  Western  world  her  ally  in 
an  effort  to  preserve  her  integrity. 

Harris's  representations,  viewed  as  an  expression  of  Far 
Eastern  policy,  were  in  entire  accord  with  what  was  already 
traditional  American  policy  in  China.  The  United  States 
desired  to  see  the  Asiatic  states  sustained  and  made  strong 
to  withstand  by  their  own  might  the  encroachments  of  the 
European  powers.  Americans,  argued  the  American  repre- 
sentatives in  China  as  well  as  in  Japan,  were  likely  to  fare 
better  in  Asia  with  the  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  the 
Asiatic  states  preserved,  than  with  the  territories  divided 
up  among  European  governments.  In  short,  the  United 
States  desired  for  its  citizens  an  open  door  to  trade,  and  the 
surest  way  to  open  this  door  and  to  keep  it  open,  was  on  the 
one  hand  to  persuade  the  sovereign  states  of  Asia  to  open 
their  doors,  and  then  to  strengthen  these  states  so  that  they 
themselves  would  be  able  to  keep  them  open.  That  Harris 
was  correctly  representing  American  policy  in  Yedo  in  1858 
there  can  be  no  doubt,  and  yet  so  gradual  had  been  the  ac- 
cumulation of  the  precedents  which  had  established  this 
policy,  and  so  meagre  had  been  the  official  utterances  of 
the  American  Government  on  the  subject,  that  one  will 
search  in  vain  in  the  official  records  for  any  such  declara- 
tions as  we  have  summarized  above.  American  policy  was 
not  a  pronouncement ;  it  was  a  body  of  precedent  to  which 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    359 

Harris  himself  was  in  his  turn  making  important  contri- 
butions in  precision  of  statement. 

Treaty  and  Tariff  of  1858 

Harris  became  a  teacher  of  poHtical  economy.  He  pro- 
ceeded to  instruct  the  Japanese  in  the  theories  of  economics 
— theories  which  he  had  learned  in  America  rather  than  in 
England  where  the  doctrine  of  Free  Trade  was  more  firmly- 
established.  He  showed  them  how  the  revenues  of  the  gov- 
ernment might  be  met  in  part  or  even  wholly  by  tariffs  on 
foreign  trade.  He  warned  them  against  the  evils  of  export 
duties,  and  held  up  the  advantages  of  a  relatively  high 
tariff — and  yet  not  too  high.  (The  Dutch  had  already  fixed 
the  import  duties  at  35  per  cent.)  ^'^  When  the  Japanese  at 
length  agreed  to  make  such  a  commercial  treaty  as  he  pro- 
posed, they  entrusted  to  him  the  duty  of  devising  the  tariff, 
while  expressing  their  preference  for  a  flat  121/4  per  cent 
rate  on  both  exports  and  imports.  Even  121/0  per  cent 
seemed  to  Harris  far  too  high  for  ship's  supplies  which 
the  whaling  vessels  would  require  and  which  constituted 
at  that  time  the  only  American  trade  in  view.  Harris  at 
length  induced  the  Japanese  to  agree  to  a  5  per  cent  duty 
on  these  supplies;  5  per  cent  on  all  exports;  35  per  cent 
on  imported  alcoholic  drinks,  which  he  abhorred  and  which 
were  not  an  article  of  American  export;  and  20  per  cent 
on  all  other  imports.  This  schedule  was  a  comfortable  one 
for  Americans,  reducing  the  import  duties  on  the  only  ar- 
ticles which  seriously  interested  American  traders  to  the 
extent  of  about  85  per  cent.  'T  have  drawn  regulations," 
reported  Harris  to  Cass  (August  7,  1858),^^  ''with  a  view 
to  the  protection  of  the  revenue,  and  the  tariff  is  arranged 
with  a  view  first  to  secure  an  income  to  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment, and  second  to  enable  our  whaling  ships  in  the 
North  Pacific  Ocean  to  obtain  their  supplies  on  reasonable 
terms."  It  was  an  ingenious  device:  while  American  trade 
was  taxed  at  5  per  cent  it  left  British  manufactures  at  20 
per  cent  and  French  wines  at  35  per  cent  to  provide  the  bulk 


360  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  the  revenue  for  the  Japanese  Government.  Needless  to 
say  the  arrangement  was  quite  unsatisfactory  to  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France.  Lord  Elgin  ^^  a  few  months  later  secured 
a  reduction  of  the  tariff  to  .5  per  cent  for  the  bulk  of  Brit- 
ish produce,  and  not  long  afterwards  there  were  still  further 
reductions.  Harris  did  not  approve  of  this  whittling  down 
of  the  Japanese  revenues,  and  did  not  appear  to  see  that  the 
English  and  French  were  merely  applying  his  own 
principle.-^ 

The  treaty  of  1858  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan  became  the  basis  of  Japan's  foreign  relations  until 
near  the  close  of  the  century,  just  as  Cushing's  treaty  with 
China  had  been  the  basis  of  China's  relations  with  the  treaty 
powers  until  it  was  replaced  with  Lord  Elgin's  treaty  in 
1858.  The  Harris  treaty,  while  including  all  the  advanta- 
geous terms  of  the  convention  of  the  preceding  year,  went 
very  much  farther  in  the  direction  for  free  diplomatic  and 
commercial  intercourse.  It  consisted  of  thirty-four  articles 
and  seven  trade  regulations,  which  included  the  tariff  sched- 
-ule.  Some  of  the  details  need  not  be  noted,  but  many  of 
the  stipulations  are  important. 

A  diplomatic  agent  was  to  be  permitted  to  reside  in  Yedo, 
and  consular  agents  were  to  reside  in  all  the  open  ports. 
The  diplomatic  representatives  and  the  consul  general  were 
to  have  the  right  to  ''travel  freely"  in  any  part  of  the  Em- 
pire of  Japan.  American  citizens  were  to  reside  perma- 
nently in  the  open  ports  and  could  "lease  ground  and  pur- 
chase buildings  thereon."  Trade  was  to  be  free  "without 
the  intervention  of  any  Japanese  officers." 

It  was  stipulated  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  "at  the  request  of  the  Japanese  Government  will 
act  as  a  friendly  mediator  in  such  matters  of  cUfference  as 
may  arise  between  the  Government  of  Japan  and  any  Euro- 
pean power."  "There  is  nothing  in  this  article,"  wrote 
Harris  in  his  journal,-^  "that  requires  a  treaty  stipulation, 
but  I  inserted  it  to  produce  an  impression  on  the  govern- 
ment and  people  and  it  had  that  effect."  Another  article 
of  similar  character  permitted  the  Japanese  to  "purchase 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN     3G1 

or  consti'uct  in  the  United  States  ships  of  war,  steamers, 
merchant  ships,  whale  ships,  cannon,  munitions  of  war, 
arms  of  all  kinds,"  and  to  engage  "scientific,  naval  and  mili- 
tary men,  artisans  of  all  kinds,  and  mariners  to  enter  its 
service."  This  article  was  expected  to  win  the  approval 
of  the  daimyos  whose  opposition  to  a  treaty  was  already 
making  itself  felt  at  Yedo, 

In  drafting  the  treaty  Harris  went  as  far  in  the  direc- 
tion of  a  political  alliance  with  Japan  as  he  dared.  While 
the  Japanese  were  encouraged  to  look  to  the  United  States 
for  military  and  naval  instructors  and  supplies,  it  was  agreed 
that  Japan  would  open  the  three  ports  of  Yokohoma,  Naga- 
saki and  Hakodate  as  depots  of  supplies  for  American  naval 
vessels.  Harris  felt  that  this  was  a  great  advantage  secured 
to  his  government  because  it  would  make  possible  the  re- 
moval of  the  American  naval  depot  at  Hongkong.  A  war 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in  the  Far 
East  seemed  to  him,  as  it  had  to  Perry,  a  possibility.  What 
Perry  had  sought  to  accomplish  by  the  appropriation  of 
naval  bases  at  the  Bonin  and  Lew  Chew  Islands,  Harris 
felt  that  he  had  effected  by  pacific  negotiations  with  the 
Shogun's  ministers. 

Americans  in  Japan  were  not  only  to  be  permitted  the 
free  exercise  of  their  religion  within  their  own  dwellings, 
but  were  to  have  the  right  to  erect  suitable  places  of  wor- 
ship. Apparently  as  a  concession  to  Japanese  fear  of  mis- 
sionaries this  article  also  stipulated  that  neither  Americans 
nor  Japanese  were  to  "do  anything  that  may  be  calculated 
to  excite  rehgious  animosity."  The  next  year  Harris,  who 
had  become  in  his  lonely  exile  a  very  devout  man  and  a 
great  believer  in  Christian  missions,  made  a  strong  effort  to 
secure  a  concession  stipulating  "full  toleration  of  religion 
among  the  Japanese  themselves"  but  failed.  However, 
wrote  Harris,  "the  first  blow  has  been  struck."  Even  then 
Verbeck  was  on  his  way  to  Japan. 

Harris  at  first  stoutly  contended  for  the  opening  of  eight 
ports,--  for  the  right  of  residence  in  Kioto  which  as  the 
residence  of  the  Mikado  was  considered  as  little  less  than 


362  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

holy  ground,  and  for  the  right  of  unrestricted  travel  for  all 
Americans  of  good  character  after  a  residence  of  one  year 
in  the  open  ports.  He  was  led  to  abandon  the  second  and 
third  of  these  contentions  when  it  was  represented  to  him 
that  they  might  lead  to  such  opposition  from  the  daimyos  as 
would  cost  him  the  entire  treaty,  and  he  consented  to  a 
reduction  of  the  total  number  of  ports  to  six,  to  which  was 
added  the  right  of  residence  for  all  Americans  in  Yedo 
after  January  1,  1862.  Kanagawa,  for  which  Yokohama 
was  later  actually  substituted,  and  Nagasaki  were  to  be 
opened  July  4,  1859;  Niigata,  or  some  more  suitable  port 
on  the  northern  coast  of  Hondo,  January  1,  1860;  and 
Hiogo,  near  Osaka,  January  1,  1863. 

The  tariff  was  notable,  aside  from  the  points  already 
mentioned,  in  two  respects:  opium  was  prohibited  as  in  the 
Russian  and  Dutch  treaties;  and  the  tariff  was  a  "con- 
ventional" one,  i.e.,  a  part  of  the  treaty  in  such  a  way  that 
its  revision  became  a  revision  of  the  treaty  itself.  The 
treaty,  like  the  British  and  American  treaties  with  Siam, 
was  subject  not  to  termination  at  a  definite  date,  but  only 
to  "revision"  at  the  end  of  ten  years  "upon  the  desire  of 
either"  party,  but  the  tariff  was  to  be  subject  to  revision, 
if  the  Japanese  desired,  five  years  after  the  opening  of 
Kanagawa,  i.e.,  July  4,  1864.  It  was  farthest  from  Harris's 
intention  to  fasten  upon  Japan  a  5  per  cent  tariff  which 
could  not  be  altered  except  with  the  consent  of  the  Euro- 
pean powers,  but  such  was  the  effect  of  his  treaty,  the  text 
of  which  was  accepted  by  Lord  Elgin  and  later  envoys  as 
the  basis  of  the  subsequent  treaties  with  other  powers. 

As  the  treaty  came  from  the  hands  of  Harris  in  the 
spring  of  1858  it  was  not  only  more  liberal  in  its  provisions 
than  the  Gushing  treaty  with  China,  but  even  more  liberal 
than  the  treaties  of  Tientsin  which  had  followed  the  occu- 
pation of  Canton  and  the  destruction  of  the  Taku  forts. 
The  treaty  was  also  both  in  intent  and  in  the  textual  provi- 
sions, more  just  to  Japan  than  the  corresponding  treaties 
were  to  China  and  also  more  expedient.  Like  the  Perry 
treaty  it  was  not  a  source  of  rancor  among  the  Japanese. 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    363 

As  a  means  of  further  cementing  the  good  relations  between 
the  two  nations,  it  contained  the  provision,  inserted  by  the 
Japanese,  that  the  ratifications  were  to  be  exchanged  in 
Washington. 

Opposition  to  the  treaty  developed  so  fast  during  the 
negotiations,  which  were  concluded  about  the  end  of  Feb- 
ruary, that  Harris  was  induced  to  consent  to  a  delay  before 
the  final  signatures  were  affixed  in  order  that  the  Yedo  offi- 
cials might  have  time  to  secure  the  assent  of  the  Mikado. 
While  they  had  "roared  with  laughter"  -^  a  few  weeks  be- 
fore when  Harris  had  alluded  to  the  supposed  Japanese 
veneration  for  the  Mikado,  they  now  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  JMikado's  assent  would  add  weight  to  the  engage- 
ment and  should  be  secured  if  possible.  They  promised 
Harris  that  the  signatures  would  be  affixed  within  sixty 
days,  and  told  him  that  if  the  Mikado  refused  to  confirm 
the  agreement,  they  were  prepared  to  disregard  the  Im- 
perial wishes.  On  March  10  Harris  returned  to  Shimoda  on 
a  Japanese  Government  steamer,  purchased  in  Holland. 
He  became  very  ill  at  Shimoda — so  ill  that  his  life  was 
despaired  of  and  he  was  attended  most  solicitously  by  the 
Shogun's  physicians. 

The  Harris  treaty  precipitated  a  crisis  in  Japanese  do- 
mestic politics.-'*  The  negotiation  of  the  documents  was 
seized  upon  by  those  daimyos-who  opposed  the  Shogun  and 
had  in  mind  his  overthrow.  The  consideration  of  the  treaty 
was  thus  not  permitted  to  proceed  on  its  merits  alone.  The 
Imperial  Court,  at  first  almost  persuaded  to  give  approval, 
was  then  overshadowed  by  the  anti-Tokugawa  party  and 
the  Mikado's  assent  was  withheld.  Most  of  the  daimyos  of 
the  Empire  had  also  opposed  the  proposed  abrogation  of 
the  policy  of  seclusion. 

Harris  returned  to  Yedo  in  April,  only  to  receive  assur- 
ances that  the  treaty  would  be  signed,  but  that  the  date  of 
signing  would  be  further  postponed.  Meanwhile  the  Dutch 
authorities,  who  had  received  a  copy  of  the  treaty,  stood 
ready  to  sign  one  in  which  would  be  omitted  the  clauses 
and  articles  which  were  most  objectionable  to  the  Japanese. 


364  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

To  thwart  the  Dutch  and  to  save  his  own  treaty,  Harris 
secured  a  written  agreement  that  the  Japanese  would  not 
sign  any  other  treaty  until  thirty  days  after  his  was  signed. 
Then  he  returned  again  to  Shimoda, 

The  treaty  question  was  abruptly  taken  out  of  domestic 
politics  by  the  news  of  the  conclusion  of  the  treaties  of 
Tientsin  and  the  reported  intention  of  Lord  Elgin  to  proceed 
to  Yedo  immediately.  On  June  23  and  24,  1858,  the 
U.  S.  S.  Mississippi  and  Powhatan,  respectively,  arrived  at 
Shimoda  with  the  news.  Harris  seized  the  opportunity,  re- 
turned to  the  Bay  of  Yedo  with  the  American  naval  vessels, 
and  sent  a  hurried  call  to  Yedo  for  a  conference.  The  Jap- 
anese were  in  consternation.  Arriving  at  the  conclusion 
which  Harris  had  always  urged,  that  it  was  safer  to  let  the 
American  treaty  stand  as  a  model  for  other  treaties  than  to 
longer  delay,  and  fortified  by  a  written  statement  from 
Harris  that  he  was  willing  to  act  as  mediator  with  Great 
Britain  and  France,  the  compact  was  signed  on  board  the 
Powhatan  July  29,  1858. 

The  treaty  did  not  have  the  approval  of  the  Mikado, 
and  by  signing  it  the  Shogun  party  had  laid  itself  open  to 
the  most  serious  criticisms  before  the  very  princes  and 
daimyos  who  were  already  seeking  means  whereby  the 
Tokugawa  regime  in  Japanese  affairs  might  be  eliminated. 
Harris  was  quite  unaware  of  the  extent  of  the  domestic 
disturbance  throughout  the  Empire  to  which  he  had  been 
contributing. 

Three  other  treaties  followed  in  quick  succession:  with 
the  Netherlands,  August  18;  with  Russia,  August  19;  with 
Great  Britain,  August  26;  and  with  France,  October  7. 

While  by  no  means  of  equal  importance  with  the  diplo- 
macy of  Benjamin  Franklin,  there  were  qualities  in  the  work 
of  Townsend  Harris  at  Yedo  which  remind  one  of  Franklin 
in  London  and  Paris.  Longford,  British  historian,  describes 
his  service  as  "not  exceeded  by  any  in  the  entire  history  of 
the  international  relations  of  the  world."  -■"'  The  further 
diplomatic  service  of  Harris  in  Yedo  will  be  treated  in  a 
later  chapter. 


THE  POLICY  OF  TOWNSEND  HARRIS  IN  JAPAN    365 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL   NOTES 

1.  The  primary  sources  for  the  life  and  diiilomatic  service  of  Town- 

send  Harris  are:  Japan  Despatches,  Vols.  1  and  2  (Dept.  of 
State) ;  Griffis :  "Townsend  Harris",  which  is  based  on  the  jour- 
nals of  Harris  and  includes  very  generous  extracts  of  them; 
a  typewritten  copy  of  a  part  of  the  Harris  journal  (Library  of 
Congress)  ;  and  the  records  of  the  Bureau  of  Appointments, 
Dept.  of  State.  Very  few  of  the  Harris  dispatches  to  the  Dept. 
of  State  were  ever  published,  but  the  extracts  from  Harris's 
journal,  printed  in  Griffis's  book,  are  in  many  cases  practically 
identical  with  the  dispatches. 

2.  Records  of  the  Bureau  of  Appointment,  Dept.  of  State.     Grif- 

fis makes  an  incorrect  guess  as  to  the  way  in  which  the  Harris 
appointment  came  about. 

3.  Ningpo   Letters,   Vol.    1,   June   22,   1855,   Macgowan   to   Marcy 

(i)ept.  of  State). 

4.  Japan  Instructions,  Vol.  1  (Dept.  of  State). 

5.  Dip.  Corres.,  1862,  p.  822. 

6.  Griffis:  "Harris,"  pp.  15,  16. 

7.  E.  H.  House:  "The  Martyrdom  of  an  Empire,"  Atlantic  Monthly, 

Vol.  XLVIL  p.  622. 

8.  Balestier  Corres.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  38  :32-l. 

9.  Japan  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Sept.  12,  1855. 

10.  W.  M.  Wood,  U.  S.  Surgeon  on  the  San  Jacinto,  wrote  a  book — 

"Fankwei" ;  or,  "The  San  Jacinto  in  the  Seas  of  India,  China 
and  Japan,"  in  which  eight  chapters  are  devoted  to  the  Harris 
Mission  to  Bankok.  Japan  Dispatches,  Vol.  1,  Nos.  5-8,  con- 
tain Harris's  own  reports  of  the  negotiations. 

11.  Japan  Dispatches,  Vol.  1,  June  2,  1856. 

12.  J.   H.   Gubbins :    "Progress   of  Japan,"   1853-71,  reprints   in  an 

appendix  all  of  these  early  treaties. 

13.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34 :33-2. 

14.  Stead :  "Japan  by  the  Japanese,"  p.  150. 

15.  Sir  Robert  K.  Douglas:  "Europe  and  the  Far  East,"  p.  155. 

16.  "Foreign  Relations,"   1879,  pp.  27   if.     These  reports,  while  no 

doubt  based  upon  inaccurate  interpretation,  appear  to  be  a 
reliable  record  nowhere  else  obtainable  of  the  negotiations 
at  Yedo. 

17.  Gubbins :  p.  257. 

18.  Japan  Dispatches,  Vol.  1,  Aug.  7,  1858. 

19.  The  Elgin  negotiations  are  given  in  the  British  Parliamentary 

Papers,  1859.  2  Sess.  Com.  33.  Corres.  rel.  to  the  Earl  of 
Elgin's  special  Mission  to  China  and  Japan,  1857-59;  see  also 
Oliphant's  "Lord  Elgin's  Mission." 

20.  It  is  hardly  fair  to  place  the  blame  for  reducing  the  tariff  exclu- 

sively on  Great  Britain,  as  Payson  J.  Treat  does  in  his  gener- 
ally admirable  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  1853-65,  p.  117. 

21.  Griffis:  "Harris,"  p.  267. 


366  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

22.  Harris  Journal  (Lib.  of  Cong.),  Section  III,  p.  43. 

23.  Ihid.,  p.  46. 

24.  The  most  thorough  reviews,  based  on  Japanese  sources,  of  the 

domestic  situation  in  Japan  are :  Treat's  Early  Diplomatic 
Relations ;  Gubbins :  The  Progress  of  Japan.  The  student  is 
fortunate  in  the  study  of  this  period  in  that  so  much  Japanese 
material  has  been  made  available  in  English,  by  both  Japanese 
and  English  scholars.     See  Bibliography  for  complete  list. 

25.  Longford :  "Story  of  Old  Japan,"  p.  302. 


CHAPTER  XX 

ANSON   BURLING AME 

Anson  Burlingame/  the  first  American  Minister  to 
reside  in  Peking,  was  about  forty-one  years  old  when  he 
arrived  in  China  in  the  latter  part  of  1861.  By  birth  he 
belonged  to  pioneer  American  stock,  his  parents  having 
moved  from  New  England  to  northern  New  York  where 
he  was  born,  and  then  to  Michigan  Territory  where  he  re- 
ceived his  primary  and  academic  education.  But  by  choice 
Burlingame  belonged  to  the  culture  and  traditions  of  Bos- 
ton; he  went  to  Harvard  for  his  training  in  law,  married 
in  Cambridge,  and  entered  Massachusetts  politics  at  an 
early  age.  His  character  and  career  bear  witness  both  to 
the  pioneering  spirit  of  his  parental  heritage  and  the  urban- 
ity and  culture  of  his  social  environment. - 

Burlingame  served  three  terms  in  Congress  but  in  1860, 
notwithstanding  his  anti-slavery  sentiments  and  his  support 
of  Lincoln,  he  was  defeated  for  reelection.  In  the  House 
of  Representatives  he  had  served  as  a  member  of  the  com- 
mittee on  foreign  affairs,  where  his  freedom-loving  nature 
expressed  itself  in  an  ardent  championship  of  Kossuth  and 
Sardinian  independence.  Even  more  characteristic  of  the 
man  was  his  denunciation  of  Preston  Brooks  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  for  the  assault  on  Charles  Sumner.  Be- 
cause of  this  rebuke  Brooks  challenged  him  to  a  duel  and 
Burlingame  promptly  accepted,  naming  rifles  as  the 
weapons  and  Deer  Island,  near  Niagara  Falls,  as  the  place. 
Brooks  then  declined  to  meet  him.  Early  in  1861  President 
Lincoln  appointed  Burlingame  Minister  to  Austria,  but  be- 
fore he  arrived  at  his  post  the  Austrian  Government  ex- 
pressed disapproval  of  the  appointment  on  the  ground  that 
Burlingame  had  been  too  ardent  an  advocate  of  Kossuth. 

367 


368  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  post  at  Peking  was  then  offered  to  Burhngame  and 
accepted. 

Burhngame  arrived  in  China  in  October,  1861,  and  en- 
tered upon  residence  in  Peking  in  the  summer  of  1862. 
In  1865  he  returned  to  the  United  States  on  leave,  probably 
with  the  expectation  of  resigning  his  post  and  reentering 
pohtics,  but  he  was  persuaded  to  return  to  China.  He 
reached  Peking  to  begin  the  second  part  of  his  service  in 
the  latter  part  of  1866,  after  an  absence  of  fifteen  months, 
and  a  year  later,  November  21,  1867,  he  resigned  ^  ''in  the 
interests  of  my  country  and  civilization" ;  he  had  accepted 
the  position  of  envoy  of  the  Empire  to  all  of  the  Western 
powers  then  having  treaties  with  China.  With  two  Chinese 
associates  and  a  retinue  of  thirty  people  he  set  out  for  the 
United  States. 

In  June,  1868,  on  behalf  of  China,  he  negotiated  with 
Seward  ^  eight  additional  articles  to  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin, 
and  then  departed  for  London.  He  secured  from  Lord  Clar- 
endon, who  had  recently  returned  to  the  Foreign  Office 
with  the  first  Gladstone  Ministry,  an  agreement  which, 
while  not  so  formal  as  a  treaty,  nevertheless  fully  answered 
his  purpose.  Thus  strengthened  by  his  successful  negotia- 
tions with  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  he  moved 
on  to  the  Continent  visiting  Paris,  Berlin,  and  the  capitals 
of  the  northern  kingdoms,  arriving  in  Petrograd  early  in 
1870.  There  he  contracted  pneumonia  and  died  February 
23,  thus  terminating  before  the  age  of  fifty  a  truly  brilliant 
career.  Some  of  the  more  conspicuous  of  his  achievements 
in  China  and  for  China  must  be  noted  in  detail,  and  in  the 
records  of  these  will  be  found  the  marks  of  his  peculiar 
qualities  of  heart  and  mind.  Burhngame  was  easily  the 
most  capable  American  diplomatic  representative  in  China 
since  Caleb  Gushing  who,  though  superior  to  him  in  intel- 
lect, lacked  his  unselfish  idealism  and  breadth  of  statesman- 
ship. 

The  survey  of  the  work  of  Anson  Burlingame  falls  natu- 
rally into  three  parts:  his  service  in  Peking;  the  supplemen- 
■f    tary  articles  to  the  treaty  of  Tientsin;  and  the  reception 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  369 

of  the  Burlingame  Mission  in  England  and  Europe,  as  well 
as  its  influence  in  China. 


The  Suppression  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion 

Notwithstanding  the  continuing  strength  of  the 
Taipings  after  the  establishment  of  the  rebel  capital  in 
Nanking  in  1853-i-a  strength  which  was  purely  relative  to 
the  utter  weakness  of  the  Imperial  forces — and  notwith- 
standing the  continuance  of  a  considerable  sympathy  for 
the  rebels  on  the  part  of  the  Christian  nations,  and  among 
foreign  traders  and  adventurers  in  China  who  found  profit 
in  assisting  and  ministering  to  the  needs  of  the  rebels,  the 
fate  of  the  rebellion  was  sealed  when  Lord  Elgin  and  Baron 
Gros  concluded  their  negotiations  with  Prince  Kung  in  Pe- 
king in  1860.  Great  Britain  had  decided  that  it  was  better 
policy  to  support  and  strengthen  the  dynasty  than  to  per- 
mit the  Empire  to  fall  to  pieces  in  rebellion.  Thus  th*e 
policy  first  actv^ocated  in  theory  by  Humphrey  Marshall  for 
the  United  States  became  the  practice  of  all  the  treaty 
powers,  Russia  included,  seven  years  later. 

For  assisting  the  Imperial  Government  the  United 
States,  because  of  the  Civil  War,  was  quite  unable,  even 
had  it  been  willing,  to  lend  the  aid  recommended  by  Mar- 
shall. The  American  naval  forces  in  China  in  1861  were 
almost  entirely  withdrawn.  The  United  States  could  do 
nothing  except  give  approval  to  w^hat  the  other  powers 
proposed.  The  American  share  in  the  suppression  of  the 
Taipings,  while  by  no  means  inconsiderable,  was  entirely 
unofficial  and  individual. 

Alluring  as  the  subject  is,  the  part  played  by  General 
Frederick  T.  WaTd,^  by  his  successor  Burgevine,  and  by 
other  Americans  who  joined  the  Ever-Victorious  Army  can 
hardly  claim  attention  as  important  in  a  study  of  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  in  China.  General  Ward,  who  organ- 
ized the  force  of  Chinese  with  the  assistance  of  a  cosmopoli- 
tan corps  of  foreign  adventurers  as  subordinate  officers,  was 
sponsored  by  Admiral  Sir  James  Hope,  and  by  him  was  ^ 


370  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

introduced  to  Burlingame  shortly  after  the  latter's  arrival 
in  Shanghai  in  1862."  The  American  minister  accepted 
Ward  because  of  this  introduction,  and  because  of  the  suc- 
cesses with  Chinese  troops  which  Ward  had  achieved,  but 
the  promotion  of  Ward  in  the  Chinese  service  was  due  to 
his  own  worth  and  to  the  British  Admiral's  backing  rather 
than  to  any  assistance  from  American  officials.  Indeed 
the  Americans,,  already  disgraced  so  often  by  the  unre- 
strained license  of  adventurers  in  China,  appear  to  have 
placed  confidence  in  Ward  only  cautiously.  In  the  later 
part  of  1862  Ward  was  fatally  wounded  and  the  leaderless 
army  thrown  into  confusion.  But  by  that  time  the  value 
of  such  a  force  was  so  evident  that  its  dissolution  would 
have  been  regarded  by  all  of  the  foreign  representatives 
and  perhaps  by  the  Imperial  Government  as  a  catastrophe. 
It  had  proved  to  be  a  most  useful  means  by  which  the  for- 
eign governments  could  unofficially  support  the  Imperial 
Government  in  its  desperate  struggle  with  the  rebels,  yet 
without  raising  embarrassing  questions  either  among  them- 
selves or  with  the  Chinese  Government.  Ward's  force  had 
also  demonstrated  a  fact  which  must  never  be  forgotten, 
namely,  that  the  Chinese,  under  competent  leadership, 
make  excellent  soldiers. 

Meanwhile  the  utmost  harmony  existed  between  the 
representatives  of  the  foreign  powers  in  Peking.  Upon  the 
death  of  Ward  it  was  agreed  that  his  successor  ought  also, 
in  the  interests  of  equality  of  influence  for  the  foreign 
powers,  to  be  an  American,  The  British  authorities  were 
especially  willing  to  agree  to  this  because  at  that  time  the 
offices  in  the  Foreign  Inspectorate  of  Customs  had  passed 
largely  into  British  hands^  and  plans  were  already  under 
way  to  create  a  naval  flotilla  for  China  which  also  would  be 
under  a  British  officer.  Both  Sir  Frederick  Bruce  and  Bur- 
lingame joined  in  urging  the  appointment  to  the  Ever- Vic- 
torious Army  of  Burgevine,  another  American  who  had  been 
an  associate  of  Ward's  and  of  high  rank  among  his  foreign 
officers.  The  appointment  was  made  with  disastrous  re- 
sults into  the  details  of  which  it  is  not  possible  to  go. 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  371 

Burgevine  was  an  adventurer  with  an  exceptional  imagina- 
tion and  perhaps  cherished  the  idea  of  carving  out  for  him- 
self an  empire  in  AsiaJ  His  motives  were  suspected  from 
the  outset,  and  of  the  successes  of  his  army  Li  Hung  Chang, 
its  titular  head,  was  jealous.  Burgevine  lost  his  temper  and 
played  into  the  hands  of  Li  Hung  Chang.  When  removed 
from  his  command  he  deceived  Burlingame  and  made  the 
American  minister  again  his  advocate.  For  a  time  the 
Burgevine  affair  not  only  imperilled  the  Imperial  efforts  to 
suppress  the  rebels  but  also  seriously  embarrassed  Mr.  Bur- 
lingame's  relations  with  the  Chinese  Government.^  Had 
Burgevine  not  failed  to  live  up  to  the  confidence  which  was 
reposed  in  him,  the  result  of  the  part  that  General  Ward 
played  in  the  Ever  Victorious  Army  might  have  been  the 
greatest  of  benefits  for  the  improvement  of  the  already  cor- 
dial relations  between  Burlingame  and  Prince  Kung.  The 
Imperial  Government,  immediately  after  the  death  of 
Ward,  heaped  his  memory  with  posthumous  honors  and  set 
apart  two  memorial  chapels  to  him.  But  the  failure  of 
Burgevine,  to  which  was  subsequently  added  the  prolonged 
and  irritating  negotiations  and  representations  over  the 
Ward  estate,^  more  than  counteracted  all  the  initial  good 
so  far  as  concerns  the  relations  between  the  LTnited  States 
and  China.  To  Major  Gordon  of  the  British  Army  was 
entrusted,  with  the  approval  of  all,  the  task  which  fell  from 
the  hand  of  Ward,  and  the  even  more  difiicult  responsibility 
of  finally  disbanding  the  Ever- Victorious  Army  before  its 
adventurer-ofiicers  fell  under  the  temptation  to  which 
Burgevine  had  succumbed  and  created  fresh  troubles  for  dis- 
traught China. 

Burlingame's  extraordinary  personal  magnetism  as  well 
as  his  evident  desire  to  deal  fairly  with  everyone  overcame 
many  obstacles  in  both  his  dealings  with  Prince  Kung  and 
with  his  diplomatic  colleagues,  and  notwithstanding  his  mis- 
take in  supporting  Burgevine,  his  influence  in  Peking  in- 
creased rapidly.  In  the  difficult  matter  of  the  disposal  of 
the  Lay-Osborn  Flotilla  in  1863  ^^  Prince  Kung  sought  his 
advice  and  followed  it,  and  the  confidence  then  acquired  by 


372  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  Chinese  Government  in  his  justice  and  sagacity  con- 
tributed in  large  measure  to  his  appointment  as  envoy  to 
the  foreign  powers  in  1867. 

The  greatest  contribution  of  the  American  minister, 
however,  to  the  international  relations  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire during  the  period  of  his  service,  was  his  application  of 
the  policy  of  cooperation  in  the  difl&cult  years  of  1863,  1864 
and  1865. 

BURLINGAME  AND  COOPERATION 

Every  American  representative  since  the  days  of  Hum- 
phrey Marshall  had  been  instructed  to  cooperate  with  the 
other  powers  in  every  way  consistent  with  the  peaceful 
policy  of  the  United  States  in  China,  and  consistent  with 
the  policy  of  the  open  door  of  equal  opportunity  for  all. 
Cooperation,  however,  had  broken  down  because  neither 
Great  Britain  nor  France  were  willing  to  accept  peaceful 
methods  of  settling  disputes,  because  their  ultimate  inten- 
tions in  the  empire  were  matters  of  suspicion  and  because 
the  American  government  was  unwilling  to  incur  any  of 
the  financial  or  political  liabilities  incident  to  cooperation. 
In  1863  the  foreign  powers  had  secured  from  China  all  that 
they  desired,  and  the  ground  was  therefore  prepared  for 
Burlingame.  Burlingame's  proposals  were  based  upon  the 
assumption,  to  which  Sir  Frederick  Bruce  heartily  agreed, 
and  to  which  the  other  ministers  acceded  either  from  con- 
victions or  because  of  its  obvious  immediate  advantages, 
that  the  interests  of  the  treaty  powers  in  China  were  iden- 
tical. All  desired  the  fulfillment  of  treaty  obligations,  none 
of  them  was  prepared  to  enforce  them  alone  if  such  en- 
forcement were  to  call  for  the  last  resort,  and  the  best  as- 
surance of  peaceful  success  was  in  the  forgetting  of  rivalries 
and  in  the  presentation  of  a  united  front  to  the  Imperial 
Government. 

One  of  the  most  important  questions  in  which  a  policy 
of  cooperation  seemed  necessary,  was  the  proper  interpre- 
tations of  rights  in  the  so-called  concessions  for  the  resi- 
dence of  foreigners.    Notwithstanding  the  declarations  at 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  373 

Shanghai  in  1853-1854,  the  tendency  was  for  the  foreigners 
to  treat  land  concessions,  the  number  of  which  had  been 
greatly  increased  in  1858,  as  actual  cessions  of  territory  to 
which  China  no  longer  could  claim  the  sovereign  rights. 
In  the  face  of  all  such  claims  Burlingame  contended  that 
"any  concession  of  territory  would  be  an  abridgment  of 
our  treaty  rights."  Thus  again  American  interests  were 
seen  to  coincide  with  the  interests  of  the  empire  itself.  The 
territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  became  a  cardi- 
nal doctrine  of  American  policy. 

"I  have  never  failed,"  wrote  Burlingame,  April  18,  1863,"  "in  my 
interviews  [with  the  Chinese  officials]  to  keep  the  non-concession 
doctrine  before  them,  because  I  had  been  made  aware  in  Shanghai, 
by  conversations  with  the  British  consul,  that  he  and  the  British  resi- 
dents supposed  they  had  a  quasi  territorial  concession  at  Shanghai 
over  which  they  could  maintain  jurisdiction  not  only  over  British 
subjects  but  over  Chinese.  This  assumption  led  the  French  to  make 
like  claims,  and  the  result  was  that  there  was  a  race,  apparently,  be- 
tween the  British  and  French  local  authorities  as  to  which  could 
secure  the  most.  I  brought  the  question,  in  many  conversations,  to 
the  attention  of  the  British  and  Eussian  ministers,  and  since  his 
arrival,  to  the  French  minister.  I  am  happy  to  say  that  I  found  my 
views  accorded  with  theirs,  and  that  we  are  now,  on  this  most  im- 
portant question,  in  perfect  agreement ;  and  this  agreement  is  a  guar- 
antee of  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire." 

The  policy  of  cooperation,  under  Burlingame,  became 
very  specific  and  practical  whereas  it  had  hitherto  been 
theoretical  and  vague.  Its  origin,  development  and  appli- 
cation may  best  be  described  in  its  author's  own  words.  The 
basis  of  the  policy  Burlingame  stated  as  follows:^-  ".  .  .  if 
the  treaty  powers  could  agree  among  themselves  to  the  neu- 
traUty  of  China,  and  together  secure  order  in  the  treaty 
ports,  and  give  their  moral  support  to  the  party  in  China 
in  favor  of  order,  the  interests  of  humanity  would  be  sub- 
served. ..." 

"Upon  my  arrival  at  Pekin,"  wrote  Burlingame,  "I  at  once  elab- 
orated my  views  and  found,  upon  comparing  them  with  those  held  by 
the  representatives  of  England  and  Russia,  that  they  were  in  accord 
with  theirs.  After  mature  deliberation,  we  determined  to  consult 
and  cooperate  upon  all  questions.  .  .  .  Preliminary  to  entering  into 
thorough  cooperation,  I  held  it  to  be  my  duty  to  ascertain  the  ulterior 


374  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

purposes  of  tlie  treaty  powers  having,  by  position  and  trade,  a  leading 
place  in  China. 

"I  found  Mr.  Balluzec,  the  Russian  minister,  prompt  to  answer, 
in  the  spirit  of  the  Russian  treaty,  that  his  government  did  not  desire 
to  menace  at  any  time  the  territorial  integrity  of  China,  but  on  the 
contrary,  wished  to  bring  it  more  and  more  into  the  family  of 
nations,  subject,  in  its  relations  with  foreign  powers,  to  the  obliga- 
tions of  international  law.  That  he  was  but  too  happy  to  cooperate 
in  a  policy  that  would  engraft  western  upon  eastern  civilization, 
without  a  disruption  of  the  Chinese  Emiure. 

"With  Sir  Frederick  Bruce,  the  British  minister,  my  conversa- 
tions were  elaborate  and  exhaustive.  I  said  to  him  frankly,  that  we 
represented  the  first  trading  powers  here,  and  that  our  interests  were 
identical,  and  I  was  ready  not  only  from  individual  desire,  but  be- 
cause of  the  wishes  of  my  government,  to  cooperate  with  him.  He 
met  me  in  a  large  and  generous  spirit,  and  said  that  he  had  ever 
desired  to  cooperate  with  the  other  treaty  powers,  and  pointed  out  in 
dispatches  to  his  government  the  evidences  of  such  desires,  and  ex- 
pi-essed  his  delight  that  the  representative  of  the  United  States  should 
hold  views  so  coincident  with  his  own.  I  said  to  him  that  while  I 
paid  full  homage  to  the  energy  of  his  government  in  opening  China, 
and  for  afl'ording  protection  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  still 
I  felt,  looking  to  British  antecedents,  a  little  distrust  about  the 
future;  that  our  trade  by  the  way  of  California  was  increasing,  and 
I  felt  anxious  about  its  future  condition.  I  illustrated  my  views  of 
distrust  by  reference  to  the  controlling  influence  of  the  British  in  the 
custom-house,  and  in  the  pretensions  set  up  by  his  countrymen  in  the 
treaty  ports  in  favor  of  territorial  concessions.  He  agreed  with  me 
that  the  sensitiveness  was  natural,  and  replied  that  he  would  be 
pleased  to  remove  every  ground  for  it.  He  said  that  circumstances 
more  than  design  had  given  the  English  the  seeming  control  of 
affairs  at  the  treaty  ports;  that  in  the  first  place  the  English  trade 
was  veiy  large;  and  besides,  from  long  connection  with  the  East, 
many  of  his  countrymen  had  acquired  knowledge  of  the  Chinese 
language,  and  when  persons  were  wanted  it  was  natural  that  those 
most  qualified  in  that  respect  should  be  selected.  He  pointed  out 
that  long  ago  he  had  recommended  that  the  custom-house  should  be 
put  upon  a  cosmoi)olitan  footing,  and  that  Mr.  Lay,  who  was  at  the 
head  of  it,  had  endeavored  to  carry  out  his  views. 

"I  must  admit  that  in  this  he  was  right.  I  was  applied  to  by  the 
Chinese,  through  their  employe,  Mr.  Hart,  then  at  the  head  of  the 
customs,  for  Americans  to  fill  places,  but  I  could  not  find  any  who  had 
studied  Chinese.  One  of  the  first  places  in  the  Chinese  service  was 
tendered  to  our  consul,  Mr.  Seward,  but  he  could  not,  he  thought,  with 
justice  to  his  own  government  accept  it.  If  we  had  had  a  school  for 
interpreters,  our  proper  influence  would  have  been  far  greater  than 
it  is  now.  Besides,  the  English  have  been  compelled  to  defend  the 
treaty  ports  without  any  assistance  from  us,  and  we  have  enjoyed  the 
fruits  of  that  protection.  But  in  the  face  of  these  obvious  facts,  Sir 
Frederick  admitted  that  it  was  not  in  the  interest  of  England  to  hold 
a  position  which  gave  her  special  privileges,  and  subjected  her  need- 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  375 

lessly  to  tlio  critic^'ism  of  the  other  treaty  powers,  and  thcrci'orc  he 
was  willing  to  have  any  arrangements  made  hy  which  she  would  not 
•  be  put  in  a  false  position. 

"He  did  not  wish,  as  far  as  he  was  concerned,  that  English  officers 
should  lead  against  the  Taipings.  He  prefei's  that  the  Chinese  should 
employ  for  purposes  of  drill  and  discipline,  men  from  the  smaller 
states  of  Europe,  and  that  I  might  rely  upon  it  that  he  would  do  all 
he  could  to  relieve  England  from  the  charge  of  being  the  'great  bully' 
of  the  East;  to  relieve  her  'from  the  dilemma  of  being  forced  by  local 
clamor  to  commit  acts  of  violence  which,  though  in  accordance  with 
past  usage,  and  perhaps  justified  by  our  (their)  former  situation,  do 
not  fail  to  jar  unpleasantly  on  the  conscience  of  England  and  of  the 
civilized  world.'  The  force  policy  was  wrong,  and  he  was  certain  that 
his  government  had  had  enough  of  wars  brought  about  through  hasty 
action  of  men  in  the  East  not  under  the  sway  of  large  ideas.  He  was  j 
for  a  change  of  policy.  ...  y 

"Upon  this  frank  avowal  of  the  policy  of  England,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  refuse  cooperation.  The  Russian  minister  and  myself 
both  concurred  in  the  view  that  the  position  of  Sir  Frederick  was 
just  what  we  desired,  and  we  hailed  with  delight  its  avowal.  The 
French  minister,  Mr.  Berthemy,  agrees  with  us.  Being  a  broad  and 
experienced  statesman,  he  at  once  saw  the  advantage  that  would  flow 
from  the  casting  down  of  all  jealousies,  and  by  a  cooperation  on  every 
material  question  in  China.  Indeed  he  has  realized  largely  the  ad- 
vantages of  such  action;  the  French  Charge  d'Ajf aires  before  him, 
acting  upon  the  old-school  policy  of  antagonizing  everybody,  thus 
causing  the  Chinese  to  believe  that  we  were  divided  among  ourselves, 
for  one  year  failed  to  get  justice  from  the  Chinese  Government,  where 
it  was  due,  in  a  case  in  which  we  were  all  interested.  -\ 

"The  policy  upon  which  we  are  agreed  is  briefly  this :  that  while  I 

we  claim  our  treaty  right  to  buy  and  sell,  and  hire,  in  the  treaty 
ports,  subject,  in  respect  to  our  rights  of  property  and  person,  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  our  own  governments,  we  will  not  ask  for,  nor  take 
concessions  of,  territory  in  the  treaty  ports,  or  in  any  way  interfere 
with  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chinese  Government  over  its  own  people, 
nor  ever  menace  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 
That  we  will  not  take  part  in  the  internal  struggles  in  China,  beyond 
what  is  necessary  to  maintain  our  treaty  rights.  That  the  latter  we 
will  unitedly  sustain  against  all  who  may  violate  them.  To  this  end 
we  are  now  clear  in  the  policy  of  defending  the  treaty  ports  against 
the  Taipings,  or  rebels;  but  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  make  war  upon 
that  considei'able  body  of  the  Chinese  people,  by  following  them  into 
the  interior  of  their  country.  In  this  connection,  while  we  feel  de- 
sirous, from  what  we  know  of  it,  to  have  the  rebellion  put  down,  still 
we  have  come  to  question  the  policy  of  lending  government  officers 
to  lead  the  Chinese  in  the  field,  for  fear  of  complications  among  our- 
selves, growing  out  of  the  relative  number  to  be  employed,  &c.  That 
while  we  wish  to  give  our  moral  support  to  the  government,  at  the 
present  time  the  power  in  the  country  which  seems  disposed  to  main- 
tain order  and  our  treaty  rights,  we  should  prefer  that  it  would 
organize  its  own  people  as  far  as  possible  for  its  own  defense,  taking 


376  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

only  foreigners  for  instruction  in  the  arts  of  peace  and  war,  and  these, 
as  far  as  possible,  from  the  smaller  treaty  powers.  \ 

"To  maintain  the  revenue  laws  of  the  government,  to  relieve  the 
treaty  powers  from  the  burdens  attending  the  suppression  of  piracy 
along  the  coast,  the  Chinese  Government  has  been  persuaded  to  pur- 
chase several  small  war  steamers,  and  to  man  them  temporarily  with 
foreigners.  This  fleet  is  coming  out  under  the  connnand  of  Sherard 
Osborn,  and  is  manned  chiefly  by  English  sailors,  with  the  under- 
standing that  it  is  a  temporary  arrangement;  and  that,  too,  is  to 
become  cosmopolitan;  and  on  the  idea  that  we  are  to  cooperate  upon 
all  questions  in  China,  no  special  objection  is  made  to  the  force  by 
the  other  treaty  powers.  I  confess  that  I  should  be  pleased,  were  it 
more  cosmopolitan  now,  but  it  was  arranged  before  I  came  out,  and 
before  the  above  policy  was  developed  and  agreed  upon.  While  Sir 
Frederick  Bruce  shall  remain,  or  while  the  policy  now  agreed  upon 
shall  be  maintained,  no  harm  can  come  from  it. 

"That  the  indemnity  may  be  collected  and  accounted  foi*,  and 
that  the  Chinese  Government  may  have  a  fund  to  maintain  a  national 
force,  organized  upon  European  principles;  that  the  local  authorities 
may  be  checked  in  their  corrupt  practices,  and  a  uniform  system  for 
the  collection  of  the  revenue  maintained,  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands 
that  the  present  foreign  custom-house  system  is  the  best  as  yet  de- 
vised, and,  as  it  has  been  administered  by  Mr.  Lay,  entitled  to  our 
support.  Indeed  it  is  alone  through  such  instrumentalities  that  we 
can  hope  to  advance  in  the  cause  of  civilization  in  China.  As  Sir 
Frederick  states,  there  can  be  nothing  more  unmeaning  than  antago- 
nism between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  in  China.  I  need 
not  attempt  to  prove  the  advantages  which  must  flow  from  coopera- 
tion ;  that  we  should  do  so  all  must  admit.  By  the  favored-nation 
clause  in  the  treaties,  no  nation  can  gain  by  any  sharp  act  of  diplo- 
macy any  privilege  not  secured  to  all. 

"The  circumstances  conspire  to  make  this  a  fortunate  moment  in 
which  to  inaugurate  the  cooperative  policy. 

"The  treaty  powers  are  represented  here  by  men  of  modern  ideas ; 
by  men  who,  in  this  land,  where  everything  is  to  be  done,  do  not 
choose  to  embarrass  each  other  by  sowing  distrust  in  the  Chinese 
mind,  but  who  with  an  open  policy  and  common  action,  deepen  each 
other's  confidence  and  win  the  respect  of  the  Chinese.  That  the  too 
sanguine  hopes  in  relation  to  China  of  our  more  advanced  civilization 
may  be  fully  realized  by  any  action  we  may  take,  ought  not  to  be 
expected.  The  peculiar  people  we  are  among  must  be  remembered; 
how  hoary  is  their  civilization,  and  how  proud  they  are,  and  how 
fgnorant  of  us  they  have  always  been,  and  how  little  their  knowledge 
of  some  of  us  has  tended  to  create  in  their  minds  a  desire  for  a 
change.  Their  government  is  good  in  theory,  but  not  now  well  admin- 
istered. The  people  are  free  to  license,  and,  as  in  our  own  counti-y, 
we  find  a  portion  of  them  in  rebellion,  because  they  have  felt  too  little 
the  influence  of  the  central  government. 

"The  trouble  here  now  is  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  regency 
which  in  a  few  years  must  hand  over  its  doings  to  the  Emperor,  and 
those  he  may  call  around  him.     The  regency  dare  not  depart  in  the 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  377 

smallest  particular  from  the  old  traditions,  and  yet  these  will  not  do 
for  these  times.  They  are  distrustful  of  us,  and  are  afraid  of  their 
censors  and  distant  local  authorities.  Besides,  there  is  a  large  anti- 
foreign  party  here.  There  are  members  of  the  foreign  board  who, 
if  left  to  themselves,  would  at  once  place  China  in  perfect  interna- 
tional relations  with  us;  but  sitting  with  them  are  spies,  who  paralyze 
them  in  their  action  with  us,  to  fall,  as  they  frequently  do,  far  short 
of  their  promises.  In  their  weakness  they  resort  to  tergiversations  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  invite  menace,  and  to  cause  us  in  our  passionate 
modes  almost  to  despair  of  holding,  with  dignity,  any  relations  at  all 
with  them." 

One  detects  in  this  dispatch  many  of  the  personal  quah- 
ties  which  gave  distinction  to  the  character  of  its  author, 
and  especially  his  enthusiastic  optimism.  It  is  therefore  not 
to  be  wondered  at  that  the  sober-minded  and  experienced 
Secretary  of  State  felt  that  the  application  of  such  a  policy 
was  almost  too  much  to  expect.    He  wrote  to  Burlingame:^^ 

"One  may  very  reasonably  fear  that  the  beneficial  policy  thus 
agreed  upon  would  fall  into  disuse  if  those  ministers,  or  any  of  them, 
should  at  any  time  give  place  to  less  intelligent  and  able  statesmen. 
But  this  consideration  does  not  deter  the  President  from  giving  it 
his  entire  approval ;  and  he  sincerely  hopes  that  a  successful  trial  of 
it,  during  the  residence  of  those  ministers  in  China,  will  render  its 
continuance  afterwards  a  cardinal  fact  in  the  policy  of  all  the  mari- 
time powers." 

Seward  had  indeed  placed  his  finger  on  the  weak  spot. 
The  policy  of  cooperation  was  purely  personal,  depending 
entirely  upon  the  enthusiastic  and  sincere  convictions  of 
Bruce  and  Burlingame,  and  no  sooner  had  these  men  dis- 
appeared from  China  than  the  policy  began  to  lapse,  al- 
though efforts  were  sometimes  made  to  drag  it  out  in  the 
service  of  some  power  otherwise  unable  to  accomplish  its 
own  peculiar  purposes. 

That  Burlingame  was  not  unaware  of  the  difficulties  is 
apparent  from  a  subsequent  letter  of  his  to  the  consul  gen- 
eral at  Shanghai  in  which  he  summarized  the  policy  as 
follows:  ^^ 

_  "You  will  perceive  that  we  are  making  an  effort  to  substitute 
fair  diplomatic  action  in  China  for  force;  and  thus  cooperation  be- 
comes the  rule  in  cariying  out  these  relations.  It  should  be  sincere; 
and  to  be  effective  requires  in  the  first  place  a  predisposition  to  get 


378  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

on  well  with  one's  colleagues;  and  in  the  seeond,  that  just  modera- 
tion which  cannot  fail  to  win  the  respect  and  confidence  of  one's 
associates." 


The  First  Chinese  Mission — Treaty  of  1868 

There  were  several  reasons  which  prerhsposed  the  Im- 
perial Government  to  think  well  of  the  Burlingame  Mis- 
sion to  the  Western  powers  in  1867.  In  addition  to  the 
great  confidence  which  was  reposed  in  Burlingame  was  the 
fact  that  the  following  year  the  British  treaty  of  Tientsin 
would  be  due  for  revision,  and  the  Chinese  knew  that  the 
British  merchants,  never  as  contented  as  their  government 
with  the  advantages  secured  under  that  treaty,  were  prepar- 
ing to  urge  upon  China  further  demands,  some  of  which 
the  Imperial  authorities  intended  firmly  to  resist.  Per- 
haps the  most  important  of  the  expected  demands,  in  the 
estimation  of  the  Chinese,  was  the  throwing  open  of  China, 
regardless  of  treaty  ports,  for  railways  and  telegraphs. ^•'^ 
But  there  were  more  general  reasons.  Instructed  by  the 
experiences  in  1839  and  1858,  the  Chinese  authorities  saw 
clearly  that  any  resistance  to  the  demands  of  foreign  powers 
might  lead  again  to  invasion  and  war.  The  more  liberal 
element  in  the  Chinese  Government  was  already  having  a 
most  difficult  time  in  the  face  of  the  reactionary  party,  and 
the  application  of  further  force  by  foreign  nations  would 
cost  the  liberal  party  its  leadership  and  result  fatally  for 
the  empire. 

China  had  already  assumed  many  obligations  to  the 
treaty  powers  which  the  officials  at  Peking  were  not  fully 
able  to  discharge  because  of  the  large  amount  of  autonomy 
possessed  by  the  provinces.  Peking  might  propose  but  the 
provinces  disposed.  Where  the  terms  of  a  treaty  conflicted 
with  the  long  established  rights  and  practices  of  the  local 
authorities,  it  was  as  difficult  to  bring  the  provinces  into 
line  as  it  was  subsequently  difficult  to  bring  the  Pacific 
Coast  states  into  harmony  with  the  national  government  in 
the  matter  of  Asiatic  immigration  to  the  United  States.  The 
treaties  of  Tientsin  in  the  duties  they  imposed  upon  China, 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  37d 

really  called  for  the  reorganization  of  the  Empire  itself  in 
such  grave  matters  as  provincial  autonomy,  the  collection 
of  inland  revenue  and  the  disposal  of  military  forces,  but 
such  reorganization  of  the  Empire  while  the  Imperial 
authority  was  so  weak  was  utterly  impossible.  China  was 
clearly  not  in  a  position  with  safety  to  itself  to  assume  even 
more  extensive  obligations  to  the  powers  such  as  would  be 
inevitable  in  the  revision  of  the  treaties  of  1858. 

Burlingame's  reasons  for  accepting  the  novel  post,  aside 
from  purely  personal  ones,  are  also  not  difficult  to  see.  Dur- 
ing his  absence  in  the  United  States  the  previous  year.  Sir 
Frederick  Bruce  having  already  been  transferred  to  Wash- 
ington, the  policy  of  cooperation  among  the  ministers,  just 
as  Seward  feared  it  might,  had  largely  broken  down.  To 
resuscitate  this  cooperative  spirit  and  give  it  guaranties  for 
the  future  required  something  more  than  the  personal  as- 
sent of  the  various  ministers.  It  must  be  secured  by  agree- 
ment with  the  governments  they  represented.  On  the  other 
hand  if  the  policy  were  to  fail  utterly  it  was  clear  to  Bur- 
lingame,  to  Hart,  to  any  impartial  observer,  that  the  conse- 
quences not  only  for  China  but  for  the  entire  world  must 
eventually  be  most  serious.  The  partition  of  the  Empire 
following  a  conflict  of  foreign  nations  wdthin  the  bounds  of 
China  itself  seemed  very  possible.  To  contribute  anything 
towards  the  avoidance  of  such  a  calamity  was  a  motive 
worthy  to  inspire  the  best  efforts  of  any  man,  and  Bur- 
lingame  was  fully  conscious  of  the  vast  issues  which  might 
hang  on  the  success  of  his  mission. 

Late  in  February,  1868,  the  Burlingame  Mission  sailed 
from  Shanghai  for  San  Francisco.  It  met  in  the  United 
States  with  the  heartiest  of  receptions.  The  picturesque 
appearance  of  the  retinue  and  the  moving  eloquence  of 
Burlingame,  who  managed  the  tour  according  to  the  best 
traditions  of  the  showman's  art,  captured  the  imagination 
of  the  American  people.  The  people  of  the  United  States 
were  now  little  interested  in  securing  new  trade  concessions 
in  China,  and  heartily  enjoyed  the  diversion  and  entertain- 
ment which  the  Mission  afforded.     Into  the  details  of  the 


380  AIMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

tour  from  San  Francisco  eastward  and  the  numerous  re- 
ceptions and  dinners  it  is  impossible  to  go.  But  the  supple- 
mentary articles  to  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin,  usually  known 
as  the  Burlingame  Treaty,  signed  at  Washington  July  28, 
1868,  will  repay  careful  study  as  an  expression  of  both 
American  opinion  and  American  policy  towards  China. 

Considered  as  a  treaty,  aside  from  the  immigration  stip- 
ulations, the  articles  are  not  of  great  importance.  Their 
negotiation  was  quite  unauthorized,  so  far  as  China  was 
concerned.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Prince  Kung 
was  anything  but  surprised  to  be  presented  with  these  ar- 
ticles for  ratification.  As  for  the  United  States  the  articles 
were  unnecessary.  They  added  little  either  to  American 
privileges  or  obligations.  But  as  an  expression  of  public 
sentiment  in  the  United  States  and  as  a  solemn  declaration 
of  official  policy  towards  China  the  supplementary  articles 
of  1868  were,  in  some  respects,  more  authoritative  than 
either  the  Cushing  Treaty  of  1844  or  the  Reed  Treaty  of 
1858.  They  were  entirely  removed  from  the  atmosphere  of 
commercial  competition,  they  were  negotiated  freely  and  not 
under  compulsion,  and  they  were  written  by  the  American 
Secretary  of  State  with  the  Envoy  of  China,  as  it  were, 
standing  at  his  elbow,  telling  him  what  to  write.^"  Fur- 
thermore, the  drafting  of  the  articles  had  been  preceded 
by  a  period  of  intensive  education  of  public  opinion  in  which 
the  envoy  of  China  had  been  allowed  to  plead  his  case  be- 
fore the  American  people. 

There  w^ere  eight  articles  to  the  agreement  and  for 
nearly  all  of  them  there  was  a  background  of  history  in 
Burhngame's  six  years  of  experience  as  American  minister 
in  Peking. 

The  appointment  of  Chinese  consuls  (Article  3)  in  the 
United  States  was  in  line  with  the  efforts  already  made  by 
Sir  Robert  Hart,  by  Burlingame,  and  by  Seward,  to  en- 
courage the  Government  of  China  to  send  official  repre- 
sentatives abroad. 

Freedom  from  persecution  because  of  religious  beliefs 
in  China  had  been  stipulated  in  Article  29  of  the  American 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  381 

Treaty  of  Tientsin.  Article  6  of  the  supplementary  treaty 
extended  this  guarantee  of  tolerance  to  include  also  the 
Chinese  in  the  United  States.  This  article  "recalls  the  great 
doctrine  of  the  Constitution  which  gives  to  a  man  the  right 
to  hold  any  faith  which  his  conscience  may  dictate,"  to  use 
Mr.  Burlingame's  own  explanation  ^'^  of  what  therefore 
seems  to  be  a  quite  unnecessary  treaty  stipulation. 

Likewise  the  article  (7)  stipulating  that  "citizens  of  the 
United  States  may  freely  establish  and  maintain  schools 
within  the  Empire  of  China  at  those  places  where  foreigners 
are  by  treaty  permitted  to  reside ;  and,  reciprocally,  Chinese 
subjects  may  enjoy  the  same  privileges  and  immunities  in 
the  United  States,"  was  meaningless  except  as  it  gave  the 
American  missionary  in  China  a  little  better  leverage  for 
the  strengthening  of  his  work.  The  missionaries  had  al- 
ready begun  to  establish  schools  long  before  1868.  The  re- 
mainder of  this  article  by  which  access  to  government 
schools  in  each  country  should  be  given  to  students  of  the 
other,  looked  in  the  direction  of  a  policy  already  urged  by 
S.  Wells  Williams  and  Burlingame,  to  encourage  the  Chi- 
nese to  take  up  Western  education  in  a  school  to  be  estab- 
lished in  China  with  the  balance  of  the  indemnity  money. 
It  was  also  in  line  with  the  fact  that  already  Dr.  W.  A.  P. 
Martin,  an  American  missionary,  was  teaching  in  a  gov- 
ernment college  in  Peking  where  Chinese  pupils  were  to  be 
prepared  for  the  customs  service,  and  was  soon  to  become 
director  of  the  school.^ ^  The  other  articles  of  the  treaty 
deal  with  matters  of  more  far-reaching  consequence. 

The  United  States  disclaimed  and  disavowed  (Article 
8)  "any  intention  or  right  to  intervene  in  the  domestic  ad- 
ministration of  China  in  regard  to  the  construction  of  rail- 
roads, telegraphs,  or  other  material  internal  improvements." 
At  the  same  time  the  United  States  engaged  to  nominate, 
if  at  any  time  they  were  desired,  "suitable  engineers  to  be 
employed  by  the  Chinese  Government."  This  article  was, 
on  the  one  hand,  fully  in  harmony  with  the  policy  already 
adopted  by  Seward  and  Burlingame  with  reference  to  the 
efforts  of  an  American  company  to  secure  and  operate  a 


382  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

concession  for  a  telegraph  line  along  the  coast,^^  and  on 
the  other,  looked  towards  the  building  up  of  a  system  of 
foreign  technical  advisers  who  should  enter  Chinese  ser- 
vice as  Raphael  Pumpelly,  an  American  engineer,  had  done 
in  1863.-"  This  plan  was  also  merely  an  extension  of  the 
arrangement  by  which  foreigners  had  taken  service  in  the 
Chinese  Maritime  customs,  and  by  which  Anson  Bur- 
lingame  himself  now  appeared  in  the  role  of  political  ad- 
viser to  the  Chinese  Government,  That  Article  8  of  the 
Burlingame  Treaty  was  an  expression  of  permanent  Ameri- 
can policy  in  China  is  amply  proved  by  the  long  succession 
of  distinguished  Americans  who  have  since  appeared  in  the 
service  of  the  Chinese  Government.  The  article  also  regis- 
tered the  corresponding  stern  disapproval  by  the  United 
States  of  any  system  of  commercial  exploitation  of  the 
resources  of  China  by  foreigners  who  would  depend  upon 
the  military  forces  of  their  governments  to  sustain  and  ex- 
tend their  privileges. 

The  fifth  and  sixth  articles  of  the  Burlingame  Treaty 
dealing  with  the  question  of  Chinese  immigration  to  Cali- 
fornia will  be  considered  in  Chapter  XXVIII.  The  most 
significant  part  of  the  supplementary  articles,  however, 
from  the  viewpoint  of  American  policy  were  Articles  1  and 
2  in  which  were  asserted  in  the  most  uncompromising  terms 
that  China  possessed,  in  spite  of  the  doctrine  of  extraterri- 
toriality, and  in  spite  of  the  engagement  already  made  to 
the  powers,  full  sovereign  rights  over  her  territory.  The 
meaning  of  these  articles  was  explained  by  Burlingame  as 
follows : 

"In  the  first  place,  it  declares  the  neutrality  of  the  Chinese  waters 
in  opposition  to  the  pretensions  of  the  exterritoriality  doctrine,  that 
inasmuch  as  the  persons  and  the  i)ropcrty  of  the  people  of  the  foreign 
powers  were  under  the  jurisdiction  of  those  powers,  therefore  it  was 
the  right  of  parties  contending  with  each  other  to  attack  each  other  in 
the  Chinese  waters,  thus  making  those  waters  the  place  of  their  con- 
flict. The  treaty  travei'scs  all  such  ahsurd  pretensions.  It  strikes 
down  the  so-called  concession  doctrines,  under  which  the  nationals 
of  different  countries  located  upon  spots  of  land  in  the  treaty  ports 
had  come  to  believe  that  they  could  take  jurisdiction  there  not  only 
of  their  own  nationals,  not  only  of  the  person  and  property  of  their 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  383 

own  people,  but  take  jurisdiction  of  the  Chinese  and  the  people  of 
other  countries.  When  this  question  was  called  under  discussion  and 
referred  to  the  home  governments,  not  by  the  Chinese  originally,  but 
by  those  foreign  nations  who  felt  that  their  treaty  rights  were  being 
abridged  by  these  concession  doctrines,  the  distant  foreign  countries 
could  not  stand  the  discussion  for  a  moment.  And  I  aver  that  every 
treaty  power  had  abandoned  the  concession  doctrines,  though  some 
of  their  officials  at  the  present  time  in  China  undertake  to  contend 
for  them,  undertake  to  expel  the  Chinese,  to  attack  the  Chinese,  to 
protect  the  Chinese,  although  the  territory  did  not  belong  to  them. 
China  has  never  abandoned  her  eminent  domain,  never  abandoned  on 
that  territory  her  jurisdiction,  and  I  trust  she  never  will.  This  treaty 
strikes  down  all  the  pretensions  about  all  the  concessions  of  terri- 
tory."^^ 

From  such  words  it  is  clear  that  the  intention  of  Mr. 
Burhngame  in  his  mission  to  the  Western  powers  was  not 
merely  to  give  his  policy  of  cooperation  among  the  powers  in 
China  the  force  of  treaty  engagements  but  also  to  bring  the 
powers  to  the  formal  affirmation  of  the  objects  for  which  the 
cooperation  was  to  be  employed.--  The  policy  of  coopera- 
tion was  a  two-edged  sword  which  might  cut  either  way, 
and  Burlingame  was  seeking  a  formal  agreement  to  the  prin- 
ciples upon  which  he  and  Sir  Frederick  Bruce  had  been 
in  such  hearty  agreement  in  Peking  a  few  years  before  but 
which  were  evidently  not  in  accord  with  the  ideas  of  the 
British  mercantile  coiTununity  nor  with  those  of  the  impor- 
tant French  officials.-^  It  seems  equally  clear  that  these 
first  two  articles  of  the  Burlingame  Treaty  officially  ex- 
pressed what  might  already  be  called  the  traditional  Ameri- 
can policy  with  reference  to  China:  the  sovereignty  and 
integrity  of  China  must  be  maintained,  and  the  door  for 
equal  opportunities  in  trade  must  be  left  open  for  the  free 
competition  of  all  nations  with  due  regard  for  the  sov-  ^ — ^ 
ereign  rights  of  the  Empire.  On  the  other  hand  the  articles  ■ 
entirely  blinked  the  fact  that  the  treaties  of  1858  had  in 
practice,  as  well  as  in  the  way  in  which  they  were  nego- 
tiated, already  seriously  transgressed  on  the  rights  of  China 
as  a  sovereign  power. 

Fundamentally  Mr.  Burlingame's  object  was  to  read 
China  back  into  the  family  of  nations  from  which  the  Em- 
pire had  been  read  out  by  Caleb  Cushing  in  1844,  when  he 


384  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

rested  his  doctrine  of  extraterritoriality  on  the  ground  that 
China  was  a  pagan  state.-'*  In  his  address  before  the  city 
council  of  Boston  Burlingame  said : 

"Again  tliis  treaty  recognizes  China  as  an  equal  among  the  na- 
tions, in  opposition  to  the  old  doctrine  that  because  she  was  not  a 
Christian  nation,  she  could  not  be  placed  in  the  roll  of  nations.  But 
I  will  not  discuss  that  question.  The  greatest  living  authority  upon 
Eastern  questions  is  here  touight — Mr.  Cushing.  He  has  stated  that 
position  more  fully  than  auy  one  else,  while  his  heart  has  leaned  ever 
up  to  the  side  of  the  Chinese." 

j\Ir.  Burlingame's  effort,  however,  rested  upon  a  premise 
far  less  sound  than  Mr.  Cushing's,  for  it  assumed  as  true 
what  was  entirely  contrary  to  fact,  viz.,  that  the  Chinese 
Empire  was  a  strong  centralized  government  capable  of 
controlling  its  own  provinces  and  equally  capable  of  dealing 
with  the  European  powers  on  terms  of  military  equality. 

This  false  assumption  that  China  was  able  to  exercise 
all  the  functions  of  sovereignty  has  underlaid  a  very  large 
part  of  the  entire  political  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  reference  to  China. 

Before  concluding  a  review  of  the  Burlingame  Mission 
in  the  United  States  one  must  note  not  merely  the  Bur- 
lingame Treaty  but  also  the  speeches  of  the  man  whose 
name  it  bears.  Mr.  Burlingame  was  an  orator,  skilled  in 
all  the  arts  of  a  style  of  oratory  which  has  now  largely 
passed  away.  His  orations  abounded  not  in  logic,  not  in 
reasoned  deductions  from  carefully  ascertained  and  clearly 
described  facts,  but  in  illustrations  and  flights  of  eloquence 
designed  not  so  much  to  induce  a  conclusion  as  to  produce 
an  impression.  While  they  clearly  reflected  his  own  con- 
victions they  did  not  always  keep  step  with  the  facts  as 
seen  by  more  sober-minded  observers.  One  illustration, 
from  his  famous  adch^ss  at  a  dinner  given  in  honor  of  the 
Mission  in  New  York  will  suffice. -■''' 

"China,  seeing  another  civilization  approaching  on  every  side,  has 
her  eyea  open.  She  sees  Kiissia  on  the  north,  Europe  on  the  west, 
America  on  the  east.  She  sees  a  cloud  of  sail  on  her  coast,  she  sees 
the  mighty  steamers  coming  from  everywhere — bow  on.  She  feels 
the  spark  from  the  electric  telegraph  falling  hot  upon  her  everywhere; 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  385 

she  rouses  herself,  not  in  anger,  but  for  argument.  She  finds  that  by 
not  being  in  a  position  to  compete  with  other  nations  for  so  long  a 
time  she  has  lost  ground.  She  finds  that  she  must  come  into  relations 
with  this  civilization  that  is  pressing  up  around  her,  and  feeling  that, 
she  does  not  wait  but  comes  out  to  you  and  extends  to  you  her  hand. 
She  tells  you  she  is  ready  to  take  upon  her  ancient  civilization  the 
graft  of  your  civilization.  She  tells  you  she  is  ready  to  take  back 
her  own  inventions,  with  all  their  developments.  She  tells  you  that 
she  is  willing  to  trade  with  you,  to  buy  of  you,  to  sell  to  you,  to  help 
you  strike  off  the  shackles  from  trade.  She  invites  your  merchants, 
she  invites  your  missionaries.  She  tells  the  latter  to  plant  the  shining 
cross  on  every  hill  and  in  every  valley.  For  she  is  hospitable  to  fair 
argument.  .  .  . 

"Let  her  alone;  let  her  have  her  independence;  let  her  develop 
herself  in  her  own  time  and  in  her  own  way.  She  has  no  hostility  to 
you.  Let  her  do  this  and  she  will  initiate  a  movement  which  will  be 
felt  in  every  workshop  of  the  civilized  world.  She  says  now :  'Send  us 
your  wheat,  your  lumber,  your  coal,  your  silver,  your  goods  from 
everywhere — we  will  take  as  many  of  them  as  we  can.  We  will  give 
you  back  our  tea,  our  silk,  free  labor,  which  we  have  sent  so  largely  out 
into  the  world.'  ...  It  has  overflowed  upon  Siam,  upon  the  British 
provinces,  upon  Singapore,  upon  Manila,  upon  Peru,  Cuba,  Australia 
and  California.  All  she  asks  is  that  you  will  be  as  kind  to  her  na- 
tionals as  she  is  to  your  nationals.  She  wishes  simply  that  you  will 
do  justice.  She  is  willing  not  only  to  exchange  goods  with  you,  but 
she  is  willing  to  exchange  thoughts.  She  is  willing  to  give  you  what 
she  thinks  is  her  intellectual  civilization  in  exchange  for  your  material 
civilization.  Let  her  alone,  and  the  caravans  on  the  roads  of  the 
north,  toward  Russia,  will  swarm  in  larger  numbers  than  ever  before. 
Let  her  alone,  and  that  silver  which  has  been  flowing  for  hundreds 
of  years  into  China,  losing  itself  like  the  lost  rivers  of  the  West,  but 
which  yet  exists,  will  come  out  into  the  affairs  of  men.  .  .  .  The 
imagination  kindles  at  the  future  which  may  be,  and  which  will  be, 
if  you  will  be  fair  and  just  to  China." 

The  assertion  by  the  official  spokesman  of  the  Empire 
that  China  invited  the  foreign  merchants  and  the  foreign 
missionaries,  and  was  ready  for  the  latter  to  plant  'the 
shining  cross  on  every  hill  and  in  every  valley'  was  a  trav- 
esty of  the  truth,  and  the  statement  made  in  the  same 
speech  that  China  was  willing  to  accept  Western  interna- 
tional law  rested  on  little  more  than  that  Dr.  W.  A.  P. 
Martin  had  translated  Wheaton's  ''Elements  of  Inter- 
national Law"  into  Chinese,  and  that  it  was  being  taught 
in  the  recently  established  customs  college.-*^ 

vSuch  assertions  created  wrong  impressions  as  to  the 
exact  condition  of  China  and  stimulated  an  optimism  from 


386  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

which  there  must  be  an  inevitable  reaction  when  the  facts 
were  known.  In  China  such  statements  filled  the  foreigners 
with  dismay.-"  Happily  for  the  Mission  when  it  reached 
England  and  the  Continent  there  were  few  opportunities  for 
speeches,  and  Burlingame's  talents  could  be  directed  to  per- 
sonal negotiations  for  which  his  rare  political  qualities 
fitted  him  nearly  as  well  as  for  speech-making. 

The  Burlingame  Mission  in  Europe  and  China 

The  Burlingame  Treaty  had  the  effect,  most  emphati- 
cally, of  an  official  approval  by  the  American  Government 
on  the  Burlingame  Mission  and  its  objects.  Far  more  im- 
portant than  as  a  treaty  engagement,  these  supplementary 
articles  were  the  adroit  vehicle  for  the  pronouncement  of 
American  policy  not  merely  vis-d-vis  China,  but  even  more 
particularly  with  reference  to  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  the  other  foreign  powers  in  China.  This  pro- 
nouncement, applied  to  the  then  immediate  present,  was 
the  official  opinion  of  the  United  States  as  to  the  revision 
of  the  British  Treaty  of  Tientsin  which  was  already  a  mat- 
ter of  negotiations  between  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  in  Peking 
and  the  Chinese  Government.  The  Burlingame  Treaty  was 
the  oflScial  American  declaration  against  the  so-called  "gun- 
boat" policy  of  applying  local  pressure  in  China  to  secure 
what  between  sovereign  nations  would  ordinarily  be  the 
subject  of  diplomatic  action  with  the  central  government. 

Fortunately  for  the  success  of  the  Mission  in  England,  it 
arrived  in  London  about  the  time  of  most  important 
changes  in  the  British  Government.  On  December  4,  1868, 
the  first  Gladstone  ministry  took  office  and  Lord  Clarendon 
was  placed  in  the  Foreign  Office.  The  Palmerston  foreign 
policy  which  had  found  its  most  complete  expression  in 
China  in  the  Anglo-French  War  (1857-60)  was  to  be  re- 
placed by  a  policy  reflecting  the  growing  liberalism  in  Eng- 
lish politics, — a  policy  which  had  been  clearly  foreshad- 
owed in  Peking  by  Sir  Frederick  Bruce  five  years  earlier. 

Mr.  Burlingame  was  able  to  secure  from  Lord  Claren- 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  387 

don,  December  28,  1868,  an  official  declaration  which  was 
far  more  practical  and  specific  than  the  formal  treaty  stipu- 
lations of  the  American  treaty.-^  In  a  letter  from  Lord 
Clarendon  to  Mr.  Burlingame  the  former  made  the  follow- 
ing statements: 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  is  fully  entitled  to  count  upon  the 
forbearance  of  the  foreign  nations,  and  the  British  Government  has 
neither  a  desire  nor  intention  to  apply  unfriendly  pressure  to  China 
to  induce  her  government  to  advance  more  rapidly  in  her  intercourse 
with  foreign  nations  than  is  consistent  with  safety  and  with  due  and 
reasonable  regard  for  the  feelings  of  her  subjects. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  China  must  observe  the  treaties  and  protect 
British  subjects  within  her  empire. 

3.  The  British  Government  announces  its  preference  rather  .for 
an  appeal  to  the  central  government  than  to  local  authorities  for  the 
redress  of  wrongs  done  to  British  subjects.  It  is  for  the  interest  of 
China  that  her  central  government  be  not  only  fully  recognized  but 
also  established  within  the  empire. 

4.  The  British  agents  in  China  have  been  instructed  to  act  in 
the  spirit  and  with  the  objects  as  explained  above. 

Thus  armed  the  Burlingame  Mission  moved  on  to  Paris 
and  the  other  European  capitals  but  nowhere  in  Europe  did 
it  meet  with  the  degree  of  success  which  had  been  attained 
in  the  United  States  and  England.  France  was  non-com- 
mittal, Bismarck  was  favorable,  but  vague ;  the  negotiations 
in  St.  Petersburg  were  left  unfinished  at  the  death  of  Bur- 
lingame. This  failure  of  the  Mission  in  Europe — if  indeed 
it  be  just  to  describe  as  a  failure  an  unfinished  task  which 
was  terminated  by  a  personal  fatality — may  be  explained- 
partially  on  grounds  other  than  the  existing  political  confu- 
sion on  the  Continent.  The  truth  was  that  while  Great 
Britain  appeared  willing  to  change  her  policy  in  China,  yet 
this  change  came  at  a  time  when  she  was  already  securely 
established  both  commercially  and  politically  in  the  Far 
East.  The  European  powers,  on  the  other  hand,  were  being 
asked,  before  they  had  secured  similar  power  and  influence 
in  China,  to  deny  themselves  the  very  methods  which 
Great  Britain,  and  in  some  degree  the  United  States,  had 
used  so  successfully.  The  character  of  the  reception  ac- 
corded to  the  Burlingame  Mission  on  the  Continent  clearly 


388  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

foreshadowed  the  quarter  from  which  the  Chinese  Empire 
might  in  the  future  expect  serious  dangers  to  both  its  sov- 
ereignty and  its  integrity. 

"In  one  way  or  another,  however  we  may  disguise  it," 
wrote  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock,-'*  "our  position  in  China  has 
been  created  by  force — naked,  physical  force;  and  any  in- 
telUgent  policy  to  improve  or  maintain  that  position  must 
still  look  to  force  in  some  form,  latent  or  expressed,  for  the 
results."  It  was  equally  true  that  for  other  powers  to 
achieve  similar  positions  in  China  similar  methods  must  be 
employed.  To  establish  a  solid  basis  for  cooperation  it 
would  have  been  necessary  for  the  Powers  already  lodged 
in  China  to  surrender  much  that  had  been  obtained  in  1842, 
1858,  and  1860.  Such  a  surrender  no  power  was  willing  to 
make. 

The  success  of  the  Burlingame  Mission  in  the  United 
States  and  England  had  two  very  definite  immediate  in- 
fluences in  China:  it  prevented  a  revision  of  the  British 
treaty  in  a  manner  satisfactory  to  the  British  merchants; 
it  also  encouraged  the  Government  of  China  not  merely  to 
oppose  more  strongly  than  before  any  increased  aggres- 
sions of  the  foreign  powers  but  also  to  stiffen  their  opposi- 
tion to  a  full  compliance  with  engagements  to  the  powers 
which  had  already  been  extorted  from  them  by  the  Anglo- 
French  War  of  the  preceding  decade.  It  encouraged  them 
to  believe  that  now  they  might  indulge  with  more  impunity 
the  thorough-going  distrust  and  even  hatred  of  the  foreigner 
which  Burlingame  in  his  fervid  eloquence  had  perhaps 
never  fully  measured  and  certainly  had  never  set  forth  in 
either  the  United  States  or  England.  This  immediate 
change  of  front  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Government  was 
bitterly  resented  by  most  of  the  foreigners  in  China,  and 
Burlingame,  no  longer  able  to  plead  his  case  and  unable  to 
finish  in  China  the  work  which  he  had  commenced  abroad, 
was  blamed.  But  in  thus  blaming  him,  might  not  his 
critics  also  have  been  bestowing  upon  the  first  Chinese 
Envoy  to  the  Western  powers  the  signal  honor  of  having 
been  the  agent  to  secure  for  China  in  her  otherwise  hn- 


ANSON  BURLINGAME  389 

potent  struggle  with  the  Western  nations  a  truce  without 
which  the  Empire  would  soon  have  been  dissolved?  Euro- 
pean colonial  expansion,  meeting  with  obstacles  in  the  Far 
East,  turned  for  a  time  to  regions  nearer  home. 

BIBLIOGKAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  primary  sources  for  Anson  Burlingame  and  his  work  are: 

F.  W.  Williams :  "Anson  Burlingame  and  the  First  Chinese 
Mission"^a  very  sympathetic  biography  which  is  based  on  all 
the  known  sources  of  information ;  the  volumes  of  Diplomatic 
Correspondence  covering  the  period  of  his  service  in  China, 
include  practically  every  dispatch  of  any  importance,  as  well  as 
Seward's  instructions;  China  Notes,  Vol.  1,  i.e.,  notes  from 
the  Chinese  Legation  to  the  Dept.  of  State,  contain  some 
valuable  reports  on  the  progress  of  the  Chinese  Mission  in 
Europe. 

2.  Williams :    "Burlingame,"  pp.  1  ff. 

3.  Dip.  Corres.,  1868,  pp.  493-503. 

4.  F.  W.  Seward :  "Eeminiscences,"  pp.  375  fF,  378,  380-1. 

5.  There  is  no  satisfactory  account  of  Ward  and  Burgevine.     The 

most  complete  story  of  their  careers  in  China  is  a  sketch  on 
W^ard  in  E.  Alexander  Powell's  popularly  written  "Gentlemen 
Rovers."  Powell  uses  sources  of  information  not  generally 
available,  but  does  not  state  what  they  are.  The  general  ten- 
dency of  British  historians,  with  the  exception  of  Andrew 
Wilson's  "The  Ever-Victorious  Army,"  is  to  minimize  or  ignore 
Ward  and  exalt  Gordon.  Wilson  knew  both  Ward  and  Burge- 
vine personally  and  is  an  excellent  authority. 

6.  China  Despatches,  Vol.  20,  Mar.  0,  'G2,  Burlingame  to  Seward. 

(Dept.  of  State.) 

7.  Wilson :  "The  Ever- Victorious  Army,"  p.  91. 
<:8L  Dip-  Corres.,  1863,  p.  866. 

9.  For.  Relations,  1888,  pp.  199  ff;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  48:45-2. 

10.  Dip.  Corres.,  1864,  pp.  343  ff. 

n.  Op.  cit,  1864,  p.  851. 

<l2,.  Ihid.,  pp.  859  ff. 

13.  Ihid.,  p.  882. 

14.  Op.  cit.,  1864,  p.  430. 

15.  Cordier:  "Relations  de  la  Chine,"  Voh  1,  p.  285. 

16.  Williams :  "Burlingame,"  p.  145. 

17.  Ihid.,  p.  149. 

18.  Martin:  "Cycle  of  Cathay,"  pp.  241,  293  ff. 

19.  Dip.  Corres.,  1867,  pp.  471,  483,  509. 

20.  Op.  cit.,  1864,  pp.  362  if;  Pompelly :  "Across  America  and  Asia." 

21.  Williams:  "Burlingame,"  pp.  148-9. 

22.  Notes,  China,  Jan.  18,  IJiftI,  Bvirlingame  to  Fish. 

23.  Dip.  Corres.,  1862,  p.  83^  1863,  p.  851;  1864,  pp.  379,  419,  426; 

1866,  pp.  489,  528;  18«  pp.  429,  466;  1868,  pp.  547  ff. 


390  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

24.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  58:28-2,  pp.  5-14;  Williams:  "Burlingame,"  p.  149. 

25.  Williams:  "Burlingame,"  pp.  138-9. 

26.  Martin:    "Cycle  of  Cathay,"  pp.   221,  222;   Dip.   Corres.,   1864, 

p.  332. 

27.  See  Morse,  Vol.  2,  chap.  IX,  for  an  excellent  review  of  the  atti- 

tude of  the  foreigners  in  China  towards  the  Mission. 

28.  Williams :    "Burlingame" :    chap.    "The    Clarendon    Letter    and 

British  Policy,"  pp.  161  fF;  Morse,  Vol.  2,  pp.  197  ff;  Cordier, 
op.  cit.,  i)p.  295  ft'. 

29.  Michie:  "The  Englishman  in  China,"  Vol.  2,  p.  221. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:  1858-1869 

The  phase  of  American  relations  with  Japan  which  be- 
gan with  the  signing  of  the  treaties  of  1858  came  to  natural 
end  in  1869  with  the  beginning  of  the  Meiji  Era  in  Japan 
and  the  withdrawal  of  William  E.  Seward  from  the  Ameri- 
can Department  of  State.  Few  generalizations  as  to  policy 
are  possible.^ 

American  interests  were  represented  in  Japan  by  four 
different  men.  Early  in  1859,  shortly  after  his  treaty  of 
the  preceding  year  had  been  approved  by  the  Senate, 
Townsend  Harris  was  raised  to  the  newly  created  post  of 
Minister  Resident.  Harris  presented  his  resignation  soon 
after  the  inauguration  of  the  Lincoln  administration  and 
was  relieved  by  his  successor,  Robert  H.  Pruyn  of  Albany, 
in  April,  1862.  Pruyn,  who  had  been  prominent  in  New 
York  state  politics  and  was  a  friend  of  Seward's,  served 
three  years,  after  which  A.  L.  C.  Portman,  Secretary  of  the 
Legation,  who  had  been  Dutch  interpreter  for  Commodore 
Perry,  became  Charge  d'Affaires  for  one  year.  R,  B.  Van 
Valkenburgh,  also  of  New  York,  arrived  in  August,  1866, 
and  retired  in  November,  1869. 

While  such  frequent  changes  in  the  service  could  not  be 
otherwise  than  costly  to  American  interests,  and  were  par- 
ticularly unfortunate  at  the  time  of  the  retirement  of 
Pruyn,  who  left  at  a  most  delicate  and  critical  stage,  it  may 
be  noted  that  the  British  diplomatic  service  was  also  fre- 
quently interrupted.  Rutherford  Alcock,-  after  fourteen 
years  in  the  British  consular  service  in  China,  with  the  rank 
of  consul  general,  was  made  the  first  British  representative 
in  Japan.  He  arrived  in  July,  1859,  taking  up  residence  in 
Yedo  at  the  same  time  with  Harris.     He  was  absent  on 

391 


392  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

leave  from  March,  1862,  until  March,  1864,  having  been 
in  the  interim  made  a  Knight  Commander  of  the  Bath, 
Alcock  was  recalled  abruptly  a  few  months  later,  although 
he  was  subsequently  vindicated  and  promoted  to  Peking, 
where  he  succeeded  Sir  Frederick  B»"uce.  He  was  replaced 
by  Harry  S.  Parkes,^  who  also  had  had  a  long  and  far- 
famed  career  in  the  Chinese  consular  service.  Parkes  ar- 
rived in  August,  1865,  thus  beginning  a  mission  in  Japan 
which  extended  over  nearly  twenty  years.  British  policy, 
however,  was  directed  step  by  step  from  London,  and  had  a 
Icontinuity  and  consistency  which  was  lacking  in  American 
policy.  Before  the  close  of  the  American  Civil  War,  the 
United  States  had  yielded  to  England  its  position  of  priority 
in  Japan.  Seward,  distracted  and  preoccupied  by  the  Civil 
War,  gave  to  American  interests  in  Japan  an  astonishing 
amount  of  attention,  and  yet  his  advice  to  the  American 
representatives  was  rarely  helpful  and  of  course  the  United 
States  was  able  to  give  only  nominal  naval  support  to  its 
ministers  in  Yedo.  Steward's  policy  for  Japan  will  be 
treated  in  the  next  chapter.  American  policy  continued 
to  be  in  Japan  as  it  had  been  and  was  in  China,  the  policy 
of  Americans  more  than  the  policy  of  their  government. 

The  American  Government  held  consistently  to  one 
principle  without  compromise:  the  achievements  of  Perry 
and  Harris  must  not  be  lost ;  the  Japanese  must  not  be  per- 
mitted to  return  to  a  policy  of  seclusion.  It  is  in  the  appli- 
cation of  this  principle  that  we  encounter  difficulties  in 
defining  policies.  The  Americans  swung  between  two 
courses.  On  the  one  hand  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  cooperate  with  the  other  treaty  powers,  particularly  with 
the  British,  French  and  Dutch,  and  on  the  other,  it  suited 
the  American  spirit  as  well  as  the  exigencies  of  the  time, 
to  show  towards  the  Japanese  conciliation,  moderation,  and 
a  spirit  of  compromise.  These  two  courses  were  often  op- 
posed to  each  other,  for  moderation  was  not  a  characteristic 
of  the  British  in  Japan,  and  they  dominated  the  situation. 

Cooperation  with  the  other  treaty  powers,  even  when  it 
required  the  Americans  to  join  in  a  use  of  force  such  as 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:   1858-1869     393 

had  never  characterized  the  policy  in  China,  and  never  again 
appeared  in  Japan,  was  rendered  the  more  easy  by  the  fact 
that  the  Japanese  Empire  was  then  passing  through  a  mo- 
mentous struggle  of  clan  feuds  and  of  rival  rulers  in  which 
there  was  always  one  faction  definitely  committed  to  the 
expulsion  of  the  foreigners  and  to  a  return  to  seclusion. 
Into  the  details  of  this  most  intricate  and  involved  domestic 
Japanese  conflict  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  go,  and  yet 
without  a  knowledge  of  these  details  it  is  often  difficult  to 
estimate  correctly  the  courses  proposed  and  the  actions 
taken  by  the  foreigners.  Briefly  the  situation  was  as 
follows : 

Anti-foreign  Agitation 

The  signing  of  the  treaties  (1854-8)  stirred  the  opposi- 
tion of  a  large  section  of  the  articulate  public  opinion  of 
the  Empire  which  was  sincerely  opposed  to  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  policy  of  seclusion,  and  it  was  seized  upon  by 
powerful  daimyos  (feudal  lords)  who  had  no  strong  anti- 
foreign  convictions  but  who  were  eager  to  find  in  the  acts 
of  the  Shogun's  government  an  object  of  criticism  by  which 
the  Takugawa  regime  might  be  weakened  and  overthrown.* 
The  anti-foreign  and  the  anti-Shogun  forces  tended  to 
coalesce  into  a  single  body  demanding  reform  in  Japanese 
affairs.  The  foreign  relations  of  the  Empire  were  retired  to 
a  secondary  place  in  the  public  interest,  and  yet  a  by-prod- 
uct of  the  domestic  struggle  was  a  stubborn  and  unreasoning 
opposition  to  the  foreigners,  coupled  with  demands  for  their 
expulsion.  Conciliation  and  isolated  action  were  weak  staffs 
for  the  foreigners  to  lean  upon  in  the  face  of  this  opposition 
which  was  so  blind,  so  indirect,  and  so  irresponsible.  A 
cooperative  policy  with  force  to  back  it  up  was  absolutely 
essential  and  would  have  been  necessary  for  the  Americans 
had  there  been  no  Civil  War  to  create  a  political  reason  for 
cultivating  harmony  with  foreign  powers. 

*  The  Shogun  (Tycoon,  i.e.,  (Jreat  Prince)  was  theoretically  an  officer  of  the 
Imperial  Court  of  Kioto  and  was  appointed  by  the  Emperor  to  repress  disturb- 
ances and  maintain  order.  I'ractically  the  office  carried  with  it  complete  control 
of  the  Emperor  whom  the  Shogun  set  up  and  deposed  at  will,  and  also  pos- 
sessed important  economic  and  commercial  privileges  not  equally  enjoyed  by  the 
less  important  princes. 


394  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  course  of  American  policy  may  best  be  reviewed, 
perhaps,  by  noting  the  more  important  steps  which  were 
taken,  explaining  in  each  case  the  underlying  domestic  sit- 
uation in  Japan,  and  then  comparing  the  course  of  the 
Americans  with  that  of  the  other  foreigners. 

Although  the  provision  in  the  Harris  Treaty  stipulating 
that  ratifications  should  be  exchanged  in  Washington  within 
one  year  had  been  inserted  at  the  request  of  the  Japanese, 
the  Tycoon's  officers  were  soon  forced  to  seek  delay  for  this 
visit  to  the  United  States.^  Notwithstanding  the  represen- 
tation of  Lord  Hotta,  the  Shogun's  emissary  to  the  Mikado, 
that  the  resumption  of  international  relations  might  be 
made  the  first  step  in  securing  for  Japan  the  ''hegemony 
over  all  nations"  which,  he  stated,  "is  doubtless  in  conform- 
ity with  the  will  of  Heaven,"  ^'  the  throne  withheld  approval 
of  the  treaties.  The  Shogun  was  thus  placed  in  the  position 
of  having  violated  a  fundamental  law  of  the  Empire,  and  for 
a  mission  to  go  abroad  would  be  to  incur  the  death  penalty. 
The  Tycoon  pleaded  for  delay  in  sending  the  embassy  to  the 
United  States  and  Harris  sympathetically  approved,  stipu- 
lating, however,  that  in  the  interim  no  other  embassy  was  to 
depart  from  Japan.  While  the  Japanese  regarded  all 
treaties  in  the  light  of  "necessary  evils,"  wrote  Harris  to 
Seward,  "there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Japanese  regard  us  in  a 
more  friendly  light  than  any  of  the  other  powers  with  whom 
they  have  come  in  contact." 

The  embassy  actually  sailed  February,  1860,  in  the  U. 
S.  S.  Powhatan,  which  had  been  placed  at  its  disposal  by 
request  of  the  Japanese.  Congress  appropriated  $50,000 
for  the  entertainment  of  the  guests,  who  were  received  and 
feted  with  great  ceremony.  After  seven  weeks  of  amazing 
sight-seeing  the  embassy  was  returned  directly  to  Japan  in 
the  U.  S.  S.  Niagara. 

Meanwhile  affairs  in  Japan  were  becoming  difficult  alike 
for  the  Shogun's  government  and  for  the  foreigners.  Harris 
had  even  intimated  to  the  Yedo  officials  that  the  powers 
might  find  it  necessary  to  turn  to  the  Mikado  if  the  Shogun 
did  not  show  a  greater  desire  to  fulfill  the  stipulations  of  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:   1858-1869     395 

treaty.  It  soon  became  evident,  however,  that  the  Sho- 
gun's  position  was  not  simple.  He  did  not  possess  the  power 
to  enforce  order  or  to  protect  the  foreigners.  The  foreigners 
themselves  had  given  great  offense.  The  treaties  had  left 
the  currency  question  in  an  unsatisfactory  condition.  The 
Japanese  Government  had  for  centuries  maintained  the 
ratio  between  silver  and  gold  at  about  5  to  1.  The  new 
treaties  compelled  the  Japanese  to  accept  foreign  silver  at 
the  foreign  valuation.  The  foreigners  were  not  slow  to  see 
the  avenue  of  profit  thus  opened  to  them.  They  could 
bring  their  foreign  silver  to  Japan,  exchange  it  for  Japa- 
nese silver  at  par,  and  with  the  latter  buy  Japanese  gold 
at  the  rate  of  5  or  6  to  1,  and  then  export  the  gold  thus 
cheaply  purchased  to  China,  where  it  could  be  disposed  of 
according  to  the  current  rates  of  international  exchange. 
Nearly  everyone,  ministers,  consuls,  and  naval  officers,  as 
well  as  merchants,  joined  in  these  speculations  which  began 
rapidly  to  drain  the  Empire  of  its  gold.  The  scandal  was 
notorious  and  became  a  subject  of  investigation  by  Parlia- 
ment. Great  Britain  sought  the  cooperation  of  the  United 
States  in  correcting  the  evil  and  Secretary  of  State  Cass 
directed  Harris  to  comply  with  the  British  request,  but  be- 
fore the  matter  was  adjusted  much  ill  wiU  had  been 
generated.^ 

Less  easily  defined,  yet  equally  productive  of  evil,  was 
the  personal  conduct  of  the  foreigners  towards  the  Japa- 
nese. Most  of  the  foreigners  came  to  Japan  from  China 
and  brought  with  them  an  impudence  and  arrogance  which, 
while  as  irritating  to  Chinese  as  to  Japanese,  created  more 
disorder  in  Japan  because  of  the  presence  of  so  many  skillful 
samurai  swordsmen  and  retainers.  The  Japanese  were  not 
only  inclined  but  were  well  prepared  to  meet  insult  with 
retaliation.  Sometimes  this  revenge  was  executed  directly 
upon  the  guilty  party,  but  more  often  it  took  the  form  of 
hostility  to  all  foreigners,  and  within  two  years  after  the 
opening  of  Yokohama  the  foreigners  were  actually  im- 
perilled by  multitudes  of  assassins  seeking  either  revenge  or 
an  opportunity  to  stir  up  trouble  which  might  eventuate 


396  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

in  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners  from  the  Empire.  The 
Tokugawa  government  at  Yedo,  unsupported  by  the  Kioto 
government,  and  strongly  opposed  in  domestic  affairs  by 
many  powerful  princes,  was  quite  unable  to  control  the 
situation. 

Early  in  January,  1861,  Heusken,  the  interpreter  of  the 
American  Legation,  while  returning  home  after  dark,  was 
cut  down  in  the  streets  of  Yedo  and  expired  within  a  few 
hours."  The  murder  of  Heusken  was  the  seventh  assassi- 
nation of  foreigners  within  eighteen  months  and  greatly 
excited  the  foreign  community.  Harris,  while  greatly 
shocked,  took  the  position  that  his  interpreter  had  been 
foolhardy  in  thus  exposing  himself  to  attack  in  the  dark- 
ness. Harris  himself  had  been  careful,  even  at  the  expense 
of  a  great  deal  of  personal  liberty,  to  avoid  giving  the 
sworded  gentry  such  opportunities  as  they  so  much  de- 
sired, but  such  a  surrender  of  rights  did  not  suit  the  dignity 
of  many  other  foreigners.  Rutherford  Alcock,^  with  the 
French,  Dutch  and  Prussian  representatives  retired  from 
Yedo,  as  a  result  of  the  murder  of  the  American  inter- 
preter, demanding  that  the  government  give  satisfactory 
guarantees  of  security  to  life  and  property  before  they 
would  return.  Harris  not  only  remained  in  Yedo,  but  even 
went  so  far  as  to  request  from  his  government  discretion- 
ary powers  to  waive  the  right  granted  by  treaty  for  for- 
eigners to  reside  in  Yedo  after  January  1,  1862. 

The  murder  of  Heusken  and  this  request  for  delay  in 
opening  Yedo  to  residence  were  the  first  matters  presented 
to  Seward  from  Japan  after  he  became  Secretary  of  State. 
His  attitude  will  be  considered  subsequently.  Suffice  it  to 
state  here  that  Harris's  advice  was  accepted  and  reparation 
for  the  murder  of  Heusken  was  settled  by  the  payment  of 
$10,000  to  the  interpreter's  mother.  The  contrast  between 
the  policy  of  Harris  and  that  of  the  British  representatives 
is  illustrated  not  only  in  the  withdrawal  of  Alcock  for  a  time 
from  Yedo,  but  also  by  the  size  of  the  indemnities  required 
by  the  British  Government  for  contemporaneous  assassina- 
tions of  British  subjects.     These  ranged  from  S  10,000  for 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:   1858-1869    397 

wounding  two  members  of  the  British  Legation  a  few 
months  later,  to  £110,000  gold  for  the  murder  of  Richard- 
son (September  14,  1862).  Alcock's  proposed  remedy  for 
assassination  was  $20,000  to  $50,000  indemnity  for  every 
foreigner  killed. 

Harris  and  Alcock  were  irreconcilable  in  temperament, 
previous  training,  and  in  their  attitude  towards  the  Japa- 
nese. It  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  policy  of  cooperation  could 
have  been  carried  out  in  Yedo  had  Harris  remained  as 
American  minister.  It  also  seems  probable  that  had  Harris 
continued  in  Japan,  the  course  of  American  policy  for  the 
following  five  years  would  have  been  quite  different. 

One  of  the  first  requests  presented  to  Pruyn  after  his 
arrival  in  1862  was  that  the  Japanese  might  exercise  Iheir 
treaty  right  to  purchase  three  war  steamers  in  the  United 
States.  Although  the  Japanese  were  obviously  preparing 
not  merely  for  possible  civil  war  but  also  to  defend  them- 
selves against  the  steadily  increasing  pressure  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  other  treaty  powers,  Pruyn  approved  of  the 
request,  and  himself  became  the  commercial  agent  for  the 
Japanese  Government  in  the  transaction,*  a  highly  irregular 
proceeding.^ 

By  pressing  so  hard  upon  the  Tycoon  for  the  execution 
of  the  treaties  the  British  Government,  unknowingly,  was 
really  playing  into  the  hands  of  those  within  the  Empire 
who  were  seeking  to  weaken  the  Yedo  government.  The 
Shogun  officials  clearly  saw  the  possibility  of  civil  war  early 
in  1863,  and  approached  the  American  minister  with  an  in- 
quiry as  to  how  the  United  States  would  regard  such  a 
conflict.  Pruyn  replied  cautiously  that  in  a  conflict  between 
supposedly  anti-foreign  forces  and  the  government  of  the 
Shogun  with  which  the  treaties  had  been  made,  he  believed 
that,  if  requested,  all  the  treaty  powers  "would  be  justified" 
by  self-defense  in  aiding  the  Shogun.^  ^  Further  study  and 
reflection,  however,  led  Mr.  Pruyn  to  modify  this  opinion 
and  less  than  six  months  later  (June  27,  1863),  he  recom- 

*Gideon  Welles,  who  subsequently  became  familiar  with  the  details  of  the 
way  in  which  this  contract  was  executed  in  the  United  States,  sharply  criti- 
cized the  proceedings."* 


398  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

mended  to  Seward  a  joint  naval  demonstration  of  the 
treaty  powers,  such  as  Seward  had  proposed  two  years  be- 
fore, to  compel  the  Mikado  to  ratify  the  treaties.  Seward 
was  willing  to  act  on  this  suggestion  but  at  that  time  the 
Lord  John  Russell  did  not  favor  it. 

Meanwhile  the  Throne  had  issued  a  number  of  decrees 
ordering  either  the  complete  expulsion  of  the  foreigners  or 
the  closing  of  all  ports  save  those  of  Nagasaki  and  Hako- 
date. Many  efforts  had  been  made  to  induce  Pruyn  to  re- 
tire from  Yedo  and  in  May,  1863,  the  legation  was  burned. 
Six  weeks  later  an  American  vessel,  the  Pembroke,  was 
fired  on  in  the  Straits  of  Shimoneseki  by  the  forces  of  the 
Prince  of  Choshiu  and  within  a  few  days  a  French  and  a 
Dutch  vessel  also  were  fired  on.  This  prince  had  taken 
literally  the  Mikado's  orders  to  expel  the  barbarians.  The 
Yedo  officials,  under  orders  from  Kioto,  formally  notified  the 
foreign  representatives  that  the  port  of  Yokohama  was  to  be 
closed  to  trade.  At  the  same  time  the  British  fleet  in  Jap- 
anese waters,  under  Admiral  Kuper,  now  numbering  ten 
vessels,  was  instructed  to  proceed  to  Kagoshima  on  the 
island  of  Kiushiu  to  demand  reparations  directly  from  the 
Prince  of  Satsuma  for  the  murder  of  Richardson,  who  had 
been  cut  down  by  the  express  orders  of  one  of  the  Satsuma 
daimyos.  In  the  midst  of  all  this  confusion  one  fact  stood 
out  clearly:  the  foreigners  to  maintain  their  place  in  Japan 
must  not  only  defend  themselves  but  must  retaliate.  The 
Yedo  government  was  quite  powerless  to  control  many  pow- 
erful princes,  or  to  carry  out  the  treaties,  and  was  ap- 
parently passing  into  a  subordination  to  Kioto  such  as  had 
not  been  known  in  Japan  since  the  establishment  of  the 
Shogunate. 

July,  1863,  was  a  tumultuous  month  in  western  Japan. 
Commander  McDougal  in  the  U.  S.  S.  Wyoming,  which  had 
fortunately  appeared  at  Yokohama  in  the  course  of  a  hunt 
for  the  Alabama,  proceeded  to  the  Straits  of  Shimoneseki 
with  the  intention  of  capturing  the  offending  Choshiu  war 
vessels  and  presenting  them  to  the  Shogun,  but  when  the 
Choshiu  shore  batteries  opened  fire  upon   the  Wyoming, 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:   1858-1869     399 

McDougal  engaged  them  in  battle,  and  while  no  effort 
was  made  to  capture  the  batteries,  a  war  steamer  and  a  brig 
were  sunk.^-  A  few  days  later  the  French  admiral,  Jaures, 
landed  a  small  force  at  the  same  spot,  destroyed  one  of  the 
batteries,  and  burned  a  village.  Meanwhile  Admiral  Kuper 
proceeded  to  Kagoshima,  a  Satsuma  city,  and  commenced 
a  bombardment  which  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  most 
of  the  city  by  fire.  The  effect  of  these  expeditions,  coupled 
with  certain  concurrent  developments  of  domestic  politics, 
was  to  reduce  the  opposition  of  the  western  clans  to  for- 
eign intercourse  and,  for  a  time,  to  strengthen  the  Tycoon. 

Acting  upon  emphatic  and  very  explicit  instructions 
from  Seward,  Pruyn  demanded  of  the  Yedo  government 
the  settlement  of  all  American  claims.  Seward  had  based 
his  instructions  on  the  conclusion  that  "the  Government  of 
Japan  had  failed  to  keep  its  faith  solemnly  pledged  by 
treaty,"  ^^  and  intimated  that  the  United  States  could  not 
maintain  its  dignity  or  self-respect  if  it  were  to  permit 
Japan  to  evade  the  payment  of  the  modest  American  claims 
while  the  other  powers  were  making  very  much  greater  de- 
mands. Seward  threatened  to  support  the  demand  with  an 
additional  naval  force.  Pruyn  asked  for  a  total  of  $32,000 
—$10,000  for  the  burning  of  the  legation,  $20,000  for  as- 
saults on  Americans  at  Yokohama,  and  $2,000  for  an  Ameri- 
can citizen  who  had  been  deported  from  the  Bonin  Islands 
by  the  Japanese.^"*  Payment  for  the  Pembroke  claim, 
$10,000,  had  already  been  made.  When  the  Japanese  de- 
clined to  meet  the  demands,  Pruyn  reminded  them  that  the 
United  States  had  never  consented  to  the  delay  in  the 
opening  of  Hiogo  and  Niigata  for  which  discretionary  powers 
had  been  given  to  Harris,  and  that  if  the  claims  were  not 
paid,  he  would  feel  at  liberty  to  declare  that  these  ports 
were  open,  under  the  stipulations  of  the  American  treaty. 

Pruyn  relented  slightly  in  the  urgency  of  his  demands 
which  had  been  presented  in  the  form  of  an  ultimatum, 
but  a  few  months  later  he  went  to  Yedo  in  the  U.  S.  S. 
Jamestown,  landed  with  a  guard  of  sixty-five  sailors  and 
marines,  and  secured  a  settlement.    In  this  adjustment  he 


400  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

proposed  that  the  claims  of  the  Americans  at  Yokohama 
should  be  submitted  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia  for  arbitra- 
tion, but  the  Japanese  authorities  preferred  to  settle  them 
directly. 

An  important  by-product  of  the  conferences  over  the 
American  ultimatum  had  been  the  securing  of  a  convention 
by  which  the  Japanese  agreed  to  lower  from  20  per  cent  to 
5  per  cent  the  import  duty  on  machines  and  machinery, 
iron  in  pigs  and  bars,  sheet  iron  and  iron  ware,  tin  plates, 
sugar,  glass,  clocks,  watches,  wines  and  liquors.^  ■'''  A  few 
days  later  the  Japanese  voluntarily  reduced  to  6  per  cent 
the  duties  on  several  other  classes  of  importation. 

Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  returned  to  Yedo  in  March,  1864. 
His  government,  which  had  been  severely  criticized  in  Par- 
liament for  the  burning  of  Kagoshima,  had  provided  him 
with  instructions  of  moderation.  Alcock,  however,  became 
convinced  that  the  thinly  concealed  object  of  the  Japanese 
Government  was  to  expel  the  foreigner,  and  he  proposed 
to  ''make  war  for  the  purpose  of  forestalling  war."  ^*^  Thus 
he  would  prevent  the  closing  of  the  port  of  Yokohama  and 
at  the  same  time  he  would  open  the  Inland  Sea  to  navi- 
gation and  force  the  Japanese  Government  to  change  its 
entire  policy  towards  the  foreigners.  The  plan  met  with  the 
approval  of  the  other  foreign  representatives  and  was  car- 
ried out  in  a  joint  naval  expedition  to  the  Straits  of  Shi- 
moneseki  in  the  latter  part  of  August,  1864.  The  com- 
bined fleet  consisted  of  nine  British,  four  Dutch,  three 
French  and  one  American,  vessels.  The  American  vessel 
was  a  rented  merchant  steamer  of  light  draught  equipped 
with  a  few  guns  and  sailors  from  the  Jamestown,  which, 
being  a  sailing  vessel,  was  of  no  use  to  the  fleet.  The  bom- 
bardment and  assault  occupied  four  days  and  as  a  result  the 
Prince  of  Nagato  agreed  to  the  opening  of  the  Straits,  and 
also  to  pay  a  ransom  for  the  city,  which  the  allied  forces 
had  refrained  from  destroying.'^  The  expedition  had  been 
undertaken  with  at  least  the  tacit  approval  of  the  Yedo  gov- 
ernment, which  had  experienced  the  most  determined  oppo- 
sition from  this  Prince. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:   1858-1869    401 

The  fleet  then  returned  to  Yokohama  and  the  diploma- 
tists took  up  the  task  of  settlement  with  the  government. 
The  Yedo  officials  agreed  (September  23)  to  abrogate  the 
order  closing  the  port  of  Yokohama,  and  also  engaged  to 
seek  from  the  Mikado  an  approval  of  the  treaties.  A  few 
days  later  the  Tycoon  agreed  to  assume  an  indemnity  of 
$3,000,000  in  six  quarterly  instalments  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  Shimoneseki  expedition. ^^  The  method  of  division 
of  the  sum  was  left  to  the  determination  of  the  powers,  and 
it  was  stipulated  that  the  payment  would  be  remitted  in 
case  the  Japanese  should  open  to  trade  some  port  in  the 
Inland  Sea. 

The  Shimoneseki  expedition  was  approved  by  President 
Lincoln  and  Secretary  Seward, ^'^  and  although  it  had  been 
undertaken  in  violation  of  instructions  then  on  their  way 
from  Lord  Russell  to  Alcock,  its  complete  success  was  suffi- 
cient to  transmute  a  reprimand  and  recall  for  Alcock  into 
a  promotion  to  Peking.-*^  Viewed  in  the  light  of  history, 
particularly  Japanese  domestic  history,  there  is  little  to 
bring  forward  in  defense  of  the  expedition.  It  was  cer- 
tainly a  marked  departure  from  traditional  American  pol- 
icy both  in  its  cooperative  aspects  and  in  its.  confessed  pur- 
pose to  intervene  in  the  domestic  conflict  of  the  Japanese 
Empire.  It  was  more  straightforward  than  Tattnall's  par- 
ticipation in  the  affair  at  Taku  in  1859,  and  yet  it  was  the 
kind  of  action  which  both  the  Pierce  and  Buchanan  ad- 
ministrations had  declined  to  sanction  in  China.  It  had 
little  to  commend  it  but  its  success.  The  Shimoneseki  ex- 
pedition had  broken  the  back  of  the  anti-foreign  movement 
in  Japan. 

Convention  of  1866 

Pruyn  retired  from  Japan  in  April,  1865,  leaving  Port- 
man  as  Charge.  A  few  months  later  Harry  Parkes  arrived 
to  supersede  Alcock.  From  the  time  of  his  arrival  British 
influence  entirely  dominated  the  foreign  relations  of  Japan. 
Parkes  had  entered  the  British  service  in  China  as  a  mere 
boy  and  had  been  reared  in  the  traditions  of  the  British 


402  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

merchants  of  the  forties  and  fifties.  His  career  had  been 
much  honored  by  those  who  advocated  with  Lord  Pahiier- 
ston  that  in  dealing  with  the  Chinese  people  the  ordinary- 
rules  of  morality  did  not  apply.  Lord  Elgin  had  commended 
him.  By  others,  by  most  Americans  probably,  he  was  re- 
garded as  the  prime  evil  genius  in  the  relations  between  the 
foreigners  and  the  Asiatics.  It  was  Parkes'  rashness  which 
had  precipitated  the  affair  of  the  lorcha  Arrow  at  Canton  in 
1856,  and  his  services  in  the  ensuing  war  had  on  several  occa- 
sions been  of  an  inflammatory  sort.  Added  to  his  aggres- 
siveness in  every  effort  which  looked  towards  the  extension 
or  protection  of  British  trade  was  the  fact  that  he  had  a 
temper  which  he  often  thought  it  not  worth  while  to  con- 
trol.-^  The  difference  between  Parkes  in  Yedo  and  Sir  Fred- 
erick Bruce  in  Peking  was  as  the  difference  between  the 
poles. 

Upon  arrival  Parkes  immediately  assumed  the  initia- 
tive and  the  leadership  among  the  foreign  representatives. 
Although  he  had  received  rather  general  instructions,  and 
although  Lord  John  Russell  had  always  inclined  towards  a 
course  of  moderation,  Parkes,  as  an  American  historian  has 
aptly  said,  "knew  what  his  government  desired,  and  he  pro- 
ceeded to  accomplish  it."  —  The  Shogun's  government,  un- 
able to  open  the  desired  port  in  the  Inland  Sea,  had  elected 
to  pay  the  Shimoneseki  indemnity,  but  after  the  first  instal- 
ment, found  itself  financially  embarrassed  and  requested  de- 
lay in  the  other  payments.  This  request  provided  Parkes 
with  the  desired  opportunity.  He  secured  the  assent  of 
the  other  foreign  representatives  to  a  proposal  which  called 
for  the  transference  of  the  negotiations  from  Yedo  to 
Osaka,  accompanied  by  a  naval  demonstration.  This  ex- 
pedition, in  which  Charge  Portman  represented  the  LTnited 
States  in  a  British  war  vessel,  arrived  at  Osaka  early  in 
November,  1865.-^  Parkes'  letter  to  the  Japanese  authori- 
ties, which  he  took  the  trouble  to  remind  them  was  dated 
from  the  admiral's  flag-ship,  demanded  a  "prompt  and  sat- 
isfactory settlement."  The  Japanese  were  given  the  choice 
between  punctual  payment  of  the  indemnity  or  the  imme- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:   1858-1869    403 

diate  opening  of  Hiogo  and  Osaka,  the  formal  consent  of 
the  Mikado  to  the  treaties,  and  "the  regularization  of  the 
tariff  on  a  basis  of  five  per  cent."  In  case  the  Japanese 
chose  the  second  alternative,  the  treaty  powers  would  gra- 
ciously remit  $2,000,000  of  the  indemnity.  When  the  Jap- 
anese delayed  their  answer  and  appeared  to  be  preparing  to 
defy  the  foreign  representatives,  the  latter  sent  identic 
notes  containing  a  threat  "to  act  as  we  may  judge  con- 
venient." A  Japanese  minister  came  to  the  flag-ship  Sep- 
tember 24  and  announced  to  Parkes  that  the  Mikado  had 
ratified  the  treaties,  that  the  Shogun  would  consent  to  the 
revision  of  the  tariff,  but  that  rather  than  open  the  port  be- 
fore the  appointed  time,  the  government  preferred  to  pay 
the  full  remaining  indemnity.  On  the  part  of  the  foreigners 
the  visit  to  Osaka  was  a  brutal  proceeding,  the  method  of 
which  the  Japanese  in  later  years  found  many  opportuni- 
ties to  imitate  in  dealings  with  Korea  and  China. 

The  tariff  settlement  with  the  Japanese  Government 
was  embodied  in  a  convention  which  w-as  signed  in  Yedo 
June  25,  1866.  This  convention  is  notable  in  American  pol- 
icy for  several  reasons.  It,  and  the  preceding  convention  of 
1864,  which  had  been  signed  by  Pruyn  jointly  with  the  Brit- 
ish, French  and  Dutch  representatives,  are  among  the  very 
few,  if  not  the  only  instances  in  the  nineteenth  century  in 
which  the  United  States  entered  into  a  joint  treaty.  While 
it  was  not  altogether  exceptional  for  the  United  States  t® 
make  similar  treaties,  concurrently  with  other  powers,  as  in 
China  in  1858,  it  marked  a  wide  departure  from  traditional 
policy  for  the  American  Government  to  sign  a  treaty  jointly 
with  other  nations.  In  1857  William  B.  Reed  had  been 
specifically  instructed  not  to  make  such  a  treaty.  The  con- 
vention was  also  remarkable  for  the  fact  that  it  stated  an 
untruth,  viz.,  that  the  foreign  representatives  had  "received 
from  their  respective  governments  identical  instructions  for 
the  modification  of  the  tariff."  Portman  had  received  no 
such  instructions.  The  treaty  was,  however,  duly  ratified  by 
the  American  Government  the  following  year.  In  the  third 
place,  the  proposed  "regularization"  of  the  tariff  took  the 


404  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

form  of  the  China  treaties  of  1858  in  that  the  duties  were 
made  specific  and  the  precise  amounts  estimated  on  ad  va- 
lorem basis  of  five  per  cent.  The  tariff  was  not  terminable 
at  a  definite  date,  but  like  both  the  Chinese  and  Japanese 
treaties  of  1858  was  merely  "subject  to  revision"  on  the 
first  day  of  July,  1872.  The  effect  of  this  provision  was  to 
place  Japan  entirely  within  the  power  of  the  united  foreign 
nations,  or  of  any  one  of  them  which  would  not  consent 
to  revision,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  increasing 
prices  of  many  articles  of  trade  had  the  effect  of  lowering 
the  duty  rate,  estimated  on  an  ad  valorem  basis,  until  in 
later  years  the  duties  received  amounted  to  little  more  than 
the  cost  of  collection.  Judged  by  any  standard  of  foreign 
policy,  the  convention  of  1866  with  Japan  may  be  regarded 
as  one  of  the  most  thoroughly  un-American  treaties  ever 
ratified  by  the  American  Government. 

The  American  policy  of  cooperation  continued  after  the 
American  Civil  War  was  over,  and  the  most  urgent  reasons 
for  its  practice  had  disappeared.  Civil  war  broke  out  in 
Japan  at  the  beginning  of  1868  and  Van  Valkenburgh  joined 
with  the  other  foreign  representatives  in  the  approval  of  a 
joint  occupation  of  the  approaches  to  Yokohama  by  the 
combined  naval  forces.-'*  The  powers  declared  their  neu- 
trality in  the  domestic  conflict.  This  had  the  effect  of  in- 
fluencing the  Mikado,  who  had  taken  over  the  powers  of  the 
Shogun  at  the  latter's  request,  February  3,  1868,  to  seek  the 
good  will  of  the  foreign  powers.  The  American  minister 
was  received  in  audience  by  the  Mikado  at  Yedo,  January 
3,  1869,  and  a  month  later,  the  Restoration  having  become 
an  accomplished  fact,  Van  Valkenburgh,  in  concert  with 
the  other  ministers,  withdrew  the  notice  of  neutrality.  The 
American  authorities  then  turned  over  to  the  Japanese 
Government  a  war  steamer  which  the  Shogun  had  previously 
purchased  in  the  United  States  but  which  on  its  arrival  at 
Yokohama  had  been  retained  by  the  American  authorities 
in  order  that  it  might  not  be  used  by  the  Shogun's  party  to 
oppose  the  Restoration.-'"' 

In  summary  of  this  most  complicated  period  we  may 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN:   1858-18G9     405 

note  two  facts:  just  as  in  China  at  the  revision  of  the 
treaties  in  1858,  the  American  Government  had  signally 
failed  while  sustaining  a  cooperative  policy  with  the  other 
foreign  powers,  to  exert  upon  the  combined  action  of  the 
powers  any  notable  influence.  Cooperation  had  meant,  after 
the  departure  of  Townsend  Harris,  not  only  British  leader- 
ship but,  under  Parkes,  British  dictation.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  in  China,  the  United  States  had  come  out  of  the 
contest  with  Japan  with  more  good  will  from  the  Japanese 
people  than  was  enjoyed  by  any  other  foreign  power.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  any  Japanese  or  any  Americans  in  1869 
realized  how  the  joint  Convention  of  1866  could  be  used 
to  obstruct  Japanese  fiscal  and  industrial  development. 
American  policy  was  clear:  the  United  States  not  only 
desired  no  exclusive  advantages,  but,  unlike  the  other 
powers,  was  as  thoroughly  committed  to  supporting  and 
sustaining  Japan  in  its  efforts  to  become  a  strong  nation,  just 
as  it  was  committed  to  a  similar  course  in  China. 

BIBLIOGEAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  primary  American  sources  for  this  period  are:     Japan  In- 

structions, Vol.  1,  and  Japan  Despatches,  Vols.  I-XI.  (The 
reports  for  the  years  18G1-S  in  "Diplomatic  Correspondence" 
are  very  complete.  Treat's  "Early  Diplomatic  Relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Japan,  1858-65,"  a  most  valuable 
intensive  study,  makes  generous  use  of  the  papers  of  R.  B. 
Pruyn  which  are,  however,  usually  practically  identical  with 
the  Pruyn  dispatches  in  the  Dept.  of  State.  Treat  also  makes 
use  of  a  large  number  of  translations  from  Japanese  sources 
some  of  which  are  unavailable  in  any  except  the  best  stocked 
American  libraries.  Gubbins's  "Progress  of  Japan"  presents 
the  Japanese  sources  very  fully.  Two  scholarly  studies  and 
interpretations  by  Japanese  can  be  recommended — Nitobe's 
'Tntercourse  between  the  United  States  and  Japan"  (Johns 
Hopkins  Univ.  Studies  in  Hist,  and  Pol.  Sci.,  extra  Vol.  9, 
1891),  and  Hishida's  "International  Position  of  Japan  as  a 
Great  Power"  (Columbia  Univ.  Studies  in  Hist.  Economics 
and  Public  Law,  Vol.  24,  No.  3,  1905). 

2.  Alcock's  "The  Capital  of  the  Tycoon,  a  Narrative  of  Three  Years' 

Residence  in  Japan,"  2  vols.,  makes  a  veiy  full  record  of 
Alcock's  service  in  Japan  before  18G2;  see  also  Mi  chic :  "The 
Englishman  in  China." 

3.  Dickens    and   Lane-Poole:    "Life   of   Sir   Henry   Parkes";    Sir 


406  AAIERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Ernest  Satow's  "A  Diplomat  in  Japan,"  throws  some  valuable 
side-lights  on  Parkes'  early  career  in  Japan. 

4.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  25  :.3C)-1. 

5.  Treat:  "Early  Diplomatic  Relations,"  pp.  99-100. 

6.  Townsend  Harris'  Journal,  Pt.  II,  p.  101  (Lib.  of  Cong.) ;  Japan 

Instructions,  Vol.   1,  Apr.  2,   1860,  Cass  to  Harris;  see  also 
Satow's  "A  Diplomat  in  Japan." 

7.  Japan  Dispatches,  Vol.  5,  Jan.  22,  Feb.  13,  '61 ;  Dip.  Corres.,  1862, 

pp.  795  ff. 

8.  Alcock :  "The  Capital  of  the  Tycoon,"  Vol.  2,  chaps.  24,  25. 

9.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  33:37-3. 

10.  Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  Vol.  II,  pp.  188-92,  561. 

11.  Dip.  Corres.,  1863,  p.  982. 

12.  Ihid.,  pp.  1040  £f. 

13.  Ihid.,  p.  1057. 

14.  Ihid.,  1864,  pp.  466  ff. 

15.  //«(/.,  1864,*  p.  479. 

16.  ParliamentaiT    Papers,    1865,    Comm.    57,    pp.    18-36,    cited    by 

Treat,  p.  324. 

17.  Dip.  Corres.,  1864,  pp.  553  ff. 

18.  Ihid.,  p.  578. 

19.  Ihid.  (1865),  p.  229. 

20.  Treat:  p.  373,  citing  British  sources. 

21.  See  Morse,  Vol.  1,  pp.  422  ff,  for  an  estimate  of  Parkes. 

22.  Treat;  p.  395. 

23.  Dip.  Corres.,  1865,  p.  276,  1866,  p.  191. 

24.  Japan  Dispatches,  Vol.  9,  Apr.  3,  1868,  Van  Valkenburgh  to 

Seward. 

25.  Dip.  Corres.,  1868,  p.  730. 


CHAPTER  XXII 
SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY 

By  1861,  by  a  process  of  negation  and  opportunism  as 
well  as  by  foresight  and  design,  the  American  Government 
had  acquired  a  fairly  definite  Far  Eastern  Policy.  This  pol- 
icy had  grown  out  of  certain  precedents  and  decisions  and 
was  incorporated  in  two  treaties — one  with  China  and  an- 
other with  Japan.  The  foundation  of  this  policy  was  "most- 
favored-nation"  treatment,  equivalent  to  what  is  now  called 
the  "opeiLidoor"  policy.  Above  this  lay  the  decision,  many 
times  repeated,  not  to  acquire  any  territorial  possessions  or 
protectorates  in  Asia  or  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Deduced  from 
the  necessities  of  the  most-favored-nation  policy  was  the 
decision  to  "sustain  China"  and,  by  inference,  to  sustain 
Japan,  thus  placing  the  United  States  in  opposition  to  any 
movement  on  the  part  of  Western  powers  to  injure  the 
territorial  integrity  or  the  political  sovereignty  of  Asiatic 
states.  The  United  States  desired  that  China  and  Japan 
become  sufiiciently  strong  to  maintain  their  own  open  doors. 
Furthermore,  the  American  Government  had  been  commit- 
ted by  the  Pierce  and  Buchanan  administrations  to  coopera- 
tion with  the  other  treaty  powers  in  all  peaceful  measures  to 
secure  the  execution  of  the  treaties  and  the  protection  of 
foreign  interests.  On  the  other  hand,  the  United  States  had 
declined  to  enter  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  France, 
and  Mr.  Reed  had  been  instructed  to  avoid  any  joint  treaty 
with  China.  Upon  these  foundations  Seward  had  to  build 
in  the  tempestuous  years  1861-9. 

Seward  entered  the  Department  of  State  with  large  and 
positive  convictions  on  the  nature  and  the  future  of  Ameri- 
can relations  with  Asia.  This  is  evident  from  his  previous 
record  in  the  Senate.    More  than  most  men  of  his  day  his 

407 


408  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

face  was  turned  towards  the  West.  As  to  the  future  expan- 
sion of  the  American  people  to  the  Pacific  Coast  he  was 
firmly  optimistic.  He  w^as  a  hearty  supporter  of  every 
movement  to  establish  American  foreign  trade  on  a  firmer 
basis.  "The  nation,"  he  said,  "must  command  the  empire 
of  the  seas,  which  alone  is  real  empire."  This  empire,  it 
seemed  to  him,  must  include  the  Pacific  as  well  as  the  At- 
lantic. Indeed  he  foresaw  the  day  when  the  Atlantic  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  would  "relatively  sink  in  impor- 
tance, while  the  Pacific  Ocean,  its  shores,  its  islands,  and 
the  vast  regions  beyond"  would  become  the  "chief  theatre 
of  events  in  the  w^orld's  great  hereafter."  This  famous  as- 
sertion, made  in  1852  while  the  Japan  Expedition  was  in 
preparation,  was  no  isolated  flight  of  oratory.  Seward  had 
a  very  definite  idea  as  to  the  function  of  the  American 
people  in  the  commerce  of  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Foreign 
trade,  he  thought,  was  to  replace  military  conquest  and  to 
become  the  vehicle  for  a  commerce  of  ideas.  The  gi^eat 
American  contribution  to  the  world,  it  seemed  to  him,  was 
political  theory.  Just  as  the  Atlantic  states  through  their 
commercial,  social  and  political  sympathies  were  steadily 
renovating  the  governments  and  social  constitutions  of 
Europe  and  Africa,  so  "the  Pacific  states  must  necessarily 
perform  the  same  sublime  and  beneficent  functions  in  Asia." 
Seward  appears  to  have  expected  that  Asia  thus  enriched 
from  America  would  repay  the  debt  in  gratitude.  He  said, 
while  Perry  was  in  the  East,  "Certainly  no  one  expects  the 
nations  of  Asia  to  be  awakened  by  any  other  influence  than 
our  own  from  the  lethargy  into  which  they  sunk  nearly  three 
thousand  years  ago.  If  they  could  be  roused  and  invigor- 
ated now,  would  they  spare  their  European  oppressors  and 
spite  their  American  benefactors?" 

Seward  was  so  convinced  of  the  value  of  the  Pacific 
Coast  to  the  United  States  that  he  would,  notwithstanding 
his  convictions  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  vote  to  receive 
California  as  a  state  even  though  it  were  to  become  slave 
territory.  He  believed  in  the  Japan  Expedition,  expressing 
the  conviction  that  the  proper  question  for  the  Senate  to  ask 


SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY  409 

was  not  why  it  had  been  sent,  but  why  it  had  not  been  sent 
before.  He  urged  the  completion  of  surveys  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean;  he  favored  the  encouragement  of  Chinese  immigra- 
tion to  Cahfornia;  and  among  the  projects  to  which  he  lent 
persistent  and  energetic  leadership,  were  the  construction 
of  a  transcontinental  railroad  and  the  inauguration  of  a  line 
of  mail  steamers  from  San  Francisco  via  the  Sandwich 
Islands  to  Japan  and  China. ^  He  also  gave  approval  and 
support  to  the  proposal  to  connect  America  with  Asia  by 
means  of  a  telegraph  line  through  Alaska,  across  the  Aleu- 
tian Islands  anrl  down  the  coast  of  Asia  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Amur.-  Lincoln  could  not  have  chosen  from  among  the 
conspicuous  leaders  of  the  day  a  secretary  of  state  who 
would  bring  to  the  Far  Eastern  question  more  previous 
thought  and  conviction. 

During  Seward's  term  of  service  the  problem  of  com- 
munications between  Washington  and  the  Far  East,  which 
had  been  almost  a  determining  factor  in  the  previous  poli- 
cies, was  partially  solved.  The  opening  of  the  transconti- 
nental telegraph  in  1862  and  the  increase  in  the  frequency 
of  trans-Pacific  travel  brought  Japan  within  a  month  of 
Washington,  while  a  similar  development  of  transportation 
and  telegraphy  from  Hongkong  to  England,  shortened  to 
some  degree  the  distance  from  China  westward.  However, 
during  the  winter  months  the  Chinese  capital  was  ice-  and 
snow-bound,  receiving  its  mail  only  by  courier  service  from 
Shanghai.  The  American  representatives  in  China,  and  to 
a  less  extent  in  Japan,  must  still  exercise  broad  discretionary 
powers  and  therefore  had  the  control  of  American  policy 
largely  in  their  own  hands.  As  an  offset  to  better  communi- 
cations came  the  Civil  War,  which  so  distracted  the  Ameri- 
can Government  as  to  leave  little  time  for  the  considera- 
tion of  Far  Eastern  policy.  Seward,  under  different  condi- 
tions, would  probably  have  shown  from  the  outset  much 
initiative  in  dealing  with  the  East,  but  as  it  was,  his  hands 
were  tied.  Nevertheless  he  found  it  possible  in  the  course 
of  eight  years  to  bring  both  Alaska  and  Korea  within  the 
range  of  Far  Eastern  policy,  and  also  to  modify  in  a  marked 


^ 


410  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

degree  many  of  the  precedents  of  his  office.  At  the  risk  of 
some  confusion  we  have  already  examined  the  contributions 
of  Burhngame  and  Harris ;  let  us  now  retraverse  the  ground 
and  note  the  policies  of  Seward. 

Seward,  Burlingame  and  China 

About  Seward  and  China  little  need  be  said.  Burlingame 
required  few  suggestions  or  instructions.  He  appeared  in 
China  in  the  calm  which  followed  the  storm.  It  was  a 
period  especially  favorable  for  constructive  work  such  as 
must  follow  destructive  war.  Notwithstanding  his  enthu- 
siasm and  amiability,  Burlingame  was  a  masterful  per- 
sonality, sure  to  dominate  any  situation.  He  dominated 
Peking  while  he  was  there,  and  in  like  measure  he  domi- 
nated American  policy  in  China.  Seward  wisely  permitted 
Burlingame  to  have  his  way;  there  were  between  them  no 
conflicts,  nor  even  differences  of  opinion.  Even  the  cus- 
tomary long  letter  of  instructions  usually  given  to  a  new 
minister  was  omitted.^  Seward's  part  in  Chinese  policy  was 
limited  to  approval  of  Burlingame;  the  Secretary  of  State 
initiated  nothing  except  the  immigration  section  of  the 
Treaty  of  1868.* 

Some  months  after  Burlingame's  arrival  in  China 
(March  6,  1862),  Seward  took  occasion,  while  approving  the 
minister's  course  in  the  closing  contests  of  the  Taiping  Re- 
bellion, to  urge  him  to  "consult  and  cooperate"  with  the 
other  representatives.  The  instruction  was  hardly  neces- 
sary, for  the  policy  was  already  in  operation  and  Burlingame 
was  the  sort  of  man  who  could  work  no  other  way.^  Shortly 
after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  Seward  summarized  his  Chi- 
nese policy  (August  14,  1865)  as  follows: 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  not  disposed  to  be  tech- 
nical or  exacting  in  its  intercourse  with  the  Chinese  Government, 
but  will  deal  with  it  in  entire  frankness,  cordiality  and  friendship. 

*  The  so-called  Burlingame  Treaty  (1868)  might  more  properly  be  called  the 
Seward  Treaty,  for  Seward,  rather  than  Burlingame,  appears  to  have  espe- 
cially desired  it  and  Seward  wrote  it.  It  was  really  an  immigration  treaty  to 
which  were  attached  some  declarations  of  foreign  policy.  As  a  part  of  Seward's 
policy  it  will  be  treated  in  Chapter  XXVIU. 


SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY  411 

The  United  States  desires  neither  to  interfere  with  the  distinct  and 
ancient  habits  and  customs  of  the  Chinese  ijeo[)le,  nor  to  embarrass 
the  members  of  the  foreign  board  in  their  difficult  and  responsible 
task." ' 

While  always  insistent  that  American  life  and  prop- 
erty must  be  protected,  Seward  was  careful  to  avoid  any- 
thing which  looked  towards  the  disregard  of  Chinese  rights. 
He  sustained  the  decision  of  S.  Wells  Wilhams  in  1866  that 
the  treaty  of  1858  clearly  prohibited  the  foreigners  from 
sending  steamers  through  the  inland  waterways,  thus  plac- 
ing himself  in  opposition  to  the  Shanghai  merchants  who 
were  making  a  vigorous  effort  to  break  down  the  treaties.'' 
He  expressed  himself  very  clearly  as  opposed  to  the  abuse  of 
the  American  flag,  the  use  of  which  was  being  sold  by 
American  merchants  to  Chinese  lorcha  and  junk  owners."^ 
When  the  American  bark  Rover  was  wrecked  off  the  coast  of 
Formosa  in  1867,  and  the  crew  murdered  by  aborigines  of 
the  island,  Seward  ordered  a  thorough  investigation  and 
instructed  Dr.  Williams  to  urge  the  Chinese  Government  to 
occupy  the  ports  and  shores  of  Formosa  more  effectively, 
but  at  the  same  time  he  ordered  it  made  clear  to  China  that 
the  United  States  in  no  case  desired  to  "seize  or  hold  posses- 
sion" of  any  part  of  Formosa.^  Rear  Admiral  Bell  con- 
ducted a  punitive  expedition  against  the  aborigines  with  the 
U.  S.  S.S.  Hartford  and  Wyoming.  With  a  landing  party  of 
181  he  advanced  on  the  uncivilized  people  at  the  south 
end  of  Formosa  on  June  13,  1867.  The  savages  were  pur- 
sued into  the  hills  where  they  frequently  led  the  American 
force  into  ambush.  The  American  casualties  were  one 
death  and  fourteen  cases  of  sun-stroke.  This  expedition,  an 
application  in  a  measure  of  the  "gun-boat  policy"  which 
Burlingame  was  so  anxious  to  avoid,  was  undertaken  by 
order  of  the  Navy  Department,  yet  no  doubt  with  Seward's 
approval.  The  expedition  was  the  precedent  upon  which 
the  Japanese  relied  in  1874  to  justify  their  more  ambitious 
and  inclusive  attack  upon  the  island." 

When  Seward  visited  China  in  1870  he  took  occasion  to 
defend  and  justify  American  policy  to  one  of  his  country- 


412  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

men  who  was  very  critical  of  its  weakness.  Seward  reviewed 
the  difficulties  of  the  Civil  War  and  examined  one  by  one 
the  alleged  deficiencies  of  American  influence  in  the  Em- 
pire and  remarked:  ''I  think  we  are  obliged  to  conclude 
from  all  these  premises  that  a  policy  of  justice,  moderation 
and  friendship  is  the  only  one  that  we  have  had  a  choice  to 
pursue,  and  that  it  has  been  as  wise  as  it  has  been  unavoid- 
able." He  concluded:  "The  United  States  cannot  be  an 
aggressive  nation — least  of  all  against  China."  ^^ 

Coercion  in  Japan 

Seward's  policy  in  Japan  was  of  a  somewhat  different 
nature.  It  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  Japanese 
Government  was  seeking  to  evade  the  fulfillment  of  its  ob- 
ligations under  the  treaties,  and  that  the  foreigners  were  in 
grave  danger  of  being  expelled  from  some  or  all  of  the  open 
ports.  Seward  was  also  under  the  impression  that  the  do- 
mestic conflict  in  Japan  was  a  clean-cut  contest  between 
the  liberal  forces  under  the  leadership  of  the  Tycoon  and 
the  reactionary  and  anti-foreign  forces  back  of  the  Mikado. 
These  assumptions  as  we  have  seen  were  quite  inaccurate. 
The  Takugawa  government  was  evading  the  requirements 
of  the  treaties  at  least  in  part  because  it  was  utterly  power- 
less to  carry  them  out.  The  foreigners  were  probably  not 
in  such  imminent  danger  of  being  expelled  as  they  believed. 
The  forces  back  of  the  Mikado  were  by  no  means  entirely 
anti-foreign.  In  the  face  of  what  Seward  believed  to  be  the 
dangers  of  the  situation  his  policy  was  aggressive  and  bel- 
ligerent. He  believed  that  "very  large  interests,  not  of  our 
own  country  only,  but  of  the  civilized  world,  are  involved 
in  retaining  the  foothold  of  foreign  nations  already  acquired 
in  the  Empire  of  Japan."  "  Towards  Japan  Seward  di- 
rected a  policy  far  more  vigorous  than  any  preceding  secre- 
tary of  state  had  directed  towards  China,  but  at  no  time  had 
China  appeared  to  be  seeking  to  expel  the  foreigners. 

Immediately  upon  receipt  of  information  as  to  the  mur- 
der of  Heusken,  which  reached  Seward  just  at  the  out- 
break of  the  Civil  War,  the  Secretary  of  State  initiated  a 


SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY  413 

proposal  to  the  treaty  powers — France,  Great  Britain,  Rus- 
sia and  Prussia — for  a  joint  naval  demonstration  against 
Japan  to  compel  Japan  to  comply  with  the  stipulations  of 
the  treaties.*  ^- 

This  proposal,  as  we  have  seen,  was  quite  contrary  to 
the  judgment  of  Townsend  Harris,  who  even  recommended 
that  he  be  given  discretionary  powers  to  postpone  the  open- 
ing of  Yedo  and  Osaka.  Seward  rather  reluctantly  con- 
curred with  Harris,  urgently  insisting,  however,  that  there 
be  no  relaxation  of  the  demand  for  the  fulfiUment  of  the 
treaties  until  the  Japanese  had  rendered  abundant  satis- 
faction for  Heusken,^'* 

While  Seward's  energetic  proposal  in  May,  1861,  may 
have  been  a  part  of  a  larger  policy  by  which  he  sought  to 
secure  the  cooperation  of  the  European  powers  in  a  joint- 
undertaking  to  divert  them  from  intervening  in  the  domes- 
tic conflict  of  the  United  States,  nevertheless  Seward  was 
not  slow  to  return  to  proposals  for  coercive  measures  against 
Japan  whenever  he  thought  the  situation  required  them, 
"You  cannot  too  strongly  advise  the  Government  of  Japan," 
he  wrote,  December  13,  1862,  "that  it  can  only  have  friend- 
ship or  even  peace  with  the  United  States  by  protecting 
the  citizens  and  subjects  of  foreign  powers  from  domestic 
violence."  ^^    Six  months  later  (June  29,  1863)  he  stated: 

"  "The  United  States  having  no  grievances  of  their  own  to  complain 
of  against  Japan,  will  not  unite  in  hostilities  against  that  govern- 
ment, but  they  will  at  the  same  time  take  care  not  to  disapprove  of 
or  censure,  without  just  cause,  the  measures  of  Great  Britain  which 
will  result  in  greater  security  for  all."  " 

A  few  days  later  he  wrote  that  while  Pruyn's  whole  moral 
influence  must  be  exerted  to  preserve  peace  between  Japan 
and  the  Western  powers,  the  Wyoming  would  have  author- 

*  This  proposal  callod  for  the  prpsontation  of  a  joint  note  accompaniod  by 
the  assembly  of  a  combined  fleet  in  Japanese  waters.  An  answer  to  the  demands 
was  to  be  required  after  a  certain  period  of  delay.  If  the  answer  were  unfa- 
vorable or  evasive.  Seward  proposed  that  the  diplomatic  representatives  be 
withdrawn  "and  such  hostilities  be  commenced  aad  prosecuted  as  the  naval 
commanders  may  deem  most  likely  to  bring  the  .Japanese  to  a  sense  of  their 
obligations."  To  this  proposal  there  were  attached  two  qualifications:  (1)  that 
the  United  States  would  make  a  special  demand  for  satisfaction  for  the  murder 
of  Iluesken  :  (2)  that  "this  convention  is  not  to  be  considered  as  oldigatory 
on"  the  United  States  until  the  sanction  of  Congress  has  been  obtained  to  the 
beginning  of  hostilities.     (May  20,  1861.)  ^^ 


414  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ity  to  "use  her  guns"  for  the  protection  of  the  Legation  or  of 
American  citizens.  Seward  approved  of  the  expedition  of 
the  Wyoming  to  Shimoneseki  in  July,  1863,  and  authorized 
Pruyn  to  use  a  firm  and  strong  pohcy  to  induce  Japan  to 
to  live  up  to  its  duties  under  the  treaties.  The  joint  expedi- 
tion to  Shimoneseki  in  September,  1864,  met  with  Seward's 
full  approval,  even  though  it  marked  an  absolute  departure 
from  traditional  American  policy  in  the  matter  of  joint 
naval  operations  with  other  powers.  He  also  approved, 
though  he  did  not  authorize,  the  visit  of  Portman  to  Osaka 
on  a  British  war  vessel  in  1865  in  the  joint  naval  demonstra- 
tion by  which  the  Mikado  was  induced  to  approve  the 
treaties,  and  the  government  made  to  revise  and  lower  the 
tariff  schedule.  Indeed,  one  receives  the  impression  from 
a  review  of  the  correspondence  that  with  Japan  Seward  was 
disposed  towards  more  forceful  measures  than  the  Ameri- 
can representatives  thought  it  wise  to  employ.  Seward, 
more  than  any  secretary  of  state  before  or  since  his  day, 
was  favorably  disposed  toward  a  ''gun-boat  policy." 

How  much  of  Seward's  policy  for  Japan  was  due  to  the 
necessities  of  the  international  situation  arising  out  of  the 
American  Civil  War  it  is  difficult  to  say.  He  was  thoroughly 
committed  to  the  cooperative  policy,  but  in  China  the 
cooperation  was  directed  towards  moderation  and  pacific 
measures,  while  in  Japan  it  eventuated  in  joint  hostilities. 

In  his  instructions  to  Pruyn  (November  15,  1861) 
Seward  expressed  the  fear  that  Japan,  which  had  been 
"gently  coerced"  by  the  United  States  into  friendship,  might 
seize  the  present  opportunity  "to  underrate  our  power"  and 
"to  disregard  our  rights."  "  He  looked  forward  to  the  day 
when  "our  domestic  differences  being  ended,  we  are  able 
once  more  to  demonstrate  our  power  in  the  East  and  estab- 
lish our  commerce  there  on  secure  foundations."  Mean- 
while Pruyn  was  to  make  a  brave  show  of  confidence  and 
power  and  thus  seek  to  preserve  friendly  relations.  The 
United  States,  declared  the  Secretary,  sought  no  exclusive 
advantages.  "Preserve  friendly  relations  with  all  European 
powers.     Leave  behind  you  all  memories  of  domestic  or 


SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY  415 

European  jealousies  or  antipathies."  And  then  as  the  diffi- 
culties with  the  European  powers  over  the  Civil  War  in- 
creased, Seward  wrote  (December  19,  1861): 

"I  cannot  too  earnestly  enjoin  upon  you  the  duty  of  cultivating 
the  best  possible  understanding'  with  these  representatives  [the  other 
foreign  ministers]  and  of  doing  all  in  your  power  to  maintain  har- 
mony of  views  and  policy  between  them  and  yourself."  *" 

When  Pruyn  expressed  to  the  ministers  of  the  Shogun 
government  the  personal  opinion  that  the  foreign  powers 
would  be  disposed  to  support  the  Shogun  against  the  clans, 
Seward  commented  that  while  the  United  States  would 
cooperate  with  the  Japanese  authorities  to  secure  the  ful- 
fillment of  the  treaties,  no  inference  must  be  drawn  that  the 
United  States  would  separate  itself  from  cooperation  with 
the  other  treaty  powers.^^  The  measures  to  which  this 
policy  of  cooperation  appeared  to  be  leading  the  United 
States  in  the  joint  Shimoneseki  expedition  and  the  joint 
convention  which  followed  it,  may  have  been  a  little  dis- 
quieting but  nevertheless,  in  view  of  the  reason  for  co- 
operation, Seward  wrote:  'T  am  authorized  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  assure  you  that  they  are  fully  approved."*  ~^ 

In  the  revolution  which  accompanied  the  Restoration 
Seward  advised  Van  Valkenburgh  to  adhere  to  the  existing 
government,  i.e.,  the  Tycoon,  so  long  as  that  government 
retained  its  power.--  Two  years  later,  after  he  had  visited 
Japan,  he  stated  that  he  had  used  all  his  influence  to  "pre- 
vent the  late  revolution"  because  he  thought  it  was  a  "retro- 
grade movement."  "I  little  dreamed,"  he  explained,  "that 
the  Mikado  would  excel  the  dethroned  Tycoon  in  emulating 
Western  civilization." 

On  the  subject  of  religious  toleration  Seward  entertained 
very  decided  views.  When  a  persecution  of  Christians  at 
Nagasaki  broke  out  in  1867,  he  took  up  with  other  powers 
the  question  of  a  united  appeal  to  Japan  to  repeal  and  abro- 
gate the  laws  which  prohibit  Christianity.  And  a  year 
later  he  wrote:  "Humanity  indeed  demands  and  expects 
a  continually  extending  sway  of  the  Christian  religion." 

*{jidcon   Welles  expressed   strong  dissent  from  this  approval. =' 


416  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

However  he  expected  this  to  come  by  a  "diffusion  of  knowl- 
edge and  calm  and  persevering  appeal  to  the  reason  and 
consciences  of  men."  He  directed  Van  Valkenburgh  to 
warn  Japan  that  "when  one  foreign  Christian  shall  have 
suffered  martyrdom  for  his  faith,  Christendom  will  be 
shocked  to  its  center  and  it  may  demand  that  the  policy  of 
forbearance  and  encouragement  which  the  treaty  powers 
have  hitherto  practised  in  Japan  shall  be  reversed."  -^ 

Alaska  and  Korea 

Seward  appears  not  to  have  been  conscious  that  the 
American  Civil  War  was  to  mark  a  new  phase  of  American 
development  in  which  internal  growth  would  quite  eclipse 
the  interests  of  foreign  trade  as  he  had  viewed  them  in  the 
fifties.  He  returned  to  his  former  interest  in  the  extension 
of  American  trade  in  the  Pacific  when  the  war  cares  were  re- 
moved. He  negotiated  the  purchase  of  Alaska  in  1867  and 
at  the  same  time  initiated  a  movement  to  secure,  jointly 
with  France,  the  opening  of  Korea.-'* 

While  the  motives  which  inspired  the  purchase  of  Alaska 
have  been  a  matter  of  doubt  and  dispute,  and  were  care- 
fully concealed  from  Stoeckl,  the  Russian  minister,  at  the 
time  of  the  negotiations,  it  is  difficult  to  resist  the  conclu- 
sion that  Seward  saw  in  Alaska  and  the  Aleutian  Islands 
a  way  of  "extending  a  friendly  hand  to  Asia."  -"'  Indeed  his 
son  stated  definitely  that  the  motive  back  of  the  purchase 
of  Alaska  was  the  desire  for  "advanced  naval  outposts"  such 
as  had  been  lacking  in  the  north  Pacific  as  well  as  in  the 
West  Indies  during  the  recent  war.-''  The  United  States 
took  possession  of  the  Midway  Islands  in  August.  1867.-'^ 
A  few  months  later  Seward  wrote  to  the  American  represen- 
tative at  Honolulu  (September  12,  1867),  "that  a  lawful 
and  peaceful  annexation  of  the  islands  to  the  United  States 
with  the  consent  of  the  people  of  the  Sandwich  Islands,  is 
deemed  desirable  by  this  government."  '^^  Sewartl  had  in 
mind  American  expansion  in  the  Pacific  and  shortly  after 
his  departure  from  the  Department  of  State  he  outlined  to 


SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY  417 

the  people  of  Oregon  a  program  of  statesmanship  for  the 
Pacific  Coast  which  called  for  the  United  States  to  "own 
and  possess"  islands  in  the  Pacific.  He  urged  them  to  re- 
gard the  extension  of  American  invention  and  enterprise 
into  Japan,  China,  Australia  and  India  as  worthy  of  consid- 
eration equally  with  international  commerce  between  the 
United  States  and  the  countries  of  western  Europe.-" 

The  opening  of  Korea  was  forced  upon  the  attention  of 
Seward  by  the  reported  aggressions  of  France.  In  March, 
1866,  a  number  of  French  Roman  Catholic  missionaries  and 
their  converts  were  massacred  in  Korea.  When  rumors  of 
the  facts  reached  China  Rear  Admiral  Roze,  of  the  French 
squadron  in  the  China  Seas,  was  dispatched  to  Korea  to 
make  an  investigation  and  also  to  conduct  a  preliminary 
survey  of  the  coast  with  a  view  to  the  dispatch  of  a  more 
formidable  expedition  later.  Admiral  Roze  returned  with 
the  information  that  the  General  Sherman,  an  American 
vessel  which  was  seeking  to  open  up  trade  with  the  Koreans, 
had  been  burned  and  the  crew  murdered.*  ^^  At  about  the 
same  time  an  American  schooner,  the  Surprise,  was  wrecked 
on  the  coast  of  Korea  and  the  crew  was  treated  with  civility 
and  kindness,  being  returned  to  China  by  way  of  Mukden 
and  Newchwang, 

Meanwhile  the  General  Sherjnan  affair  and  the  French 
action  after  the  murder  of  the  missionaries  was  creating  a 
great  deal  of  uneasiness  in  China  among  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives. M.  de  Bellonet,  the  French  Charge,  without 
authorization  from  Paris  had  made  an  abrupt  demand  on 
the  Chinese  Government  for  satisfaction  for  the  action  of 
the  Koreans.  He  addressed  to  Prince  Kung  an  extraor- 
dinary note  in  which,  reminding  him  that  the  French  were 
a  people  who  loved  war,  he  calmly  announced  that  in  a 
few  days  the  French  military  forces  would  ''march  to  the 

*TIu>  actual  dotails  of  the  General  Hherman  affair  wore  not  known  for  nearly 
twenty  years.  It  was  eventually  established,  liowever,  that  the  (lintral  Slicrman 
entered 'the  mouth  of  the  Ta-dong  River  at  the  time  of  u  freshet  and  was 
strande<l  in  the  river  when  the  water  suddenly  fell.  The  erew.  which  was 
heavily  arnn-d.  misunderstood  the  advances  of  the  Korean  authorities,  and  sub- 
jected" tliem  to  many  indignities.  WTiereupon  fire-rafts  were  set  out  in  the  river 
to  drift  down  on  the  deneral  biherman  and  the  crew  was  put  to  death.  If  the 
fault  for  the  loss  of  tlie  vessel  and  its  crew  was  partly  that  of  the  Koreans, 
at  least  it  was  probal)ly  not  exclusively   theirs.^' 


418  AAIERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

conquest  of  Korea,"  even  going  so  far  as  to  state  that  only 
the  Emperor  of  France  now  had  the  "right  and  power  to 
dispose,  according  to  his  good  pleasure,  of  the  country  and 
the  vacant  throne."  Bellonet  stated  that  "the  prince 
to  whom  will  be  confided  the  destinies  of  Korea,  under  the 
protectorate  of  his  Majesty,  the  Emperor  (French),  must 
become  a  Christian."  ^-  Prince  Kung,  probably  upon  the 
advice  of  Burlingame,  made  public  the  correspondence 
which  had  passed  between  him  and  the  French  Charge, 
much  to  the  latter's  discomfiture.  Admiral  Roze  followed 
up  his  preliminary  survey  with  a  strong  expedition  in  Oc- 
tober but  was  unable  to  accomplish  anything  beyond  the 
destruction  of  Kang-hoa,  a  city  on  an  island  north  of 
Chemulpo.  The  Roze  expedition  was  looked  upon  by 
Koreans,  Chinese  and  foreigners  alike  as  a  virtual  defeat 
for  France.  It  was  expected  that  in  the  following  spring 
the  French  would  collect  a  more  powerful  expedition  and 
make  a  second  attack.  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  was  pre- 
paring to  attend  the  expedition,  whether  invited  or  not, 
with  a  British  naval  force  to  look  out  for  the  British  inter- 
ests, and  Burlingame,  as  alarmed  as  his  colleagues  at  the 
disclosure  of  such  extensive  French  ambitions,  urged  that 
he  be  instructed  to  join  the  expedition.  He  wrote  (Decem- 
ber 15,  1866) : 

"If  my  advice  can  have  weight,  it  will  be  that  our  presence  there 
should  rather  restrain  than  promote  aggression,  and  serve  to  limit 
action  to  such  satisfaction  only  as  great  and  civilized  nations  should, 
under  the  circumstances,  have  from  the  ignorant  and  the  weak."  ^ 

Proposed  Joint  Expedition  to  Korea 

The  interest  of  France  in  Korea  was  not  news  to  the 
Department  of  State.  Ten  years  before  the  French  minis- 
ter at  Washington  had  solicited  the  cooperation  of  President 
Pierce  in  a  plan  by  which  France  would  occupy  Korea  as 
part  of  a  joint  plan  to  compel  China  to  revise  the  treaties. 
In  1861  Townsend  Harris  had  reported  that  there  was  talk, 
at  the  time  the  Russians  occupied  Tsushima,  that  France 


SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY  419 

was  contemplating  with  Great  Britain  the  partition  of 
Japan,  Seward,  on  receipt  of  the  reports  of  Bellonet's 
correspondence  with  Prince  Kung  and  the  presence  of  the 
French  forces  in  Korea,  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
expected  partition  of  Asia  had  begun.  Four  days  after  re- 
ceiving the  Burlingame  dispatch  of  November  12,  not  know- 
ing that  the  French  expedition  was  unauthorized,  Seward 
found  an  opportunity  to  propose  to  Berthemy,  the  French 
minister  at  Washington,  that  the  United  States  and  France 
unite  in  joint  action  to  obtain  from  Korea  satisfaction  for 
the  murders  of  the  French  and  the  Americans.  Berthemy, 
ignorant  of  Seward's  motives  and  knowing  nothing  of  the 
Bellonet  correspondence,  was  mystified,  and  yet  was  in- 
clined to  approve  the  proposal.  But  before  Seward's  pro- 
posal had  reached  Paris  the  French  Government,  embar- 
rassed alike  by  the  necessity  of  withdrawing  the  French 
forces  from  Mexico  and  by  the  reports  of  Admiral  Roze's 
failure,  had  found  it  expedient  to  announce  to  the  Corps 
Legislatif  that  the  first  reports  from  Korea  were  mislead- 
ing and  that  actually  a  great  victory  had  been  achieved. 
IVI.  de  Bellonet,  instead  of  being  recalled  in  disgrace,  was 
promoted  to  Stockholm,  and  Admiral  Roze  escaped  repri- 
mand. No  reason  now  existed  for  a  joint  expedition  with 
the  American  forces  into  Korea,  so  the  proposal  of  Seward 
was  declined  graciously.  By  a  fortuitous  course  of  blunders 
and  accidents  the  United  States  was  thus  released  from  obli- 
gation to  carry  through  what  could  hardly  have  failed  to  be  a 
thoroughly  disagreeable  program.^^ 

The  next  year  (1867)  the  American  naval  forces  in  the 
Far  East  made  two  attempts  to  learn  the  details  of  the 
fate  of  the  General  Sherman,  but  in  vain.  Then  Seward's 
nephew,  Consul  General  George  F.  Seward  of  Shanghai, 
sought  a  commission  to  proceed  to  Korea  with  a  view  to 
making  a  treaty,  and  the  request  was  granted.  George  F. 
Seward  was  given  a  letter  from  President  Johnson  to  the 
king,  and  was  authorized  to  proceed  to  Korea,  supported 
by  a  naval  force,  "to  procure  a  treaty  of  amity  and  com- 
merce as  nearly  similar  in  its  provisions  to  those  existing 


420  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

between  the  United  States  and  Japan  as  may  be  found 
practicable  and  expedient."  ^^ 

In  the  instructions  to  young  Seward  was  a  paragraph  in 
which  the  Secretary  of  State,  no  longer  embarrassed  by  the 
threatened  annexation  of  the  peninsula,  resumed  a  policy 
more  in  accord  with  the  general  spirit  of  American  relations 
in  Asia.    He  wrote : 

"The  design  of  this  government  is  to  render  your  visit  a  generous 
and  friendly  one,  reserving  the  question  of  force,  if  found  necessary, 
for  ultimate  consideration.  You  will  not  be  expected  therefore  either 
to  direct  the  exercise  or  make  any  display  of  force  by  way  of  intimi- 
dation, but  on  the  other  hand  you  will  be  expected  to  practise  dis- 
cretion, prudence  and  patience,  while  firmly  asserting  the  dignity  and 
maintaining  the  demands  of  the  United  States.  You  will  however 
give  notice  to  the  Korean  Government,  if  you  find  it  expedient,  that 
this  government  cannot  suffer  the  outrage  committed  in  the  case  of 
the  General  Sherman  to  remain  indefinitely  without  receiving  proper 
guaranty  of  adequate  and  ample  redress." 

This  expedition  to  Korea  was  not  undertaken  because 
when  the  instructions  arrived  in  Shanghai  it  had  been  dis- 
covered that  it  was  not  likely  to  meet  with  success. 

A  survey  of  Seward's  eight-year  record  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  leads  inevitably  to  the  conclusion  that  he 
was  the  greatest  Secretary  of  State,  so  far  as  Far  Eastern 
matters  are  concerned,  since  Daniel  Webster.-  Indeed,  we 
may  say,  at  the  risk  of  anticipating  a  conclusion  the  facts 
for  which  appear  in  subsequent  chapters,  that  Seward  was 
the  only  Secretary  of  State  in  the  nineteenth  century,  until 
John  Hay,  who  appears  to  have  had  a  firm  grip  on  the  sit- 
uation. And  when  compared  with  Hay  it  will  be  found 
that  Seward  had  superior  abilities  to  follow  a  policy  through 
when  beset  with  difficulties.  In  many  of  the  stipulations  of 
the  Burlingame  Treaty  Americans  may  take  honest  pride, 
yet  in  this  compact  the  immigration  question  was  not 
treated  with  statesmanship.  The  most  conspicuous  feature 
of  Seward's  policy,  aside  from  its  aggressiveness,  was  his 
desire  for  cooperation  with  other  treaty  powers.  Where 
other  occupants  of  the  office  both  before  and  after  his  time 
dodged  and  evaded  the  problem  of  cooperation,  Seward  met 
it  boldly.    For  the  sake  of  maintaining  cooperation  he  at 


SEWARD'S  FAR  EASTERN  POLICY  421 

times  sacrificed  American  ideals.  Over  against  the  treaty 
with  China  there  stands  to  his  credit  two  of  the  most  un- 
American  actions,  one  accomphshed  and  the  other  proposed, 
in  all  American  history.  The  joint  Convention  with  Japan 
in  1866,  and  the  proposed  joint  expedition  for  the  coercion 
of  Korea  were  not  worthy,  even  after  all  possible  explana- 
tions have  been  made  and  accepted,  of  American  traditions. 
But  in  neither  case  was  Seward  acting  as  a  free  agent.  He 
was  paying  the  price  of  cooperation  with  states  which  had 
entirely  different  ideals  as  to  the  execution  of  their  poli- 
cies in  Asia.  To  later  administrations  such  cooperation  was 
distasteful,  and  was  abandoned.  There  is,  however,  this  to 
be  said,  that  after  1868  American  interests  in  Asia  steadily 
receded  until  three  decades  later  when  the  American  Gov- 
ernment resumed  the  policy  of  cooperation.  The  with- 
drawal of  the  United  States  from  cooperation  was  one, 
though  not  the  only,  cause  of  this  retirement  of  American 
influence. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Geo.  E.  Baker:  "Works  of  William  H.  Seward,"  Vol.  1,  pp.  51  ff, 

236  ft',  249-50,  35(j  ;  Vol.  4,  p.  125,  pp.  24,  25. 

2.  Papers  Relating  to  the  Intercontinental  Telegraph;   Seward  to 

the  Committee  of  Commerce  of  the  Senate,  Gov't.  Printing 
Office  (1864). 

3.  Burlingame   was   first   appointed   minister  to   Vienna,   but   was 

unacceptalile  to  the  Austrian  Government  because  of  his  sym- 
pathies for  the  cause  of  Kossuth.  While  in  Paris  Burlingame 
received  notice  of  his  appointment  to  Pekin.  This,  in  part, 
may  account  for  Seward's  failure  to  issue  the  customary  in- 
structions. China  Despatches,  Vol.  20,  July  6,  1861,  Burlin- 
game to  Seward.     See  F.  W.  Williams :  "Anson  Burlingame." 

4.  Dip.  Corres.,  1862,  p.  839. 

5.  Ibid.,  1865,  Vol.  II,  p.  461,  Aug.  14,  1865. 

6.  Ihid.,  1866,  p.  536. 

7.  Ihid.,  1866,  p.  536. 

8.  China  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  June  20,  1867. 

9.  C.  O.  Paullin :  U.  S.  Naval  Inst.  Proceedings,  1911,  pp.  1139  ff. 

10.  William  II.  Seward's  "Travels  Around  the  World,"  p.  216. 

11.  Japan  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Dec.  19,  1861. 

12.  Dip.  Corres.,  1862,  pp.  814-16,  p.  547. 

13.  Notes   to   Russian   Legation,    Vol.    VI,   p.    102,    May    20,    1861, 

Seward  to  Stoeckl. 

14.  Dip.  Corres.,  1862,  pp.  813,  814. 


422  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

a.*"' 

-fSii^Ihid.,  18G2,  p.  974. 

16.  Ihid.,  1863,  p.  1036. 

17.  Ibid.,  1862,  p.  817. 

18.  Ibid.,  1862,  p.  819. 

19.  Ihid.,  1863,  p.  1013. 

20.  Ibid.,  1865,  p.  229. 

21.  Diaiy  of  Gideon  Welles,  Vol.  2,  p.  210;  Vol.  3,  p.  89. 

22.  Dip.  Corres.,  1868,  p.  705. 

23.  Japan  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Sept.  5,  1868 ;  see  also  Oct.  7,  1867, 

July  14  and  Oct.  5,  1868;  For.  Eel.,  1868,  p.  757. 

24.  See  Tyler  Dennett:  "Seward's  Far  Eastern  Policy,"  Amer.  Hi^t. 

Rev.,  Oct.  1922,  pp.  45-62,  for  a  discussion  of  the  purchase  of 
Alaska  in  the  light  of  recently  discovered  evidence  of  a  con- 
temporaneously proposed  joint  expedition  with  the  French  to 
Koi'ea. 

25.  Frank  A.  Golden:  "Purchase  of  Alaska,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  Vol. 

XXV,  No.  3,  pp.  11  if;  Speech  of  Chas.  Sumner  of  Mass.,  on 
the  Cession  of  Russian  America,  p.  1. 

26.  F.  W.  Seward:  Reminiscences,  p.  360. 

27.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  79:40-2;  S.  Rept.  194:40-3;  Moore's  "Digest,"  Vol. 

1,  p.  555. 

28.  Moore's  "Digest,"  Vol.  1,  p.  484  (footnote). 

29.  Seward's  Works,  Vol.  5,  pp.  577  ff. 

30.  Henri  Cordier:  "Relations  de  la  Chine,"  Vol.  1,  j)p.  267  flf;  W.  E. 

Griffis:  "Corea,  the  Hermit  Nation,"  pp.  373,  482-3;  Korean 
Repository,  July,  1898;  Dip.  Corres.,  Vol.  1,  pp.  414-5,  419  flp. 

31.  Korean  Despatches,  Vol.  2,   Mar.  29,  1885,  Foulk  to   Chandler 

(filed  by  date);  Griffis:  "Corea,"  p.  395  (footnote). 

32.  Cordier :  "Relations,"  Vol.  1,  p.  268.  ' 

33.  Dip.  Corres.,  1867,  Vol.  1,  p.  426. 

34.  The  documentary  evidence  of  Seward's  proposal   for  the  joint 

expedition  into  Korea  is  a  despatch  of  Berthemy  to  Marquis 
de  Moustier,  Mar.  2,  1867,  in  the  archives  of  the  French  Em- 
bassy at  Washington.  See  also  F.  F.  Low  to  Hamilton  Fish, 
Feb.  1,  1873,  China  Desp.,  Vol.  33,  which  encloses  a  draft  of 
the  answer  which  was  sent  to  Berthemy  from  Paris  in  reply 
to  Seward's  propos^al.  See  Tyler  Dennett  in  Amer.  Hist.  Rev., 
Oct.,  1922,  for  a  full  discussion  of  these  documents  and  for  the 
details  of  Seward's  Far  Eastern  policy. 

35.  Dispatches  to  Consuls,  Vol.  49,  p.  267 ;  For.  Rel.,  1870,  pp.  336-9. 


PART  V 
THE  RISE  OF  JAPAN 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION 

The  contrasts  between  China  and  Japan,  always  strik- 
ing, were  never  more  so  than  at  the  time  of  the  Japanese 
Restoration  (1867).  China,  spread  over  more  than  thirty 
degrees  of  longitude,  including  every  sort  of  climate,  soil 
and  mineral  resource,  was  economically  self-sufficient,  and 
believed  herself  to  be  politically  independent.  Japan,  a 
small  island  empire  of  wdiich  only  a  little  more  than  one- 
seventh  was  aralDle  land,  with  relatively  few  known  mineral 
resources,  unable  to  procure  such  essential  articles  as  sugar 
and  cotton,  frankly  recognized  her  economic  dependence 
and  her  potential  pohtical  weakness.  Her  rocky  and  storm- 
bound coasts,  a  sure  defense  under  a  policy  of  seclusion  in 
the  days  of  sail-navigation  were,  in  the  new  era  which  had 
been  ushered  in  by  foreigners  in  heavily  armored,  steam- 
propelled  vessels,  as  much  prison  walls  as  defenses.  Only 
the  merest  fringe  of  the  Chinese  Empire  had  been  touched 
by  the  foreigner.  Canton,  the  rocky  island  of  Hongkong, 
the  new  city  of  Shanghai,  Tientsin,  and  even  Peking  had  at 
times  within  the  past  generation  been  occupied  by  foreign 
military  forces,  but  these  cities  were  only  on  the  circum- 
ference of  an  immense  world  which  comprised  nearly  a 
fourth  of  the  population  of  the  entire  globe.  Even  if  the 
foreigners  had  permanently  held  every  one  of  these  points 
and  many  more,  the  Chinese  people  would  not  have  been 
greatly  embarrassed  commercially,  industrially,  or  even  po- 
litically. Between  the  mountains  and  the  sea  China  had 
every  possible  resource  necessary  for  comfort  as  well  as  for 
existence,  and  to  the  advance  of  the  foreigner  there  was  op- 
posed a  vast  mass  of  civilized,  organized,  industrious  hu- 
manity.    In  comparison  with  China,  Japan  was  a  prison. 

425 


426  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Within  its  narrow  borders  the  Japanese  people  might  con- 
tinue to  live  as  they  had  in  the  past,  but  no  longer  as  volun- 
tary prisoners;  they  would  be  in  the  position  of  captives. 
If  the  foreigners  were  to  hold  her  few  harbors,  Yokohama, 
Hiogo,  Nagasaki,  the  Straits  of  Shimoneseki  and  Hakodate, 
which  has  the  qualities  of  a  Gibraltar,  they  could  reduce  the 
proud  Japanese  Empire  to  an  industrial  and  political  condi- 
tion incomparably  inferior  to  what  was  possible  for  any 
other  oriental  state,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the 
Malay  peninsula  and  archipelago. 

The  political  theories  about  which  the  two  empires  were 
organized  had  a  common  characteristic;  each  nation  re- 
garded its  sovereign  as  either  actually  or  potentially  over- 
lord of  the  world.  In  oriental  political  economy  there  were 
but  two  possible  classifications  of  states — tribute-bearing 
and  tribute-receiving.  Both  China  and  Japan  belonged  to 
the  latter  class.  The  Emperor  of  China  had  insisted  that 
the  European  nations  bring  tribute  and  perform  the 
kotow  if  they  would  enter  his  presence.  Japan  held  its 
Mikado  in  religious  reverence;  he  was  of  divine  origin — a 
tribal  god — yet  possessed  of  discretion  sufficient  to  pre- 
vent him  from  demanding  in  fact  the  obeisance  of  the  world 
which  was  believed  to  be  due  in  theory.  The  contrast  be- 
tween China  and  Japan  at  this  point  lay  in  the  fact  that 
while  China's  claims  to  over-lordship  were  undercut  by  an 
essentially  democratic  and  peace-seeking  domestic  organiza- 
tion, and  crumpled  before  the  impact  of  the  Western  World, 
Japan's  claims  were  supported  by  popular  assent  and  reli- 
gious enthusiasm  and  at  the  opening  of  the  nation  to  the 
Western  World  entered  a  renascence  of  vitality. 

When  Lord  Hotta,  the  Shogun's  prime  minister,  went  to 
Kioto  in  March,  1858,  to  seek  the  assent  of  the  Mikado  to 
the  Harris  treaty,  he  unfolded  to  his  sovereign  in  an  address 
to  the  throne  a  theory  of  sovereignty  in  which  this  religio- 
political  idea  is  defined  with  precision.    He  wrote: 

"Among  the  rulers  of  the  world  at  present,  there  is  none  so  noble 
and  illustrious  as  to  comniaiul  universal  vassalage,  or  who  can  make 
his  virtuous  influence  felt  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         427 

whole  world.  To  have  such  a  ruler  over  the  whole  world  is  doubtless 
in  conformity  with  the  will  of  Heaven.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  and  in  establishing  relations  with  foreign  countries,  the 
object  should  always  be  kept  in  view  of  laying  a  foundation  for  secur- 
ing the  hegemony  over  all  nations." 

As  a  first  step  in  the  accomplishment  of  this  purpose,  after 
the  domestic  affairs  of  Japan  had  been  renovated  and  for- 
eign relations  established,  he  recommended  that  Japan 
should  "join  hands  with  nations  whose  principles  may  be 
found  identical  with  those  of  our  country. 

"An  alliance  thus  formed  should  also  be  directed  towards  pro- 
tecting harmless  but  powerless  nations.  Such  a  polity  could  be 
nothing  else  but  the  enforcement  of  the  power  and  authority  deputed 
(to  us)  by  the  Spirit  of  Heaven.  Our  national  prestige  and  position 
thus  insured,  the  nations  of  the  world  will  come  to  look  up  to  our 
Emperor  as  the  Great  Ruler  of  all  the  nations,  and  they  will  come 
to  follow  our  policy  and  submit  themselves  to  our  judgment."  *  ^ 

This  same  idea  reappears  at  regular  intervals  in  the  litera- 
ture of  Japan  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  There  is  nothing  comparable  to  it  in  the  utter- 
ances of  contemporaneous  Chinese  statesmen. 


The  Politically  Nebulous  East 

With  these  fundamental  differences  between  China  and 
Japan  in  mind  let  us  turn  to  a  brief  consideration  of  the 
political  situation  thus  created. 

Eastern  Asia  was  in  a  politically  nebulous  state,  which 
might  be  compared  roughly  to  a  solar  system  before  the 
orbits  of  the  planets  had  become  fixed  or  the  satellites  prop- 
erly distributed.  There  were  certain  central  masses,  some 
with  greater,  some  with  lesser  degrees  of  specific  gravity, 
and  there  were  smaller  organisms  which  swung  on  irregular 
orbits  in  between  the  larger  spheres.  These  latter  bodies, 
while  influenced  in  their  movements  by  each  of  the  larger 
masses,  were  still  not  wholly  assigned  to  any  one  of  them. 

*Prof.  W.  W.  McLar'^n  states :  "Expansion  and  agrgrandizomont  of  the 
Empire  had  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  teaching  of  the  loyalist  schools 
before  the  Restoration.  Yoshida  Shoin,  the  Choshiu  patriot,  had  published  a 
book  in  which  he  had  predicted,  as  a  consequence  of  the  restoration  of  the 
Emperor,  the  conquest  of  Formosa,  the  Kurile  Islands,  Kamchatka,  Korea, 
and   a   large  portion  of  Manchuria  and   Siberia."  - 


428  AMERICANS  TN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  large  spheres  were  China,  Japan,  Russia  in  Asia  and 
Great  Britain  in  Asia.  The  potential  satellites  were  the 
islands  off  the  coast  of  Asia — the  Kuriles.  Sakhalin,  Yezo, 
Tsushima,  the  Bonin  Islands,  the  Lew  Chew  group,  and 
Formosa;  and  the  so-called  tributary  states  surrounding 
China — Burmah,  Annam,  Tibet  and  Korea,  Until  the 
Europeans  came  with  their  rapid  and  reliable  communica- 
tion and  attempted  to  apply  the  rules  of  Western  inter- 
national law,  these  regions  and  islands  had  given  to  the 
larger  Asiatic  states  only  a  moderate  degree  of  trouble; 
lacking  the  steamship  and  the  telegraph  wire  both  Japan 
and  China  were  quite  content  with  the  political  status  quo. 
Now  the  situation  was  radically  changed.  Immediate  rea- 
sons appeared  for  a  closer  organization  of  the  politically 
nebulous  East.  We  see  the  consolidation  taking  place 
within  China  and  Japan;  we  note  also  a  proportionate  in- 
crease in  the  power  of  gravitation  which  these  masses,  with 
which  may  be  included  the  Russian  and  British  Empires 
and  France,  began  to  pull  upon  the  intervening  islands 
and  the  outlying  regions.  The  laws  of  physics  operated 
in  international  politics.  The  pull  upon  these  semi-de- 
tached spheres  was  in  direct  ratio  to  the  specific  gravity  of 
the  neighboring  masses,  and  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  distance. 
China's  relation  to  these  satellite  bodies  was  simple. 
Formosa  ^  was  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  ad- 
ministered as  a  part  of  the  Province  of  Fukien,  and  yet  re- 
maining largely  in  the  possession  of  unconquered,  unsub- 
dued aborigines.  The  Lew  Chew  Islands'*  had  their  own 
king,  who,  however,  received  his  investiture  from  the  Chi- 
nese Emperor  and  paid  a  regular  tribute  to  Peking  through 
the  customs  ofiEicer  at  Foochow.  Korea,'"'  Burmah  and  An- 
nam likewise  had  their  own  kings,  but  received  investiture 
from  and  paid  tribute  to  Peking.  Tibet,  similarly  to  For- 
mosa, was  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  Into 
the  history  of  the  origin  and  growth  of  these  relationships 
it  is  not  necessary  to  go.  In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  they  were  entirely  voluntary  and  mostly  ceremo- 
nial.    There   had    been   an   extension    of   the   traditional 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         429 

patriarchal  system  on  a  regal  scale.  The  dependence  in  so 
far  as  it  was  actual  was  more  economic  than  political. 
China  was  a  source  upon  which  any  economically  deficient 
nation  might  draw  to  supplement  its  resources.  The  trib- 
ute-bearing embassies  were  accompanied  by  trading  expedi- 
tions. On  the  other  hand  these  territories,  while  of  no  ac- 
tual value  to  China,  had  a  potential  importance  in  that  they 
would  be  a  menace  to  the  empire  were  they  to  fall  into 
unfriendly  hands.  Rather  than  call  them  active  buffer- 
states,  we  may  describe  them  as  comfortable  cushions. 
Probably  none  of  them  in  the  nineteenth  century  could  or 
would  have  gone  to  war  to  defend  the  Chinese  Empire. 
China  would  not  have  gone  to  war  to  protect  them  from 
injury,  nor  did  she  compel  Siam  to  continue  to  pay  tribute 
after  1834.  Indeed  China  had  not  only  already  acquiesced 
in  the  entrance  of  the  British  in  Burmah  and  the  French 
in  Annam,  but  had  even  ceded  a  part  of  one  of  her  own 
provinces,  the  left  bank  of  the  Amur,  to  Russia  in  1860. 
The  situation  with  Japan  was  very  different.  To  no  part 
of  the  mainland  of  Asia  did  Japan  lay  any  claim  except  that 
Korea,  until  1832,  had  been  accustomed  to  pay  tribute  to 
Japan  as  well  as  to  China. **  The  Korean  tribute  was  partly 
like  that  to  China,  ceremonial  and  symbolic  of  a  trade  rela- 
tionship, and  partly  an  oriental  form  of  black-mail  such  as 
all  tribute  had  once  been,  by  which  Korea  purchased  im- 
munity. The  Lew  Chew  Islands  paid  a  similar  tribute 
which,  however,  went  directly  to  the  Prince  of  Satsuma 
rather  than  to  the  Mikado  or  Shogun.  All  of  the  islands 
north  and  east  of  the  Lew  Chew  group  Japan  claimed  as  a 
part  of  the  Japanese  Empire.  The  Bonins  had  been  discov- 
ered centuries  before  by  a  Japanese  navigator.  Tsushima, 
lying  between  Japan  and  Korea,  was  purely  Japanese  and 
under  the  rule  of  a  daimio.  Yezo  (now  called  Hokkaido) 
was  Japanese  beyond  dispute,  although  it  was  sparsely  set- 
tled. The  Kurile  Islands  were  claimed  but  not  occupied. 
Sakhalin  also  was  claimed  although  it  was  not  until  1808 
that  a  Japanese  navigator  first  sailed  around  the  island  and 
discovered  that  it  was  not  a  peninsula  of  Asia.'^    Japan  did 


430  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

not  administer  Sakhalin,  nor  were  there  on  the  island  more 
than  a  very  few  Japanese  settlers.  These  islands  were  to  the 
Japanese  Empire  what  the  surrounding  states  of  her  neigh- 
bor were  to  China — buffers  of  little  or  no  value  until  they 
were  threatened  by  some  hostile  power.  That  these  islands 
might  be  valuable  as  sources  of  raw  materials  did  not  be- 
come apparent  to  the  Japanese  until  their  potential  wealth 
had  been  pointed  out  to  them  by  foreigners.  On  the  other 
hand,  Formosa,  to  which  the  Japanese  set  up  no  sort  of 
claim,  already  seemed  desirable  because  of  its  supplies  of 
tropical  produce. 

We  have  now  before  us  a  view  of  the  stage  upon  which 
Japan  was  to  enact  the  first  scenes  in  its  unfolding  drama 
of  political  expansion. 

The  Japanese  Empire  Begins  Consolidation 

In  1861  Russia  occupied  the  island  of  Tsushima,  which 
is  of  great  strategic  value  because  it  commands  the  southern 
entrance  to  the  Sea  of  Japan.  The  Russians  built  barracks 
and  planted  seed  as  though  they  had  every  intention  of 
remaining  permanently.  "For  the  last  eighteen  months," 
wrote  Townsend  Harris  in  reporting  the  situation,  "many 
officials,  English  and  French,  civilians  and  naval  men,  have 
frequently  declared  that  war  with  Japan  was  inevitable,  and 
that  it  could  only  end  in  the  partition  of  the  country 
(Japan).  It  is  said  that  the  Russian  commander  justified 
his  action  by  referring  to  these  declarations,  adding  that  he 
remains  at  Tsushima  solely  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
its  falling  into  the  power  of  the  English  or  French."  ^  To 
this  dispatch  Seward  replied  with  a  confidence  in  his  ability 
to  influence  the  Far  Eastern  policy  of  Russia  which  now 
seems  amazing: 

"If  the  occupation  of  Tsushima  is  still  an  object  of  anxiety  to  his 
Majesty,  the  Tycoon,  I  will  at  once  call  the  attention  of  the  President 
to  the  matter,  and  with  his  authority,  wliicli  I  doubt  not  will  be 
granted,  I  will,  in  the  name  of  this  government,  as  the  friend  of 
Japan,  as  well  as  of  Russia,  seek  from  the  latter  explanations  which 
1  should  hope  would  be  satisfactory  to  Japan." 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         431 

Seward  was  as  alert  to  meet  any  efforts  looking  towards  the 
partition  of  Japan  as  Humphrey  Marshall  had  been  to  pre- 
vent the  partition  of  China. 

Before  Seward's  offer  of  good  offices  reached  Japan 
Admiral  Sir  James  Hope,  supported  by  a  formidable  British 
fleet,  had  ordered  the  Russians  to  leave  the  island  and  they 
had  obeyed.  Meanwhile  Japan,  which  had  other  matters  of 
dispute  with  Russia,  had  entered  into  friendly  negotiations 
with  her  threatening  neighbor  through  the  Japanese  Em- 
bassy then  visiting  Europe. 

With  Russia  Japan  was  in  the  midst  of  prolonged  nego- 
tiations over  the  possession  of  Sakhalin  and  the  Kurile 
Islands.  The  Russians  had  lodged  a  claim  for  Sakhalin  as 
early  as  1804.^  By  the  treaty  of  1855  the  boundary  in  the 
Kuriles  had  been  fixed  between  Urup  and  Iturup  but  the 
two  nations  had  been  left  in  joint  occupation  of  Sakhalin. 
In  1859  Count  Muravieff  entered  Yedo  accompanied  by  a 
naval  force  and  demanded  the  cession  of  the  entire  island 
to  Russia.  When  reminded  of  the  treaty  he  declared  that  in 
making  it  Count  Putiatin  had  exceeded  his  instructions 
and  that  the  compact,  notwithstanding  the  ratifications,  was 
invalid.  The  Japanese  would  not  yield.  Three  years  later 
the  two  nations  agreed  in  principle  to  the  division  of  the 
island  at  the  50th  parallel,  but  the  agreement  was  not 
consummated  owing  to  the  state  of  Japanese  domestic 
affairs. 

In  1866  the  Shogun's  government  sent  an  envoy  to  St. 
Petersburg  to  reach  a  settlement  but  nothing  was  accom- 
plished. Four  years  later  the  newly  constituted  Mikado's 
government  instituted  a  Board  of  Exploration  for  Sakhalin. 
That  same  year  the  Japanese  Government  sought  the  good 
offices  of  William  H.  Seward  when  he  was  passing  through 
Japan  on  his  tour  of  the  world,  to  secure  the  mediation  of 
the  United  States  in  the  controversy.  Seward  suggested 
that  a  simple  solution  of  the  difficulty  would  be  for  Japan  to 
buy  the  Russian  claims  to  the  island  just  as  the  United 
States  had  purchased  Alaska, ^*^  The  Japanese  did  not  relish 
the  idea  of  buying  what  they  believed  to  be  theirs  by  right. 


432  AIMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  suggestion,  however,  was  adopted,  but  Russia  rejected 
the  proposal.  The  Japanese  Government  made  formal  ap- 
plication through  the  American  minister,  C.  E.  De  Long,  for 
the  good  offices  of  the  United  States,  and  Secretary  of  State 
Fish  immediately  took  up  the  matter  in  an  informal  way 
with  the  Russian  Government.  Russia  replied  both  gra- 
ciously and  adroitly  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  submit 
such  a  matter  to  mediation  because  a  precedent  would  thus 
be  established  which  some  unfriendly  European  power 
might  subsequently  attempt  to  utilize  to  the  disadvantage 
of  Russia.^ ^ 

Several  attempts  to  fix  the  boundary  were  made  in  the 
next  few  years  and  in  1875  Admiral  Enomoto  signed  a 
treaty  in  St.  Petersburg  by  which  Russia  received  the  whole 
of  Sakhalin,  while  certain  rights  in  the  island  were  secured 
to  Japan,  and  Japan  took  most  of  the  Kuriles.  Tokio  had 
seized  a  moment  to  settle  the  matter  while  Russia  was 
again  becoming  involved  in  the  Balkans.  Japan  was  willing 
to  make  a  concession  in  this  settlement  because  by  it  Japan 
was  for  the  first  time  negotiating  the  revision  of  a  treaty  on 
equal  terms  with  a  European  power.  This  precedent  Japan 
deemed  valuable  at  the  time  when  she  was  setting  out  on  her 
long  negotiations  for  the  revision  of  the  treaties  of  1858  and 
1866.1- 

Towards  the  end  of  1861  the  Japanese  formally  notified 
Townsend  Harris  that  they  intended  to  reoccupy  the  Bonin 
Islands  which  they  claimed  by  right  of  discovery  in  the 
sixteenth  century.  They  declared  that  the  rights  of  Ameri- 
cans would  not  be  disturbed.  Seward  allowed  the  matter  to 
pass  without  comment  although  Commander  John  Kelly 
had  formally  taken  possession  of  the  Coffin  group  of  the 
Bonins  in  1853.  Japan  was  forced  to  withdraw  from  the 
Bonins  for  a  time  during  the  domestic  disturbances,  but 
returned  to  them  again.  The  Japanese  yoke  did  not  rest 
easily  upon  the  Americans  in  the  islands  who  had  long  been 
a  law  unto  themselves  and  had  even  adopted  piracy  as  a 
profession. 1-^  There  were  several  protests;  in  1864  Pruyn 
collected  $1000  in  settlement  of  a  claim  made  by  a  sailor 


FIRST  STEPS  TN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         433 

from  Perry's  fleet  who  had  been  left  there.^'^  But  in  1873 
Secretary  of  State  Fish  formally  ruled  that  inasmuch  as  the 
possession  of  the  islands  had  never  been  expressly  sanctioned 
by  the  American  Government  those  citizens  who  had  gone 
there  were  to  be  regarded  as  having  expatriated  them- 
selves.^^* Great  Britain  after  investigation  also  abandoned 
its  claim.  The  Japanese  came  into  undisputed  possession  of 
the  islands  which  they  now  regard  as  legally  a  part  of  the 
mainland  of  Japan. 

It  was  the  assumption  of  the  foreign  representatives  in 
China  in  1866  that  Korea  was  a  dependency  of  the  Chinese 
Empire.^  ^  Japan,  while  still  holding  to  such  claims  on  the 
peninsula  as  had  been  represented  by  the  tribute  which  was 
paid  regularly  before  1832,  gave  tacit  assent  to  the  priority 
of  China  in  Korea.  In  that  year  Prince  Kung,  foreseeing 
that  the  assertion  of  Chinese  suzerainty  over  Korea  at  the 
time  of  the  murder  of  the  French  missionaries  would  lead 
directly  to  a  demand  on  China  for  reparations  to  be  paid  to 
France,  adopted  the  characteristically  Chinese  policy  of 
evading  responsibility  for  these  claims.  This  act  of  the 
Chinese  Government,  while  appearing  to  be  the  easiest  way 
out  of  a  difficulty,  was  a  repudiation  by  China  of  suzerainty 
over  the  peninsula.  The  French  Charge,  Bellonet,  had 
forthwith  seized  upon  this  repudiation,  and  proceeded 
against  Korea  as  an  independent  kingdom.  The  Chinese 
Government  expressed  no  interest  in  the  American  expedi- 
tions of  the  following  year  under  Commanders  Robert  W. 
Shufeldt  and  John  C.  Febiger  respectively.  The  contrast 
between  the  policy  of  China  and  that  of  Japan  at  this  point 
is  significant. 

The  Japanese,  although  in  the  midst  of  the  disturbances 
which  preceded  the  Restoration,  immediately  expressed  con- 
cern in  both  the  French  expeditions  and  the  visits  of  the 
American  naval  vessels.  The  Tycoon  announced  (May, 
1867)  to  United  States  Minister  Van  Valkenburgh  his  inten- 
tion to  send  an  envoy  to  Korea  because  he  had  learned  that 
there  was  war  between  the  French  and  the  Koreans.  He 
was  also  much  disturbed  over  the  troubles  between  the 


434  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Koreans  and  the  Americans  because  Korea  "is  a  neighbor  of 
Japan"  and  the  ''United  States  and  Japan  are  friends." 
He  extended  the  good  offices  of  Japan  and  expressed  the 
hope  that  through  Japanese  influence  the  Korean  king 
would  sue  for  peace,  and  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States 
would  return  to  the  peninsula.^^ 

"This  friendly  proceeding  is  highly  appreciated,"  replied 
Seward.  "It  is  deemed  proper  to  add  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  will  feel  obliged,  should  no  satisfactory 
explanation  or  apology  be  furnished  by  Korea,  to  consider 
how  proper  reparation  can  be  obtained  and  honor  main- 
tained." A  few  months  later  (January  27,  1868),  while  he 
was  considering  the  possibility  of  a  treaty  with  Korea,  Sew- 
ard added  an  expression  of  satisfaction  that  "the  United 
States  may  be  able  to  avail  themselves  of  the  good  offices 
of  the  proposed  Japanese  Legation."  ^^ 

Meanwhile  Japan  experienced  many  difficulties  in  re- 
suming intercourse  with  the  peninsula.  The  Tycoon  was 
unable  to  send  the  proposed  envoy  in  1867.  The  next  year 
So,  the  daimio  of  Tsushima,  through  whose  office  the  previ- 
ous intercourse  with  Korea  had  been  carried  on,  was  ordered 
to  send  a  special  mission  to  announce  the  Restoration. 
Three  years  before  King  Chul-chong  died  without  issue  and 
a  boy  selected  from  another  branch  of  the  Ni  family  had 
been  installed  with  his  father,  the  later  well  known  Tai-wen- 
Kun,  as  regent.  The  latter  was  anti-foreign  in  policy.  To 
him  is  ascribed  the  responsibility  for  having  caused  the  mas- 
sacre of  the  French  missionaries.  The  Tai-wen-Kun  had 
regarded  the  expedition  under  Admiral  Roze  as  a  complete 
victory  for  Korea  but  it  had  left  him  greatly  enraged  against 
the  Japanese  because  many  of  the  troops  used  in  the  French 
expedition  had  been  drawn  from  the  French  garrison  at 
Yokohama.  The  regent  believed  that  Japan  should  have 
prevented  the  sending  of  these  troops,  and  the  fact  that 
Japan  did  not  interfere  was  interpreted  by  him  to  mean 
that  the  Japanese  had  not  only  abandoned  their  policy  of 
seclusion  but  had  even  gone  so  far  as  to  enter  into  an 
alliance  with  the  French.    The  Korean  government  refused 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         435 

to  receive  the  Japanese  mission  and  likewise  refused  to  deal 
with  two  other  missions  dispatched  in  1869.* 

Thus  the  first  overtures  to  Korea,  with  which  had  been 
coupled  a  demand  that  Korea  resume  the  custom  of  paying 
tribute,  utterly  failed.  In  1868  Herr  von  Brandt,  the  Ger- 
man representative  in  Tokio,  whom  the  Japanese  had  in- 
vited as  they  did  the  Americans,  to  approach  Korea  through 
the  good  offices  of  Japan  with  a  view  to  securing  a  treaty, 
was  unceremoniously  denied  correspondence  with  the  Ko- 
rean government  on  the  ground  that  he  had  been  accom- 
panied to  Fusan  by  Japanese  officers.  To  one  of  these 
Japanese  commissions  the  Tai-wen-Kun  is  believed  to  have 
replied  in  the  following  bellicose  manner: 

"Your  demand  is  so  unreasonable  that  instead  of  Korea  paying 
yon  tribute,  it  is  for  you  to  return  tlie  money  paid  by  Korea.  In  your 
dispatch  you  have  made  many  insinuations  of  your  having  adopted 
foreign  customs ;  but  we  can  assure  you  that  Japan  is  Japan — Korea 
is  Korea,  but  Korea  has  its  own  customs.  Some  years  back  we  had  a 
difference  with  a  country  called  France  which  is,  among  barbarians, 
considered  to  be  veiy  powerful  and  very  large,  whilst  Korea  is  very 
small — but  we  defeated  that  great  country !  .  .  .  To  show  our  honesty, 
when  the  barbarians  went  to  your  country,  we  immediately  wrote  you 
that  we  had  made  every  preparation  to  help  you.  But  when  the 
French  attacked  Korea  you  neither  sent  us  aid,  nor  any  answer  to  our 
dispatch.    From  that  day  our  treaty  of  friendship  was  at  an  end.  .  .  . 

"Not  only  have  you  broken  the  treaty  as  we  have  described,  but 
you  have  also  broken  another  very  chief  point  of  the  treaty,  in  adopt- 
ing the  manners  and  customs  of  the  Western  barbarians.  Our  infor- 
mation is  that  you  have  adopted  French  drill — and  when  you  want 
money  you  go  to  England ;  and  if  you  wish  to  tax  your  own  people  or 
impose  duties  you  take  the  advice  from  Americans.  You  think  the 
Western  barbarians  are  great  people.  We,  Koreans,  are  a  very  small 
countiy,  but  yet  we  have  the  courage  to  put  into  writing  to  you  that 
Western  barbarians  are  beasts.  The  above  is  intended  as  a  direct 
insult  to  you  and  your  allies — the  barbarians."  ^ 

Hanabusa,  chief  secretary  of  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office, 
was  sent  to  Korea  in  1871  with  two  war  vessels  to  remon- 
strate with  the  Koreans  but  they  decUned  to  be  intimidated 
and  the  expedition  accomplished  nothing.  The  Koreans 
were  particularly  disgusted  because  Hanabusa  had  adopted 

♦One  of  these  latter  missions  was  charged  with  an  investigation  of  the 
relations  then  existing  Ix'tween  Korea  and  Russia.  Many  Japanese  officials  at 
that  time  were  urging  that  Japan  refuse  to  yield  to  the  Russian  claims  for  all 
or  even  any  part  of  Sakhalin,^^ 


436  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

foreign  styles  of  clothing.  Japan  was  now  on  the  point  of 
going  to  war  with  Korea. 

About  this  time  further  light  on  the  relations  between 
Korea  and  China  was  being  revealed  through  the  corre- 
spondence of  United  States  Minister  F.  F.  Low  with  the 
Chinese  officials  in  Peking.  In  preparation  of  the  American 
expedition  to  Korea  in  1871,*  which  was  really  the  con- 
summation of  the  plans  made  by  Seward  in  1868.  Low 
invited  the  good  offices  of  China  and  asked  the  Peking 
officials  to  transmit  to  Korea  a  letter  stating  the  purpose  of 
the  proposed  expedition.  The  Chinese  complied  with  the 
request,  but  stated  equivocally  that  although  Korea  was  a 
"country  subordinate  to  China,"  nevertheless  it  was  "wholly 
independent  in  government,  religion,  prohibitions  and  laws." 
Low  interpreted  this  answer  to  mean  that  China  was  seek- 
ing not  to  make  clear  the  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, but  to  avoid  the  assumption  of  any  liability  for  the 
loss  of  the  General  Sherman  or  the  unrequited  murder  of 
the  French  missionaries. 

An  answer  to  Mr.  Low's  letter  to  the  King  of  Korea  was 
duly  received  in  Peking  before  the  departure  of  the  expedi- 
tion in  1871  and  what  purported  to  be  a  copy  of  it  was 
reluctantly  transmitted  to  the  American  minister.  While 
in  Korea  Mr.  Low  received  from  the  Koreans  a  copy  of  the 
letter  as  originally  addressed  to  the  Chinese  officials.  When 
compared  with  the  document  which  the  Chinese  had  given 
to  Mr.  Low,  it  was  found  that  the  Chinese  had  omitted  to 
transcribe  a  part  of  the  letter  in  which  the  King  of  Korea 
had  made  the  most  profuse  acknowledgments  of  vassalage 
to  the  Emperor  of  China.  Low  reached  the  conclusion  from 
a  comparison  of  the  two  documents  that  China  was  actually 
very  much  opposed  to  the  opening  of  Korea  to  the  Western 
nations.    He  wrote  (August  3,  1871): 

"That  Korea  acknowlcd£i:es  the  siipvemaey  of  China  in  a  manner 
amounting  ahnost  to  servility  is  quite  apparent,  and  it  is  quite  rea- 
sonable to  suppose  that  China  does  and  will  use  all  the  means  in  her 
power  short  of  i:»rovokinf?  the  hostility  of  western  nations  to  maintain 
and  perpetuate  the  present  status  so  far  as  the  relation  of  the  two 

♦The  Low-Rogers  Expedition  is  reviewed  in  the  following  chapter. 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         437 

countries  is  concerned.  So  long  as  Korea  maintains  her  present  atti- 
tude of  non-intercourse  the  supremacy  of  China  will  be  aeknowleds'ed 
and  observed.  This  magnifies  the  importance  of  China  in  the  estima- 
tion of  her  people  and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  officials,  adds  to  their 
dignity  and  importance.  Were  Korea  opened  to  foreign  intercourse, 
the  bonds  of  vassalage  which  bind  her  to  China  would  be  weakened, 
if  not  broken  entirely,  and  the  tribute  which  now  comes  annually 
to  Peking:  would  soon  be  numbered  among  the  things  of  the  past.  This 
the  Peking  officials  see  clearly  and  hence  the  desire  to  see  Korea  re- 
main as  she  is."  " 

Japan  on  the  Verge  of  War 

While  affairs  between  Korea  and  Japan  remained  still 
unsettled,  the  latter  dispatched  (April,  1871)  a  representa- 
tive to  Peking  with  the  rank  of  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
powers  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with  China.--  There  were 
many  rumors  in  the  foreign  settlements  both  in  Japan  and 
in  China  that  the  intent  of  this  mission  was  to  create  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  of  Japan  and  China  which 
would  be  directed  against  the  foreign  powers.  The  mission 
was  halted  at  Tientsin  and  a  treaty  was  signed  July  29, 
1871.  To  the  Japanese  its  provisions  were  unsatisfactory 
because  it  did  not  provide  for  most-favored-nation  treat- 
ment and  because  it  contained  only  the  most  grudging  con- 
cessions of  extraterritoriality  with  bilateral  application.  In 
the  treaty  ports  Japanese  merchants  were  to  be  under  the 
joint  jurisdiction  of  the  Japanese  consul  and  the  local 
Chinese  official,  and  in  the  interior  under  the  Chinese  alone. 
To  the  foreigners  there  was  one  disquieting  article  in  which 
the  rumors  of  the  treaty  ports  appeared  to  be  realized.*  It 
provided  for  a  defensive  alliance. 

The  American  minister,  possibly  the  other  foreign  rep- 
resentatives as  well,  felt  that  an  alliance  between  China  and 
Japan  would  be  "calamitous"  and  he  exerted  his  influence  to 
have  the  article  stricken  out  of  the  treaty.    He  believed  that 

♦Article  2,  according  to  the  Cliinese  text,  read  :  "Tlie  two  countries  having 
a  >;o()d  understanding  must  naturaUy  feel  an  interest  in  each  other.  If  any 
other  country  treat  either  with  injustice,  in  such  case  each  will  mutually  assist 
the  other  ;is  soon  as  informed  of  the  necessity,  or  acting  as  intermediary,  will 
try  to  skillfully  arrange  the  difficulty, — in  this  way  the  friendship  will  be 
strengthened." 

A  translation  of  the  .Japanese  text  was  more  ambiguous:  "China  and  Japan 
being  friendly,  either  shall  in  case  of  experiencing  injustice  or  wrong  from 
another  state,   be  entitled   to  assistance  or  good  offices  of  the  other."  •'■' 


438  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  Japanese  were  quite  different  from  the  Chinese  and  that 
the  former  represented  a  "power  to  be  welcomed  as  an  ally 
and  to  be  dreaded  as  a  foe  by  all  civilized  states  should 
trouble  occur  with  China,  or  our  troubles  with  Korea  en- 
large and  increase."  ^'^  This  objection  to  any  form  of  alli- 
ance between  the  two  states  appears  to  have  arisen  out  of 
the  fear  that  in  the  association  thus  formed  Japan  would 
not  only  acquire  the  power  but  also  the  desire  to  adopt 
reactionary  policies  like  those  of  China  with  reference  to 
the  modernizing  of  the  empire.  Secretary  of  State  Fish,  in 
his  reply  to  De  Long  (December  30,  1872),  expressed -this 
fear. 

"In  any  conversation  you  may  have  with  a  view  to  influencing  the 
proceedings  of  the  Japanese  Government  in  its  intercourse  with 
China  it  is  advisable  to  induce  the  Japanese  to  separate  themselves 
as  far  as  possible  from  the  exclusive  policy  of  the  Chinese  and  to 
adopt  the  progressive  policy  of  free  commercial  and  social  intercourse 
with  the  powers."  *  ^ 

The  fears  of  the  foreigners  were  not  very  well  justified  by 
the  facts  of  the  existing  situation.  China  had  treated  the 
Japanese  mission  with  scant  courtesy  and  had  made  few 
concessions.  Meanwhile  the  Japanese  were  becoming  con- 
vinced that  the  hostility  of  the  Koreans  was  being  inspired 
from  Peking.  A  still  more  delicate  situation  was  growing 
up  over  the  possession  of  the  Lew  Chew  Islands. 

When  the  feudal  nobles  surrendered  their  powers  to  the 
Mikado  after  the  Restoration,  the  rights  of  the  Prince  of 
Satsuma  in  the  Lew  Chew  Islands  were  forthwith  trans- 
ferred to  the  Crown.  The  nature  of  these  rights  cannot 
easily  be  defined.  Hitherto  they  had  involved  nothing  more 
than  the  payment  of  annual  tribute. t  The  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment now  interpreted  them  to  involve  Japanese  sov- 
ereignty. An  order  was  issued  (September,  1872)  to  the 
king  of  the  Lew  Chews  to  appear  in  Tokio  to  announce  his 
accession  to  the  throne  and  to  congratulate  the  Japanese 

♦Tliis  reference  to  free  social  intercourse  is  rather  amusing  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  l)oth  in  China  and  in  .Tapan  in  all  social  functions  the  foreigners  had 
adopted  the  policy  of  rigidly  excluding  both  Chinese  and  Japanese  from  their 
society^" 

tFor  Commodore  Perry's  opinion  on  the  political  status  of  the  Lew  Chews, 
see  pp.  208,  '2.1'Z.^ 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         439 

upon  the  establishment  of  the  new  government.  The  king- 
dom of  the  Lew  Chews  was  formally  incorporated  into  the 
Japanese  Empire,  the  king  being  reduced  to  the  rank  of 
Japanese  prince  and  given  a  pension  of  30,000  yen.  Japan 
assumed  the  responsibilities  incurred  by  the  Lew  Chewans 
under  their  treaties  with  the  foreign  powers,  and  the  latter 
accepted  the  new  status  of  the  islands.-^  China,  however, 
protested  at  what  appeared  to  them  nothing  less  than  a 
high-handed  piece  of  robbery. 

In  the  estimation  of  the  Chinese  the  Japanese  added 
insult  to  injury  not  many  months  after  this  when  the  latter 
made  a  claim  on  China  for  reparations  for  some  Lew  Chew 
sailors  who  had  been  wrecked  on  the  coast  of  Formosa  and 
murdered  by  the  aboriginal  inhabitants.  The  claim  was 
based  on  the  ground  that  these  sailors  were  subjects  of 
Japan. 

Japan  thus  arrived  in  the  latter  part  of  1872  at  a  very 
alarming  situation.  Russia  was  clinging  tenaciously  to  Sak- 
halin, Korea  was  insulting,  China  was  aggrieved.  There 
was  also  a  most  disturbed  condition  of  domestic  affairs. 
The  ablest  Japanese  leaders  had  been  dispatched  on  the 
famous  Embassy  to  the  Western  powers  with  the  hope  of 
securing  a  revision  of  the  treaties,  and  at  home  the  samaurai, 
recently  disestablished  and  accorded  a  financial  settlement 
which  proved  a  most  unsatisfactory  solace  to  men  whose 
profession  was  arms,  were  in  a  bellicose  mood  which  pre- 
saged either  civil  or  foreign  war.  The  Korean  insults  which 
had  been  followed  by  the  prohibition  of  all  trade,  and  the 
unavenged  death  of  the  Lew  Chew  sailors  afforded  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  harassed  government  to  divert  the  attention 
of  the  unhappy  soldiery  from  a  civil  war  which  would 
paralyze  all  the  recently  inaugurated  domestic  reforms. 

Minister  De  Long  reported  from  Tokio  in  the  latter  part 
of  November,  1872,  that  Japan  was  about  to  embark  upon 
a  most  ambitious  military  program.  The  Koreans  were  to 
be  punished  for  their  persistent  refusal  to  pay  tribute  as 
well  as  for  the  insults  rendered;  an  expedition  was  to  be 
undertaken  to  Formosa  to  punish  the  aborigines;  and  an 


440  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

embassy  was  to  be  dispatched  to  Peking  which  would  be 
authorized  to  demand  an  audience  with  the  Emperor  and  to 
threaten  war  on  China  in  case  the  audience  was  denied. 
De  Long  was  unable  to  resist  the  intrigues  of  an  oriental 
court  and  found  a  great  deal  of  satisfaction  in  giving  the 
Japanese  an  extraordinary  degree  of  sympathy  and  assis- 
tance in  the  execution  of  these  rash  purposes.* 

In  the  latter  part  of  November,  1872,  C.  W.  Le  Gendre, 
United  States  consul  at  Amoy  since  1862,  happened  to  pass 
through  Japan  on  his  way  home  on  leave.  He  had  taken  a 
prominent  part  in  the  American  expedition  to  Formosa  in 
1868  following  the  wreck  of  the  bark  Rover,  and  claimed  to 
have  a  considerable  amount  of  military  experience.  De 
Long  introduced  Le  Gendre  to  the  Japanese  authorities  who 
immediately  recognized  him  as  a  valuable  assistant  in  the 
proposed  negotiations  with  China  and  the  expedition  against 
Formosa.  Le  Gendre  advised  the  Japanese  that  the  Chinese 
Government  did  not  exercise  sovereignty  over  that  portion 
of  Formosa  where  the  Lew  Chew  sailors  had  been  murdered. 
He  assured  them  that  a  small  expeditionary  force  sent  to 
Formosa  could  easily  effect  a  landing  and  that,  once  estab- 
lished, it  would  be  very  difficult  to  dislodge  them.  The 
Japanese  engaged  Le  Gendre  as  counsellor  to  the  proposed 
mission  to  Peking,  agreed  to  make  him  a  general  in  the 
Japanese  army  in  case  of  war  with  Formosa,  and  held  out 
the  inducement  that  in  case  Japan  were  to  remain  perma- 
nently in  Formosa,  Le  Gendre  would  be  made  governor  of 
the  island.  De  Long  felt  much  gratified  at  the  arrangement 
which,  it  seemed  to  him,  would  still  farther  separate  Japan 
from  China,  avert  civil  war  in  Japan,  and  place  Formosa 
and  possibly  Korea,  under  "a  flag  of  a  nation  in  sympathy 
with  tlie  Western  powers."  -'■'  Into  the  details  of  the  em- 
bassy to  Peking  it  is  not  possible  to  go  altliough  it  con- 
stitutes one  of  the  most  amusing  as  well  as  significant  epi- 
sodes in  the  history  of  Japanese  relations  with  China.*^" 
Soyeshima,  with  a  diplomatic  rank  superior  to  that  of  any 

*Wb('n  tlu'  full  cxti'iil  of  De  I.diiK's  activitios  became  kiiowii  in  Washington 
the  next  year,  lie  was  iiiiinediatcly   recalled. 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         441 

diplomatic  resident  in  Peking,  with  a  large  suite,  clothed 
in  Western  dress,  attended  by  Le  Gendre  as  Counsellor,  and 
accompanied  by  two  war  vessels,  appeared  in  China  in 
March,  1873.  The  ostensible  purpose  of  the  mission  was  to 
exchange  ratifications  of  the  treaty  of  1871.  The  intent  was 
to  secure  the  assent  of  China  to  the  annexation  of  the  Lew 
Chews,  to  the  expedition  against  Formosa,  and  also  to 
secure  from  China  a  disclaimer  of  sovereignty  over  Korea. 
Li  Hung  Chang  at  Tientsin  was  disposed  to  receive  the 
mission  with  contempt,  and  the  foreign  representatives  at 
Peking  were  almost  equally  scornful.  The  Japanese  insisted 
upon  the  most  exact  observance  of  international  law,  espe- 
cially in  the  matter  of  diplomatic  rank,  thus  claiming  for 
Soyeshima  as  ambassador  a  precedence  over  the  representa- 
tives of  the  foreign  powers  who  were  only  ministers.  Le 
Gendre  did  not  prove  a  help  to  the  embassy.  The  diplo- 
matic negotiations,  even  when  one  accepts  the  Japanese 
account  of  them,  could  hardly  be  called  straight-forward. 
The  mission  failed  to  secure  Chinese  assent  to  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Lew  Chews;  but  it  did  secure  as  definite  a 
waiving  of  responsibility  for  Korea  as  had  been  given  to 
Mr.  Low  in  1871,  and  the  evasive  answers  of  the  Chinese 
with  respect  to  Formosa  were  such  as  to  give  the  Japanese  at 
least  a  shadow  of  permission  for  the  proposed  expedition.* 

Incidentally  Soyeshima  forced  the  audience  question  to 
an  issue  when  it  was  hanging  in  suspense  and  while  he  was 
in  Peking  the  entire  diplomatic  body  was  for  the  first  time 
received  in  audience  by  the  Emperor,  Soyeshima  being 
accorded  precedence  over  all  the  other  representatives. 

The  maturing  bellicose  plans  of  Japan  now  experienced 
an  interruption  from  within.  The  Iwakura  Embassy  while 
in  Europe  heard  of  the  proposed  plans  and  were  in  dismay. 

*  Japan  confronted  China  with  the  principle  of  international  law  that 
sovereignty  over  territory  was  not  to  be  recognized  where  the  power  claiming 
sovereignty  did  not  exercise  the  fnnctions  of  gdvernnient.  To  this  claim  China 
replied  with  a  quotation  from  her  classics  which  she  understood  better  than 
international  law.  "Formosa  is  an  island  lying  far  off  amidst  the  sea,"  wrote 
Prince  Kung  to  the  ministers  of  the  Japanese  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
May  14,  l.S74,'"and  we  have  never  restrained  the  savages  living  there  by  any 
legislation,  nor  have  we  estalilished  any  governnu'«t  over  them,  following  in 
this  a  maxim  mentioned  in  the  Ifci  Ri :  "Do  not  change  the  usages  of  a  people, 
but  allow  them  to  keep  their  good  ones.'  But  the  territories  inhabited  by  these 
savages  are   truly   within   the  jurisdiction   of   China."  =^' 


442  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

They  had  seen  enough  of  European  poHtics  to  reahze  that 
Asia  would  not  be  left  undisturbed  in  the  fighting  of  its  own 
battles  and  they  hastened  home  to  plead  for  peace.  Im- 
mediately upon  their  return  there  was  a  division  in  the  cab- 
inet between  peace  and  war,  and  the  issue  was  submitted  to 
the  Emperor.  The  arguments  for  peace  were  overwhelm- 
ing: Japan  was  without  an  army  and  the  only  way  in  which 
one  could  be  raised  was  to  ask  for  contributions  of  soldiers 
for  the  ex-daimios  whose  return  to  power  would  be  an  ob- 
struction to  the  newly  organized  government;  the  Empire 
lacked  the  necessary  money;  and  then  there  were  the 
Western  powers  to  be  considered.  Okubo,  one  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Iwakura  Mission,  pointed  out  this  danger,  in 
effect,  as  follows: 

"Of  all  the  foreign  powers  Russia  is  the  most  to  be  feared,  and  her 
southward  movement  is  well  known ;  so  that  if  Japan  and  Korea  fight 
with  one  another,  both  will  fall  an  easy  prey  to  Russia. 

"England  is  also  a  powerful  nation,  from  whom  Japan  has  already 
borrowed  much  money,  so  that  if  Japan  and  Korea  fight  and  we  can- 
not pay  the  interest  in  consequence  of  the  war,  she  would  make  it  a 
pretext  for  interfering  in  our  internal  affairs,  thus  making  Japan 
another  India."  ^^ 

The  young  Emperor  cast  his  vote  for  peace.  This 
action  enraged  the  war-seeking  daimios,  one  of  whom  had 
been  so  eager  for  war  with  Korea  that  he  had  offered  to  go 
to  the  peninsula  and  expose  himself  to  further  insults  and 
even  death  to  provide  the  Japanese  with  a  sufficient  excuse 
for  a  declaration  of  war.  But  the  Emperor's  decision  had 
not  avoided  the  issue  of  war.  If  a  foreign  war  were  not  to 
be  permitted,  then  civil  war  would  ensue.  In  the  spring 
of  1874  Japan  decided  to  carry  out  the  Formosan  expedition. 

Formosa,  the  Lew  Chews  and  Korea 

The  Formosan  Expedition  was  organized  in  April,  1874. 
Two  Americans  in  addition  to  Le  Gendre  were  engaged  in  it 
and  an  American  steamer  was  secured  as  a  transport.  As 
soon  as  the  true  nature  of  the  expedition  became  known  the 
American   Government  requested  that  the  Americans  be 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         443 

detached  from  it,  and  the  AmeFscan  steamer  returned  to  its 
owners.  There  was  much  excitement  along  the  coast  of 
China.  Le  Gendre  was  arrested  by  the  American  consul  at 
Amoy  and  sent  to  Shanghai.  The  Japanese  effected  a  land- 
ing early  in  May,  and  showed  every  intention  of  remaining 
in  possession  of  the  eastern  portion  of  the  island.  In  Octo- 
ber, 1874,  a  Japanese  envoy  arrived  in  Peking  to  settle  the 
Formosa  dispute.  There  was  a  war  of  words  and  then  a 
rupture  of  the  negotiations.  As  the  Japanese  envoy  was 
about  to  leave  Peking  Dr.  S.  Wells  Williams  suggested  arbi- 
tration, but  the  envoy  stated  that  the  matter  was  'too  com- 
plicated' for  arbitration.^^ 

But  the  Japanese^were  not  to  be  permitted  to  settle  the 
Formosan  affair  in  their  own  way.  ^  Sir  Thomas  Wade,  the 
British  Minister,  had  already,  so  it  is  believed,  intimated  to 
the  Japanese  that  Great  Britain  would  not  view  the  Jap- 
anese occupation  of  Formosa  with  satisfaction  owing  to  the 
close  trade  relations  of  Formosa  with  the  British  merchants 
in  China,  and  now  he  intervened  and  became  mediator  of 
the  dispute.    An  agreement  was  signed  October  31,  1874.^^ 

In  the  treaty  between  China  and  Japan  in  1874,  for  the 
settlement  of  the  Formosan  trouble,  Japan  cleverly  inserted 
the  following  sentence:  "The  raw  barbarians  of  Formosa 
once  unlawfully  inflicted  injury  on  the  people  belonging  to 
Japan,  and  the  Japanese  Government  with  the  intention  of 
making  the  said  barbarians  answer  for  their  acts  sent  troops 
to  chastize  them."  The  treaty  also  stated  that  Japan  had 
acted  justly  in  the  matter.  Thus  Japan  cut  the  ground  from, 
under  the  Chinese  claims  of  suzerainty  over  the  Lew  Chews, 
for  the  people  referred  to  as  belonging  to  Japan  were  Lew 
Chew  sailors.  The  Chinese  claim,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
Japanese,  no  longer  had  a  standing  in  international  law, 
and  when  the  Chinese  discovered  the  way  in  which  they  had 
been  outwitted,  they  fell  back  on  sullen  defiance.  In  1879 
the  Lew  Chew  prince  was  still  further  reduced  by  the 
Japanese  because  his  emissaries  had  been  seeking  the  good 
oflSces  of  the  American  and  other  ministers  in  Tokio,  with  a 
view  to  having  the  old  relationship  to  China  restored.    The 


444  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

American  Government  had  contented  itself,  when  Japan 
formally  annexed  the  islands,  with  the  assurances  that 
American  rights  would  in  no  way  be  disturbed,  and  never 
interfered  with  the  program  of  Japan;  it  regarded  the  con- 
troversy as  purely  between  China,  the  King  of  the  Lew 
Chews,  and  Japan, 

The  points  of  irritation  between  China  and  Japan  mul- 
tiplied after  the  Formosan  affair  in  1874,  and  when  General 
Grant  visited  Peking  in  1879  the  two  nations  were  on  the 
point  of  war.  Grant  saw  very  clearly  that  the  European 
nations  might  seize  the  opportunity  to  enhance  their  own 
interests.  It  was  therefore  a  matter  of  satisfaction  to  Gen- 
eral Grant  when  the  Chinese  proposed  and  the  Japanese 
agreed  to  submit  the  Lew  Chew  question  to  his  mediation. 

After  many  conferences  with  the  Chinese  in  Peking  and 
a  thorough  review  of  the  question  in  Tokio,  General  Grant 
wrote  a  letter,  August  18,  1879,  to  Prince  Kung  which,  be- 
fore being  sent  was  shown  to  the  Emperor  of  Japan  and 
received  his  approval,^^  In  this  letter  Grant  made  the 
following  proposals:  (1)  China  to  withdraw  certain  threat- 
ening and  menacing  dispatches  which  had  been  addressed  to 
Japan  on  the  subject;  (2)  each  country  to  appoint  a  com- 
mission, and  the  two  commissions  to  confer  on  the  subject; 
(3)  no  foreign  power  to  be  brought  into  the  discussion,  but 
in  case  the  commissions  could  not  agree  they  might  appoint 
an  arbitrator  whose  decisions  should  be  binding  on  both 
Japan  and  China.  General  Grant  then  took  the  opportunity 
to  point  out  to  China  the  necessity  for  peace.  His  language 
is  interesting  for  its  earnestness  and  as  an  indication  of 
General  Grant's  conclusions  on  the  impending  conflict  in 
Asia,    He  wrote: 

"In  the  vast  East,  emhracingr  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  human 
popuhition  of  the  world  there  are  but  two  nations  even  partially  free 
from  the  domination  and  dictation  of  some  one  or  other  of  the  Euro- 
pean Powers,  with  strength  enouj^h  to  maintain  their  independence — 
Japan  and  China  are  the  two  nations.  The  people  of  both  are  brave, 
intellifjent,  fruf?al  and  industrious.  With  a  little  more  advancement 
in  modern  civilization,  mechanics,  engineering,  etc.,  they  could  throw 
off  the  offensive  treaties  which  now  cripple  and  humiliate  them,  and 
could  enter  into  competition  for  the  world's  commerce.  ,  ,  . 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         445 

"Japan  is  now  rapidly  reaching  a  condition  of  independence,  and 
if  it  had  now  to  be  done  over,  such  treaties  as  exist  could  not  be  forced 
upon  her.  What  Japan  has  done,  and  is  now  doing,  China  has  the 
I)ower — and  I  trust  the  inclination — to  do.  I  can  readily  conceive 
that  there  are  many  foreigners,  particularly  those  interested  in  trade, 
who  do  not  look  beyond  the  present  and  who  would  like  to  have  the 
]jresent  condition  remain,  only  grasping  more  from  the  East,  and 
leaving  the  natives  of  the  soil  merely  'hewers  of  wood  and  drawers 
of  water'  for  their  benefit.  I  have  so  much  sympathy  for  the  good 
of  their  children,  [the  foreigners]  if  not  for  them,  that  I  hope  the 
two  countries  will  disappoint  them." 

It  has  been  stated,  and  probably  correctly,  that  General 
Grant  went  even  so  far  as  to  recommend  that  Japan  and 
China  form  an  alliance  against  the  Western  powers.* 

Both  nations  accepted  Grant's  proposal  and  the  two 
commissions  met  in  Peking.  After  three  months'  discus- 
sion they  arrived  at  a  settlement  according  to  which  the 
islands  were  to  be  divided. f  However,  on  the  day  fixed  for 
the  signatures  China  suddenly  withdrew  the  question  from 
the  commission  and  referred  it  to  the  Chinese  superin- 
tendents of  trade  of  the  northern  and  southern  districts. ^^ 
"A  glaring  instance  of  international  treachery"  on  the  part 
of  China,  the  North  China  Daily  News  (January  27,  1883) 
called  it,  but  it  was  subsequently  discovered  that  Japan,  not 
content  with  the  settlement  of  the  Lew  Chew  question  by 
its  self,  had,  at  the  last  minute,  insisted  upon  the  inclusion 
in  the  agreement  of  some  additional  provisions  opening  new 
ports  and  trading  privileges  in  China  to  Japan. 

China  had  been  predisposed  to  settle  the  matter  in  1880 
because  of  the  strained  relations  with  Russia,  although  the 
surrender  of  Chinese  territory  to  a  foreign  power  during 
the  minority  of  the  emperor  was  a  risk  such  as  few  Chinese 
statesmen  would  have  dared  to  assume.  As  soon  as  the 
trouble  with  Russia  was  over,  the  Lew  Chew  question  again 

*The  Government  of  the  United  States  feared  that  the  good  offices  of  the 
United  States  were  being  accepted  by  the  two  powers  under  a  misapprehension 
that  General  Grant  in  some  way  officially  represented  the  United  States,  and 
instructed  its  representatives  to  make  clear  that  he  had  acted  in  an  entirely 
personal  capacity."" 

fit  has  been  frequently  stated  •"  that  General  Grant  himself  proposed  the 
partition  of  the  islands  between  China  and  Japan.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
most  important  point  in  the  mediation  by  General  Grant  was  that  China  and 
Japan  should,  if  possible,  settle  their  own  disputes  without  the  admission  of 
any  European  into  the   controversy. 


446  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

became  the  subject  of  great  irritation.  Li  Hung  Chang  out- 
lined China's  position  as  follows:  China  would  not  under 
any  circumstances  consent  to  the  destruction  of  the  au- 
tonomy of  the  islands,  or  the  division  of  them  between 
Japan  and  China.  He  desired  that  the  islands  should  be  re- 
stored to  their  original  conditions  of  tributary  state  to  both 
China  and  Japan.  Failing  this,  he  thought  China  would 
agree  to  enter  into  treaty  stipulations  with  Japan  by  which 
both  powers  would  guarantee  the  absolute  independence  of 
the  Lew  Chews. ^^ 

In  1882  Li  Hung  Chang  was  not  unwilling  to  fight  Japan 
for  the  possession  of  the  islands  and  war  seemed  imminent. 
The  international  situation  remained  the  same.  A  war 
between  China  and  Japan  would  be  destructive  to  the  best 
interests  of  both  nations,  and  also  detrimental  to  the  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States.  John  Russell  Young,  then  Ameri- 
can minister  in  Peking,  who  as  a  newspaper  correspondent 
had  accompanied  General  Grant  around  the  world,  and  who 
was  also  on  very  intimate  terms  with  Li  Hung  Chang, 
strongly  urged  the  Viceroy  not  to  enter  into  hostilities  with 
Japan.  The  question  had  passed  beyond  the  stage  where  it 
might  be  controlled  by  considerations  of  justice.  China  had 
signed  away  her  rights  in  the  treaty  of  1874.  Japan  had 
formally  annexed  the  islands  and  had  been  administering 
them  for  several  years.  But  more  important  even  was  the 
fact  that  China  was  in  no  condition  to  enter  a  war.  Peace 
at  any  price  was  the  only  safe  policy  for  the  Empire. 

The  Lew  Chew  question  was  soon  lost  in  the  greater 
problem  which  confronted  China  in  the  aggressions  of 
France  upon  her  southern  border,  and  the  annexation  of  the 
Lew  Chews  by  Japan  became  a  fait  accompli. 

Meanwhile  Japan  had  accomplished  the  first  step  of  her 
program  in  Korea. 

In  September,  1875,  a  Japanese  surveying  party  was 
fired  on  while  surveying  the  Korean  coast  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Han  River.  Immediately  General  Kuroda  and  Gen- 
eral Inouye  were  sent  to  Korea  to  settle  the  matter.  At  the 
same  time  an  envoy  was  sent  to  Peking.     The  envoy  to 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         447 

Peking  again  secured  a  disclaimer  of  any  Chinese  responsi- 
bility for  Korea,  and  became  convinced  that  China  would 
not  interfere  so  long  as  Japan  did  not  take  any  Korean 
territory.  Japan  therefore  decided  to  be  content  with 
merely  opening  the  country,  and  found  inspiration  and  sug- 
gestions for  the  role  in  the  way  Commodore  Perry  had 
opened  Japan.  Without  bloodshed,  but  in  the  presence  of 
an  imposing  naval  and  military  force,  Korea  was  led  lo  make 
a  treaty  with  Japan  at  Kang-hoa  February  27,  1876. 

The  Treaty  of  Kang-hoa  was  Japan's  entering  wedge  on 
the  mainland  of  Asia.  Its  most  important  provision  was 
contained  in  the  first  article :  ''Chosen,  being  an  independ- 
ent state,  enjoys  the  same  sovereign  rights  as  does  Nip- 
pon." ^"  Thus  the  first  step  was  taken;  Korea  was  led, 
adroitly,  to  disavow  Chinese  suzerainty.  The  treaty  also 
provided  for  the  opening  of  several  ports,  acknowledged 
Japan's  right  to  make  surveys  of  the  coast,  stipulated  that 
consular  and  diplomatic  relations  could  be  established  and 
granted  to  Japan  extraterritoriality  in  criminal  matters.  In 
general  the  treaty  was  unilateral,  and  similar  to  those  which 
the  foreign  powers  had  imposed  upon  both  China  and 
Japan. 

"The  treaty  of  1876,"  states  a  Japanese  historian,  "was  the  first 
clear  announcement  of  Japan's  foreign  policy  as  regards  Korea.  The 
policy  of  annexation,  though  not  impossible  to  carry  out,  was  from 
the  very  first  rejected  in  view  of  the  possible  conflict  with  China  (and 
later  with  Russia  also)  ;  but  neither  China  nor  any  other  nation  was 
to  be  allowed  to  substantiate  its  claim  of  suzerainty  over  Korea  on 
the  ground  of  free  competition."  ^' 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Satah,  Lord  Hotta,  p.   74,  cited  by  Treat :    "Early  Diplomatic 

Relations,"  pp.  99-100. 

2.  W.  W.  McLaren :  "Political  Hist,  of  Japan,"  p.  35. 

3.  James  W.  Davidson:  "The  Island  of  Formosa"  (1903),  particu- 

larly chaps.  9-13. 

4.  Foreign  Relations,  1880,  pp.   194  ff,  Dec.   11.   1879,   Seward  to 

Secretary  of  State;   1875,  p.  786,  Feb.   9,   1875,  Bingham  to 
Secretary  of  State. 

5.  W.   W.   Rockhill :     "China's   Intercourse   with   Korea   from   the 

Fifteenth  Century  to  1895." 


448  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

(5.     Griffis:  "Hermit  Kingdom,"  pp.  58,  159,  372. 

7.  Stead:  p.  150. 

8.  Japan  Uesp.  Vol.  4,  Oct.  7,  1861 ;  for  Seward's  answer  see  Japan 

Instructions,  Vol.  1,  Feb.  5,  1862. 

9.  Stead:  pp.  149  tt'.,  give  a  history  of  the  Sakhalin  controversy. 

10.  William  H.  Seward's  "Travels  Around  the  World,"  p.  58. 

11.  Japan  Desp.  Vol.  1-3,  Jan.  11,  1870;  Japan  Instr.  Vol.  1,  Jan.  17, 

1871;  Russia  Instr.,  Nov.  11,  1870;  Russia  Disp.,  Dec.  9,  1870. 

12.  Stead  :  p.  175. 

13.  The  Benjamin  Pease,  referred  to  in  Misc.  H.  Doc.  31 :45-2,  p.  12, 

pp.  32,  60,  200  tl".,  made  his  headquarters  in  the  Bonin  Islands. 

14.  Dip.  Corres.,  1804,  III,  p.  518;  Treat,  op.  cit,  pp.  309,  344. 

15.  For.  Relations,  1874,  pp.  635,  637. 

16.  Dip.  Corres.,  1867,  I,  up.  419  ft". 

17.  Dip.  Corres.,  1867,  II,  p.  36. 

18.  Dip.  Corres.,  1868,  p.  634. 

19.  Stead:  p.  148. 

20.  Japan  Gazette,  July  18,  1872,  reprinted  in  Japan  Weehly  Mail. 

21.  China  Desp.,  Vol.  30,  Aug.  3,  1871. 

22.  Stead  :  p.  154. 

23.  Martens'   "Recueil  de  Traites,"  01,  p.   502,  gives  the  Japanese 

form  of  this  article.  The  treaties  published  by  the  Maritime 
Customs  give  the  longer  form  of  the  article  in  which  a  defi- 
nite defensive  alliance  is  provided  for.  This  is  the  first 
instance,  of  which  there  have  been  others  in  more  recent 
years,  where  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  texts  of  agreements 
between  the  two  nations  do  not  agree. 

24.  Japan  Desp.,  Vol.  18,  July  6,  1871. 

25.  For.  Relations,  1873,  p.  567;  see  also  Japan  Instr.,  Vol.  1,  Aug. 

24,  1871. 

26.  See  accounts  of  receptions  to  W.  H.  Seward  in  "Travels  Around 

the  World." 

27.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  34:33-2  (Perry  Corres.),  pp.  139,  143,  168. 

28.  For.  Relations,  1873,  pp.  553,  564. 

29.  Japan  Desp.,  Vol.  21,  Nov.  22,  1872. 

30.  While  there  are  references  to  the  Soyeshima  Embassy  in  the 

despatches  of  Low  to  Fish  (For.  Relations,  1873,  pp.  177,  186 
et  seq.)  the  most  interesting  account,  evidently  based  on 
Japanese  documentary  sources  or  reminiscences,  is  found  in 
Stead,  pp.  159  flf. 

31.  China  Desp.,  Vol.  36,  Aug.  22,  1874,  Williams  to  Fish. 

32.  Stead :  p.  166. 

33.  China  Desp.,  Vol.  37,  Oct.  29,  1874. 

34.  P.  P.  China  No.  2  (1875)  Corres.  resp.  settlement  of  difficulties 

bet.  China  and  Japan;  Further  Corres.  presented  Mar.  9,  1875; 
For.  Relations,  1875,  p.  221,  Williams  to  Fish,  Nov.  12,  1874. 

35.  China    Desp.,   Vol.   (51,   Oct.   9,   1882,   Young   to   Frelinghuyson ; 

John  Russell  Young:  "Men  and  Memories,"  Vol.  2,  p.  294; 
"Around  the  World  with  General  Grant,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  410-12; 
415;  543-6;  558-60  "The  Loochoo  Islands,"  by  Charles  S.  Leav- 
enworth, p.  159  tF.,  gives  extracts  from  Li  Hung  Chang's  Let- 


FIRST  STEPS  IN  JAPANESE  EXPANSION         449 

ters  and  Despatches  on  the  Lew  Chews.    These  documents  are 
not  in  agreement  with  Mr.  Young's  account  in  several  details. 

36.  For.  Kelations,  1881,  p.  243,  Apr.  4,  1881. 

37.  Eobert  P.  Porter:  "Japan,  the  Eise  of  a  Modern  Power,"  p.  119; 

Morse:  "International  Relations,"  Vol.  II,  p.  322,  and  many 
others. 

38.  For.  Relations,  1881,  p.   229;   see  also  1873,  pp.  188,  553,  564; 

1879,  p.  637;  1880,  p.  194. 

39.  "Secret  Memoirs  of  Count  Tadasu  Hayashi,"  Appendix  A,  pp. 

316  if.;  China  Desp.,  Vol.  58,  Nov.  19,  1881. 

40.  Stead :   p.   177,   contains   summary   of   contents   with   comments 

of  Japanese  historian. 

41.  Ibid.,  p.  179. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TEEATY  OF  1882 

The  preceding  chapter  on  Japanese  expansion  closed, 
not  because  a  convenient  date  had  been  reached,  but  because 
it  is  now  necessary  to  describe  another  line  of  activity  be- 
fore going  on  with  the  account  of  Japan's  efforts  to  consoli- 
date a  satisfactory  territorial  position  in  Asia.  In  taking 
the  next  step  in  Korea,  Japan  was  greatly  aided  by  the 
desire  of  Western  nations,  particularly  the  United  States,  to 
see  the  peninsula  opened  to  trade. 

The  movement  to  open  Korea,  first  seriously  initiated 
by  William  H.  Seward  in  1868  and  accomplished  in  1882 
by  Commodore  R.  W.  Shufeldt,  was  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant political  action  undertaken  by  the  United  States 
in  Asia  until  the  occupation  of  the  Philippines  in  1898. 
To  disturb  Korea  in  any  way  was  to  disturb  the  equilibrium 
of  the  Far  East.  By  the  treaty  of  1876  in  which  Korea  was 
led  to  disavow  Chinese  suzerainty,  a  balance  had  been  estab- 
lished between  China  and  Japan.  The  transcending  politi- 
cal question  for  the  Western  nations  was  whether  to  recog- 
nize the  contention  thus  set  up  by  Japan  that  Korea  was 
independent,  or  to  continue  to  accept  the  evasive  utter- 
ances of  China  as  implying  the  existence  of  Chinese  suze- 
ranity. 

Expediency  of  Disturbing  the  Status  Quo 

One  is  forced  to  the  conclusion  from  a  study  of  the 
declarations  of  both  Chinese  statesmen  and  Korean  leaders 
of  the  time  that  there  was  involved  for  the  Western  nations 
no  question  of  political  righteousness.  Notwithstanding 
the    unconvincing   nature   of   the    disavowals    of   Chinese 

450 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    451 

sovereignty,  China  in  1876  had  no  vahcl  claim  to  Korea. 
Peking  exercised  no  achninistrative  functions  and  had  re- 
peatedly denied  any  control  of  Korean  affairs.  The  Chinese 
had  disavowed  any  responsibility  for  claims  arising  out  of 
the  damage  to  foreign  life  and  property  in  the  peninsula; 
they  undertook  no  measures  whatever  to  prevent  shipwrecks 
or  the  recurrence  of  such  events  as  the  murder  of  the  French 
missionaries.  Even  when  one  gives  to  the  Chinese  asser- 
tions of  the  subordinations  of  Korea  to  the  Empire  a  value 
unmodified  by  the  accompanying  disavowals  of  responsi- 
bility, one  is  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Chinese  were 
pursuing  merely  a  dog-in-the-manger  policy.  They  did  not 
want  Korea,  but  they  did  not  want  Korea  to  come  under 
the  shadow  of  any  other  power,  nor  did  they  relish  the  idea 
of  Korean  independence.  Likewise  Japan  had  not  the 
shadow  of  a  claim  to  possession  of  Korea.  Japan's  claims 
were  purely  economic.  In  a  measure  Japan  was  dependent 
upon  Korea  for  food-stuffs.  To  admit  that  the  economic 
dependence  of  one  nation  upon  another  constitutes  a  valid 
claim  for  territorial  possession  by  the  dependent  country  is 
to  admit  a  proposition  which  renders  insecure  the  bounda- 
ries of  most  of  the  nations  of  the  earth. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  in  the  existing  relationship 
between  Japan  and  Korea  a  question  of  political  expediency 
for  the  Western  nations,  which  merited  a  greater  degree  of 
study  than  was  given  to  it  by  American  statesmen  in  their . 
various  efforts  to  enter  into  treaty  relationship  with  the 
Korean  people.  For  Korea  there  were  four  possibilities: 
Chinese  suzerainty;  Japanese  suzerainty;  the  suzerainty  of 
some  European  power  such  as  France  or  of  Russia ;  or,  politi- 
cal independence.  In  framing  a  policy  to  meet  such  an  un- 
certain situation  the  Americans  could  bring  forward  two 
traditional  and  characteristically  American  policies:  the 
United  States  had  already  registered  its  disapproval  of  the 
advance  of  European  powers  in  Asia,  and  was  committed  to 
a  policy  of  recognizing  and  even  sustaining  in  a  feeble  way 
the  independence  of  the  Asiastic  states;  and,  Americans 
were  prone  to  hold  that  every  people,  with  the  exception  of 


452  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  American  Indians,  were  and  by  right  ought  to  be  free 
and  independent. 

Among  the  four  possibilities  enumerated  above  the 
question  of  the  future  status  of  Korea  was  purely  one  of 
expediency.  The  Koreans,  at  least  their  rulers,  were  bitterly 
anti-foreign.  They  were  disposed  to  adhere  to  a  blind  and 
irrational  policy  of  seclusion.  That  they  did  not  desire  to 
be  subjected  to  any  Western  power  was  obvious.  That  they 
would  not  welcome  Japanese  domination  was  equally  evi- 
dent. Where  they  stood  as  between  Chinese  suzerainty  and 
political  independence  was  not  clear  when  the  Americans 
came  to  consider  the  question  of  a  treaty.  Obviously  the 
United  States  was  under  no  obligations  to  consider  them 
independent  if  they  did  not  so  desire.  But  at  this  point 
another  question  intervened:  which  was  better  for  American 
trade,  Chinese  suzerainty  or  Korean  independence?  Korea 
under  the  shadow  of  China  presumably  would  resist  rather 
than  encourage  foreign  trade  and  domestic  renovation.  This 
consideration  appears  to  have  had  influence.  That  a  condi- 
tion of  technical  independence,  undefended  and  defenseless, 
might  be  worse  than  Chinese  suzerainty,  seems  never  to 
have  occurred  to  the  American  Government. 

There  were  three  possible  ways  to  approach  Korea: 
directly,  through  Japan,  or  through  China.  'The  United 
States  tried  them  all  impartially,  moved  by  a  single  desire  to 
make  a  treaty  and  to  open  the  country. 

Direct  negotiations  were,  as  we  have  already  noted, 
authorized  by  William  H.  Seward  in  1868.^  Had  the  Jap- 
anese succeeded  in  1868  or  1869  in  establishing  friendly 
relations  with  the  Koreans  it  is  very  probable  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  would  have  accepted  the 
Japanese  invitation,  as  the  German  representative  at  Tokio 
did,  and  would  have  sought  an  entrance  into  Korea  by 
means  of  Japanese  good  offices.  The  failure  of  the  Japanese 
negotiations,  however,  induced  the  American  Government 
to  make  its  next  effort  through  Peking. 

The  corresponrlence  between  U.  vS.  Minister  Low  and 
the  Tsung-li  Yamen  at  Peking  in  1870-1  has  already  been 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    453 

alluded  to.  The  details  of  the  visit  of  the  Americans  to 
Korea  in  1871  were  as  follows: 

The  expedition  under  the  joint  direction  of  Mr.  Low 
and  Admiral  John  Rogers  was  designed  to  be  carried  out 
after  the  pattern  of  the  Perry  visit  to  Japan  in  1853.  It 
was  as  much  of  a  failure  as  most  imitations  are.  With  a 
fleet  of  five  steamships  the  Americans  arrived  off  the  coast 
on  May  19,  1871,  and  a  few  days  later  came  to  anchor  in 
the  Salee  River  below  Seoul.  Communications  with  the 
shore  were  opened  through  some  minor  officials  who  visited 
the  ship  but  the  objects  of  the  expedition  were  not  revealed. 
Shortly  afterwards  a  Korean  fort  fired  on  a  surveying  party 
which  had  proceeded  up  the  river,  and  in  the  engagement 
which  took  place  two  Americans  were  wounded,  and  many 
Koreans  were  killed  or  wounded.  Mr.  Low  demanded  an 
apology  which  was  not  forthcoming.  The  Americans  then 
resorted  to  retaliation,  destroying  five  forts  and  killing  or 
wounding  350  Koreans.  Again  Low  demanded  communica- 
tions with  high  ofiicials  with  a  view  to  making  a  treaty,  but 
now  the  Koreans  were  stubborn  and  refused  to  forward 
Low's  letters  to  the  King.  The  Americans  were  thus  pre- 
sented with  a  choice  between  further  military  measures  or 
retirement.  Not  being  prepared,  or  authorized,  to  under- 
take the  conquest  of  Korea,  Rear  Admiral  Rogers,  like  his 
predecessor,  the  French  Admiral  Roze  in  1866,  decided  to 
retire,  which  he  did  on  July  3.- 

Korea  was  again  left  in  the  belief  that  the  foreigners 
had  been  compelled  to  retreat  before  her  army,  and  the 
expedition  was  looked  upon  by  the  Chinese  also  as  a  defeat 
for  foreigners.  The  outcome  of  the  expedition  was  regretted 
by  the  foreign  communities  because  it  tended  to  lower  the 
prestige  of  the  foreign  powers  in  Asia  at  a  time  when  the 
Chinese  were  stiffening  their  opposition  to  the  revision  of 
the  treaties.  The  expedition  reflected  no  credit  on  the 
Americans, 


454  AAIERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  United  States  Inclines  to  Japan 

The  developments  of  the  next  few  years  materially 
altered  the  situations  of  both  China  and  Japan  with  refer- 
ence to  the  peninsula.  Air.  Low  became  persuaded  that  the 
Chinese  Government  had  been  acting  with  duplicity,  and 
that  while  professing  inthfference  it  had  secretly  exerted  its 
influence  to  thwart  the  expedition.  IMeanwhile  other  factors 
were  at  work  to  mar  the  relations  between  the  Chinese  and 
the  foreigners.  While  the  Americans  had  regarded  the 
murder  of  the  French  Catholic  converts  in  the  Tientsin 
massacre  in  1870  as  due  more  to  the  rashness  and  unscrupu- 
lous conduct  of  the  French  than  to  the  savagery  of  the 
Chinese,  the  murder  of  the  British  envoy,  Margery,  on  the 
Burmah  border  in  1875,  had  been  a  shock  to  the  entire 
foreign  body  in  China  and  a  sinister  reminder  of  the  fact 
that  China  tolerated  the  foreigners  only  because  their  armies 
and  navies  protected  them.  The  persecution  of  Christians 
and  missionaries  was  increasing.  Furthermore  the  Chinese 
immigration  question  in  California  was  becoming  acute. 
As  an  indication  of  the  attitude  of  American  public  opinion 
we  may  cite  the  fact  that  although  Congress  had  extended 
permission  to  the  Japanese  students  to  enter  the  naval 
academy  at  Annapolis,  the  repeated  requests  of  the  Chinese 
Government  for  a  similar  courtesy  had  been  ignored.^ 

Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  was  steadily  rising  in  the 
"estimation  of  Americans.  The  first  steps  in  the  expansive 
movement  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter  had  provoked  ad- 
miration, although  those  who  knew  the  details  of  the  Jap- 
anese negotiations  in  Peking  regarded  them  as  treacherous. 
Meanwhile  the  Japanese  efforts  at  domestic  reform  had  won 
the  approval  of  the  American  Government  to  such  an  extent 
that  in  1878  Secretary  of  State  William  H.  Evarts  was 
willing  to  sign  a  revision  of  the  treaty  of  1866. 

While  De  Long  had  been  recalled  from  Tokio  for  his 
indiscretions,  his  contention  had  come  to  be  accepted  by  the 
American  Government,  viz.,  that  Japan  held  the  key  by 
which  to  unlock  the  East.    Soyeshima  in  Peking  in  1873 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    455 

had  forced  the  Chinese  to  abandon  a  most  cherished  tradi- 
tion and  secured  for  the  diplomatic  corps  an  audience  with 
the  Emperor  in  which  no  kotow  had  been  exacted.  Three 
years  later  Japan  had  succeeded  in  negotiating  a  treaty  with 
Korea  in  which  several  ports  were  thrown  open  to  Japanese 
trade.  Although  the  European  powers  and  the  foreign 
diplomats  in  China  were  most  reluctant  to  realize  and 
admit  it,  Japan  was,  in  the  opinion  of  America,  rapidly 
achieving  the  leadership  of  Eastern  Asia.* 

The  Japanese  were  exerting  themselves  to  gain  this 
very  recognition.  Japanese  policy  was  being  directed 
towards  inducing  the  foreign  powers  to  deal  with  Korea 
through  Japan.  An  article  supplementary  to  the  treaty  of 
August  24,  1876,  had  stipulated  that  in  case  any  foreigners 
were  wrecked  on  the  coast  of  Korea  they  were  to  be  deliv- 
ered to  the  Japanese  authorities  who  would  assume  respon- 
sibility for  their  repatriation.'*  This  article  was  obviously 
intended  to  transfer  to  Japan  a  relationship  which  had 
formerly  existed  between  Korea  and  China.  In  1866  the 
crew  of  the  Surprise  had  been  repatriated  across  the  Chinese 
border  and  by  the  agency  of  Chinese  officials. 

The  next  American  effort  to  open  Korea  was  made  by 
Commodore  R.  W.  Shufeldt  who  had  commanded  the  U. 
S.  S.  Wachusetts  which  visited  Korea  in  1866-7  to  investi- 
gate the  General  Sherrnan  affair.  Shufeldt's  instructions 
from  R.  W,  Thompson,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  were  dated 
October  29,  1878,  and  to  them  were  added  a  letter  from 
Secretary  of  State  Evarts  to  Thompson,  dated  November 
9,  1878 — a  little  more  than  three  months  after  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  new  treaty  with  Japan. 

Evarts  expressed  no  great  interest  in  the  opening  of 
Korea.  So  far  as  he  knew  there  had  been  no  material 
change  in  the  prospects  since  1871.  He  drew  attention  to 
the  provision  of  the  treaty  of  1876  relating  to  the  return  of 
shipwrecked  seamen  by  way  of  Japan  as  possibly  indicating 

*  Perhaps  the  (locisive  factor  in  incllninR  American  policy  toward  Japan, 
was  the  influence  of  (Jeneral  Grant  who  had,  in  1879,  been  more  favorably 
impressed  by  the  Japanese.  Grant's  visit  to  the  East  may  be  reckoned  as  a 
very  important  date  in  the  history  of  American   policy   in  Asia. 


456  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

an  "intimacy  between  those  two  countries  which  may  be 
taken  advantage  of"  and  stated  that  he  would  be  glad  to 
have  Shufeldt  investigate  and  report  as  to  whether  Korea 
would  be  willing  to  make  a  treaty  "similar  in  spirit  and 
purpose  to  those  already  in  existence  with  other  oriental 
countries."  Thompson  directed  Shufeldt,  in  the  course  of 
a  cruise  in  the  U.  S.  S.  Ticondcroga  which  was  to  include 
visits  to  unfrequented  parts  of  Africa,  Asia,  and  the  islands 
of  the  Indian  Ocean  and  adjacent  seas,  to  "visit  some  part 
of  Korea  with  the  endeavor  to  open  by  peaceful  measures 
negotiations  with  that  government.  It  is  believed  that  the 
attack  upon  the  Korean  forts  in  1871  is  susceptible  of  satis- 
factory explanation  and  that  a  moderate  and  conciliatory 
course  towards  the  government  would  result  in  opening  the 
ports  of  that  country  to  American  commerce."  -'  That  the 
American  Government  was  aware  in  thus  resuming  the 
efforts  to  open  Korea  that  it  was  taking  any  step  of  impor- 
tance is  not  apparent. 

In  April,  1880,  Commodore  Shufeldt  in  the  Ticonderoga 
reached  Nagasaki.  His  appearance  and  mission  took  the 
Japanese  by  surprise.  United  States  Minister  John  A. 
Bingham  had  been  instructed  to  invite  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment to  give  to  Shufeldt  suitable  letters  of  introduction 
to  the  Korean  authorities.  The  Japanese  hesitated. 
Foreign  Minister  Inouye  stated  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment was  reluctant  to  disturb  the  Koreans  at  a  time  when 
its  own  relations  with  them  were  still  so  largely  unsettled. 
The  best  that  Bingham  was  able  to  secure  was  a  letter  of 
introduction  to  the  Japanese  consul  at  Fusan, 

Shufeldt  arrived  at  Fusan  May  4,  1880,  and  immediately 
attempted  to  send  a  letter  to  the  King  of  Korea  through 
the  Japanese  consul.  The  consul  reported  that  the  governor 
of  the  district  refused  to  forward  the  letter.  Shufeldt  then 
returned  to  Japan  and  went  personally  to  Tokio.  With  no 
little  reluctance  Inouye  was  persuaded  to  send  Shufeldt's 
letter  with  one  of  his  own  to  the  King  of  Korea,  on  the 
condition  that  Shufeldt  would  remain  at  Nagasaki  for  an 
answer.     Thus  the   Americans  were  made   to   appear  as 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    457 

though  they  were  deahng  with  Korea  through  Japanese 
channels.  This  second  attempt  failed  as  dismally  as  the 
first,  and  in  the  reply  of  the  Korean  minister  of  ceremony 
there  appeared  the  following  sentence  which  was  so  lacking 
in  truth  as  to  raise  suspicions  as  to  its  origin : 

"It  is  well  known  to  the  world  that  our  foreign  relations  are  only 
with  Japan,  neighboring  to  ns,  which  have  been  maintained  since  three 
hundred  years,  and  that  other  foreign  nations  are  not  only  situated 
far  from  us,  but  there  has  never  been  any  intercourse  with  them."  ° 

It  was  reasonably  clear  to  Shufeldt  that  Japan  was 
actuated  by  no  earnest  desire  to  have  the  trade  of  Korea 
thrown  open  to  the  world,  and  that  the  Japanese  were 
manipulating  the  negotiations  to  serve  their  own  purpose. 

Shufeldt  and  the  Good  Offices  of  Li  Hung  Chang 

While  Shufeldt  was  waiting  at  Nagasaki  for  his  answer 
from  Korea  his  presence  and  purpose  was  made  known  to 
Li  Hung  Chang  at  Tientsin.  To  the  Viceroy  the  news  was, 
probably,  somewhat  alarming.  China  was  then  on  the  verge 
of  war  with  Russia.  In  the  prospective  conflict  China  would 
be  helpless  as  General  Gordon,  who  was  summoned  to  give 
advice  because  of  his  success  in  the  Taiping  Rebellion, 
bluntly  advised  Li  Hung  Chang.  The  presence  of  Shufeldt 
in  Japan  could  only  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  the 
American  Government,  approving  the  treaty  of  1876  in 
which  the  Chinese  suzerainty  over  Korea  was  not  acknowl- 
edged, was  about  to  throw  the  weight  of  its  influence  on 
the  side  of  Japan  in  the  controversy  over  Korea.  Thus 
China  was  menaced  directly  by  Russia  and  also,  so  it  ap- 
peared, by  a  combination  of  Japan  and  the  United  States, 
and  as  a  result  of  either  of  these  dangers  China  might  lose 
its  position  in  the  peninsula.  Chinese  diplomacy,  however, 
was  by  no  means  unequal  to  such  a  situation,  and  Li  Hung 
Chang  lost  no  time  in  inviting  Shufeldt  with  very  flattering 
words  to  come  to  Tientsin.  The  Commodore,  stung  by  what 
he  believed  to  be  Japanese  duplicity,  was  quite  willing  to 
accept  the  invitation.    Li  assured  Shufeldt  that  he  would 


458  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

use  his  influence  to  secure  a  treaty  from  Korea,  and  then 
dangled  before  the  commodore's  eyes  the  possibiUty  of  a 
position  in  the  Chinese  navy.  Thus  the  astute  Viceroy 
scored  a  victory  against  Japan,  and  diverted  the  United 
States  to  dealing  with  Korea  through  China.  As  for  the 
American  Government,  its  purpose  was  merely  to  get  results. 
That  in  some  way  it  was  being  made  use  of  first  by  Japan 
and  then  by  China  appears  to  have  received  no  thoughtful 
consideration. 

Having  received  from  the  Viceroy  the  assurance  of  his 
good  offices,  Commodore  Shufeldt  returned  to  the  United 
States  in  the  Ticonderoga.  Jn^March,  1881,  Shufeldt  was 
ordered  to  special  duty  at  the  U.  S.  Legation  at  Peking, 
under  instructions  from  both  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and 
the  Secretary  of  State.  The  latter  requested  the  American 
minister,  James  B.  Angell,  to  facilitate  in  any  way  possible 
the  appointment  of  Shufeldt  to  the  Chinese  navy,  and  Shu- 
feldt was  instructed  to  follow  up  the  promises  of  Li  Hung 
Chang.  Shufeldt  arrived  in  China  in  June,  1881,  and  estab- 
lished himself  at  Tientsin. 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  cooperative  policy 
which  had  been  inaugurated  under  Burlingame  was  still 
supposed  to  be  in  force  it  was  not  understood  among  the 
foreign  representatives  that  cooperation  could  be  expected 
to  include  assistance  to  any  one  nation  in  securing  for  its 
nationals  any  of  the  influential  positions  in  the  Chinese 
service,  and  Shufeldt  quickly  fell  foul  of  the  intrigues  of 
various  powers  which  did  not  wish  to  see  an  American  placed 
in  a  position  of  such  influence.  So  embarrassing  did  the 
Commodore's  position  at  Tientsin  become  that  he  finally 
declined  to  have  anything  more  to  do  with  the  Viceroy's 
proposal.  It  is  by  no  means  sure  that  Li  Hung  Chang  had 
ever  been  very  much  in  earnest  about  it. 

The  Viceroy  assured  Shufeldt  that  he  had  sent  a  letter 
to  Korea  advising  that  a  treaty  be  made,  and  requested  that 
Shufeldt  remain  at  Tientsin  until  a  reply  had  been  re- 
ceived." In  December,  1881,  Li  was  willing  to  make  the 
treaty.    The  actual  negotiations  took  place  in  Tientsin  in 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    459 

the  following  spring  between  Li  Hung  Chang  and  Shufeldt 
who  was  assisted  by  Chester  Holcombe,  then  Charge  d' Af- 
faires at  Peking.  The  Viceroy's  first  draft  is  of  peculiar 
interest  because  it  reveals  the  motives  of  the  Government 
of  China  in  encouraging  the  treaty,  and  also  shows  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Chinese  with  reference  to  their  own  treaties  with 
foreign  powers.  In  the  first  article  of  the  treaty  Li  wished 
to  have  inserted  a  good-offices  clause  similar  to  that  in  the 
American  treaty  of  Tientsin,  and  also  the  phrase:  ''Chosen, 
being  a  dependent  state  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  etc."  In 
other  articles  he  specified:  inland  trade  to  be  reserved  for 
the  Koreans;  importation  of  opium  to  be  prohibited; 
foreigners  to  be  permitted  to  rent  land  but  with  the  explicit 
understanding  that  the  land  could  not  be  alienated  from 
Korea;  extraterritoriality  to  be  granted  'temporarily,'  but 
Korean  officials  should  be  permitted  to  arrest  Koreans  in 
the  service  of  foreigners;  no  merchant  consuls;  missionary 
work  to  be  excluded;  import  duties  to  be  10  per  cent  on 
necessities  and  30  per  cent  on  luxuries,  and  the  export 
duties  to  be  3  per  cent;  the  treaty  to  come  to  an  end  in  five 
years;  and  the  Chinese  language  to  be  used  in  official 
intercourse. 

Shufeldt  was  willing  to  accept  many  of  Li's  propositions 
either  as  they  stood  or  with  slight  modifications,  but  he 
pointed  out  that  for  the  United  States  to  sign  a  treaty  with 
Korea  in  which  the  latter  was  stated  to  be  a  dependent  state 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  would  be  equivalent  to  placing  Korea 
under  the  joint  protection  of  China  and  the  United  States. 
This  was  exactly  what  the  Viceroy  desired.  The  Commo- 
dore explained  to  Li  that  he  had  no  authority  to  enter  into 
an  alliance  with  China,  and  that  the  presence  of  such  a 
clause  in  the  treaty  would  cause  its  rejection  in  the  United 
States.  The  Viceroy  was  inclined  to  insist  upon  its  inclu- 
sion and  at  length  Shufeldt,  eager  to  accomplish  the  great 
purpose  of  his  life,  telegraphed  (April  19,  1882)  to  Secretary 
of  State  Frelinghuysen  for  instructions  as  to  whether  he 
should  comply  with  the  Viceroy's  stipulation.  No  answer 
to  this  request  was  received.    Meanwhile  Shufeldt  reached 


460  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

a  compromise  with  the  Viceroy  in  which  he  agreed  to  ac- 
knowledge the  dependence  of  Korea  in  two  ways:  he  would 
write  a  letter  to  Li  officially  stating  that  he  had  requested 
the  assistance  of  China  in  making  the  treaty  because  Korea 
was  a  dependency  of  China;  he  would  also  transmit  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States  a  letter  from  the  King  of 
Korea  in  which  the  latter  stated  that  the  treaty  had  been 
made  by  consent  of  the  Chinese  Government. 

The  treaty  as  agreed  upon  was  sent  to  Korea  in  a  Chinese 
naval  vessel  and  the  following  day  Shufeldt  followed  in  the 
U.  S.  S.  Swatara.    The  compact  was  signed  without  discus- 
^on  by  the  Korean  envoys  on  May  22,  1882. 

A  letter  from  the  King  of  Korea  to  the  President  of 
the  United  States  was  then  given  to  Shufeldt,  dated  two 
days  before  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  although  Li  had 
promised  that  it  should  be  dated  after  the  treaty,  in  which 
the  king  made  the  following  statement: 

"Chosen  has  been  from  ancient  times  a  State  tributary  to  China. 
Yet  hitherto  full  sovereignty  has  been  exercised  by  the  kings  of 
Chosen  in  all  matters  of  internal  administration  and  foreign  rela- 
tions. Chosen  and  the  United  States  in  establishing  by  mutual  con- 
sent a  treaty  are  dealing  with  each  other  upon  a  basis  of  equality. 
The  King  of  Korea  distinctly  pledges  his  own  sovereign  powers  for  the 
complete  enforcement  in  good  faith  of  all  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty 
in  accordance  with  international  law. 

"As  regai'ds  the  various  duties  which  devolve  upon  Chosen,  as  a 
tributary  state  to  China,  with  these  the  United  States  has  no  con- 
cern whatever." 

Li  Hung  Chang  had  failed  to  accomplish  his  purpose. 
Indeed  at  the  end  he  had  been  led  to  approve  a  convention 
in  which  the  Chinese  claim  to  suzerainty  was  specifically 
ignored.  The  two  supplementary  letters  which  he  had  de- 
manded were  worthless.  Li  had  evidently  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  Korea  could  not  much  longer  be  kept  in  seclu- 
sion and  that  regardless  of  Chinese  pretensions,  it  was  to 
the  advantage  of  both  Korea  and  China  that  the  first  treaty 
be  made  with  the  United  States.  Had  the  first  treaty  been 
with  France,  there  would  probably  have  been  a  religious- 
toleration  clause  in  it  such  as  had  given  so  much  trouble 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    461 

to  China;  and  had  the  first  treaty  been  with  England,  it 
might  have  been  difficult  to  exclude  a  provision  for  the 
legahzation  of  opium.  The  treaty  would  be  a  model  for  the 
others,  and  the  United  States  would  set  a  liberal  standard. 
But  Li  Hung  Chang  came  bitterly  to  regret  his  mistake  in 
permitting  the  Shufeldt  treaty.  Indeed  it  was  one  of  the 
great  mistakes  of  his  career,  largely  impairing  his  claim  as  a 
statesman.  The  treaty  between  Japan  and  Korea  in  1876 
had  been  the  first  wedge  to  separate  Korea  from  China ;  the 
Shufeldt  treaty  was  the  second  wedge,  and  of  even  greater 
importance  because  by  it  China  assented  to  the  claim  first 
made  by  Japan  six  years  before  that  Korea  was  as  independ- 
ent as  Japan.  The  Shufeldt  treaty  was  a  step  towards  the 
dismemberment  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  just  as  surely  a  step 
in  that  direction  as  the  treaties  with  England  or  France  with 
reference  to  Burmah  and  Annam.  It  was  an  unintended 
blow  dealt  at  the  security  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

The  United  States  had  no  direct  interests  to  serve  in 
making  the  treaty.  Secretary  of  State  James  G.  Blaine 
(November  14,  1881)  in  the  official  instructions  to  Shufeldt 
had  clearly  reflected  the  casual  attitude  of  the  American 
Government.    He  wrote: 

"While  no  political  or  commercial  interest  renders  svich  a  treaty 
urgent,  it  is  desirable  that  the  ports  of  a  country  so  near  Japan  and 
China  should  be  opened  to  our  trade  and  to  the  convenience  of  such 
vessels  of  our  Navy  as  may  be  in  those  vuaters,  and  it  is  hoped  that 
the  advantages  resulting  from  the  growing  and  friendly  relations 
between  those  great  empires  and  the  IJuited  States  will  have  attracted 
the  attention  and  awakened  the  interest  of  the  Korean  Government. 

"If  the  Government  of  Korea  (or  Chosen)  is  willing  to  open  its 
ports  to  our  commerce  as  China  and  Japan  have  done,  we  will  with 
pleasure  establish  such  friendly  relations,  but  we  do  not  propose  to 
use  force  or  to  entreat  such  action."  * 

On  its  surface  the  treaty  appeared  to  be  a  highly  benevolent 
act  towards  Korea  for  it  not  only  opened  the  nation  to 
Western  civilization  and  trade  but  also,  in  a  measure,  re- 
moved it  from  the  blight  of  Chinese  restraint.  But  more 
closely  scrutinized,  and  viewed  in  the  light  of  history,  the 
treaty  is  seen  to  have  been  the  instrument  which  set  Korea 


462  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

adrift  on  an  ocean  of  intrigue  which  it  was  quite  helpless  to 
control. 

The  Personal  Views  of  Commodore  Shufeldt 

The  treaty  is  another  illustration  of  the  peculiarly  per- 
sonal character  of  much  of  American  policy  in  Asia.  It 
appears  to  have  been  authorized  primarily  because  of  the 
ambition  and  importunities  of  Commodore  Shufeldt.  The 
ambition  was  entirely  worthy  and  above  reproach,  but  it 
was  hardly  a  sufficient  justification  for  such  a  project.  In 
this  connection  it  is  of  importance  to  note  an  incident  in  the 
personal  relations  of  the  Commodore  and  the  Viceroy  which 
also  throws  some  light  on  the  growing  anti-Chinese  senti- 
ment in  the  United  States. 

Shufeldt  returned  to  China  in  1881  well  disposed 
towards  the  Chinese  for  he  had  before  him  the  possibility  of 
distinguished  service  in  building  up  the  Chinese  navy  as 
well  as  the  distinction  of  opening  up  Korea.  At  Tientsin 
Shufeldt  w^as  rather  shabbily  treated.  While  enduring  these 
affronts  from  the  Viceroy,  Shufeldt  wrote  to  Senator  A.  A. 
Sargent  of  California  a  personal  letter  in  which  he  expressed 
his  disgust  with  brutal  frankness.  Unhappily  the  letter  was 
published  in  American  papers  and  after  Shufeldt  left  China 
was  printed  widely  in  the  East.  It  expressed  sentiments 
greatly  at  variance  with  the  generous  spirit  of  the  treaty 
with  Korea.  The  letter  is  to  be  taken  rather  as  significant 
of  a  kind  of  temper  and  disposition  towards  the  Chinese 
which  had  never  been  entirely  absent  from  the  foreign 
settlements  in  China  but  was  rarely  expressed  by  Americans 
until  the  Chinese  immigration  trouble  arose.  It  was,  how- 
ever, typical  of  a  growing  sentiment  in  the  United  States 
which  exerted  an  important  influence  in  the  shaping  of 
American  policy  in  both  China  and  Korea. 

"Six  months  residence  in  this  city  (Tientsin),"  wrote  Shufeldt, 
''the  political  center  of  the  Chinese  Government,  and  an  intimacy 
rather  exceptional  with  the  rulinjij  element,  has  convinced  me  that 
deceit  and  untruthfulness  i>ervade  all  intercourse  with  foreip:ners ; 
that  an  ineradicable  hatred  exists,  and  that  any  appeal  across  this 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    463 

barrier,  either  of  sympathy  or  gratitude,  is  entirely  idle.  The  only 
appeal  or  argument  appreciated  is  force.  .  .  .  All  sympathy  will  be 
construed  into  weakness,  all  pity  into  fear." 

Contrasting  the  policies  of  the  United  States  with  those 
of  Great  Britain  which,  thought  Shufeldt,  was  the  real  ruler 
of  China,  he  wrote: 

"The  United  States  standing,  or  endeavoring  to  stand,  upon  a 
higher  plane  than  that  of  mere  physical  force,  pursues  in  China  a 
policy  of  moral  suasion  which  neither  convinces  nor  converts  the 
Chinaman  to  the  doctrine  of  common  brotherhood  of  men  or  nations — 
for  high  as  the  heavens  are  above  the  earth,  so  high  is  his  conceit; 
as  deep  as  the  waters  of  the  sea  is  the  measure  of  his  contempt  for 
the  'outside  barbarians.'  " 

"Any  high  moral  ground  in  the  field  of  diplomacy — any  appeal  to 
the  motives  which  ordinarily  govern  nations — indeed,  any  argument 
unaccompanied  by  the  outward  and  visible  sign  of  force,  is  used  only 
for  the  purpose  of  delay,  which  in  the  end  is  equivalent  to  victory. 
Yet  the  United  States  has  interests  in  China  destined  in  the  future 
to  be  greater  than  those  of  any  other  nation — possessing  as  we  do 
the  Pacific  Ocean  as  a  common  highway — geographically  with 
reference  to  the  continent,  politically  with  reference  to  each  other.  .  .  . 
Our  policy  therefore  should  be  positive  and  governed,  to  the  extent 
of  the  moral  law,  by  American  interests  alone,  and  followed  up  by 
the  argument  which  they  understand — the  argument  of  force,  pressure, 
not  persuasion." 

Shufeldt  noted  with  the  eye  of  a  naval  man  that  "all 
martial  spirit  has  died  out"  of  the  Chinese  race,  and  ven- 
tured the  assertion  that  to  the  American  form  of  government 
the  Chinese  were  most  antagonistic.  He  pointed  to  the 
condition  of  the  returned  Chinese  students  whom,  he 
thought,  had  been  made  the  "victims  of  the  oriental  hatred 
of  popular  institutions,  and  the  innocent  cause  of  dislike  on 
the  part  of  the  mandarins  for  everything  American." 

"Under  these  circumstances,"  he  continued,  "portrayed  without 
prejudice,  even  without  sentiment — I  am  of  the  earnest  conviction 
that  the  policy  of  the  United  States  in  China,  and  towards  the 
Chinese  in  America,  should  be  with  us  as  with  them — purely  selfish — 
coming  as  it  ought  to,  under  the  universal  law  of  right  and  justice, 
but  by  no  means  governed  by  the  fallacious  idea  of  international 
friendship,  or  even  the  broader  ground  of  a  common  brotherhood." 

It  was  an  amazing  letter,  but  it  was  far  more  restrained 
in  its  descriptions  of  the  Chinese  than  were  very  many  of 


464  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  speeches  in  California  and  in  Congress  during  the  ab- 
sorbing discussions  of  the  Chinese  exclusion  question.  It 
has  been  asserted  that  the  publication  of  this  letter,  coupled 
with  the  changes  in  the  Department  of  State  incident  to 
the  inauguration  of  the  Arthur  administration,  may  account 
for  the  fact  that  Shufeldt  was  left  without  an  answer  to  his 
telegram  in  which  he  had  inquired  whether  the  American 
Government  would  accept  a  treaty  with  Korea  in  which 
dependency  upon  China  was  expressed.  It  seems  more 
likely,  however,  that  no  answer  to  the  telegram  was  sent 
because  now  for  the  first  time  the  Department  of  State  was 
being  forced  to  reconsider  the  entire  question  of  the  policy 
toward  Korea  in  the  light  of  the  relations  of  that  country 
to  China  and  Japan  respectively.*  To  the  American  Gov- 
ernment this  was  a  new  and  perplexing  question,  and  before 
an  answer  was  devised,  Shufeldt  had  already  signed  the 
treaty.  While  the  treaty  was  ratified,  it  was  perhaps  not 
exactly  welcomed  by  Secretary  of  State  Frelinghuysen.  To 
the  declining  popularity  of  the  Chinese  in  the  United  States, 
as  well  as  to  the  embarrassment  of  the  Department  of  State, 
may  perhaps  be  assigned  the  reason  why  the  letter  of  the 
King  of  Korea  to  the  President,  expressing  dependence  upon 
China,  was  promptly  pigeon-holed  and  never  officially  pub- 
lished in  any  record. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  l)cst  review  of  the  events  leading  up  to  the  opening  of  Korea 
is  C.  O.  Paullin:  "The  Opening  of  Korea"  (Pol.  Sci.  Quart., 
Vol  XXV,  No.  3).  This  article  forms  a  chapter  in  Paullin's 
"Diplomatic  Negotiations  of  American  Naval  Officers."  This, 
however,  is  based  on  the  Navy  Dept.  records  and  does  not 
include  those  of  the  State  Dept.  except  as  the  latter  appear  in 

♦"This  (olcRraphic  nipssage."  notod  John  Russoll  Youiiff,  who  had  been  asked 
to  review  the  Korean  question  and  who  had  tiled  a  report  May  1,  1882,  "read 
in  tlie  lifjht  of  tile  coiifidi'iilial  dispatcli  to  Mr.  Holconil)e  .  .  .  would  seem  to 
invite  the  question  as  to  whether  the  proposed  treaty  is  for  the  lienelit  of 
(Miiiia  or  Korea.  How  far  slmuld  we  commit  ourselves  to  a  convention  wliich 
Cliiiia  wiinld  rej^ard  as  protectinj;  her  frontiers  from  some  dreaded  ultimate 
<lan^'cr  on  the  part  of  Kussia  or  .lajian.  and  wliicli  Russia  and  .Iai)an  niiiilit  dci'iii 
an  unwarranted  interference  in  .\siatic  affairsV"  Younii  recommi'ndcd  tliat 
tlie  question  he  evaded  by  mal<in};  a  purely  commercial  treaty.  .Shufeldt  had, 
in  a  measure,  exceedi'd  liis  instructions  in  makinu  so  liroad  a  treaty  when  hi' 
had    lieen    expected    to   secure    little    more    than    a    shipwreck    convention.' 

Young  was  soon  to  <lepart  for  the  East  unfl^'r  apjjointment  as  minister  at 
Peking.  While  passing  through  Tokio  he  learnefl  that  the  treaty  had  actually 
given  great  offense   in   Japan. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  KOREA— TREATY  OF  1882    465 

the  Shufeldt  papers,  and  the  Journal  of  the  Cruise  of  the  Ticon- 

dcroga   (Mss.),  both  of  which  are  in  the  Navy  Dept.  library. 

Griffis :     "Hermit  Empire,"  chaps.  44-46,  48,  is  also  valuable. 
I.     Reports   of   the   Low-Rogers    Expedition,    For.    Relations,    1871 ; 

Nov.  22,  1870,  p.   Ill;  Apr.  3,  1871,  pp.   116,   121,  124,   142; 

1874,  p.  254. 
I.     For.  Relations,  1871,  p.  77,  Jan.   10,  1871,  Low  to  Fish,   gives 

a  summary  of  conditions  in  China  as  viewed  by  the  American 

minister.    The  empire  was  reported  to  be  in  a  state  of  decline 

and  ruin. 
:.     China  Dcsp.,  Vol.  43,  Nov.  30,  1876,  Seward  to  Secretary  of  State. 
.     Cruise  of  the  Ticonderoga  (Mss.),  Navy.  Dept.  Archives. 
.     Japan  Desp.,  Vol.  43,  Sept.  14,  1880,  Bingham  to  Secretary  of 

State. 
.     The  official  reports  of  the  Shufeldt  negotiations  with  Li   Hung 

Chang  are  in  China  Desp.,  Vols.  55,  57-59,  filed  according  to 

dates:    Oct.   11,   1880,  Oct.   22,   1880;   Dec.   19,  July   1,   1881; 

Jan.   20,   23,    Mar.   11,   28,   Apr.   10,   28,   May   13,   22,   24,   29, 

June  8,  12,  26,  1882. 
;.     China  Instr.,  Vol.  3,  Nov.  14,  1881. 
K     China  Desp.,  Vol.  59,  May  1,  1882. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOE  KOREA 

The  signing  of  the  Shufeldt  treaty  (May  22,  1882)  dis- 
closed to  the  world  the  contest  which  had  already  begun  for 
Korea.  Not  only  Japan  and  China,  but  every  Western 
power  interested  in  the  Far  East  were  involved. 

Japanese  Advance 

Under  different  conditions  it  might  have  been  expected 
that  Korea  itself  would  cast  the  deciding  vote  as  to  the 
possession  of  the  peninsula,  but  the  Korean  Government 
was  utterly  deficient.  A  change  in  dynasty  in  1863  had 
brought  to  the  throne  a  boy  under  the  regency  of  his  father 
who  was  known  as  the  Tai-wen-Kun.^  The  regent  was  anti- 
foreign,  a  blind  patriot,  a  Confucianist,  usually  pro-Chinese, 
but  chiefly  concerned  in  the  retention  of  his  personal  place 
and  clan  influence.  Ten  years  later  the  king  attained  his 
majority.  He  had  married  into  the  Min  family,  and  thus 
acquired  as  queen  a  strong-minded,  aggressive  woman,  some- 
what disposed  towards  progress  and  violently  opposed  to 
the  Tai-wen-Kun  who  was  immediately  retired.  The  treaty 
of  1876  had  been  signed  with  the  approval  of  China  which, 
in  the  midst  of  its  wavering  policy  towards  Japan  was,  for 
the  moment,  seeking  conciliation.  But  the  execution  of  the 
treaty  met  with  strong  opposition  from  the  reactionary  Ko- 
rean party.  Japan,  so  suave  and  conciliatory  when  dealing 
with  the  Western  powers,  was  from  the  outset  harsh  in 
Korea.  The  reports  of  returning  explorers,  not  a  few  of 
whom  visited  the  peninsula  in  the  next  five  years,  are  in 
entire  agreement  upon  this  point.  Because  the  arrogant  and 
ruthless  character   of  the   Japanese   settlers   and  officials 

466 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA     467 

played  directly  into  the  hands  of  the  seclusion  party,  Japan 
found  it  wise  to  proceed  very  cautiously  in  entering  upon  the 
new  privileges.  While  a  Japanese  settlement  was  immedi- 
ately developed  at  Fusan,  where  Korean  trade  with  Japan 
had  been  transacted  for  centuries,  it  was  not  until  1880  that 
Gensan,  on  the  eastern  coast  at  Broughton's  Bay,  and 
In-chuin,  near  Chemulpo,  were  opened  to  Japanese  trade 
and  then  in  the  face  of  much  opposition. 

The  progressive  element  in  Korea  found  a  measure  of 
leadership  in  the  young  king  and  queen,  and  was  nourished 
by  Japanese  contacts.  Two  embassies  were  sent  to  Tokio 
where  the  visitors  were  treated  to  sight-seeing  as  the  Japa- 
nese embassies  of  1860  and  1872  had  been  treated  in  the 
United  States.  Just  as  the  Americans  had  made  efforts  to 
stimulate  progress  in  Japan,  so  Japan  displayed  before  the 
astonished  Koreans  the  advantages  of  Western  civilization, 
A  "Civilization  Party"  came  into  being  in  1880.  Thus 
developed  a  most  complicated  domestic  conflict  in  Korea 
which  somewhat  resembles  the  pre-restoration  struggles  in 
Japan.  The  issue  was  not  clear-cut  between  the  two  par- 
ties although  the  Tai-wen-Kun,  as  leader  of  the  reaction- 
aries, was  pro-Chinese  while  the  progressive  party  inclined 
towards  the  Japanese  largely  because  Japan  was  at  that 
time  the  only  source  of  enlightenment.  In  1881  twenty- 
four  Koreans  were  sent  to  Japan  to  study,  but  at  the  same 
time  more  than  three  times  as  many  were  sent  to  China 
for  the  same  purpose. - 

Japan,  steadily  pushed  its  influence  at  Seoul  and  in  1882 
a  Japanese  officer  was  installed  as  drill-master  for  Korean 
troops.  Military  supplies  were  also  ordered  from  Japan. 
The  intentions  of  the  Japanese  when  Shufeldt  arrived  in 
Korea  were  unknown.  As  soon  as  it  was  reported  in  Tokio 
that  the  American  envoy  was  about  to  leave  Tientsin,  the 
Japanese  representative  in  Seoul,  then  in  Japan,  was  rushed 
with  all  possible  speed  to  Korea  where  he  arrived  the  day 
after  the  appearance  of  Shufeldt  and  the  Chinese  fleet. 
Shufeldt  received  the  impression  that  the  Japanese  would 
have  liked  to  retrieve  the  ground  lost  in  their  blunder  of 


468  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

two  years  before  by  manipulating  the  negotiations  in  such 
a  way  that  the  American  treaty  would  have  been  obtained 
through  Japanese  agencies.  Li  Hung  Chang  had  amply 
provided  for  such  a  contingency  and  the  Japanese,  who  for 
the  moment  were  involved  in  serious  controversies  with  the 
Koreans,  were  unable  to  intervene. 

The  increase  of  Japanese  influence,  coupled  with  the 
signing  of  the  Shufeldt  treaty,  provoked  the  reactionary 
forces  and  drew  the  Tai-wen-Kun  again  into  the  arena. 
Two  months  after  the  signing  of  the  treaty  (July  23,  1882) 
the  ex-regent,  supported  by  a  mob,  made  an  effort  to  seize 
the  persons  of  the  king  and  queen,  attacked  and  burned  the 
Japanese  legation,  and  assassinated  some  of  the  more  im- 
portant leaders  of  the  Civilization  Party,  including  mem- 
bers of  the  queen's,  the  Min,  family.  The  king  and  queen 
escaped,  although  it  was  at  first  reported  that  the  latter  had 
been  killed,  and  the  Japanese  legation,  which  was  a  mili- 
tary as  well  as  a  diplomatic  organization,  escaped  from  the 
city,  made  its  way  to  the  coast,  and  after  many  adventures 
was  picked  up  and  taken  to  Japan  in  a  British  surveying 
vessd. 

It  was  freely  predicted  in  the  treaty  ports  and  also 
abroad  that  war  between  China  and  Japan  was  rapidly 
approaching.* 

^'Tlndoubtedly  the  American  Government,  though  unin- 
tentionally, had/incurred  an  obligation  in  making  a  treaty 
with  Korea.  While  this  fact  may  not  have  been  fully 
realized  in  Washington,  it  w^as  evident  to  John  Russell 
^'(•uiig  who,  at  the  time  of  the  disturbance  in  Seoul,  was 
passing  through  Japan  on  his  way  to  his  newly  appointed 

*Tlip  Spectator  (London.  Septoml)or  2,  18S2).  for  pxaniplo.  stat(>d  :  "The 
outbreak  of  hostilities  Ix'twcen  China  and  .Japan  is  one  of  th(>  most  liliely 
events  to  happen  within  the  next  few  weeks."  It  was  also  remarked  in  this 
same  article  that  in  event  of  hostilities  the  United  States  had  "always  shown 
a  greater  disposition  to  act  throuRh  .Japan  than  through  China."  In  a  pre- 
vious article  (March  11)  the  Spectator,  in  reviewing  the  various  steps  in 
.Japanese  expansion,  had  characterized  them  as  "entiM'iHl  without  a  sutlicient 
r<'as()n  and  of  their  own  accord,"  and  described  them  as  part  of  a  "policy 
wliich  can  only  he  charact«^rized  as  one  of  reckless  and  unscrupulous  aml)i- 
tion."  It  was  freely  predicted  that  in  the  .•ii)pr()achinij  struggle  China,  wliose 
navy  had  been  recently  greatly  strengthened,  and  then  consisted  of  about 
seventy  vessels,  sixteen  of  whicli"  would  compare  in  ellicieiicy  witli  tliose  of  any 
navy  in  the  world,  would  win.  China  was  Iniying  her  navy  in  England  and 
training  it  under  British  auspices.  The  Chinese  navy  later  passed  under 
German  inlluence. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA     469 

duties  as  minister  at  Peking.  Young,  as  already  noted, 
had  reviewed  the  Shufeldt  despatches  before  leaving  Wash- 
ington. Better  than  anyone  else  he  was  able  to  understand 
their  significance  because  he  had  only  recently  returned 
from  the  East  with  General  Grant.  Young  was  a  devout 
admirer  of  Grant  and  had  been  fully  conversant  with 
Grant's  views  on  the  futility  of  war  between  China  and 
Japan.  In  Tokio,  Inouye,  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  had  intimated  to  Young  that  Japan  was  disposed  to 
feel  that  the  Shufeldt  treaty  had  been  made  in  the  interest 
of  China,  and  that  it  would  have  the  effect  of  disturbing 
the  relations  between  Korea  and  Japan.  In  Shanghai 
Young  learned  from  th^  Japanese  consul  of  the  events  of 
July  23  in  Seoul.  F/om  what  he  knew  of  Japanese  de- 
termination to  hold  'the  place  already  won  in  Korea,  the 
prospect  for  peace  appeared  ommous  and  it  became  neces- 
sary for  him  swiftly  and  withydt  instructions  from  Wash- 
ington to  devise  a  policy.  \)^ith  the  approval  of  Admiral 
Clitz,  he  despatched  the  U.  S.  S.  Monocacy  to  Korea  with 
instructions  to  watch  the  proceedings,  preserve  the  strictest 
neutrality,  and  offer  "good  offices"  if  convenient.  Com- 
mander Cotton  was  ordered  not  to  join  with  the  Japanese 
in  any  demonstration,  to  use  his  influence  to  dissuade  the 
Japanese  from  any  belligerent  movement,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  make  the  visit  of  the  Monocacy  an  act  of  courtesy 
to  the  Japanese. 

While  the  visit  of  the  Monocacy  cannot  be  said  to  have 
been  the  influence  which  averted  war,  as  was  claimed  for  it, 
the  seriousness  of  the  situation  had  not  been  underesti- 
mated by  Young.  The  Japanese  immediately  mobilized 
both  naval  and  military  forces  and  sent  the  Japanese  min- 
ister, Hanabusa,  back  to  Seoul  with  a  large  military  escort. 
Meanwhile  Li  Hung  Chang  had  despatched  a  fleet  and  four 
thousand  troops  "to  support  the  government."  Hanabusa 
reentered  Seoul  August  16,  and  two  weeks  later  the  Korean 
Government  complied  with  his  demands  which  included 
the  promise  to  pay  550,000  yen  indemnity  in  five  yearly 
instalments,  permission  for  the  maintenance  of  Japanese 


470  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

troops  in  Seoul  for  the  protection  of  the  legation,  a  special 
embassy  to  Japan  to  offer  apologies,  and  additional  trade 
privileges  for  the  Japanese.  The  Chinese  envoy  watched 
the  proceedings  and  then  retired  with  his  troops,  taking 
with  him  into  exile  in  China  the  Tai-wen-Kun  who  had 
provoked  the  trouble.  Li  Hung  Chang  had  again,  just  as 
in  1876,  avoided  the  issue  with  Japan,  concurring  in  the 
second  advance  of  Japan  in  the  peninsula. 

A  few  weeks  later  the  King  of  Korea  issued  a  proclama- 
tion which  was  designed  to  allay  the  fears  of  the  Koreans. 
Scholars  were  urging  that  Japan  be  kept  at  a  distance,  but 
this,  urged  the  king,  was  both  unwise  and  impossible.  If 
Korea  were  to  adhere  to  a  policy  of  seclusion  she  would 
remain  isolated,  and  would  be  deprived  of  all  assistance. 
"Let  there  be  no  more  talk,"  stated  the  king,  "about  Japa- 
nese and  foreigners."  ^ 

China  and  Great  Britain  Aroused 

Notwithstanding  this  declaration  the  fundamental  facts 
of  the  situation  remained  unaltered.  In  September,  1882, 
Li  Hung  Chang  issued  some  trade  regulations  for  China  and 
Korea  which  bore  no  evidence  of  having  even  received  the 
approval  of  the  King  of  Korea.  They  asserted  that  the 
peninsula  was  a  tributary  state  and  that  the  concessions 
granted  to  China  were  "not  within  the  scope  of  the  favored- 
nation  rule  existing  between  the  several  treaty  powers  and 
China."  The  Chinese  were  to  be  permitted  to  open  ware- 
houses in  two  suburbs  of  Seoul,  and  there  was  to  be  a 
uniform  duty  of  5  per  cent  on  all  exports  and  imports  except 
red  ginseng  which  was  to  pay  15  per  cent.^ 

While  Korean  subjects  in  China  were  not  to  have  ex- 
traterritoriality, Chinese  subjects  in  Korea  were  granted 
greater  immunities  than  those  enjoyed  by  any  other  power. 
A  Korean  envoy  was  to  be  sent  to  China  but  he  was  to 
reside  at  Tientsin  rather  than  Peking,  and  would  have  a 
rank  equivalent  only  to  that  of  consul.  Li  Hung  Chang, 
to  whose  yamen  the  envoy  was  related,  was  thus  elevated 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA     471 

to  a  dignity  equal  with  that  of  the  king.  Finally,  the 
Koreans  were  to  consent  to  granting  a  subsidy  to  a  line  of 
Chinese  steamers  between  the  two  countries.  China  was 
thus  set  forth  not  merely  as  abandoning  none  of  her  former 
claims  upon  the  peninsula,  but  as  actually  adopting  an 
aggressive  policy  to  meet  the  Japanese  advance. 

Li  Hung  Chang  followed  the  proclamation  of  the  trade 
regulations  by  placing  his  personal  representative,  Herr 
von  Mollendorff,  formerly  of  the  German  consular  service, 
as  Inspector  of  the  Korean  Customs  and  member  of  the 
Foreign  Office, 

A  brief  survey  of  the  international  situation  thus  created 
now  becomes  necessary. 

X  China  was  rapidly  slipping  into  chaotic  conditions  which 

/rivalled  those  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion.     Domestic  affairs 

/  were  passing  into   the  hands   of  reactionaries   who   were 

\  ignorant,  corrupt  and  weak.    The  prevailing  policy  was  to 

I  resist  every  reform  and  to  meet  every  crisis  with  weak  com- 

\|)romises.     The  management  of  foreign  affairs  was  more 

knd  more  being  turned  over  to  Li  Hung  Chang  who,  as 

i^iceroy  of  Chili  since  1871  and  northern  Superintendent 

of  Trade  with  headquarters  at  Tientsin,  was  entrusted  also 

with  the  inauguration  of  whatever  measures  were  taken  to 

j renovate  the  defenses  of  the  empire.    Li  Hung  Chang  was 

',not  a  great  statesman,  except  as  compared  with  his  country- 

Imen;  he  was  not  the  equal  of  any  one  of  several  of  his 

Japanese  contemporaries. 

China  was  beset  by  hostile  powers.  In  1867  France  had 
annexed  three  provinces  of  Cochin  China  as  the  first  steps 
in  a  program  of  territorial  aggression  at  the  expense  of 
China  which  was  yet  to  be  completed.  Russian  troops  had 
occupied  Kuldja  and  the  province  of  Hi  (in  Chinese 
Turkestan)  where  they  remained  until  1881  when  China 
regained  part  of  the  territory  by  the  payment  of  an  in- 
demnity and  the  granting  of  other  terms  unfavorable  to 
China.  Japan  had  taken  the  Lew  Chews  and  had  shown 
a  disposition  to  take  Formosa.  Russia  as  well  as  Japan 
was  threatening  Korea.    Worst  of  all  China  was  becoming 


472  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  back  yard  of  European  politics.  The  opening  of  Korea 
disclosed  the  ugly  outlines  of  European  intrigue  as  they 
had  not  been  revealed  before. 

Russia,  although  working  at  first  quietly  and  secretly, 
was  vitally  interested  in  the  future  of  Korea.  The  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  had  been  projected  as  early  as  1862, 
although  not  actually  begun  until  1891.  Vladivostock  was 
closed  by  ice  from  two  to  four  months  in  the  winter  and 
was  too  far  removed  from  the  markets  of  Asia  to  be  of  first 
rate  commercial  importance.  Korea,  in  the  possession  of 
a  power  hostile  to  Russia,  would  be  not  only  a  barrier  to 
warm  water,  but  also  to  southern  markets.  Whoever  con- 
trolled Korea  could  also  control  the  Sea  of  Japan  and  the 
approaches  to  Vladivostock.  Without  Korea  Russia  had 
no  assurance  that  she  could  even  hold  what  she  had  already 
obtained  in  Siberia,  much  less  penetrate  into  Manchuria. 

France,  long  since  separated  from  alliance  w-ith  Great 
Britain,  was  now  becoming  the  creditor  of  Russia  and  was 
at  the  same  time  seeking  the  good  wall  of  Japan.  French 
interests  in  South  China  as  well  as  French  interests  in 
Russia  brought  France  into  line  against  China. 

The  opening  of  Korea  was  therefore  alarming  to  Great 
Britain.  The  latter  was  primarily  concerned  with  placing 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  southward  movement  of  Russia 
at  every  point  along  the  far-flung  frontier.  In  this  contest 
with  Russia,  China  occupied  the  position  of  a  gigantic  bar- 
rier state  between  Russia  and  India.  So  long  as  Korea  re- 
mained under  the  shadow  of  China,  Britisli  interests  found 
a  measure  of  protection.  Korea,  severed  from  China,  was 
all  the  more  likely  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  Russia.  Even 
before  Li  Hung  Chang  had  invited  Shufeldt  to  make  a 
treaty  with  Korea  the  Viceroy,  so  it  is  believed,  had  given 
a  similar  invitation  to  the  British  Minister  at  Peking  which 
for  some  reason  was  declined.  While  Great  Britain  inter- 
posed no  objections  or  obstructions  to  the  American  treaty 
with  Korea,  British  interests  immecHately  upon  its  signa- 
ture became  very  active  and  set  about  to  thwart  the  execu- 
tion of  the  agi'eement  in  such  a  way  as  would  definitely 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA     473 

sever  Korea  from  the  Chinese  Empire.  Thus  Great  Britain 
became,  without  the  formality  of  an  alliance,  the  ally  of 
China,  and  was  ranged  against  not  only  Russia  and  France, 
but  also  against  Japan.'* 

It  had  never  been  the  intention  of  Li  Hung  Chang  to 
relinquish  Chinese  claims  in  Korea,  and  when  he  found 
that  the  document  which  he  and  Shufeldt  had  drafted,  in- 
stead of  affording  protection  to  Chinese  interests  in  the 
peninsula  actually  operated  to  weaken  them,  he  set  about, 
with  the  advice  of  the  British  and  not  improbably  at  their 
insti^tion,  to  rectify  his  blunder. 

'4nto  this  mass  of  conflicting  interests,  most  of  which 
had  their  roots  in  a  century  of  European  diplomacy  and 
intrigue,  came  the  United  States  which  was  not  only 
utterly  detached  from  the  European  conditions  of  which 
the  Far  East  was  coming  to  be  but  a  phase,  but  also  con- 
tern^tuous  of  alliances  and  international  ei^tanglements. 
*\^ere,  in  such  slippery  places  as  the  Korean  peninsula 
afforded,  was  the  United  States  to  stand?  AVith  every  one 
of  the  contesting  European  parties  the  United  States  was 
on  the  friendliest  terms,  and  to  the  proposed  victims  of 
their  intrigues  it  was  bound  either  hy  "good  offices"  or 
mediation  clauses  in  existing  treaties.\/ Had  the  alignment 
in  Korea  been  merely  between  the  East  and  the  West,  the 
Unitpd  Stales  would  not  have  found  it  difficult  to  choose. 
^^^j^itkmm  American  policy  indicated  the  support  of  the 
East.  By^he  line  was  north  and  south  as  well  as  east  and 
west.  kTo  take  sides  for  or  against  either  China  or  Japan 
was  to  depart  from  an  historic  friendship  with  either  one 
or  the  other  of  the  only  remaining  strong  Eastern  states. 
''The  United  States  had  thrust  itself  into  the  situation 
prompted  more  by  a  spirit  of  adventure  than  led  by  any 
wise  counsels  of  statesmanship.  Once  in, /rhe  American 
Government  desired  nothing  but  peace. v  The  unofficial 
recommendations  of  General  Graof  had  been  taken  up  into 
the  official  American  policy  :\peaceful  relations  between 
China  and  Japan  were  necessary  in  the  interest  of  the 
building  up  of  a  strong  East  to  meet  the  aggressive  West, 


474  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

and  they  were  equally  important  for  American  trade  inter- 
ests. yBAt  American  statesmanship  was  too  unfamiliar  with 
the  facts  and  too  inexperienced  to  frame  and  execute  a 
policy  which  would  remove  the  causes  of  war  and  make 
peacej^ossible, 

^"Wniile  instructing  its  representatives  in  Tokio  and 
Peking  to  do  everything  possible  to  allay  the  growing  ir- 
ritation between  the  two  countries,  the  American  Govern- 
ment determined  to  adhere  to  the  policy.,  oj^  regarding 
Korea  as  a  sovereign  and  independent  state.  "A  diplomatic 
post  equivalent  in  rank  to  those  at  Tokio  and  Peking  was 
created  at  Seoul  and  Lucius  H.  Foote  was  appointed  to  it 
in  February,  1883.  Secretary  of  State  Frelinghuysen  drew 
attention  to  the  anomalous  trade  situation  created  by  the 
Chinese  commercial  regulations  of  the  preceding  year. 
Under  these  regulations  the  Americans  were  denied  the 
following  privileges  which  were  permitted  to  the  Chinese: 
to  reside  and  trade  at  four  points  in  the  interior;  to  travel 
in  the  interior  under  passport ;  to  transport  native  produce 
from  one  port  to  another.  In  addition  the  duties  were 
discriminating  in  favor  of  China.  "To  this  the  United 
States  cannot  consent,"  stated  Frelinghuysen.*'  Minister 
Foote' arrived  at  Chemulpo  May  12,  1883. 

xjThe  Japanese  had  now  become  very  well  reconciled  to 
the  American  treaty  with  Korea.  Foote  visited  Tokio  on 
his  way  through  Japan  and  was  supplied  with /a  Japanese 
interpreter  who  accompanied  him  to  Seoul,  ^le  Japanese 
recognized  that  the  American  policy  in  Korea  was,  in  effect, 
distinctly  friendly  to  Japan.  Li  Hung  Chang,  when  he 
learned  of  the  visit  to  Tokio  and  of  the  presence  of  a  Japa- 
nese interpreter  in  the  American  legation  at  Seoul,  was  as 
disgusted  as  the  Japanese  were  pleased.  The  interpreter 
remained  only  a  few  months. 

The  other  foreign  powers  adopted  towards  Korea  a  very 
different  policy.  \\'hile  Russia  remained  in  the  background 
Great  Britain,  Germany  and  France  hastened  to  Korea  after 
the  signing  of  the  Shufeldt  treaty.  Admiral  Willes  con- 
cluded a  treaty  for  Great  Britain  two  weeks  later,  following 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA      475 

the  very  liberal  provisions  of  the  American  treaty,  but  this 
was  never  ratified.  In  November  of  the  following  year  a 
second  treaty  with  less  liberal  provisions  which  were  more 
in  accord  with  the  views  of  British  merchants  was  signed 
by  Sir  Harry  Parkes.  A  treaty  with  Germany  was  signed 
the  same  day.  Great  Britain  then  showed  the  trend  of  its 
policy  by  appointing  as  diplomatic  representative  a  consul 
general  who  ti'as  made  responsible  to  the  British  minister 
in  Peking.  Thus  England  was  supporting  the  Chinese 
claim  to  suzerainty  over  Korea  by  making  the  British  dip- 
lomatic establishment  in  the  peninsula  an  appendage  of  the 
British  Legation  in  China.  Germany  was  represented  by 
a  consul  who  reported  directly  to  Berlin;  France  by  a 
"Commissaire"  reporting  directly  to  Paris;  and  Japan  by  a 
Charge,  Minister,  or  Ambassador  Plenipotentiary,  as  suited 
the  situation.  In  1884  Congress  reduced  the  post  at  Seoul 
to  that  of  Minister  Resident,  equal  ki  rank  to  that  at 
Bankok.  Foote  thereupon  resigned. vThe  Chinese  Govern- 
ment then  requested  that  the  American  Government  make 
the  Seoul  Legation  an  appendage  of  the  American  Legation 
in  Peking,  but  the  United  States  declined  (December  5, 
1885). 

The  policy  of  China  was  equally  significant.  In  Oc- 
tober, 1883,  a  Chinese  commissioner  "to  manage  the  com- 
merce of  Korea"  appeared  in  Seoul  and  without  consulta- 
tion with  or  the  approval  of  the  Korean  Government  posted 
the  following  astonishing  notice  on  one  of  the  gates  of  the 
city: 

"I  wish  to  inform  the  people  that  I  have  received  the  appointment 
of  Commissioner  for  China  to  manage  the  Commerce  of  Korea ;  and 
also  that  I  arrived  at  Chemulpo  on  October  14th;  came  to  Seoul  on 
the  16th,  and  opened  my  oifice  on  the  20th. 

"Whereas  Korea  has  been  dependent  upon  China  since  the  time 
Kuichi  was  appointed  King  of  Chosen,  several  thousand  years  ago, 
and  the  people  devoted  themselves  to  the  teachings  of  Si-Su  and 
Rejei-Mi,  and  for  the  past  two  hundred  years  have  been  wonderfully 
obedient  to  our  existing  dynasty;  and  the  peoples,  officials  and  our 
merchants,  in  their  intercourse  with  our  people  have  acted  in  a 
laudable  manner;  and  as  at  present  various  nations  are  opening 
commercial  relations  with  Korea; — 

"Therefore,  the  Chinese  Government  has  issued  trade  regulations 


476  AMERTCA^.'S  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

benefiting  Korea;  and  I  hope  the  merchants  and  citizens  will  ap- 
preciate this  fact,  and  obey  and  adhere  to  these  regulations,  that 
harmonious  feelings  may  exist  between  China  and  Korea,  especially 
as  Korea  is  a  dependency  of  China,  and  we  wish  to  live  in  peace  and 
harmony.  My  duty  is  to  manage  the  commerce  which  is  known  to 
our  merchants  and  if  any  questions  arise,  or  any  business  needs  at- 
tention of  whatever  import,  it  is  your  duty  to  appeal  to  me  for  a 
proper  understanding  and  settlement  of  the  same. 
"Seoul,   October  20,   1883. 

"Chix-Ciiu  Tang." 

Later  the  Chinese  representative  in  Seoul  was  known  as 
a  "Resident,"  the  term  being  apparently  borrowed  from 
India  where  the  British  representative  in  the  court  of  a 
native  state  is  usually  known  as  the  British  Resident.  This 
Chinese  Resident,  Yuan  Shi  Kai,  was  the  personal  repre- 
sentative of  Li  Hung  Chang,  acting  under  the  immediate 
direction  of  the  Viceroy.  His  diplomatic  status  vis-d-vis 
his  European  colleagues  was  always  a  delicate  and  irritating 
point.  Should  he  be  treated  as  a  diplomatic  representative? 
If  so  what  was  his  relative  rank  in  such  a  diplomatic  corps? 
This  resident  immediately  claimed  for  himself  a  position 
quite  different  from  that  of  the  representatives  of  the  other 
countries.  He  demanded  and  received  permission  to  be 
carried  in  his  chair,  accompanied  by  his  attendants,  through 
the  central  gate  to  the  palace  when  he  came  for  audience 
with  the  king,  while  the  other  representatives  were  com- 
pelled to  leave  their  chairs  at  the  gate  and  walk  more  than 
half  a  mile  to  the  hall  of  audience.  His  exact  status  and 
the  scope  of  his  powers  was  never  defined  and  when  the 
United  States  addressed  to  the  Tsungli  Yamen  an  official 
inquiry  about  it  in  1889  the  Chinese  officials  replied  with 
some  asperity:  "It  would  seem  to  the  Prince  and  the  min- 
isters that  there  is  also  no  necessity  of  making  inquiry 
about  it."  ^ 

Japan  having  won  another  point  in  the  contest  for 
Korea  in  the  settlement  of  August  30,  1882,  paused  and 
waited  for  another  favorable  opportunity  to  advance.  The 
Yokohama  Specie  Bank  advanced  a  sum  of  money  for 
founding  newspapers  in  Korea,  for  training  Korean  soldiers, 
and  for  other  means  of  peaceful  penetration.^     Takezoye, 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA      477 

a  man  well  learned  in  Chinese,  was  sent  to  Seoul  as  Min- 
ister. 

China,  while  adopting  energetic  measures  in  the  pe- 
ninsula, w^as  not  yet  prepared  to  fight.  In  1882  Li  Hung 
Chang  was  requested  to  prepare  a  plan  for  the  invasion  of 
Japan,  but  he  was  able  to  persuade  the  Board  of  Military- 
Affairs  that  such  a  step  would  be  premature.  Notwith- 
standing the  clan  struggles  in  Japanese  politics,  the  large 
national  debt  and  the  relative  isolation  in  which  Japan 
stood,  the  Viceroy  was  of  the  opinion  that  in  case  of  war 
the  Powers  would  be  on  her  side. 

"If  Japan  should  discover  prematurely,"  argued  Li,  "our  plans  to 
make  war  against  her,  then  her  government  and  people  will  be 
reunited,  she  will  ally  with  a  foreign  power,  and  accumulate  money 
l)y  issuing  loans,  increase  her  army  and  navy,  build  and  purchase  war- 
ships, with  the  result  that  we  should  be  in  a  disadvantageous  position, 
pregnant  with  danger.  An  ancient  maxim  says:  'Nothing  is  so 
dangerous  as  to  expose  one's  plans  before  they  are  ripe.'  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  I  recommend  to  your  Majesty  that  we  maintain 
extreme  caution,  carefully  concealing  our  object  whilst  all  the  time 
increasing  our  strength."  * " 

The  King  of  Korea,  catching  a  glimpse  of  the  vistas  of 
independence,  and  becoming  impressed  with  his  importance 
in  international  affaip^,  stood  erect  and  turned  to  the 
Americans  for  help,  ^e  did  not  relish  the  idea  of  having 
th/ee  or  more  thousand  Chinese  troops  quartered  in  Korea. 
\' nder  the  old  relationship,  w'hatever  it  may  have  been, 
not  only  were  there  no  Chinese  envoys  and  no  Chinese 
troops  in  Korea,  but  there  were  no  Chinese  merchants  ex- 
cept at  the  border.  The  average  Korean  probably  did  n6t 
know  a  Chinese  by  sight  before  the  Shufeldt  treaty.  \JTh.e 
increase  of  Chinese  influence  in  the  peninsula  was  as  muoh 
resented  as  the  coming  of  the  Japanese  had  been,  x/he 
king  appealed  to  the  American  Government  (October, 
1883)  to  send  him  an  adviser  for  the  office  of  foreign  affairs, 

*FIowPVPr.  the  evidence  makes  very  probable  the  inference  that  Li  Hung 
Chang  did  not  fully  appreciate  the  .'Strategic  value  of  Korea  to  China  until 
after  the  Sliufeldt  treaty.  He  appears  to  have  consented  to  the  treaty  of  1S76 
between  Korea  and  Japan  ;  he  engineered  the  Shufeldt  treaty  :  ho  acquiesced  in 
the  settlement  with  Japan  in  September,  1SS2 ;  and  he  argued  in  the  reply 
to  the  Chang  Pei  Lun  memorial  that  China  did  not  have  a  valid  case  against 
Japan  in  Korea.  It  appears  to  have  been  Great  Britain  which  aroused  the 
Viceroy  to  exert  himself  in  Korea. 


478  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

and  asked  for  instructors  for  his  army.^°  He  also  placed 
orders  for  munitions  with  an  American  firm  of  Yokohama, 
The  king  even  telegraphed  for  Commodore  Shufeldt  to  re- 
turn to  Korea  and  enter  his  employ. 

Shortly  after  the  arrival  of  Minister  Foote  the  Koreatn 
Government  sent  an  embassy  to  the  United  States,  whe 
embassy  was  entertained  by  the  American  Government  and 
returned  after  a  brief  visit  in  the  U.  S.  S.  Trenton  with 
Ensign  George  C.  Foulk  of  the  U.  S.  Navy  in  attendance. 
Foulk  became  Naval  Attache  at  the  Legation  and  com- 
pletely won  the  confidence  of  the  king.^^  When  Foote  re- 
turned from  Seoul  shortly  after  the  coup  d'etat  of  1884, 
Foulk  became  Charge.  In  September,  1884,  Dr.  H.  N. 
Allen,  Presbyterian  medical  missionary,  arrived  and  within 
a  few  months  other  missionaries  followed.  The  king  made 
an  official  request  to  the  American  Government  for  school 
teachers.  American  influence  in  Seoul  was  easily  para- 
mount. 

The  opportunity  for  which  Japan  had  been  waiting 
I  came  in  the  latter  part  of  1884,  when  China  found  herself 
confronted  with  a  war  with  France.  As  soon  as  the  hos- 
tilities had  begun  Takezoye  waited  upon  the  King  of  Korea, 
painted  the  probable  fate  of  China  in  the  darkest  of  colors, 
and  offered  to  remit  the  indemnity  agreed  to  two  years 
before,  if  the  king  would  introduce  military  reforms  in 
Korea,  with  a  view  to  the  elimination  of  Chinese  influence. 
The  Japanese  minister  promised  the  support  of  Japan  if 
.Korea  would  assert  her  independence.  A  month  later  he 
demanded  that  Japanese  merchants  be  given  most-favored- 
nation  treatment  on  the  basis  of  the  Chinese  trade  regula- 
tions of  September,  1882.  This  was  granted.  Still  later  he 
pointed  out  the  danger  to  Korea  if  Japan  and  China  were 
to  fight  on  Korean  soil,  a  possibility  which  seemed  to  the 
Japanese  minister  very  probable.^-  Meanwhile  a  plot  was 
formed  between  Japanese  officials  and  certain  progressive 
Koreans  to  seize  the  king  and  queen.  This  plot  was  exe- 
cuted in  the  midst  of  much  assassination  on  the  night  of 
December  4,  1884,  on  the  occasion  of  a  dinner  given  to  the 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA      479 

f  diplomatic  corps  to  celebrate  the  opening  of  a  Korean  postal 
system.  The  king  and  queen  were  surrounded  by  the  lead- 
ers of  the  plot  and  by  the  Japanese  officials,  and  the  follow- 
ing day  the  king  issued  orders  creating  widespread  reforms, 
,  as  well  as  declaring  Korean  independence  of  China.  The 
next  day  Yuan  Shi  Kai  with  several  thousand  soldiers  put  in 
an  appearance,  recaptured  the  palace,  and  forced  the  Japa- 
nese— only  130  in  all — to  retreat  to  Chemulpo  where  they 
found  refuge  on  the  Japanese  war  vessels. 

The  old  form  of  government  was  immediately  restored 
under  the  direction  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai,  and  such  pro-Japanese 
leaders  as  had  not  escaped  with  the  Japanese  were  assassi- 
nated. The  coup  d'etat  of  December  4  again  brought 
Chin^and  Japan  to  the  verge  of  war. 

\?rance  had  been  urging  Japan  to  declare  war  on  China 
because  France  needed  the  use  of  Japanese  ship-yards  which 
were  not  available  under  Japan's  proclamation  of  neutrality. 
Japan  though  willing  to  aid  France  was  wary  of  French 
associations.  Count  Inouye  proceeded  to  Seoul  and  reached 
an  agreement  with  Korea  (January  8,  1885)  in  which  the 
latter  consented  to  a  moderate  indemnity  and  the  punish- 
ment of  those  guilty  of  the  murder  of  a  Japanese  officer, 
and  further  promised  to  rebuild  the  Japanese  legation  and 
barracks  for  the  Japanese  soldiers. 

Japan  then  despatched  Count  Ito  to  Tientsin  where 
negotiations  for  a  treaty  with  China  were  opened  with  Li 
Hung  Chang  April  3.  Count  Ito,  according  to  a  Japanese 
historian,  stated  his  case  as  follows: 

''The  claims  of  China  over  Korea  were  historical  only  .  .  .  The 
claims  of  Japan  over  Korea  were  economical,  i.e.,  she  did  not  claim 
any  legal  authority  over  Korea,  but  from  her  geographical  position 
and  the  necessity  of  providing  for  her  constantly  increasing  popula- 
tion, she  was  intent  on  utilizing  Korea  as  the  best  source  from  which 
the  defect  in  the  home  produce  of  rice  was  to  be  supplied,  as  well  as 
the  nearest  field  in  which  the  future  sons  of  Japan  might  find  employ- 
ment. For  this  purpose  Japan  would  have  Korea  always  independent 
and  under  no  foreign  "influence;  but  within  late  years  China  was  send- 
ing military  and  political  agents  to  Korea,  and  interfering  with 
Korean  international  affairs^  as  if  she  intended  to  make  good  her 
claim  over  Korea,  long  since  become  purely  historical.     This  state  of 


480  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

things  had  to  be  rectified,  for  Japan  would  never  consent  to  Korea's 
becoming  in  reality  a  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire."  " 

Two  (lays  after  the  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  the  war 
between  China  and  France  was  brought  to  a  close  in  what 
amounted  to  at  least  a  partial  victory  for  China.  Japan 
was  thus  left  in  no  position  to  act  arbitrarily  at  Tientsin. 
Count  Ito  had  to  content,  himself  with  a  treaty  which  still 
fell  short  of  a  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Korea, 
yet  substantial  advances  were  made.  It  was  agreed  that 
both  China  and  Japan  should  have  the  right  to  send  troops 
into  Korea,  upon  the  notification  of  each  other,  in  case  of 
emergency;  the  instructors  of  the  Korean  army  were  to  be 
foreign  drill-masters,  not  Chinese  or  Japanese ;  and  Li  Hung 
Chang  promised  to  send  a  commission  to  Korea  to  investi- 
gate the  charge  that  Chinese  soldiers  had  b^n  acting  in  a 
disorderly  and  brutal  manner.  In  short,  Nine  treaty  raised 
Japan  to  a  position  of  paramount  importance  equal  to  that 
of  China  in  the  peninsula. 

Then  Russia  began  to  show  her  hand.  A  treaty  similar 
to  those  with  Great  Britain  and  Germany  was  signed  in 
July,  1884,  Soon  there  were  rumors  that  Korea  had  also 
entered  into  a  secret  treaty  by  which  Russia  promised  "to 
protect  the  integrity  of  Korea  against  all  attacks  by  whom- 
soever made,"  in  return  for  which  Russia  was  to  supply  the 
instructors  for  the  army  and  Korea  was  to  "loan"  Port 
Lazareff  to  Russia  for  a  winter  harbor.^  ^  The  treaty  was 
reported  to  establish  complete  Russian  suzerainty  over  the 
peninsula.  Great  Britain  then  ordered  the  occupation  of 
Port  Hamilton,  an  island  off  the  southern  coast  of  Korea, 
and  reckoned  as  a  part  of  the  kingdom.  This  was  accom- 
plished April  15,  1885.1'' 

The  King  of  Korea  protested  that  he  had  no  knowledge 
of  the  treaty  and  when  Alexis  de  Speyer,  formerly  of  the 
Russian  Legation  in  Tokio,  arrived  as  "Agent  Provisoire"  of 
Russia  in  June,  1885,  the  Korean  Government  refused  to 
carry  out  the  terms  of  the  agreement  on  the  grounds  that 
military  drill-masters  had  already  been  requested  from  the 
United  States  and  that  the  treaty  with   Russia  was  un- 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA     481 

authorized.  The  negotiations  with  Russia  were  found  to 
have  been  the  work  of  von  Mollendorff.  Probably  the 
Viceroy  had  known  nothing  of  this  adventure  of  his  auto- 
cratic representative.  The  latter  was  dismissed,  the  treaty 
went/linratified,  and  Russia  discreetly  withdrew  her  claims. 

J^Ieanwhile  the  American  Government  delayed  in  se- 
curing the  authorization  of  Congress  to  the  loan  of  military 
instructors  to  Korea  ancl^  it  was  not  until  April,  1888,  that 
three  officers  arrived.*  ^he  Korean  confidence  in  /me 
United  States  had  been  greatly  shaken  by  the  delay.  The 
United  States  was  an  uncertain  friend  to  lean  on  in  time 
of  trouble. 

Upon  the  departure  of  von  Mollendorff,  the  Korean 
Customs,  which  hitherto  had  been  managed  exclusively  by 
Korea,  were  unceremoniously  taken  under  the  care  of  Sir 
Robert  Hart,  of  the  Chinese  Maritime  Customs.  Although 
the  funds  thus  collected  were  turned  over  to  the  Korean 
Government,  the  returns  were  published  in  the  Chinese 
Customs  Reports  as  though  Korea  were  a  province  of 
China.  Sir  Robert  Hart's  policy,  to  use  his  own  words,  was 
to  "keep  steadily  in  view  the  possibility  of  union  between 
the  Koreans  and  the  Chinese  Customs — such  a  result  will 
be  best  for  both  Korea  and  China."  ^^  The  new  customs 
inspectorate  was  henceforth  utilized  as  an  agency  for  re- 
claiming the  peninsula  to  China,  and  was  a  step  in  the 
direction  of  eventual  annexation.  Sir  Robert  in  this  in- 
stance had  no  difficulty  in  serving  two  masters  for  both  the 
government  of  which  he  was  a  subject  and  the  one  of  which 
he  was  an  employe  wanted  the  same  thing. 

The  Korean  Government  made  some  feeble  protests 
against  the  occupation  of  Port  Hamilton  to  which  were 
added  the  protests  of  the  Chinese.  Great  Britain  then  took 
up  negotiations  with  China  and  when  China  secured  from 
Russia  a  distinct  promise  that  it  would  not  occupy  any 
Korean  territory  after  the  evacuation  of  the  island,  the 
British  flag  was  hauled  down  (February  27,  1887).    These 

*Both  China  and  Japan  had  officially  endorsed  the  Korean  request  for  these 
teachers. 


482  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

negotiations  were  conducted  as  though  Korea  were  a  part 
of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

Between  Japan  and  the  realization  of  her  program  for 
Korea,  Great  Britain  as  well  as  Russia  and  China  were  seen 
to  stand  squarely  in  the  way.y  The  United  States  stood 
aloof  from  the  contest  and  although  very  kindly  disposed 
towards  Japan  studied  neutrality.  \^he  American  policy, 
howeveir,  had  already  been  to  Japan  as  helpful  as  an 
alliance.  Great  Britain  working  in  the  interest  of  China  in 
Korea  was  never  able  to  accomplish  for  China  as  much  as 
the  United  States  had  wrought  for  Japan. 

Korea,  1885-1894 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  both  the  Chinese  and  the 
Japanese  troops  were  withdrawn  from  the  peninsula  in 
Julv,  1885,  the  struggle  between  the  two  empires  continued. 
JIapan,  now  passing  into  the  arduous  labors  of  treaty  re- 
vision, and  also  preoccupied  -^ith  domestic  reforms,  was 
passive  for  several  years,  but!'  China,  encouraged  by  the 
support  of  Great  Britain,  became  very  aggressive. 

The  Tai-wen-Kun,  after  three  years  of  comfortable  exile 
in  China,  was  returned  to  Korea  with  ceremonious  escort. 
He  could  be  counted  on  to  oppose  Japan.  H.  F.  Merrill,  an 
American  who  had  served  in  the  Chinese  Customs  service, 
replaced  von  Mollendorff  as  chief  commissioner  of  Korean 
customs.  Mr.  Merrill  was  charged  by  Sir  Robert  Hart  to 
seek  the  consummation  of  a  union  of  the  Chinese  and 
Korean  Customs.^^  At  the  same  time  Li  Hung  Chang,  who 
was  jealous  of  Hart's  influence  in  Peking,  appointed  0.  N. 
Denny,  an  American  who  had  served  with  credit  in  the 
American  consular  service  in  China,  as  an  adviser  to  the 
Korean  Government.  The  Viceroy  expected  thus  to  have 
two  representatives  in  Seoul — Denny  and  Yuan  Shi  Kai. 
These  two  gentlemen,  however,  did  not  get  on  well  to- 
gether. Yuan  Shi  Kai  sought  to  keep  Denny  in  a  position 
suborrhnate  to  himself  and  the  result  of  his  efforts  in  that 
direction  was  to  place  Denny  in  opposition  to  Yuan  and 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA     483 

then  to  ally  him  with  the  cause  of  Korean  independence. 
Denny  resigned  (April  1,  1888)  after  forcing  an  issue  with 
Yuan  Shi  Kai  in  which  Li  Hung  Chang  sustained  Yuan 
Shi  Kai.* 

In  the  summer  of  1886  a  rumor  was  circulated,  pre- 
sumably by  agents  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai,  and  with  the  knowl- 
edge of  Li  Hung  Chang,  that  Russia  had  entered  into  a 
secret  treaty  with  Korea,  the  effect  of  which  would  have 
been  to  accomplish  all  that  von  Mollendorff  and  de  Speyer 
had  attempted  the  previous  year,  viz.,  to  transfer  to  Russia 
the  suzerainty  over  Korea  which  was  claimed  by  China.  A 
plot  was  formed  by  Yuan,  so  it  is  believed,  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  king,  queen  and  crown  prince  and  deport  them 
to  China,  placing  the  Tai-wen-Kun  again  in  power.  Thus 
it  was  hoped  to  accomplish  the  next  step  in  the  annexation 
of  the  peninsula.  A  forged  treaty  between  Korea  and  Rus- 
sia was  published  and  circulated  but  the  plot  was  detected 
and  exposed  by  Denny,  Merrill,  the  British  consul  general 
and  others.^^  The  scheme  was  reminiscent  of  the  pro-Japa- 
nese coup  d'etat  of  December  4,  1884.  It  failed  disastrously 
and  resulted  in  great  loss  of  prestige  for  China.  At  about 
the  same  time  the  attempt  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai  to  smuggle 
ginseng  to  China  on  Chinese  war  vessels  was  exposed. 

The  next  year,  probably  as  a  direct  result  of  the  Chinese 
interference  in  Korean  affairs,  the  Korean  Government  de- 
cided to  establish  regularly  constituted  diplomatic  repre- 
sentation abroad.  China  interfered  and  Secretary  of  State 
Bayard  telegraphed  to  Peking  a  very  sharp  communication 
expressing  "surprise  and  regret"  at  the  Chinese  action.^'' 
The  Korean  Mission  to  Washington  eventually  effected  its 
departure  from  Korea  (November  13,  1887)  on  board  the 

*  Morse  believes  that  Denny  "wrought  much  mischief,"  which  is  true  if  one 
accepts  the  contention  that  Korea  should  have  been  made  into  a  Chinese 
province.  Morse  asserts,  quoting  a  despatch  of  Kockhill,  January  2S,  1S87, 
that  Yuan  was  a  progressive  leader,  urging  Korea  to  adopt  useful  reforms. 
Rockhill  was  in  Seoul  for  only  three  months,  as  Chargf,  and  had  come  from 
Peking  where  even  the  Americans  favored  the  Chinese  program  of  annexation. 
The  consensus  of  opinion  of  the  Americans  in  Korea  for  the  decade,  was  tliat 
Yuan  was  actually  an  obstructive  influence,  seeking  uniformly  the  elimination 
of  all  non-Chinese  leadership  in  the  peninsula,  and  opposing  all  reforms  which 
would  tend  toward  the  invigoration  of  Korea.  He  opposed  Dr.  Allen's  hospital, 
and  even  discouraged  any  efforts  of  the  Americans  to  organize  a  famine  relief 
fund. 


484  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

U.  S.  S,  Ossipee,  thus  eluding  six  Chinese  war  vessels  which 
had  been  sent  to  stop  it.-"  Two  years  later  when  Pak  Chun 
Yang,  the  Korean  minister  at  Washington,  returned  to 
Korea,  Yuan  Shi  Kai  demanded  that  he  be  punished  for 
having  acted  independently  of  the  Chinese  minister  in 
Washington.  The  Korean  envoy  to  Europe  never  pro- 
ceeded farther  than  Hongkong. 

At  the  time  when  Denny's  controversy  with  Yuan  Shi 
Kai  was  agitating  both  Seoul  and  Tientsin,  Li  Hung  Chang 
asked  the  American  Government  to  recall  Ensign  Foulk 
who  had  been  acting  for  the  second  time  as  Charge  at  Seoul 
since  September,  1886,  on  the  ground  that  Foulk  as  well 
as  Denny  had  been  encouraging  the  king  in  independent 
courses  of  action.  This  request  was  supported  by  the  official 
approval  of  the  Korean  Foreign  Office  which  was  completely 
under  the  control  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai,  but  was  somewhat 
weakened  by  secret  messages  from  the  king  imploring  Foulk 
to  remain  in  Korea.  At  the  same  time  the  Foreign  Office 
issued  a  formal  request  for  all  foreigners  to  withdraw  from 
Seoul.  Foulk  was  recalled,  but  his  conduct  was  approved 
by  the  Department  of  State  and  some  years  later,  having 
resigned  from  the  United  States  Navy,  Foulk  entered  the 
faculty  of  the  Doshisha,  an  American  missionary  college, 
at  Kioto,  Japan.  The  request  for  the  departure  of  the 
foreigners  from  Seoul  was  not  pressed. 

China,  meanwhile,  set  out  to  secure  a  practical  mo- 
nopoly of  the  telegraph  lines.  Japan  had  secured  the  rights 
for  a  cable  line  from  Fusan  to  Japan.  This  line  was  in- 
corporated into  the  system  of  the  Great  Northern  Telegraph 
Company  to  which  Japan  had  granted  a  monopoly  of  cable 
lines  to  China,  China  proceeded  to  build  a  land  line  from 
Tientsin  to  the  border  and  thence  to  Seoul,  or  rather  to  a 
suburb  of  Seoul.  While  this  was  in  course  of  construction, 
Japan  asked  for  permission  to  build  a  line  from  Fusan  to 
Seoul  which  would  thus  afford  Tokio  also  direct  communi- 
cation with  the  capital.  The  Korean  Government  refused 
to  grant  the  concession  but  agreed  to  build  the  line  as  a 
Korean  enterprise.     This  was  done — but  under  Chinese 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA     485 

direction.  The  result  of  this  contest  was  that  Japan  was 
effectually  prevented  from  acquiring  telegraph  rights  in  the 
peninsula  equal  to  those  enjoyed  by  China. 

Japan,  not  only  preoccupied  with  domestic  affairs  and 
treaty  revision,  but  also  alarmed  at  the  advance  of  Russia 
which  Tokio  was  powerless  to  check,  appears  to  have  be- 
come for  the  time  being  little  interested  in  Korean  affairs.* 
By  some  this  was  interpreted  to  mean  that  Japan,  already 
preparing  to  fight  China,  was  not  unwilling  that  the  pe- 
ninsula be  annexed  to  China.  Annexation  by  China  would 
settle  the  question  of  title  and  leave  Japan  free  to  wrest 
the  peninsula  from  her  rival  in  a  successful  war. 

The  most  sensitive  feature  of  Japanese-Korean  relations 
was  the  exportation  of  food-stuffs  from  the  peninsula. 
Japan  looked  to  Korea  for  supplies  of  rice  and  beans.  In 
the  autumn  of  1889  the  Korean  governor  of  one  of  the  east- 
ern provinces,  alleging  a  prospective  shortage  of  food-stuffs, 
prohibited  the  exportation  of  beans  or  bean-cake  at  Wonsan 
(Brough ton's  Bay).  Although  the  prohibition  was  re- 
moved in  two  months  and  Japan,  at  that  time  badly  in- 
volved in  domestic  discord,  contented  itself  merely  with 
protests,  two  years  later  the  controversy  was  revived  and 
the  Japanese  minister  in  Seoul  presented  a  claim  for  140,000 
yen  on  behalf  of  Japanese  merchants.  So  much  time 
had  elapsed  that  investigation  of  the  facts  was  difficult  but 
the  Korean  Foreign  Office  offered  47,000  yen  in  settlement. 
The  Japanese  minister  was  recalled,  charged  with  lack  of 
energy,  and  was  replaced  by  Oishi,  a  young  Japanese 
politician  who  advanced  the  Japanese  claim  to  176,000  yen 
and  presented  an  ultimatum  (May,  1893)  demanding  pay- 
ment within  fourteen  days.  Japan  would  have  been  willing 
to  accept  the  good  offices  of  the  American  minister  in  Seoul, 
Augustine  Heard,  but  Li  Hung  Chang  acted  quickly  and 
met  the  emergency  by  advising  Korea  to  settle  the  matter 
with  1 10,000  yen,  an  offer  which  was  accepted  by  the  Japa- 

*"If  mattors  in  Korea  come  to  a  crisis  Japanese  politicians  ought  to  make 
up  their  minds  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  that  country."  Whether  Korea 
retains  its  independence  is  a  matter  of  "comparatively  little  concern  to  us." 
Nichi  Nichi  ISIiimbuii,  Mar.  7,  1887. 


4S6  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

nese.  The  Koreans  made  the  settlement  reluctantly,  and 
greatly  resented  the  conduct  of  Japan.  The  effect  was  to 
destroy  Japanese  prestige  which  had  been  growing  for  sev- 
eral years  during  the  oppressions  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai.  Just  as 
Korean  sentiment  had  swung  towards  Japan  after  the  dis- 
closure of  Yuan  Shi  Kai's  plot  in  1886,  so  now  it  turned 
back  toward  China  which,  whatever  its  intentions,  knew 
how  to  temper  its  measures  with  tact. 

The  next  autumn  (1893)  the  Korean  Government 
placed  an  embargo  on  the  exportation  of  rice.  There  were 
indications  that  the  Chinese  were  engaged  in  an  effort  to 
drive  the  Japanese  traders  from  the  peninsula.  Korean 
sympathies  were  now  running  strongly  against  the  Japanese 
who  were  acting  arrogantly.  The  prohibition  of  rice  exports 
was  removed  at  the  end  of  three  months  (February,  1894). 
But  meanwhile  the  Tong-haks  (Society  of  Eastern  Learn- 
ing) a  semi-religious  organization  reminiscent  of  the  Tai- 
pings,  yet  conspicuously  anti-Christian,  and  fanatically 
anti-foreign  and  anti-Japanese,  began  to  gather  force  in  the 
southern  provinces,  and  advanced  on  Seoul  at  the  end  of 
March,  1894.*  ^i 

\Xhe  Tong-hak  movement  was  accompanied  by  the  mur- 
der at  Shanghai  of  Kim  Ok-kiun,  an  intensely  anti-Chinese 
and  progressive  Korean.  Kim  had  been  a  fugitive  in  Japan 
since  the  couy  d'etat  of  December  4,  1884,  and  several 
efforts  had  been  made,  either  with  the  approval  or  by  the 
instigation  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai,  to  cause  his  assassination  or 
bring  about  his  extradition  to  Korea.  Kim's  murderer,  a 
Korean,  and  the  corpse,  were  returned  to  Korea  in  a 
Chinese  war  vessel.  The  corpse  was  divided  into  eight 
parts  one  of  which  was  exhibited  with  much  oriental  en- 
thusiasm in  each  of  the  eight  provinces,  and  the  murderer 

*  Morso  staffs:  ".  .  .  sucli  ixilitical  aims  as  tlii'r(>  were  in  the  Toiitrliak 
movciiiciit  may  fairly  he  said  to  liavc  liccn  in  tlip  intorost  of  .Tapan."' --  Tliis  is 
true  only  to  flic  extent  that  the  movement  was  intensely  nationalistic,  anil 
sought  the  elimination  of  all  forei};n  iiithience  in  Korea,  includin);  the  Chinose. 
It  is  true  that  the  elimination  of  the  Chinese  was  in  the  Interest  of  .I.-ipan  for 
Korea  was  utterly  unalile  to  maintain  independenee.  The  Tong-haUs  <lid  not 
intend  to  work  in  the  interest  of  .lapan.  Their  slogan  was,  as  Morsi>  states, 
"l)o\vn  with  the  .Ia|)anes<>  and  all  foreigners."  Insulting  notiees  were  even 
posted  on  the  .I;ipanese  legation,  and  the  .Japanese  authorities  prepared  to 
remove  their  women  and  children   from   Korea. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONTEST  FOR  KOREA  487. 

was  received  in  Seoul  with  approval.  The  career  and  fate 
of  Kim  Ok-kiun  from  the  time  of  the  plot  in  1884  until  his 
quartered  body  was  distributed  in  the  provinces  of  Korea 
left  the  authorities  of  Japan,  China  and  Korea,  all,  to 
do  considerable  explaining  and  reveals  the  wretched  condi- 
tions which  had  been  created  in  the  peninsula  since  the 
first  treaty  in  1876.  One  is  left  with  the  feeling  that  in 
the  approaching  war  there  were  no  rights  whatever  except 
the  rights  of  the  inoffensive  and  oppressed  Korean  people, 
and  mese  rights  had  never  been  an  issue. 

The  Tong-hak  movement  led  directly  to  a  request  from 
the  King  of  Korea  to  Li  Hung  Chang  for  troops.  Yuan 
Shi  Kai  would  have  preferred  that  the  situation  be  made 
the  occasion  for  Chinese  intervention,  which  would  have 
been  the  next  logical  step  jii  Yuan's  progi^am,  but  the 
Viceroy  was  more  cautious.  '  The  Chinese  troops  and  war 
vessels  w^ere  despatched  from  Tientsin  June  6,  and  a  notifi- 
cation to  that  effect  was  sent  to  Tokio,*  in  accordance  with 
the  stipulation  of  the  treaty  of  1885,  but  the  Japanese  forces 
were  more  mobile  and  when  the  Chinese  arrive^d  at  Seoul 
they  found  the  Japanese  troops  already  there.  /Meanwhile 
the  Tong-hak  niovement  had  been  suppressed  by  the 
Korean  troops/  Japan  then  proposed  to  China  joint  action 
in  the  reformation  of  the  Korean  Government.  China  de- 
clined, asserting  with  a  self-righteousness  which  appears 
amusing  in  the  light  of  the  history  of  the  preceding  decade, 
that  although  suzerain  in  the  peninsula,  she  did  not  inter- 
fere in  the  affairs  of  her  vassal  state.  ^Japan  thereupon 
took  the  matter  in  her  own  hands,  and  as  a  first  step 
towards  the  elimination  of  the  obstructive  Chinese  influ- 
ence, demanded  that  the  king  declare  the  independence  of 
Korea.  On  July  27  the  king,  now  a  captive  in  the  hands 
of  the  Japanese,  complied,  declared  war  on  China,  and  in- 
vited the  Japanese  troops  to  expel  the  Chinese  from  his 
territories. 

*There  appears  to  have  been  no  truth  in  the  Charge  that  China  did  not  send 
this  notification  which  the  treaty  required.  A  Japanese  historian  states  that 
the  notice  was  sent,  but  saj's  that  it  was  objectionable  because  it  contained  the 
statement  that  Korea  was  a  protectorate  and  a  dependency  of  China.^^ 


488  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Geo.  H.  Jones,  Korean  Repository,  July,   1S98, — sketch  of  the 

life  of  the  Tai-wen-Kun;  see  also  Griffis:    ''Hermit  Kingdom." 

2.  An  excellent  synopsis  of  Korean   history   is  II.   C.   Allen's   "A 

Chronological  Index  of  Events  in  Korea"  (Seoul,  1901).  The 
author  was  closely  associated  with  all  the  events  after  1883, 
serving  at  various  times  in  the  employ  of  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment, and  then  as  secretary,  charge,  and  minister  for  the  U.  S. 
There  are  some  typographical  errors  in  this  index. 

3.  See  contemporary  English  papers  in  both  Japan  and  China. 

4.  Text  of  this  treaty  in  Customs  edition  of  "China  Treaties  and 

Conventions,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  1521-7. 

5.  For  an  account  of  Korean  history,  1882-94.  in  which  it  is  assumed 

that  (yhina  had  a  legal  claim  to  suzerainty  over  Korea,  and 
that  it  was  to  the  interest  of  Korea,  as  well  as  of  China  and 
Great  Britain,  that  the  claim  be  sustained,  see  Morse,  Vol.  3, 
chap.  1.  Morse  represents  the  prevailing  British  view,  and 
more  especially  the  ideas  of  Sir  Robert  Hart. 
G.     Korea  Instructions,  Vol.  1,  May  12,  1883. 

7.  China  Desp.,  Vol.  85,  July  13,  1889. 

8.  Stead,  p.  189. 

9.  Secret  Memoirs  of  Count  Ilayashi,  Appendix  A,  p.  318. 

10.  Senate  Rept.  1443:48-2,  Feb.  26,  1885. 

11.  The  Papers  of  George  C.  Foulk  are  deposited  in  the  New  York 

Public  Library. 

12.  Stead,  pp.  190  ff.     While  Prof.  Nagao  Ariga,  the  writer  of  the 

account,  does  not  state  that  Takezoye  organized  the  coup  dfetat 
which  followed,  the  inference  that  he  was  by  no  means  inno- 
centlj'  involved,  as  the  Koreans  claimed  and  as  Foulk  believed, 
is  very  reasonable. 

13.  Ihid.,  p.  197. 

14.  The  alleged  text  of  this  treaty  was  published  in  the  North  China 

Daily  News,  Aug.  5,  1885.  Li  Hung  Chang  told  Young  that 
the  text  was  substantially  correct ;  China  Desp.,  Vol.  76,  Aug. 
21,  1885. 

15.  China,  No.  1,  1887.     Port  Hamilton  Corres.  Command  Papers, 

4976-5053. 
IG.     Morse:     Vol.  3,  p.  13;  see  footnotes  to  following  pages  for  Sir 
Robert  Hart's  very  able  defense  of  his  objects. 

17.  Ihid.,  p.  18. 

18.  The  facts  of  the  plot  were  exposed  in  a  pamphlet;  China  and 

Korea,  by  O.  N.  Denny,  1888. 

19.  For.  Relations,  1888,  p.  220. 

20.  Allen :     "Chronological  Index." 

21.  For.  Relations,  Vol.  2,  1894,  p.  15. 

22.  Morse:    Vol.  3,  p.  20. 

23.  Stead:    p.  203. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR 

/The  United  States  was  well  situated  to  play  the  role 
of  mediator  in  Asia.  The  American  Government  was  far 
removed,  by  geographical  position,  by  international  policies, 
by  commercial  interests,  from  either  the  conflicts  between 
Japan  and  China  or  the  designs  o/ other  Western  powers  on 
Asiatic  trade  and  territory.  The  Americans  .dfisiiM^above 
all  else  peace  in  the  Faft  East,  for  \var_meant  J^o  them  a 
disttirljunce  of  trade. '^^Tliey"  also  desired  the  repression  of 
tli^" growing  Euiopean  influence  in  those  regions  for  the 
advance  of  Europe  in  Asia  was  a  threat  at  the  open  door. 
\pnis  latter  fact  made  the  United  States  in  some  degree  a 
partisan  of  the  East  against  the  West,  and  in  the  eyes  of 
Europe  disqualified  the  Americans  as  mediators.  The 
powers  did  not  desire  mediation;  they  distrusted  it.  The 
Europeans  sought  not  justice  but  privilege  in  Asia. 

"Tne  United  States  was  bound  by  treaties  to  extend  good 
offices  at  the  request  of  China  and  Korea,  and  to  act  as 
friendly  mediator  at  the  request  of  Japan.  But  the  mean- 
ing of  these  pledges  has  been  wholly  misunderstood  by 
many  modern  friends  of  the  Asiatic  people.  'T  think  it 
proper  to  observe,"  wrote  Secretary  of  State  Fish  to  Min- 
ister De  Long  (April  28,  1871),  when  Japan  sought  the  good 
offices  of  the  United  States  in  the  Sakhalin  dispute, /that 
it  is  not  supposed  that  the  President  can  mediate  in  a  con- 
troversy or  dispute  between  Japan  and  other  countries 
unless  both  parties  to  the  controversy  accept  him  as  media- 
tor." ^  Both  parties,  of  course;  or  else  mediation  becomes 
nothing  less  than  interference  and  intervention. 

There  were  in  the  nineteenth  century  no  disputes  be- 
tween either  the  oriental  states,  with  trivial  exceptions,  or 

489 


490  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

between  one  of  them  and  a  western  nation,  in  which  both 
sides  honestly  sought  justice,  or  in  which  both  parties  to 
the  controversy  were  prepared  to  submit  to  an  examination 
of  the  facts  in  a  court  of  mediation.  We  have  now  seen  how 
Russia  evaded  mediation  in  the  case  of  Sakhahn,  and  how 
Japan  was  equally  reluctant  to  submit  the  Formosan  ques- 
tion to  mediation  in  1874.  Russia  was  an  aggressor,  Japan 
was  equally  so,  Russia  would  not  submit  to  mediation; 
Japan  submitted  not  to  mediation,  but  to  the  intervention 
of  Great  Britain.  At  first  the  Lew  Chew  controversy  ap- 
pears to  be  an  exception  to  our  sweeping  generalization  but 
we  have  seen  in  the  end  that  it  was  not.  Japan  upset  the 
decision  of  the  conference  at  Peking  by  bringing  in  at  the 
last  moment  some  extraneous  demands.  Another  case  in 
point  was  a  request  for  American  good  offices  in  the  inter- 
val between  the  battle  at  the  Taku  forts  (1859)  and  the 
renewal  of  the  Anglo-French  War  against  China  in  1860. 
The  Chinese,  alarmed  at  their  easy  success  at  Taku  where 
they  had  forced  the  allied  fleets  to  withdraw,  appealed  to 
United  States  Minister  Ward,  even  before  the  American 
treaty  had  been  ratified,  to  mediate  with  the  ministers  of 
Great  Britain  and  France.  Ward  invited  the  Chinese  to 
renew  the  invitation  after  they  had  ratified  the  treaty  upon 
which  they  were  basing  their  appeal.-  They  were  appar- 
ently ashamed  to  renew  the  request  after  the  treatment 
given  to  the  American  legation  in  the  subsequent  visit  to 
Peking,  but  there  is  no  reason  whatever  for  believing  that 
had  the  request  been  made  again  the  British  and  French 
representatives  would  have  been  willing  to  submit  the  facts 
to  impartial  review.  The  evidence  in  the  American  records 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  British  and  French  were 
wholly  wrong,  and  there  is  nothing  in  their  records,  aside 
from  assertions,  which  controverts  this  conclusion. 

The  case  of  the  Maria  Luz  (1872)  is  one  of  the  rela- 
tively trivial  exceptions.  A  Peruvian  coolie  ship  from 
China  in  distress  was  forced  to  put  in  at  Yokohama.  The 
Japanese  promptly  freed  the  coolies.  Peru  sought  the  good 
offices  of  the  United  States  in  the  settlement  of  the  conse- 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  491 

quent  claim  against  Japan,  The  American  Government  ac- 
cepted the  duty  with  the  express  stipulation  that  it  could  do 
nothing  which  would  imply  approval  of  the  coolie  trade. 
At  the  suggestion  of  the  United  States,  the  claim  was  re- 
ferred to  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  who  awarded  the  decision 
to  Japan,  May  29,  1875.  The  reference  of  this  matter  to 
Russia  became  especially  easy  because  in  1864  Mr.  Pruyn 
had  agreed  to  submit  a  disputed  claim  of  the  United  States 
against  Japan,  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Czar.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  American  claim  had  been  settled  without  refer- 
ence to  St.  Petersburg,  but  the  discussion  had  given  the 
United  States  an  opportunity  to  show  its  willingness  to 
conform  its  practice  to  its  preaching.^ 

American    Mediation    in    the    Franco-Chinese    War, 

1883-1884 

A  more  important  case  in  which  American  good  offices 
were  invoked  was  the  Franco-Chinese  controversy  over 
Annam.  This  is  an  important  episode,  the  narration  of 
which  is  also  necessary  in  order  to  show  more  fully  the 
nature  of  Chinese-American  relations  during  the  period 
following  the  Shufeldt  treaty  with  Korea. 

Soon  after  the  French  Charge  in  Peking  had  announced 
(1866)  to  the  astonished  Yamen  that  his  government  was 
about  to  annex  Korea,  France  would  appear  to  have  con- 
cluded to  seek  territorial  expansion  only  in  the  south. 
France  had  made  a  treaty  with  Annam  in  1862,  and  twelve 
years  later  concluded  a  second  one  in  which  France  recog- 
nized the  complete  independence  of  Annam,  in  much  the 
same  way  as  Japan  recognized  by  treaty  the  independence 
of  Korea  two  years  later.  Indeed  French  policy  in  Annam 
afforded  Japan  a  model  for  policy  in  Korea — a  similar 
satellite  of  China.  In  1874  France  also  actually  acquired 
Cochin  China.  China  protested  because  the  treaty  in  effect 
made  France,  rather  than  China,  the  suze^^^ift  over  Annam. 
The  matter  remained  in  dispute  until  the  latter  part  of 
1883  when  Li  Huns  Chang  signed  a  convention  with  France 


492  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

according  to  which  the  Chinese  troops  were  to  be  withdrawn 
from  Annam,  and  the  two  nations  were  jointly  to  guarantee 
the  independence  of  this  territory  which  for  two  centuries 
had  paid  tribute  to  Peking.  There  was  a  sudden  change  of 
government  in  France  and  the  convention  was  repudiated 
at  Paris.  The  new  French  cabinet  proposed  an  expedition 
to  China  and  a  liberal  credit  was  voted.  Then  a  French 
officer,  Riviere,  was  killed  in  an  engagement  with  the  Black 
Flags,  an  irregular  company  of  troops  which  were  supposed 
to  be  more  or  less  supported  by  the  Chinese  Government. 
War  became  all  but  inevitable.  Indeed,  it  seems  quite 
plain  that  France  was  seeking  to  provoke  war  for  the  sake 
of  securing  more  territory  in  the  south. 

China,  stung  by  the  charges  of  bad  faith,  defiant  and 
unhumbled,  still  quite  ignorant  of  the  weakness  of  the 
empire,  perhaps  misled  by  encouragements  from  Germany 
and  England,  and  quite  underestimating  the  strength  of 
France,  was  determined  to  yield  no  territory  to  France,  and 
also  not  to  yield  suzerainty  over  Annam.  At  this  point 
John  Russell  Young,  the  American  minister,  whose  rela- 
tions with  Li  Hung  Chang  were  very  intimate  and  confiden- 
tial, and  whose  relations  with  Tsung-li  Yamen  were  cordial, 
pleaded  for  peace.  The  question  was,  as  he  tried  to  explain, 
not  whether  China  was  in  the  wrong  or  in  the  right,  but 
whether  she  could  afford  a  war  with  a  foreign  power.  She 
had  relatively  few  troops  with  a  modern  training,  and  they 
were  in  the  north.  To  transport  them  to  Annam  there  was 
no  railroad,  and  the  Chinese  Navy  could  not  protect  them 
by  sea.  France  was  studiously  cultivating  Japan  with  a 
view  to  securing  joint  action  against  China.  Russia  was 
an  eternal  menace  to  the  Chinese  northern  frontier.  Eng- 
land was  busy  in  Egypt,  and  presumably  not  unwilling  that 
France  should  become  involved  in  China.  For  China  itself 
war  seemed  likely  to  enc|  in  disaster."* 

At  length  the  counsels  of  Mr.  Young  had  their  effect 
and  he  was  asked  to  invite  the  good  offices  of  the  President 
to  secure  a  mediation  of  the  dispute.  To  this  request  Secre- 
tary of  State  Frelinghuysen  replied,  July  13,  1883: 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  493 

"This  government  cannot  intervene  unless  assured  that  its  good 
offices  are  acceptable  to  both.  In  such  case  it  would  do  all  possible 
in  the  interests  of  peace.  The  United  States  Minister  at  Paris  has 
been  directed  to  sound  French  Government,  and  ascertain  if  it  will 
admit  our  good  offices  in  the  sense  of  arbitration  or  settlement."  ° 

The  answer  was  not  long  delayed.  France  declined  to  ac- 
cept the  good  ojSices  of  the  United  States.*' 

The  French  forthwith  proceeded  to  declare  a  blockade 
of  Tonquin  and  Annam,  and  although  negotiations  con- 
tinued at  Shanghai,  the  troops  of  the  two  nations  came  into 
active  conflict  in  December,  1883.  On  May  11,  1884,  Li 
Hung  Chang  signed  with  Commandant  Fournier  a  conven- 
tion which  was  intended  by  the  Chinese  to  be  the  protocol 
to  a  treaty.  In  the  Fournier  Convention  France  waived  a 
claim  for  indemnity  in  return  for  the  acknowledgment  of 
her  territorial  and  commercial  claims  in  Annam.  There 
was  entire  disagreement  between  the  Chinese  and  the 
French  as  to  the  interpretation  of  this  protocol,  and  even  as 
to  its  authorized  text,  and  on  June  23,  1884,  Colonel 
Dugenne  and  twenty-two  French  soldiers  were  killed  in 
an  engagement  at  Bade.* 

Again  China  appealed  to  the  good  offices  of  the  United 
States  and  again  (July  20,  1884)  Minister  Young  referred 
the  matter  to  Washington,  China  wished  to  submit  to 
arbitration  the  question  as  to  whether  she  had  acted  in  bad 
faith  with  reference  to  the  Fournier  Convention.  Again 
France  declined  to  admit  the  good  offices  of  the  United 
States. 

China  was  thus  brought  face  to  face  with  war.  The 
American  minister  renewed  his  efforts  to  find  a  peaceful 
solution,  feeling  that  peace  at  any  price  which  France  might 
demand  would  be  better  than  conflict.  At  length  Prince 
Kung  asked  Mr.  Young  to  go  to  Shanghai,  see  M.  Patenotre, 
the  French  representative,  and  obtain  a  settlement.    China 

*H.  B.  Morse,  who  was  present  at  the  Li  Hung  Chang-Fournier  negotiations 
and  saw  the  documents,  gives  personal  testimony  as  well  as  other  evidence  to 
prove  that  the  French  Government  was  guilty  of  extremely  bad  faith  in  the 
ol)Servance  of  this  convention.  His  verdict  is:  "It  is  only  on  the  ground  that 
an  Asiatic  nation  has  no  rights  which  the  white  man  is  hound  to  respect  that 
the  course  of  France  is  to  he  explained."  For  the  French  statement  of  the 
case  see  Cordier.' 


494  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

was  even  willing  to  agree  to  any  indemnity  which  Young 
might  recommend.  The  American  minister  referred  the 
request  to  Washington  for  approval,  but  Secretary  of  State 
Frelinghuysen  was  wary,  having  already  been  twice  re- 
pulsed by  France,  and  withheld  his  approval.  An  August  5 
Admiral  Lespes  attacked  Keelung  in  Formosa.  After  this 
attack  all  hopes  of  peace  vanished.  The  Chinese  were 
roused.  Prince  Kung  was  retired,  and  with  the  retirement 
of  the  prince  came  the  eclipse  of  Li  Hung  Chang,  who  had 
clearly  reaUzed  the  folly  of  resisting  the  French. 

Early  in  September  the  China  Merchants  Steam  Navi- 
gation Company  which  had  been  purchased  a  few  years 
before  from  Russell  and  Company,  was  resold  to  the  former 
owners,  and  the  American  flag  was  raised  over  the  fleet  of 
steamers.  France,  thus  deprived  of  the  opportunity  of 
making  a  most  profitable  reprisal  upon  China,  was  now  less 
than  ever  willing  to  accept  any  good  ofiices  from  the  United 
States.  However,  the  American  Government  kept  in  very 
close  touch  with  the  rapidly  developing  situation  and  on 
several  subsequent  occasions  was  the  medium  of  communi- 
cation between  Paris  and  Peking.  Sir  Robert  Hart  also 
undertook  the  task  of  mediation  and  after  more  than  a  year 
of  work  succeeded  in  bringing  about  the  signing  of  a  proto- 
col, April  4,  1885.^ 

Mr.  Young,  although  his  efforts  at  mediation  between 
China  and  France  had  failed,  was  determined  to  demon- 
strate the  good  faith  of  the  United  States  in  its  advocacy 
of  arbitration  as  a  means  of  settling  disputes,  and  was  able 
to  secure  the  consent  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  the 
arbitration  of  the  'Ashmore  Fisheries  Case'  by  the  British 
and  the  Netherlands  consuls  at  Swatow.  The  case  involved 
the  action  of  the  Chinese  officials  in  depriving  Dr.  W.  Ash- 
more,  an  American  missionary  at  Swatow,  of  a  fishery  which 
he  had  purchased  in  connection  with  a  mission.  An  award 
of  $4600  was  made  to  Dr.  Ashmore  June,  1884.'*  Earlier  in 
the  same  year  Mr.  Young  had  proposed  that  the  claims  of 
the  foreigners  arising  out  of  a  riot  at  Canton  in  September, 
1883,  be  submitted  to  arbitration,  but  he  was  unable  to 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  495 

secure  the  consent  of  the  Chinese  to  such  a  statement  of  the 
disputed  points  as  would  have  satisfied  the  British  authori- 
ties.io 

Good  Offices  of  the  United  States  in  Korea 

Having  in  mind  the  foregoing  review  of  previous  Ameri- 
can efforts  to  mediate  the  disputes  of  the  Far  East,  we  are 
in  a  position  to  return  to  a  survey  of  American  policy  in 
the  mpidly  maturing  conflict  in  the  Korean  peninsula. 

^ince  the  ratification  of  the  Shufeldt  treaty  the  Ameri- 
can Government  had  consistently  maintained  a  policy, 
sound  in  legality  but  weak  in  statesmanship,  that  it  would 
recognize  Korea  as  a  sovereign,  ind^endent  nation  in  all 
that  pertained  to  foreign  relations.*  'The  policy  would  have 
been  perfect  in  a  perfect  world,  but  in  fact  it  rested  upon  as 
great  a  fallacy  as  that  which  had  underlain  the  Gushing 
treaty  with  China. ,  yKorea  lacked  the  vitality  which  alone 
makes  possible  the  exercise  of  sovereignty.  The  Korean 
Government  was  a  vine,  not  a  very  lovely  one  either,  which 
trailed  in  the  dust  unless  it  could  cling  to  some  stronger 
power  for  support.  Of  independence  there  was  nothing 
save  a  pitifully  feeble  cry  of  desire.  /ITiere  were  many  con- 
testants for  this  position  of  supporting  power  in  Korea,  but 
the  United  States  was  not  one  of  them.  The  Korean  Gov- 
ernment was  in  the  position  of  an  incompetent  defective 
not  yet  committed  to  guardianship.  The  United  States 
was  her  only  disinterested  friend — but  had  no  intention  of 
becoming  her  guardian. 

Vwhen  the  American  Government  became  aware  that  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  troops  were  facing  each  other  in  the 
peninsula  the  American  Minister  in  Seoul,  Mr.  Sill,  was 
instructed  (June  22,  1895) : 

"In  view  of  the  friendly  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  wel- 
fare of  Korea  and  its  people,  you  are,  by  direction  of  the  President, 

*"Witli  the  reserved  relation  of  Korea  to  China  we  cannot  properly  inter- 
fere to  raise  any  question  unless  the  course  of  China  should  be  such  as  to 
manifestly  shift  accountability  as  regards  foreign  interests  and  intercourse  to 
the  shoulders  of  China."     Wharton  to  Heard,  Aug.  25,  1890." 


496  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

!   instructed  to  use  every  possible  eflfort  for  the  preservation  of  peaceful 
I  conditions."  " 

The  Koreans,  caught  between  the  mill-stones,  and  quite 
powerless  to  act  effectively  for  peace,  appealed  to  Russia, 
France,  England,  and  the  United  States  for  help,  and  Mr. 
Sill,  the  American  minister,  joined  with  the  representatives 
of  the  other  powers  in  asking  China  and  Japan  to  agree  to 
a  simultaneous  withdrawal  of  their  troopg  from  Korean 
soil.  Both  China  and  Japan  refused,  ^n  July  5th  the 
KoreaiTrepfesentMiveln  Washington  "asked  that  the  Presi- 
dent "adjust  the  difficulty"  arising  out  of  the  fact  that  the 
Japanese  minister  in  Seoul  had  presented  to  the  Korean 
King  a  long  list  of  administrative  reforms  and  was  pressing 
that  they  be  immediately  adopted.  At  about  the  same  time 
the  Chinese  Government  at  Peking  sought  the  good  offices 
of  England  and  Russia  to  secure  a  peaceful  solution.  The 
British  minister  in  Peking  urged,  through  Charles  Denby, 
Jr.,  American  Charge,  that  the  United  States  take  the  initia- 
tive in  uniting  the  great  Powers  in  a  joint  protest  at  Tokio 
against  the  beginning  of  hostilities  in  Korea  by  Japan.  On 
July  8  Denby  wired  that  Li  Hung  Chang  had  officially  ex- 
pressed the  desire  that  the  United  State  take  the  initiative 
as  the  British  minister  had  suggested. 

^ /ould  not  be  argued  that  in  the  conflict  now  beginning 
for  the  control  of  the  peninsula  Japan  was  innocent  of  blame. 
The  Japanese  Empire,  vis  a  vis  Korea,  was  placed  some- 
what similarly  to  England  and  the  kingdom  of  the  Nether- 
lands which  had  been  created  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in 
1815.  The  two  island  kingdoms  could  not  but  view  with 
concern  the  nature  of  the  control  of  the  adjacent  mainland. 
Great  Britain  was  pleased  to  witness  the  creation  of  a 
Belgium;  the  Japanese  had  since  1871  been  working  to 
create  on  the  Korean  peninsula  a  political  condition  sim- 
ilarly favorable  to  their  empire.  Japan  could  not  honestly 
assume  the  role  of  injured  innocence.  Indeed,  after  1892 
the  attitude  of  Japan  towards  China  became  distinctly  un- 
compromising and  even  menacing.  In  an  address  before  the 
Diet  (December,  1892)  Count  Aoki,  Minister  of  Foreign 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  497 

Affairs,  sought  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  Diet  from 
troublesome  criticism  of  domestic  affairs  and  the  failure 
of  treaty  revision.    He  said : 

"As  for  the  position -of  the  country,  everybody  is  agreed  that  it  is 
excellent.  If  you  look  at  the  map  of  the  world  you  will  see  that 
America  has  her  back  turned  to  us,  and  that  on  her  western  coast, 
thousands  of  miles  away  from  our  shores,  no  good  port  lies  open. 
Europe  is  only  less  distant  from  us  for  all  practical  purposes.  But 
here  in  Asia,  the  case  is  very  different.  At  your  doors  sits  a  nation 
of  2,700,000  people,  ready  to  take  your  manufactures  and  products, 
and  to  give  you  its  own  in  return.  Look  at  the  coal  fields  of  your 
country  in  the  north  and  in  the  south.  Are  not  these  landmarks  set 
by  nature  to  indicate  the  position  your  country  ought  to  take?" 

Thus  far  Aoki  would  appear  to  have  been  advocating  merely 
a  policy  of  peaceful  economic  penetration  into  the  mainland 
of  Asia,  but  a  following  paragraph  practically  incited  an 
attack  upon  China: 

"Occupying  such  a  position  and  possessing  such  capacities,  why  is 
it  that  the  people  of  Japan  do  not  devote  more  thought  to  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  Empire?  If  you  go  back  in  your  history  to  the  Ashikaga 
era,  you  will  find  that  the  men  of  southern  Japan  whom  some  may 
perhaps  call  pirates,  launched  themselves  in  little  boats  and  harried 
the  coasts  of  China  with  its  hundreds  of  millions  of  people,  coming 
and  going  at  will  and  taking  and  leaving  at  will.  Surely  it  seems 
somewhat  petty  that  the  descendants  of  such  men  as  those  should 
allow  their  mental  vista  to  be  occupied  entirely  with  the  four  ideo- 
graphs jouaJcu  kaisei  (treaty  revision).  It  seems  to  me  that  larger 
subjects  invite  their  attention.  The  present,  however,  is  not  the 
occasion  for  me  to  dwell  at  length  upon  this  phase  of  our  foreign 
policy."     (Reported  in  Japan  Daily  Mail,  December  20,  1892.) 


/. 


[t  could  not  have  escaped  the  attention  of  the  American 
Government  that  in  June,  1894,  Japan  had  reached  a  very 
ominous  crisis  in  its  domestic  affairs  in  which  a  foreign  war 
would  be  a  very  welcome  diversion  to  the  repeated  inter- 
ference of  the  Diet  in  the  affairs  of  government.  On  June 
2,  1894,  the  Diet  had  been  dissolved  by  the  Emperor  for 
the  third  time  since  December  25,  1891.  There  was  within 
the  Empire  a  clear-cut  contest  between  the  oligarchy  which 
had  governed  the  country  since  the  Restoration  and  a  more 
popular  form  of  government  in  which  the  lower  house  of 
the  Diet  was  seeking  control  of  the  purse  strings,^  ^    Only  a 


498  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

foreign  war,  it  seemed,  could  stop  this  contest,  the  issue  of 
which  was  so  o;rcatly  to  be  dreaded  by  the  oKgarchy. 

JS^otwithstanding-  these  facts  the  United  States  gave  no 
evidence  of  a  disposition  to  join  with  Chii>a  and  the 
European  powers  in  opposing  Japan  in  I^rea,  'The  treaties 
demanded  the  tender  of  good  offices.N-^'jPfie  United  States 
made  the  offer  and  it  was  rejected.  TKe  obUgation  under 
the  treaties  was  therefore  for  the  moment  discharged.  -In- 
tervention was  now  the  only  alternative,  but  intervention 
with  the  other  foreign  powers  involved  support  of  a  policy 
which  would  really  weaken  rather  than  strengthen  Asia. 

Japan  having  refused  to  heed  the  protests  of^the  United 
States  as  well  as  those  of  England  and  RussiaV'^ecretary  of 
State  Gresham  told  the  Korean  envoy  in  Washington  on 
July  9  that  the  American  Government  would  not  intervene 
either  forcibly,  or  jointly,  with  the  European  powers;  that 
it  would  maintain  ''impartial  neutrality,"  and  that  it  would 
seek  to  influence  Japan  only  in  a  "friendly  way."  Mr. 
Gresham  expressed  to  the  Japanese  minister  in  Washington 
the  hope  that  Japan  would  deal  "kindly  and  fairly  with  her 
feeble  neighbor." 

To  China's  request  for  intervention  Gresham  replied 
advising  that  China  offer  the  whole  question  for  friendly 
arbitration.  Jle  did  not  then  .believe  that  Japan  would  re- 
sort to  war.  China  was  not/prepared  to  submit  the  entire 
question  to  arbitration.  The  fundamental  point  at  i^sue 
was  the  validity  of  Chinese  suzerainty  over  Korea. VThis 
pretension  would  have  had  a  most  doubtful  status  before 
any  board  of  arbitration  when  studied  in  the  light  of  the 
various  treaties  which  had  been  made  by  Korea  beginning 
with  the  Japanese  treaty  in  1876,  and  also  when  considered 
in  the  light  of  existing  treaties  between  Japan  and  China. 
China  by  1894  had  surrendered  too  much  and  acquiesced 
in  too  much,  ever  to  establish  a  position  of  technical 
suzerainty  over  Korea. 
(  On  October  8,  the  British  Charge  approached  the  Ameri- 
ycan  Government  with  a  proposition  for  joint  intervention 
I  by  the  United  States,  Germany,  France,  Russia  and  Great 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  499 

Britain  on  the  basis  of  an  indemnity  to  be  paid  by  China  to 
Japan,  and  the  guarantee  by  the  Powers  of  the  independ- 
ence of  Korea.    A  month  later  China  formally  invoked  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States,  citing  the  treaty  of  1858, 
and  asking  for  joint  action  with  the  other  foreign  powers. 
Before  this  invitation  was  received,  Gresham  directed  U.  S. 
Minister  Dun  in   Tokio  to  inquire   whether  good   offices 
/  would  be  acceptable  to  Japan,  and  the  same  day  Gresham 
/  carefully  defined  the  position  of  the  United  States  in  a  note 
[which  clearly  explained  why  the  American  Government  had 
been  unwilling  to  join  the  European  powers  in  intervention: 

I  ''T[lig_deplorable  war  between  .Tapnn  nnrl  CTiinn  endangers  no 
pol^cxZpJr~tEe~"  U nited-IH.tai£a_in  A_sia.  Our  attitude  towards  "IHie 
belTigerents  fs  that  of  an  impartiaFan'H'  friendly  neutral,  desiring  the 
welfare  of  both.  If  the  struggle  continues  without  check  to  Japan's 
military  operations  on  land  and  sea,  it  is  not  improbable  that  other 
powers  having  interests  in  that  quarter  may  demand  a  settlement  not 
favorable  to  Japan's  future  security  and  well-being.  Cherishing  the 
most  friendly  sentiments  of  regard  for  Japan,  the  President  directs 
that  you  ascertain  whether  the  tender  of  his  good  offices  in  the 
interests  of  peace  alike  honorable  to  both  nations  would  be  acceptable 
to  the  Government  at  Tokio,^' 

In  the  above  frienglfy  warning  to  Japan  one  reads  be- 
tween the  lines  that  j^resham  clearly  understood  the  inter- 
national situation.  The  proposals  for  intervention  had  been 
directed  against  Japan  with  a  view  to  repressing  her  ad- 
vancing power  and  influence  in  Asia.  These  proposals  had 
not  been  primarily  in  the  interests  of  any  Asiatic  state,  but 
in  the  interests  of  European  political  and  commercial  am- 
bitions in  Korea.  Dressed  in  their  best  clothes  these  pro- 
posals looked  in  the  direction  of  a  protectorate  in  Korea; 
viewed  more  cynically  and  critically,  they  looked  in  the 
direction  of  dismemberment  not  merely  of  Korea,  but  also 
further/dismemberment  of  China  and  perhaps  of  Japan. 

Japan,  however,  disregarded  the  admonitions  of  the 
United  States,  and,  instead  of  pausing  at  a  point  where  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  might  have  been  valuable 
in  saving  Asia  in  general  fro.  \  a  large  increase  of  European 
influence,   overreached  hers(  i  by  continuing  the  war  so 


J 


00  AMERICArNS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 


J 


successfully  begun .-v/apan  thus  invited  the  very  interven- 
tion which  Gresham  expected. 

From  the  policy  of  cooperation  as  followed  by  William 
H.  Seward  and  Anson  Burlingame,  the  United  States  had 
swung  to  the  opposite  extreme  of  absolute  isolation.  Suc- 
ceeding administrations,  after  Seward,  had  no  taste  for  ac- 
tive cooperation  with  European  powers  in  Asia  on  the  only 
terms  upon  which  it  was  offered,  i.e.,  cooperation  to  repress 
and  weaken  the  Asiatic  states,  and  there  was  no  disposition 
to  knight-errantry  like  Burlingame's.     There  was  at  the 

I  most  only  a  feeble  interest  in  Asiatic  affairs.  The  American 
Government  appears  to  have  concluded  in  the  second  Cleve- 
land administration  that  if  only  the  Monroe  Doctrine  could 
be  sustained  for  the  entire  western  hemisphere,  the  political 
conditions  on  the  other  side  of  the  Pacific  might  safely  be 
ignored.  All  that  can  be  said  for  this  absurd  assumption 
is  that  it  marked  a  very  definite  phase  in  the  political  de- 
velopment of  the  American  nation. 

China's  position  was  fast  becoming  desperate.  While 
the  American  Government,  ever  since  the  Korean  treaty  of 
1882,  had  steadily  and  consistently  discouraged  China  in 
the  belief  that  in  case  of  a  crisis  in  Korea  the  United  States 
would  support  the  contentions  of  China,  Great  Britain  had 
consistently  supported  China's  pretensions.  Now  Great 
Britain,  aside  from  ineffectual  efforts  to  draw  the  European 
f  powers  and  the  United  States  into  a  concert  of  intervention 
to  thwart  Japan,  did  nothing.  British  neutrality  was,  in 
effect,  benevolent  towards  Japan  which  in  an  unbroken 
series  of  victories  found  herself  at  the  end  of  November, 
1894,  in  possession  of  the  seas,  the  peninsula,  and  even  of 
Port  Arthuf  which  practically  controlled  the  avenues  to 
Peking,  ^e  American  legations  in  Peking  and  Tokio,  re- 
spectively, had  been  in  charge  of  the  Japanese  and  Chinese 
archives  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  Japan  now  let 
it  be  known  that  she  would  be  willing  to  entertain  direct 
overtures  from  China  through  the  Americans.  On  the  day 
after  the  fall  of  Port  Arthur,  November  22,  Charles  Denby, 
American    minister    at    Peking,    was    authorized    by    the 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  501 

Tsung-li  Yamen  to  begin  negotiations  through  Edwin  Dun/ 
American  minister  at  Tokio.  Denby  proposed  peace  on  the 
following  terms:  the  independence  of  Korea;  and  the  pay- 
ment by  China  of  a  reasonable  indemnity.  Japan  replied 
that  when  peace  was  made  she  would  dictate  the  terms  as 
becarn^  a  victor.  Strategically  Japan  was  in  a  position  to 
exacj^any  terms  she  might  desire. 

\/China,  unable  to  secure  any  assistance  from  the  United 
States  and  deserted  by  England,  still  clung  fatuously  to  the 
belief  thaj/some where,  somehow,  help  would  issue  out  of  the 
West.  She  turned  again  to  England  and  she  turned  to 
Russia.*  That  China  was  not  sincere  in  her  approaches  to 
Japan  is  abundantly  proved  by  the  details  of  the  prelimi- 
nary negotiations.  Even  while  Denby,  by  authority  of  the 
Yamen,  was  negotiating  through  Dun  in  Tokio,  Li  Hung 
Chang  sent  Mr.  G.  Detring,  his  personal  representative,  to 
Japan  as  an  envoy  and  yet  without  any  of  the  powers  of 
a  plenipotentiary.  The  Japanese  refused  to  receive  him. 
A  month  later  China  sent  two  officials  of  inferior  rank  with- 
out suitable  credentials,  one  of  whom  could  not  fail  to  be 
particularly  objectionable  to  the  Japanese.  They  were  met 
in  Japan  by  John  W.  Foster,  formerly  Secretary  of  State 
toward  the  close  of  the  Harrison  administration,  and  more 
recently  legal  adviser  to  the  Chinese  legation  in  Washing- 
ton.^^ General  Foster  had  been  summoned  by  the  Chinese 
Government  to  act  as  adviser  in  the  peace  negotiations.  He 
promptly  told  the  envoys  that  they  were  without  proper 
credentials,  and  the  envoys  were  in  fact  repulsed  by  the 
Japanese  Government. 

A  Japarujfeb  was  not  ready  for  peace.  While  the  Chinese 
envoys  were  in  Japan  the  Japanese  fopces  were  advancing 
on  Wei-hai-wei<  and  on  January  31ymis  fortress  was  sur- 
rendered. Tlrere  still  remained  Formosa  which  Japan  had 
desired  for  more  than  twenty  years  and  which  she  would 

•"Negotiations  were  kept  up  between  China  and  Japan  by  the  American 
ministers  until  late  in  January,  1895.  It  would  serve  no  good  purpose  to 
recount  them  here.  The  two  nations  mistrusted  each  other,  and  China  was 
always  trying  to  ascertain  in  advance  what  the  demands  of  Japan  would  be, 
in  order  that  she  might  procure  the  intervention  of  England  or  Russia." 
(Charles  Denby.)'* 


502  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

have  held  in  1874  but  for  the  intervention  of  Great  Britain. 
It  was  not  until  March  20  that  Li  Hung  Chang,  equipped 
with  full  powers,  met  the  Japanese  plenipotentiaries.  Count 
Ito  and  Count  jMutsu,  at  Shimoneseki.  Even  then  the 
Chinese  were  resting  their  hopes  on  the  intervention  of 
European  powers,  and  it  was  not  until  May  24 — more  than 
a  month  after  the  treaty  of  peace  between  China  and  Japan 
— that  the  Japanese  forces  landed  in  Fornlosa. 

Korea  after  the  Peace  of  Shimoneseki 

^he  Treaty  of  Shimoneseki  (April  17,  1895)  and  the 
Treaty  of  Commerce  (July  21,  1896)  are  important  in  the 
study  of  American  policy  in  omy  two  respects  and  to  these 
we  must  limit  our  discussion.VThe  defeat  of  China  was  the 
beginning  of  a  new  commercial  era  within  that  empire,  the 
relation  of/^hich  to  American  policy  will  be  discussed  else- 
where. Tne  victory  of  Japan  also  carried  with  it  the  partial 
realization  of  a  program  of  Japanese  expansion  which,  as 
already  noted,  had  been  pro/ected  at  least  as  early  as  the 
days  of  the  Restoration.  Japan  came  into  possession  of 
Formosa  and  the  Pescaderoes,  thus  acquiring  a  strategic 
position  controlling  the  southern  avenue  of  approach  to 
central  China  and  all  northern  Asia.  Japan  also  held  Wei- 
hai-wei  as  well  as  Port  Arthur  and  the  Liaotung  Peninsula 
which  controlled  the  approaches  to  Peking.  China  was 
further  compelled  to  recognize  the  full  independence  and 
autonomy  of  Korea,  a  victory  for  Japan  which  would  prob- 
ably have  been  consummated  in  1885  but  for  the  sudden 
ending  of  the  Franco-Chinese  War. 

That  Japan  regarded  this  recognition  of  the  independ- 
ence of  Korea  as  merely  the  severing  of  Chinese  ties,  and 
not  as  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  Korean  question  is 
evident  from  Japanese  policy  already  inaugurated  in  the 
peninsula  when  the  treaty  of  Shimoneseki  was  signed. 
While  the  king  was  practically  a  prisoner  in  his  palace,  the 
Japanese  demanded  a  franchise  for  all  the  railroads  in 
Korea  for  fifty  years,  all  the  telegraphs  for  twenty-five 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  503 

years,  and  all  the  posts  for  five  years.  They  sought  to 
eliminate  the  foreign  advisers  to  the  Korean  Government, 
and  they  urged  Korea  to  dispose  of  the  Korean  legation  in 
Washington  and  to  place  Korean  affairs  in  the  United 
States  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese  legation.  This  program  / 
received  a  sudden  check  when  Germany,  Russia  and  France 
presented  a  joint  request,  amounting  to  a  demand,  that 
Japan  recede  from  the  Liaotung  Peninsula,  returning  Port 
Arthur  to  China,  and  followed  up  this  demand,  which  Japan 
had  no  choice  but  to  agree  to,  by  pressure  to  make  certain 
the  withdrawal  from  Wei-hai-wei,  a  port  which  Japan  had 
agreed  to  hold  only  until  the  inclemnity  provided  for  in  the 
treaty  with  China  had  been  paid.  Japan  thus  discovered, 
as  Secretary  of  State  Gresham  had  warned  many  months  / 
before,  that  she  was  n(>)b  to  be  permitted  to  consummate 
her  program.  Meanwh^e  Great  Britain  as  well  as  the  other 
powers,  including  theiJnited  States,  protested  against  the 
proposed  franchises  in  Korea. 

Japan  was  represented  at  Seoul  by  Viscount  Miura,  a 
military  man  who  was  fairly  representative  of  the  extreme 
expansionist  party  in  Japanese  politics.  Meeting  with  re- 
sistance not  only  from  the  other  treaty  powers,  but  also 
from  the  Koreans,  Miura  became  a  party  to,  if  not  the  in- 
stigator of,  a  plot  similar  to  the  coup  d'etat  of  1884  and 
the  abortive  plans  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai  two  years  later,  to  elimi- 
nate the  queen  and  her  party  from  Korean  politics,  and 
indeed,  to  demolish  all  opposition  to  Japan.  This  plot  was 
accomplished  October  8,  1895,  in  an  attack  on  the  palace 
and  the  murder  of  the  queen  followed  by  the  burning  of 
her  body.  Viscount  Miura  was  recalled,  court-martialed, 
and  although  his  complicity  in  the  crime  was  proven,  he 
was  acquitted  on  a  technicality.^*^  Miura  had  served  Japan 
badly.  When  the  Japanese  influence  at  Seoul  became 
ascendant  in  the  summer  of  1894,  all  foreigners  who  wished 
Korea  well  had  been  disposed  to  welcome  the  change  from 
the  reactionary  regime  of  Yuan  Shi  Kai.  Now  the  for- 
eigners were  shocked,  and  the  Koreans  also  turned  against 
Japan.    Japanese  influence  suffered  a  rapid  decline. 


504  AM1:KICANS  in  eastern  ASIA 

Russia,  which  probably  would  not  otherwise  have  come 
forward  in  the  peninsula  until  the  completion  of  the  trans- 
Siberian  railway,  now  seized  the  opportunity  and  began  to 
displace  Japan,  although  not  with  the  entire  approval  of 
the  Koreans  who  wished  not  only  to  be  rid  of  both  Chinese 
and  Japanese  interference,  but  also  to  be  free.  The  king, 
however,  one  of  the  most  pitifully  abject  and  unworthy 
sovereigns  recorded  in  the  pages  of  history,  took  refuge  in 
the  Russian  legation  (February  11,  1896)  and  Russia  as- 
sumed as  complete  a  control  of  Korean  affairs  as  China  and 
Japan,  respectively,  had  tried  and  yet  failed  to  acquire. 
Under  Russian  influence  the  government  became  more  and 
more  corrupt.  By  a  series  of  agreements  (Lobanoff-Yam- 
agata,  June  9,  1896,  Waeber-Komura,  May  14,  1897,  and 
Rosen-Nissi,  April  25,  1898)  ^^  Japan  yielded  to  Russia  to 
the  extent  of  recognizing,  for  the  first  time,  the  political 
status  quo,  in  return  for  which  Russia  granted  to  Japan  a 
freedom  in  its  commercial  and  industrial  relations  with 
Korea  which  would  permit  of  a  policy  of  economic  penetra- 
tion, and  would  at  the  same  time  allow  Japan  time  enough 
to  build  the  fleet  and  organize  the  army  which  was  necessary 
for  the  conflict  with  Russia  which  was  clearly  in  view. 

This  see-sawing  of  foreign  influ^ice  in  Seoul  created  a 
difficult  position  for  the  American  JGovernment.  The  pos- 
sible pitfalls  were  innumerable,  "l^oth  Russia  and  Japan 
made  bids  for  American  sympathy  and  encouraged  t|ie/m- 
vestment  of  American  capital  in  the  peninsula,  ^oth 
powers  were  obviously  seeking  to  commit  American  interests 
in  such  a  way  that  when  the  crisis  came  the  United  States 
woulfl  turn  to  their  respective  sides.  -^In  August,  1895, 
Korea  granted  a  concession  to  an  American  company  for 
the  operation  of  a  gold-mine,  and  in  April  of  the  following 
year  the  contract  for  a  railroad  from  Chemulpo  to  Seoul  was 
awarded  to  Americans,  with  Russian  approval  and  help. 
But  the  events  of  1897  frightened  American  capital  and  the 
railroad  contract  was  turned  over  the  following  year  to  the 
Japanese.  Japanese  capitalists  then  appealed  to  America 
for  capital  to  be  invested  in  Korea  under  Japanese  guar- 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  505 

antees.  Concurrently  the  Japanese  Government  withdrew 
its  protests  against  the  annexation  of  Hawaii,  adopted  a 
very  conciUatory  poHcy  on  the  immigration  question,  and 
when  Philippine  annexation  was  under  discussion,  expressed 
the  hope  that  the  Americans  would  retain  the  islands. 

The  Americans  in  Korea  were  less  cautious  than  their 
government.  When  Japan  promised  a  better  government 
for  the  Koreans  in  1894,  they  had  favored  the  Japanese. 
When,  after  the  disgraceful  murder  of  the  queen,  the  Rus- 
sians came  forward  and  promised  to  put  an  end  to  Japanese 
intrigues,  they  favored  the  Russians.  When  Russia  proved 
to  be  only  another  wolf  in  the  Korean  fold,  they  fell  back 
upon  the  characteristically  American  doctrine  of  Korean 
independence.  That  Korea  could  become  actually  inde- 
pendent only  by  the  intervention  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment not  merely  in  Korea,  but  also  in  the  rapidly  increasing 
snarl  of  European  politics  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to 
them.  > 

Tile  American  Government  sought  to  restrain  its  citi- 
zens; most  of  whom  were  missionaries,  from  contributing  to 
the  hopes  of  the  Koreans  that  help  must  some  day  certainly 
come  from  the  United  States.  But  American  law  is  deficient 
in  its  power  to  impose  restraints  on  the  expression  of  per- 
sonal opinion  by  American  citizens  in  foreign  countries. 
There  was,  however,  one  thing  which  could  be  done.  The 
American  minister  at  Seoul,  as  the  official  representative  of 
his  government,  could  be  restrained.  Following  the  emeute 
of  October  8,  1895,  Secretary  of  State  Gresham  telegraphed 
to  Minister  Sill,JJlI«tervention  in  the  political  concerns  of 
Korea  is  not  one  of  your  functions,"  ^^  and  when  the  minis- 
ter persistently  failed  to  preserve  the  absolute  neutrality 
which  his  government  had  assumed,  he  was  replaced,  though 
not  until  the  McKinley  administration  had  been  inaugu- 
rated. Dr.  H.  N.  Allen  (July  27,  1897)  was  raised  to  the 
post  from  the  position  of  Secretary  of  the  Legation.  The 
American  policy  was  clearly  defined  (November  19,  1897) 
by  Secretary  of  State  Sherman  in  his  instructions  to  Dr. 
Allen. 


506  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

"You  have  been  appointed  to  this  interestiBg  mission  at  a  time 
when  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  rival  purposes  and  interests  in  the 
east  may  find  in  Korea  a  convenient  ground  of  contention,  and  it 
behooves  the  United  States  and  their  representatives,  as  absolutely 
neutral  parties,  to  say  or  do  nothing  that  can  in  any  way  be  construed 
as  taking  sides  with  or  against  any  of  the  interested  powers.  And 
such  particularity  would  not  only  be  in  itself  improper  but  mi^ht 
have  the  undesirable  and  unfortunate  effect  of  leading  the  Koreans 
themselves  to  regard  the  Unitt'd  States  as  their  natural  and  only  ally 
for  any  and  all  such  purposes  of  domestic  policy  as  Korea's  rulers 
may  adopt."  " 

/mf^hG  Secretary  then  reaffirmed  the  principle  that  the  use  of 
'     good  offices  was  in  no  way  equivalent  to  a  promise  of  inter- 
vention, and  was  entirely  dependent  upon  the  acceptance  of 
the  good  offices  by  both  parties  to  the  controversy. 

At  the  end  of  the  century  the  situation  in  Korea  was  as 
follows:  The  Korean  Court  was  more  corrupt  than  ever; 
while  Russia  still  held  her  place  nominally,  Japanese  influ- 
ence was  in  the  ascendancy  again ;  and  Great  Britain,  having 
deserted  China,  was  supporting  Japanese  aspirations. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Japan  Instr.,  Vol.  1,  Apr.  28,  1871,  Fish  to  De  Long. 

2.  Ward  Corres.,  p.  594,  Aug.  20,  1859,  Ward  to  Cass. 

3.  For.  Relations,  18()3,  II,  p.  1079;  1873,  I,  p.  613;  Payson  Jackson 

Treat:  "Japan  and  the  United  States,"  pp.  100,  101,  70;  For. 
Relations,  1873,  I,  pp.  524-5;  Moore's  "Digest,"  II,  p.  655. 

4.  Mr.   Young  refers  to  the  conference  with   Li  Hung  Chang   in 

"Men  and  Memories,"  Vol.  2,  p.  308.  See  also  Tyler  Dennett: 
"American  Good  Offices  in  Asia,"  Journal  of  International 
Law.  January,  1922. 

5.  China  Instr.  Vol.  3,  July  13,  1883,  Frelinghuysen  to  Young. 

6.  Cordier:      "Relations,  etc.,"  Vol.   II,  p.   399.     This   is   the  sole 

reference  b.y  historians  to  these  overtures. 

7.  Morse:    Vol.  II,  pp.  353-7;  Cordier:   Vol.  II,  pp.  435  ff. 

8.  For.   Relations   contain   no   references   whatever  to   the  Young- 

Li  Hung  Chang  or  the  Frelinghuysen-Morton  correspondence 
for  the  arbitration  of  the  Franco-Chinese  War.  The  Young 
dispatches,  among  the  ablest  pa])ers  in  the  archives  of  the 
Dept.  of  State,  are  as  follows :  China  Desp.,  Vol.  65,  Aug.  8, 
1883,  Aug.  16,  1883,  Sept.  7,  Oct.  8,  1883;  Vol.  67,  Dec.  24, 
1883;  Vol.  68,  Jan.  6,  1884;  Vol.  71,  Aug.  21,  1864;  Sept.  4, 
1884;  Vol.  73,  Dec.  22,  1884.  The  details  of  the  Hart  nego- 
tiatif)ns  will  be  found  in  Morse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  364-7. 

9.  Moore's  "Arbitrations,"  II,  1875. 


AMERICAN  GOOD  OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE  WAR  507 

10.  For.  Relations,  1883,  p.  209 ;  1884,  p.  46 ;  Morse,  op.  cit.,  p.  320. 

11.  Korean  Instr.,  Vol.  1,  Aug.  25,  1S90,  Wharton  to  Heard. 

12.  For.  Relations,  1894,  II,  p.  22.     The  following  pages  in  Foreign' 

Relations  bring  together  and  give  in  great  detail  the  diplo- 
matic correspondence  of  the  American  Government  in  relation 
to  the  Sino- Japanese  War. 

13.  See  W.  W.  McLaren :   "A  Political  History  of  Japan,"  chaps.  9, 

10. 

14.  Charles  Denby:    "China  and  Her  People,"  Vol.  2,  p.  132. 

15.  John  W.  Foster:     "Diplomatic  Memories,"  Vol.  II,  chaps.  30-32. 

These  chapters  together  with  Denby's  chap.  10  give  a  fairly 
complete  account  of  the  entire  peace  negotiations.  The  cor- 
respondence of  the  peace  negotiations  was  published  in  the 
English  newspapers  in  both  Japan  and  China.  The  official 
documents  were  collected  and  published  in  pamphlet  form  by 
the  Tientsin  Times. 

16.  Japan  Daily  Mail,  Feb.  1,  1896,  gives  the  report  of  the  Miura 

court-martial  proceedings. 

17.  These,  as  well  as  other  treaties  with  or  concerning  Korea,  have 

been  collected  in  a  convenient  booklet  entitled  "Korea : 
Treaties  and  Agreements,"  published  by  the  Carnegie  Endow- 
ment for  International  Peace  (1921).  They  will  also  be  found, 
of  course,  in  the  various  larger  collections  of  treaties. 

18.  For.  Relations,  1895,  p.  972,  Oct.  11,  1895;  see  Sill's  reply,  p.  977. 

19.  Korea  Instr.,  Vol.  1,  Nov.  19,  1897,  Sherman  to  Allen. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 
TREATY  REVISION 

The  tap-root  of  American  policy  in  Asia  was  always 
commercial  and  political  most-favored-nation  treatment — 
equality  of  privilege.  While  the  other  Western  powers 
might  fairly  claim  a  similar  basis  for  their  policies,  there 
was  a  difference.  All  treaties  started  with  most-favored- 
nation  treatment  as  a  base,  but  the  European  powers  and 
Great  Britain  constantly  sought  to  whittle  down  to  a 
minimum  the  safeguards  interposed  by  treaties  for  the 
political  and  commercial  independence  of  the  Asiatic  states, 
and  to  manipulate  the  interpretation  or  revision  of  the 
treaties  in  some  way  which  would  actually  create  a  pre- 
ferred position  for  the  nationals  of  the  power  thus  exerting 
itself.  At  this  point  the  American  Government  parted  com- 
pany with  the  other  treaty  powers  after  1866.  The  United 
States  desired  not  merely  to  protect  the  Asiatic  states  in 
the  enjoyment  of  the  rights  guaranteed  by  treaty,  but  also 
to  remove  or  modify  any  restrictions  upon  their  liberties 
which  would  thwart  their  development  as  strong  states. 
The  United  States  wanted  a  strong  East;  the  other  powers 
did  not. 

The  United  States  entered  the  period  of  treaty  revision 
with  another  policy  not  easily  reconciled  with  the  purpose  to 
promote  a  strong  East.  Cooperation  with  other  powers  was 
difficult  so  long  as  that  cooperation  was  to  be  manipulated 
for  the  repression  of  Asia.  The  cooperative  policy,  there- 
fore, which  reached  its  height  under  Seward  in  the  Con- 
vention of  1866  and  the  Burlingame  treaty,  was  abandoned. 
It  is  difficult  to  name  an  exact  date  when  this  took  place. 
While  it  was  nominally  sustained  by  the  Department  of 
State  until  1877  when  Hamilton  Fish-retired  at  the  end  of 

508 


TREATY  REVISION  509 

the  Grant  administration,  actually  cooperation  had  ceased 
in  Japan  by  1870,  and  in  China  did  not  survive  the  de- 
parture of  Burlingame.  The  name  continued  in  Peking 
throughout  the  century,  a  polite  fiction,  a  synonym  for 
ordinary  diplomatic  courtesy,  but  the  spirit  of  the  coopera- 
tion was  well  described  by  John  Russell  Young,  American 
minister  at  Peking,  1882-5,  who  wrote: 

"This  policy,  when  studied,  simply  meant  in  practical  experience 
that  when  matters  went  to  please  Great  Britain  there  was  joint  action. 
Otherwise  there  would  be  no  action  until  Great  Britain  was  pleased, 
and  as  there  were  very  few  questions  in  which  the  United  States 
were  concerned,  it  was  deemed  best  for  the  American  interests  that 
the  Legation  should  act  alone  arid,  like  its  British  associate,  unite  in 
"joint  action"  when  such  a  course  served  the  United  States."  *  ^ 

While  the  period  of  treaty  revision  did  not  formally 
start  until  1868,  hardly  before  the  signatures  to  the  treaties 
were  dry  the  efforts  to  modify  them  had  begun.  The 
foreigners  were  bent  on  increasing  their  advantages;  China 
and  Japan  were  seeking  to  reduce  them.  The  three  main 
objects  of  attack  were  the  five  per  cent  tariff,  extraterritor- 
iality, and  further  opening  of  the  country.  To  all  of  these 
provisions,  in  Japan  as  well  as  in  China,  the  United  States 
was  well  committed  in  1858. 

Revision  in  China  by  Interpretation  and  Agreement 

China's  power  of  resistance  reached  its  lowest  ebb  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  Anglo-French  War  in  1860,  which  coin- 
cided with  a  revival  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion.  In  the  next 
forty  years  China  lost  much,  both  by  treaty-interpretation 
and  by  new  treaties,  and  gained  nothing  except  as  foreign 
powers  occasionally  opposed  the  aggressions  of  their  own 
or  some  other's  nationals.  During  the  four  years  in  which 
Sir  Frederick  Bruce  and  Anson  Burlingame  worked  together 
in  Peking,  the  efforts  of  the  mercantile  communities,  not- 
ably at  Shanghai,  to  secure  loose  interpretations  of  the 

*Charles  Denby,  Amorican  minister  at  Peking  from  1SS5  to  1898,  writes  of 
the  cooperative  policy  as  though  it  did  not  disappear  until  the  struggle  for 
concessions  which  followed  the  Sino-Japanese  War.  The  erroneous  nature  of 
this  assumption  will  appear  in  the  following  pages.* 


510  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

treaties  in  favor  of  increased  privileges  for  foreigners  met 
with  effective  resistance.  British  pubhc  opinion  underwent 
a  great  change  in  the  sixties  which  is  represented  in  the 
inauguration  of  the  first  Gladstone  ministry  in  1868.* 

Official  policies  for  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
respectively,  are  registered  in  the  Burlingame  treaty  of  1868 
and  the  Lord  Clarendon  letter,  but  after  them  "all  regulat- 
ing influences  seem  to  have  been  removed,"  and  "the  utmost 
pretensions  of  the  merchants,  commercial,  fiscal,  and  munici- 
pal, have  in  the  course  of  time,  one  after  another,  been 
attained."  "*  The  coasting  trade,  contrary  to  the  desire  or 
intention  of  the  Chinese  Government,  passed  into  the  hands 
of  foreigners;  for  many  years  the  Americans  were  the  chief 
beneficiaries.  The  effort  to  secure  Chinese  representation 
in  the  municipal  government  at  Shanghai  was  thwarted,  and 
while  the  technical  sovereignty  of  the  Empire  over  the  city 
was  not  abolished,  the  power  of  the  Imperial  government 
to  levy  taxes  was  curtailed.  Shanghai  contributed  nothing 
to  the  Imperial  revenues  except  through  customs.  Extra- 
territoriality was  stretched  to  cover  law  as  well  as  jurisdic- 
tion and  the  foreigners  even  reserved  for  themselves  the 
exclusive  right  to  interpret  the  law  under  the  treaties.  The 
imperial  government  was  prevented  from  full}''  enforcing 
the  penalties  for  smuggling.  Eventually  the  immunity  from 
inland  taxation  secured  under  the  British  tariff  of  1858  by 
the  payment  of  an  additional  2Vii  per  cent  duty  at  the  ports 
was  greatly  broadened  to  include  a  large  amount  of  trade 
which  was  not  only  not  a  part  of  the  foreign  commerce  of 
the  Empire,  but  was  not  even  carried  on  by  foreigners. 
Thus  in  a  measure  China  lost  even  the  power  to  regulate 
internal  taxation.  The  provision  of  the  Burlingame  treaty 
(Article  8)  by  which  the  United  States  disavowed  "any 
intention  or  right  to  intervene  in  the  domestic  administra- 

*"It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  ton  ypars  later  the  treaty  of  Tientsin  in 
its  ontircty  would  have  l)eoii  an  iiii|)()ssil)ility  ;  not  but  what  tlie  (Miinese 
authorities  t'ould  have  i)een  coinpclled  to  yield  all  that  it  contains;  but  that 
the  i;ritish  (iovernnieiit  yieldirif;  to  the  (Icniocratic  inipulse  that  has,  in  the 
interval,  passed  over  lOurope  and  America,  would  have  hesitated  to  impose  all 
the  conditions  to  which  the  Clilnese  Covernnient  tlii'n  submitted."  (Address 
of  .1.  Barr  Hobertson  before  the  North  China  Branch  of  the  Royal  Asiatic 
Society,   May  IG,   1870.') 


TREATY  REVISION  511 

tion  of  China  in  regard  to  the  construction  of  railroads, 
telegraphs,  or  other  material  internal  improvements,"  never 
accepted  in  a  formal  way  by  other  powers,  was  of  no  value 
except  to  exclude  Americans  from  privileges  of  interference 
enjoyed  by  their  competitors.  Meanwhile,  because  of  rising 
prices,  the  five  per  cent  duties  ceased  to  be  effectively  five 
per  cent.  This  also  amounted  to  a  revision  in  the  interests 
of  the  foreigner.  While  the  treaties  of  1858  were,  during 
the  nineteenth  century,  never  actually  and  formally  revised, 
a  revision  by  interpretation  and  special  agreement  was 
steadily  taking  place,  and  almost  uniformly  to  the  disad- 
vantage of  China.  In  1900  the  commercial  and  political  as 
well  as  the  geographical  sphere  in  which  the  Empire  might 
exercise  its  sovereign  rights  was  much  smaller  than  in  1860. 
As  the  years  went  on  this  form  of  revision  became  of  less 
and  less  benefit  to  American  interests  and  even  became 
disadvantageous,  but  after  the  day  of  Burlingame  and  Sew- 
ard, the  American  Government  offered  no  effective  opposi- 
tion.^ 

Treaty  revision  in  Japan  proceeded  in  less  subtle  ways 
and  was  characterized  by  the  very  aggressive  policies  of  the 
Japanese  Government  which  forced  the  conflict  of  interests 
into  the  light  of  day.  The  steps  in  the  revision  are  clearly 
definable.  The  first  efforts  were  made  immediately  by  the 
foreigners  and  went  against  Japan.  They  were  directed  first 
at  the  tariff  which  under  Townsend  Harris  had  been  favor- 
able to  Japan  as  well  as  to  the  United  States.  In  1866 
Japan  was  forced  by  a  joint  naval  demonstration  to  consent 
to  'regularize'  the  various  tariff  reductions  which  had  been 
secured  by  Lord  Elgin,  Mr.  Pruyn,  and  by  the  voluntary 
concessions  of  the  Japanese,  in  a  conventional  tariff  of 
specific  duties  similar  to  those  of  the  British  tariff  of  Tien- 
tsin. Similarly,  as  in  China,  the  rise  in  prices  had  the  effect 
of  reducing  this  tariff  so  that  in  another  ten  years  the 
specific  duties  amounted  to  less  than  four  per  cent  when 
calculated  on  an  ad  valorem  basis. 

After  1866  American  cooperation  in  treaty  revision 
ceased.    From  that  time  onward  American  policy  is  marked 


512  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

in  five  stages:  Japanese  efforts  in  1872  to  which  may  be 
joined  certain  decisions  of  the  American  Government  in  the 
limitation  of  extraterritoriaUty;  the  treaty  of  1878;  the 
Shufeldt  treaty  with  Korea  in  1882,  which  is  an  official  state- 
ment of  poHcy  for  that  date ;  the  treaty  revision  conferences, 
1882-8,  concluding  with  the  unratified  treaty  of  1889;  and 
the  actual  revision  accomplished  in  1894.  In  passing  it  may 
be  noted  that  the  history  of  American  policy  in  tariff  revi- 
sion in  Japan  might,  during  this  period,  have  been  repeated 
in  China  had  the  latter  government  been  in  a  position  to 
invite  it. 

Japanese  Efforts  at  Revision 

The  revision  of  the  treaties  with  Japan  was  due  in  1872. 
Among  the  foreigners  there  was  a  movement  on  foot  to  de- 
mand the  unlimited  opening  of  the  country  to  travel,  resi- 
dence and  trade.  The  Japanese,  realizing  the  difficulties  of 
the  approaching  crisis,  set  out  to  meet  them  just  as  China 
had  done  in  1868  by  means  of  an  embassy,  consisting  of 
Lord  Iwakura  and  four  "vice-ambassadors."  Although 
American  influence  in  Tokio  had  reached  its  lowest  point 
since  the  opening  of  the  Empire,*  the  United  States  was 
looked  upon  as  friendly  to  Japan,  and  the  embassy  planned 
to  visit  America  first,  as  the  Burlingame  mission  had  done, 
possibly  with  a  view  to  securing  similar  official  approval  in 
the  United  States  which  might  be  used  effectively  in 
Europe. 

While  Japan  gave  formal  notice  in  1871  of  its  desire  to 
revise  the  treaties  the  following  year,  it  appears  that  the 
original  intention  of  the  Emperor  had  been  to  postpone  the 
revision  until  the  return  of  the  embassy.!  For  some  reason, 
perhaps  because  of  advice  received  in  the  United  States  and 

♦"With  the  (ivirthi-dw  of  the  Tycoon  American  prestige  in  .Tapan  went 
down,  for  with  liiin  into  exile  went  all  those  others  wliose  minds  first  imbibed 
impressions  from  foreign  powers  and  wistlom  from  the  shadow  of  Terry's  fleet, 
and  the  wise  connsels  of  our  first  minister,  Mr.  Harris.  Since  then  no  exhibi- 
tion of  our  power  or  greatness  has  ever  been  made  in  these  seas,  wliilst  other 
nations  have  carefully  made  displays  of  theirs."  (De  Long  to  Fish,  Jan. 
1!),  1.S71.)  « 

t"As  soon  as  the  embassy  returns  homp  we  will  consider  the  revision  of  the 
treaties,  and  acconijilish  what  we  have  expected  and  intended."  (Letter  of  the 
Emperor  to   President   Grant.') 


TREATY  REVISION  513 

because  of  the  enthusiastic  reception  accorded  to  the  Jap- 
anese, it  was  deemed  wise  to  proceed  at  once  to  a  revision 
of  the  treaty,  and  Ito  and  Okubo,  two  of  the  envoys,  were 
sent  back  to  Japan  to  secure  the  necessary  full  powers. 
They  returned  to  Washington  with  a  draft  of  the  revision 
as  desired  by  Japan.  This  draft  contained  a  provision  which 
would  give  to  Japan  tariff  autonomy  and  probably  stipu- 
lated that  in  return  for  the  opening  of  either  more  ports  or 
the  interior  of  the  Empire,  the  foreigners  should  relinquish 
either  part  or  all  of  their  extraterritorial  rights.*  In  the 
midst  of  the  negotiations  which  ensued  the  embassy  with- 
drew the  proposal,  at  the  crafty  advice,  so  it  is  said,  of  the 
German  minister  in  Tokio,  von  Brandt,  who  advised  the 
envoys  that  it  was  not  to  the  advantage  of  Japan  to  nego- 
tiate separately  with  the  different  powers.^  The  American 
Government,  it  is  believed,  had  warned  Japan  against  mak- 
ing any  more  joint  treaties,  but  it  was  always  the  policy  of 
the  other  powers  in  Tokio  to  maintain  joint  action  in  treaty 
revision  negotiations  and  usually  to  thwart  attempts  to 
transfer  the  negotiations  from  Japan  to  a  foreign  capital. 
The  Japanese  announced  that  a  conference  of  the  treaty 
powers  soon  would  be  called  in  Europe  and  that  the  nego- 
tiations would  there  be  resumed.  The  embassy  remained  in 
Europe  more  than  a  year,  visiting  all  of  the  capitals  and 
studying  intently  every  aspect  of  Western  life,  and  then 
hurried  home  to  avert  the  proposed  wars  in  1873  and  also 
to  report  that  the  Western  powers,  by  means  of  the  treaties, 
had  deliberately  assigned  Japan  to  an  inferior  political 
status  like  that  of  the  other  oriental  states. f  The  powers 
were  not  only  indisposed  to  make  any  concessions  in  the 

*  The  writer  has  not  seen  a  draft  of  this  proposed  treaty.  The  inferences 
are  based  on  a  letter  from  De  Long  to  Fish  (April  29,  1872)  in  which  the 
former  returns  a  draft  of  the  treaty  with   comments. 

t  "I'ntil  tile  late  Embassy  came  to  Europr,  no  Japanese  had  any  correct 
idea  of  the  true  nature  or  of  the  internati(jnal  bearings  of  the  treaties  which 
bind  Japan.  The  higher  classes  had  vaguely  felt  that  the  treaties  were  one- 
sided, but  they  did  not  possess  sufficient  knowledge  of  European  history  and 
law  to  be  able  to  measure  them  with  precision.  It  was  not  until  the  members 
of  the  Embassy  reached  Europe  that  they  were  able  (especially  during  their 
stay  in  Paris)  to  study  the  question  thoroughly.  They  then  perceived  that 
the  Japan  treaties  are  but  another  application  of  the  rules  and  precedents 
which  Europe  has  employed  toward  all  Eastern  powers  since  the  capitulations 
were  made  with  Turkey."  Frederic  Marshal],  an  attache  of  the  Japanese  lega- 
tion in  Paris,  to  Lord  Derby,  May  6,  1874.» 


514  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

revision  of  the  treaties  but  were  acting  together  to  demand 
the  unlimited  opening  of  the  Empire.  There  is  no  record 
of  the  answers  prepared  by  the  American  Government  to 
the  Japanese  proposals  but  it  is  probable  that  the  United 
States,  while  refraining  from  demands  for  the  unlimited 
opening  of  the  Empire,  would  have  been  quite  unwilling  to 
surrender  extraterritorial  rights  or  grant  tariff  autonomy, 
although  minor  concessions  might  have  been  offered. 

Upon  the  return  of  the  Iwakura  Embassy,  Japan  set  out 
to  devise  a  program  for  the  accomplishment  of  treaty 
revision.  The  general  principles  of  this  program  were:  to 
establish  as  rapidly  as  possible  precedents  of  equality  in 
negotiations;  to  break  down  the  joint  action  of  the  powers 
and  to  isolate  them  from  each  other,  introducing  a  principle 
of  reciprocity;  and  to  carry  on  the  negotiations  for  treaty 
revision  away  from  home.  The  specific  objects  to  be  at- 
tained were:  tariff  autonomy,  to  which  was  joined  the  inten- 
tion to  raise  the  duties  in  order  to  increase  the  revenues  of 
the  government  and  possibly  to  afford  protection  to  infant 
industries ;  recovery  of  control  of  the  coasting  trade ;  and  the 
abolition  of  extraterritoriality.  The  method  to  be  adopted 
was  opportunist:  not  to  insist  upon  the  realization  of  the 
entire  project  at  once,  but  to  seize  every  opportunity  to 
advance  its  details. 

Russia  and  the  United  States  provided  the  first  op- 
portunities. In  1875,  as  already  noted,  Russia  consented  to 
the  negotiation  in  St.  Petersburg  of  a  revision  of  the  bound- 
ary treaty  of  1855.^"  Russia,  for  reasons  the  full  force  of 
which  appear  in  the  history  of  her  relations  with  China  and 
Korea,  had  never  positively  engaged  herself  to  support  the 
cooperative  policy  and,  until  the  close  of  the  Sino-Japanese 
War,  usually  preferred  isolated  action.  The  United  States 
joined  (1873)  with  the  other  treaty  powers  in  urging  Italy 
to  refuse  to  ratify  a  treaty  in  which  it  was  proposed  to  open 
the  interior  to  Italians  under  Japanese  jurisdiction.^^ 
Nevertheless  that  same  year  the  American  Government  con- 
sented to  a  Postal  Convention  with  Japan  which  was  nego- 
tiated and  signed  in  Washington  (August  6,  1873).    This 


TREATY  REVISION  515 

was  the  first  treaty  with  Japan  in  which  the  full  equality  in 
the  negotiations  was  recognized. ^^  This  action  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  was  much  resented  by  the  diplomats 
in  Tokio.  Americans  were  engaged  to  organize  the  Japanese 
postal  system.  The  United  States  took  other  steps  toward 
limiting  the  application  of  the  principles  of  extraterritorial- 
ity. In  the  face  of  the  pretensions  of  the  other  foreign 
powers  that  newly  enacted  laws  were  not  valid  for  foreign- 
ers unless  approved  by  the  foreign  governments — a  conten- 
tion which  was  sustained  in  China — the  American  Govern- 
ment ordered  the  Americans  to  conform  to  the  hunting  reg- 
ulations in  1874,  to  the  new  press-laws  in  1876,  and  to  the 
quarantine  regulations  in  1878  and  1879.^^  United  States 
Minister  Bingham  also  assented,  with  the  approval  of  the 
government,  to  the  proposition  that  Americans,  entering  the 
interior  under  passport,  should  submit  themselves  to  Japa- 
nese laws,  it  being  reserved  only  that  trial  and  punishment 
for  violation  of  these  laws  must  be  under  consular  juris- 
diction.^^ 

Policy  of  Judge  Bingham — Treaty  of  1878 

Judge  John  A.  Bingham  of  Ohio,  American  minister  in 
Tokio  from  1873  to  1885,  deserves  equal  rank  with  Town- 
send  Harris  among  the  determined  and  uncompromising 
American  friends  of  Japan  which  the  last  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  produced  in  abundance.  He  represented  not 
so  much  the  American  Government  with  which  he  often  had 
differences  of  opinion,  as  the  American  people.  He  was  a 
characteristic  American  of  the  period.* 

Immediately  upon  his  arrival  in  Tokio  Judge  Bingham 
set  himself  to  secure  the  revision  of  the  treaties  and  formal 
abrogation  by  the  United  States  of  the  policy  of  coopera- 
tion which  he  detested  as  un-American,  as  inimical  to  Japan, 
and  as  opposed  to  American  commercial  interests.    He  be- 

♦Bingham  had  been  long:  in  puhlic  life  before  he  went  to  Japan.  He  was  a 
member  of  the  House  of  Representatives  almost  continuously  from  1855.  Dur- 
ing the  Civil  War  he  was  judge  advocate  in  the  army,  and  took  part  in  the 
trial  of  the  Lincoln  conspirators.  He  had  been  one  of  the  managers  from  the 
House  in  the   impeachment   proceedings  against   President  Johnson." 


516  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

lieved  the  policy  of  the  other  treaty  powers  was  being 
directed  to  prevent  Japan  from  becoming  strong,  rich  or 
democratic,  and  to  secure  control  of  Japanese  markets  and 
resources.  The  Convention  of  1866,  urged  Bingham,  was 
operating  in  a  manner  detrimental  to  American  commercial 
and  political  interests  for  it  opened  the  door  to  excessive 
European  importations,  prevented  the  growth  of  Japanese 
industries,  and  restricted  the  revenues  of  the  government. 
Its  effect  was  to  cause  Japan  to  pay  tribute  to  England  at 
the  expense  of  the  other  powers.  He  noted  that  in  1874 
Japan  was  forced  to  settle  the  balance  of  trade  by  a  payment 
of  about  $8,000,000.  He  pointed  out  that  one  of  the  causes 
back  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion  in  1877  was  an  agrarian 
movement  arising  out  of  the  excessive  land  taxes  which  the 
Japanese  Government,  unable  to  increase  its  customs,  was 
forced  to  levy.  Steadily  and  persistently  Judge  Bingham 
denounced  the  existing  treaties  and  demanded  their  revision, 
or  even  their  abrogation. ^^ 

With  equal  vigor  Bingham  set  himself  against  the  co- 
operative policy  which  was  being  steadily  invoked  to  sus- 
tain the  political  and  commercial  purposes  of  the  other 
treaty  powers.  This  brought  him  into  conflict  with  Sir 
Harry  Parkes  who  had  been  chiefly  responsible  for  the 
Convention  of  1866,  and  had  since  dominated  the  diplomatic 
corps  in  Tokio.  It  also  arrayed  him  against  the  British 
mercantile  community,  and  the  British-owned  newspapers 
of  the  open  ports.  Bingham  was  looked  upon  as  little  less 
than  a  traitor  to  foreign  trade  and  the  attacks  upon  him 
were  vitriolic.  It  was  a  magnificent  yet  probably  unneces- 
sary struggle  in  which  Japanese  and  American  interests 
quickly  found  themselves  allied.  American  influence  in 
Tokio  rose  rapidly  and  Japanese  opposition  to  the  other 
treaty  powers  stiffened.  The  Japan  Herald  (December  12, 
1873)  asserted  that  "England  should  again  introduce  into 
Japan  a  little  of  the  gun-boat  policy."  But  ten  years  later 
the  Japan  Weekly  Mail  (January  20,  1883)  mourned  the 
fact  that  in  Japan  "British  influence  remains  at  a  palpable 
discount"  and  "among  all  Japan's  treaty  friends  she  (the 


TREATY  REVISION  517 

United  States)  is  at  present  the  most  trusted  and  the  most 
consulted." 

Bingham,  at  length  supported  by  his  government,  had 
won  his  battle  for  Japan.  Dissatisfaction  with  the  British 
policy  under  Parkes  had  been  making  itself  felt  in  England 
and  a  Parliamentary  investigation  was  threatened.  That 
year  (1883)  Parkes  was  transferred  from  Tokio  to  Peking. 
The  greatest  obstruction  to  treaty  revision  favorable  to 
Japanese  aspirations  had  been  removed.  Bingham  found 
his  own  government  slow  to  relinquish  the  cooperative 
policy  although  not  unwilling  to  consider  reasonable  meas- 
ures for  treaty  revision,  and  on  at  least  two  occasions^"  the 
American  minister  -,/as  sharply  recalled  to  his  duty  of  coop- 
eration, but  in  the  end  he  won  a  complete  victory  in  the 
Department  of  State.  In  1876  the  Japanese  Government, 
through  its  minister  in  Washington,  Yoshida,  approached 
Secretary  of  State  Fish  with  a  desire  for  a  revision  of  "small 
clauses  in  the  old  treaties."  ^^  Yoshida  pointed  out  that  the 
expenses  of  the  government  had  greatly  increased  with  the 
coming  of  the  foreigners  and  that  the  customs  receipts  had 
not  increased  proportionately.  The  increasing  taxation  laid 
upon  the  Japanese  people  was,  he  said,  drying  up  the  springs 
of  national  prosperity.  The  duties  were  now  "in  many 
cases"  down  to  less  than  one  per  cent  if  calculated  on  an 
ad  valorem  basis.  A  return  to  even  an  effective  five  per 
cent  would,  for  example,  increase  the  receipts  at  Yokohama 
by  at  least  $100,000  a  year.  Fish  found  the  request  "very 
reasonable  and  proper."  He  sympathized  with  the  desire  to 
increase  the  revenues  and  to  "protect  industries."  The 
conversations  continued  for  about  a  year. 

What  Japan  specifically  desired,  stated  Yoshida,  was: 
the  revision  of  the  Convention  of  1866  in  separate  negotia- 
tions with  each  power,  thus  breaking  down  the  habit  of 
joint  action;  the  transfer  of  negotiations  from  Tokio  to  the 
foreign  capitals;  the  recovery  of  control  over  the  coasting 
trade  which  in  Japan,  as  it  had  in  China,  was  passing  into 
the  hands  of  foreigners;  the  restoration  of  the  right  of 
tariff  autonomy,  with  which  was  joined  the  desire  to  elim- 


5lg  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

inate  conventional  tariffs  altogether  and  to  increase  the 
duties;  the  introduction  of  a  principle  of  reciprocity  such 
as  would  witness  to  the  sovereign  independence  of  the  Em- 
pire. The  question  of  extraterritoriality  was  for  the  time 
being  put  aside.  The  only  objection  by  Fish  to  the  proposed 
program  was  over  the  question  of  most-favored-nation  treat- 
ment in  case  the  United  States  were  to  agree  to  the  revision 
while  the  other  powers  did  not.  It  cannot  be  claimed  that 
Fish  showed  as  much  interest  in  the  proposed  revision  as  did 
Judge  Bingham,  and  the  negotiations  remained  unfinished 
at  the  close  of  the  Grant  administration.  Meanwhile  Japan 
was  enlarging  her  demands. 

Four  months  after  William  M.  Evarts  assumed  his  duties 
of  office  in  the  Hays  administration  Yoshida  presented 
(July  27,  1877)  a  complete  draft  of  the  convention  desired 
by  his  government.  The  revision  of  small  clauses  previ- 
ously proposed  now  appeared  as  a  proposition  for  an  en- 
tirely new  treaty  which  would  abrogate  the  Convention  of 
1866,  and  which  would  also  carry  with  it  the  abrogation  of 
the  treaty  of  1858  in  another  five  years.  The  objections  of 
Mr.  Fish  were  met  in  the  following  provision: 

"It  is  also  agreed  that  the  present  convention  shall  take  effect 
when  Japan  shall  have  conchided  a  similar  convention  or  conventions 
either  collectively  or  severally,  with  all  the  other  parties  to  the 
Tariff  Convention  of  ISGH,  similar  in  ellect  to  the  present  convention." 

This  was  amended  in  the  complete  draft  (Article  10)  so 
that  to  make  it  effective  Japan  would  have  to  secure  revi- 
sions not  merely  with  the  signatories  of  the  Convention  of 
1866  but  also  with  "all  the  other  treaty  powers  holding 
relations  with  Japan." 

Evarts  was  from  the  outset  favorably  disposed  toward 
the  treaty,  the  more  so  because  of  the  fact  that  a  few  years 
before  Sir  Harry  Parkes,  in  cooperation  with  the  German 
representative,  arbitrarily  defined  the  meaning  of  "iron 
manufactures"  and  Parkes  had  also  ruled  that  coal  should 
pay  an  export  duty  only  when  it  was  taken  away  in  sailing 
vessels.    These  actions  were  taken  without  consultation  with 


TREATY  REVISION  519 

either  the  Japanese  authorities  or  Judge  Bingham.*  They 
were,  in  fact,  a  revision  of  the  tariff  by  two  treaty  powers 
acting  alone.  The  negotiations  in  Washington  proceeded 
leisurely  and  in  secret.  After  many  changes  in  phraseology 
and  the  omission  of  all  reference  to  the  treaty  of  1858,  the 
treaty  was  signed  July  25,  1878,  without  any  consultation 
with  the  other  treaty  powers.  The  change  in  American 
poHcy  in  a  decade  was  marked.  Before  signing  the  Bur- 
lingame  treaty  Seward  had  telegraphed  the  text  to  all  the 
other  treaty  powers.-*^  Now,  ten  years  later,  the  American 
Government  definitely  and  even  secretly  abrogated  the 
cooperative  policy. 

The  publication  of  the  treaty  was  received  with  great 
displeasure  alike  by  the  American  friends  of  Japan  who 
objected  to  the  reservations  of  Article  10,  and  by  the  foreign 
powers  which  saw  not  merely  the  advance  of  Japan  towards 
the  achievement  of  its  aspirations,  but  also  deflection  from 
the  useful  cooperative  policy.  By  Americans  Evarts  was 
accused  of  trickery  in  Article  10 — a  charge  which  was  wholly 
groundless.-^  By  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  of  the  British 
Foreign  Office,  Evarts'  independent  and  secret  action  was 
characterized  as  "contrary  to  all  usage."  —  A  combination 
of  the  European  treaty  powers,  led  by  Germany  and  Eng- 
land, was  immediately  formed  to  prevent  the  treaty  from 
coming  into  operation  and  this  was  successful,  although  it 
was  known  that  both  Italy  and  Russia  had  been  favorably 
disposed  towards  revision.  The  rage  of  the  British-owned 
journals  of  the  treaty  ports  was  boundless.  The  next  year 
Great  Britain  attempted  to  secure  an  offset  to  the  leadership 
of  America  by  proposing  a  treaty  revision  conference  to  be 
held  in  London.  Japan  declined  to  enter  it  unless  her  right 
to  tariff  autonomy  was  admitted.     In  the  tentative  tariff 

*"It  appears  from  your  dispatch,  No.  270.  that  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
changed  by  a  protocol  the  terms  of  the  Convention  of  lS(!(i  in  a  certain  par- 
ticular so  far  as  it  applied  to  their  respective  countries;  and  in  your  dispatch, 
No.  549,  you  report  that  the  British  minister  at  Tokio  has  compelled  the  Japa- 
nese (iovernment  to  adopt  an  apparently  forced  and  unauthorized  construction 
of  one  of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention.  As  the  Convention  of  1800  was 
a  joint  convention  to  which  the  United  States  was  a  party  and  as  other  govern- 
ments that  participated  in  it  have  assumed  to  revise  its  provisions  no  objec- 
tions can  legitimately  be  urged  against  the  United  States  pursuing  the  same 
course."      (Evarts  to  Bingham,  June  21,  1877. '») 


520  AIMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

revision  then  being  discussed  the  United  States  was  to  be 
punished  for  its  break  with  the  cooperative  policy  by  having 
the  new  chity  on  kerosene,  then  the  chief  American  import, 
increased  from  five  to  twenty  per  cent,  while  cottons  and 
woolens,  the  chief  British  articles  of  import,  were  to  pay 
only  ten  per  cent. 

•The  next  year  (1880)  the  United  States,  in  return  for 
the  immigration  treaty  with  China,  negotiated  at  Peking  a 
partial  revision  of  the  treaty  of  Tientsin  in  which  opium  was 
again  placed  on  the  prohibited  list  for  American  importers. 
This  was  a  second  though  less  abrupt  repudiation  of  the 
cooperative  policy. 

The  Shufeldt  Treaty  with  Japan 

The  United  States,  now  well  embarked  upon  an  inde- 
pendent course  of  action,  turned  its  attention  as  already 
noted  to  Korea.  In  1882  it  was  evident  that  even  though 
Shufeldt  were  to  fail  a  treaty  with  some  power  could  not 
long  be  delayed.  There  had  already  been  no  less  than  ten 
efforts  to  open  Korea. -^ 

The  Shufeldt  treaty  deserves  attention  in  the  history  of 
treaty  revision  even  though  it  was  a  new  treaty,  for  it  re- 
flects the  general  policy  of  the  American  Government  at  the 
time,  and  the  treaty  made  the  following  year  by  Sir  Henry 
Parkes  and  by  the  German  minister  from  Peking  show  with 
equal  clearness  how  wide  had  become  the  gulf  between 
American  and  European  policies  in  Asia. 

The  only  important  stipulations  which  Li  Hung  Chang 
had  failed  to  persuade  Shufeldt  to  include  in  the  Korean 
treaty  were  the  acknowledgment  of  Chinese  suzerainty,  the 
prohibition  of  the  importation  of  religious  books — a  pro- 
vision which  was  aimed  to  prevent  missionary  work — and 
the  reservation  of  the  right  to  Korea  to  impose  transit  taxes. 
The  treaty  provided  that  while  the  tariff  was  to  be  issuetl  by 
Korea  as  a  sovereign  power,  the  duties  were  not  to  exceed 
ten  per  cent  on  ordinary  articles,  or  thirty  per  cent  on  luxur- 
ies.    Opium  was  excluded,  the  purchase  of  land  was  not 


TREATY  REVISION  521 

stipulated,  and  revision  was  possible  in  five  years.  A  simi- 
lar treaty  signed  by  Admiral  Willes  for  the  British  Govern- 
ment aroused  great  opposition  from  the  British  mercantile 
community.-*  The  Yokohama  Chamber  of  Commerce,  rep- 
resenting the  merchants  of  all  nations,  but  chiefly  composed 
of  British  subjects,  even  went  so  far  as  to  protest  officially 
to  Judge  Bingham  against  the  restrictions  to  trade  in  the 
Shufeldt  treaty,  the  ratification  of  which  it  was  thought 
would  be  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  foreigners  in 
the  pending  treaty  revision  negotiations  in  Japan.*  British 
interests  were  also  affected,  as  already  noted,  by  the  failure 
to  recognize  Chinese  suzerainty. 

The  Admiral  Willes  treaty  was  not  ratified  and  the  fol- 
lowing year  Sir  Harry  Parkes  was  sent  to  Korea  to  make 
a  compact  which  would  be  satisfactory  to  British  commer- 
cial interests.  The  contrasts  between  the  compact  thus 
negotiated  and  the  Shufeldt  treaty  are  marked.  The  right 
of  diplomatic  officers  and  consuls  to  "travel  freely  in  any 
part"  of  the  country  was  inserted,  and  the  right  of  the 
Korean  Government  to  withdraw  the  exequatur  of  consuls 
was  omitted.  Two  interior  points  were  opened  to  trade; 
British  subjects  were  to  be  allowed  to  purchase  as  well  as 
rent  land ;  free  exercise  of  religion  was  permitted ;  part  of 
the  yearly  rental  for  British  settlements  was  to  be  reserved 
as  a  municipal  fund  to  be  held  under  the  joint  control  of 
the  Korean  and  British  authorities;  freedom  of  travel  for 
either  pleasure  or  trade  within  100  li  of  any  open  port  was 
stipulated,  and  the  tariff  and  trade  regulations  were  revis- 
able,  as  in  Japan,  only  by  ''mutual  consent."    The  penalty 

♦"Understanding  that  negotiaticin  of  a  treaty  of  conimprco  with  the  Korean 
Government  is  contemplated  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  I  am 
directed  l)y  the  committee  of  the  Yokohama  CJeneral  Chamlier  of  Commerce  to 
express  the  liope  that  your  government  will  favorably  consider  the  wish  of  the 
members  of  the  chamber  (which,  you  are  doubtless  aware,  represents  the  gen- 
eral mercantile  community  of  Yokohama  and  comprises  firms  of  all  national- 
ities) that  an  opportunity  be  afforded  them  of  stating  their  views  on  the  com- 
mercial clauses  of  the  proposed  treaty  before  its  final  ratification,  and  ask  you 
to  be  good  enough  to  forward  this  application  to  the  proper  quarter  for 
consideration. 

"It  is  obvious  to  your  government,  bearing  in  mind  the  negotiations  now 
pending  between  the  Japanese  GovernincMit  and  the  Foreign  Powers  for  the 
revision  of  existing  treaties  that  concessions  to  Korea  involving  restrictions  on 
travel  not  hitherto  in  force  in  Japan,  will  undoubtedly  operate  prejudicially 
against  satisfactory  completion  of  their  negotiations."  (James  P,  Mallison  to 
Bingham,  August  23,   1882,) 


522  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

for  sinuggiiiig  was  lightened;  revision  of  the  treaty  at  the 
end  of  ten  years  was  possible,  again  "by  mutual  consent"  ; 
and  the  Shufeldt  clauses  were  amended  as  follows:  the  im- 
port tariff  was  to  be  conventional  and  specific,  and  was 
graded  in  four  schedules  of  five,  seven  and  one  half,  ten,  and 
twenty  per  cent  respectively.  Cotton  and  woolen  manufac- 
tured goods  were  to  pay  seven  and  one  half  per  cent,  and 
metals,  raw  cotton,  thread,  raw  wool  and  yarns,  constituting 
the  bulk  of  the  probable  British  importations  were  placed  in 
the  five  per  cent  class.  While  the  prohibition  of  opium  was 
retained,  an  exception  was  made  in  favor  of  "medicinal 
opium."  The  coasting  trade  was  thrown  open  to  British 
subjects.  In  short,  the  new  treaty  was  an  exceedingly  busi- 
nesslike and  thoroughgoing  affair  in  which  Korea  sur- 
rendered not  only  what  had  been  granted  to  the  foreigners 
by  treaty  in  both  China  and  Japan,  but  also  a  considerable 
amount  of  what  the  foreigners  had  obtained  also  by  the 
extra-treaty  method  of  interpretation.  British  support  to 
Chinese  claims  of  suzerainty  over  the  peninsula  was  pur- 
chased at  the  expense  of  Korea  in  a  treaty  which  out-dis- 
tanced in  many  particulars  any  treaty  previously  made  in 
the  interests  of  foreigners  in  the  Far  East.  Just  as  the 
Harris  treaty  with  Japan  in  1858  and  the  Shufeldt  treaty 
revealed  the  kind  of  policy  the  United  States  would  like 
to  pursue  when  uninfluenced  by  European  competition,  so 
the  Parkes  treaty  with  Korea  showed  the  kind  of  policy 
which  British  and  Continental  commercial  interests  desired 
to  follow  when  conditions  were  favorable.  The  effect  was 
still  further  to  increase  American  prestige  in  Tokio  where 
the  American  policy  was  appreciated  as  much  for  its  com- 
mercial as  for  its  political  implications. 

The  Unratified  Treaty  of  1889 

The  attempts  at  treaty  revision  in  Japan  in  1878-9  had 
ended  in  failure,  but  the  action  of  the  Americans  had  been  a 
great  encouragement.  Another  effort  was  made  in  1880  in 
which  it  was  proposed  to  deal  with  the  treaty  powers  jointly, 


TREATY  REVISION  523 

and  to  accomplish  the  recovery  of  both  judicial  and  tariff 
autonomy  by  degrees,  according  to  a  graduated  scale.  The 
premature  publication  of  a  draft  of  this  treaty  by  a  news- 
paper which  had  received  it  from  one  of  the  European 
ministers,  aroused  popular  opposition  to  such  compromises 
and  the  proposal  was  dropped.-^ 

Two  years  later  another  effort  was  made.  Japan  pro- 
posed a  new  tariff  which  would  increase  duties  to  eleven  and 
even  to  twenty-six  per  cent.  The  powers  replied  with  a 
counter  proposal  which  would  have  yielded  about  $1,000,000 
less  revenues  annually.  In  this  draft  kerosene  was  reduced 
from  twenty  to  fifteen  per  cent,  cotton  yarn  from  ten  to 
seven  per  cent,  and  opium  as  medicine  was  to  be  admitted  at 
ten  per  cent.  Looking  toward  the  abolition  of  extraterri- 
toriality the  Japanese  Government  proposed  the  introduc- 
tion of  foreign  associate  judges  w^hose  services  were  to  be 
continued  from  six  to  ten  years.  Judge  Bingham  sat  in  this 
conference  at  the  request  of  the  Japanese  and  with  the  ap- 
proval of  Evarts,  though  without  the  power  to  commit  the 
American  Government.  This  effort  also  came  to  nothing  for 
a  variety  of  reasons.  The  Chinese  and  Korean  relations  of 
Japan  were  becoming  difficult,  and  great  popular  opposition 
developed  in  Japan  when  the  terms  of  the  treaty  became 
known.  The  provision  in  regard  to  opium  especially  at- 
tracted attention  because  of  a  suspected  attempt  of  Sir 
Harry  Parkes  some  years  before  to  introduce  the  opium 
trade  in  Japan.-*' 

It  may  fairly  be  claimed  that  the  next  effective  blow  for 
treaty  revision  was  struck  not  in  Japan  but  in  the  United 
States.  In  his  annual  message  to  Congress,  December  4, 
1883,  President  Arthur  took  occasion  to  state: 

"This  government  is  disposed  to  consider  the  request  of  Japan  to 
determine  its  own  tariff  duties,  to  provide  such  proper  judicial  tri- 
bunals as  may  commend  themselves  to  the  Western  powers  for  the 
trial  of  causes  to  which  foreigners  are  parties,  and  to  assimilate 
the  terms  and  duration  of  its  treaties  to  those  of  other  civilized 
states."  "^ 

This  open  declaration  created  still  further  discomfort  in  the 
foreign  communities  in  Japan.     It  was  characterized  as 


524  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

lacking  in  political  sagacity  by  the  Japan  Daily  Mail  (May 
5,  1883)  which  pointed  to  the  treaty  of  1878,  the  Korean 
treaty,  the  return  of  the  Shimoneseki  indemnity  (February 
22,  1883) ;  meanwhile  the  Chinese  indemnity  money  was 
still  withheld,  and  the  Chinese  Exclusion  Act  seemed  to  the 
Daily  Mail  to  indicate  a  disposition  to  discriminate  between 
China  and  Japan  in  favor  of  the  latter  which  was  "the 
smaller  and  in  every  way  inferior  power." 

It  is  not  possible  to  establish  a  direct  connection  but  it 
seems  very  probable  that  President  Arthur's  declaration  of 
December  4th  had  some  influence  on  Great  Britain,  for 
seven  days  later  Lord  Granville  issued  a  memorantkun  in 
which  he  expressed  an  hitherto  unknown  willingness  to 
accept,  not  a  restoration  of  autonomy,  but  a  revision  of  the 
tariff  such  as  had  been  proposed  in  the  counter  draft  of 
1882.  Germany  also  assented.  "Signs  are  not  wanting," 
stated  a  writer  in  the  London  Times,  June  9,  1884,  "that 
the  beginning  of  the  end  has  come."  It  would,  however,  be 
unfair  not  to  mention  in  this  connection  that  for  several 
years  the  tone  of  the  British  press  towards  treaty  revision 
had  been  changing,  and  in  1884  Japan  had  some  advocates 
in  London  as  warm  as  any  in  the  LTnited  States.  Indeed,  a 
comparison  of  press  clippings  on  Japanese  affairs  in  the 
British  and  Continental  press  suggests  that  for  the  past  ten 
years  Japan  had  been  systematically  carrying  on  a  press 
campaign  abroad  to  create  the  necessary  public  sentiment 
in  support  of  her  contentions.  The  beginning  of  1884  may 
be  reckoned  as  an  important  turning  point  in  the  affairs  of 
the  Far  East  for  it  marks  the  turn  of  British  policy  towards 
the  conciliation  of  Japan.  At  almost  any  time  from  then 
until  the  signing  of  the  treaties  in  1894  Japan  might  have 
obtained  substantial  concessions  from  the  European  powers, 
but  as  the  opposition  began  to  give  way  Japan  steadily 
advanced  her  claims  and  became  more  and  more  unwilling  to 
accept  compromises. 

Japan  received  further  encouragement  from  the  United 
States  in  1886  when  (April  30),  the  day  before  another 
treaty   revision    conference    opened,    President    Cleveland 


TREATY  REVISION  525 

agreed  to  an  extradition  treaty  with  Japan,  "because,"  as  he 
stated  later  in  sending  the  treaty  to  the  Senate,  "of  the  sup- 
port which  its  conclusions  would  give  to  Japan  in  her  efforts 
towards  judicial  autonomy  and  complete  sovereignty."  -* 

Such  declarations  from  the  United  States,  coupled  with 
entire  withdrawal  from  the  cooperative  policy,  and  the  de- 
parture of  Judge  Bingham  from  Tokio  in  1885  had  the 
effect  of  eliminating  the  American  Government  from  a  posi- 
tion of  influence  in  the  prolonged  treaty  revision  conferences 
of  1886-7.  It  was  no  longer  necessary  for  Japan  to  consult 
and  conciliate  the  United  States  and  her  ministers  then 
turned  their  attention  to  the  European  states  with  a  view 
to  causing  still  further  deflections  from  cooperation.  It  was 
believed  that  Count  Ito  entered  into  an  understanding  with 
Bismarck  which,  however,  was  quite  different  from  that  with 
the  United  States.-'^  The  American  Government  had  given 
its  support  to  Japan  freely;  Germany  asked  for  compensa- 
tion in  the  form  of  increased  privileges  for  its  nationals. 
The  increase  of  German  influence  not  merely  in  Tokio  but 
even  on  the  entire  political  structure  of  the  government  was 
marked.  Neither  the  American  nor  the  British  ideals  of 
democracy  were  consistent  with  the  ideals  cherished  by 
Japanese  leaders  for  their  nation.  Modern  Germany  af- 
forded a  more  acceptable  model.  Hitherto  Germany  had 
acted  in  the  Far  East  in  the  closest  cooperation  with  Great 
Britain.  The  winning  of  Germany  to  the  Japanese  side 
greatly  weakened  the  position  of  England,  and  paved  the 
way  for  a  better  Anglo-Japanese  understanding.  Thus, 
while  the  Western  nations  were  making  the  Far  East  the 
back  yard  of  European  politics,  Japan  boldly  entered  Eu- 
rope in  an  effort  to  make  the  Continent  the  playground  of 
Japanese  statesmen  only  thirty  years  after  the  nation  had 
first  opened  its  doors  to  the  Western  world. 

Into  the  details  of  the  treaty  revision  conferences  of  1884 
and  1886-7  it  is  not  necessary  to  go  in  a  study  of  American 
pohcy.  Only  their  abrupt  termination  in  the  summer  of 
1887  is  important.  Inouye,  who  had  been  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  for  eight  years,  was  on  the  point  of  conclud- 


526  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ing  treaties  which  would  have  involved  not  merely  the 
establishment  of  a  judiciary  of  foreigners,  but  also  the  sub- 
mission of  Japanese  laws  to  the  approval  of  the  treaty 
powers.  While  the  proposed  treaties  represented  an  advance 
towards  independence,  they  were  very  far  removed  from 
granting  either  judicial  or  tariff  autonomy.  The  inunediate 
advantage  to  Japan  would  lie  in  the  fact  that  in  return  for 
a  tariff  which  would  leave  British  trade  in  nearly  its  old 
position  of  advantage,  Great  Britain  was  willing  to  yield 
important  concessions  in  the  matter  of  extraterritoriality. 
British  and  German  manufactures  were  to  be  taxed,  on  the 
average  about  seven  per  cent,  while  American  products 
would  be  taxed  from  twelve  to  fourteen  per  cent.  Chinese 
sugar,  China  not  being  represented  in  the  treaty  revision 
conferences,  was  to  pay  twenty  per  cent.  Great  opposition 
to  the  treaties  developed  in  Japan.  Count  Katsu,  an  influ- 
ential Tokugawa  leader,  presented  a  memorandum  to  the 
Cabinet  enumerating  "twenty-one  faults  of  the  time"  in 
which  he  severely  castigated  the  hurried  and  superficial 
measures  for  westernizing  the  Empire  which  had  been  con- 
comitant with  the  efforts  to  revise  the  treaties,^*^  and 
General  Tani,  Minister  of  Commerce  and  Agriculture,  who 
had  been  sent  to  Europe  by  the  Emperor  to  study  interna- 
tional politics,  returned  and  entered  a  protest  against  the 
treaties  which  was  emphasized  by  his  resignation  from  office. 
The  Tani  memorial  which,  although  suppressed  by  the  gov- 
ernment was  secretly  printed  and  circulated  by  the  thou- 
sands, was  credited  with  causing  the  resignation  of  Count 
Inouye.  This  memorial  throws  much  light  on  currents  of 
Japanese  thought.^^ 

Viscount  Tani  pointed  out  that  Japan  need  not  be  in 
such  great  haste  about  the  revision  of  the  treaties.  While 
Japan  was  a  small  nation  it  was  to  be  remembered  that  size 
by  itself  had  little  to  do  with  independence.  Greece,  Swit- 
zerland and  Belgium  were  independent,  while  India,  Poland 
and  Turkey  were  not.  The  important  consideration  in 
independence  was  that  foreign  powers  have  no  voice  in  the 
government.    The  proposed  treaties,  therefore,  marked  not 


TREATY  REVISION  527 

the  independence  but  the  dependence  of  Japan,  for  they 
gave  to  foreign  powers  a  control  over  even  the  laws  of  the 
Empire.  Tani  urged  the  postponement  of  treaty  revision. 
No  nation,  he  thought,  would  be  likely  to  send  an  army  to 
Japan  to  compel  revision,  and  while  the  international  rival- 
ries were  creating  so  much  confusion  and  so  many  jealousies, 
Japan  was  in  a  way  to  profit  by  waiting  and  by  watching 
European  politics. 

"When  I  was  abroad,"  wrote  Tani,  "I  quietly  observed  that  our 
government  was  inclined  towards  Germany.  Science,  commerce, 
military  system  and  even  the  style  of  clothing,  all  seemed  to  follow 
Germany.  .  .  .  The  object  of  the  foreigners  who  cross  the  ocean  to 
Japan  is  commerce,  but  if  they  find  everything  to  favor  Germany, 
and  protection  given  only  to  Germans  in  matters  of  commerce  in 
which  rightfully  all  nations  ought  to  be  able  to  compete,  it  will  only 
lead  to  our  receiving  the  ill  will  of  England,  America,  France  and 
Russia.  .  .  . 

"Our  condition  may  be  compared  to  that  of  an  immoral  woman 
who  endeavors  to  get  the  love  of  many,  but  at  last  gets  a  bad  reputa- 
tion and  is  rejected  by  all  without  exception.  Is  it  not  indeed 
shameful  ? 

"Then  what  policy  must  we  pursue? 

"Cease  holding  the  policy  and  principles  of  the  past,  laying  aside 
the  spirit  of  dependence,  improve  our  internal  government  affairs, 
make  our  country  secure  by  military  preparation,  not  to  bring  dis- 
grace upon  the  name  and  honor  of  our  country  by  making  an  outward 
show  only  of  truth,  justice  and  authority;  encourage  and  protect  the 
people  at  home  and  then  wait  for  the  time  of  the  confusion  of 
Europe*  which  must  come  eventually  sooner  or  later,  and  although 
we  have  no  immediate  concern  with  it  ourselves  we  must  feel  it, 
for  such  an  event  will  agitate  the  nations  of  the  Orient  as  well,  and 
hence,  although  our  country  is  not  mixed  up  in  the  matter,  so  far  as 
Europe  is  concerned,  we  may  then  become  the  chief  nation  of  the 
Orient. 

"If,  therefore,  we  at  this  time  provide  twenty  strong  warships 
and  an  army  100,000  strong  we  can  hold  the  balance  among  the 
Eastern  nations  and  show  a  strong  front  to  Western  countries.  Then 
if  there  is  war  between  England  and  Russia,  Russia  can  control 
England  by  uniting  with  us,  and  England  can  crush  Russia  ii"  she 
forms  an  alliance  with  us.  In  case  of  war  between  China  and  France, 
our  relations  towards  Russia  and  England  would  be  the  same  as 
already  stated.  Should  we  remain  neutral  the  advantage  to  us  would 
be  great  as  an  asylum,  and  for  providing  provisions  and  communica- 
tions which  both  have  such  an  important  bearing  upon  success  or 
defeat.  It  is  therefore  evident  that  we  can  seize  the  opportunity  and 
obtain  the  balance  of  power  in  the  East  and  thus  compel  others  to 

•  Italics  by  T.  D. 


528  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

esteem  and  fear  us.     In  the  same  way  we  may  stand  with  European 
countries. 

"Is  not  this  a  pleasant  picture?" 

Probably  this  sagacious  advice  of  Viscount  Tani,  so 
reminiscent  of  Lord  Hotta's  memorial  in  1858,  was  not 
taken  very  seriously  by  the  foreign  governments,  although  it 
furnishes  the  key  to  an  understanding  of  Japanese  politics 
both  domestic  and  international  for  the  next  generation,  but 
even  had  it  been  taken  seriously  there  is  nothing  to  indicate 
that  the  Americans  would  not  have  regarded  it  with  com- 
placency. 

Count  Okuma  replaced  Inouye  as  minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  early  in  1888,  and  a  new  treaty  revision  program  was 
adopted  in  which  Japan  resolved  never  again  to  enter  a  joint 
conference  with  the  powers  on  the  subject.  The  following 
November  Japan  signed  a  treaty  with  Mexico  in  which  the 
national  aspirations  were  at  last  realized.  The  treaty  was 
uniformly  bi-lateral,  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  was  elim- 
inated, tariff  autonomy  was  granted,  and  the  most-favored- 
nation  clause  was  so  qualified  that  a  special  concession 
granted  to  one  nation  in  a  reciprocal  agreement,  could  not 
be  claimed  by  the  other  except  in  exchange  for  some  equiva- 
lent concession.  In  the  closing  days  of  the  Cleveland  ad- 
ministration, Richard  B.  Hubbard,  the  American  Minister 
in  Tokio,  by  direction  from  his  government,  signed  a  some- 
what similar  treaty  for  the  United  States.  These  treaties 
produced  the  collapse  of  the  cooperative  policy.  Germany 
signed  a  treaty  on  June  11  and  Russia  indicated  a  willing- 
ness for  revision.-^ ^ 

Treaties  of  1894 

The  signing  of  these  treaties  brought  great  confusion 
both  to  the  domestic  and  to  the  international  affairs  of 
Japan.  Great  objection  to  the  treaties  with  the  United 
States  and  Germany  developed  in  Japan  because  the  pro- 
vision for  foreign  judges  as  a  temporary  measure  had  been 
retained  and  the  tariff  schedule  was  still  conventional.^'' 
The  treaties  were  not  regarded  as  any  great  improvement 


TREATY  REVISION  529 

over  those  which  had  been  rejected  the  year  before.  While 
the  Cabinet  was  still  debating  the  question  Count  Okuma 
was  attacked  by  an  assassin  and  narrowly  escaped  death. 
The  Cabinet  then  resigned  and  Viscount  Aoki  became  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs.  Meanwhile  Great  Britain  is  be- 
lieved to  have  secured  from  Germany  an  agreement  that  the 
treaty  would  not  be  ratified  until  Great  Britain  had  taken 
action.  This  promise,  whether  formal  or  informal  does  not 
matter,  had  the  effect  of  throwing  the  control  of  the  situa- 
tion almost  entirely  into  the  hands  of  Great  Britain  where  it 
remained  until  the  treaty  of  1894  was  actually  signed.  Dis- 
satisfaction in  Japan  with  the  treaty  increased  and  the 
Japanese  Government  asked  the  American  Government, 
which  had  not  ratified  the  treaty,  to  hold  it  in  abeyance  for 
the  time  being. 

Great  Britain,  while  still  holding  tenaciously  to  the 
favorable  commercial  privileges  of  the  Convention  of  1866, 
as  modified  by  the  various  proposed  tariff  revisions  in  the 
eighties,  was  no  longer  disposed  to  block  Japanese  aspira- 
tions. Indeed  England  may  be  said  to  have  moved  meas- 
urably towards  the  position  long  held  by  the  United  States 
that  the  advance  of  Japan  in  Asia  would  be  beneficial  to 
Western  trade.  British  policy  tended  towards  conciliation 
and  towards  the  admission  of  Japan  to  a  place  in  British 
estimation,  not  equal  to  that  of  Western  powers,  but  rather 
coordinate  with  that  assigned  to  China.  Japan,  as  well  as 
China,  was  now  seen  to  be  essential  to  the  British  opposi- 
tion to  Russia.  Viscount  Tani's  predictions  were  already 
being  realized.  The  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan 
was  signed  July  16,  1894,  in  London.  This  compact,  which 
was  to  take  the  place  of  all  other  treaties,  was  a  compromise. 
While  extraterritoriality  was  to  be  abolished  in  five  years,  a 
partially  conventional  tariff  was  retained,  and  Japan  did  not 
receive  the  right  to  absolute  control  of  her  coasting  trade. 
In  return  for  these  concessions,  Japan  agreed  to  open  the 
Empire,  with  the  stipulation  that  foreigners  were  not  to  be 
permitted  to  own  land.  The  existing  perpetual  leases  in  the 
foreign  settlements,  however,  were  confirmed,  thus  placing 


530  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

upon  the  emancipated  Empire  a  disfiguring  mark  of  her 
former  captivity.  A  similar  yet  more  liberal  treaty  with 
the  United  States  was  signed  in  Washington,  November  22, 
1894. 

In  the  long  diplomatic  struggle  thus  brought  to  an  end 
we  may  note  the  following  summary  conclusions: 

Japan  had  won  a  notable  victory  not  merely  in  opening 
the  way  for  the  definite  abrogation  of  extraterritoriality  but 
also  in  the  estaVjlishn^ent  of  the  beginnings  of  a  cordial 
understanding  with  Great  Britain.  Japan  had  placed  her- 
self, potentially,  above  China  at  the  very  moment  when 
China  was  relying  on  England  to  help  her  in  Korea. 

Great  Britain,  as  we  view  the  situation  in  the  light  of 
subsequent  history,  had  won  an  even  greater  diplomatic 
victory  for  she  had  been  able  to  transfer  herself  from  a  posi- 
tion of  hostility  to  Japan  to  one  of  growing  friendliness  and 
good  feeling,  and  this  without  more  than  a  partial  sacrifice 
of  the  commercial  advantages  of  the  old  tariff  of  1866. 
Japan  was  so  filled  with  gratitude  for  the  removal  of  British 
opposition  that  her  people  were  inclined  to  overlook  the  fact 
that  it  was  the  American  Government  which  had  forced 
Great  Britain  into  treaty  revision.  The  good  will  which  had 
formerly  been  directed  towards  the  Americans  was  now 
turned  towards  the  English. 

The  United  States,  having  discarded  all  diplomacy  and 
finesse  in  the  abrogation  of  the  cooperative  policy  and  the 
ready  concession  to  Japan  of  what  were  her  legitimate  de- 
mands, had  received  little  material  benefit.  Indeed,  it 
appears  that  Japan  and  the  United  States  were  now  ap- 
proaching the  parting  of  the  ways.  The  Japanese  Govern- 
ment had  successfully  entered  European  politics  and  the 
United  States,  in  the  second  Cleveland  administration,  had 
lapsed  into  almost  complete  political  isolation.  Meanwhile 
the  question  of  Japanese  innnigration  to  the  Pacific  Coast 
had  already  appeared  as  a  factor  to  disturb  perfect  harmony 
between  the  two  powers.  With  the  revision  of  the  treaties 
and  the  action  of  the  United  States  in  the  Sino-Japanese 
War  we  may  say  that  the  first  chapter  in  the  relations  be- 


TREATY  REVISION  531 

tween  Japan  and  the  United  States  came  to  a  close.  There 
was  no  rupture,  good  feeling  continued,  but  Japan  had  dis- 
covered that  while  it  was  necessary  for  national  safety  to 
give  less  and  less  attention  to  America,  the  other  Western 
powers  demanded  a  great  deal  of  attention ;  if  not  made  the 
friends  of  Japanese  expansion,  they  would  become  its  in- 
superable obstacles. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  "Men  and  Memories,"  by  John  Russell  Young,  Yol.  2,  p.  322. 

2.  Charles  Denby :     "China  and  Her  People,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  151,  162. 

3.  J.   Barr   Robertson:      "The   Convention   of   Peking,"    reprinted 

from  the  North  China  Herald,  June  2,  1870. 

4.  Morse :    Vol.  2,  p.  158. 

5.  Morse:    Vol.  2,  chaps.  6  and  7  give  an  excellent  review  in  detail 

of  the  course  of  treaty  revision  in  China. 

6.  Japan  Disp.,  Vol.  17,  Jan.  19,  1871,  De  Long  to  Pish. 

7.  Charles  Lanman:    "The  Japanese   in   America"    (1872)   p.   37. 

This  book  by  the  American  Secretary  of  the  Japanese  Legation 
in  Washington  gives  many  interesting  details  of  the  Iwakura 
Embassy. 

8.  Stead :    "Japan  by  the  Japanese,"  p.  156.     To  the  student  this 

essay  by  Nagao  Arega,  Japanese  legal  delegate  at  the  first 
Hague  Peace  Conference,  on  Japanese  diplomacy  is  highly 
recommended.  It  has  the  advantage  of  having  been  prepared 
by  one  who  had  access  to  many  authentic  sources  of  informa- 
tion. The  sections  on  treaty  revision  are  especially  valuable. 
See  also  Count  Aoki's  review  of  treaty  revision  history  before 
lower  House  of  Diet  Dec,  1890.  Reprinted  in  Japan  Daily 
Mail  Dec.  19,  1890. 

9.  The  Marshall  letter  to  Lord  Derby  was  never  published. 

10.  Stead:   p.  175.     . 

11.  For.  Relations,  1874,  p.  645. 

12.  E.  H.  House :  "The  Thraldom  of  Japan,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  Nov. 

1887,  pp.  731-2. 

13.  For.   Relations,   1874,   pp.   637,   645,   653,   663,   773,  779;   1878, 

p.  486 ;  1879,  pp.  604  if. ;  1876,  pp.  363,  367 ;  1878,  p.  514. 

14.  Payson  J.  Treat:    "Japan  and  the  United  States,  1853-1921"; 

pp.  119  fF.  give  a  good  review  of  the  American  policy. 

15.  John  W.  Foster:    "Diplomatic  Memoirs,"  Vol.  1,  pp.  5  ff. 

16.  Judge   Bingham   arrived   in   Japan    Sept.    25,   1873.      His    first 

dispatch  urging  treaty  revision  was  dated  Jan.  17,  1874.  Japan 
Desp.,  Vol.  27,  Jan.  17,  1874. 

17.  For.  Relations,  1874,  p.  675,  Apr.  20;  p.  698,  Aug.  26. 

18.  There  is  a  documentary  record  of  these  interesting  negotiations 

in  Notes  from  the  Japanese  Legation,  Vol.  2,  beginning  Apr. 


532  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

24,  1876,  Dcpt.  of  State.  See  also  Stead,  p.  205  ff.  for  the 
statement  of  policy  being"  pursued  by  Japan. 

19.  Japan  Inst.,  Vol.  2. 

20.  Seward's  "Travels  Around  the  World,"  p.  200. 

21.  E.    H.    House:     "The    Martyrdom    of    an    Empire,"    Atlantic 

Monthly,  Jan.- June,  1881,  Vol.  XL VII,  p.  621. 

22.  Moore's  "Digest,"  Vol.  5,  p.  753. 

23.  Allen:    "Chronological  Index  of  Korea." 

24.  Reports  on  Korea  from  the  British  Minister  in  Japan.     Japan, 

1883,  (C.  3455)  Japan,  1884  (C.  4044). 

25.  Stead :  p.  206. 

26.  Stead :   p.  207. 

27.  Richardson's  Messages,  Vol.  8,  p.  175. 

28.  Richardson's  Messages,  Vol.  8,  p.  402. 

29.  Chinese  Times  (Tientsin),  Nov.,  1887. 

30.  Stead:   p.  208. 

31.  Stead :   p.  208,  refers  to  the  "Tani  Memorial,"  W.  W.  McLaren 

in  Transactions  of  the  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan,  Vol.  XLII, 
Part  I,  gives  what  appear  to  be  extracts  from  the  Tani 
Memorial,  but  does  not  include  the  parts  I  here  quote. 

32.  Stead :  p.  211,  gives  a  synopsis  of  the  treaty  with  GernLany. 

33.  Ihid. 


PART   VI 

THE   DISINTEGRATION   OF  THE 
CHINESE  EMPIRE 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

ASIATIC  IMMIGKATION  AND  AMERICAN  FOEEIGN 

POLICY 

Asiatic  immigration  in  the  United  States  viewed  his- 
torically is  much  more  than  a  domestic  question;  it  has 
exercised  a  marked  influence  on  foreign  pohcy.  We  have 
seen  in  preceding  chapters  how  in  the  last  quarter  of  the 
nineteenth  century  the  American  Government  steadily  sup- 
ported Japanese  aspirations.  We  have  also  noted  that  in 
the  conflict  between  China  and  Japan  the  United  States, 
while  maintaining  technical  neutrality,  showed  a  tendency 
towards  courses  which  were  distinctly  favorable  to  Japan. 
A  partial  explanation  for  this  is  found  in  a  study  of  the 
Asiatic  immigration  question.* 

The  immigration  problem  on  the  Pacific  Coast  in  the 
nineteenth  century  was  compounded  of  three  conflicts: 
It  was  economic;  a  struggle  between  working  men  who 
sought  to  maintain  high  wages  and  employers  who  desired 
cheap  labor.  It  was  social;  a  color  conflict  in  which  issues 
broadly  similar  to  those  of  the  negro  question  appeared  in 
the  West.  It  .was  also  political;  a  contest  between  the 
Democratic  and  Republican  parties  to  win  the  support  of  a 
doubtful  bloc  of  independent  voters  in  the  course  of  several 
hotly  contested  state  and  national  elections.^ 

The  Coolie  Traffic 

Swift  clipper  ships  carried  across  the  Pacific  the  news  of 
the  gold-strike  and  of  the  demand  at  San  Francisco  for 
food-stuffs,  building  materials,  and  also  for  cheap  labor. 
About  the  same  time,  in  some  instances  even  earlier,  Aus- 

*  Another    phase   of    the    subject    is    discussed    in    Chapter    XXIX,    The    Mis- 
sionaries and  American  Policy  in  Asia. 

535 


536  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

tralia,  Panama,  Chili,  Demarara,  Cuba  and  other  West 
Indian  ports  began  to  ask  for  Chinese  laborers.  Vessels  of 
all  nations  were  drawn  into  the  transportation  of  laborers  to 
these  various  destinations.  Competition  became  very  keen 
and  abuses  appeared  which  aroused  the  attention  of  the 
civilized  world.  The  infamous  'coolie  trade'  was  in  full 
swing  by  1854.  This  traffic,  which  must  be  distinguished 
from  Chinese  immigration  to  California,  employed  some 
American  vessels.* 

The  evils  of  the  coolie  trade  in  general  were  as  follows: 
As  the  demand  for  laborers  increased,  artificial  methods  for 
stimulating  recruiting  were  employed  and  large  numbers  of 
ignorant  men  were  decoyed  either  to  'barracoons'  at  Macao 
or  directly  to  the  vessels  where  they  were  detained  by  force 
and  became  practically  slaves.  They  were  crowded  into 
ships  which  were  sometimes  not  even  sea-worthy,  and  sup- 
plied with  insufficient  food  and  water;  the  mortality  en 
route  was  very  high,  ranging  in  the  case  of  vessels  entering 
Havana  in  1857  from  9^4  per  cent  for  American  vessels  to 
381/4  per  cent  for  Portuguese.  At  their  destination  the 
laborers  were  often  transferred  to  contractors  who  sold  them 
like  slaves.  They  were  miserably  treated  and  subjected  to 
all  the  customary  evils  of  the  contract  labor  system  so  that 
at  the  expiration  of  the  term  of  the  contract  they  were 
unable  to  return  to  China.  Although  the  government  was 
apathetic,  the  scandals  in  connection  with  the  enlistment 
of  the  laborers  in  China  aroused  the  gentry  and  added  to  the 
anti-foreign  sentiment  among  the  Chinese  so  that  a  general 
uprising  against  foreigners  was  threatened  at  various  south- 
ern ports.  Great  Britain  took  action  in  1855  in  the  so-called 
British  Passengers  Act  which  carefully  regulated  the  trade 
from  Hongkong,  subjecting  it  to  close  inspection  and  for- 
bidding British  vessels  to  carry  contract  laborers  to  other 
than  British  ports.  Other  governments  were  slower  to  act. 
The  trade  at  the  South  China  ports  was  transferred  to 

*At  Swatow  in  1855,  out  of  ;i  total  of  twclvi-  vessels  can'ying  C38S  coolies, 
five  wore  Aiii(>rican  :  tlioy  took  out  :M)'<().  'riic  Ilongkons  roturns  for  the 
coolie  trade  for  1857  showed  that  out  of  a  total  of  70  vessels  employed,  22 
were  American.  In  the  same  year  "J  of  the  03  vessels  bringing  coolies  to 
Havana  were  American," 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    537 

Macao  where  government  officials  were  very  indulgent,  or 
to  other  ports  where  the  control  of  neither  the  Chinese  nor 
the  treaty  powers  was  effective,  and  American  vessels  con- 
tinued to  share  in  the  opprobrious  trade  until  1862  when 
they  were  prohibited  by  act  of  Congress.  Meanwhile  the 
American  representatives  in  China  without  the  support  of 
legislation  made  vain  efforts  to  check  the  evils  of  the  traffic/^ 
Reputable  firms  withdrew  entirely  from  the  trade  but  in- 
dividuals brought  much  disgrace  upon  the  American  flag 
and  added  to  the  anti-foreign  sentiment  in  China. 

Chinese  Labor  in  California 

The  immigrants  to  California  do  not  appear  to  have 
been,  at  the  outset,  very  different  in  character  from  those 
to  other  regions.  The  passage  to  San  Francisco  cost  about 
$50.  This  money  was  usually  supphed  by  some  capitalist, 
native  or  foreign.  The  laborer  engaged  himself  either  in 
China  or  California  by  contract  to  work  for  a  period  of  years 
at  a  stipulated  wage.  The  contracts  were  transferable. 
The  Chinese  usually  entered  into  the  contracts  freely,  no 
doubt,  yet  at  their  destination  they  did  not  become  abso- 
lutely free  laborers.* 

In  later  years  the  management  of  these  Chinese  immi- 
grants fell  into  the  hands  of  large  Chinese  companies  and 

♦Specimen    of    a    contract  :    "Chin    Suy    to    serve    for    on    whose 

account  Bryson   makes   this   agreement,   or   for  any   party  who  may 

appoint  to  control  his  affairs,  as  shcpiicrd.  laborer,  or  in  whatever  capacity 
may  be  required,  in  the  State  of  California,  for  a  term  of  5  years ;  and  the 
said  Chin   Suy  hereby   states  his  readiness  to  obey  in   every  respect  any  orders 

and   directions   which    he   may   at  any   time   receive    either   from   ■   or 

from    any    party    nominated    by .    or    Bryson,    to    manage    his    affairs. 

"And    Bryson    hereby    agrees    on    the    part    of    said that    Chin 

Suy  shall  receive  wages* at  the  rate  of  $35  per  month,  which  shall  be  paid  him 
at  the  close  of  each  quarter  ;  and  that  payment  of  wages  to  Chin  Suy  at  this 
rate  shall  commence  from  the  beginning  of  his  service  in  the  said  state ; 
Bryson  also  undertakes  to  provide  Cliin  Suy  with  a  good  sleeping  place  and 
with  food  equal  in  quality  to  such  as  is  ordinarily  eaten  by  workmen  in  China  ; 
Chin  Suy  also  agrees  to'  repay  by  means  of  four  equal  quarterly  instalments, 
to  be  deducted  from  his  wages,  the  sum  of  $6  which  has  been  advanced  to  him 
by  Bryson,  or  by  the  party  on  whose  account  Bryson  makes  the  agreement  ; 
and  as  words  alone  furnish  no  proof  of  the  aljovc  agreement  having  been  duly 
contracted,  this  Deed  has  been  executed  in  duplicate,  each  of  the  contracting 
parties   keeping   a    copy." 

It  will  easily  be  seen  that  such  a  contract  afforded  wide  latitude  for 
abuses  in  the  enlistment  in  China,  on  the  voyage,  and  in  California.*  WTiile 
this  contract,  which  was  used  in  1852,  may  not  be  typical,  it  is  illustrative  of 
the  method  by  which  the  trade  had  to  be  financed  owing  to  the  poverty  of  the 
laborers. 


538  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

they  applied  a  system  of  financing  and  handlino;  of  labor 
which,  while  customary  and  entirely  acceptable  in  China, 
seemed  very  mysterious  and  un-American  in  California. 
The  laborers  were  consigned  to  some  Chinese  company  in 
San  Francisco  and  upon  arrival  went  to  work,  usually  at 
some  task  assigned  to  them  by  the  company,  to  pay  off  the 
debt  which  had  been  incurred  for  transportation.  Much  has 
been  written  in  defense  of  the  system  to  prove  that  these 
laborers  were  not  'coolies'  such  as  were  shipped  to  other 
countries,  and  that  they  were  not  slaves.  One  may  accept 
this  conclusion,  admitting  that  the  Chinese  who  came  to 
California  were  superior,  and  were  eager  to  come,  and  yet 
not  reach  the  further  conclusion  that  they  were  free.  That 
some  of  them  were  free  seems  altogether  probable,  but  so 
secretive  and  so  impenetrable  were  the  methods  of  Chinese 
trade  relationships  it  was  rarely  possible  to  distinguish  with 
certainty  between  the  free  and  the  contract  laborer.^ 

At  first  the  Chinese  in  California  were  welcomed  by 
everyone,  but  as  soon  as  the  rush  for  gold  subsided  and 
ordered  industrial  communities  developed,  in  which  there 
w^as  increasing  unemployment  among  disappointed  w^hite 
gold-seekers,  the  Chinese,  in  company  with  all  non-white 
laborers,  became  unpopular.  They  were  the  objects  of 
attack  not  merely  because  they  were  cheap  laborers  but  also 
because  they  were  not  Caucasians.  It  is  estimated  that 
about  one  third  of  the  white  population  of  California  be- 
tween 1850  and  1860  were  from  the  southern  states.  There 
was  also  a  large  influx  of  European  immigrants,  mainly  Eng- 
lish and  Irish.  The  number  of  Chinese  on  the  Pacific  Coast 
rose  rapidly  to  about  25,000  in  1852,  and  50,000  in  1867. 
The  next  year  there  were  large  importations  of  coolies  to 
work  on  the  Pacific  railroads  and  in  1869,  out  of  a  total  of 
10,000  railroad  laborers,  nine  tenths  of  them  were  Chinese. 
By  1875  the  number  of  Chinese  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  not- 
withstanding the  large  numbers  who  had  returned  to  China, 
had  risen  to  100,000.  and  in  1882  there  were  132,000  of 
whom  nearly  40,000  had  entered  in  that  year.*"' 

Various  repressive  measures  were  undertaken  by  the 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    539 

Pacific  Coast  states  to  restrict  this  increase.  The  Chinese 
were  from  the  outset  denied  citizenship,  and  after  1852  they 
were  subjected  to  discriminating  taxes.  Between  1850  and 
1870  one  half  of  the  total  California  state  revenues  were 
derived  from  the  miners'  licenses  which  were  paid  very 
largely  by  the  Chinese.  They  were  at  the  same  time  sub- 
jected to  an  increasing  amount  of  abuse,  injustice,  intim- 
idation and  assault  from  the  white  residents,  particularly  in 
the  cities  where  the  unemployed  gathered  in  large  numbers. 
Without  offering  any  justification  for  this  treatment  which 
was  brutal  and  appalling,  it  is  evident  from  the  figures  that 
California  was  actually  engaged  in  a  very  elemental  conflict 
for  race  supremacy.  South  China  had  a  superabundant 
population ;  California  was  sparsely  settled  and  yielded  large 
returns  not  merely  in  its  mines  but  in  its  agriculture  to  the 
plodding,  indefatigable  labor  of  the  Oriental.  If  natural 
laws  were  permitted,  unchecked,  to  assert  themselves  it  was 
only  a  question  of  time  when  the  Chinese  with  lower  stand- 
ards of  living  and  lower  wage  standards,  would  be  able  to 
displace  the  whites.  The  condition  in  the  southern  states 
after  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  was  ever  before  the 
citizens  of  California,  so  many  of  whom  had  come  from  the 
South.  On  the  other  hand  many  employers,  looking  to  the 
immediate  returns,  welcomed  the  cheap  labor. 

Treaties  of  1868  and  1880 

William  H.  Seward,  as  was  consistent  with  his  convic- 
tions as  a  trade  expansionist,  was  a  cheap-labor  man.  So  far 
as  he  had  any  views  on  the  subject  Anson  Burlingame,  com- 
ing from  New  England  where  the  problem  of  cheap  labor 
was  being  solved  by  European  immigration,  was  of  similar 
persuasion.  The  Burlingame  treaty  of  1868,  which  has 
already  been  discussed  as  to  its  foreign  policy,  was  a  cheap- 
labor  treaty.  Indeed  the  mystery  of  why  it  was  thought 
necessary  to  write  a  treaty  for  the  expression  of  what  Lord 
Clarendon  put  far  more  tersely  in  a  letter  to  Burlingame  is 
explained  when  we  come  to  study  the  immigration  clauses 


540  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  the  Burlingame  treaty.  It  would  appear  that  Seward, 
who  wrote  the  document,  was  as  much  interested  in  the 
labor  problem  as  he  was  in  the  extension  of  American  trade 
across  the  Pacific.  At  the  moment  he  was  particularly  con- 
cerned about  the  delays  in  the  completion  of  the  Pacific  rail- 
road due  to  the  inability  of  the  contractors  to  secure  labor. 
Chinese  coolies  offered  a  solution  of  the  problem,  but  the 
supply  was  imperilled  at  two  points.  There  was  a  growing 
hostility  in  California,  and  while  the  Chinese  Government 
was  apathetic,  the  departure  of  Chinese  from  the  Empire 
was  actually  a  violation  of  ancient  Chinese  law.  The  treaty 
was  intended  at  once  to  regularize  the  Chinese  immigration 
at  its  source,  and  to  protect  it  in  the  United  States.* 

The  text  of  the  famous  declaration  (Article  5)  which  a 
subsequent  American  minister  ^  to  Peking  declared  to  be 
'buncombe'  was : 

"The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Emperor  of  China 
cordially  recognize  the  inherent  and  inalienable  right  of  man  to 
change  his  home  and  allegiance,  and  also  the  mutual  advantage  of 
the  free  migration  and  emigration  of  their  citizens  and  subjects 
respectively  from  one  countiy  to  the  other  for  purposes  of  curiosity, 
of  trade,  or  as  permanent  residents." 

The  treaty,  which  was  bi-lateral,  guaranteed  to  Chinese  sub- 
jects "visiting  or  residing  in  the  United  States  .  .  .  the 
same  privileges,  immunities,  and  exemptions  in  respect  to 
travel  or  residence  as  may  there  be  enjoyed  by  the  citizens 
or  subjects  of  the  most  favored  nation."  Nevertheless  the 
right  of  naturalization  was  reserved;  that  is,  it  was  not 
obligatory  upon  a  state.  The  privilege  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  appoint  consuls  at  American  ports  was  stipu- 
lated. Other  articles  prohibited  contract  laborers  and  safe- 
guarded the  Chinese  in  America,  as  well  as  the  Americans 
in  China,  in  the  exercise  of  religious  freedom. 

*  "Tho  treaty  coiicliulcd  -witli  the  T'liitcd  Stati-s  rccosnizos  hr«adl,v  tlio  rlsht 
of  Cliina  to  tho  jurisdiction  of  its  own  affairs  and  offers  substantial  protection 
to  tlie  Cliinese  in  California.  It  was  this  latter  consideration  wliieli  led  to  the 
adoptinj;  of  the  more  solemn  form  of  a  treaty  in  the  United  Stat<'s.  A  treaty 
lii'inj,'  till'  sni)reme  law  of  the  land  overrides  the  obnoxious  local  legislation 
against  the  Cliinese  iminiKrants."  (Burlinsame  to  Bismarck,  written  in  Berlin, 
.January   4.    1S70.') 

"If  I  have  l)een  rifrhtly  informed  by  those  who  ought  to  know,  that  treaty 
was  made,  not  at  the  requ'est  of  Mr.  Hurlingame  or  of  the  Chinese  (Jovernment, 
hut  at  the  request  of  Secretary  Seward."  (Pres.  James  B.  Augell,  in  the 
Journal  of  Hociul  Hcicncc,  May,  1S83.) 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    541 

California  in  1868  was  still  attempting  to  control  the 
Chinese  immigration  by  means  of  state  legislation,  and  the 
Burlingame  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  vSenate  without  op- 
position from  labor  interests  and  to  the  general  satisfaction 
of  employers.  But  that  year,  a  presidential  year,  the  Demo- 
cratic party  in  the  state  raised  an  anti-Chinese  issue  and 
elected  a  Democratic  governor.  From  that  time  onward  the 
immigration  question  became  the  football  of  politics,  state 
and  nation.^  The  number  of  Chinese  steadily  though  not 
rapidly  increased.  Meanwhile  various  state  laws  directed 
against  the  Chinese  were  found  to  be  unconstitutional. 
Oregon  and  Nevada  became  interested  in  the  matter.  The 
political  parties  in  California  were  evenly  balanced  and 
while  the  Republican  party,  the  party  of  Seward  and  Bur- 
lingame, had  generally  favored  Chinese  immigration  it  was 
now  seen  that  to  continue  that  support  was  to  lose  the  vote 
in  doubtful  states.  The  Chinese  question  was  revived  again 
in  1876,  and  was  fanned  to  a  blaze  in  the  summer  of  1877  in 
the  sand-lot  meetings  under  the  infamous  appeals  of  Dennis 
Kearney.  In  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1878-9  the 
legislature  was  empowered  to  pass  legislation  prohibiting 
corporations  from  employing  any  Mongolian  and  was  au- 
thorized to  remove  the  Chinese  from  the  state.  A  Republi- 
can legislature,  now  standing  in  fear  of  the  labor  vote, 
passed  a  law  making  it  a  misdemeanor  for  any  corporation 
to  employ  a  Chinese.  This  law  was  declared  in  a  federal 
court  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  Burlingame  treaty. 

In  March,  1876,  the  Republican  State  Committee  of 
California  had  passed  a  resolution  requesting  the  President 
to  enter  into  negotiations  for  a  modification  of  the  treaty 
of  1868,  and  two  months  later  Senator  A.  A.  Sargent  intro- 
duced in  Congress  a  bill  to  that  effect.  Instead,  a  Congres- 
sional investigation  was  ordered. ^*^  Owing  to  the  illness  of 
Senator  Oliver  P.  Morton,  chairman  of  the  committee,  and 
the  withdrawal  of  members  from  New  York  and  INIassachu- 
setts,  the  investigation  was  conducted  before  a  commission 
made  up  of  two  Californians  and  one  member  from  Ten- 
nessee.   As  a  result  of  this  investigation,  which  was   devoid 


542  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

of  all  judicial  character,  Congress  passed  in  1879  the  Fifteen 
Passenger  Bill  which  would  have  limited  the  number  of 
Chinese  immigrants  to  be  brought  in  any  one  vessel  to 
fifteen.  President  Hayes  vetoed  the  bill  but  immediately 
instituted  a  commission  to  proceed  to  China  to  secure  either 
modifications  of  the  existing  treaty  or  a  new  one.  The  com- 
mission consisted  of  one  Californian,  John  T.  Swift,  subse- 
quently minister  at  Tokio,  one  southerner,  W.  H.  Trescott 
of  South  Carolina,  and  President  James  B.  Angell  of  the 
University  of  Michigan,  who  was  also  to  be  United  States 
Minister  at  Peking,  succeeding  George  F.  Seward. 

The  commission  was  Republican.  There  was  a  presiden- 
tial election  approaching  in  November,  1880,  and  both 
parties  had  recorded  themselves  in  their  platforms  as  op- 
posed to  Chinese  immigration.  The  commission  arrived  in 
China  at  a  time  when  the  government  was  particularly  well 
disposed  towards  the  United  States  because  of  the  popular- 
ity attained  by  General  Grant  the  previous  year.  China  was 
greatly  embarrassed  by  Russia  over  the  unsettled  Kuldja 
dispute  and  was  contending  unsuccessfully  with  the  treaty 
powers  for  the  right  to  increase  the  tariff  duties.  The  agita- 
tion against  the  opium  trade  had  been  renewed  and  was  at 
its  point  of  greatest  earnestness  since  1838.  It  was  a  fortu- 
nate time  for  the  Americans  to  bring  up  the  immigration 
question.  The  commission  asked  for  a  revision  of  the  treaty 
which  would  grant  to  the  United  States  the  right,  at  its 
discretion,  not  merely  to  regulate,  limit  or  suspend,  but  also 
to  prohibit  the  immigration  of  Chinese  laborers.  The 
Chinese  Government,  never  greatly  interested  in  the  welfare 
of  its  subjects  away  from  home,  and  for  the  last  thirty  years 
desperately  occupied  with  internal  questions  and  foreign 
aggressions  within  the  empire,  had  never  been  disposed  to 
make  the  treatment  of  Chinese  abroad  a  subject  of  per- 
sistent protest,  although  it  had  not  passed  unnoticed.  But 
now  well  informed  by  its  diplomatic  representatives  in 
Washington  of  the  political  aspects  of  the  trouble,  and 
greatly  encouraged  by  Americans  who  sympathized  with  the 
Chinese,  the  Yamen  asserted  itself  and  absolutely  refused  to 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    543 

yield  the  right  to  the  American  Government  to  prohibit  the 
immigration.  The  demands  of  the  Americans  had  aroused 
the  pride  of  a  very  proud  race. 

The  treaty  which  was  signed  November  17,  1880,  was  a 
compromise  reflecting  the  moderating  influence  of  President 
Angell,  and  also  the  fact  that  the  presidential  election, 
already  passed,  had  recorded  a  Republican  victory.  To  the 
United  States  was  given  the  right  to  "regulate,  limit  or 
suspend"  but  not  to  prohibit  the  coming  of  Chinese  laborers 
'Whenever  in  the  opinion  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  the  coming  of  Chinese  laborers  to  the  United 
States,  or  the  residence  therein,  affects  or  threatens  to 
affect  the  interests  of  that  country  or  of  any  locality  within 
the  territory  thereof."  Laborers  already  in  the  United 
States  were  secured  in  the  right  of  most-favored-nation 
treatment,  and  "Chinese  subjects,  whether  proceeding  to  the 
United  States  as  teachers,  students,  merchants,  or  from 
curiosity"  were  to  have  equal  privileges.^  ^  Concurrently,  a 
treaty  of  commercial  intercourse  was  negotiated  in  which 
Americans  were  excluded  from  the  opium  trade  by  a  very 
stringent  agreement.  The  Chinese  were  very  much  pleased 
with  this  clause  "their  object  being,  if  possible,"  to  use  the 
words  of  President  AngelFs  report,  "to  isolate  the  British 
Government  on  this  question  from  the  other  Christian  pow- 
ers, and  to  compel  that  Government  to  take  the  odium  of 
forcing  this  wicked  and  demoralizing  traffic  for  the  avowed 
purpose  of  financial  advantage."  ^-  While  not  breaking  so 
abruptly  with  the  cooperative  policy  as  in  Japan,  the  United 
States  thus  indicated  a  preference  for  independent  action  in 
treaty  revision.  The  commission  had  succeeded  in  handling 
delicate  subjects  successfully,  and  relations  between  the  two 
governments  remained  friendly. 

Growth  of  III  Feeling 

The  Pacific  Coast  states  were  not  at  all  content  with 
the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1880.  They  were  demand- 
ing absolute  exclusion.    As  a  compromise  with  this  extreme 


544  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

demand  Congress  passed  a  law,  IMay  6,  1882,  suspending  the 
immigration  of  Chinese  laborers  for  ten  years,  and  defining 
the  word  laborer  to  include  both  skilled  and  unskilled  work- 
ers, as  well  as  those  engaged  in  mining.  To  prevent  fraud  in 
the  readmission  of  laborers  who  returned  to  America  after 
a  visit  in  China  a  system  of  customs-house  registry  and 
certificates  was  devised.  The  certificates  were  to  be  issued 
to  all  departing  Chinese,  with  the  exception  of  diplomatic 
officers.^^  The  bill  was  passed  only  after  President  Arthur 
had  already  vetoed  one  providing  for  suspension  of  immi- 
gration for  twenty  years,  but  even  ten  years  was  twice  as 
long,  according  to  President  Angell,  as  any  period  mentioned 
in  the  negotiations  at  Peking  in  1880.  The  new  law  also 
prohibited  any  state  from  granting  citizenship  to  Chinese. 
Two  years  later,  just  before  a  presidential  campaign  (July 
5,  1884),  the  law  was  amended  by  making  the  system  of 
identification  more  exact,  and  by  the  addition  of  a  new 
definition  of  laborers  which  would  also  exclude  hucksters, 
peddlers,  or  those  engaged  in  taking,  drying  or  otherwise 
preserving  shell  or  other  fish  either  for  home  consumption 
or  for  exportation.  The  certificates  issued  to  returning 
Chinese  laborers  must  now  be  vised  before  departure  from 
China  by  an  American  diplomatic  or  consular  officer.^  ^  The 
consular  service,  upon  which  this  new  duty  was  imposed, 
was  not  strengthened  to  meet  the  responsibility,  and  was 
not  prepared  to  comply  with  the  law  either  eff'ectively  or 
honestly.^ ^  Thus  in  less  than  four  years  after  the  negotia- 
tion of  the  treaty  the  United  States,  as  even  President 
Arthur  stated,  had  clearly  departed  from  the  spirit,  if  not 
from  its  letter  as  the  Chinese  Government  understood  it.^*"' 
The  serious  disturbance  of  friendly  relations  between  the 
two  governments  may  be  said  to  date  from  this  time. 

The  Chinese  immigration  question  appeared  as  a  factor 
in  national  politics  at  the  very  moment  when  the  American 
Government  was  formulating  a  Korean  policy.  While  Con- 
gress was  passing  the  restriction  law.  Commodore  Shufeldt 
was  waiting  at  Tientsin  for  a  reply  to  his  telegram  inquiring 
whether  he  should  admit  a  recognition  of  Chinese  suzerainty 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    545 

over  Korea  in  the  text  of  his  proposed  treaty.  Another  dis- 
turbing factor  in  the  situation  had  been  the  sudden  recall, 
the  previous  year,  of  all  of  the  Chinese  students  who  had 
been  sent  to  America.*  While  it  is  difficult  to  trace  with 
exactness  the  influence  of  the  growing  unpopularity  and 
distrust  of  the  Chinese  on  American  policy  in  Korea,  the 
fact  stands  out  that  for  the  next  decade  the  Chinese  were 
steadily  losing  popularity  in  the  United  States  while  their 
rivals,  the  Japanese,  with  whom  the  Americans  had  very 
few  direct  or  personal  contacts,  were  in  equal  measure  win- 
ning confidence  and  approval. 

The  letter  of  Commodore  Shufeldt  to  Senator  A,  A.  Sar- 
gent, already  alluded  to,  while  important  only  because  of 
the  fact  that  it  was  written  by  a  diplomatic  officer  of  the 
government,  may  be  cited  as  an  indication  of  the  growing 
American  distrust  of  the  Chinese. 

It  is  not  possible  to  show  from  the  diplomatic  records 
that  the  treatment  of  the  Chinese  in  the  United  States 
caused  the  Chinese  Government  to  adopt  a  particularly  un- 
friendly policy  towards  Americans  in  China,  although  offi- 
cials like  Prince  Kung  and  Li  Hung  Chang  bitterly  resented 
the  treatment.  The  Chinese  Government  was  generally 
anti-foreign  and  as  between  the  persecution  of  Chinese  in 
the  United  States  which  was  remote,  and  the  opium  trade, 
the  aggressions  of  France,  and  the  general  arrogance  of  the 
foreigner  which  was  ever  before  the  eyes  of  the  Chinese,  the 
Americans  escaped  adverse  discriminatory  action.  It  is, 
rather,  in  Washington  to  which  the  perfection  of  communi- 

*Beginning  in  1872  China  had  sent  several  companies  of  boys,  in  all  more 
than  one  hundred,  to  he  placed  in  American  schools  and  colleges.  The  ages 
ranged  from  eight  to  sixteen.  Various  explanations — lack  of  funds  for  their 
support,  resentment  at  the  growing  anti-Chinese  feeling  in  America,  and  the 
growth  of  reactionary  sentiment  in  China — were  offered  for  the  recall  of  these 
students.  One  of  the  students  who  subsequently  rose  to  eminence  in  Chinese 
affairs.  Tong  Shaii-yi.  told  the  writer  personally  that  the  real  cause  was  the 
fear  that  the  l)oys  were  becoming  too  much  Americanized.  They  had  even 
lietitioned  their  Chinese  tutor  for  permission  to  cut  off  their  queues.  The 
tutor,  himself  a  very  conservative  Chinese  scholar,  reported  this  to  Peking  and 
an  order  for  their  recall  was  immediately  issued.  The  contrast  thus  presented 
between  the  .Japanese  who  had  gone  so  far  as  to  adopt  Western  dress,  and  the 
Chinese  who  declined  to  permit  the  boys  to  remove  their  queues,  is  striking. 
There  were  in  tlie  United  States  at  that  time  a  large  number  of  .Japanese 
students,  but  they  were  usually  of  a  much  more  mature  age  than  the  Chinese. 
The  fundamental  ditliculty  witli  the  Cliinese  students  was  that  they  were  sent 
awa.v  from  lionie  ti;a  young,  even  before  they  had  attained  a  moderate  mastery 
of  th(>ir  own  dillicult  language.  Wliatever  the  cause,  the  withdrawal  of  the 
students  made  a   liad   impression   in  the   United   States." 


546  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

cations  had  largely  transferred  the  direction  of  American 
policy,  that  we  may  study  the  influence  of  the  anti-Chinese 
prejudices.  Between  1885  and  1894  public  opinion  was 
being  prepared  for  the  choice  between  China  and  Japan 
which  was  presented  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Sino-Japanese 
War.  During  this  period  the  Chinese  representatives  found 
abundant  causes  for  creating  many  embarrassments  to  the 
Department  of  State.  The  causes  were  conspicuously  just, 
but  it  may  be  questioned  whether  the  Chinese  Government 
would  not  have  been  more  astute,  in  view  of  the  graver 
issues  in  the  East,  in  adopting  a  more  conciliatory  policy  in 
Washington. 

The  inauguration  of  the  first  Cleveland  administration 
was  inauspicious  for  the  Chinese  in  the  United  States. 
There  had  been  riots  at  Rock  Springs,  Wyoming,  and  also  at 
Tacoma  and  Seattle  in  which  Chinese  had  been  killed  or 
injured.  China,  accustomed  to  prompt  demands  from  the 
treaty  powers  for  indemnity  for  similar  events  in  China,  now 
found  some  satisfaction  in  making  equally  prompt  demands 
for  indemnity  from  the  American  Government.  President 
Cleveland  recognized  the  moral  obligation  of  the  claim  and 
made  it  the  subject  of  two  messages  to  Congress  in  1886,  but 
Congress  granted  it  reluctantly  and  with  poor  grace  after 
much  delay.  California  called  a  state  convention  and  ad- 
dressed a  memorial  to  Congress  demanding  absolute  prohi- 
bition of  Chinese  immigration,  the  elimination  of  Chinese 
labor  from  all  public  works,  and  the  boycott  of  all  employ- 
ers of  Chinese  labor.  Then  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  proposed  to 
Minister  Denby  in  Peking,  and  Secretary  of  State  Bayard 
suggested  to  the  Chinese  minister  in  Washington,  on  the 
same  day  (January  12,  1887),  that  a  new  treaty  be  nego- 
tiated. Bayard  desired  the  exclusion  of  the  Chinese  laborers 
for  thirty  years ;  the  minister  declined  to  discuss  the  proposi- 
tion while  the  claims  for  indemnity  remained  unsatisfied. 
However,  a  new  treaty  was  signed  fourteen  months  later 
(March  12,  1888),  in  another  presidential  year,  which  stip- 
ulated for  prohibition  for  twenty  years,  and  for  payment  of 
indemnity  to  the  extent  of   $276,619.75.    In  executive  ses- 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    547 

sion  the  Senate  amended  the  treaty  by  the  insertion  of 
provisions  which  would  shut  out  at  least  20,000  Chinese  who 
were  residents  of  the  United  States  but  then  visiting  in 
China.  On  September  13,  1888,  Congress  enacted  a  law  to 
make  effective  the  pending  treaty  as  soon  as  the  treaty 
should  be  ratified. ^^ 

Ten  days  later  a  press  report  from  London  contained  the 
rumor  that  the  Chinese  Government  would  not  ratify  the 
pending  treaty.  Those  were  the  closing  days  of  the  presi- 
dential campaign  in  which  President  Cleveland  was  seeking 
reelection.  In  spite  of  the  official  information  that  China 
was  merely  reserving  the  treaty  for  further  deliberation, 
Congress  pas'sed  (October  1,  1888)  the  Scott  Act  which  ab- 
solutely prohibited  the  return  of  all  Chinese  laborers  who 
had  gone  to  China  for  a  visit, ^'^  even  though  they  held  cer- 
tificates already  issued  by  the  customs  houses.  The  bill  was 
signed  by  President  Cleveland  on  the  ground  that  China 
had  not  properly  cooperated  with  the  United  States  in  the 
immigration  question. -°  China  immediately  entered  a  pro- 
test at  the  extraordinary  action,  and  July  8,  1889,  the 
Chinese  Minister  in  Washington  addressed  an  exhaustive 
argument  to  the  Department  of  State  in  which  he  stated, 
tartly,  that  he  had  yet  to  learn  that  it  was  customary  for 
governments  to  act  on  the  strength  of  mere  newspaper 
reports.  "So  far  as  the  legation  knows,"  he  wrote,  "the 
treaty  is  still  pending,  and  awaiting  the  reply  of  the  State 
Department  to  the  amendments  proposed  in  the  legation 
note  of  September  twenty-fifth  last." 

"I  was  not  prepared  to  learn  .  .  .  that  there  was  a  way  recognized 
in  the  law  and  practice  of  this  country  whereby  your  country  could 
release  itself  from  treaty  obligations  without  consultation  or  the  con- 
sent of  the  other  party;  it  can  hardly  be  contended  that  my  govern- 
ment was  exceeding  diplomatic  practice  or  courtesy  in  following  the 
example  of  the  Senate  and  proposing  amendments.  .  .  ."  "' 

During  the  Harrison  administration  a  condition  amount- 
ing practically  to  non-intercourse  existed  between  the 
Chinese  legation  and  the  Department  of  State.  The  Ameri- 
can Government  was  in  a  position,   notwithstanding  its 


548  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

legality  as  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court,  utterly  inde- 
fensible from  the  viewpoint  of  diplomacy.  The  conduct  of 
Lord  Elgin  at  Tientsin  and  Peking,  of  Sir  Harry  Parkes  in 
Tokio,  and  of  the  French  minister  at  Shanghai  in  1883  was 
not  more  brutal  and  bullying  than  that  of  the  American 
Government  after  1888.  The  only  important  difference  was 
that  the  American  Government  had  done  wrongly  what  it 
had  a  perfect  right  to  do  if  other  measures  had  been  em- 
ployed, viz.,  regulate  its  own  immigration  questions,  while 
the  powers  in  China  had  done  what  they  had  no  moral  right 
to  do  under  any  conditions.  All  parties  had  degraded  the 
principles  of  international  law.  It  is  becoming  for  Ameri- 
cans in  criticizing  the  actions  of  other  governments  in  Asia 
to  be  humble  if  not  charitable.* 

The  original  restriction  act  of  1882,  as  amended  two  years 
later,  presumably  did  not  expire  until  1894  but  in  1892,  with 
another  presidential  election  approaching,  Congress  again 
took  up  the  immigration  question  and  enacted  (May  5, 
1892)  the  Geary  law,  the  most  stringent  exclusion  act  yet 
passed.-^  According  to  this  law  no  bail  was  to  be  permitted 
in  habeas  corpus  proceedings,  and  the  burden  of  proof  that 
a  Chinese  had  the  right  to  be  in  the  United  States  was 
placed  upon  the  Chinese  himself.  In  other  words  he  was 
presumed  to  be  guilty  of  illegal  residence  until  he  could 
prove  himself  innocent.  The  punishment  for  violation  of 
the  law  was  hard  labor  for  one  year  and  then  deportation. 
Later  (November  3,  1893)  the  definition  of  the  word  laborer 
was  enlarged  to  include  certain  other  classes  such  as  laun- 
drymen.  Under  the  amendment  the  certificate  which  each 
laborer  was  required  to  secure  as  proof  of  his  right  to  be  in 
the  country  must  bear  his  photograph.  In  other  respects 
the  rigor  of  the  Geary  law  was  somewhat  modified.-^    The 

*Thc  rosputmcnt  of  tlio  Cliinoso  Govprnniciit  at  the  trontmont  of  tho  inimi- 
Kratioii  question  l)y  the  United  States  is  shown  in  the  refusal  to  aceept  Senator 
Uenry  W.  Khiir  of  New  Ilaniiishirc  as  niinistei-  in  ISOI.  Blair  had  been  so 
unfortunate  as  to  make  remarks  in  the  Senate  in  connection  witli  both  the 
restriction  act  of  1 KS2  and  tlie  acts  of  ISSS  which  rendered  liini  persona  von 
t/rat(i  to  the  Chinese. -=  Tlu>  rejection  of  HIair  l)v  China  accounts  in  part  for 
tlie  fact  that  Charles  Denby.  who  ha<l  been  a  Clev<>land  appointee  in  IRSf), 
continued  as  niinistet  at  rekinir  t  liroufihout  the  Hari-ison  ( Hepuhlican)  admin- 
istration. Denliy  was  reapiiointed  in  the  second  Cleveland  administration  and 
continued    undiT    -McKiuley    until    18'JS. 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    549 

following  year  (March  17,  1894)  a  new  immigration  treaty 
with  China  was  signed  in  which  the  prohibition  of  the  ad- 
mission of  Chinese  laborers  for  ten  years  was  agreed  to. 
The  exempt  classes  of  Chinese — teachers,  students,  mer- 
chants, travelers  and  officials — were  carefully  defined,  and 
transit  across  the  country  was  permitted.  The  Chinese 
legally  resident  in  the  United  States  were  guaranteed  most- 
favored-nation  treatment.  The  stipulation  requiring  regis- 
tration was  made  bi-lateral,  applying  equally  to  Americans 
resident  in  China. 

Clearly  the  American  Government,  after  all  its  em- 
barrassments in  dealing  with  China  on  the  immigration 
question,  was  not  in  any  mood  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War  to  become  in  any  marked  degree  a  partisan  of 
China.  Scrupulous  neutrality  it  did  maintain,  but  the 
American  people,  who  knew  much  by  hearsay  of  the  Chinese 
in  America,  and  nothing  of  the  Far  Eastern  question,  were 
not  disposed  to  favor  an  extension  of  Chinese  influence  in 
the  Korean  peninsula,  or  anywhere  else. 

The  Threat  of  Japanese  Immigration 

The  Japanese  immigration  question  also  exercised  some 
influence  upon  American  policy  in  Asia,  though  in  a  very 
different  way. 

Although  tenaciously  holding  to  the  assertion  of  her 
rights,*  the  Japanese  Government  was  very  careful  to  avoid 
any  clash  with  the  Am.erican  Government  over  the  immigra- 
tion question  during  the  period  of  treaty  revision.  John  T. 
Swift  of  California,  who  had  been  very  active  in  the  anti- 
Chinese  agitation  in  the  United  States,  succeeded  Richard 
B.  Hubbard  of  Texas  as  American  minister  at  Tokio  in  May, 
1889.  Following  the  death  of  Mr.  Swift  at  his  post  in 
March,  1891,  Frank  L.  Coombs,  also  of  California,  was  made 
minister  for  the  remainder  of  the  Harrison  administration. 

*Tlio  .Tnpanese  trenty  with  Peru,  1S73  (Art.  7>,  contained  a  stipulation  to 
the  effect  that  no  restriction  be  placed  by  either  government  on  iiiiniigrant 
laborers  in  any  lawful  capacity  and  that  they  might  go  freely  from  one  country 
to  the  other. 


550  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Thus,  at  the  tmie  when  the  Japanese  immigration  question 
was  first  arising,  the  United  States  was  represented  in  Japan 
by  men  especially  alert  to  note  its  possible  dangers. 

Swift  warned  his  government  that  the  treaty  of  1889, 
negotiated  by  Hubbard  and  awaiting  ratification  by  both 
governments,  contained  a  bi-lateral  immigration  clause  such 
as  had  already  been  agreed  to  in  the  Japan-Mexico  treaty, 
which  would  open  the  United  States  to  Japanese  immigra- 
tion as  the  Burlingame  treaty  had  opened  the  country  to 
the  Chinese.  For  this  reason  the  American  Government 
was  relieved  of  some  embarrassments  when  Japan  formally 
requested  that  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  be  held  in  abey- 
ance. Such  a  provision  could  not  have  secured  the  approval 
of  the  Senate  in  1890.  Coombs,  shortly  after  his  arrival  in 
Japan,  had  a  conference  with  Viscount  Enomoto  who  prom- 
ised to  bring  about  a  satisfactory  regulation  of  Japanese  im- 
migrants by  Japan.  On  August  22,  1892,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  issued  instructions  to  the  governor  of  prefec- 
tures, requiring  them  to  discourage  immigration  to  the 
United  States. 

"It  would  be  needless  to  call  your  attention  to  the  fact,"  he  wrote, 
"that  the  most  cordial  and  friendly  .relations  have  been  happily 
existinj?  between  Japan  and  the  United  States;  besides,  our  com- 
mercial ■  interests  in  the  United  States  are  becoming  more  and 
more  important;  and  these  relations  wo  cannot  permit  to  be  dis- 
turbed on  account  of  such  a  minor  question  as  labor  immio-ration." 

A  month  later  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  instructed  the 
Japanese  consul  genci'al  at  Honolulu  to  endeavor  to  dis- 
suade Japanese  from  going  to  the  Pacific  Coast.  That  it 
was  the  policy  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  discourage 
undesired  labor  emigration  was  confirmed  (October,  1893) 
by  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Hayashi  to  U.  S.  Minis- 
ter Edwin  Dun. 

In  the  treaty  of  1894  between  the  Ihiited  States  and 
Japan  the  following  paragraph  was  inserted  to  take  care  of 
the  immigration  question,  as  well  as  to  safeguard  Japan  in 
her  policy  of  withholding  the  right  of  foreigners  to  purchase 
land  in  Japan: 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    551 

"It  is,  however,  understood  that  the  stipulations  contained  in  this 
and  the  prceedinf--  article  (relating  to  liberty  of  trade,  residence, 
leasing  of  hind,  ownershii)  of  property,  etc.)  do  not  in  any  way  effect 
the  laws,  ordinances  and  regulations  with  regard  to  trade,  the  immi- 
gration of  hd)()rers,  police  and  public  security,  which  are  in  force  or 
which  nuiy  hereafter  be  enacted  in  either  of  the  two  countries."  * 

Thus  far  the  only  effect  of  the  immigration  question  had 
been  to  deter  the  United  States  from  being  the  first  of  the 
great  powers  to  ratify  the  revised  treaty  which  Japan  had 
proposed  in  1888.  Great  Britain  was  awarded  the  credit, 
which  more  properly  belonged  to  the  United  States  by  virtue 
of  its  consistent  record  on  treaty  revisions  ever  since  1878, 
for  being  the  first  to  relieve  Japan  of  the  onerous  extra- 
territorial stipulations. 

The  Japanese  immigration  question  was,  however,  exert- 
ing a  more  positive  effect  on  American  policy  in  another 
direction.  The  planters  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  gravely 
handicapped  by  lack  of  willing  labor,  had  encouraged  the 
immigration  of  both  Chinese  and  Japanese  coolies.  The 
treaty  of  1871  with  Japan  had  been  followed  by  a  second 
convention  (March  6,  1886)  by  which  it  was  agreed  that  the 
Japanese  Government  would  furnish  laborers,  as  requested, 
for  Hawaii,  on  thirty  days  notice.  There  were  in  1890 
slightly  more  than  12,000  Japanese  in  the  Sandwich  Islands, 
out  of  a  total  population  of  about  90,000.  There  were  also 
15,000  Chinese.-"'  In  November,  1893,  at  the  time  of  the 
revolution  in  the  islands,  after  the  rejection  of  the  Ameri- 
can annexation  treaty,  the  Japanese  Government  sent  a  war 
vessel  to  Honolulu  to  protect  Japanese  subjects. 

After  the  withdrawal  from  the  Senate  of  the  Hawaiian 
annexation  treaty  by  President  Cleveland  (March  9,  1893), 
the  Japanese  Government  assumed  a  more  positive  tone 
towards  the  newly  established  Hawaiian  Republic.  Japan 
demanded  that  the  Japanese  immigrants  to  Hawaii  be  given 
the  same  rights  as  the  native  Hawaiians  which  included  the 

*"We  strongly  objected  to  this  clause  which  America  tacked  on  to  Article 
2  but  our  objoctions  were  of  no  avail.  Mr.  Oriscom  r<Jresbaml,  the  American 
Secretary  of  Stati',  alisolutely  refused  to  agree  to  revise  the  treaty  at  all  unless 
the  clause  was  admitted.  We  were  loath  to  agree,  but  did  so  because  the  ri-vi- 
sion  of  the  English  treaty  was  problematical  on  account  of  the  probationary 
clause,  and  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  start."  (Secret  Memoirs  of  Count 
Uayashi,   p.   248.) 


552  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

rights  of  citizenship  and  office-holding  from  which  they  had 
always  been  excluded.*  Japan  based  this  demand  upon  the 
most-favored-nation  clause  in  her  original  treaty  with 
Hawaii  in  1873,  and  a  treaty  between  h^pain  and  Hawaii 
(1863)  in  which  the  Spanish  had  been  granted  the  same 
rights  and  privileges  as  those  enjoyed  by  the  Hawaiians. 
The  disposition  of  the  Hawaiian  Republic  was  to  restrict  all 
oriental  immigration,  but  to  this  the  Japanese  Government 
made  firm  objections  and  in  1897  went  so  far  as  to  send  a 
war  vessel  to  Honolulu  with  a  demand  for  free  immigration. 
Meanwhile  the  Republic  had  been  unsuccessful  in  limiting 
the  immigration  by  means  of  a  restrictive  legislation  and  at 
length  arrested  1100  newly  arrived  Japanese  with  a  view  of 
deporting  them. 

The  majority  report  on  the  joint  resolution  for  the  an- 
nexation of  Hawaii  presented  to  the  House  May  17,  1898, 
stated  that  this  "rapid  growth  of  Japanese  element"  was  "a 
most  threatening  fact"  in  the  existing  Hawaiian  situation 
for  if  the  Japanese  demands  for  citizenship  were  granted  the 
Japanese  voters  (there  were  reported  to  be  24,000  Japanese 
in  the  islands  at  the  time,  19,000  of  them  men)  would  con- 
trol the  government  and  would  be  able  to  effect  a  revision  or 
abrogation  of  the  reciprocity  treaty  of  1887  by  which  Pearl 
Harbor  had  been  granted  to  the  exclusive  use  of  the  United 
States  as  a  naval  base.  This  argument  carried  much  weight 
jin  the  debate  both  in  the  House  and  in  the  Senate.  Senator 
George  Frisbie  Hoar,  who  only  a  few  months  later  desper- 
ately opposed  the  annexation  of  the  Philippines,  voted  for 
the  annexation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  rested  his  argu- 
ment for  their  acquisition  in  no  small  measure  upon  the 
menace  of  Japanese  control  of  the  islands.  Senator  Hoar 
stated:  'They  [the  islands]  will  fall,  ]\Ir.  President,  if  we  do 
not  prevent  it,  a  prey  to  Japan,  not  by  conquest  but  by  im- 
migration. This  result  all  parties  agree  that  w^e  must  pre- 
vent.   Japan  is  not,  according  to  the  opponents  of  annexa- 

*Tlio  foiistifution  of  Hawaii,  prdiiuilfiatcd  July  7,  1SS7.  liad  limited  citizon- 
ship  and  ollicr-lidldini;  to  Hawaiians  and  to  thoisc  of  Mthor  American  or  Euro- 
pean par('nta;;('.  The  Americans  and  Europoaus  were  not  I'cquired  to  forswear 
their  orijjinal  citizenship.-" 


ASIATIC  IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN  POLICY    553 

tion  of  this  body  and  of  the  press,  to  be  allowed  to  get  the 
Sandwich  Islands  either  by  force  or  by  absorption.  .  .  .  The 
danger  is,  as  I  have  said,  that  there  will  be  an  infusion  of 
Japanese  and  then  an  attempted  annexation  to  Japan." 
Senator  Hoar  urged  that  the  possession  of  the  islands  must 
either  be  settled  then  peaceably  by  annexation  or  later  by 
force  in  a  conflict  between  America  and  Asia. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  following  general  sources  of  information  on  Chinese  immi- 

gration are  recommended:  .1.  W.  Foster :  "American  Diplo- 
macy in  the  Orient,"  chap.  8, — valuable  because  the  author  was 
intimately  associated  in  public  life  and  in  the  service  of  the 
Chinese  Government  with  the  late.r  phases  of  the  subject; 
Charles  Denby :  "China  and  Her  People,"  Vol.  2,  chap.  9 — • 
Denby  was  the  American  minister  in  Peking,  1885-98 ;  Alleyne 
Ireland:  "China  and  the  Powers"  (privately  printed,  1902), 
chap.  3  contains  concise  summary;  Ma.ry  Roberts  Coolidge: 
"Chinese  Immigration" — Dr.  Coolidge  gave  to  the  domestic 
phases  of  the  subject  most  exhaustive  study,  and  yet  the  author 
was  so  carried  away  by  the  injustices  dealt  to  the  Chinese  as  to 
fail  to  present  adequately  the  fimdamental  issues  in  the  con- 
flict of  races.  The  bibliographical  notes  are  exceptionally 
valuable.  The  present  writer  has  made  no  very  extended 
study  of  Chinese  immigration  as  a  domestic  question  aside 
from  the  diplomatic  records  of  the  Department  of  State. 

2.  Marshall  Corres.,  pp.  78,  84-4,  116-7,  106;  Parker  Co.rres.,  pp.  632, 

669;  Paliamentary  Papers,  Accounts  and  Papers,  43,  1857-8, 
Report  to  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  Coolie  traffic,  ordered 
printed   July   27,   1858,  p.   78. 

3.  Parker  Corres.,  p.  625;  Reed  Corres.,  pp.  67-76,  78,  Reed  to  Cass, 

Jan.  13,  1858,  pp.  185,  204,  489. 

4.  S.  Doc.  99  :34-l,  pp.  119  ff.     Parker  Corres.  on  Rohert  Browne 

affair. 
5     Foster,  p.   282,   thinks  the  Chinese  laborers  in   California  were 
"perfectly  free,"  and  cites  a  great  many  authorities.     None  of 
the   similar   statements   on   this   jDoint   seems   to    the   present 
writer  convincing. 

6.  Table,  Coolidge,  p?  498. 

7.  Notes  from  Chinese  Legation,  Vol.  1,  Jan,  18,  1870,  Burlingame 

to  Fish. 

8.  Denby:    Vol.  2,  p.  98. 

9.  Coolidge  is  particularly  valuable  for  tracing  the  various  stages 

of  the  party  conflict  on  the  immigration  question. 

10.  Foster:  pp.  286  ff. ;  S.  Rept.  689:44-2;  S.  Misc.  Doc.  20:45-2. 

11.  Negotiations  of  the  Treaty  Commission,   For.  Relations,   1881, 

pp.  168-203 ;  J.  B.  Angell :  "Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United 


554  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

States  and  China,"  Amcr.  Jour,  of  Social  Science,  Vol.   17, 

pp.  24  if.);  Chester  Ilolcombe:    The  Outlook,  1904,  Apr.  23, 
pp.  993-4. 

12.  China  Desp.,  Vol.   56,  Nov.   17,  1880,   Anj^ell  to   Blaine.     This 

sentence  is  omitted  in  the  dispatch  as  printed  in  For.  Relations, 
1881. 

13.  St.  at  Large,  Vol.  22,  pp.  58-61. 

14.  St.  at  Large,  Vol.  23,  pp.  115-118. 

15.  Denby:    Vol.  2,  p.  105. 

16.  See  Pres.  Arthur's  opinion,  Richardson's  Messages,  Vol.  8,  p.  236. 

17.  Chinese  Students  in  U.   S.,  For.  Relations,  1872,  pp.  130,  135, 

138;  1873,  pp.  140,  186;  1875,  p.  227;  1885,  p.  144. 

18.  Statutes  at  Large,  Vol.  25,  pp.  476-479. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  504. 

20.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  273 :50-l. 

21.  For.  Relations,  1889,  p.  132. 

22.  Pres.  Harrison's  Message,  Apr.  4,  1892,  Rejection  of  Henry  W. 

Blair;  For.  Relations,  1892. 

23.  St.  at  Large,  Vol.  27,  pp.  25-G. 

24.  Ihid.,  Vol.  28,  pp.  7-8. 

25.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  76  :52-2,  Table,  p.  60. 

26.  Ibid.,  p.  26. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

THE  MISSIONAEIES   AND   AMERICAN  POLICY  IN   ASIA 

While  a  review  of  the  broader  aspects  of  the  influence 
of  the  American  missionaries  on  the  social  and  political  as 
well  as  the  religious  life  of  the  Asiatic  states  is  very  alluring, 
we  must  confine  ourselves  rigidly  to  a  more  precise  subject — • 
the  influence  of  the  missionaries  on  American  policy.  It  is 
discussed  in  the  following  phases :  the  assistance  of  the  mis- 
sionaries either  as  themselves  official  representatives  of  the 
government  or  to  those  who  were  officials;  the  status  as- 
signed to  the  missionaries  in  the  various  treaties  or  obtained 
by  special  conventions  and  interpretations;  missionaries 
and  American  neutrality;  and  the  protection  of  the  mis- 
sionaries by  the  Government  of  the  United  States.^ 

Missionaries  as  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers 

Notwithstanding  the  repeated  requests  of  the  American 
consuls,  commissioners,  and  ministers  from  1816,  onward, 
their  government  made  no  provision  for  the-  training  of  a 
single  interpreter  for  a  consulate  or  legation  until  1864,- 
Throughout  the  century  the  American  officials,  only  a  very 
few  of  whom,  unless  they  had  previously  been  missionaries, 
had  any  accurate  knowledge  of  either  the  written  or  spoken 
language  of  the  countries  to  which  they  were  assigned,  were 
largely  dependent  in  China,  Japan  and  Korea  upon  either 
native  interpreters,  upon  foreigners  of  other  nationalities, 
or  upon  the  missionaries.  There  were  only  four  salaried 
American  interpreters  connected  with  diplomatic  and  con- 
sular service  in  China  as  late  as  1899,  according  to  a  report 
of  Minister  Conger.  Until  about  1833,  when  Rev.  E.  C. 
Bridgman,^  the  first  American  to  acquire  the  Chinese  lan- 

555 


556  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

guage,  became  available  at  Canton,  the  Americans  in  China 
depended  very  largely  upon  Rev.  Robert  Morrison,  the 
British  missionary  employed  by  the  East  India  Company, 
or  upon  his  son  John  H.  Morrison  for  both  translation  and 
interpreting.  Bridgman,  in  company  with  Rev.  David 
AbeeV  arrived  in  1830.  They  were  followed  by  S.  Wells 
Williams^  (1833),  a  missionary  printer,  and  Rev.  Peter 
Parker,  M.  D."  (1834),  a  missionary  physician.  From  that 
time  onward  Bridgman,  Parker  or  Williams  actually  trans- 
acted the  greater  part  of  the  American  official  business  with 
the  representatives  of  the  Chinese  Government  for  nearly 
forty  years. 

In  1858  United  States  Minister  Reed,  who  had  come  to 
China  with  scant  regard  for  missionaries,  wrote  to  Secretary 
of  State  Cass : 

"...  I  am  bound  to  say  further  that  the  studies  of  the  missionary 
and  those  connected  with  the  missionary  cause  are  essential  to  the 
interests  of  our  country.  Without  them  as  interpreters  the  public 
business  could  not  be  transacted.  I  could  not  but  for  them  have 
advanced  one  step  in  the  discharge  of  my  duties  here,  or  read,  or 
written,  or  understood  one  word  of  correspondence  or  treaty  stipula- 
tions.   With  them  there  has  been  no  difficulty  or  embarrassments. 

"It  was  the  case  also  in  1844,  when  Mr.  Cushing's  interpreters  and 
assistants  in  all  their  public  duties  were  all  from  the  same  class;  in 
1853,  with  Mr.  Marshall,  and  in  1854  with  Mr.  McLane,  Dr.  Bridgman, 
who  was  the  principal  assistant  in  all  these  public  duties,  still  lives 
in  an  active  exercise  of  his  usefulness ;  and  I  am  glad  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  expressing  to  him  my  thanks  for  the  incidental  assistance 
and  constant  and  most  valuable  counsel.  .  .  . 

"There  is  not  an  American  merchant  in  China  (and  I  have  heard 
of  but  one  English)  Avho  can  write  or  read  a  single  sentence  of 
Chinese." ' 

The  condition  described  by  Mr.  Reed  continued,  and  for 
the  remainder  of  the  century,  except  for  the  briefest  inter- 
vals, there  were  some  American  missionaries  employed  either 
in  important  posts  in  the  consulates  or  in  the  legation  in 
China,  and  it  was  these  men  rather  than  their  titular  su- 
periors who,  in  most  cases,  had  the  actual  contacts  with  the 
Chinese  officials.  A  similar  condition  existed  in  Siam  as 
well  as  in  Korea.  Chester  Holcombe,  formerly  a  missionary 
and  then  secretary  and  Charge  in  the  legation  at  Peking,  did 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    557 

at  least  half  the  work  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Shufeldt 
treaty  with  Li  Hung  Chang;  and  Dr.  H.  N.  Allen,  the  first 
American  missionary  in  Korea,  and  subsequently  secretary 
of  the  Korean  legation  and  then  American  minister  at  Seoul, 
carried  the  brunt  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence  between 
Korea  and  the  United  States.  Indeed  at  least  one  instance 
is  known  where  an  American  minister,  nameless  in  this 
record,  lay  hopelessly  intoxicated  in  his  legation  while  the 
missionaries  not  only  ministered  to  his  physical  needs  but 
even  wrote  the  dispatches  to  the  Department  of  State  at  a 
very  critical  moment  in  political  affairs. 

Due  to  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  language  was  the  lingua 
franca  in  Japan  and  that  the  Japanese  very  quickly  acquired 
English  the  problem  of  interpretation  was  never  so  difficult 
in  Japan  as  elsewhere  in  Asia.  For  this  reason  and  also, 
perhaps,  because  the  American  Government  was  especially 
careful  not  to  offend  the  anti-Christian  prejudices  of  the 
Japanese  inherited  from  the  old  Jesuit  days,  the  missionaries 
never  played  a  prominent  part  in  the  direct  relations  of  the 
two  governments. 

The  Chinese  Repository  ^  (1832-51),  of  which  Bridgman 
and  Williams  were  not  merely  the  editors  but  to  which  they 
were  often  the  chief  contributors,  is  easily  the  most  accurate 
and  faithful  chronicle  which  has  come  down  to  us  of  the 
period  which  it  covers.  Indeed,  a  close  comparison  of  the 
Repository  with  the  Treaty  of  Wanghia  shows  that  Caleb 
Cushing  in  his  negotiations  in  1844  was  very  greatly  in- 
debted to  Bridgman,  not  merely  for  his  work  as  interpre- 
ter but  also  as  adviser.  Several  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty 
appear  to  have  grown  directly  out  of  discussions  which  had 
preceded  them  in  the  Repository. 

On  Cushing's  departure  Dr.  Parker  immediately  entered 
upon  a  distinguished  service  as  unofficial  and  then  official 
interpreter  and  secretary  to  the  legation.  This  service  must 
not  be  overlooked  in  an  appraisal  of  his  less  valuable  ser- 
vices as  Commissioner  (1855-7).  Until  1854  the  consulates 
at  Amoy  and  Ningpo,  when  they  were  cared  for  at  all,  were 
for  the  most  part  in  charge  of  missionaries.    The  remarkable 


558  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

services  of  S.  Wells  Williams  for  the  government  began 
officially  in  1853-4  as  interpreter  in  the  Perry  expedition, 
and  were  resumed  a  year  later  when  he  resigned  from  mis- 
sionary work  and  became  secretary  and  interpreter  in  the 
legation,  a  position  which  he  held  for  twenty  years,  becom- 
ing during  the  period  charge  d'affaires  no  less  than  seven 
times.  After  1880  the  missionary  became  less  important  as 
an  interpreter  in  the  legation  because  Li  Hung  Chang,  with 
whom  much  of  the  more  important  business  was  transacted, 
had  provided  himself  wdth  interpreters,  among  them  W,  H. 
Pethick,  drawn  from  the  American  consular  service,  to  act 
as  his  personal  interpreter.  Meanwhile,  however,  other  mis- 
sionaries had  been  drawn  into  the  consular  service  and  in 
succeeding  decades  rose  to  positions  of  great  responsibility 
either  in  it  or  in  the  diplomatic  service. 

A  less  direct  yet  even  broader  influence  on  American 
policy  in  Asia  came  from  the  books  published  by  the  mis- 
sionaries. Until  1847  the  American  public  knew  about 
China  chiefly  through  British  writers,  many  of  whose  books 
were  republished  in  the  United  States.  In  that  year  a  New 
York  publisher  brought  out  the  first  edition  of  Williams' 
"JNIiddle  Kingdom,"  though  not  until  nearly  every  other 
publisher  had  declined  the  venture  and  the  company  which 
undertook  it  was  guaranteed  against  loss  by  a  Canton  mer- 
chant.^ One  of  the  objects  of  this  monumental  work  was 
to  put  an  end  to  ''that  peculiar  and  almost  indefinable  im- 
pression of  ridicule"  which  Williams  thought  was  being  be- 
stowed upon  the  Chinese  "as  if  they  were  the  apes  of  Euro- 
peans and  their  social  state,  arts  and  government  the  bur- 
lesque of  the  same  things  in  Christendom."  For  the  next 
forty  years  or  more  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  books 
written  by  missionaries  (including  those  of  W.  E.  Griffis 
who,  while  not  a  missionary,  occupied  a  similar  position  and 
view-point)  were  practically  the  only  American  source  of 
any  adequacy  or  accuracy  for  the  formation  of  public  opin- 
ion about  China,  Japan  and  Korea.  During  the  greater  part 
of  the  nineteenth  century  Americans  looked  upon  Asia 
through  the  eyes  of  missionaries. 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    559 

The  American  missionary  was  not  merely  the  interpreter 
for  his  countrymen;  he  also  played  a  most  important  role 
as  the  interpreter  of  his  country  to  the  Asiatic.  Briclgman 
published  (1838)  a  geographical  history  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Chinese  language  which  was  twice  revised  (1846, 
1862),  and  exerted  an  influence  in  predisposing  the  Chinese 
Government  to  friendliness  towards  the  United  States.^** 
The  linguistic  studies  of  the  missionaries,  their  dictionaries 
and  similar  works,  opened  up  the  channels  of  communica- 
tion. While  the  British  and  Continental  missionaries 
shared  in  these  labors,  until  1858  the  Americans  were  the 
leaders.  With  the  exception  of  Rev.  W,  A.  P.  Martin,^  ^ 
who  entered  the  Chinese  service  in  1862  as  a  teacher  in  the 
Tungwen  College,  later  becoming  president  of  the  Imperial 
University,  and  Rev.  D.  B.  McCartee,  who  held  important 
posts  in  the  Chinese  diplomatic  service,  American  mission- 
aries did  not  to  a  great  degree  become  employees  of  the 
Chinese  Government.  But  in  Japan  and  in  Korea  there 
were  notable  instances  where  missionaries  like  Verbeck, 
Allen  and  Hulbert  occupied  official  positions  of  influence. ^^ 
Verbeck  is  credited  with  having  proposed  and  stimulated 
the  organization  of  the  Iwakura  Embassy  from  Japan  in 
1872. 

The  Status  of  Missionaries  under  the  Treaties 

The  legal  status  of  the  missionaries  in  the  various  coun- 
tries to  which  they  went  is  not  always  easy  to  define.  In 
China,  Japan  and  Korea  the  American  missionary  intro- 
duced himself  by  subterfuge  which  was  accompanied  by  the 
tolerance  and  indulgence  of  native  officials.  The  first  mis- 
sionaries in  Canton  in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury were  not  only  without  legal  right  to  be  there  but  were 
in  violation  of  imperial  regulations.  They  were  sponsored 
by  obliging  hong  merchants  who  represented  them  to  be 
clerks  attached  to  the  mercantile  houses.  But  in  1844,  due 
to  the  gratitude  of  one  of  the  subordinate  Chinese  com- 
missioners whose  parents  had  been  patients  of  Dr.  Parker, 


560  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  right  to  erect  churches  at  the  open  ports  was  inserted 
in  Article  17  of  the  Gushing  treaty,  at  the  suggestion  of  the 
Chinese.'"'  The  treaty,  however,  contained  no  stipulation 
conferring  upon  the  missionaries  any  liberty  to  seek  con- 
verts. Later,  through  the  efforts  of  the  French  envoy,  the 
Emperor  issued  a  rescript  granting  a  degree  of  religious 
toleration.*  ^^  This  rescript  referred  only  to  the  "religion  of 
the  Lord  of  Heaven,"  i.e.,  the  Roman  Catholic  faith. f 
Kiying,  without  the  formality  of  securing  a  second  imperial 
rescript,  followed  with  an  order  that  the  Imperial  proclama- 
tion should  apply  to  Protestants  as  well  as  Catholics. 

To  neither  Catholic  nor  Protestant  missionaries  was  the 
rescript  very  satisfactory.  While  it  legalized  their  work  in 
the  open  ports  it  shut  them  off  from  the  interior  of  the 
country  where  the  Catholic  missionaries  had  already  been 
at  work  for  many  years.  It  was  estimated  by  Abeel  that  in 
1830  the  Roman  Catholic  missionaries  were  employing  no 
less  than  four  bishops  and  nineteen  priests — French,  Portu- 
guese, Italian  and  Spanish — and  claimed  more  than  200,000 
converts.  These  labors  were  by  no  means  confined  to  Macao, 
there  being  missionaries  even  in  far-away  Szechuan.  After 
the  treaties  of  1844  the  missionaries,  Protestant  and  Catho- 
lic, American  and  European  alike,  quickly  spread  to  the 
newly  opened  ports,  and  notwithstanding  the  stipulations  of 

*  "Kiying.  imperial  comniissionor,  minister  of  state,  and  sovernor  general  of 
Kwang-tung  and  Kwang-si,  respectfully  addresses  the  throne  hy  memorial. 

"On  examination  it  apjiears  tliat  the  religion  of  the  Lord  of  Heaven  is  that 
professed  by  all  the  nations  of  tlie  West:  that  its  main  ob.ieet  is  to  eneourage 
the  good  and  suppress  the  wicked  ;  that  since  its  introduction  into  China  dur- 
ing the  Ming  dynasty  it  has  n(>ver  bvvu  interdicted,  that  subsequently,  when 
Chinese,  practising  this  religion,  often  made  it  a  covert  for  wickixlness,  even 
to  the  seducing  of  wiv<>s  and  daugliters.  and  to  the  <leceitful  extraction  of  the 
pupils  fi'oni  the  eyes  r)f  the  sick,  government  made  an  investigation  and  inllicted 
punishment,  as  is  on  recoi'd  :  and  that  in  the  reign  of  Kiaking  special  clauses 
were  first  laid  down  for  the  punishment  of  the  guilty.  The  prohil>iti(in,  there- 
fore, was  dir(>cted  against  evil  doing,  under  the  covert  of  religion,  and  not 
against  th(>  religion  profess(>d   by  the   Western   foreign   nations. 

"Now  tile  request  of  the  French  .Vmbassador.  Lagrenr-,  that  those  Chinese, 
doing  well,  who  practise  this  religion,  be  (-xemiit  from  criminality,  seems  feasible. 
It  is  right,  therefore,  to  make  the  request,  and  earnestly  to  crave  celestial  favor 
to  grant  that  henceforth  all  natives  and  foreigners  without  distinction,  who 
learn  and  practise  the  religion  of  the  Lord  of  Heaven  and  do  not  excite 
trouble  by  improper  conduct,  be  exempted  from  criminality.  .  .  .  .\s  to  those 
of  the  Freiicb  and  ollii'v  foreign  nations  wlio  practise  the  religion,  let  tliem 
only  bo  permitted  to  build  churches  at  the  live  ports  open  for  commercial  inter- 
course.    They  must  not  presume  to  (>nter  tlie  country  to  propagate  religion.   .   .   . 

"Let  it  "be  according  to  the  counsel  (of  Kiying).  Tliis  is  from  tlie 
Emperor." 

t  Sul)sequently  th(>  term  "IJeligion  of  the  Lord  .Tesus"  was  iiilroduccd  into 
the   Chin<'se    vocabulary   to   designate    the   I'rotestaiit    faith. 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    561 

the  rescript,  frequently  made  tours  into  the  surrounding 
country.  The  most  awkward  feature  of  the  open  violation 
of  the  laws  of  the  empire  was  that  regardless  of  whether 
their  activities  were  lawful  or  not,  the  missionaries  were 
exempted  from  Chinese  jurisdiction  by  extraterritoriality. 
The  British  authorities  made  some  efforts  to  restrain  British 
and  even  American  missionaries,  but  the  French  and  the 
American  Governments  did  not.^^  While  no  specific  viola- 
tions of  the  law  on  the  part  of  the  American  missionaries 
were  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  American  Government 
in  the  next  ten  years,  fully  half  the  claims,  trivial  in  amount 
yet  several  in  number,  for  reparation  and  damages,  were 
filed  by  missionaries  who  had  proceeded  to  establish  mission 
work  in  locations  which  were  in  violation  of  the  Chinese 
interpretation  of  the  treaty,  and  which  had  been  resented  in 
some  way  either  by  the  officials,  the  gentry,  or  the  rabble 
of  the  various  localities.  While  these  claims  were  usually 
settled  by  conciliation  and  compromise,  they  created  no 
small  amount  of  irritation. 

The  actual  negotiations  of  the  American  treaty  of  Tien-  . 
tsin  were  in  the  hands  of  Dr.  S.  Wells  Williams  and  Rev. 
W.  A.  P.  Martin,  the  latter  acting  as  interpreter  of  Man- 
darin which  Williams  did  not  at  that  time  speak.  At  the 
preliminary  negotiations  at  Taku,  before  the  destruction  of 
the  forts  by  the  British  and  French,  Dr.  Williams  drew  up 
an  article  stipulating  full  toleration  for  all  persons  profess- 
ing Christianity,  and  permission  for  American  missionaries 
to  travel  anywhere  in  the  country,  renting  or  buying  houses 
or  land,  and  living  with  their  families.  The  Chinese  commis- 
sioner rejected  this  article  as  being  too  broad.  But  Count 
Putiatin  secured  an  article  which  would  permit  the  Russian 
missionaries  to  propagate  as  well  as  practice  their  faith  in  all 
open  localities  ("toutes  les  localites  ouvertes").  This  privi- 
lege was  to  be  governed  by  passports  to  be  issued  by  the 
consuls  in  conference  with  the  local  Chinese  authorities. 

At  Tientsin  Dr.  Williams,  therefore,  drafted  a  similar 
article  for  the  American  treaty,  but  Mr.  Reed  objected  to  it 
because  of  the  passport  provision  and  also  because  it  as- 


562  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

signed  to  the  consul  and  the  Chinese  authorities  the  respon- 
sibility of  determining  what  missionaries  should  be  worthy 
to  receive  passes.  This  latter  provision  was  then  stricken 
out,  and  the  article  submitted  to  the  Chinese.  They  ob- 
jected to  it  and  made  a  proposal  to  limit  the  American  mis- 
sionaries to  the  open  ports,  and  to  make  their  number  sub- 
ject to  the  determination  of  the  consuls  alone.  This  was 
less  than  had  been  secured  in  the  Russian  treaty  which  was 
already  signed,  and  was  therefore  very  unsatisfactory  to  Dr. 
Williams.  Mr.  Reed  was  impatient  to  sign  the  treaty  the 
following  day,  and  would  have  omitted  the  article  altogether 
had  it  been  necessary  to  secure  the  desired  consummation  of 
his  task.  However,  Dr.  Williams  persisted  and  in  the  morn- 
ing was  able  to  draft  an  article  which  was  acceptable.^^ 
It  reads : 

"Article  29. — The  principles  of  the  Christian  religion,  as  professed 
hy  the  Protestant  and  Roman  Catholic  churches,  are  recognized  as 
teaching  men  to  do  good,  and  to  do  to  others  as  they  would  have 
others  do  to  them.  Hereafter  those  who  quietly  profess  and  teach 
these  doctrines  shall  not  be  harassed  or  persecuted  on  account  of  their 
faith.  Any  person,  whether  citizen  of  the  United  States,  or  Chinese 
convert,  who,  according  to  these  tenets,  peaceably  teaches  and  prac- 
tises the  principles  of  Christianity  shall  in  no  case  be  interfered  wjth 
or  molested." 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  article  omitted  all  definition 
of  locality  in  which  the  missionaries  might  live  and  work, 
and  that  by  the  insertion  of  a  provis^ion  for  religious  tolera- 
tion within  the  empire  into  a  foreign  treaty,  China  was 
actually  making  as  much  of  a  surrender  of  those  sovereign 
rights  in  domestic  legislation  which  states  usually  reserve 
for  themselves,  as  in  the  commercial  provisions  of  the  Lord 
Elgin  treaty.  The  British  treaty  contained  an  article  very 
similar  to  that  in  the  American  treaty.  The  French  treaty 
carried  provision  for  missionary  liberty  a  step  further  by 
stipulating  that  "an  efficacious  protection  shall  be  given  to 
the  missionaries  who  peaceably  go  into  the  interior.  ,  ,  ." 
Two  years  later  the  French  Convention  of  Peking  (October 
25,  1860)  added  very  important  concessions  for  Roman 
Catholics.    China  engaged  to  proclaim  throughout  the  Em- 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    563 

pire  that  people  were  permitted  to  propagate  and  practice 
the  'teachings  of  the  Lord  of  Heaven/  that  those  who  indis- 
criminately arrested  Christians  would  be  duly  punished ;  and 
further,  that  all  real  estate  formerly  owned  by  Christians 
and  confiscated  at  the  time  when  the  CathoUcs  were  expelled 
from  the  empire,  would  be  paid  for.  The  right  to  rent  and 
purchase  land  and  erect  buildings  thereon  in  all  the  prov- 
inces was  also  inserted,  surreptitiously,  in  the  Chinese  text 
of  the  Convention.  This  latter  provision,  although  not 
binding  upon  the  Chinese  since  the  French  text  alone  was 
authoritative,  was  later  actually  assented  to  by  the  Chinese 
Government  (1865).^'^ 

The  aggressiveness  of  the  American  missionaries  in  their 
disposition  to  force  the  opening  of  the  empire  is  notable. 
It  is  entirely  in  accord  with  what  had  been  the  prevailing 
spirit  in  missionary  circles  from  the  beginning.  Before  1858 
the  missionary  suffered  far  more  from  the  restriction  im- 
posed upon  him  than  did  the  merchant.  Consequently  the 
missionary  was  the  more  impatient  for  greater  liberty  under 
treaty  protection.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  Dr. 
Parker,  as  commissioner,  would  have  embarked  upon  a  pro- 
gram looking  towards  the  dismemberment  of  the  empire  by 
the  appropriation  of  Formosa  for  the  United  States.  In 
proposing  this  project  he  appears  to  have  been  reflecting  a 
spirit  which  was  at  the  time  far  more  characteristic  of  the 
missionaries  than  of  the  merchants.  Even  the  implacable 
Lord  Elgin,  fresh  from  his  victories  at  Tientsin,  was  a  little 
shocked  at  the  sentiments  of  Dr.  Bridgman,  dean  of  the 
American  missionaries,  who  appears  to  have  been  willing 
to  go  him  one  better.^ ^  The  missionaries  were,  in  1858, 
greatly  influenced  by  the  Taiping  Rebellion  with  which  they 
for  the  most  part  greatly  sympathized,  and  which  seemed 
to  hold  out  the  prospect  of  a  complete  revolution.  For  the 
Manchu  government  the  missionaries  had  scant  respect,  and 
the  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  the  Empire  seemed  to  them 
much  less  important  considerations  than  the  opening  of 
doors  to  evangelization.  Theirs  was  not  a  very  farsighted 
policy. 


/ 


564  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

One  may  also  pause  at  this  point,  which  was  the  turning 
point  in  all  missionary  work,  to  speculate  as  to  the  impres- 
sion which  the  American  missionaries  had  made  upon  the 
Chinese.  To  the  Imperial  officials,  wholly  ignorant  of  the 
Western  world,  the  distinction  between  the  relation  of  the 
French  Government  to  Roman  Catholic  missionaries  and 
converts  and  the  relation  of  the  American  Government  to 
American  missionaries  could  not  have  been  very  obvious. 
The  Americans  made  much  of  the  fact  that  in  the  United 
States  there  was  complete  separation  of  Church  and  State. 
and  yet  in  China  there  were  Bridgman,  Parker  and  Williams 
negotiating  the  treaty  of  Wanghia,  there  was  Parker  enter- 
ing the  diplomatic  service  and  rising  to  the  highest  rank, 
there  were  Williams  and  IMartin  at  Taku  and  Tientsin,  and 
at  the  same  time  there  w^ere  the  missionaries  in  frequent 
communication  and  open  sympathy  with  the  Taipings  at 
Nanking.  Not  only  had  the  Taiping-wang  borrowed  the 
color  of  the  doctrines  he  was  proclaiming  from  the  mission- 
aries, but  in  1860  it  w-as  the  Rev.  Issachar  J.  Roberts,  the 
chief  rebel's  old  teacher,  who  proceeded  to  Nanking  and, 
invested  with  yellow  robes  and  a  crown,  became  the  erst- 
while minister  of  foreign  affairs  in  the  rebel  camp.^^  Chris- 
tianity in  either  its  Catholic  or  Protestant  forms  was  a  dis- 
integrating influence  in  the  Manchu  Empire  and  it  must 
have  been  difficult  for  the  American  missionaries  to  free 
themselves  from  the  suspicion  which  was  freely  harbored 
against  the  French  missionaries  that  they  were  in  some 
undefined  way  the  agents  of  a  government  which  sought  the 
disruption  of  China. 

The  American  missionaries  entered  Japan  without  the 
protection  of  any  express  treaty  stipulation  for  their  work. 
The  laws  of  Japan  against  the  Christian  religion  were  well 
known  and  Commodore  Perry  was  instructed  to  make  clear 
the  American  separation  of  Church  and  State.  No  mention 
of  religion  appears  to  have  occurred  in  the  negotiation  of 
the  treaty  of  1854.  But  before  Harris  had  negotiated  the 
treaties  of  1857  and  1858  the  Dutch  had  secured  toleration 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    565 

for  the  worship  of  "their  own  or  the  Christian  religion" 
within  their  own  dwelHngs.  One  of  the  projects  nearest  to 
the  heart  of  Townsend  Harris  was  to  secure  the  opening  of 
Japan  to  American  missionaries  and  he  was  most  careful  to 
impress  the  authorities  with  his  own  personal  devotion  to 
Christian  faith  and  practice.  He  had,  however,  at  length 
to  content  himself  with  an  article  on  religious  freedom  which 
merely  enlarged  slightly  the  privileges  already  granted  to 
the  Dutch.  Americans  were  to  be  permitted  the  free  exer- 
cise of  their  religion,  the  erection  of  suitable  places  of  wor- 
ship, and  on  the  other  hand  were  not  to  "do  anything  that 
may  be  calculated  to  excite  religious  animosity."  Never- 
theless several  of  the  American  missionary  societies,  already 
informed  of  the  possible  opening  for  their  work  in  Japan  by 
S.  Wells  Williams  and  the  chaplains  of  Perry's  fleet,  had 
undertaken  to  meet  the  situation.  Rev.  Guido  Verbeck, 
born  in  Holland  and  in  1858  an  applicant  for  American 
citizenship,  was  sent  to  Nagasaki  by  the  Reformed  Dutch 
church.  Upon  his  arrival  he  found  Dr.  J.  C.  Hepburn, 
Presbyterian,  and  Rev.  John  Liggins  and  M.  C.  Williams, 
Episcopalian  missionaries,  had  preceded  him  to  their  posts 
to  which  they  had  been  transferred  from  China.-''  The 
existing  prohibitions  against  aggressive  evangelization  were 
not  serious  handicaps  for  there  had  to  be,  just  as  previously 
in  China,  a  large  amount  of  language  study  before  the  mis- 
sionaries could  enter  effectively  upon  their  duties.  Mis- 
sionary work  in  Japan  began,  as  elsewhere,  with  educational 
and  medical  service.  Meanwhile  the  missionaries  enjoyed 
merely  the  protection  which  was  extended  to  all  citizens 
under  the  treaty. 

The  course  of  American  missions  in  Japan  was  in  some 
respects  quite  different  from  that  in  China.  ^Although  the 
government  was  prone  to  look  upon  the  Christianization  of 
Japanese  subjects  as  undermining  loyalty  to  the  Empire  and 
the  Mikado.*  nevertheless  the  missionary,  as  a  teacher  of 
Western  civilization,  became  more  and  more  acceptable  to 

*"Wo  .   .   .  obtained  from  their  higli  officers  the  distinct  and  positive  avowal 
that   the   Mikado's   govornnK-nt   is   based   on    the   Shintoo   creed,    and   for   its   per- 


/ 


566  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  Japanese,  who  were,  unlike  the  Chinese,  most  eager  to 
learn.  As  Japan  entered  into  the  long  contest  for  treaty 
revision  the  westernization  of  Japan  became  a  cult  which 
had  the  support  and  aggressive  encouragement  of  the  high- 
est Japanese  authorities,  and  the  missionaries  greatly 
profited.  Influential  officials  and  Japanese  students  sent 
abroad  to  study  became  Christians  and  in  Japan  formed  for 
the  missionaries  a  substantial  constituency  such  as  did  not 
exist  in  China  at  any  time  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Hav- 
ing established  themselves  in  the  treaty  ports  the  mission- 
aries began  gradually  to  extend  their  work  into  the  interior, 
using  passports  which  granted  them  the  right  to  travel  for 
"health  or  scientific  research."  This  subterfuge  was  winked 
at  by  the  Japanese  authorities  until  about  1888  when  public 
opinion  began  to  undergo  a  reaction  against  such  rapid 
westernization  of  the  Empire.  From  that  time  onward  for 
a  few  years  the  authorities  became  more  critical  of  the 
presence  of  missionaries  in  the  interior,  some  of  whom  had 
openly  established  regular  mission  stations  where  they  re- 
mained for  long  periods  without  other  authorization  than 
their  passports. 

In  1890  the  anti-foreign  feeling  in  Japan  expressed  itself 
in  attacks  on  several  missionaries,  one  of  whom  was  an 
American.  The  American  minister  asked  for  a  declaration 
of  policy  from  the  Japanese  Government,  and  Foreign  Min- 
ister, Count  Aoki,  stated  that  while  the  practices  of  the 
missionaries  as  regards  travel  in  the  interior  were  irregular, 
their  privileges  would  not  be  withdrawn. -- 

In  the  missionary  question,  as  well  as  in  so  many  other 
respects,  Japan  became  far  more  tactful  towards  the  Chris- 
tian nations  than  did  China.  Within  a  decade  after  the 
opening  of  Japan  to  trade  a  discovery  was  made  that  in 
southern  Japan  communities  of  Japanese  Roman  Catholic 
Christians,  their  faith  and  practice  somewhat  corrupted  by 
their  long  isolation,  had  been  able  to  exist  during  the  long 

pptuity  depends  upon  the  inaintenaiice  of  tliat  faitli  at  all  hazards.  That  they 
foresee  ill  till'  propuKatiiin  of  Christ  iariily  the  overthrow  of  this  faith  and  the 
conse(juent  fall  of  the  Mikado's  dynasty.  .  .  ."  (l)e  Long  to  I'Msh,  Jan.  22, 
1870.)  =' 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA     567 

period  since  the  Catholics  were  expelled  from  Japan  in  the 
early  part  of  the  seventeenth  century.  One  of  the  first  edicts 
issued  by  the  restored  Mikado  in  1868  renewed  the  prohibi- 
tions against  Christianity,  and  forthwith  the  removal  and 
banishment  of  the  newly  discovered  Christians  was  begun. 
This  action  drew  a  strong  and  identic  protest  from  the 
foreign  representatives  which  was  warmly  supported  by  the 
American  Government.  Seward,  apparently  fearing  that  the 
persecution  of  Christians  might  lead  to  an  intervention  of 
foreign  nations  with  direful  results  to  the  Empire,  instructed 
Van  Valkenburgh  to  convey  to  the  Japanese  authorities  a 
very  blunt  warning.  The  persecution  of  the  native  Chris- 
tians continued  and  two  years  later  Secretary  of  State  Fish 
took  up  with  the  British,  French  and  German  governments 
the  question  of  joint  action  to  restrain  Japan.  Lord  Claren- 
don replied  that  it  seemed  unwise  to  take  any  action  which 
would  in  any  way  embarrass  the  new  sovereign  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  his  newly  devised  domestic  administration,  and 
the  matter  was  dropped.-^ 

The  Japanese,  however,  were  quick  to  realize  in  1872 
when  the  Iwakura  Embassy  reached  the  United  States  that 
the  persecution  of  Christians  was  depriving  Japan  of  the 
confidence  of  Christian  nations  which  was  so  essential  to 
the  accomplishment  of  treaty  revision.  When  Okubo  and 
Ito  were  sent  back  to  Japan  for  full  powers  and  instructions 
for  the  proposed  treaty  with  the  United  States  they  carried 
the  message  from  the  Embassy  that  Japan  must  abandon 
the  program  for  the  extirpation  of  Christianity.^'*  Mean- 
while the  missionaries  themselves  had  been  winning  the 
confidence  of  the  authorities.  Verbeck  had  already  been 
called  to  Tokio  to  organize  the  Imperial  University,  and 
not  a  few  of  the  American  teachers  who  had  been  secured 
for  the  government  schools  were  stoutly  maintaining  their 
purpose  to  engage  in  missionary  work  in  an  unofficial  and 
personal  way.  The  Japanese  Government,  at  a  time  when 
Chinese  authorities  were  seriously  considering  the  possibility 
of  expelling  the  missionaries,-  changed  its  policy  and  began 
to  conciliate  if  not  to  welcome  them.    This  contrast  in  policy 


568  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

was  as  profitable  to  Japan  as  it  was  costly  to  China,  in  the 
formation  of  public  opinion.  Between  the  American  and 
the  Japanese  governments  there  never  was  any  conflict  or 
irritation  on  the  question  of  missionaries  or  Christianity 
after  1870. 

In  Korea  American  missionary  work  started  in  much  the 
same  extra-legal  way  as  in  Japan  and  China.  Catholic 
Christianity  had  been  introduced  into  the  peninsula  by  a 
Chinese  priest  in  1794.''^  He  was  put  to  death  in  1801  but 
the  Seminaire  des  Missions  Etrangeres  of  Paris  took  up  the 
project  and  renewed  the  work  under  French  priests.  Some 
priests  were  decapitated  in  1839.  The  massacre  of  1866, 
resulting  in  the  energetic  action  of  M.  de  Bellonet  and  Ad- 
miral Roze,  has  already  been  referred  to.  France  had  as- 
sumed the  protectorate  of  Roman  Catholic  missions  and 
converts  in  the  East  and  before  1880  had  made  clear  that  the 
disturbance  of  Christian  converts  was  likely  to  be  followed 
by  demands  on  the  part  of  France,  not  merely  for  large  in- 
demnities, but  even  for  the  surrender  of  territory.  Korea 
was  both  anti-Christian  and  anti-foreign  and  China  was  in 
fear  that  the  unauthorized  projects  of  Bellonet  might  some 
day  be  renewed  in  more  authoritative  fashion.  When  Com- 
modore Shufeldt  arrived  at  Tientsin  in  1881  he  found  that 
while  Li  Hung  Chang  was  willing  to  assist  in  securing  a 
treaty  with  Korea  he  was  equally  disposed  to  draft  a  com- 
pact in  which  missionary  work  would  be  prohibited.  The 
first  draft  prepared  by  the  Viceroy  and  submitted  to  Shu- 
feldt and  Holcombe  contained  a  prohibition  against  the 
importation  of  religious  books  which  was  framed  to  accom- 
plish this  purpose.  Upon  the  representation  of  Holcombe 
that  such  a  stipulation  would  probably  defeat  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  in  the  United  States,  the  Viceroy  with- 
drew it,  leaving  the  treaty  without  any  reference  to  reli- 
gion.-*' By  the  treaty  of  1882  the  American  missionary 
enjoyed  in  Korea  only  the  rights  which  belonged  to  all 
American  citizens. 

The  missionaries,  long  eager  to  enter  the  Hermit  King- 
dom, appeared  at  Seoul  in  1883-4.    Dr.  H.  N.  Allen  opened 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    569 

a  government  hospital  (February,  1885)  and  two  months 
later  a  regular  Presbyterian  evangelistic  mission  was  opened 
by  Rev.  H.  G.  Underwood.-"  Soon  after  this  the  Methodist 
Episcopal  church  entered  Korea  with  Rev.  W.  B.  Scranton, 
M,  D.,  and  Rev.  H.  G.  Appenzeller.-^  Another  Christian 
influence  was  introduced  when  Korea  officially  requested 
the  American  Government  to  nominate  some  school 
teachers  and  Messrs.  Gilmore,  Bunker  and  Hulbert,  edu- 
cated in  an  American  theological  seminary,  arrived  in  the 
summer  of  1886.  American  missions,  which  occupied  the 
field  to  a  greater  extent  than  British  or  Continental,  not 
only  prospered  in  Korea  but  won  the  confidence  of  the 
highest  authorities,  including  the  king  and  queen.  Under 
the  provisions  of  the  British  and  German  treaties,  by  means 
of  the  most-favored-nation  clause  in  the  American  treaty, 
they  entered  the  interior  and  established  sub-stations  far 
removed  from  the  treaty  ports.  These  Americans,  who  came 
in  time  to  outnumber  the  mercantile  representatives,  be- 
came sources  of  a  very  strong  unofficial  American  influence. 
Thus  emerged  a  very  difficult  problem  for  the  American 
Government  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  section. 

Missionaries  and  Neutrality 

Because  of  the  wise  and  conciliatory  policy  of  Japan  the 
missionaries  within  the  Empire  were  never  placed  in  a  posi- 
tion which  might  be  considered  as  equivalent  to  hostility  to 
the  existing  government.  In  both  China  and  Korea  very 
different  situations  developed,  one  in  connection  with  the 
Taiping  Rebellion  and  the  other  in  the  matter  of  Korean 
independence. 

The  influence  of  the  missionaries  on  the  beginnings  of 
the  Taiping  Rebellion  has  already  been  noted.  The  sym- 
pathy of  the  Protestant  missionaries  with  the  Taipings, 
which  continued  at  least  until  1860,  has  also  been  men- 
tioned. When,  in  1853,  the  American  Government  adopted 
toward  the  rebellion  a  policy  of  technical  neutrality  and 
non-interference,   and  when  at   the  same   time   Marshall 


570  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ignored  his  instructions  and  adopted  the  policy  of  sustaining 
and  supporting  the  Imperial  authority,  the  attitude  and 
sympathy  of  the  American  missionaries  became  a  great 
obstacle  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  purpose.-^  He  en- 
joined them  to  neutrality,  but  at  least  one  of  them  defied 
him  and  visited  the  rebel  camp  at  Nanking.^"  Marshall's 
only  recourse,  for  the  enforcement  of  his  injunction,  was 
the  public  withdrawal  of  the  protection  of  the  United  States 
from  those  who  violated  it.  He  had  no  power  to  force  them 
to  desist.  At  the  same  time  the  country  was  in  great  tur- 
moil, the  Imperial  power  was  paralyzed,  and  the  mission- 
aries might  indulge  their  sympathies  with  the  utmost  im- 
punity. Meanwhile  their  government  in  Washington,  by 
no  means  as  positive  in  its  convictions  as  their  representa- 
tive in  China,  was  disposed  to  look  upon  the  revolution 
without  disfavor.    The  missionaries  were  in  this  one  respect 

■^  in  a  common  class  with  the  smugglers.  The  American  Gov- 
ernment had  taken  the  position  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
China  to  enforce  her  own  laws,  and  so  long  as  the  Imperial 
Government  was  unable  to  prevent  the  importation  of 
opium,  or  munitions  for  the  rebels,  or  to  prevent  the  com- 
munication of  the  missionaries  with  Nanking,  there  was 
nothing  to  be  done.  No  effective  solution  of  the  problem 
was  devised  and  it  solved  itself  a  few  years  later  when  the 
missionaries,  in  common  with  other  foreigners,  both  officials 
and  others,  came  to  see  that  their  confidence  in  the  rebels 
had  been  misplaced. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  diplomatic  relations  between 

the  United  States  and  Korea  the  American  Government 

sought  to  discourage  the  Koreans  from  assuming  that  the 

\v      American  treaty  implied  any  more  than  was  stated,  viz., 

;    that  the  United  States  recognized  the  independence  of  the 

'     kingdom.    The  good  offices  clause  was  not  to  be  interpreted 

^        as  including  any  protectorate  functions  whatever.    The  mis- 
sionaries, however,  were  in  a  difi"erent  position  from  the 

/        diplomatic  representatives.     Veiy  early  in  their  work  Li 

\ Hung  Chang  and  his  representative.  Yuan  Shi  Kai,  by 

opposing  and  obstructing  them,  forced  the  missionaries  into 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    571 

opposition  to  the  gradually  unfolding  purposes  of  China. 
The  missionaries  proceeded  on  the  theory  that  the  govern- 
ment which  was  most  favorable  to  their  work  was  the  best 
government  for  the  kingdom.  The  reduction  of  Korea  to  a 
province  of  China  would  mean  the  extension  to  Korea  of 
the  anti-foreign  and  anti-Christian  influences  which  from 
the  time  of  the  Tientsin  massacre  were  preparing  the  way 
in  China  for  the  Boxer  uprising.  As  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment became  more  and  more  friendly  towards  them,  the 
missionaries  repaid  the  confidence  with  a  sturdy  and  char- 
acteristically American  support  of  Korean  claims  to  de  facto 
as  well  as  de  jure  independence.  This  support  was,  in  turn, 
a  great  encouragement  to  the  Koreans.  It  encouraged  them 
to  oppose  Yuan  Shi  Kai  in  the  period  preceding  the  Sino- 
Japanese  War,  and  it  was  an  even  greater  encouragement 
to  the  opposition  which  arose  against  the  intrigues  of 
Japan  and  Russia  in  the  years  that  followed.  That  it  misled 
the  Korean  people  into  the  assumption  that  the  American 
Government  would,  in  some  time  of  emergency,  intervene 
and  assume  protectorate  functions  over  the  peninsula,  there 
can  be  little  doubt. 

After  the  Sino-Japanese  War  Seoul  became  a  center  of 
incredible  intrigue  exceeding  even  that  which  preceded  the 
war.  The  American  missionaries  openly  sided  with  the  king 
in  his  feeble  efforts  to  preserve  the  independence  of  his 
kingdom.  Both  the  Russian  and  the  Japanese  governments 
at  different  times  complained  at  the  actions  of  the  mission- 
aries. At  length,  unwillingly,  and  upon  repeated  orders 
from  the  Department  of  State,  the  American  Minister  sent 
to  every  American  citizen  in  Korea  the  following  notice 
which  was  also  published  in  The  Independent  (Seoul,  May 
15,  1897): 

"Legation  of  the  United  States. 
Seoul,  Korea,  May  11,  1897. 
Sir,— 

By  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  State  I  am  required  to  make 
publicly  known  to  every  citizen  of  the  United  States  sojourning!:  or 
being  temporarily  or  permanently  in  Korea,  the  repeatedly  expressed 
view  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  that  it  behooves  loyal 


572  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

citizens  of  the  United  States  in  any  foreign  country  whatsoever  to 
observe  the  same  scrupulous  abstention  from  participating  in  the 
domestic  concerns  thereof  which  is  internationally  incumbent  upon 
his  government.  They  should  strictly  refrain  from  any  expression  of 
opinion  or  from  giving  advice  concerning  the  internal  management 
of  the  country,  or  from  any  intermeddling  in  its  political  questions. 
If  they  do  so,  it  is  at  their  own  risk  and  peril.  Neither  the  repre- 
sentative of  this  government  in  the  country  of  their  sojourn,  nor  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  itself,  can  approve  of  any  such 
action  on  their  part,  and  should  they  disregard  this  advice  it  may 
perhaps  not  be  found  practicable  to  adequately  protect  them  from 
their  own  consequences.  Good  American  citizens,  quitting  their  own 
land  and  resorting  to  another,  can  best  display  their  devotion  to  the 
country  of  their  allegiance  and  best  justify  a  claim  to  its  continued 
and  efficient  protection  while  in  foreign  parts,  by  confining  them- 
selves to  their  legitimate  avocations,  whether  missionary  work,  or 
teaching  in  schools,  or  attending  the  sick,  or  other  calling  or  business 
for  which  they  resort  to  a  foreign  country, 

I  am  Sir, 

You.rs  respectfully, 
John  M.  B.  Sill, 
Minister  Resident  and  Consul  General." 


Persecution  of  Christians  in  China 

The  treaty  of  Tientsin  had  created  an  anomalous  posi- 
tion for  American  missionaries  in  China.  They  were  citizens 
of  a  government  which  had  held  consistently  to  the  separa- 
tion of  church  and  state,  and  they  were  thoroughly  imbued 
with  conscientious  convictions  as  to  the  lightness  of  this 
principle.  Under  other  circumstances  they  probably  would 
not  have  demanded  preferential  treatment,  and  yet  the 
treaty  unquestionably  created  them  a  special  and  preferred 
class  with  privileges  not  accorded  to  the  mercantile  popula- 
tion. Their  privileges  were  still  further  defined,  if  not 
increased,  by  the  French  treaty  and  the  Convention  of  1860, 
the  advantages  of  which  they  might  claim  under  the  most- 
favored-nation  clause.  By  the  Berthemy  Convention 
(1865)  all  vagueness  as  to  rights  was  removed  when  China 
definitely  conceded  the  right  of  the  French  missionaries  to 
purchase  land  as  well  as  pursue  their  calling  in  every  pro- 
vince. And  yet  the  missionaries  felt  themselves  to  be  on  not 
very  certain  ground.    Did  they,  or  did  they  not,  have  all  the 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    573 

rights  of  the  Roman  Catholic  missionaries?  There  was  not 
entire  agreement  among  the  succeeding  American  ministers 
and  secretaries  of  state  on  this  point. ^^  The  American  Gov- 
ernment appears  to  have  been  reluctant  to  recognize  that  the 
missionaries  in  China  were  a  preferred  class,  and  the  mis- 
sionaries themselves  do  not  appear  to  have  coveted  the  dis- 
tinction, but  in  time  all  the  treaty  rights  granted  to  the 
French  missionaries  and  applicable  to  the  Americans  were 
claimed  for  them  by  their  government  and  exercised.  The 
missionaries  established  themselves  in  the  interior,  they 
acquired  "perpetual  leases"  of  land,  and  they  demanded  pro- 
tection from  the  Chinese  authorities.  Their  government 
collected  their  claims  for  damages  and  in  at  least  one  in- 
stance the  American  minister,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Department  of  State,  intervened  to  secure  the  religious  tol- 
eration for  native  Christians  which  was  guaranteed  by 
treaty.^-  In  1896,  following  an  outburst  of  anti-missionary 
and  anti-foreign  riots  in  various  provinces  the  American 
Government  secured  a  direct  and  explicit  statement  from 
China  that  the  missionaries  had  every  right  which  had  been 
granted  to  the  French. ^^  In  the  course  of  years  the  mis- 
sionary question  as  viewed  by  the  American  Government 
had  come  to  be  one  of  national  prestige.  To  accept  less  for 
the  Americans  than  was  given  to  the  French  would  be  inter- 
preted by  the  Chinese,  so  it  was  believed,  as  a  weakness  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  which  would  lead  to  even 
greater  troubles  between  the  two  governments."*  The  mis- 
sionary question  was  another  illustration  of  the  fact  that 
direct  American  relations  with  the  Asiatic  states  were  sub- 
ject to  the  modifications  of  international  competition. 

The  rights  granted  to  the  missionaries  were  made  the 
basis  by  the  merchants  for  a  demand  for  further  opening 
of  the  country  to  trade,  and  it  seems  reasonable  to  believe 
that  at  any  time  in  the  century  at  least  after  1870,  the 
Chinese  Government  would  have  at  least  removed  all  mis- 
sionaries from  the  interior  had  it  been  free  to  do  so.^^  The 
Protestant  missionaries  were  objectionable  to  the  local  au- 
thorities, to  the  gentry,  and  to  large  masses  of  the  ignorant 


574  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

populace  because  their  converts  rejected  ancestor  worship, 
refused  to  join  in  the  expenses  of  idol-processions  and  temple 
repairs,  and  because  of  their  generally  disturbing  influence 
on  the  indolent  and  corrupt  practices  of  the  local  authori- 
ties.^^ The  Catholic  missionaries  were  still  more  objection- 
able because  they  claimed  ofiicial  rank  in  the  hierarchy  of 
Chinese  officials,  because  they  interfered  where  their  con- 
Verts  were  concerned  with  the  operations  of  the  courts  and 
police,  and  because,  through  the  French  Government,  they 
assumed  a  protectorate  over  the  Chinese  converts.  They 
were  an  imperium  in  imperio.  Religious  toleration  became 
to  the  ruling  classes  less  and  less  a  voluntary  toleration  and 
assumed  the  character  of  still  another  imposition  by  foreign 
powers.  Thus  the  missionaries  came  to  be  placed  in 
an  utterly  false  position  such  as  they  had  escaped  in  Japan 
and  Korea,  and  yet  from  which  it  was  difficult  for  either 
them  or  their  government  to  retire.  Christianity  was,  in  a 
measure,  like  opium,  being  imposed  upon  China  without  the 
consent  of  the  people.  The  Chinese  were  free  to  abstain 
from  either,  but  they  were  not  free  to  prohibit  them.  No 
candid  friend  of  Christianity  and  the  missionaries  can  well 
shut  his  eyes  to  these  facts. 

With  the  details  of  the  various  riots  from  the  massacre 
of  Tientsin  (1870)  until  the  Boxer  uprising  we  cannot  be 
concerned.  In  general  we  may  note  that  in  these  riots  the 
Protestants  suffered  less  than  the  Catholics,  and  among  the 
former  the  American  missions  suffered  least  of  all.  This  fact 
may  be  offered  in  testimony  that  the  affairs  of  the  American 
missions  were  managed  with  greater  tact,  with  more  conciU- 
ation,  or  were  less  associated  in  the  minds  of  the  Chinese 
than  were  other  missions  with  the  suspected  territorial 
designs  of  foreign  governments.  The  American  as  well  as 
the  British  Government  consistently  abstained  from  any 
cooperative  action  with  other  powers  which  would  have 
tenxled  to  support  the  pretensions  of  France  for  the  Roman 
Catholic  missionaries  and  in  time,  i.e.,  in  the  second  Cleve- 
land administration  where  the  entire  cooperative  policy  was 
repudiated,  the  United  States  withdrew  from  any  coopera- 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    575 

tion  whatever  with  other  governments  in  the  settlement  of 
missionary  troubles. 

China  was  blindly  and  injudiciously  contending  for  the 
integrity  not  merely  of  an  empire  but  also  of  a  form  of  social 
organization  both  of  which  were  disintegrating  before  her 
eyes.  Had  China  been  possessed  of  more  intelligent  and 
skillful  rulers  she  might  have  won  the  sympathy  of  the 
Americans  in  her  hopeless  struggle  for  there  was  a  measure 
of  justice  on  her  side,  but  her  leaders  were  utterly  incompe- 
tent to  meet  the  situation,  and  China  lost  the  confidence  she 
so  sorely  needed  to  sustain  her  claims  to  Korea  and  against 
Japan.  The  missionaries  were  contending  for  the  establish- 
ment of  religious  toleration  and  missionary  freedom  without 
which  it  seemed  that  their  work  could  not  run  its  natural 
course.  When  one  compares  the  hospitality  they  received 
from  the  Japanese  and  Korean  governments  which  were 
never  coerced  by  the  foreign  powers  to  give  it,  with  the 
hostility  of  the  Chinese  who  had  granted  freedom  to  mis- 
sionaries in  1858  and  1860  only  after  they  had  been  intimi- 
dated by  the  powers,  one  wonders  whether  there  is  not  here 
a  clear  case  of  cause  and  effect.  It  would  appear  that  the 
Christian  missionary  work  in  China  did  not  receive  a  net 
benefit  from  the  protection  of  foreign  governments. 

On  the  other  hand  the  philanthropic  and  spiritual  inter- 
est of  an  increasing  number  of  Americans  in  the  welfare  of 
China,  which  was  directly  created  by  the  missionaries,  was 
the  one  constant  force  operating  upon  American  public 
opinion  in  the  last  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The 
commercial  interest  of  the  United  States  in  China  rose  and 
fell  with  the  trade  returns.  The  political  interest  ran  par- 
allel with  the  course  of  trade.  Both  declined  steadily  from 
1860  to  1895.  In  general  one  may  conclude  that  while  the 
missionary  contributed  much  to  the  disintegration  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  in  the  last  century,  and  the  weakness  result- 
ing from  the  prostration  of  China  must  by  itself  now  be 
looked  upon  as  a  catastrophe,  he  was  at  the  same  time  creat- 
ing much  which  in  more  recent  years  has  operated  strongly 
to  repair  the  damage  which  had  been  done. 


576  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

From  the  history  of  Christian  missions  in  China,  Japan 

and  Korea  one  conclusion  stands  out  sharply:  much  harm 

and  little  good  has  come  from  governmental  patronage  and 

,   protection  of  missionary  work;  and  the  missionary  renders 

1  the  most  enduring  service  to  the  people  among  whom  he 

\  labors  when  he  separates  himself  farthest  from  political 

\  concerns. 

1  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  best  general  sources  on  the  missionary   question   are:  the 

various  volumes  of  Foreign  Relations,  to  consult  which  their 
index  is  an  indispensable  guide;  Moore's  Digest  which  con- 
tains important  excerpts  and  references  under  appropriate 
headings  in  the  sections  on  China,  Japan  and  Korea,  respec- 
tively; S.  Wells  Williams'  "Life  and  Letters";  W.  A.  P. 
Martin's  "Cycle  of  Cathay";  Charles  Denby:  "China  and 
Her  People,"  Vol.  1,  chap.  17;  Chester  Holcombe :  "The  Real 
Chinese  Question,"  chap.  6.  The  Missionary  question  in 
Foreign  Relations  is  presented  more  completely  than  almost 
any  other  subject.  Practically  nothing  of  importance  in  the 
dispatches  was  omitted. 

2.  For  interpreters  in  the  consular  and  diplomatic  service  in  China 

see  H.  Misc.  Docs.  31 :45-2,  part  1,  pp.  480  ff. 

3.  Eliza  J.   Gillett  Bridgman:    "Life  and  Labors  of  Elijah   Cole- 

man Bridgman"  (New  York,  1864) — a  very  inadequate  book. 

4.  David  Abeel :   "Journal  of  a  Residence  in  China"  (2d  Ed.,  N.  Y., 

1836). 

5.  S.   Wells   Williams'   "Life  and   Letters";   Williams'   Journal   in 

Proceedings  of  the  N.  China  Branch  of  the  Royal  Asiatic 
Society,  and  in  the  Japan  Asiatic  Society,  respectively,  al- 
ready referred  to. 

6.  Life,  Letters  and  Journals  of  Rev.  and  Hon.  Peter  Parker,  M.  D. 

7.  Reed  Corres.,  p.  360,  June  20,  1858,  Reed  to  Cass. 

8.  "Chinese  Repository,"  Vols.  1-20,  1832-1851,  Canton,  Macao  and 

Victoria.  The  field  of  the  Repository,  after  its  cessation,  was 
occupied  by  the  China  Review  and  the  Chinese  Recorder. 

9.  Williams'  "Life  and  Letters,"  p.  155. 

10.  An  excellent  review  of  the  labors  of  the  A'^arious  American  mis- 

sionaries will  be  found  in  "Memorial*  of  Protestant  Mis- 
sionaries in  China"  (Shanghai,  1867). 

11.  Martin:    "Cycle  of  Cathay." 

12.  CriiRs:    "Verbeck   of  Jajian" ;  Allen:    "Chronological  Index  of 

Korea";  Homer  B.  Hulbert :  "The  Passing  of  Korea." 

13.  "Life  of  Peter  Parker,"  p.  328. 

14.  Williams'    "Middle    Kingdom,"    Vol.    2,    ])p.    356    ff. ;    "Chinese 

Repository,"  Vol.  14,  p.  195. 

15.  Walter  Lowrie:   "Memoir  of  the  Rev.  Walter  M.  Lovvrie"  (Phila- 

delphia, 1854). 


MISSIONARIES  AND  AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  ASIA    577 

IG.     S.  Wells  Williams'  Journal,  p.  86. 

17.  Henri  Cordier:    "Relations,"  Vol.  1,  chaps.  4  and  5. 

18.  Theodore   Walrond :     "Letters   and   Journals   of  James,   Eighth 

Earl  of  Elgin." 

19.  Lindsay  Brine:    "The  Taeping  Rebellion  in  China,"  pp.  295-8. 

20.  Otis  Gary:    "A  History  of  Christianity  in  Japan"  (New  York, 

1909);  W.  E.  Griffis:    "Verbeek  of  Japan"  (New  York,  1900). 

21.  For.  Relations,  1870,  p.  461. 

22.  Japan  Desp.,  Vol.  61,  Jan.  2,  1890,  Swift  to  Secy,  of  State. 

23.  For.  Relations,  1868,  I,  pp.  749,  753,  827;  1870,  pp.  455,  460,  482. 

24.  Stead  :    "Japan  by  the  Japanese,"  p.  156. 

25.  Henri  Cordier:    "Relations,"  Vol.  1,  chap.  18. 

26.  Holcombe,  p.  163,  makes  a  slightly  different  statement  of  the 

settlement  of  the  religious  question  from  the  statement  con- 
tained in  the  diplomatic  dispatches.  The  writer  has  followed 
the  latter.     For  references  see  chap.  24. 

27.  L.  H.  Underwood:    "Underwood  of  Korea"   (New  York,  1918); 

"The  Call  of  Korea,"  by  H.  G.  Underwood  (New  York,  1908). 

28.  W.  E.  Griffis :    "A  Modern  Pioneer  in  Korea"  (biog.  of  Henry  Gr. 

Appenzeller). 

29.  Marshall  Corres.,  pp.  183  ff. 

30.  Charles  Taylor,  M.  D. :    "Five  Years  in  China,"  pp.  38  ff. 

31.  Moore's  "Digest,"  Vol  5,  pp.  452  ff. ;  see  Koo :    "Status  of  Aliens 

in  China,"  chap.  16,  for  a  digest  of  the  policies  of  the  various 
treaty  powers,  with  special  reference  to  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Germany. 

32.  Moore's  "Digest,"  Vol.  5,  p.  460. 

33.  Ibid.,  p.  458 ;  see  also  China  Desp.,  Vol.  103,  July  10,  1897,  Denby 

to  Secy,  of  State. 

34.  For.  Relations,  1875,  pp.  333,  399. 

35.  For  Tientsin  massacre  and  Wensiang  note,  see  For.  Rel.,  1870, 

pp.  355  ff. ;  1871,  pp.  97  ff. 

36.  Arthur  H.  Smith :    "China  in  Convulsion,"  Vol.  1,  chaps.  3,  4, 

give  an  excellent  exposition  as  viewed  by  a  liberal  Protestant 
missionary. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

AMERICAN  TEADE:     1844-1898 

The  broad  history  of  the  American  commerce  with  Asia 
is  too  large  a  subject  to  be  brought  within  the  scope  of  this 
study  and  yet  certain  phases  of  it  cannot  be  neglected  if  one 
w^ould  understand  the  course  of  American  policy.  The  very 
intimate  relation  between  trade  and  politics  in  the  first  half 
of  the  century  has  already  been  shown.  In  the  next  fifty 
years  both  trade  and  politics  became  more  complex  and  it  is 
not  always  so  easy  to  trace  the  relationship.  Trade  history 
under  the  treaties  falls  naturally  into  three  periods,  each 
with  marked  and  peculiar  characteristics.  These  periods 
are:  1844-58,  1859-95  and  1896-1900.  The  treaties  of  1858 
are  a  clear  dividing  line  after  which  the  trade  which  had 
hitherto  been  confined  to  China,  and  to  five  open  ports, 
spread  out  to  a  steadily  increasing  number  of  cities  in  China, 
and  also  extended  itself  to  Japan,  and  then  to  Korea.  The 
close  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War  is  also  a  dividing  line,  coin- 
ciding as  it  does,  roughly,  with  the  new  industrial  and  mer- 
cantile development  of  the  United  States  which  followed 
the  recovery  from  the  panic  of  1893.  The  end  of  the  century 
finds  this  new  development  in  the  full  tide  of  its  growth. 
Meanwhile  the  close  of  the  war  in  Asia  had  set  in  motion  a 
new  commercial  and  political  activity  to  which  was  related 
the  McKinley-Hay  policies  with  which  our  study  comes  to 
a  close.  A  comprehensive  survey  of  the  trade  history  would 
include  an  examination  of  American  relations  with  the 
Pacific  Islands,  and  the  Indian  Ocean  ports,  but  for  our 
purposes  we  can  afford  to  neglect  them  because  they  appear 
to  have  exercised  practically  no  influence  on  policies.  In 
the  last  quarter  of  the  century  until  1898  the  attention  of 

578 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  579 

Americans,  in  so  far  as  it  extended  to  Asia  at  all,  was  cen- 
tered on  Japan  and  China  with  occasional  reference  to 
Korea  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

Both  American  commerce  and  tonnage  increased  rapidly 
from  1844  to  1858.  But  it  was  also  the  time  during  which 
the  first  generation,  the  pioneer  traders  in  China,  disap- 
peared. American  trade  was  being  carried  on  by  the  sons 
and  relatives,  for  the  most  part,  of  the  men  who  had  founded 
it.  The  significant  fact,  looking  towards  the  future,  was 
that  the  third  generation  in  these  families  was  not  remaining 
in  the  trade.*  It  is,  probably,  no  injustice  to  those  who 
came  later,  to  state  that  the  American  mercantile  com- 
munity in  the  East  reached  its  point  of  maximum  vigor 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  American  Civil  War.  Dry-rot 
was  already  setting  in  and  the  domestic  development  of  the 
United  States  was  such  that  men  of  ability  and  character 
equal  to  that  of  the  pioneers  in  Asia  could  now  find  ampler 
rewards  at  home  in  the  fields  of  manufacturing,  banking  and 
transportation.  The  East  India  trade  was  no  longer  an  El 
Dorado. 

The  period  of  1859-95  was  characterized  by  the  decay, 
withdrawal  or  failure  of  all  the  American  mercantile  houses 
famous  before  the  treaties  of  Tientsin,  and  by  the  entrance 
of  no  new  merchants  who  rose  to  equal  eminence.  The  fail- 
ures of  Olyphant  and  Company  in  December,  1878,  and  of 
Russell  and  Company  in  June,  1891,  eliminated  two  of  the 
most  famous  of  the  older  American  firms,  and  surrendered 
to  British  and  German  competitors  a  prestige  and  commer- 
cial leadership  in  China  which  Americans  have  never  re- 
gained. No  younger  firms  and  no  American  banks  had  been 
developing  to  take  over  American  interests  and  carry  them 
on.  The  new  firms  which  had  appeared  since  the  Civil  War 
were,  with  very  few  notable  exceptions,  not  well  supplied 
with  capital,  and  sometimes  inclined  to  speculations  and 

*One  may  trace  this  fact  in  the  history  of  nearly  all  of  the  American 
families  prominently  irtentifled  with  the  East  India  trade  before  1850 — there 
never  were  more  than  a  score  of  them.  In  the  second  half  of  the  century  it 
is  rare  to  find  an  American  merchant  in  either  China  or  Japan  hy  the  name 
of  Perkins,  Kusscll,  Forbes,  rushing,  (llyphaiit,  Talbot.  Oriswold,  I-ow,  Wet- 
more  or  Wolcott,  who  was  born  after  1S30.  On  the  other  hand  these  names 
occur  with   increasing  frequency  in   the  domestic  commercial  life   of  the   nation. 


580  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

methods  which  brought  little  credit  to  American  trade. 
This  was  especially  true  in  China. 

In  measuring  the  influence  of  trade  on  political  policy  it 
must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  trade  was  never  a  large 
proportion  of  the  total  American  foreign  trade. ^  From 
1821  to  1897  the  ratio  of  the  total  value  of  merchandise  im- 
ported into  and  exported  from  the  United  States  in  the  trade 
with  all  Asia  ranged  from  5.90  to  6.97  per  cent  of  the  total 
American  former  trade.  While  it  rose  in  an  exceptional 
period  of  nine  months  in  1843  to  nearly  14  per  cent,  from 
1850  to  1890  it  ranged  either  slightly  above  or  slightly  below 
5  per  cent.  The  exports  from  the  United  States  were  small 
as  compared  with  the  imports — from  a  third  to  as  low  as  a 
tenth  as  much.  The  value  of  the  trade  with  China  dropped 
steadily  from  1860  to  1897  from  3  to  less  than  2  per  cent  of 
the  total  American  trade,  and  while  the  trade  with  Japan 
was  steadily  increasing  from  nothing,  it  had  reached  only 
2  per  cent  of  the  total  American  foreign  trade  in  1897. 
These  facts  lead  to  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  in  the 
four  decades  following  the  close  of  the  American  Civil  War 
the  trans- Pacific  trade  of  the  United  States  was  of  slight  im- 
portance to  the  American  people.  It  was  the  missionary 
and  political  interests  of  America  in  Asia  which  kept  the 
Far  Eastern  problem  before  the  American  people,  to  even 
the  slight  degree  in  which  it  held  their  attention. 

One  finds  in  the  relative  status  of  the  China  and  the 
Japan  trade  another  reason  why  American  policy  steadily 
inclined  towards  Japan.  While  the  volume  of  trade  with 
China  indicated  a  fairly  steady  increase  after  the  close  of 
the  Civil  War,  its  value  showed  an  actual  shrinkage  due  to 
the  declining  value  of  silver.  The  increase  in  volume  of 
trade  was  not  even  sufficient  to  offset  the  decrease  in 
values.*  While  the  trade  was  valued  at  $22,472,605  in 
1860,  thirty  years  later  it  was  only  $19,206,680.  On  the 
other  hand  the  trade  with  Japan,  beginning  with  $193,865 
in  1860,  advanced  to  $26,335,967  in  1890,  having  surpassed 

*The  haekwan  tacl  declined  from  $1,522   (January  1,  1874)   to  $1.01   (1893)  ; 
$.849   (1894)  ;  and  $.703   (1900). 


AMERICAN  TRADE:  1844-1898 


581 


Value  in  Gold  of  Merchandise  Imported  into  and  Exported  from  the 
United  States,  Fiscal  Ye.\rs  1865  to  1904  * 


CHINESE     empire 


Exports  to 


Imports 
from 


HONGKONG 


Exports  to 


Imports 
from 


JAPAN 


Exports  to 


Imports 
from 


Dollars 
2,669.449 
3,145,231 
3.57S,S08 
3,980,014 
5,203,238 
3,116,381 
2,070,832 
2,936,835 
1,062.598 
843.121 
1.464,524 
1.390,360 
1,707,872 
3,604,546 
2,651.677 
1.101,383 
5.447.680 
5.895.983 
4.080.322 
4.626.578 
6,396,500 
7.520,581 
6,246.626 
4,582,585 
5,791,128 
2,946,209 
8,701.008 
5.663,497 
3.900,457 
5.862.426 
3.603.840 
6,921,933 
11,921,433 
9,992.894 
14,493,440 
15,259,167 
10,405,834 
24,722,906 
18,898,163 
12,862,202 


Dollars 
5.129,917 
10,131,142 
12,112.440 
11,384,999 
13,207,361 
14,565,527 
20.064.365 
26,752.835 
26.353.110 
18,144.210 
13,473,600 
12,353.943 
11.130.495 
15,887.820 
16,431.344 
21,769,618 
22.317.729 
20.214,341 
20,141,331 
15,616,793 
16,292,169 
18,972,963 
19,076,780 
16,690,589 
17,028,412 
16,260,471 
19,321,850 
20,488,291 
20,636,535 
17.135,028 
20,545.829 
22.023,004 
20,403,862 
20.326.436 
18,619,268 
26,896,926 
18.303,706 
21.055.830 
26,648,846 
29.342,488 


Dollars 


Dollars 


1.493,372 

1.286.008 
2.102,224 
3,339.532 
3,229,834 
3,262,709 
3,290,522 
2,877,392 
2,916,854 
3,227,897 
3,777,759 
3,083,849 
4,149,311 
4,056,236 
2,984,042 
3,351,952 
3,686,384 
4,439,153 
4,768,697 
4,894,049 
4,216,602 
4,209,847 
4,253,040 
4,691,201 
6,060,039 
6,265,200 
7,732,525 
8,485,978 
8,009,848 
8,030,109 
8,772,453 
10,412,548 


838,649 

449,230 

1,202,816 

493,690 

1,171,189 

2,232,663 

1,653,350 

2,251,089 

2,399,828 

2,424,092 

1,918,894 

1,504,580 

983,815 

1,072,459 

1.436.481 

1,445,774 

1,480.266 

969.745 

563,275 

763,323 

878,078 

892,511 

776,476 

1,419,124 

923.842 

746.517 

2,479,274 

1,256,267 

1,416,412 

1,277,755 

1,359,905 

1,652,038 


Dollars 

41,913 

254,779 

712,024 

769,471 

1,291,936 

571,186 

476,173 

906,213 

1,174,854 

1,046,965 

1,661,933 

1,099,696 

1,252,346 

2,246,827 

2,676,924 

2,552,888 

1,468,976 

2,540,664 

3,376,434 

2,528,529 

3,057,415 

3,135,533 

3,335,592 

4,214,382 

4,619,985 

5,232,643 

4,807,693 

3,290,111 

3,195,494 

3,986,815 

4,634,717 

7,689,685 

13.255,478 

20,385.541 

17.264.688 

29,087.475 

19.000.640 

21.485.883 

20.933.692 

24,955,032 


Dollars 

285,176 

1,815,364 

2,618,283 

2,424,153 

3,245,317 

3.052.026 

5,298,153 

6,537,584 

7,903,794 

6,468,460 

7,759,569 

15,470,047 

13,687,061 

7,446,547 

9,845,562 

14,510,834 

14,217,600 

14,439,495 

15,098,890 

11,274,485 

11,767,956 

14,885,573 

17,114,181 

18,621,576 

16,687,992 

21,103,324 

19,309,198 

23,790,202 

27,454,220 

19,426,522 

23,695,957 

25,537,038 

24,009,756 

25,223,610 

26,716,814 

32,748,902 

29,229,543 

37,552,778 

44,143,728 

47,166,576 


»  From  1S(!5  to  1S72  includes  Hongkong. 
^  Prior    to    1873    incliulcd    in    "Chinese   Empire." 

*  Adapted   from    Monthly   nummary   of   Commerce  and  Finance,   Sept. 
p.  1211. 


1904, 


582  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  China  trade.*  After  the  Smo-Japanese  War  the  entire 
trade  with  Asia  was  greatly  stimulated  but  Japan  retained 
the  lead.  In  1897  the  total  trade  between  the  United  States 
and  China  was  $32,328,295  while  the  trade  with  Japan  had 
reached  $37,265,234.  (See  above  table.)  The  more  im- 
portant factors  in  the  increase  of  the  Japan  over  the  China 
trade  were :  the  purchase  of  an  increasing  proportion  of  tea 
and  silk  in  Japan  for  which  China  had  been  the  sole  source 
before  I860;  and  the  beginning  of  manufacturing  in  Japan 
which  created  a  market  for  an  increasing  amount  of  Ameri- 
can raw  cotton.  The  trade  with  Korea  was  trivial. t  An- 
other factor  tending  to  promote  the  Japanese  trade  was  the 
entrance  of  Japanese  commission  houses  into  the  United 
States  after  the  Centennial  Exposition  of  1876. 

A  better  understanding  of  the  trade  conditions  at  the 
beginning  of  the  McKinley  administration  comes  from  a 
review  of  the  commercial  policies  of  the  competing  nations 
in  the  preceding  generation.  What  were  the  possible  meth- 
ods of  promoting  trade  and  how  far  had  the  Americans 
adopted  those  methods  with  success?  Broadly  speaking 
there  were,  aside  from  the  simple  exchange  of  commodities, 
the  following  methods:  ownership  of  merchant  fleets;  plac- 
ing of  foreign  advisers  in  positions  of  influence  in  the  ser- 
vice of  Asiatic  states  where  their  influence  would  tend  to 
divert  purchases;  securing  of  concessions  for  the  operation 
of  telegraphs,  railroads  or  mines ;  and  loaning  money  to  the 
various  governments. 

*  The  statistics  used  for  Cliina  do  not  include  Hongkong.  If  the  latter  trade 
is  added,  it  will  be  found  that  the  China  trade  retained  first  place;  however, 
the   ratio  of  increase  was  greater   for  the  Japan   triidc. 

t  It  is  dilficult  to  appraise  the  exact  share  of  the  Anu>ricans  in  the  Korean 
trade  which  had  reached  a  total  of  a  little  more  than  .i;9,500,000  gold  in  1897. 
A  certain  amount  of  American  produce  was  l)rought  into  Korea  through  Japa- 
nese and  Chinese  sources,  and  the  American  firms  in  Korea  (l(>alt  almost  excUi- 
.sively  with  Japanese  or  Chinese  merchants.  The  Decennial  Reports  of  the 
Chinese  Maritime  Customs  for  the  years  1882-91  show  the  Americans  to  have 
had  hut  2  per  cent  of  the  import  trade  at  Chemulpo  (Jenchuan)  one  of  the 
three  Korean  ports  of  entry.  The  hulk  of  the  Korean  trade  was  divided 
between  the  English  and  the  Japanese  with  the  latter  steadily  gaining  the 
ascendancy. 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  583 

Decline  of  American  Shipping 

The  decline  of  the  American  merchant  marine  which 
became  so  marked  after  the  Civil  War  was  somewhat  re- 
tarded in  Chinese  and  Japanese  waters  by  special  circum- 
stances. 

The  treaties  of  Tientsin  by  increasing  the  number  of 
open  ports  and  opening  the  Yangtze  River  as  far  as  Hankow 
to  foreign  ships  created  a  new  demand  for  vessels  which 
were  more  dependable  than  the  native  junks.  The  dis- 
ordered internal  conditions  of  China  and  Japan  made  it 
especially  convenient  not  only  for  the  foreigners  but  also  for 
native  merchants  to  entrust  their  cargoes  to  insurable  vessels 
under  foreign  flags  which  were  best  able  to  command  the 
respect  of  insurgents  and  most  likely  to  have  their  claims 
paid  in  case  of  loss  by  capture.  These  conditions  coincided 
with  the  improvement  of  steam  navigation.  The  result  was 
the  creation  immediately  of  a  considerable  fleet  of  relatively 
small  steamers  under  foreign  flags  which  obtained  a  very 
large  share  of  the  rapidly  developing  trade.  The  number  of 
these  vessels  was  swollen  in  China  by  the  practice  of  selling 
to  the  Chinese  lorcha  owners  the  right  to  use  a  foreign  flag 
over  their  vessels.  This  was  accomplished  by  an  ingenious 
transaction  in  which  the  technical  ownership  of  the  lorcha 
was  transferred  to  the  foreigner  who  in  turn  gave  back  to 
the  Chinese  a  mortgage  for  the  full  value  of  the  vessel  which 
carried  with  it  the  right  to  operate  the  craft.  The  foreign 
flag  was  then  hoisted  as  an  evidence  of  foreign  ownership 
but  the  foreigner  named  in  the  vessel's  papers  never  ap- 
peared except  in  case  of  trouble  with  either  the  native  or 
foreign  authorities  when  his  technical  ownership  was  suffi- 
cient to  bring  any  legal  troubles  which  might  arise  into  the 
extraterritorial  courts.  These  semi-fraudulent  transac- 
tions were  winked  at  by  the  foreign  authorities  and  led  to 
great  abuses  for  many  years.-  The  lorcha  Arrow  which  gave 
so  much  trouble  to  Viceroy  Yeh  at  Canton  in  1856  had  been 
flying  the  British  flag  under  such  an  arrangement.  There 
was  at  least  one  American  merchant  in  the  two  decades  fol- 


584  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

lowing  the  treaties  of  1858  who  speciahzed  in  this  class  of 
business. 

The  American  mercantile  houses  had  entered  the  coast- 
ing trade  of  China  under  the  transshipment  provisions  of 
the  Gushing  treaty  and  as  a  part  of  the  opium  traffic,  and 
were  well  prepared  to  enter  into  the  new  opportunities 
created  by  the  treaties  of  1858.  Russell  and  Company  or- 
ganized the  Shanghai  Steam  Navigation  Company  and 
within  a  few  years  had  no  less  than  sixteen  steamers  en- 
gaged in  the  coast-wise  and  river  trade.  Four  of  these  had 
been  built  in  the  United  States  and  had  carried  American 
registers.  One  was  built  in  the  United  States  and  sold  to 
a  Japanese  daimio  who  resold  it  to  the  Shanghai  company. 
Six  were  built  in  Scotland  after  1868  and  brought  to  Shang- 
hai under  British  register.  Five  had  been  built  at  Shang- 
hai.^ They  were  operated  under  the  American  flag  under 
consular  "sailing-letters,"  the  flag  being  merely  an  evidence 
of  American  ownership  but  not,  of  course,  of  American 
registry.  Owing  to  the  scarcity  of  American  seamen  and 
masters  in  the  Far  East,  and  still  more  because  Chinese  or 
other  non- American  labor  was  cheaper  it  became  customary 
to  dispense  almost  or  even  entirely  with  American  citizens 
in  the  operation  of  these  vessels,  even  the  master  being  in 
some  cases  an  Englishman.  The  practice  was  at  least  some- 
what irregular  and  could  not  stand  very  close  scrunity  ac- 
cording to  American  maritime  law,  but  it  was  winked  at  by 
the  Shanghai  consulate  and  was  not  unknown  to  the  De- 
partment of  State.  It  is  the  presence  of  these  vessels  and 
the  lorchas  already  described  which  partially  accounts  for 
the  fact  that  American  shipping  in  Chinese  waters  appears 
to  have  retained  its  place  long  after  the  American  mercantile 
marine  had  begun  to  disappear  from  other  foreign  ports. 

Another  factor  in  keeping  the  American  flag  on  the 
Pacific  was  the  establishment  of  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship 
Company  line  in  1867. •*  By  act  of  Congress  (February  16, 
1865)  a  subsidy  which  in  the  course  of  ten  years  amounted 
to  a  little  more  than  $4,500,000  was  granted  in  this  line.  In 
1872  an  additional  vessel  was  authorized  with  an  additional 


AMERICAN  TRADE:  1844-1898  585 

subsidy  of  $500,000  annually,  but  two  years  later  it  was 
discovered  that  a  million  dollars  had  been  spent  to  secure 
this  additional  assistance  from  the  government  and  in  1877 
when  the  original  grant  expired  all  subsidy  was  eliminated. 
This  line  of  steamers  was  originally  intended  to  run  by  way 
of  Honolulu  to  Japan  and  Shanghai,  but  the  company  was 
released  from  the  obligation  to  stop  at  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
and  was  thus  able  to  reduce  the  distance  to  be  sailed  by 
taking  the  great-circle  route.  The  subsidizing  of  this  line 
of  steamers  was  often  referred  to  in  later  years  when  the 
perennial  question  of  ship-subsidies  appeared,  either  as  an 
argument  to  prove  the  value  of  them  or  to  show  their  cor- 
rupting influence.  Probably  more  important  than  the  gov- 
ernment aid  was  the  rapid  development  of  the  Chinese  immi- 
gration, which  was  extremely  profitable.  It  is  a  notable  fact 
that  the  Pacific  Mail  continued  to  operate  its  lines  after  the 
subsidy  was  removed,  and  that  in  later  years  another  com- 
pany, the  Occidental  and  Oriental,  put  on  four  additional 
vessels.  It  ought  also  to  be  mentioned  that  these  latter 
steamers  were  of  British  construction  and  ownership,  being 
merely  leased  to  an  American  company. 

Neither  the  Japanese  nor  the  Chinese  accepted  with 
complacency  the  passing  of  their  coast-wise  trade  into  the 
hands  of  foreigners.  Japan  immediately  entered  upon  a  pro- 
gram of  nautical  education  and  ship-building  and  as  rapidly 
as  possible  entered  both  the  California  and  the  China  trade, 
while  China  also  displayed  an  unwonted  degree  of  enterprise 
which  resulted  in  the  organization,  under  the  patronage  of 
Li  Hung  Chang,  of  the  China  Merchants  Company,  with  a 
view  to  competition  with  the  steamers  under  foreign  flags. 
For  the  assistance  of  this  new  company  a  form  of  subsidy 
was  devised  in  which  the  company  was  permitted  to  trans- 
port the  government  rice  from  the  Yangtze  and  Shanghai  to 
Tientsin  at  rates  in  excess  of  current  freight  rates.  The 
American  vessels  were  unable  to  meet  this  competition,  ac- 
companied as  it  was  by  the  undoubted  anti-foreign  senti- 
ment of  Chinese  merchants  and  government  alike,  and  in 
1877  Russell  and  Company  sold  its  fleet  to  the  China  Mer- 


586  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

chants.^  During  the  Franco-Chinese  War  the  entire  China 
Merchants  fleet  was  resold  to  Russell  and  Company  but 
after  the  war  the  Chinese  forced  the  return  of  the  fleet  by 
declining  to  continue  the  rice-freights  so  long  as  the  steam- 
ers remained  in  foreign  hands.  The  American  flag  then 
practically  disappeared  from  the  merchant  marine  in 
Chinese  waters.  The  significant  facts  are  that  this  fleet  had 
never  been  under  American  registry  and  had  never  complied 
with  the  American  law  as  to  American  construction  and  op- 
eration ;  that  at  the  time  when  the  American  fleet  was  sold 
to  the  Chinese  in  1877  a  British  fleet  of  nine  steamers  was 
already  in  successful  operation  up  the  Yangtze  and  along  the 
coast;  and  that  notwithstanding  the  use  of  the  American 
flag  in  the  trans-Pacific  trade,  the  total  volume  of  American 
trade  with  China  does  not  appear  to  have  been  greatly  bene- 
fited by  it.  The  greater  part  of  the  freight  from  China  to 
America  was  carried  in  foreign  vessels — after  the  opening  of 
the  Suez  Canal  by  way  of  the  Mediterranean  and  across  the 
Atlantic.  While  the  American  fleet  was  of  some  unques- 
tioned advantage  to  the  American  traders,  the  causes  of  the 
relative  unimportance  of  the  Far  Eastern  trade  of  the 
United  States  in  the  last  forty  years  of  the  century  lie  much 
deeper  than  in  a  declining  merchant  marine. 

Foreign  Advisers  in  China,  Japan  and  Korea 

The  most  remarkable  instance  of  the  use  of  foreign 
advisers  was  in  the  Foreign  Inspectorate  of  Chinese  Mari- 
time Customs.  As  already  shown  the  Chinese  Customs 
came  under  the  direction  of  Messrs.  Wade,  Lay  and  Hart, 
respectively,  not  so  much  because  British  claims  were  being 
urged,  as  because  the  Americans  were  simply  without  com- 
petent candidates.  It  is  indeed  fortunate  for  the  Maritime 
Customs  that  Americans  did  not  come  into  control  of  it 
for  in  all  probability,  had  they  done  so,  it  would  have  been 
made  the  victim  of  the  spoils  system  of  American  politics.* 

♦William  II.  Seward,  beset  with  offlce-seekers  at  the  beginning  of  the  Lin- 
coln administration,  was  under  the  impression  that  he  had  the  official  right 
to  dictate  appointments   to   the   Chinese    Maritime    Customs.      One    of   his    first 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  587 

The  first  experience  of  the  Chinese  Government  with 
American  assistants  was  in  the  employment  of  Ward  and 
Burgevine  in  the  suppression  of  the  Taiping  RebeUion. 
Ward  rendered  an  honorable  service,  but  Burgevine  left  a 
stain  upon  his  country's  reputation.  The  purchase  of  the 
Lay-Osborne  Flotilla  in  England  led  to  a  new  interest  in 
coal  mines,  the  product  of  which  would  be  so  much  in  de- 
mand for  steam  navigation  of  government  vessels.  Raphael 
Pumpelly,  an  American  who  had  just  completed  similar 
geological  surveys  for  the  Japanese  Government,  was  in- 
vited to  make  a  report  on  Chinese  coal  resources.  This  might 
have  led  to  an  early  development  of  Chinese  mines  under 
American  supervision  had  not  the  Lay-Osborne  Flotilla  be- 
come such  a  source  of  embarrassment  to  the  Tsung-li 
Yamen.  The  return  of  this  fleet  not  only  put  an  end  to  the 
interest  in  coal  mines  but  also  made  the  government  wary 
of  foreign  advisers  like  Mr.  Lay.*^ 

Following  the  end  of  the  Taiping  Rebellion  several  Eng- 
lishmen and  Frenchmen  from  Ward's  or  Gordon's  armies 
entered  Chinese  service,  especially  in  the  supervision  of 
arsenals.  No  Americans  were  similarly  employed  for  there 
were  no  competent  candidates.  The  next  important  post 
in  the  Chinese  service  for  which  an  American  was  a  possible 
candidate  was  in  connection  with  the  Chinese  navy  which 
Li  Hung  Chang  had  begun  to  develop  about  1880.  Com- 
modore Shufeldt  thought  that  he  was  deprived  of  the  posi- 
tion through  the  intrigues  of  other  governments.  There 
may  have  been  a  measure  of  truth  in  Shufeldt's  suspicions, 
but  it  seems  hardly  probable  that  the  man  who  wrote,  even 
in  confidence,  the  famous.  Sargent  letter,  could  have  ren- 
dered a  very  effective  service  to  either  the  Chinese  or  his  own 
countrymen.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  in  the  employment 
of  foreign  advisers  for  China  the  American  interests  were 
not  well  represented,  but  they  would  appear  to  have  had  as 
much  representation  as  they  deserved  or  as  was  warranted 
by  the  proportion  of  American  to  the  total  foreign  trade  of 

official  communications  to  the  American  reprcsi'ntative  in  Cliina  was  to  ask 
him  to  replace  an  American  then  in  the  Customs  service  with  one  of  Seward's 
political    friends. 


588  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

China,  The  failure  of  Russell  and  Company  in  1891  greatly 
prejudiced  the  Chinese  against  Americans.  The  Chinese 
Government  lost  heavily  in  this  failure  and  Li  Hung  Chang 
is  reported  to  have  stated  shortly  after  the  failure,  which 
came  at  a  time  when  the  immigration  question  was  produc- 
ing the  maximum  amount  of  trouble,  that  he  would  never 
again  employ  an  American  for  any  purpose. 

Japan  turned  freely  to  America  for  advice  and  was 
fortunate  in  securing  a  large  number  of  Americans  of  excel- 
lent ability  and  character.^  However,  the  greater  number 
of  the  Americans  in  Japanese  service  were  employed  either 
in  the  development  of  the  school  system  or  otherwise  in 
positions  which  were  only  remotely  related  to  trade.  Japan 
turned  to  the  United  States  for  assistance  in  building  her 
new  navy  after  the  Restoration,  and  even  earlier  had  pur- 
chased several  American-built  naval  vessels,  but  in  such 
matters  the  Americans  were  at  an  obvious  disadvantage 
because  the  American  navy  was  itself  rapidly  declining,  and 
American  ship-yards  had  already  lost  their  world-wide  su- 
premacy. The  Japanese  orders  for  naval  vessels  during  the 
American  Civil  War  appear  to  have  been  handled  in  a  way 
which  could  not  lead  to  extended  future  orders.  Japanese 
interests  were  badly  served.  However  the  rapid  increase  of 
American  trade  with  Japan  may  be  somewhat  attributed  to 
the  influence  of  American  advisers  as  well  as  to  the  influence 
of  the  returned  Japanese  students,  so  many  of  whom  in  the 
seventies  and  eighties  were  being  educated  in  the  United 
States. 

The  indifference  of  the  American  Government  to  the 
desires  of  Korea  for  American  advisers  has  already  been 
noted,  and  the  reason  for  it  indicated.  Korea  was  an  im- 
poverished country  with  little  money  to  spend  for  any 
purpose  and  a  preponderance  of  American  influence  in 
Korea  was  more  embarrassing  than  profitable. 

Foreign  Concessions  at  the  Treaty  Ports 

The  word  concession  is  used  loosely  in-  two  different 
senses  meaning  in  the  one  case  the  foreign  settlement  at  a 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  589 

treaty  port,  and  in  the  other  a  business  privilege  or  contract 
granted  to  foreigners  by  the  government. 

In  the  foreign  settlements  established  after  the  treaties 
of  Tientsin  in  China  the  Americans  came  out  badly.  While 
the  American  minister  was  "junketing"  through  Europe  to 
the  Orient  and  back  in  1859  and  1860 — the  term  accurately 
describes  the  conditions  under  which  John  E.  Ward  assumed 
and  discharged  the  duties  of  his  office — there  was  no  one 
to  uphold  the  principles  of  the  international  foreign  settle- 
ment as  they  had  been  worked  out  at  Shanghai  in  1853-4. 
Unopposed,  the  British  reverted  to  the  plan  which  Hum- 
phrey Marshall  had  overthrown,  and  established  at  Hankow 
and  Canton  British  settlements  in  which  the  British  Gov- 
ernment leased  the  land  from  China  and  then  issued  titles 
to  applicants  in  the  form  of  sub-leases.  Thus  disappeared 
even  the  safe-guard  to  Chinese  sovereignty  which  had  ap- 
peared in  the  earliest  Shanghai  land  regulations  where  the 
title,  although  registered  at  the  British  consulate,  was  actu- 
ally issued  by  the  taotai.  There  was  no  disposition  on  the 
part  of  the  Chinese  to  discriminate  against  the  Americans 
and  when  Tientsin  was  opened  a  lease  for  a  settlement 
was  actually  issued  to  the  American  consul,  but  it  was  never 
approved  by  his  government.  At  the  new  ports  the  Ameri- 
cans were  quite  satisfied  with  their  allotments  of  land,  but 
the  fact  remains  that  the  idea  of  an  international  settlement 
had  been  superseded  by  that  of  a  series  of  national  settle- 
ments such  as  the  British  and  French  had  originally  contem- 
plated. The  effect  of  this  change  was  to  place  the  desirable 
water-front  or  mercantile  property  at  each  newly  opened 
treaty  port  under  the  control  of  some  power  other  than 
China  and  to  make  the  Americans  tenants  of  some  European 
nation.  The  result  was  that  when  in  later  years  new  Ameri- 
can firms  appeared  in  China  the  most  desirable  locations 
were  all  preempted  and  the  Americans  had  to  take  what  was 
left.  Prospective  American  interests  in  1858-61  suffered  in 
this  respect  in  China  because  they  were  indolently  repre- 
sented. In  1862  Burlingame  found  that  both  the  French 
and  the  British  residents  were  disposed  to  assume  that  the 


590  AINIERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

leases  of  land  in  the  various  foreign  settlements  were  equiv- 
alent to  cession  of  territory.  In  1862  France  withdrew  from 
the  international  settlement  at  Shanghai.  In  June,  1863, 
the  Chinese  Government  formally  granted  permission  to  the 
Americans  to  erect  residences,  business  houses  and  go-downs 
at  Hong-kew,^  across  Soochow  Creek  and  outside  the  legal 
limits  of  the  settlement,  but  a  few  months  later  the  Ameri- 
cans at  Hong-kew,  some  of  whom  had  established  themselves 
there  many  years  before  without  formal  permission,  heartily 
agreed  to  the  merging  of  the  new  area  in  the  International 
Settlement  under  new  Land  Regulations.  The  French,  how- 
ever, stood  aloof. 

In  the  treaty  ports  in  Japan,  and  later  in  Korea,  different 
conditions  prevailed  from  the  outset.  The  Japanese  never 
relinquished  control  of  their  ports,  and  although  the  foreign- 
ers virtually  maintained  their  own  municipal  government 
in  the  open  ports  no  rights  discriminating  in  favor  of  any 
nation  were  granted.  In  Korea  the  Americans  were  first  on 
the  ground,  after  the  Japanese  and  obtained  preferred  build- 
ing locations,  some  of  which  were  subsequently  given  up 
merely  because  there  was  no  reason  for  holding  them. 

Telegraphs  and  Cables 

Americans  were  the  first  to  project  the  plan  of  trans- 
Pacific  telegraph  communications.  The  first  proposal  was 
for  a  line  northward  through  British  Columbia,  thence  by 
way  of  Alaska  and  the  Aleutian  Islands,  down  the  coast  of 
Siberia  to  the  mouth  of  the  Amur.^  It  was  hoped  by  thus 
utilizing  land  lines  for  the  greater  part  of  the  way  to  avoid 
the  difficulties  which  were  encountered  with  the  first  sub- 
marine cables.  During  the  Civil  War  this  project  was 
being  urged.  The  necessary  rights  to  cross  British  and 
Russian  territory  were  secured  and  Congress  voted  assist- 
ance. The  project  collapsed  upon  the  completion  and  suc- 
cessful operation  of  the  second  Atlantic  cable.  In  1865 
Anson  Burlingame  secured  a  verbal  agreement  from  the 
Tsung-li  Yamen  that  China  would  grant  permission  to  the 


AMERICAN  TRADE:  1844-1898  591 

East  India  Telegraph  Company  of  New  York  to  lay  cables 
along  the  coast  of  China  as  far  south  as  Hongkong.^"  The 
line  thus  projected  would  be  linked  up  to  the  Russian  tele- 
graph already  completed  to  Kiatka,  800  miles  from  Peking, 
to  the  Russo-American  line  by  way  of  Kamtchatka  and 
Alaska,  and  at  Hongkong  to  a  proposed  British  line  from 
India.  In  order  to  bring  about  an  amicable  adjustment  of 
the  rival  claimants  for  this  important  concession  it  had 
become  necessary  for  the  Americans  to  agree  to  make  the 
company  international  in  character  by  admitting  both  Brit- 
ish and  French  share-holders.  But  the  East  India  Telegraph 
Company  does  not  appear  ever  to  have  passed  beyond  the 
promotion  stage.  With  the  collapse  of  the  Russo-American 
company  it  also  disappeared.  Indeed  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  such  an  extensive  plan  could  ever  have  been  realized  by 
Americans  without  generous  assistance  from  abroad,  al- 
though the  Russo-American  company,  which  was  almost 
identical  with  the  Western  Union  Telegraph  company,  spent 
$3,000,000  before  abandoning  the  northern  line. 

A  part  of  the  plan  thus  first  promoted  by  Americans  was 
immediately  taken  up  by  the  Danes,  who  occupied  an  espe- 
cially favorable  political  position  because  they  were  friendly 
with  both  Russia  and  Great  Britain.  The  Great  Northern 
Telegraph  Company  (Danish)  supported  by  Sir  Thomas 
Wade  at  Peking  secured  in  1870  the  privilege  of  laying  a 
cable  along  the  coast  northward  from  Hongkong  to  Shanghai 
with  the  understanding  that  the  cable  ends  at  the  various 
ports  were  to  be  carried  to  hulks  moored  in  the  ports  and  not 
to  be  landed.  The  entrance  of  the  Danish  Company  marked 
the  disappearance  of  American  interests  from  the  telegraph 
situation  in  China.  However  the  Americans  gave  the  most 
cordial  support  to  the  Great  Northern  Telegraph  Company 
and  assisted  in  its  promotion  in  a  multitude  of  ways.  In 
1874,  when  the  military  value  of  the  telegraph  was  revealed 
to  the  Chinese  at  the  time  of  the  threatened  Japanese  at- 
tack on  Formosa  M.  M.  De  Lano,  the  American  consul  at 
Foochow,  represented  the  Danish  interests  and  conducted  a 
large  part  of  the  negotiations  by  which  the  Great  Northern 


592  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Telegraph  Company  secured  the  rights  not  only  for  a  cable 
to  Formosa  but  also  for  certain  land  lines  in  Fukien.^^  At 
about  the  same  time  the  Woosung  Railway  Company 
granted  permission  to  the  Danes  to  land  their  line  at  Woo- 
sung and  carry  it  to  the  international  settlement  at  Shanghai 
over  the  property  recently  purchased  for  the  railway. 

The  Chinese,  however,  viewed  the  extension  of  tele- 
graphs with  timidity.  Not  only  were  there  objections  from 
the  superstitious  people  and  geomancers  who  urged  that  the 
wires  w^ould  disturb  the  jung-shui,  but  the  government  also 
feared  that  it  would  be  unable  to  protect  the  lines  and  that 
their  injury  by  either  thieves  or  the  superstitious  would 
result  in  the  inevitable  claim  for  damages  and  perhaps  for 
further  demands  by  the  treaty  powers.  The  Woosung- 
Shanghai  line  was  ordered  removed,  the  cable  to  Formosa 
was  postponed,  and  the  government  purchased  the  land  lines 
in  Fukien  and  then  destroyed  them.  Before  1875  the 
Chinese  Government  had  adopted  the  policy  also  in  opera- 
tion in  Japan  of  excluding  foreigners  from  the  ownership 
or  control  of  both  telegraphs  and  railroads.  The  difference 
between  China  and  Japan  at  this  point  was  that  while  the 
Japanese  were  earnestly  seeking  to  perfect  themselves  in  the 
skill  necessary  for  the  successful  operation  of  such  utilities, 
sending  multitudes  of  students  abroad  and  employing  many 
foreign  teachers  at  home,  the  Chinese  Government  was  pur- 
suing its  customary  policy  of  advancing  to  meet  no  problem 
and  solving  each  one  as  much  by  denial  and  evasion  as 
possible. 

Military  necessity,  aided  by  the  enlightened  convictions 
of  Li  Hung  Chang  and  a  few  other  military  officials,  was 
nevertheless  slowly  crowding  the  Chinese  Government  to 
take  action  and  in  1881,  while  retaining  Chinese  ownership 
of  the  lines,  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  gave  to  the  Great  Northern 
Telegraph  Company  the  contract  for  the  construction  of 
some  new  land  lines  in  the  vicinity  of  Tientsin  and  Peking. 
The  American  Government  viewed  this  advance  of  Danish 
interests  without  dissatisfaction,  although  Secretary  of  State 
Fish  (March  4,  1875)  had  already  expressed  disapproval  of 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  593 

the  evident  monopolistic  character  of  the  Danish  intentions. 
But  the  Americans  became  alarmed  at  the  advance  of  the 
Great  Northern  Telegraph  Company  when  it  became  known 
that  Li  Hung  Chang  had  negotiated  with  the  company  for  a 
monopoly  of  the  cable  lines.  According  to  the  reported  con- 
tract any  American  company  would  be  excluded  for  twenty 
years  from  the  right  even  to  land  a  cable  at  a  Chinese  port. 
The  American  Government  protested  energetically 
against  the  ratification  of  this  contract  but  in  vain.  Prince 
Kung  officially  stated  that  whenever  an  American  company 
might  desire  to  lay  a  cable  between  Japan  and  China  an 
arrangement  would  be  made  ''which  shall  not  disappoint  the 
American  company  in  the  least  degree."^-  This  answer 
seemed  at  the  time  to  be  reasonably  satisfactory  but  in  fact 
it  was  not,  for  the  Great  Northern  Telegraph  Company 
made  a  secret  contract  with  the  Japanese  Government  which 
secured  a  monopoly  of  cables  westward  from  Japan.  The 
precise  form  of  Prince  Kung's  statement  leaves  one  wonder- 
ing whether  he  knew  of  the  monopoly  in  Japan  or  whether 
the  wording  of  the  statement  had  been  suggested  to  him  by 
those  who  did.  At  any  rate  the  Americans  were  now  com- 
pletely excluded  from  carrying  a  trans-Pacific  cable  to 
China  by  way  of  Japan  which  was  the  natural  route.  More 
alertness  in  Tokio  might  have  prevented  the  consummation 
of  an  arrangement  so  disadvantageous  to  Americans.* 

The  First  Railv^ays 

Even  before  the  Restoration  was  accomplished  both  the 
Japanese  and  the  foreigners  became  interested  in  railroads 
in  Japan.  British,  French  and  American  interests  were 
competing  for  privileges.  While  United  States  Minister 
Van  Valkenburgh  was  absent  from  Yedo  at  the  opening  of 
Osaka  in  January,  1868,  A.  L.  C.  Portman,  temporarily  act- 

*Wtien  in  the  nineties  tlie  American  Government  souglit  to  promote  the 
laying  of  a  trans-Pacific  cable,  Japan  was  more  than  willing  to  cooperate  in  a 
Japanese-American  cable,  but  was  prevented  by  the  Danish  monopoly  from 
granting  to  Americans  the  right  to  land  in  Japan  or  Formosa  cables  which 
would  connect  either  with  China  or  Luzon.  The  Americans  were  therefore 
forced  to  lay  the  trans-Pacific  cable  by  way  of  Guam  with  extensions  to  Japan 
and  China. 


594  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

ing  as  charge  at  Yedo,  apparently  without  any  instructions 
either  from  his  superior  or  from  Washington,  and  also  with- 
out any  definite  financial  support,  secured  from  the  Yedo 
government  (January  16,  1868)  a  concession  for  a  railroad 
from  Yokohama  to  Tokio  to  be  built  and  owned  by  Ameri- 
cans. The  contract  provided  that  the  government  would 
have  the  right  to  purchase  the  road  at  any  time  at  fifty  per 
cent  above  its  cost.  The  new  government,  however,  refused 
to  ratify  the  contract,  and  immediately  adopted  the  policy 
of  keeping  all  railroads  as  well  as  telegraph  lines  exclusively 
in  Japanese  ownership.  Shortly  afterwards  H.  N.  Lay,  of 
Lay-Osborne  Flotilla  fame,  appeared  in  Japan  as  the  agent 
of  British  firms  which  desired  to  build  railroads.  An  agree- 
ment was  reached  as  a  result  of  which  Mr.  Lay  proceeded  to 
London  and  advertised  (April  23,  1870)  a  loan  of  £100,000 
to  be  made  to  Japan  for  the  construction  of  a  railroad.  Lay 
stated  that  the  receipts  of  the  road  as  well  as  the  customs  of 
all  the  treaty  ports  would  be  pledged  for  payment.  The 
Japanese  repudiated  this  statement  of  Mr.  Lay  who  was 
again  betraying  his  inclination  to  misinterpret  and  exceed 
his  instructions  just  as  he  had  done  in  the  purchase  of  the 
flotilla  for  China  eight  years  before.  The  terms  of  the  loan 
were  changed,  but  British  capital  was  secured  and  British 
engineers  were  engaged.  The  line  from  Yokohama  to  Tokio 
was  opened  in  the  summer  of  1872,  and  soon  construction 
was  begun  on  a  line  from  Osaka  to  Kioto.  These  two  seg- 
ments became  part  of  a  main  trunk  line  from  Tokio  to  Kobe 
which  was  rapidly  pushed  to  completion. 

The  first  proposal  for  a  railway  in  China  came  from  Eng- 
lish and  American  merchants.^  ^  In  1863  the  exigencies  of 
the  closing  struggles  with  the  Taipings  were  believed  to 
afford  a  sufficient  occasion  for  demonstrating  to  the  Chinese 
the  utility  of  steam  transportation.  A  petition  for  permis- 
sion to  build  a  line  from  Shanghai  to  Soochow  signed  by 
twenty-seven  foreign  firms,  mostly  British,  was  presented  to 
Li  Hung  Chang,  who  was  then  in  general  charge  of  the  mili- 
tary operations,  in  the  capacity  of  Imperial  Commissioner 
and  Governor  of  Kiangsu.    Li  Hung  Chang  with  the  embar- 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  595 

rassments  of  the  Lay-Osborne  Flotilla  and  the  defection  of 
Buroevine  fresh  in  his  mind,  replied  that  railways  could  be  a 
benefit  to  China  only  if  they  were  exclusively  in  the  hands 
of  the  Chinese,  and  he  declined  even  to  present  the  petition 
to  Peking.  A  few  months  later  Sir  MacDonald  Stephenson 
came  to  China,  at  the  suggestion  of  British  merchants,  and 
made  a  somewhat  superficial  survey  of  possible  railway 
routes. 

The  next  effort  to  introduce  railway  building  into  the 
empire  was  stimulated  by  the  construction  of  the  Yoko- 
hama-Tokio  line.  At  the  port  of  Shanghai  there  was  a 
transportation  problem  somewhat  like  that  at  Tokio.  The 
foreign  shipping  found  it  convenient  to  anchor  in  the  Woo- 
sung  River  a  dozen  miles  below  the  foreign  settlement.  A 
railroad  from  the  anchorage  to  the  city  would  serve  a  pur- 
pose similar  to  the  Yokohama-Tokio  line.  Oliver  B.  Brad- 
ford, American  vice  consul  at  Shanghai,  with  the  approval  of 
George  F.  Sew^ard,  the  consul  general,  and  of  United  States 
Minister  Low  at  Peking,  as  well  as  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
Department  of  State,  undertook  to  promote  the  construc- 
tion of  a  narrow  gauge  railroad  from  the  anchorage  at  Woo- 
sung  to  Shanghai.^* 

Three  obstacles  appeared.  At  the  request  of  the  Chinese 
Government  which  had  become  alarmed  at  the  prospective 
demands  of  foreigners  for  railroad  privileges  in  the  ap- 
proaching revision  of  the  treaties,  Anson  Burlingame  had 
secured  from  the  United  States  in  the  treaty  of  1868  the 
stipulation  (Article  8)  that  the  United  States  "do  hereby 
freely  disclaim  and  disavow  any  intention  or  right  to  inter- 
vene in  the  domestic  administration  of  China  in  regard  to 
the  construction  of  railroads,  telegraphs  or  other  material 
improvements."  The  second  obstacle  was  that  the  Chinese 
had  assumed  the  policy  of  reserving  all  railroad  rights  to 
themselves.  Third,  Bradford  had  no  adequate  financial 
backing.  He  was  purely  a  promoter.  The  first  obstacle  was 
ignored,  the  second  was  met  by  fraud  and  the  third,  after 
vain  attempts  to  interest  American  capital  which  at  that 
time  was  not  even  equal  to  financing  railways  in  America, 


596  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

was  overcome  by  admitting  a  preponderating  British  inter- 
est into  the  company. 

The  "Woosung  Road  Company"  was  formed  by  Brad- 
ford to  purchase  land  for  a  "horse-road."  Shortly  after- 
wards the  interests  of  this  company  were  transferred  to  the 
"Woosung  Tramway  Company"  (in  the  Chinese  text  of  the 
transfer:  the  "Woosung  Carriage-Road  Company")  and 
land  was  purchased  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  a  carriage 
road.  When  title  to  the  land  had  been  secured,  grading  was 
begun  and  rails  were  laid  with  the  knowledge,  of  course,  yet 
without  the  approval  of  the  local  Chinese  officials.  The 
first  official  information  received  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment as  to  the  true  nature  of  the  undertaking  was  a  request 
to  the  customs  to  admit  duty-free  the  locomotive  and  cars 
which  had  arrived  from  England.  Notwithstanding  the  pro- 
tests of  the  government  as  well  as  of  the  local  Chinese  land 
holders  the  road  was  partially  opened  for  traffic  June  30, 
1876,  and  continued  in  operation  for  a  few  weeks  until  at  the 
time  of  the  Chefoo  agreement  the  government  secured  from 
Sir  Thomas  Wade  a  stipulation  that  China  should  have  the 
privilege  of  buying  the  line  from  the  company  which  was 
now  a  British  concern.  By  order  of  Wade  the  operation  of 
trains  was  temporarily  discontinued  and  when  the  Chinese 
had  completed  the  purchase  of  the  line,  the  rails  were  torn 
up  and  the  entire  equipment  shipped  to  Formosa.  The 
immediate  cause  of  the  failure  of  the  enterprise  was  the 
killing  of  a  Chinese  by  a  train,  and  the  opposition  of  the 
local  people,  but  back  of  this  lay  the  belief  of  the  Chinese 
officials  that  if  they  were  to  permit  such  a  high-handed 
scheme  to  succeed  a  precedent  would  be  established  which 
would  upset  entirely  the  Chinese  policy  of  controlling  its 
own  railway  development.* 

*"I  have  been  to  much  trouble  to  ascertain  from  the  Chinese  officials  their 
reasons,  etc.,  for  their  action  in  the  premises  and  I  submit  the  following,  as 
near  their  language  as  possible.  They  declare  that  '.  .  .  the  removal  of  the 
Woosung  Hallway  is  being  carried  out  solely  in  consequence  of  the  political 
necessity  of  tlie  act.  That  to  allow  it  to  remain  where  it  is  would  utterly 
stultify  the  action  of  tb(>  authorities  and  afford  the  strcmgest  encouragement 
to  similar  invasions  of  Chinese  territory  and  of  lier  independence  as  a  nation.' 
By  a  general  consensus  of  opinion,  both  of  the  Chinese  ofticials  and  Chinese 
merchants,  the  net  result  of  the  scheme  carried  out  by  the  Woosung  Road  Com- 
pany  is    to    brand    all    railway    schemes    (and    even    ordinary    road-making    pro- 


AMERICAN  TRADE:  1844-1898  597 

The  Woosung  Railway  episode  has  been  given  at  some 
length  because  it  serves  to  throw  light  on  the  contemporary 
conditions  of  American  trade.  American  capital  was  not 
seeking  an  entrance  into  either  Japan  or  China  in  this 
period,  while  British  capital  was  eager  for  opportuities. 
The  Americans  who  stand  forth  in  the  trade  history  of  this 
period  were  adventurers  and  promoters  lacking  both  the 
character  and  the  business  connections  which  would  have 
been  necessary  to  establish  and  carry  through  large  under- 
takings. They  were  utterly  unlike  the  earlier  Americans 
who  by  just,  generous  and  conciliatory  business  methods 
won  the  confidence  of  Chinese  merchants  in  the  old  pre- 
treaty  days  at  Canton.  Now,  while  British  and  Continental 
merchants  and  capitalists  were  appearing  in  China  with 
ample  resources  and  respectable  personnel,  prepared  to 
make  investments,  loan  money,  or  otherwise  meet  the  needs 
of  the  situation,  the  American  merchants  were  steadily 
losing  ground  and  the  American  consulates  reeked  with 
malodorous  scandals.  Americans  were  not  prepared  to  do 
business  in  the  East  on  a  large  scale.  Both  citizens  and  capi- 
tal could  find  more  satisfactory  returns  at  home  within  the 
borders  of  the  United  States. 

Railway  Construction  in  China  after  1885 

Railway  construction  in  China  again  became  a  mooted 
question  in  1885,  at  the  close  of  the  Franco-Chinese  War. 
In  1886  there  were  gathered  at  Tientsin  and  Peking  the 
largest  number  of  "concession-hunters"  yet  seen  in  China, 
A  German  syndicate  had  sent  representatives  who  were 
reported  to  be  seeking  to  loan  to  China  £35,000,000  for  rail- 

posals)  with  suspicion  and  dislike  in  the  eyes  of  the  Chinese  officials  and  the 
government  itself,  and  to  tend  to  retard  for  several  years  their  introduction 
into  the  empire.  This  feeling  has  no  connection  with  the  merits  of  such  enter- 
prises, which  the  Chinese  do  to  a  considerahle  extent  both  understand  and 
appreciate,  but  it  is  due  wholly  and  solely  to  the  deceit  and  fraud  practiced 
at  the  commencement  by  the  original  promoters  of  the  scheme."  (Consul 
General  (i.  Wiley  Wells  to  Department  of  State,  November  20,  1877.'=) 

The  excerpt  is  from  a  report  on  the  moral  delinquencies  of  the  American 
consulate  at  Shanghai  which  resulted  in  an  exhaustive  investigation  by  the 
Department  of  State,  a  Committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  then 
the  proposed  impeachment  of  George  F.  Seward.  One  of  the  indictments 
against  Bradford  was  his  connection  with  the  railroad.  Both  Bradford  and 
Seward    were    removed    from    office. 


598  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

way  construction.  A  French  syndicate,  encouraged  by  the 
clause  in  the  recent  French  treaty  of  1885  which  stipulated 
that  if  China  decided  to  build  railways  the  French  Govern- 
ment would  give  to  China  every  facility  to  procure  in  France 
the  personnel  she  might  need,  was  established  at  Tientsin, in 
a  $100,000  mansion  with  a  liberal  expense  account  for  enter- 
taining. Meanwhile  there  appeared  the  Kaiping  Railway 
Company,  a  Chinese  concern  with  Wu  Ting  Fang  as  direc- 
tor, Li  Hung  Chang  as  patron,  and  with  construction  already 
started  on  a  line  in  the  direction  of  the  Kaiping  coal  mines. 
This  company  had  close  British  affiliations.  It  was  espe- 
cially favored  by  the  Chinese  who  were  now  clearly  deter- 
mined to  retain  control  not  merely  of  the  ownership  but  of 
the  construction  of  whatever  railways  might  be  built. 

The  American  Government  was  represented  by  Charles 
Denby  of  Indiana  who,  before  coming  to  China  in  1885  as 
minister,  had  been  prominently  identified  with  railroad 
building  in  the  United  States.  Denby  was  keenly  and  intel- 
ligently interested  in  the  Chinese  transportation  problem 
which  was  in  some  respects  so  similar  to  that  which  the 
American  people  had  been  solving  for  the  last  quarter  cen- 
tury. He  was  also  convinced  that  the  time  had  come  when 
American  interests  in  China  ought  to  be  pushed  aggressively. 
General  James  H.  Wilson, ^'^  an  American  engineer,  arrived 
about  the  same  time  and  no  opportunity  was  lost  to  present 
to  the  Chinese  the  superiorities  of  American  methods  of  rail- 
way construction  and  operation.  A  model  of  American  rail- 
way track  and  a  small  train  operated  by  clock-work  was  even 
set  up  within  the  palace  grounds  for  the  amusement  of  the 
boy  Emperor  and  the  Court.  The  French  syndicate,  how- 
ever, was  quick  to  offset  this  advantage  by  the  gift  of  even 
more  elaborate  equipment  of  French  design.  Denby's  advice 
was  freely  drawn  upon,  especially  after  he  expressed  his 
sympathy  with  the  Chinese  in  their  desire  to  retain  control 
of  their  railways.* 

American  interests,  operating  through  Russell  and  Com- 

*The  chartor  for  the  Kaiping  Railway  Company,  which  in  1887  hocanio  the 
China  Railway  Company,  was  based  upon  a  model  charter  for  a  stock  coinpaiij 
supplied  by  lienby. 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  599 

pany,  bid  for  the  construction  of  a  line  from  Tientsin  to 
Taku  which  would  actually  become  a  link  in  the  projected 
Tientsin-Kaiping  road,  but  American  capitalists  were  un- 
willing to  advance  a  loan  for  the  work  and  the  contract  went 
to  the  Kaiping  Company.  At  about  the  same  time  the 
Americans  made  a  bid  for  the  construction  of  80  miles  of 
road  in  Formosa,  but  were  under-bid  by  a  British  company 
which  secured  the  contract. 

The  year  1887  was  one  of  great  activity  among  the 
foreign  investors.  A  Chinese- American  bank  was  projected. 
This  was  supported  by  the  so-called  Philadelphia  Syndicate 
and  received  the  approval  of  Li  Hung  Chang.  It  was  pro- 
posed to  loan  the  government  80,000,000  taels  to  finance 
railway  construction,  and  to  organize  a  mint.  The  same 
interests  also  secured  extensive  concessions  including  the 
right  to  install  telephone  systems.  The  Yamen  refused  to 
ratify  the  agreement,  and  although  efforts  were  made  subse- 
quently to  revive  the  scheme  nothing  ever  came  of  it.  It  is 
quite  probable  that  it  had  been  from  the  outset  more  a 
promoters'  than  an  investors'  proposition. 

The  French  syndicate  likewise  failed  to  secure  the  desired 
concessions  and  was  diverted  to  the  construction  of  fortifica- 
tions at  Port  Arthur.  A  considerable  amount  of  American 
equipment  was  used  in  the  Tientsin-Kaiping  line  which  was 
opened  in  1888,  but  it  could  not  be  claimed  that  Americans 
had  accomplished  much  towards  regaining  the  commercial 
position  in  China  which  they  had  occupied  in  1860.  The 
causes  of  their  failure  had  been  lack  of  capital  and  inade- 
quate authoritative  representation  in  China  able  to  conclude 
business  agreements. 

The  close  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War  marked  the  begin- 
ning of  an  entirely  new  phase  of  China's  financial  relations 
with  the  West.  Before  1894  the  Chinese  Government  had 
been  proceeding  on  the  principle  of  borrowing  as  little  as  pos- 
sible and  retaining  complete  control  of  both  mines  and  rail- 
roads. The  policy  had  been  successful  in  a  purely  negative 
way.  China  became  debtor  to  foreigners  to  only  a  slight 
extent,  but  meanwhile  Chinese  capital  had  not  been  forth- 


600  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

coming  to  build  railways.  The  Chinese  investors  distrusted 
Chinese  stock  companies  and  they  had  no  relish  for  lending 
money  to  their  government.  As  a  matter  of  fact  current 
rates  of  interest  among  the  Chinese  were  very  much  higher 
than  the  rates  at  which  money  could  be  borrowed  from 
abroad;  it  was  only  a  question  of  time  in  1894  when  China 
would  be  forced  into  the  foreign  markets.  The  expenses  of 
the  war  with  Japan  rather  than  the  need  for  railways  cre- 
ated the  immediate  necessity.  At  the  close  of  the  war  China 
was  indebted  to  foreign  money  lenders  to  the  extent  of 
£7,000,000  secured  by  the  customs.  It  then  became  neces- 
sary to  borrow  200,000,000  taels  to  pay  the  indemnity  to 
Japan.  American  bankers  offered  to  make  all  or  part  of  this 
loan  but  their  competitors  offered  more  favorable  terms. 
About  £16,000,000  were  supplied  by  Russian  and  French 
banks  with  interest  at  4  per  cent  under  a  guaranty  by  the 
Russian  Government,  and  an  equal  amount  by  a  British- 
German  syndicate  at  5  per  cent,  secured  by  customs  receipts. 
China  now  entered  upon  the  most  discouraging  and  dis- 
astrous phase  of  her  foreign  relations.  Having  been  more 
or  less  estranged  from  the  United  States  by  both  the  immi- 
gration and  the  Korean  matters,  and  having  been  practically 
deserted  by  Great  Britain  in  the  war  with  Japan,  the 
Chinese  Government,  led  by  Li  Hung  Chang,  turned  to 
Russia.  Possibly  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  Li 
Hung  Chang  had  decided  to  enter  European  politics  aggres- 
sively where  Japan  had  been  operating  so  successfully  for  a 
decade.  But  China,  unlike  Japan,  was  unprepared  to  take 
such  a  step.  The  Empire  now  had  to  gather  the  bitter  har- 
vest of  a  half-century  of  reactionary,  foreign-hating  policy 
which  had  been  characterized  by  arrogance  and  stupidity. 
Even  Li  Hung  Chang,  China's  most  progressive  and  ablest 
leader,  had  never  set  his  foot  on  foreign  soil  until  he  went 
to  Shimoneseki  to  sign  the  fateful  treaty  with  Japan.  While 
Japan  had  been  earnestly  studying  the  international  situa- 
tion and  faithfully  training  her  leaders  to  cope  with  it,  China 
had  recalled  the  few  students  she  had  sent  abroad  and 
sought  to  turn  back  the  hands  of  the  clock.    Now  in  her  hour 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  601 

of  greatest  need  China  was  helpless ;  rich  in  resources  and  in 
intellectual  ability  but  impoverished  by  a  corrupt  and  unen- 
lightened government.  By  a  tactful  and  conciliatory  policy 
at  Peking,  Russia  had  long  been  preparing  for  this  hour  of 
opportunity.  Suffice  it  to  say,  for  the  moment,  that  while 
it  cannot  be  shown  that  in  the  closing  years  of  the  century 
American  trade  or  American  investors  had  actually  suffered 
a  net  loss  because  of  the  disastrous  treaties  and  agreements 
which  China  made  voluntarily  or  otherwise  with  Russia, 
France  and  England,  yet  the  presence  of  large  European 
fleets  and  the  steady  pressure  of  the  diplomatic  representa- 
tives at  Peking  exercised  a  disturbing  influence  on  the  letting 
of  such  contracts  for  railway  construction  as  the  Americans 
desired.  The  Americans,  unsupported  by  guarantees  of 
their  government,  were  at  a  disadvantage  in  bidding  against 
Europeans  who  had  become  political  agents  as  well  as 
money-lenders. 

Three  or  four  American  companies,  one  from  Japan,  but 
the  others  hitherto  unknown  in  China,  appeared  in  1896 
seeking  the  opportunity  to  build  railways.  A  preliminary 
agreement  was  made  to  give  the  contract  for  a  line  from 
Hankow  to  Peking  to  one  of  two  competing  American  firms 
but  Belgians,  backed  by  French  and  Russian  capital,  were 
prepared  to  give  more  favorable  terms  to  China.  The 
Chinese  were  disposed  to  favor  the  Americans  and  at  the  last 
minute  would  have  given  them  the  contract,  so  it  is  believed, 
but  the  representatives  of  the  American  banks  were  without 
authority  to  act  quickly,  if  at  all,  and  the  diplomatic  pres- 
sure at  Peking,  notwithstanding  the  opposition  of  the  Brit- 
ish, turned  the  contract  over  to  the  Belgian  company.*  The 
struggle  for  contracts  had  assumed  a  political  character  but 
the  Americans  retained  a  clear  advantage  over  their  com- 
petitors because  the  Chinese  recognized  that  the  United 
States  had  no  territorial  designs.     In  April,  1898,  after  a 

*Tt  has  1)pon  frequontly  stated  that  this  contract  was  lost  to  the  Amcricang 
because  the  Department  of  State  would  not  support  the  claims  of  the  Ameri- 
can company.  This  would  appear  to  be  a  mistaken  assumption.  U.  S.  Minister 
Denby  wrote.  October  20,  1897  :  "The  night  before  the  Belsian  contract  for 
the  liankow-Paoting-fu  line  was  let,  it  was  offered  to  an  American  but  he  had 
no  power  to  accept  it." 


602  AIMERTCANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

great  deal  of  manoeuvering  the  Chinese  minister  in  Wash- 
ington signed  a  contract  for  an  American  syndicate  to  build 
the  Canton-Hankow  line.  At  about  the  same  time  China 
expressed  a  willingness  to  give  to  Americans  the  right  to 
build  a  line  northward  from  Peking  to  Kalgan.  With  both 
this  and  the  Canton-Hankow  line  went  valuable  mining 
privileges.  When  a  contract  was  signed  by  which  American 
capital  would  have  been  used  to  finance  the  Tientsin- 
Chinkiang  line,  the  Germans  protested,  but  American  capi- 
tal could  have  been  admitted  to  a  share  (1898)  in  this  line 
which  was  actually  built  by  the  British  and  Germans 
jointly,  had  the  Americans  been  prepared  to  handle  the 
necessary  loan. 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  Canton-Hankow  line  does 
not  come  within  the  nineteenth  century."  It  is,  however, 
significant  for  our  study  that  the  Americans  delayed  the 
beginning  of  operations  and  then  allowed  the  control  to  pass 
contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  contract  into  Belgian  hands 
from  which  it  was  later  purchased  and  then  resold  to  China. 
The  death  of  Calvin  Brice,  the  head  of  the  syndicate  formed 
to  carry  through  the  Canton-Hankow  contract,  was  disas- 
trous to  the  enterprise.  Two  conclusions  of  importance 
stand  out:  American  capitalists,  not  yet  seriously  inter- 
ested in  investments  in  China,  had  actually  secured  more 
contracts  than  they  were  prepared  to  execute;  and  the  loss  of 
American  prestige  and  influence  and  the  lack  of  experience, 
so  manifest  in  the  business  relations  of  the  last  quarter 
century,  had  now  become  a  serious  handicap  to  effective 
competition  with  other  foreign  nations. 

Out  of  an  estimated  total  of  nearly  7500  miles  of  railway 
concessions  granted  before  December  1,  1898  the  Americans 
had  actually  accepted  or  secured  only  300  miles.  They  had 
lost  several  times  as  much  through  inability  to  provide 
capital  on  acceptable  terms. 


AMERICAN  TRADE:  1844-1898  603 

Spheres  of  Influence 

Concurrently  with  the  struggle  for  contracts  and  con- 
cessions which  followed  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  the  inter- 
ference of  the  treaty  powers  in  the  affairs  of  China  was  be- 
coming so  marked  as  to  arouse  Americans  to  the  impending, 
if  not  present,  danger.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  in  this 
period  American  capital  had  secured  for  the  immediate 
present  more  than  it  could  digest,  it  was  felt  that  the  future 
was  very  bright  for  the  Americans  if  only  the  field  of  free 
competition  were  to  remain  open.  In  this  respect  the 
Americans  of  1898  were  like  the  China  merchants  in  the 
fifties.  The  tide,  they  believed,  was  beginning  to  turn. 
The  one  unsecured  essential  for  successful  trade  with  China 
was  the  assurance  of  a  field  of  free  competition.  Now  the 
field  was  being  threatened  by  a  series  of  treaties  and  agree- 
ments between  China  and  the  other  primary  treaty  powers 
that  looked  towards  the  closing  of  doors  which  had  swung 
open  to  Americans  on  terms  equal  with  those  of  their  com- 
petitors for  a  hundred  years.  For  Americans  it  was  a  day 
of  uncertainty  similar  to  that  which  preceded  the  treaties  of 
Wanghia  and  of  Tientsin.  More  accurately,  perhaps,  the 
Americans  were  face  to  face  with  the  problem  which  Hum- 
phrey Marshall  had  envisaged  in  1853  when  he  believed  that 
foreign  intervention  in  the  Taiping  Rebellion  would  result 
in  the  partition  of  China. 

While  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  this  study  to 
concern  ourselves  with  the  mass  of  details  which  attended 
the  delimitation  of  spheres  of  influence  and  the  execution 
of  "non-alienation"  agreements  in  China,  it  is  important,  as 
we  approach  the  annexation  of  the  Philippines,  to  have 
clearly  in  mind  the  extent  to  which  the  Chinese  Empire  in 
the  summer  of  1898  had  actually  been  withdrawn  from  the 
field  of  free  commercial  competition.^**  France  had  secured 
from  China  the  promise  that  French  citizens  would  be  pre- 
ferred above  those  of  all  other  nationalities  in  the  exploita- 
tion of  all  mines  in  the  three  southern  provinces  of  Yunan, 
Kwangsi  and  Kwangtung;  that  all  railways  having  Pakhoi 


604  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

as  a  starting-point  would  be  constructed  by  either  French  or 
Franco-Chinese  companies;  and  that  no  part  of  the  three 
provinces  would  be  alienated  from  China  or  leased  to  any 
other  power.  France  also  obtained  a  lease  for  the  Bay  of 
Kwangchow-wan,  the  best  harbor  south  of  Hongkong. 
Russia  had  secured  the  right  to  preference  in  the  construc- 
tion of  all  railroads  north  and  northeast  of  Peking,  as  well  as 
the  recognition  of  all  IMongolia  and  Manchuria  as  a  Russian 
sphere  of  influence,  and  had  leased  Port  Arthur,  which  com- 
manded the  naval  approach  to  Peking  and  North  China. 
The  Russian  agreements  carried  administrative  and  military 
privileges  which  involved  the  actual,  though  not  theoretical, 
transfer  of  sovereignty.  Germany  had  secured  the  right  to 
preference  for  capital  or  material  needed  for  any  purpose  in 
Shantung,  and  had  leased  Kiaochow,  the  best  naval  base 
south  of  Port  Arthur.  Great  Britain  had  secured  a  non- 
alienation  agreement  for  the  Yangtze  Valley  and  the  prom- 
ise that  so  long  as  the  British  trade  preponderated  in  the 
Empire  a  British  subject  should  remain  the  head  of  the  cus- 
toms service.  Finally  Japan  had  secured  a  non-alienation 
agreement  for  the  province  of  Fukien  which  carried  with  it 
the  exclusion  of  leases  to  any  other  power. 

These  agreements  had  been  accompanied  by  the  signing 
of  railway  and  mining  contracts  which  had  been  secured  by 
intimidation  and  had  been  attended  by  a  display  of  naval 
forces  in  Chinese  waters  which  revealed  utter  contempt  for 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Empire.  Clearly  China  was  in  danger 
and  partition  among  the  powers  along  the  lines  of  the 
spheres  of  influence  was  being  freely  discussed.  Were  the 
dismemberment  of  the  Empire  to  be  accomplished,  and  the 
various  regions  thus  marked  out  to  fall  to  the  exclusive  con- 
trol of  the  powers  now  claiming  them,  China  would  become 
a  group  of  colonies  from  which  the  American  merchant 
could  be  excluded  at  the  will  of  the  respective  powers  just 
at  the  time  when,  after  long  years  of  waiting,  he  seemed  to 
be  on  the  point  of  realizing  his  dreams.  In  fact  he  was 
already  practically  excluded,  by  agreements  actually  exe- 
cuted before  the  summer  of  1898,  from  the  mining  and  rail- 


AMERICAN  TRADE:   1844-1898  605 

way  rights  in  almost  every  valuable  field.  If  it  had  been  the 
sincere  intention  of  the  powers  to  permit  free  competition 
in  their  respective  spheres  there  was  obviously  no  reason 
whatever  for  the  existing  agreements. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  Several  studies  of  American  trade  with  Asia  were  made  by  the 

Bureau  of  Statistics  of  the  U.  S.  Treasury  Dept.  after  1898. 
The  more  useful  of  these  are:  "Commercial  Japan  in  1899"; 
Monthly  Summary  of  Commerce  and  Finance,  July,  1899; 
"Commercial  China  in  1900" ;  ihid.,  June,  1901 ;  "Commercial 
Korea  in  1904";  ibid.,  Jan.,  1904.  See  also  Monthly  Summary 
of  Trade  and  Finance,  Apr.,  1898,  pp.  1632-3,  1638-9;  ihid., 
Sept.,  1904,  p.  1211 ;  Jan.,  1904,  p.  2330.  See,  "China  and  the 
Far  East,"  George  H.  Blakeslee,  editor,  chaps.  2,  3,  5  and  6. 

2.  The  vise,  and  misuse,  of  the  American  flag-  in  China  may  best 

be  studied  in  the  so-called  Seward-Bradford  investigation,  H. 
Kept.  134:45-3,  and  H.  Misc.  Doc.  31:45-2  (Part  II). 

3.  H.  Misc.  Doc.  31-45-2  (Part  II),  pp.  228-31. 

4.  Royal  Meeker:    "History  of   Shipping   Subsidies"    (New  York, 

1905);  Walter  T.  Dinsmore:  "Shipping  Subsidies"  (Boston 
and  New  York,  1907) ;  David  A.  Wells :  "Our  Merchant  Ma- 
rine" (New  York,  1882);  H.  Rept.  1^10:51-1.  Meeker  has  a 
full  bibliography.  H.  Rept.  1210,  pp.  136  ff.,  gives  a  complete 
review  of  the  trans-Pacific  American  shipping. 

5.  Foreign  Relations,  1877,  p.  88. 

6.  Raphael   Pumpelly :     "Across   America   and   Asia"    (New   York, 

1870),  chaps.  15-22.  This  book  is  also  very  valuable  for  the 
light  it  throws  on  the  political  conditions  in  the  East  in  1863. 

7.  Inazo  Nitobe:    "Intercourse  between  United  States  and  Japan," 

pp.  116  ff. ;  Robert  E.  Lewis:  "The  Educational  Conquest  of 
the  Far  East,"  especially  tables,  appendix,  pp.  223-4. 

8.  H.  Misc.  Doc.  31:45-2  (Part  II),  p.  561;  Historic  Shanghai  by 

Montalto  de  Jesus. 

9.  Papers  Relating  to  the  Intercontinental  Telegraph  (Govt.  Print- 

ing Off.,   1864);  George  Kennan:    "Tent  Life  in  Siberia." 

10.  For.  Relations,  1867,  Part  I.  pp.  452,  456,   471   ff.,  484;   1866, 

Part  I,  p.  475 ;  1874,  pp.  246,  323,  335 ;  1875,  pp.  260  ff. 

11.  H.  Misc.  Doc.  31:45-2  (Part  II)  gives  the  DeLano  correspondence 

very  fully. 

12.  For.  Relations,  1881,  pp.  224,  275,  280;  1882,  p.  115. 

13.  Percy  Horace  Kent:    "Railway  Enterprise  in  China"   (London, 

1907).  This  is  a  good  general  survey,  but  for  the  details  of 
American  projects  it  should  be  supplemented  by  American 
sources. 

14.  H.  Misc.  Doc.  31 :45-2  (Part  II)  gives  the  documentary  history 

of  the  Woosung  Railway  in  great  detail. 

15.  Ihid.,  p.  139. 


606  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

16.  James  11.  Wilson:    "China:    Travels  in  the  Middle  Kin^idnin," 

first  edition,  1887,  was  the  first  book  to  be  published  in  the 
United  States  describing?  the  opportunities  for  railroad  de- 
velopment in  China.  The  third  edition  (1901)  includes  the 
author's  account  of  the  Boxer  uprising;  General  Wilson  was 
second  in  command  of  the  American  forces  in  China  in  1900. 

17.  William  Barclay  Parsons:    "An  American  Engineer  in  China" 

(New  York,  1900).  Mr.  Parsons  was  the  engineer  for  the 
Brice  Syndicate  for  the  sun^ey  of  the  Canton-Hankow  line 
in  1899. 

18.  John  V.  A.  MacMurray :    "Treaties  and  Agreements  with  and 

Concerning  China,  1S94-1919,"  2  vols.  (New  York,  1921).  The 
various  compacts  by  which  China  signed  away  so  many  of  her 
sovereign  liberties  are  given  in  the  first  volume  of  this  in- 
valuable collection. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 
HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES 

In  1898,  at  the  end  of  one  hundred  and  fourteen  years 
of  relations  with  the  Pacific  and  Asia,  the  poUtical  aspects 
of  the  Far  Eastern  question  were  for  the  first  time  presented 
for  the  serious  consideration  of  the  American  people  in 
flefinite  proposals  for  the  annexation  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  and  the  cession  of  the  Philippines. 

There  had  been  brief,  fragmentary  and  partisan  discus- 
sions in  Congress  in  1843  when  the  Cushing  Mission  was 
authorized,  in  1852  when  the  Perry  Expedition  was  on  its 
way  eastward,  and  for  the  remainder  of  the  sixth  decade  of 
the  century  Congress  had  kept  a  sharp  eye  on  the  condition 
of  affairs  as  is  indicated  by  the  publication  during  that 
period  of  the  entire  diplomatic  correspondence  with  China — 
more  than  twenty-five  hundred  pages  of  documents.  Indeed 
the  first  years  of  the  Buchanan  administration  occupied,  in 
relation  to  Far  Eastern  affairs,  a  somewhat  similar  position 
to  the  first  years  of  the  McKinley  administration.  In  each 
case  the  nation,  having  recovered  from  a  period  of  financial 
depression  and  panic,  found  itself  with  a  surplus  of  produce 
for  which  a  foreign  market  seemed  desirable  and  necessary.^ 
In  both  instances  the  new  mercantile  energy  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  was  contemporaneous  with  disorganization  and 
uncertainty  in  the  Far  East  to  which  was  joined  the  fear 
that  other  nations  might  seize  the  opportunity  to  obtain 
preferred  positions  and  perhaps  to  close  the  doors.*  In  both 
cases  Great  Britain  found  in  the  United  States  a  sufficient 
encouragement  to  justify  approaches  to  the  American  Gov- 
ernment with  a  view  to  the  achievement  of  a  cordial  under- 

*Ono  dops  not  fail  to  note  the  striking  similarities  of  the  situations  in 
1859  and  1897  with  that  at  the  close  of  the  World  War  in   1918. 

607 


608  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

standing  if  not  an  alliance  for  the  settlement  of  the  Far 
Eastern  question.-  Both  Buchanan  and  Hay,  who  became 
Secretary  of  State  in  September,  1898,  were  promoted  to 
positions  of  great  influence  in  American  foreign  policy  from 
periods  of  acceptable  diplomatic  service  at  the  Court  of  St. 
James  following  crises  in  Anglo-American  relations  which 
had  brought  the  American  people  to  the  brink  of  war  with 
England.  But  in  1857  President  Buchanan  had  been  so  sure 
of  the  general  indifference  of  the  American  people  that  he 
had  not  even  presented  the  Far  Eastern  question  to  them  for 
consideration,  whereas  forty  years  later  McKinley  had 
neither  the  disposition  nor  the  power  to  keep  it  from  them. 
The  same  identical  questions  which  had  been  decided  by 
Marcy,  Buchanan  and  Cass  in  the  later  fifties,  reappeared 
in  the  late  nineties.  Indeed  these  questions,  though  often 
decided,  had  never  been  disposed  of.  Seward  had  faced 
them;  so  had  Fish,  Frelinghuysen,  Blaine,  Bayard  and 
Gresham.  They  were :  Should  the  United  States  establish 
protectorates  or  acquire  territory  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far 
East?  To  what  extent  should  the  United  States  take  action 
to  assert  and  to  maintain  the  open  door  in  China  and  to 
sustain  its  sovereignty  and  integrity?  What  were  the  limits 
to  the  degree  of  cooperation  which  should  be  established  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  in  the  pursuit  of 
a  common  object  and  policy?  The  broad  outlines  of  the 
American  problem  in  Asia  had  not  changed  in  forty  years; 
no,  not  in  more  than  half  a  century.  The  task  of  Caleb 
Gushing  in  1844  had  been  to  obtain  for  Americans  a  non- 
territorial  equivalent  for  Hongkong.  He  had  only  partially 
succeeded.  The  task  for  American  statesmen  in  the  last 
three  years  of  the  century  was  to  obtain  for  Americans  a 
real  equivalent,  territorial  or  otherv/ise,  not  merely  for 
Hongkong  but  now  also  for  Kwangchow-wan,  Foochow, 
Tsingtao,  Wei-hai-wei  and  Port  Arthur,  spheres  of  influence, 
and  the  non-alienation  agreements  of  five  powers.  The  rea- 
son why  the  task  had  gone  so  long  unfinished  was  merely 
that  the  American  people  had  not  cared  enough  about  the 
markets  of  Asia  to  finish  it.    But  in  March,  1897,  the  month 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  609 

of  McKinley's  inauguration,  American  steel  rails  began  to 
sell  in  the  European  markets  at  $18  a  ton,  and  this  was 
assumed  to  indicate  that  at  length  the  American  people  had 
reached  the  point  in  their  industrial  development  where 
they  could  no  longer  safely  neglect  the  markets  of  the 
world. ^  It  was  believed  by  McKinley,  by  Mark  Hanna, 
perhaps  by  John  Hay,  and  by  some,  though  not  all  capi- 
talists and  "captains  of  industry,"  that  the  American  people 
were  now  ready  to  resume  the  task  for  wich  the  policy  of 
Daniel  Webster  and  Caleb  Gushing  had  proved  to  be  so 
inadequate. 

The  Annexation  of  Hawaii 

The  annexation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  the  hors 
d'oEUvre.  The  acquisition  of  these  islands,  however,  while 
indubitably  a  piece  of  Far  Eastern  policy,  was  equally  a 
measure  of  coast  defense,  as  is  clearly  revealed  in  the  fifty- 
five  years'  history  of  the  question.'* 

The  American  interest  in  Hawaii  from  1842  onward 
rose  and  fell  with  the  corresponding  interest  in  the  Far 
East.  Tyler  and  Webster  were  of  the  opinion  (December 
30,  1842)  that  the  United  States  would  make  a  "decided 
remonstrance"  if  any  other  power  were  to  take  possession 
of  the  islands  or  subvert  the  native  government.  A  few 
months  later  when  Lord  George  Paulet  seized  the  islands 
for  Great  Britain,  Commodore  Kearny,  returning  from  his 
successful  efforts  to  secure  for  the  United  States  most- 
favored-nation  treatment  in  China,  entered  a  vigorous  pro- 
test. Acting  Secretary  of  State  Legare  wrote  to  Edw^ard 
Everett  in  London  that  the  American  Government  might 
feel  justified  in  "interfering  by  force,"  and  the  action  of 
Paulet  was  disavowed.  Otherwise  it  seems  very  probable 
that  the  Hawaiian  question  would  have  taken  on  something 
of  the  "fifty-four-forty-or-fight"  spirit.  At  that  time  the 
American  interest  in  the  islands  arose  out  of  their  value  to 
the  Pacific  and  trans-Pacific  trade,  particularly  to  the 
American  whalers  in  the  North  Pacific  which  found  at 
Honolulu  a  convenient  place  to  refit.     When  the  French 


610  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

took  possession  of  Honolulu  in  1849,  though  without  haul- 
ing down  the  Hawaiian  flag,  the  American  Government  an- 
nounced that  it  could  not  view  with  indifference  the  passing 
of  the  islands  under  the  control  of  any  other  power.  Two 
years  later  the  king  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  American 
representative  an  unregistered  deed  of  cession  of  his  do- 
mains, and  while  the  deed  was  never  executed,  Marcy 
stated  (December,  ,1853)  while  Perry  was  negotiating  with 
Japan,  that  it  seemed  "inevitable"  that  the  islands  would 
come  under  the  control  of  the  United  States.  Less  than 
four  months  later  he  authorized  the  American  representa- 
tive to  sign  a  treaty  of  annexation.*  The  treaty  was  not 
ratified  by  the  United  States  because  of  the  excessive  annui- 
ties stipulated  for  the  native  rulers  and  because  it  provided 
that  the  islands  should  be  admitted  into  the  Union  as  a 
state. 

In  1863  the  rank  of  the  American  representative  was 
raised  to  that  of  Minister  Resident.  About  the  time  of  the 
purchase  of  Alaska  and  the  acquisition  of  the  Midway 
Island  in  1867  a  new  reciprocity  treaty  was  negotiated  but 
it  was  never  ratified,  just  as  a  similar  reciprocity  treaty  of 
1855  had  failed.  Seward  considered  annexation  preferable 
to  reciprocity  if  the  two  were  in  conflict. 

The  settlement  of  the  Pacific  Coast,  the  increase  of 
trans-Pacific  commerce,  and  the  improvement  of  steam 
navigation  now  brought  the  Hawaiian  Islands  within  the 
purview  of  coast  defense.  The  annexation  question  was 
revived  in  1871  and  Secretary  of  State  Fish  recognized  the 
value  of  Honolulu  as  a  "resting  spot  in  mid-ocean  between 
the  Pacific  Coast  and  the  vast  domains  of  Asia  which  are 
now  opening  to  commerce  and  Christian  civilization." 

In  1875  a  convention  of  commercial  reciprocity  con- 
taining a  non-alienation  agreement  very  similar  in  import 
to  those  negotiated  in  China  in  1898-9  was  effected.  The 
United  States  was  given  preferred  treatment  not  open  to 
other  nations  under  the  most-favored-nation  clause.     In 

♦This  authorization  l)y  Marcy  was  sent  to  Honolulu  immediately  after  the 
receipt  of  Perry's  first  disjiatehes  in  which  lie  unfolded  his  jjhin  for  the  exten- 
sion  and   i)rotection   of  American    trade  in    tlie   I'acific  and   the  East. 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  611 

1881  Blaine,  while  expressing  the  desire  of  the  United 
States  that  the  "real  and  substantial  independence"  of  the 
islands  be  maintained,  reasserted  their  strategic  importance 
and  stated  that  occupation  by  a  foreign  power  in  case  of 
international  difficulties  would  be  a  "positive  threat"  which 
could  not  be  "lightly  risked"  by  the  United  States.  New 
factors  in  the  situation  had  arisen.  The  Chinese  immi- 
grants, brought  in  to  work  on  the  sugar  plantations,  had 
increased  to  a  point  where  they  threatened  the  "substitution 
of  Mongolian  supremacy  for  native  control,"  while  the 
sugar  industry  under  the  reciprocity  convention  of  1875  had 
greatly  increased  the  value  of  the  islands  and  the  wealth 
of  the  Americans.  "The  Hawaiian  Islands,"  stated  Blaine, 
"cannot  be  joined  to  the  Asiatic  system.  If  they  drift  from 
their  independent  station  it  must  be  toward  assimilation 
and  identification  with  the  American  system  to  which  they 
belong  by  the  operation  of  natural  laws  and  must  belong  by 
the  operation  of  political  necessity." 

An  extension  of  the  reciprocity  treaty  was  negotiated 
in  1884  and  when  it  reached  the  Senate,  so  important  now 
appeared  the  strategic  value  of  the  islands,  that  an  amend- 
ment to  the  treaty  was  added  by  which  Pearl  Harbor,  near 
Honolulu,  was  leased  to  the  United  States  as  a  naval  base. 
About  the  time  this  treaty  was  being  ratified  (1887)  the 
United  States  declined  to  enter  into  a  convention  with 
Great  Britain  and  France  jointly  to  guarantee  the  neu- 
trality of  the  islands. 

Candor  must  compel  one  to  admit  that  the  American 
policy  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  showing  marked  paral- 
lels to  the  existing  and  later  policies  of  China  and  Japan  in 
Korea:  economic  penetration  under  the  treaties  of  1875 
and  1887,  insistence  on  no  disturbance  of  the  trade,  and 
demands  for  preferred  commercial  and  political  treatment. 

Passing  over  many  details  of  the  domestic  political  de- 
velopment in  Honolulu  we  come  to  the  peaceful  revolution 
of  1893  which  was  followed  by  the  abdication  of  the  re- 
actionary Queen  Liliuokalani,  the  establishment  of  a  pro- 
visional government  with  Sanford  B.  Dole  as  President,  and 


612  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  negotiation,  concurrently,  of  an  annexation  treaty  which 
was  signed  February  14,  and  presented  to  the  Senate  in 
the  closing  days  of  the  Harrison  athninistration.  The 
President  characterized  the  Hawaiian  monarchy  as  "effete," 
and  the  native  government  as  "weak  and  inadequate."  The 
choice  seemed  to  him  to  be  between  making  a  formal  pro- 
tectorate, which  had  informally  existed  for  half  a  century 
and  had  come  to  be  tacitly  recognized  by  all  powers,  or 
annexation.    He  urged  the  latter. 

President  Cleveland,  scandalized  at  what  appeared  to 
him  to  have  been  the  intervention  of  American  citizens,  if 
not  of  American  officials,  in  the  coup  d'etat  of  January, 
1893,  withdrew  the  treaty  from  the  Senate  and  started  an 
investigation.  The  important  difference  between  the  va- 
rious coup  d'etats  in  Korea  by  which  the  Tai-wen-Kun,  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  successively  sought  to  obtain  control 
of  the  government  was  that  at  Honolulu  the  efforts  of  the 
Americans  who  were  determined  upon  annexation  were 
unstained  by  assassinations  and  such  barbarities  as  the 
murder  ana  burning  of  a  queen — a  very  important  differ- 
ence. The  Cleveland  investigation  only  served  to  make 
more  certain  that  the  Hawaiians  were  incapable  of  main- 
taining unaided  an  enlightened,  just  and  stable  government. 
The  delay  incident  to  the  investigation  proved  that  the 
newly  created  republic  while  well  able  to  maintain  itself  in 
the  face  of  all  native  dissent,  was  not  capable  of  meeting 
the  pressure  of  foreign  powers  like  Japan.  One  of  the 
earliest  projects  of  the  McKinley  administration  was  to 
revive  the  question  of  annexation  and  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
to  that  effect  (June  16,  1897).  "Annexation  is  not  a 
change,"  stated  McKinley,  "it  is  a  consummation." 

Suspicion  of  Japanese  Designs  in  Hawaii 

The  treaty  met  with  opposition  in  two  quarters:  from 
certain  sections  of  American  public  opinion  which  will  be 
described  below ;  and  from  the  Japanese  Government  which, 
elated  by  its  success  in  the  Sino-Japanese  War  and  enriched 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  613 

by  the  Chinese  indemnity  which  was  being  devoted  to  naval 
and  military  purposes,  was  undergoing  a  wave  of  popular 
enthusiasm  both  for  expansion  and  for  the  assertion  of 
racial  dignity. 

The  Japanese  Government  through  United  States  Min- 
ister Buck  at  Tokio,  and  even  more  energetically  through 
the  Japanese  Minister,  Hoshi  Toru,  at  Washington,  entered 
a  vigorous  protest — probably  the  most  vigorous  protest  that 
up  to  that  time  had  ever  been  issued  by  Japan  to  another 
power.  This  protest  was  doubly  significant  because  it  en- 
larged the  question  which  might  have  been  supposed  to 
concern  Japan.  Not  only  did  Japan  protest  that  the  an- 
nexation of  the  islands  would  endanger  the  settlement  of  the 
Japanese  claims  over  the  immigration  question  then  pend- 
ing, and  the  general  rights  of  Japanese  in  the  islands  under 
the  treaties  between  Japan  and  Hawaii,  but  also  that  the 
annexation  would  "disturb  the  status  quo  in  the  Pacific." 
While  the  Japanese  Government  took  occasion  to  deny  that 
it  entertained  designs  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  the 
sovereignty  of  the  islands,  the  fact  remained  that  the  Japa- 
nese claim  for  the  right  of  citizenship  in  the  islands  was  not 
withdrawn.  Did,  then,  Japan  have  in  mind  a  program  of 
economic  penetration  similar  to  that  which  was  already  in 
operation  in  Korea?  Such  a  conclusion  is  not  absolutely 
necessary  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  while  Japan  had 
succeeded  in  holding  Formosa  in  1895  the  hold  was  not 
very  secure,  and  Japan  may  have  felt  that  the  annexation 
of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  would  precipitate  a  scramble  for 
islands  in  the  Pacific  in  the  confusion  of  which  Japan  would 
be  separated  from  Formosa  just  as  she  had  been  forced  to 
retire  from  the  Liaotung  peninsula.  The  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo,  by  which  Japan  was  in  possession  of  For- 
mosa, the  Pescaderoes,  the  Lew  Chews,  the  Bonins  and  the 
Kurile  islands,  was  an  important  matter  to  Japan .•'^ 

But  Japan  could  not  well  afford  to  alienate  American 
public  opinion,  nor  the  sympathies  of  the  American  Gov- 
ernment which  had  stood  Japan  in  such  good  stead  for 
so  many  years.    Just  at  the  moment  things  were  going  badly 


614  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

with  Japan  in  Korea.  After  the  murder  of  the  queen  the 
king  had  taken  refuge  in  the  Russian  legation,  and  now  the 
pohtical  affairs  of  Korea  were  being  directed  from  St. 
Petersburg.  Meanwhile  Japan  w^as  seeking  friends  for  her- 
self in  the  struggle  for  the  peninsula  which  was  merely 
postponed.  Specifically  Japan  desired  to  induce  American 
capital  to  invest  in  Korea  under  Japanese  auspices  with  a 
view  to  ranging  the  United  States  on  the  Japanese  side  in 
the  coming  struggle.  Japan  quickly  though  informally 
withdrew  its  protest  against  the  disturbance  of  the  status 
quo  in  the  Pacific  and  confined  its  later  negotiations  to  the 
immigration  and  claims  questions.  It  was  at  length  agreed 
that  the  Hawaiian  Republic  should  settle  the  claims  for 
about  $130,000  and  Japan  then  adopted  a  conciliatory  atti- 
tude on  the  immigration  question  which  was  at  length  dis- 
missed without  any  specific  promises  having  been  made  by 
the  American  Government.  When  the  annexation  of  the 
islands  was  accomplished  a  stipulation  was  inserted  that 
American  immigration  laws  would  be  extended  to  the 
islands  thus  bringing  the  Japanese  immigrants  under  the 
provision  of  the  treaty  of  1894  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States.  To  this  as  well  as  to  the  extension  of  Ameri- 
can immigration  laws  to  the  Philippines  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment made  another  very  sharp  protest,  but  without 
effect. 

While  the  military  and  economic  value  of  the  islands 
was  sufficient  to  commend  the  annexation  to  many  it  was 
the  Far  Eastern  question  which  at  length  upset  the  balance 
of  opinion  and  hastened  the  incorporation  of  the  islands. 
Following  the  declaration  of  a  state  of  war  with  Spain 
(April  20,  1898)  Commodore  George  Dewey  destroyed  the 
Spanish  fleet  at  Manila  May  1.  Three  days  later  Francis 
G.  Newlands  of  Nevada  introduced  into  the  House  a  joint 
resolution  to  annex  Hawaii  to  the  United  States.  The  de- 
bate on  the  bill  began  June  11.  The  House  approved  of  it 
by  vote  of  209  to  91,  and  the  Senate  passed  it  July  6,  42  to 
21.  On  July  8,  1898,  President  McKinley  gave  to  the  joint 
resolution  his  very  ready  assent  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  615 

became  a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States.  The 
commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  make  recom- 
mendations for  legislation  reported  (December  6,  1898). 
By  act  of  Congress  April  30,  1900.  the  "Territory  of 
Hawaii"  was  created  and  a  territorial  form  of  government 
authorized. 

In  order  that  we  may  have  clearly  before  us  the  intimate 
relation  between  events  and  opinions  in  those  momentous 
days,  and  may  consider  together  the  debates  on  the  an- 
nexation of  Hawaii  and  the  cession  of  the  Philippines,  it 
is  well  at  this  point  to  review  briefly  the  course  of  the 
Spanish  American  War. 

The  Philippines  in  the  Spanish-American  War 

No  relation  whatever  can  be  established  between  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  with  Spain  and  the  Far  Eastern 
question  except  that  there  was  a  concurrence  of  dates  in 
the  disturbed  conditions  in  China  and  the  climax  of  the 
often  recurring  disturbances  in  Cuba,  and  that  both  syn- 
chronized with  the  expansive  movement  in  American  trade 
which  had  followed  the  recovery  from  the  Panic  of  1893.*^ 
The  Sino-Japanese  War  had  caused  a  very  notable  strength- 
ening of  Continental  fleets  in  Chinese  waters.* 

Notwithstanding  the  warnings  of  naval  officers  fre- 
quently offered  in  the  last  quarter  of  a  century,  the  Ameri- 
cans were  without  a  naval  base  in  the  Far  East.f    There- 

*The  naval  forces  in  the  Far  East  at  the  end  of  November,  1895,  were  as 
follows  :  ' 

British  —  total  displacement  —  i')8.908  tons 

Kussian  "                  "  58.S.38       " 

French  "                  "  28,609       " 

fiernian  "                  "  23.078       " 

American  "                 "  18,553      " 

The  American  naval  force  was  even  weaker  than  the  figures  would  indicate  for 
it  included  some  antiquated  vessels  like  the  Monocacj',  an  old  side-wheeler, 
which  uixin  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1898  was  stuck  in  the  mud  at  Shanshai 
and  could  not  be  moved  even  to  comply  with  the  declaration  of  neutrality  by 
the  Chinese  Government.  Between  1895  and  the  spring  of  1898  the  American 
fleet  was  actually  decreased,  but  at  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay  Commodore 
Dewey's  vessels  had  a   total  displacement  of  about   19,000  tons. 

t  The  Secretary  of  the  Xavy,  in  his  annual  report  for  1884.  about  four 
months  liefore  the  occupation  of  Port  Hamilton  by  the  British  naval  forces, 
recommended  that  "additional  coaling  and  naval  stations"  be  established  at 
nine  points,  among  which  he  mentioned  Port  Hamilton  as  well  as  Honolulu. 
'•I'rom  which  latter  naval  station  [Port  Hamilton]  and  the  ports  of  Korea  there 


616  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

fore  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish-American  War  the 
American  fleet  in  the  Far  East  was  left  by  the  declarations 
of  neutraUty  of  Japan,  China  and  Great  Britain,  in  a  posi- 
tion which  required  either  a  retirement  of  the  fleet  to 
Honolulu  from  which  a  declaration  of  neutrality  by  the 
Hawaiian  Republic  might  have  barred  it,  or  an  attack  upon 
Manila.  The  retirement  of  the  American  forces  from  the 
Far  East  in  the  spring  of  1898  when  the  Chinese  Empire 
was  in  such  precarious  condition  would  have  resulted  in  a 
very  great  loss  of  American  prestige  and  perhaps  an  attack 
upon  American  life  and  property,  for  the  Chinese  had  al- 
ways been  quick  to  interpret  such  events  as  an  involuntary 
weakening  of  a  foreign  power.  American  shipping,  also, 
would  have  been  exposed  to  attack  from  the  Spanish  fleet 
at  Manila. 

The  attack  upon  Manila  by  the  American  forces  was 
not,  however,  accidental  or  unforeseen.  Commodore  George 
Dewey  was  ordered  to  Japan  (October  21,  1897)  to  assume 
command  of  the  Far  Eastern  Squadron.*  Ten  days  after 
the  destruction  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Maine  at  Havana  Harbor 
Dewey  was  instructed  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  en- 
gage the  Spanish  Squadron  at  Manila  and  to  conduct  offen- 
sive operations  against  the  Philippines.  The  intent  of 
these  orders,  however,  appears  plainly  to  have  been  to 
remove  the  menace  of  the  Spanish  fleet  rather  than  to  ac- 
quire Manila. 

The  American  fleet  was  ordered  to  rendezvous  at  Hong- 
kong and  measures  were  immediately  taken  to  secure  ade- 
quate supplies.  Dewey  was  even  prepared  to  ignore  any 
declaration  of  neutrality  which  might  be  made  by  the  Chi- 
nese Empire.^    He  was  informed  that  Japan,  which  at  that 

should  l)e  ostal)lishc(l  n  regular  lino  of  stpaincrs  carrying  tli(>  rnitcd  States  flag, 
coniH'Cting  with   tlu"  ijrcscnt   line  bctwoeri   San    Franci.sco  and   .lajian." 

Dr.  H.  ('.  Alh'n  statod  that  W.  W.  Kockhill  once  remarked  to  him  that  the 
King  of  Korea  liad  at  one  time  tlirouuh  Admiral  Shnfeldt  offered  I'ort  Hamil- 
ton to  tile  I'nited  States  as  a  naval  station.  This  off(>r  was  made,  presumably, 
after   tlie  evacuation    of   tile   island    l>y   the  British    in    INST. 

*  The  iiartisan  and  political  influences  under  which  the  entire  war  with 
Spain  was  conducted  are  well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Dewey,  in  order  to 
make  sure  of  the  assignment  to  the  Far  lOastern  Squadron,  felt  compelled  to 
invoke  the  jiolitieal  influences  of  Senator  Proctor  of  Vermont,  his  native  state, 
lie  took  this  action  upon  the  advice  of  Kooscvelt,  then  Assistant  Secretary  of 
the   Navy, 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  617 

time  was  badly  frightened  by  the  presence  of  such  large 
European  forces  in  the  East,  would  maintain  the  most  scrup- 
ulous neutrality — a  neutrality  which,  nevertheless,  Japan 
was  induced  to  relax  slightly  a  few  months  after  the  war 
broke  out.  Upon  the  announcement  that  a  state  of  hostili- 
ties existed  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  (there  was 
no  declaration  of  war  by  either  side )  the  British  representa- 
tives at  Hongkong  requested  the  American  fleet  to  leave 
by  4  p.  M.,  April  25.  Commodore  Dewey  complied  and 
with  no  unnecessary  delay  proceeded  to  Manila  Bay.  The 
battle  of  May  1st  with  its  swift  and  brilliant  victory  left 
Dewey  in  control  of  the  bay,  with  the  city  in  his  power. 
Owing  to  the  lack  of  a  sufficient  landing  force  Dewey  re- 
frained from  occupying  the  city  which  he  would  have  been 
unable  to  police.  Manila  was  not  taken  until  August  13 
and  then  after  some  little  resistance  which  probably  would 
not  have  been  presented  had  the  Americans  been  prepared 
on  May  1st  to  reap  the  fruits  of  their  naval  victory. 

Two  concurrent  events,  significant  in  a  study  of  policy, 
demand  attention. 

There  had  been  incipient  or  open  rebellion  in  the  Philip- 
pines for  more  than  a  decade.  The  execution  by  the  Span- 
ish authorities  of  Dr.  Jose  Rizal,  the  Filipino  patriot,  De- 
cember 30,  1896,  had  produced  a  short-lived  insurrection 
which  was  suspended  early  in  1897  by  the  arrival  of  Spanish 
reinforcements  and  the  agreement  of  the  rebel  leaders, 
Andres  Bonifacio  and  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  upon  the  payment 
of  several  hundred  thousand  dollars,  to  retire  from  the 
island.  These  men  went  to  Hongkong  and  established  a 
Filipino  Junta  with  the  money  thus  obtained  and  were  able 
to  continue  their  patriotic  agitation.  This  Junta  formally 
sought  the  intervention  and  protection  of  the  United 
States  and  later  proposed  an  alliance.  The  insurgents  had 
previously  sought  the  aid  of  Japan.  Early  in  1898  there 
were  insurrections  in  both  Luzon  and  Cebu.  In  April,  1898, 
Commodore  Dewey  had  several  conferences  with  the  Fili- 
pino leaders  at  Hongkong,  and  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
month  E.  Spencer  Pratt,  United  States  consul  general  at 


618  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Singapore,  had  an  interview  with  Aguinaldo,  recently  ar- 
rived from  Hongkong,  and  appears  to  have  proposed  to 
him  that  he  return  to  China,  join  Dewey's  forces,  and  ac- 
company the  Americans  to  Manila  with  a  view  to  assisting 
them  in  the  Philippines  just  as  Gomez  and  Garcia  had  been 
helping  the  American  forces  in  Cuba,  by  promoting  insur- 
rection against  the  Spanish  authority.  Dewey  approved 
of  the  suggestion  and  May  19  Aguinaldo  was  brought  to 
Manila  in  the  U.  S.  dispatch  boat  McColloch,  upon 
Dewey's  order.'*  While  Dewey  was  careful  to  make  no 
promises  to  Aguinaldo,  he  did  give  no  little  encouragement 
and  turned  over  to  him  the  arsenal  at  Cavite  and  permitted 
him  to  organize  his  insurgent  forces  within  the  American 
hues.  Consul  General  Rounseville  Wildman  had  also  as- 
sisted the  insurrectos  to  purchase  arms  in  Hongkong. 
Aguinaldo  gave  out  the  statement  to  the  Filipinos  that  the 
United  States  would  assist  the  insurrectors. 

It  does  not  appear  that  Admiral  Dewey  or  any  of  the 
American  representatives  in  contact  with  the  insurgents 
before  the  arrival  of  the  first  expeditionary  forces  June  30, 
had  any  suspicion  that  the  United  States  would  acquire 
the  Philippines.  "Every  American  citizen  who  came  in 
contact  with  the  Filipinos  at  the  inception  of  the  Spanish 
War,"  stated  General  Thomas  M.  Anderson,  who  was  the 
first  to  give  to  Dewey  the  news  that  there  was  talk  in  the 
United  States  of  the  retention  of  the  islands,  "or  at  any 
time  within  a  few  months  after  hostilities  began  probably 
told  those  he  talked  with  .  .  .  that  we  intended  to  free 
them  from  Spanish  oppression,"  In  other  words,  Consul 
General  Pratt,  Admiral  Dewey,  and  many  more  were  re- 
affirming what  had  been  stated  hundreds  of  times  by 
American  representatives  in  the  East  since  the  days  in  1832 
when  Edmund  Roberts  made  his  treaties,  viz.,  that  the 
United  States  had  neither  the  intention  nor  the  constitu- 
tional right  to  acquire  colonies.  In  support  of  this  opinion 
there  was  also  the  very  recent  declaration  of  President 
McKinley  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  that  the  acquisition 
of  territory  was  not  the  purpose  of  the  United  States. 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  619 

The  Filipino  insurgents  appear,  however,  to  have  con- 
sidered the  possibiUty  that  the  American  Government 
might  alter  its  traditional  policy,  and  to  have  decided  that 
at  any  rate  it  would  be  well  to  accept  such  aid  as  was  being 
immediately  offered  and  to  meet  future  problems  as  they 
arose.  Aguinaldo  organized  a  government  on  June  12,  pro- 
claimed a  provisional  constitution  June  23,  and  on  August 
6,  a  week  before  the  American  forces  occupied  Manila, 
issued  an  appeal  to  the  nations  of  the  world  for  recognition 
of  the  independence  and  belligerency  of  his  government. 
Meanwhile  the  insurrectos  established  military  control  over 
part  of  Luzon. 

The  second  significant  event  of  this  period  was  the 
action  of  the  three  European  powers  which  only  three  years 
before  had  intervened  to  demand  the  recession  of  the 
Liaotung  peninsula  to  China  and  subsequently  forced  the 
Empire  to  lease  the  various  ports  already  referred  to  as 
well  as  to  grant  the  spheres  of  influence.  Germany,  espe- 
cially, had  revealed  an  alarming  land-hunger,  and  was 
known  to  be  intriguing  in  Europe  to  bring  about  interven- 
tion in  the  Spanish-American  war.  At  Hongkong  Prince 
Henry,  the  Kaiser's  brother,  who  had  been  dispatched  to 
China  to  make  sure  of  the  lease  of  Kiaochow,  remarked  to 
Dewey  that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  European  powers 
would  permit  the  United  States  to  retain  Cuba.  Shortly 
after  May  first  two  German  cruisers  appeared  at  Manila 
and  other  German  war  vessels  followed.  Indeed  a  trans- 
port with  1200  reserves  was  anchored  in  the  harbor  for  a 
month.  Vice  Admiral  von  Dietrichs  stated  to  Dewey  rather 
sharply:  ''I  am  here  by  order  of  the  Kaiser,  sir,"  and 
proceeded  to  show  a  notable  indifference  to  the  blockade 
regulations  which  Dewey  had  established.  The  German 
force  at  the  end  of  June  was  larger  than  the  blockading 
squadron.  At  the  same  time  the  Germans  sustained  very 
intimate  relations  with  the  Spanish  authorities  within  the 
uncaptured  city,  and  made  themselves  familiar  with  the 
military  situation.  President  McKinley  is  reported  to  have 
believed  that  war  with  Germany  was  imminent. 


620  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Meanwhile  the  ranking  officer  of  the  British  naval  ves- 
sels, Admiral  Chichester,  also  observing  the  proceedings, 
upon  orders  from  his  government  fully  sustained  Dewey's 
blockade  regulations,  and  on  August  thirteenth  when  the 
American  fleet  proceeded  to  attack  the  city  in  cooperation 
with  the  American  land  forces,  the  British  Admiral  moved 
H.M.S.  Immortalite  to  a  point  which  placed  it  between  the 
American  fleet  and  the  vessels  of  the  European  powers. 
Upon  receiving  notice  that  the  city  had  surrendered  to  the 
Americans,  the  British  vessel  alone  offered  a  salute  to  the 
American  flag. 

Peace  Negotiations  with  Spain 

The  peace  negotiations  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  began  July  22,  with  a  message  from  the  Queen  to 
President  McKinley,  transmitted  through  Jules  Cambon, 
the  French  Ambassador  at  Washington. ^*^  To  the  inquiry 
of  the  Queen  as  to  the  possible  terms  of  peace  the  President 
replied,  July  30,  stipulating  (1)  the  relinquishment  by 
Spain  of  Cuba;  (2)  the  cession  of  to  the  United  States,  and 
the  evacuation  by  Spain  of  the  islands  of  Porto  Rico  and 
the  other  islands  now  under  sovereignty  of  Spain  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  also  the  cession  of  an  island  in  the 
Ladrones  to  be  selected  by  the  United  States;  (3)  the  right 
to  occupy  and  hold  "the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila 
pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  which  shall  de- 
termine the  control,  disposition,  and  the  government  of  the 
Philippines."  The  question  of  pecuniary  indemnity  was 
reserved  for  subsequent  discussion.  The  stipulation  for  the 
cession  of  an  island  in  the  Ladrones  had  reference  to  a  cable 
station  which,  as  already  noted,  had  become  necessary  be- 
cause of  the  monopoly  of  the  Great  Northern  Telegraph 
Company  in  Japan  and  China.  The  carefully  drawn  speci- 
fications as  to  Manila  and  the  Philippines  indicates  either 
that  McKinley,  encouraged  by  the  decision  of  Congress  on 
the  Hawaiian  annexation,  had  already  determined  to  hold 
some  part  of  the  Philippines  if  possible,  or  at  least  that  he 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  621 

was  giving  this  question  close  consideration.  It  must  have 
been  quite  obvious  to  any  one  famihar  with  the  dispatches 
from  Tokio,  Seoul  and  Peking  in  the  summer  of  1898,  that 
the  Philippines  offered  a  most  important  strategic  position 
for  the  United  States  in  case  the  threatened  partition  of 
China  along  the  lines  of  the  spheres  of  influence  should  take 
place.  A  close  study  of  the  trade  conditions  during  the 
century  since  the  American  flag  first  appeared  in  Manila 
Bay,  would  have  indicated  that  the  commercial  value  of 
the  islands  was  of  very  much  less  importance  than  the 
strategic  advantages.^  ^ 

"The  terms  relating  to  the  Philippines  seem,"  replied 
the  Spanish  Minister  of  State  (August  7)  "to  our  under- 
standing, to  be  quite  indefinite."  He  pointed  out  that  the 
Spanish  flag  still  waved  over  Manila  and  that  the  control  of 
Spain  of  the  archipelago  was  still  unquestioned  by  any 
military  operations.  However,  the  protocol,  signed  August 
12,  contained  the  stipulation  with  reference  to  the  Philip- 
pines substantially  as  outlined  by  President  McKinley 
twelve  days  before. 

In  his  instructions  to  the  Peace  Commissioners  (Sep- 
tember 16)  the  President  revealed  an  expanding  purpose  in 
the  Far  East  by  ordering  them  to  demand  "the  cession  in 
full  right  and  sovereignty  of  the  island  of  Luzon,  and  equal 
port  and  trade  rights  with  the  Spanish  in  all  unceded  ter- 
ritory in  the  islands."  McKinley  elaborated  his  reasons 
for  these  demands: 

"Without  any  original  thought  of  complete  or  even  partial  acquisi- 
tion, the  presence  and  success  of  our  a,rms  at  Manila  imposes  upon  us 
obligations  which  we  cannot  disregard.  The  march  of  events  rules 
and  overrules  human  action.  Avowing  unreservedly  the  purpose 
which  has  animated  all  our  efforts,  and  still  solicitous  to  adhere  to 
it,  we  can  not  be  unmindful  that  without  any  desire  or  design  on 
our  pa,rt  the  war  has  brought  us  new  duties  and  responsibilities  which 
we  must  meet  and  discharge  as  becomes  a  great  nation  on  whose 
growth  and  career  from  the  beginning  the  Rider  of  Nations  has 
plainly  written  the  high  command  and  pledge  of  civilization." 

The  above  paragraph  was  obviously  a  reference  to  the 
alarming  international  situation  in  the  Far  East.    Asia  was 


622  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

in  imminent  danger  of  a  convulsion  which,  once  started, 
could  hardly  have  failed  to  involve  the  entire  world.  The 
Philippines  were  unlikely  to  remain  long  in  the  hands  of 
Spain  which,  impoverished  by  war,  was  unable  to  defend 
them  and  badly  in  need  of  money.  Either  by  conquest  or 
by  purchase  they  would  very  probably  fall  into  the  out- 
stretched hands  of  some  waiting  European  power — very 
likely  Germany — if  the  Americans  were  to  stand  aside. 

"Incidental  to  our  ten;ire  of  the  Philippines  is  the  commercial 
opportunity  to  which  American  statesmanship  can  not  be  inditt'erent," 
continued  McKinley.  "It  is  just  to  use  every  legitimate  means  for 
the  enlargement  of  American  trade ;  but  we  seek  no  advantages  in 
the  Orient  which  are  not  common  to  all.  Asking  only  the  open  door 
for  ourselves,  we  are  ready  to  accord  the  open  door  to  others.  The 
commercial  opportunity  which  is  naturally  and  inevitably  associated 
with  this  new  opening  depends  less  on  large  territorial  possessions 
than  upon  an  adequate  commercial  basis  and  upon  broad  and  equal 
privileges." 

This,  the  first  use  in  an  American  document  of  the 
''open  door"  phrase  establishes  the  connection  between 
McKinley's  Chinese  and  Philippines  policies.  A  fortui- 
tous concurrence  of  events  had  brought  within  American 
grasp  the  very  expedient  which  Commodore  Perry  and  Dr. 
Peter  Parker  had  urged  in  1853  and  1857.  Manila  might 
become  the  equivalent  for  Hongkong,  and  the  leased  ports 
of  China,  for  the  lack  of  which  American  trade  and  interests 
in  the  Far  East  were,  in  the  summer  of  1898,  in  serious 
prospective  if  not  present  embarrassment. 

Exactly  forty  days  after  signing  the  instructions  to  the 
Peace  Commissioners  who  had  departed  immediately  for 
Paris  where  the  conference  was  held.  Secretary  of  State 
Hay  (October  26)  still  further  enlarged  the  American  de- 
mands by  cabling  to  the  Commissioners: 

"The  information  which  has  come  to  the  President  since  your 
departure  convinces  him  that  the  acceptance  of  the  cession  of  Luzon 
alone,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  islands  subject  to  Spanish  rule,  o.r  to 
be  the  subject  of  future  contention,  can  not  be  justified  on  political, 
commercial,  or  humanitarian  grounds.  The  cession  nnist  be  of  the 
wliole  of  the  archipelago  or  none.  The  latter  is  wholly  inadmissible 
and  the  former  must  therefore  be  required." 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  G23 

The  precise  nature  of  the  information  which  induced 
McKinley  thus  to  increase  his  demands  would  appear  to 
have  been  gathered  from  the  reports  of  the  American  mili- 
tary and  naval  authorities  and  from  the  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence from  the  various  foreign  capitals  in  both  the 
East  and  the  West.  W^hile  Admiral  Dewey  had  thought  so 
little  of  the  first  German  interference  at  Manila  that  at 
first  he  had  not  even  made  a  report  upon  it,  the  facts  were 
reported  to  Europe  or  London  by  at  least  one  foreign  con- 
sul at  Manila  and  were  known  by  the  President.  Various 
American  military  and  naval  officers  from  Manila  were  dis- 
patched to  Paris  where  they  appeared  before  the  Peace 
Commissioners  in  October  and  expressed  themselves  very 
frankly.*  Russia  was  reported  to  be  desirous  of  establishing 
at  least  a  naval  base  in  the  islands.  It  was  very  unlikely 
that  France,  the  possessions  of  which  in  South  China  were 
most  immediately  concerned,  would  let  such  another  op- 
portunity pass  unutilized.  Japan,  fearful  whether  in  an- 
other scramble  for  islands  she  might  not  be  separated  from 
Formosa  as  she  had  been  from  Port  Arthur,  was  very  de- 
sirous that  the  Philippines  be  brought  under  American  pro- 
tection, though  not  unwilling  to  effect  an  understanding 
with  the  United  States  by  which  the  Empire  could  share 
in  the  possession  of  the  islands.  Great  Britain  was  alarmed 
at  the  prospect  of  the  increase  of  European  influence  so  near 
Hongkong,  Singapore  and  her  South  Pacific  possessions. 
The  arguments  against  the  retention  by  the  L^nited  States 
either  of  a  mere  naval  base  or  of  the  island  of  Luzon  were, 
from  the  standpoint  of  military  and  political  affairs,  over- 
whelming. The  complete  relinquishment  or  only  partial 
possession  of  the  islands  would  have  promoted  war  rather 
than  peace  in  Asia. 

After  many  protests  and  with  the  utmost  reluctance 

♦"Senator  Fryp  :  Q.  If  we  should  adopt  your  line  of  demarcation  what  do 
you  think   Spain  would  do  with  the  balance  of  those  islands? 

A.      Sell   them   to  <ierinany. 

Q.     Is  not  (ierniany  aljout  as  troublesome  a  neighbor  as  we  could   get? 

A.  The  most  so,  in  my  opinion.  I  think  it  probable  that  the  balance  of 
the  Spanish  possessions  in  the  Pacific  not  acquired  by  us  will  go  to  Germany. 
Germany  has  long  desired  to  possess  the  Carolines,  and  she  hoisted  her  flag 
at  Yap  in  ISSO."'  (Statement  of  Commander  K.  B.  Bradford.  U.  S.  N.,  October 
14,   1S'J8,   before  the   United   States  Peace  Commission  at  Paris.'=) 


624  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Spain,  while  she  "relinquished"  all  claims  to  sovereignty 
over  Cuba,  "ceded"  Porto  Rico,  Guam  and  the  Philippines 
to  the  United  States  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris  (December  10, 
1898).  It  was  agreed  also  in  lieu  of  the  assumption  by  the 
United  States  of  the  Spanish  debt  in  Cuba  or  the  Philip- 
pines, that  Spain  should  receive  $20,000,000  for  the  Philip- 
pines. 

Debate  on  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines 

Five  phases  of  the  debates  in  Congress  over  the  annexa- 
tion of  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines  may  be  distinguished. 
It  was  a  partisan  contest  in  which  both  the  Democratic  and 
Republican  party  leaders  kept  an  eye  upon  the  presidential 
campaign  of  1900.  There  was  the  clear-cut  legal  question 
as  to  whether  the  American  Government  had  the  constitu- 
tional right  to  acquire  non-contiguous  territory  not  designed 
to  be  admitted  to  statehood  in  the  Union.  There  was  the 
moral  question  arising  out  of  the  consent-of-the-governed 
doctrine.  There  was  the  economic  question  which  included 
on  its  industrial  side  the  fear  of  the  introduction  of  Asiatic 
cheap  labor  and  on  the  commercial  side  the  ambitions  of 
the  trade  expansionists.  There  was,  also,  the  question  of 
expediency:  All  other  phases  of  the  subject  being  dismissed 
as  settled,  did  political,  military  or  commercial  expediency 
demand  annexation?  It  was  one  of  the  greatest  debates  in 
American  congressional  history.^^ 

Of  the  partisan  passages  in  the  debate  little  need  be 
said,  although  one  would  like  to  record  them  as  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  futile  demagogic  clap-trap  of  the  politician  such 
as  always  intrudes  itself  in  popular  government.*  How- 
ever, neither  question  was  decided  on  purely  partisan  lines, 
and  in  the  final  vote  on  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  while  several 
Republicans  voted  against  it,  there  were  enough  Democratic 

♦For  example,  in  the  dobate  on  Hawaii :  "But  above  all,  William  McKinley 
will  have  sor(>  need  for  the  tliiee  eleetoral  votes  of  Hawaii  in  tlie  melancholy 
days  of  November,  in  1!)()(),  when  he  again  faces  at  the  polls  the  ^reat  tribune 
of  the  peoiile.  William  Jennings  Bryan,  of  Nel)raska."  And  a;;ain  :  "There  is 
a  pressinfi  necessity  for  two  rotten  l>oroiij;li  Senators  to  el<e  (lut  flie  single 
gold-standard  majority  at  th(>  other  end  of  the  capit(d."  Tliese  were  two  of 
the  thre(>  reascms  assigned  by  Cliamp  (Mark  (Deni.)  to  the  Kepublicans  as 
being   Hk;  actinil  motives  for  the  annexation   of   Hawaii. 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  625 

and  Populist  votes  to  secure  the  necessary  two-thirds  ap- 
proval. At  the  beginning  of  1899  the  annexation  of  the 
Philippines  had  become  so  popular  -in  various  parts  of  the 
country  that  the  Democratic  leaders,  Bryan  included, 
deemed  it  unwise  to  oppose  it.  Within  six  months  after 
Dewey's  victory  the  territorial  enlargement  of  the  nation 
had  ceased,  in  large  measure,  to  be  a  partisan  question. 

The  constitutional  and  moral  aspects  of  the  choice  were 
discussed  in  able  and  elevated  manner  quite  in  contrast 
with  the  partisan  debate.  The  opinion  of  Chief  Justice 
Taney  in  the  Dred  Scott  case  was  frequently  alluded  to.* 
Much  was  made  of  the  fact  that  both  in  Hawaii  and  the 
Philippines  whatever  government  might  be  set  up  after 
annexation  had  been  accomplished  would  be  without  the 
consent  of  the  governed,  and  that  the  transfer  of  the  ter- 
ritories themselves  was  being  advocated  without  any  clear 
indication  of  the  consent  of  the  people.  This  argument, 
strong  in  fact,  lost  much  of  its  force  from  those  who  while 
advancing  it  still  maintained  that  naval  bases  both  at  Pearl 
Harbor  and  in  the  Philippines  ought  to  be  acquired. 

The  minority  report  on  the  joint  resolution  for  the 
annexation  of  Hawaii  was  presented  in  the  House  by  Hugh 
A.  Dinsmore  who  had  for  two  years  (1887-9)  been  the 
United  States  Minister  Resident  at  Seoul.  Dinsmore 
argued  that  the  annexation  would  be  neither  constitutional 
nor  desirable.  "If  we  acquire  Hawaii,  it  is  but  the  first 
step  in  the  progress  of  colonial  aggrandizement,"  stated 
Dinsmore.  "What  must  we  expect  if  we  enter  upon  a 
colonial  policy?  Suppose  we  set  our  feet  upon  territory  in 
the  Orient.  From  that  moment  we  become  involved  in 
every  European  controversy  with  reference  to  aggressions 
and  the  acquirement  of  territory  there.  No  longer  will  our 
ancient  peace  abide  with  us."  Much  of  the  opposition  to 
annexation  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  by  the  con- 
tinuance of  a  policy  of  territorial  and  political  isolation  it 

*  "There  is  certainly  no  power  given  by  the  constitution  to  the  Federal 
Government  to  establish  or  maintain  cohmies  liordering  on  the  United  States 
or  at  a  distance,  to  l)e  ruled  and  governed  at  its  own  pleasure,  nor  to  enlarge 
its  territorial  limits  in  any  way  except  by  the  admission  of  new   States." 


626  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

would  be  possible  for  the  United  States  to  avoid  war. 
Senator  George  Frisbie  Hoar  (Massachusetts),  although  he 
had  already  set  his  face  like  flint  against  the  acquisition  of 
the  Philippines,  nevertheless  saw  the  futility  of  this  argu- 
ment when  applied  to  Hawaii,  After  a  conference  with 
President  McKinley  in  which  the  latter  had  told  him  of 
the  landing  of  the  Japanese  immigrants  at  Honolulu,  of 
the  evidence  of  their  military  training,  of  the  patent  de- 
termination of  Japan  to  acquire  the  islands,  Hoar  went  into 
the  Senate  and  made  a  powerful  speech  in  advocacy  of 
annexation.  He  based  his  argument  largely  upon  the  con- 
viction that  the  failure  to  annex  at  that  time  would  lead 
to  inevitable  conflict  with  Japan  at  some  future  date.  He 
pointed  out  that  were  a  line  to  be  drawn  from  the  point  of 
American  territory  in  the  Aleutian  Islands  nearest  Asia  to 
the  southernmost  point  of  American  territory  on  the  Pacific 
Coast,  Hawaii  would  lie  eastward  of  that  line.  The  an- 
nexation of  Hawaii  was  to  Senator  Hoar,  indeed  to  most 
Americans,  primarily  a  measure  of  coast  defense.  While 
Dewey's  victory  at  Manila  served  to  expedite  the  considera- 
tion of  the  question,  it  was  the  fear  of  Japanese  aggression 
which  carried  the  greater  weight  in  the  debate  and  it 
seems  probable  that  this  argument  alone  would  have  been 
sufficient  to  accomplish  the  annexation. 

In  the  course  of  the  Hawaiian  debate  practically  all  the 
partisan,  constitutional,  and  moral  grounds  were  traversed 
and  in  the  consideration  of  the  Philippine  question  no  new 
principles  were  brought  forward.  But  the  facts  were  in 
some  respects  very  different.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
intent  of  the  makers  of  the  Constitution  in  respect  to  the 
acquisition  of  non-contiguous  territory  for  colonial  pur- 
poses it  is  at  least  certain  that  no  adequate  provision  had 
been  made  for  specific  constitutional  means  to  meet  the 
situation  which  developed  at  Manila  after  May  1st,  1898. 
In  the  first  place  the  American  fleet  in  Manila  Bay  was  in 
actual  danger.  The  arrival  of  reinforcements  from  Spain, 
the  stiffening  of  either  Spanish  or  Filipino  opposition  to 
Dewey's  presence,  or  the  intervention  of  European  powers 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  627 

were  all  possible  eventualities.  There  were  the  gravest  mili- 
tary reasons  for  strengthening  the  American  forces,  and  for 
the  occupation  of  the  city  of  Manila.  Additional  naval 
vessels  were  sent  and  by  the  end  of  July  there  had  arrived 
from  San  Francisco  an  expeditionary  force  of  nearly  11,000 
although  Dewey  had  asked  for  only  5000.  The  occupation 
of  Manila,  August  13,  did  not  greatly  alter  the  military 
situation  even  though  an  armistice  had  been  established. 
Talk  of  European  intervention  still  continued,  the  Germans 
extended  their  interest  to  other  islands  of  the  archipelago, 
and  the  attitude  of  the  insurrectos  was  most  uncertain.  In 
all  probability  conflict  with  the  Filipinos  might  have  been 
avoided  had  the  American  Government  possessed  the  power 
to  issue  immediately  a  statement  guaranteeing  ultimate 
autonomy  to  the  Islands  under  an  American  or  even  an 
international  protectorate.    But  no  such  power  existed. 

While  these  facts  were  sufiicient  to  account  for  the  new 
aspects  of  the  case  presented  to  Congress  in  December, 
1898,  there  was  another  fact  of  greater  actual  potency. 
President  McKinley  and  his  advisers  at  some  date  which 
may  be  clearly  fixed  as  not  earlier  than  May  1,  and  not 
later  than  the  end  of  that  month,  became  persuaded  that 
the  retention  of  at  least  Manila  would  be  desirable  for 
either  military  or  commercial  reasons,  or  for  both.  The 
President  became  convinced  also  that  the  American  people 
would  support  such  a  program.  It  soon  became  evident, 
however,  that  it  would  be  unsafe  to  retain  Manila  without 
taking  the  entire  archipelago  for  much  the  same  reasons 
that  it  had  been  accepted  as  unsafe  to  retain  Pearl  Harbor 
without  annexing  all  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  The  result 
was  that  a  situation  was  deliberately,  as  well  as  of  necessity, 
created  in  the  Philippines  which  made  the  debate  on  the 
approval  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  somewhat  different  from 
the  debate  on  Hawaii.  When  Congress  met  in  December, 
and  when  the  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  sent  to  the 
Senate  early  in  January,  there  were  already  more  than 
15,000  American  soldiers,  mostly  volunteers,  in  the  Islands, 
and  they  were  in  danger  of  a  Filipino  uprising.    This  new 


628  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

situation  abounded  in  opportunities  to  appeal  to  American 
national  pride,  and  placed  both  the  politician  and  the 
statesman  who  viewed  with  alarm  the  prospect  of  colonial 
possessions  in  positions  where  only  the  wisest  of  men  ought 
to  be.  Nothing  in  all  previous  American  political  expe- 
rience afforded  an  adequate  precedent  or  guide. 

On  December  10,  1898,  the  day  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was 
signed.  Senator  George  G.  Vest  (Missouri)  introduced  a 
joint  resolution: 

"That  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  no  power  is 
given  to  the  Federal  Government  to  acquire  territory  to  be  held  and 
governed  permanently  as  colonies. 

"The  colonial  system  of  European  nations  can  not  be  established 
under  our  present  Constitution,  but  all  territory  acquired  by  the 
Government,  except  such  small  amount  as  may  be  necessary  for  coal- 
ing stations,  correction  of  boundaries,  and  similar  governmental  pur- 
poses, must  be  acquired  and  governed  with  the  purpose  of  ultimately 
organizing  such  territory  into  States  suitable  for  admission  into  the 
Union." 

Two  days  later  the  debate  began  but  the  President  did  not 
wait  for  a  decision.  On  December  21,  he  instructed  the 
War  Department  to  extend  the  military  government  al- 
ready established  at  Manila  over  the  entire  archipelago  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  McKinley  described  American  rights 
in  the  islands  as  acquired  by  conquest.^'*  This  instruction, 
which  was  a  few  days  later  telegraphed  to  Manila  and  pub- 
lished, consolidated  the  opposition  of  the  insurrectos  to 
the  United  States,  whereas  the  passage  of  the  Vest  resolu- 
,tiqn  would  probably  have  prevented  the  approaching  re- 
bellion.* 

Senator  Augustus  O.  Bacon  (Georgia)  introduced  on 
January  11  a  resolution  which  also  would  have  prevented 
the  impending  rebellion. 

"That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaim  any  disposition  or  in- 
tention to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction  or  control  over  said 
islands,  and  assert  their  determination,  when  a  stable  and  independent 

*"Tliey  hpssed  for  some  tangiblo  concession  from  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment— one  wliicli  tliey  could  present  to  the  people  and  which  niifrht  serve  to 
allay  the  excitement.""  (Report  of  meetinc.  January  9,  ISO;).  of  American 
officers  appointed  by  Major  General  E.  S.  Otis  to  confer  with  commission  rep- 
resenting the  Aguiiialdo  government.)  " 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  629 

government  shall  have  been  duly  erected  therein  entitled  to  recogni- 
tion as  such,  to  transfer  to  said  government,  upon  terms  which  shall 
be  reasonable  and  just,  all  rights  secured  under  the  cession  by  Spain, 
and  to  thereupon  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  islands  to 
their  people." 

The  passage  of  this  resolution  would  have  given  to  the 
Philippines  a  status  similar  to  that  already  accorded  to 
Cuba.  February  14th,  a  vote  on  the  Bacon  resolution  re- 
sulted in  a  tie,  and  Vice  President  Hobart  cast  the  deciding 
vote  against  it.  The  same  day  a  joint  resolution,  previously 
introduced  by  Samuel  D.  McEnery  (Louisiana)  was  passed, 
26  to  22,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  ''it  is  the  intention  of 
the  United  States  to  establish  on  said  islands  a  government 
suitable  to  the  wants  and  conditions  of  the  inhabitants  of 
said  islands,  to  prepare  for  them  local  self-government* 
and  in  due  time  to  make  such  disposition  of  said  islands  as 
will  promote  the  interests  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  and  the  inhabitants  of  said  islands."  Permanent  an- 
nexation was  expressly  disavowed.  After  so  much  en- 
couragement from  the  opposition  which  was  conducting  an 
active  campaign  for  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  American 
forces,  the  Filipinos  were  less  than  ever  prepared  to  accept 
a  status  as  a  theoretically  conquered  people.  In  point  of 
fact  the  American  forces  had  not  even  conquered  the  island 
of  Luzon.  The  most  that  can  be  said  in  extenuation  is  that 
the  policy  and  the  resolution  had  been  adopted  in  great 
ignorance  of  the  actual  facts  in  the  islands,  and  in  a  blissful 
and  exalted  assumption  that  any  race  ought  to  regard  con- 
quest by  the  American  people  as  a  superlative  blessing. 

Significance  of  Senate  Approval  of  Treaty  of  Paris 

The  vote  on  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  set  for  February 
6.  Two  days  before  the  vote  the  insurgents  and  the 
American  military  forces  came  into  actual  conflict,  and 
some  American  soldiers  were  killed.  That  this  fact  in- 
fluenced the  decision  of  the  Senate  there  can  be  little  doubt. 

♦Italics   by   T.   D. 


630  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  vote  was  57  to  27,  three  Republican  senators  voting 
with  the  opposition.  A  change  of  two  votes  would  have 
defeated  the  treaty.  While  there  would  appear  to  be  no 
foundation  for  the  charge  that  the  American  military  forces 
in  the  Philippines  had  dehberately  brought  on  the  conflict 
of  February  4  with  a  view  of  influencing  the  Senate,  it  is 
quite  evident  that  while  the  treaty  was  under  consideration, 
the  Administration  had  created  a  condition  in  the  Islands 
which  in  the  end  exercised  a  coercing  influence  on  the 
Senate.  That  such  a  pohcy  had  appeared  to  be  necessary 
at  the  time  reveals  how  utterly  inadequate  are  the  provi- 
sions of  the  American  Constitution  enabling  the  govern- 
ment to  initiate  wise  preventive  measures  to  meet  such 
threatening  situations  as  were  now  constantly  recurring  in 
Asia, 

"The  war  that  followed  it,"  wrote  Senator  Hoar  seven  years  later, 
"crushed  the  Republic  that  the  Philippine  people  had  set  up  for 
themselves,  deprived  them  of  their  independence,  and  established 
there,  by  American  power,  a  government  in  which  the  people  have  no 
part,  against  their  will.  No  man,  I  think,  will  seriously  question 
that  that  action  was  contrary  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  the 
fundamental  principles  declared  in  many  State  constitutions,  the 
principles  avowed  by  the  founders  of  the  Republic,  and  by  our  states- 
men of  all  parties  down  to  a  time  long  after  the  death  of  Lincoln."  ^^ 

Such  a  passage,  which  was  and  is  still  more  or  less  char- 
acteristic of  the  opposition  to  the  acquisition  of  the  Islands 
is  worthy  of  note.  It  assumed  what  was  not  true.  The 
Filipinos  had  not  set  up  a  "republic";  the  nature  of  the 
government  which  they  would  select,  or  which  Aguinaldo 
and  his  advisers  would  have  selected  for  them,  was  not  clear, 
and  the  measures  which  they  had  actually  adopted  by 
February  1,  1899,  by  no  means  prove  that  they  were  likely 
to  set  up  democratic  institutions.  The  rebellion  arose  not 
in  support  of  a  republic  but  in  opposition  to  the  proposed 
conquest  by  the  United  States. 

But  even  were  one  to  grant  the  entire  truth  of  every 
similar  assertion  made  by  Senator  Hoar  and  so  many  others, 
one  need  not  reach  his  conclusion  in  the  absence  of  any 
constructive  suggestion  for  dealing  with  the  international 


HAWAII  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  633 

(les  Philippines  par  les  etats-unis,"  Revue  Hiftorique,  juillet- 
aout,  1903,  pp.  282-3,  for  a  Continental  point  of  view;  also 
Baron  von  Eckardstein's  "Ten  Years  at  the  Court  of  St. 
James    1895-1905." 

7.  North  China  Daily  Neics,  Nov.  29,  1895. 

8.  Dewey  :   "Autobiography,"  1G8  tf. 

9.  Le  Roy  gives  a  thoroughly  adequate  discussion,  based  on  Filipino 

as  well  as  American  documents  of  the  relations  of  Pratt,  Wild- 
man  and  Dewey  to  Aguinaldo.  For  a  much  less  judicial  and 
more  partisan  discussion  see  James  H.  Blount:  "The  Ameri- 
can Occupation  of  the  Philippines,  1898-1912."  The  pamphlet 
literature,  magazine  articles,  and  government  documents  are 
too  multitudinous  to  admit  of  inclusion  here. 

10.  Moore's  "Digest,"  vol.  1,  pp.  520  if.     John  Bassett  Moore  had 

been  in  the  Department  of  State  for  several  years,  and  became 
Secretary  of  the  American  Peace  Commission  at  Paris. 

11.  For  a  highly  enthusiastic  estimate  of  the  possibilities  of  Ameri- 

can trade  with  Asia— really  a  campaign  document  for  the 
Administration  policy — see  Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  Century 
Magazine,  August,  1898.  This  was  partially  reprinted  in 
S.  Doc.  62  :55-3,  Pt.  I,  pp.  563  ff. 

12.  S.  Doc.  62:55-3   (Pt.  I)  p.  484. 

13.  A  very  adequate  collection   of  these  debates   is  to  be  found   in 

Marion  Mills  Miller:  "Great  Debates  in  American  History" 
(New  York,  1913)  14  vols.— Vol.  3,  chaps.  5  and  6, 

14.  S.  Doc.  331:57-1,  pp.  776-8. 

15.  S.  Doc.  208  :56-l,  p.  62. 

16.  Hoar's  "Autobiography,"  Vol.  2,  p.  304. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

THE  KEASSEETION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY 

In  the  McKinley  administration  the  most  aggressive 
force  in  the  relations  of  the  Government  with  Asia  was  not 
the  Department  of  State.  The  Phihppine  policy  issued 
from  the  President  and  he  entrusted  its  execution  to  the 
military  branch  of  the  government.  The  Department  of 
State  does  not  appear  to  have  had  much  to  do  with  it.  It 
was  carried  forward  by  military  rather  than  by  diplomatic 
measures.  Much  subsequent  trouble  would  probably  have 
been  avoided  had  it  been  otherwise.  There  are  at  least 
intimations  that  McKinley  would  have  been  willing  to 
adopt  in  China  a  policy  similar  to  that  w^hich  was  being 
applied  in  the  Philippines.  Happily  the  entrance  of  John 
Hay  into  the  McKinley  cabinet  in  the  autumn  of  1898  re- 
stored the  ascendancy  of  diplomacy  over  military  interven- 
tion and  led  to  measures  which  not  only  averted  the  dis- 
memberment of  China  but  likewise  rendered  unnecessary 
a  program  such  as  McKinley  might  otherwise  have  pro- 
posed.* On  the  other  hand,  the  determination  of  the  Presi- 
dent gave  to  the  Hay  diplomacy  a  support  without  which 
it  might  have  been  less  successful. f 

*.Tohn  W.  Foster  reports  a  conversation  between  McKinley  and  Hay  in 
wiiich  the  former  is  asserted  to  have  expressed  a  willingness  to  share  in  the 
Iiartition  of  China  in  case  the  dismemberment  of  the  Empire  were  actually  to 
taki)    place.'    "^ 

tJohn  Hay,  U.  S.  Ambassador  at  the  Court  of  St.  James  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  McKinley  administration,  was  invited  to  become  Secretary  of  State, 
August  18,  ISDN,  in  place  of  K.  \V.  Day,  wlio  liad  lieeii  Mjiijointed  a  member  of 
the  I'eace  Commission.  Hay  assumed  th(>  duties  of  the  new  office  September  30. 
He  was  the  mo.st  experienced  diplomat  ap])oiiited  to  this  office  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  one  of  tbcA  best  informed  men  of  his  day  upon  lOuropean  politics. 
In  the  dii-ectiim  of  di-flomatic  affairs  in  the  Far  East  Mr.  Hay  was  ably 
assisted  by  W.  W.  Hockhill  who.  at  that  time  Director  of  the"  Bureau  "of 
.\iiierican  Uepublics,  had  been  almost  continuously  in  the  diplomatic  service 
or  the  Dei)artment  of  State  for  fourteen  years.  Hockhill  ent(>re(l  the  diplo- 
matic service  at  his  own  charges  at  (he  liCgation  in  Peking  in  1SS4,  retiring 
tliree  years  later.  In  1 SS?  he  served  for  a  few  moiitlis  as  cluirtit'  d'd^dircx  at 
Seoul  at  a  very  critical  time.  Sulisequeiitly  he  extended  liis  knowledge  of  Far 
Eastern   affairs    by   travels  and    researches,    and    in    1890    was   exceedingly    well 

634 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  635 


The  Far  East  in  1899 

The  close  of  the  Sino-Japanese  War  had  revealed  a 
working  agreement  between  Russia,  Germany  and  France. 
The  most  subtle  force  in  this  informal  alliance,  perhaps, 
was  Germany,  which  was  already  seeking  to  divert  the  at- 
tention of  Russia  from  the  Near  to  the  Far  East.*  Whatever 
the  relations  between  Germany  and  Russia  it  is  evident  that 
the  place  of  France  in  the  concert  was  due  not  to  any  desire 
to  assist  Germany  but  rather  to  the  fact  that  the  extension 
of  Russian  military  and  commercial  influence  in  the  Far 
East  promised  an  ever  widening  field  for  French  investors. 
In  contrast  to  this  concert  of  powers  we  find  the  other  three 
nations  which  were  interested  in  China,  the  so-called  "trad- 
ing nations" — Great  Britain,  Japan  and  the  United  States 
— severally  in  diplomatic  isolation,  and  yet  collectively 
opposed  to  Russia,  Germany  and  France,  and  thus  drawn 
by  a  common  interest  to  each  other. 

The  diplomatic  cordiality  between  Russia  and  the 
United  States,  so  noticeable  in  China  after  1850,  certainly 
did  not  arise  out  of  any  spiritual  kinship  between  the  Rus- 
sian and  the  American  political  theories  or  institutions.  It 
was,  however,  profitable  to  both  nations  and  was  studiously 
cultivated  by  Russia.     In  her  long  struggle  with  England 

prepared  to  interpret  the  situation  in  the  East.  It  has  often  been  said  tliat 
Rockhill's  position  in  the  Bureau  of  American  Republics  was  secured  for  him 
in  order  tnat  the  Department  of  State  misht  still  have  the  benefit  of  his  advice 
on  diplomatic  matters  in  Asia.  Hay  regarded  him  as  one  of  the  two  best 
American  diplomats,  the  other  being  Henry  Wliite.^  The  extent  of  Hay's 
dependence  upon   Rockhill  has.   perhaps,    not   yet   been   fully  appreciated. 

♦Russia  was  for  the  moment  usually  regarded  as  the  leader  in  the  concert 
of  powers  which  brought  about  the  recession  of  the  Liaotung  peninsula.  There 
were  even  rumors  that  Li  Hung  Chang  had  been  assured  by  Russia  before  the 
Treaty  of  Shinioneseki  that  Port  Arthur  would  be  returned  to  China,  (ieneral 
Foster,  who  would  be  expected  to  know,  denied  this.  Count  Witte  in  his 
Memoirs  states  that  he  was  the  initiator  of  the  plan  and  records  that  the  deci- 
sion was  reached  on  March  30.  1X9.").  Korff  and  other  Russians  credit  Witte's 
statement.  Cordier  believes  that  France  was  the  initiator,  having  addressed 
a  communication  to  Russia  on  the  subject  April  10.  The  writer  has  heard  it 
asserted  b.v  one  who  was  intimately  associated  with  the  diplomatic  corps  at 
the  time  that  it  was  usually  accepted  that  the  plan  for  intervention  was  first 
put  forward  by  the  Ji^rench  Legation  at  Peking.  There  is  also  another  version 
of  the  affair  which  was  credited  by  Minister  Denby  but  which  seems  never  to 
have  been  widely  known.  It  was'  believed  that  throughout  the  negotiations  at 
Shinioneseki  Li  Hung  Dianir  was  in  telegraphic  communication  with  Herr  von 
Brandt,  formerly  <;erman  Minister  at  Peking  and  then  attached  to  the  German 
Foreign  Office.  It  was  believed  that  Li  Hung  Chang,  after  feigning  illness  for 
two  days,  signed  the  treaty  immediately  upon  receijit  of  a  telegram  from  von 
Brandt  stating  that  thi^  powers  would  come  to  the  rescue  of  China.  Count 
Hayashi  believed   that  Germany  was  the  initiator  of  the  concert.' 


636  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

she  sought  the  United  States,  also  opposed  by  England,  as 
a  friend  and  possible  ally.  So  long  as  Great  Britain  was 
seeking  to  break  down  the  Monroe  Doctrine  she  was  creat- 
ing favorable  conditions  for  a  Russo-American  understand- 
ing. Russian  friendship  for  the  United  States  was  always 
related  to  British  policy;  the  sale  of  Alaska  was  a  case  in 
point.  While  Stoeckl  made  it  appear  that  Russia  was  re- 
luctant to  sell,  the  situation  was  in  fact  quite  otherwise. 
Russia  was  eager  to  place  in  the  keeping  of  the  United 
States  a  territory  which  Great  Britain  could  so  easily  have 
taken  from  Russia  in  the  case  of  a  war  such  as  seemed 
probable.  Russia  was  equally  glad  to  be  free  to  devote  her 
energies  to  Eastern  Asia.  Almost  immediately  after  the 
sale  of  Alaska  Russia  adopted  in  Peking  a  policy  which 
aroused  the  suspicion  of  the  American  representatives.* 

The  policy  of  Russia  in  China  appears  to  have  been 
always  to  conciliate  China  and  win  her  especial  good  will 
with  a  view  to  capitalizing  it  subsequently  as  was  illus- 
trated in  the  relations  between  Russia  and  China  after  1895. 
There  had  been  many  similar  episodes  in  the  preceding 
thirty-five  years.  Russia  never  sincerely  accepted  the  co- 
operative policy  in  China.  Russian  policy  in  Korea  was 
equally  devious.  These  methods  and  designs  in  the  East, 
coinciding  as  they  did  with  the  reports  of  the  Siberian  exile 
atrocities,  the  new  outbursts  of  Jewish  persecutions,  as  well 
as  with  the  new  cordial  understanding  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  definitely  ended  the  traditional 
friendship  which  had  led  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  in  1871 
to  pen  his  poetic  invocation :  "God  bless  the  Empire  that 
loves  the  Great  Union,  Strength  to  her  People!  Long  Life 
to  the  Czar!" 

Cordial  relations  between  Germany  and  the  United 
States  in  China  existed  until  1882.     Then  Germany  be- 

*In  a  pcrsoual  letter,  March  13,  1S73,  Minister  Low  stated  to  Secretary  of 
State  I'Msli  that  he  luul  reason  to  l)eliev<>  that  Russia  was  not  sincerely  cooper- 
ating witli  the  other  ministers  in  the  common  iihm  to  foi'ce  the  audience  ques- 
tion, lie  lielieved  that  Itussia  was  secr<'tly  advising  the  Chinese  not  to  yield. 
He  thought  that  Russia  was  either  seeking  to  prevent  the  other  powers  from 
increasing  tlieir  inlluence,  or  was  lioping  to  provoke  hostilities  between  China 
and  the  powers,  thus  creating  coiulitions  similar  to  1S(K)  which  would  he 
favorable  for  Kussia   to  acquire   more  Chinese   territory.-' 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  637 

trayed  indications  of  an  aggressive  policy  which  raised 
questions  as  to  how  far  the  Americans  ought  to  carry  co- 
operation.* The  advance  of  German  influence  in  Japan  in 
the  next  decade  was  accomplished  at  the  expense  of  the 
United  States  and  still  further  separated  the  two  powers. 
The  seizure  of  Kiaochow  and  the  establishment  of  the  Ger- 
man sphere  of  influence  in  Shantung  brought  Germany  into 
direct  conflict  with  fundamental  American  policy.  At  the 
same  time  the  harmonious  relations  between  Berlin  and 
Washington  were  being  disturbed  by  questions  of  reciprocal 
tariff  arrangements. 

There  had  been  no  kinship  between  the  policies  of 
France  and  those  of  the  United  States  in  China  at  least 
since  1862  when  the  French  withdrew  from  the  Interna- 
tional Settlement  at  Shanghai.  The  Americans  were  wholly 
opposed  to  the  French  protectorate  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
missions  and  regarded  French  policy  as  one  which  tended 
to  create  general  hostile  feeling  among  the  Chinese  for  all 
foreigners.  American  policy  had,  however,  never  taken 
the  form  of  active  opposition  to  French  interests  and  while 
the  United  States  had  sought  to  mediate  in  the  Franco- 
Chinese  War  (1884-5)  the  attitude  of  Frelinghuysen  had 
been  one  of  the  most  scrupulous  and  even  timid  neutrality. 
In  1899  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  France 
were  cordial,  but  the  American  Government  was  as  far 
removed  from  sympathy  with  French  as  with  Russian  or 
German  designs  in  the  East. 

The  old  cordiality  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
was  cooling,  but  it  W8.s  not  cold.  The  United  States  had 
stood  by  Japan  in  the  Sino-Japanese  War,  and  the  immi- 
gration and  Hawaiian  questions  had  only  created  a  passing 
chill.  The  evieute  of  October  8,  1895,  in  Seoul,  the  murder 
of  the  queen  and  the  subsequent  acquittal  of  Miura  had 
greatly  reduced  American  regard  for  the  Japanese  but  there 

♦"The  government  with  whom  we  have  been  most  in  sympathy  is  Ger- 
many. .  .  ."  But  "in  recent  years  Germany  has  shown  activity  in  the  East. 
Her  policy  has  been  eager,  decisive,  and  peremptory,  going  so  far  ...  as  to 
land  troops  on  Chinese  soil,  and  prevent  the  Chinese  from  carrying  out  their 
interpretation  of  the  treaties.  The  ad\an(e  of  German  iiilhience  had  been 
marlied  and  steady."  (Young  to  Frelinghuysen,  February  4,  1883.*)  Cordier 
relates  the  episode  at   Swatow  where  German   marines  were  landed.* 


638  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

had  been  little  to  choose  between  the  methods  of  China  and 
of  Japan  in  Korea  except  that  one  had  failed  and  the  other 
had  been  successful.  The  American  occupation  of  the 
Philippines  was  the  best  test  of  the  quality  of  Japanese- 
American  relations.  Before  1898  the  Filipino  insurgents 
had  sought  aid  from  Japan  and  a  small  quantity  of  arms 
had  been  smuggled  into  Luzon  from  Japanese  sources. 
When  the  insurgents  turned  against  the  United  States  in 
1899  they  again  appealed  to  Japan  for  sympathy  and  help. 
Through  a  German  firm  in  Japan  some  munitions  were 
actually  started  on  their  way  to  the  Philippines,  but  they 
were  intercepted  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
effort  ever  received  any  sympathy  from  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment. Japan  was  never  in  a  more  difficult  situation  than 
in  1898  and  the  Japanese  Government,  as  well  as  the  more 
conservative  press,  expressed  the  earnest  wish  that  the 
United  States  would  remain  in  the  Philippines.  Among 
all  the  possible  neighbors  to  Japan,  particularly  to  Formosa, 
Japan  vastly  preferred  the  United  States  to  any  other 
Western  power.  Furthermore,  the  traditional  American 
policy  was  as  favorable  to  Japan  in  China  as  it  had  been 
to  Japan  in  Korea.  The  closing  of  the  doors  in  China 
before  Japan  had  really  entered  them  in  force,  or  the  par- 
tition of  the .  Empire  at  a  time  when  Japan  was  wholly 
unable  to  share  in  the  supposed  benefits,  were  as  inimical 
to  Japan  as  to  the  United  States.  The  two  nations  were 
natural  allies  and  Japan,  recently  so  roughly  treated  by  the 
concert,  probably  would  have  been  not  unwilling  to  effect 
a  formal  alliance  with  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States. 

The  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  in  the  Far  East  had  never  been  actually  unfriendly 
since  1853.  They  reached  their  maximum  of  cordiality  in 
both  China  and  Japan  in  1866  and  then  cooled  slowly  until 
in  the  second  Cleveland  administration  all  semblance  of 
cooperation  disappeared.  But  in  1898-9  Great  Britain 
found  herself  diplomatically  isolated  in  Europe  and  opposed 
in  the  East  by  the  three  most  powerful  European  powers. 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  639 

She  then  turned  again  to  the  United  States  just  as  she  had 
under  similar  conditions  in  1854  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Crimean  War.  England  had  always  boasted  that  she, 
like  the  United  States,  desired  the  open  door  in  China. 
The  assertion  was  true  in  a  measure,  but  with  this  qualifica- 
tion, that  since  1842,  while  the  door  had  been  open,  the 
vestibule,  i.e.,  the  trade  routes,  either  by  way  of  the  Cape 
or  by  way  of  Gibraltar,  Suez,  Ceylon,  Malacca,  Singapore 
and  Hongkong — the  only  trade  routes  from  Europe — had 
been  in  the  well  fortified  keeping  of  Great  Britain.  She 
could  have  effectually  closed  the  door  from  Europe  to  Asia 
at  any  time,  and  no  doubt  would  have  closed  it  to  any 
nation  which  ventured  to  take  up  arms  against  her,  not 
merely  in  China,  but  anywhere  else  in  the  world.  After 
1895  Great  Britain's  strategic  position  in  the  East  under- 
went a  relative  diminution.  Japan  acquired  Formosa,  thus 
assuming  potential  control  of  the  trade  routes  north  of 
Hongkong.  Germany  obtained  an  equivalent  to  Hongkong 
on  the  Shantung  peninsula  which  was  calculated  to  tap  the 
trade  of  North  China  as  effectively  as  Hongkong  had 
drained  the  trade  of  the  South.  Russia  came  into  possession 
of  a  supposedly  impregnable  fortress  at  Port  Arthur  and 
controlled  practically  all  the  coast  of  Northern  Asia  down  to 
Shanhaikwan  where  the  Great  Wall  meets  the  sea. 
Meanwhile  a  new  trade  route  in  the  North — the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway — was  in  the  course  of  construction.  In 
1899  Great  Britain  was  in  a  relatively  weaker  position  in 
China  than  she  had  ever  been  before.  It  is  not  to  be  won- 
dered at  that  Admiral  Chichester  placed  the  Immortalite 
between  the  American  and  the  European  fleets  on  the 
morning  (August  13,  1898)  when  the  Americans  moved  to 
the  attack  on  the  city  of  Manila.  Had  Russia,  Germany 
or  France,  instead  of  the  United  States,  been  the  attacking 
party  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Great  Britain  could  have  done 
otherwise  than  oppose  them.  And  yet  England,  about  to 
be  engaged  in  South  Africa,  could  have  offered  only  a  very 
uncertain  resistance  to  any  coalition  of  European  powers. 
Events  thus  conspired  to  bring  the  United  States,  Japan 


640  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

and  Great  Britain  together.  Their  interests  in  China  ap- 
peared to  be  identical.  The  closing  of  the  door  was  an 
obstacle  alike  to  all  three.  As  for  American  interests,  the 
Spanish-American  War  and  the  Filipino  insurrection  had 
created  a  diplomatic  situation  novel  in  American  history 
since  the  Civil  War,  for  which  the  truculent,  non-coopera- 
tive policy  of  Cleveland  and  Gresham  was  no  solution. 

Overtures  for  an  Alliance 

When  the  famous  Hay  notes  of  September  6,  1899  are 
isolated  from  the  details  of  the  international  situation  in 
which  they  were  launched  they  lose  much  of  their  signifi- 
cance. As  a  definition  of  policy  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  we  may  think  of  them  as  the  answer  of  the  American 
Government  to  certain  informal  proposals  from  British 
sources  which  had  invited  an  alliance  of  three  or  four 
powers  for  purposes  very  similar  to  those  which  were 
eventually  expressed  in  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  of 
1902. 

An  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  no  new  idea  even  in 
1899.  British  writers  had  been  proposing  such  a  relation- 
ship intermittently  for  a  quarter  of  a  century.  The  steady 
advance  of  Japan  had  convinced  many  even  before  1880 
that  the  assumption  of  British  foreign  policy  that  Japan 
was  a  weak  and  negligible  quantity  while  China  was  the 
only  nation  in  the  Far  East  worth  cultivating,  was 
erroneous.* 

*  The  Japan  Daily  Herald  (November  9,  1875)  notes  without  disapproval  an 
article  in  the  London  i<pectator  in  which  it  was  suggested  that  by  means  of  an 
alliance  with  Japan  England  niiiiht  be  able  to  engage  unemployed  Japanese 
saiuaurai  in  war  against  ("bina  over  the  murder  of  Margery.  The  Sijcctator 
reinarl<ed  that  Enghmd  needed  an  island  and  an  ally  in  the  Far  East.  The 
Shanghai  Courier  and  <l(i~cttc  (reprinte<l  in  the  Japan  Oazctlc,  August  5, 
IsTii)  replied  that  for  an  ally  Enghnul  could  count  on  Japan,  and  as  for  an 
island  it  nnght  be  possible  to  secure  either  the  I^ew  Chews  from  Japan  or 
•  Juclpert  from  Korea.  The  Japan  Gazette,  February  5,  1,S77,  reprinted  from 
the  I\ill  Mall  Iiud()et  an  article  in  which  the  question  was  raised:  "Are  we 
laying  the  seeds  of  a  valuable  and  sincere  alliance?"  The  German  Army 
Gazett(»  (alludi'd  to  in  the  Japan  Herald,  October  21),  1S7'.))  had  advocated  an 
offensive  and  dcfensiv»>  alliance  between   (iermany  and  Japan. 

Jajtan's  unique  strategic  position  bad  also  not  passed  unnoticed  by  some 
Americans.  I  te  Long  had  felt  (hat  an  alliance  between  Japan  and  the  Ignited 
States  might  some  day  be  desirable.  Harris  appears  to  have  l)een  not  unmindful 
of  the  advantages  of  such  an  arrangement,  and  General  Grant  nuiy  have 
recognized  It. 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  641 

The  abrupt  change  of  attitude  on  Japanese  treaty  re- 
vision in  1886  was  an  indication  of  changing  British  policy, 
but  it  was  so  little  marked  that  until  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  in  1894  Japan  suspected  that  England  was  in  secret 
alliance  with  China.^  When  it  became  clear  that  there  was 
no  such  pact  Japanese  statesmen  would  appear  to  have 
begun  seriously  to  consider  the  possibility  of  some  sort  of 
an  Anglo- Japanese  convention.  This  was  fully  in  line  with 
the  policy  which  had  been  suggested  by  Lord  Hotta  in 
1858  and  by  Viscount  Tani  in  1887.  The  Japanese  halted 
between  an  alliance  with  Russia  and  one  with  England. 
On  the  whole  Japan  had  less  to  forgive  if  she  chose  Russia, 
but  she  also  would  have  more  co  fear. 

A  new  impetus  to  the  discussion  was  given  by  the  visit 
of  Lord  Charles  Beresford,  representing  the  Associated 
Chambers  of  Commerce  of  Great  Britain,  to  China  and 
Japan  in  the  winter  of  1898-9.  Both  in  China  and  in  Japan 
in  public  addresses  Lord  Beresford  developed  at  length  the 
idea  that  the  open  door  in  China  could  not  be  maintained 
in  the  face  of  the  opposition  of  France  and  Russia  unless 
there  was  a  combination  of  powers  which  were  willing  to 
fight  to  keep  it  open.*  Beresford  proposed  an  elaborately 
devised  scheme  for  the  creation  of  a  police  force  in  China 
in  which  Chinese  troops  would  be  directed  by  British,  Ger- 

*"Our  policy  as  dpclared  by  the  Cabinet,  approved  by  the  country,  and  I 
am  pertVctly  sure  by  every  one  in  this  room,  is  what  is  called  the  'open  door.' 
.  .  .  Ministers  have  raved  with  their  hands  over  their  heads,  declaring  that 
they  will  tight  for  the  'open  door.'  "  (Speech  of  Beresford  at  annual  dinner 
of  Shanghai  Branch  of  China  Association,  reported  in  North  China  Daily  News, 
November   21,   1S98.) 

"Great  Britain,  as  you  know,  has  declared  in  the  most  public  manner  that 
her  policy  in  the  future  with  regard  to  the  safety  of  her  interests  and  trade 
and  commerce,  must  be  the  policy  of  the  open  door,  and  as  far  as  I  can  gather 
from  the  many  kind  interviews  I  have  received  in  this  country,  the  people  of 
this  great  Empire  are  determined  that  the  policy  of  the  open  door  shall  con- 
tinue in  China  so  far  as  thev  are  concerned.  Therefore  I  say  that  our  policy 
and  our  interests  for  the  future  are  identical."  Beresford  then  proposed,  as 
he  had  in  China,  a  "commercial  alliance  or  understanding  based  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  open  door."  But  the  open  door  would  not  be  of  very  much  use, 
he  lielieved,  unless  the  integrity  of  China  was  maintained.  Therefore  he  pro- 
posed an  alliance  of  the  four  trading  nations — Great  Britain,  Japan,  the  United 
States  and  <Jermany — "with  the  definite  understanding  on  the  integrity  of 
Cliina,  so  that  the  door  can  be  kept  open."  To  the  possible  objection  that 
Germany  might  not  be  ready  to  agree  to  the  open  door,  Beresford  pointed  out 
that  Germany  had  already  declared  Kiaochow  an  open  port.  "I  am  suggesting 
to  you  nothing  new,"  remarked  the  speaker.  The  policy  was  supposed  already 
to  exist,  but  he  believed  that  an  alliance  was  necessary  to  guarantee  it. 
(Beresford  speech  before  the  Tokio  Japanese-Oriental  Association,  reported  in 
the  Japan  Times,  January  22,   1899.) 


642  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

man,  Japanese  and  American  military  instructors.  The 
open  door,  he  thought,  would  be  of  little  use  "unless  the 
room  inside  is  in  order."  The  proposed  police  force  would 
operate  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  Ever-Victorious  Army 
under  Ward  and  Gordon  had  aided  in  the  suppression  of 
the  Taiping  Rebellion,  but  Beresford's  plan  would  have 
involved  placing  the  Chinese  troops  under  foreign  control. 
"Why,"  he  asked  in  Japan,  "should  not  the  Japanese  officers 
try  to  put  the  Chinese  army  in  order,  on  the  understanding 
that  China  will  keep  the  door  open?  ...  I  believe  I  per- 
sonally was  the  first  public  man  in  England  that  ventured 
to  suggest  that  what  would  be  for  the  interest  of  your  coun- 
try and  ours  would  be  an  alliance  between  the  Empire  of 
the  West  and  the  Empire  of  the  East.     (Applause.)'' 

The  Beresford  speeches  were  an  exercise  in  diplomatic 
kite-flying.  It  was  officially  denied  in  Parliament  that  he 
was  speaking  in  any  other  capacity  than  as  a  representative 
of  the  Chambers  of  Commerce,  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
early  in  1898,  before  Beresford  departed  from  England, 
Joseph  Chamberlain  and  others  had  supported  a  proposal 
for  an  alliance  of  Great  Britain  with  both  Germany  and 
the  United  States.  This  semi-official  proposal  reached  the 
form  of  actual  conversations  with  the  German  ambassador 
in  London  '  and  was  even  taken  up  officially  with  Mr.  Hay.* 
Lord  Beresford  returned  from  the  Far  East  by  way  of 
America  where  he  made  many  speeches  in  the  early  part 
of  1899.  That  the  Beresford  proposals  as  outlined  in 
China  and  Japan  found  their  way  to  President  McKinley, 
Secretary  Hay  and  Mr.  Rockhill,  there  can  be  little  doubt. 
The  Beresford  plan  accomplished  nothing  except  the 
creation  of  a  rumor  that  the  Department  of  State  had  made 
a  "secret  alliance  with  England."    How  utterly  baseless  this 

*".  .  .  I  saw  in  the  evening  papers  the  news  of  the  Anglo*Gernian  agree- 
ment to  defend  the  integrity  of  Cliina  and  the  ^)pen  Door.  This  is  the  greatest 
triumph  of  all.  Lord  S.  [Salisbury]  proposed  this  to  me  before  I  left  England. 
I  could  not  accept  it  because  I  knew  that  unspeakable  Senate  of  ours  would 
not  ratify  it,  and  ever  since  I  have  b(>en  laboring  to  bring  it  about  without  any 
help,    and   succeeded   as   far   as    was    possible    for    one   power   to   do."      (Hay    to 

C S n ,   October   20,   1900,   in   "Letters  and   Diaries   of  John   Hay," 

VoL  3,  p.  199.     Printed  but  not  published,  Washington,   1908.) 

Hay  subsequently  e.\press(>d  some  doubt  as  to  the  sincerity  of  Germany  in 
the  Anglo-German    convention. 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  643 

rumor  was  ought  to  have  been  apparent  when  in  April, 
1899,  Great  Britain  entered  into  a  convention  with  Russia 
by  which  the  two  powers  agreed  to  respect  each  other's 
spheres  of  influence  in  the  Yangtze  Valley  and  outside  the 
Great  Wall,  respectively.  This  agreement  was,  in  effect,  a 
certificate  of  title  granted  by  each  to  the  other  for  special 
privileges  in  a  very  large  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  A 
similar  agreement  between  Germany  and  England  had  been 
made  the  preceding  year.  Affairs  in  China  were  daily  be- 
coming more  complicated  and  each  new  agreement  was 
inimical  to  the  United  States  as  well  as  to  China.  It  was 
quite  true  that  England  would  have  liked  to  save  China 
for  open  trade  but  British  diplomacy  had  no  other  resource 
than  the  alliance.  British  commerce  was  far  better  off  with 
the  existing  low  Chinese  tariffs  and  an  open  door  to  the 
entire  trade  than  it  would  have  been  with  a  part  of  China 
under  exclusive  British  control  and  the  other  fragments 
closed  to  free  commercial  intercourse,  but  England  appar- 
ently felt  that  she  must  fight  fire  with  fire.*  If  England 
could  not  rely  upon  the  support  of  the  United  States,  and 
apparently  she  could  not,  she  was  likely  to  adopt  a  policy  in 
China  which  would  be  as  objectionable  to  the  United  States 
as  were  the  policies  of  Russia,  France  and  Germany.  For 
America  to  ignore  the  British  calls  for  help  and  at  the  same 
time  to  offer  no  substitute  for  an  alliance  was  to  drive  Eng- 
land still  farther  along  towards  the  partition  of  China  and 
render  more  certain  the  dismemberment  of  the  Empire. 

The  choice  before  the  United  States  in  1899  was  just 
what  it  had  been  in  the  fifties:  cooperation  with  Great 
Britain,  or  independent  action.  To  reject  an  alliance  and 
offer  nothing  in  its  place  was  a  purely  negative  policy  which 
only  increased  the  difficulties  and  pitted  the  United  States 
against  not  one,  but  all  of  the  other  powers.  It  is  a  signifi- 
cant fact  that  the  rejection  of  the  offer  of  an  alliance  in 
1857  had  accomplished  nothing  for  China  and  had  resulted 

*".  .  .  we  havp  hithorto,  at  any  rato — whatever  the  future  may  have  in 
store  for  us — maintained  the  principle  of  the  open  floor  in  that  country." 
(Joseph  Chamberlain  at  the  meeting  of  the  Wolverliampton  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, reported  in  the  London  Timcn,  January  19,  1899.) 


644  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

in  the  eclipse  of  American  prestige.  In  the  settlement  at 
Tientsin  in  1858  the  United  States  had  no  influence. 
Otherwise  the  Americans  might  have  exercised  a  restraint 
upon  the  dictatorial  and  ruthless  Lord  Elgin.  Again,  in 
Japan  the  retirement  of  the  United  States  from  a  cordial 
cooperation  with  England  had  resulted  in  the  elimination 
of  American  influence  in  the  final  treaty  revision.  What 
it  had  accomplished  for  Japan  might  have  been  obtained 
by  other  means;  it  had  been  costly  to  the  United  States. 
So  now  in  1899  the  United  States  was  in  grave  danger  of 
complete  elimination  from  influence  in  China.  The  choice 
was  really  between  cooperation  with  such  powers  as  had 
similar  interests  and  exercising  upon  them  as  much  of  a 
restraining  influence  as  a  powerful  ally  always  possesses, 
or  futilely  opposing  the  entire  company  of  the  powers. 

John  Hay  and  the  Open-Door  Notes 

England  wanted  an  alliance.  It  is  unlikely  that  Japan 
would  have  hesitated  to  join.  Probably  John  Hay,  had  he 
been  at  liberty  to  make  a  perfectly  free  choice,  would  have 
favored  it,  although  the  Beresford  plan  was  in  its  details 
open  to  the  gravest  of  objections.*  Beresford's  plan 
would  have  driven  the  Chinese  into  the  arms  of  Russia  and 
provoked  a  war  terrible  to  contemplate.  But  an  alliance  to 
protect  China  rather  than  to  destroy  her  had  much  to  com- 
mend it.  Those  who  talk  so  glibly  about  the  superlative 
advantages  of  independent  action  in  American  foreign  re- 
lations cannot  bring  to  the  support  of  their  arguments  any 
large  array  of  facts  gathered  from  American  relations  with 
the  East  since  1899.  It  seems  highly  probable  that  an 
alliance  of  Great  Britain,  Japan  and  the  United  States  at 
that  time  in  support  of  a  common  policy  in  China,  such  as 
Mr.  Hay  could  have  defined  and  the  other  powers  would 

*"Tho  fact  is,  a  treaty  of  alliance  is  impossible.  It  could  never  get  through 
the  Senate.  As  long  as  I  stay  here  no  action  shall  be  taken  contrary  to  my 
convictidn  tliat  the  one  iiulisijcnsable  feature  of  our  foreign  policy  should  be 
a  rriciidly  uiKlerstaiidiiig  with  lOiigland.  But  an  alliance^  must  remain,  in  the 
pres<'n1  state  of  things,  an  unattainable  dream."*  (Hay  to  Henry  White, 
September    24,    1899.) 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  645 


have  accepted,  would  have  been  vastly  preferable  to  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  of  1902  which  would  have  been 
rendered  unnecessary. 

The  peculiar  contribution  of  Hay  at  this  critical  mo- 
ment was  not  the  invention  of  the  open  door  policy,  for 
that  was  as  old  as  our  relations  with  China,  but  the  direct- 
ing of  a  diplomatic  technique  by  which  the  open  door  could, 
in  a  measure,  be  guaranteed  without  actual  resort  to  either 
force  or  alliances.  It  was  not  an  adequate  measure  but  it 
IS  difficult  to  see  how  any  more  effective  measure  could 
have  been  devised  under  the  circumstances.     Two  factors 

the  rece^ 

nited  States  and_the-p*esence 

with  large  reserves 


contributing  to  the  success  ofjlay's  effort^_were 

in  the  East  oTa  large  expeditiona! 
in  Oie  United  Slaleri;  aiid  (.he  natural  ideniity~of  BritisH, 
Japanese,  aiuPpossibly  German,  interests  in  China.  Al- 
though no  shadow  of  treaty  engagements  existed,  a  certain 
amount  of  "give-and-take"  had  been  going  on  between 
Japan,  England  and  the  United  States  for  several  months. 
The  United  States  had  declined  to  intervene  in  Korea  after 
the  murder  of  the  queen,  and  had  recalled  an  anti-Japanese 
American  representative;  Japan  had  withdrawn  her  pro- 
tests at  the  annexation  of  Hawaii;  England  had  stood  by 
the  United  States  in  the  Spanish-American  War;  and  now 
the  American  Government  was  making  the  utmost  effort 
to  maintain  the  strictest  neutrality  in  the  Boer  War  in  the 
face  of  no  inconsiderable  anti-British  an^  pro-Boer  Ameri- 
can sentiment.  The  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  in  process 
of  negotiation,  and  England  had  expressed  wilhngness  to 
make  concessions  to  promote  the  construction  of  an  Ameri- 
can, rather  than  an  Anglo-American  Isthmian  canal.  In 
a  word,  the  United  States  was  now  well  embarked  again 
upon  a  cooperative  policy  like  that  of  Seward's. 

But  John  Hay  was  a  very  different  type  of  man  from 
William  H.  Seward,  and  when  he  turned  to  the  Chinese 
question  he  found  the  model  not  in  Seward's  bellicose  policy 
in  Japan  but  in  the  more  direct,  straightforward,  irenic  and 
independent  course  of  Anson  Burlingame,  who  had  set  out 


646  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

to  save  China  from  the  rapacity  of  the  powers  by  agree- 
ment. On  September  6,  1899,  Hay  instructed  the  American 
representatives  in  London,  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  (Jo- 
seph H.  Choate,  Andrew  D.  White  and  Charlemagne  Tower, 
respectively)  to  approach  the  governments  to  which  they 
were  accredited  with  similar  though  not  identic  proposi- 
tions concerning  commercial  rights  in  China.  He  pointed 
to  the  various,  verbal  or  written  statements  which  had 
already  been  made  by  each  power  respecting  freedom  of 
trade  for  all  nations  on  equal  terms  and  asked  for  "formal 
declarations"  to  the  following  effect:  " 

"First.  [That  it]  Will  in  no  wise  interfere  with  any  treaty  port 
or  vested  interest  within  any  so-called  'sphere  of  influence'  or  leased 
territory  it  may  have  in  China. 

"Second.  That  the  Chinese  tariff  of  the  time  being  shall  apply  to 
all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all  such  ports  as  are  within  said 
'spheres  of  interest'  (unless  they  be  'free  ports')  no  matter  to  what 
nationality  it  may  belong,  and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  collected 
by  the  Chinese  Government. 

"Third.  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbor  dues  on  vessels  of 
another  nationality  frequenting  any  port  in  such  'sphere'  than  shall 
be  levied  on  vessels  of  their  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  railroad 
charges  over  lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its  'sphere'  on 
merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities 
transported  through  such  'sphere'  than  shall  be  levied  on  similar 
merchandise  belonging  to  its  own  nationals,  transported  over  equal 
distances." 

The  propositions  received  immediate  attention.*  The 
proposals  were  not  entirely  acceptable  to  any  of  the  powers 
addressed.  Even  England  wished  to  have  exceptions  made 
to  meet  the  peculiar  conditions  of  her  own  interests.  It  is 
notable  that  although  the  notes  contemplated  the  applica- 
tion of  the  declaration  to  all  leased  territory,  Lord  Salisbury 
excluded  the  newly  leased  area  at  Kowloon  from  his  assent. 
Great  Britain  really  regarded  this  land  as  for  all  practical 
purposes  a  part  of  the  ceded  territory  of  Hongkong.  It  had 
been  taken  in  the  form  of  a  lease  rather  than  as  a  cession 
in  order  that  Germany,  Russia  and  France  might  not  have 

•Wlicn    the   correspoDdonce    was    published    it    was  agreed    to    omit    from    it 

the   various  notes  which   carried   the   negotiations  and  to  include  only    the  Hnal 

answers.  This  fact  has  proved  misleading  to  many  who  have  assumed  that 
only  (Jreat  Britain  made  an  immediate  reply. 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  647 

precedent  for  transmuting  their  respective  leases  into  actual 
cessions  of  territory.  With  this  single,  and  in  principle  not 
unimportant  exception,  England  agreed  to  the  declaration 
(November  30).  Germany  stated  (December  4)  that  she 
"would  raise  no  objection"  if  the  other  powers  agreed. 
France,  which  was  approached  November  22,  replied  De- 
cember 16.  Russia  gave  a  very  evasive  declaration  two 
days  later.  Japan  and  Italy,  which  were  approached  after 
the  other  powers,  agreed  promptly  December  26  and  Jan- 
uary 7,  respectively.  The  news  of  the  negotiations  was 
released  to  the  press  January  3,  1900. 

What  was  Obtained? 

What  had  been  obtained?  Not  so  much  as  is  popularly 
supposed.  The  United  States  had  not  secured  more  than 
already  accrued  to  it  under  the  "most-favored-nation" 
clauses  in  the  treaties.  The  preferential  railway  and  min- 
ing privileges  had  in  no  way  been  disturbed.  Although  the 
United  States  expressly  stipulated  that  it  did  not  recognize 
the  spheres  of  influence  the  replies  to  the  notes  had  in 
each  case  afforded  an  opportunity  of  reaffirming  that  there 
were  such  spheres.  There  remained  no  good  harbor  on  the 
entire  coast  of  China  where  the  American  Government 
could  have  leased  a  port  had  it  so  desired.  On  March  20, 
1900,  Secretary  Hay  announced  that  he  regarded  as  "final 
and  definitive"  the  declarations  of  the  several  powers  that 
the  open  door  would  be  maintained  and  that  China  would 
continue  to  collect  the  customs  and  therefore  exercise  the 
rights  of  sovereignty  in  the  sphere  of  influence,  but  as  a 
matter  of  fact  only  the  partition  of  the  Empire  had  been 
halted.  The  Hay  notes,  which  are  believed  to  have  been 
drafted  by  Rockhill,  were  as  significant  in  their  omissions 
as  in  their  contents.  By  their  omissions  they  marked  vir- 
tual surrenders  which  the  American  traders  in  the  forties 
and  fifties  would  probably  have  contemplated  with  little 
satisfaction.  These  notes  have  been  popularly  mislabeled. 
They  did  not  secure  a  completely  open  door.    But  they  did 


648  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

avert  the  immediate  partition  of  the  Empire,  for  the  Powers 
assented  to  the  recognition  of  the  sovereign  tax-collecting 
rights  of  China.  They  also  averted  the  accomplishment 
of  any  scheme  of  foreign-officered  police  such  as  Lord 
Beresford  had  proposed. 

The  Hay  Notes  may  be  best  appreciated  when  they  are 
regarded  as  a  purely  temporary  expedient  to  meet  a  specific 
situation.  As  such  they  were  a  success.  As  a  permanent 
measure  they  are  less  to  be  commended  for  they  did  not 
secure  the  open  door  as  had  been  hoped  and  they  did  not 
avert  further  threatening  engagements  among  the  powers, 
notably  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  The  United  States 
had,  in  fact,  missed  a  great  opportunity  to  serve  both  its 
own  interests  and  those  of  China,  but  the  failure  cannot  be 
ascribed  to  John  Hay. 

The  open  door  policy  has  become  so  much  a  phrase  to 
conjure  with  in  American  politics  that  a  definition  of  it  as 
it  was  in  1899  is  in  order.  Based  on  sixty  years  of  history 
and  on  the  circumstances  as  well  as  the  text  of  the  notes  the 
definition  was  as  follows:  The  United  States  still  adhered 
to  the  policy,  to  which  Seward  alone  had  made  exception, 
of  independent  rather  than  allied  action.  This  indepen- 
dence was  not,  however,  to  preclude  cooperation.  The 
American  Government  relinquished  the  right  to  lease  a  port 
in  China  like  Kiaochow  or  Port  Arthur  for  all  the  good  ports 
were  either  leased  or  preempted  by  non-alienation  agree- 
ments. The  United  States  was  making  no  specific  demand 
for  the  open  door  for  investments;  there  was  not  enough 
American  money  seeking  investment  to  make  it  worth  while 
to  quarrel  about  the  preferential  rights  to  construct  rail- 
ways or  operate  mines  which  had  already  been  given  to  the 
other  powers.  The  United  States  merely  demanded  an 
open  door  for  trade  in  that  part  of  China  in  which  American 
merchants  were  already  interested,  viz.,  the  area  westward 
from  Kwangtung  on  the  South  to  Manchuria  on  the  North. 
As  for  Korea,  the  United  States  was  not  politically  or  com- 
mercially interested.  And  as  for  those  parts  of  the  tradi- 
tional Chinese  Empire  in  the  extreme  south  where  "France 


\ 


THE  REASSERTION  OF  THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  649 

had  already  carved  out  an  empire,  or  along  the  Amur  where 
Russia  had  begun  the  partition  of  China  in  1860,  the  United 
States  had  never  murmured  a  protest. 

^  What  the  American  Government  would  have  done  had 
the  powers  withheld  assent  from  the  Hay  proposals  is  a 
speculative,  yet  interesting  and  important  question.  It 
seems  cleaT__tliai_lhe_United  States__would  not  have  taken 
jip  arms  eitlier  to^enfprce  "aiseni2tothe~open  door  l^olicy, 


ortcTprevent  the  £artition  of  the  Jiimpire.  _Chi_lhe_other 
Kand^ad_  th^d^ismembernient^^  started^^here 

._wpulcLJiave  been  a  very  strong  sentmieni;  in  the_United 
States  against  remai'ii^Tg  nloof  fr'^nithe__divj^ioriof__the 
^ptiiis7''X'onsidering  what  John  Hay  had  towOTk  withTand 
what  he  had  to  work  against,  his  must  be  regarded  as,  if  not 
a  famous  victory,  then  at  least  an  important  diplomatic 
coup.  The  United  States  had  not  secured  a  great  deal,  as 
the  next  score  of  years  revealed,  but  what  it  had  obtained 
cost  nothing,  was  accompanied  by  the  assumption  of  no 
obligations,  and  was  in  return  for  no  actual  concessions. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  John  W.  Foster:    "Diplomatic  Memoirs,"  Yol.  2,  p.  257. 

2.  William  Roscoe  Thayer:    "Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,"  Yol. 

2,  p.  244. 

3.  For  the  different  assertions  with  reference  to  the  return  of  Port 

Arthur  to  China,  see  "Memoirs  of  Count  Witte,"  p.  84;  S.  A. 
Ivorff :  "Russia's  Foreign  Relations  during  the  Last  Half  Cen- 
tury," p.  57;  "Recollections  of  a  Foreign  Minister"  (Memoirs 
of  Alexander  Iswolsky) ;  Chas.  Louis  Seeger,  translator,  p.  30; 
Cordier:  "Relations,  etc.,"  Yol.  3,  p.  288;  "Secret  Memoirs  of 
Count  Hayashi,"  pp.  51  ff. 

4.  China  Dispatches,  Yol.  34,  Mar.  13,  1873,  Low  to  Fish. 

5.  Foreign  Relations,   1883,  p.   191;   Cordier:     "Relations,"   Yol.   2, 

pp.  577  ff. 

6.  Hayashi  Memoirs,  p.  45. 

7.  "Letters  from  the  Kaiser  to  the  Czar,"  p.  48. 
j8.     Thayer:    "John  Hay,"  Yol.  2,  p.  221. 

•9.     The   Hay   Notes   and    correspondence    are   printed    in   For.    Rel. 
1899,   pp.   128   ff.   under  the   caption    "Correspondence   Concern- 
ing American  Commercial  Rights  in  China."   Moore's  "Digest," 
Yol.  5,  pp.  534  ff.,  gives  all  the  essential  material. 


\ 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXEE  INSUREECTION 

Excluding  all  details  of  the  Boxer  affair  extraneous  to 
a  study  of  policy,  we  may  outline  our  theme  in  four  ques- 
tions: What  happened?  What  did  the  American  Govern- 
ment desire?  What  methods  were  employed?  What  were 
the  successes  and  failures? 

The  Boxer  Insurrection 

The  disturbances  in  China  which  culminated  in  the 
Boxer  affair  had  been  approaching  for  many  years.  For 
three  quarters  of  a  century  the  alien  Manchu  dynasty  had 
been  losing  the  loyalty  and  confidence  of  the  Chinese  peo- 
ple. The  Chinese  entertained  no  special  dislike  for  the 
Alanchus  as  aliens  or  as  conquerors,  but  the  corruption  and 
weakness  of  their  government  made  them  objectionable  as 
rulers.  In  return  for  the  taxes,  which  were  steadily  increas- 
ing, the  government  did  not  maintain  peace  within  the 
Empire  nor  was  it  successful  in  protecting  China  from  the 
attacks  of  other  nations.  Brigands,  pirates  and  revolution- 
ists continually  disturbed  the  orderly  conditions  necessary 
for  trade.  The  humiliating  defeats  at  the  hands  of  foreign 
powers,  1839-42,  1856-60,  1894-5,  to  which  were  added 
numberless  other  impositions  and  exactions  by  foreigners, 
costing  the  Empire  large  sums  of  money  and  some  losses  of 
territory,  revealed  the  Manchus  as  incapable  of  effectively 
discharging  the  trust  which  had  been  reposed  in  them. 
After  1853  the  Manchu  dynasty  owed  its  power  in  China 
not  to  its  own  vitality  or  the  loyalty  of  its  subjects,  but 
rather  to  the  fact  that  the  foreign  powers  had  willed  that  it 

650 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  651 

remain.  Otherwise  the  Manchus  probably  would  not  have 
survived  the  Taiping  Rebellion. 

The  Chinese  people  do  not  appear  to  have  had  any- 
conspicuous  hatred  of  the  foreigner  as  such.  They  liked  the 
foreign  trade  for  it  was  profitable.  They  hated  the  for- 
eigner only  because  his  presence  in  the  Empire  increased 
their  taxes,  disturbed  their  peace,  and  because  his  extra- 
territorial privileges  gave  to  him  a  privileged  social,  religious 
and  economic  position.  He  was  able  to  evade  many  of  the 
onerous  local  taxes  which  fell  the  more  heavily  upon  the 
Chinese.  Roman  Catholic  converts,  and  to  some  slight  de- 
gree Protestant  converts  also,  passed  under  the  protection 
of  foreign  powers.  After  1860  the  French  missionaries  went 
through  the  country  and  demanded  the  return  of  church 
property  which  had  been  sequestered  more  than  two  cen- 
turies ago  and  had  long  since  passed  into  the  possession  of 
innocent  proprietors  who  supposed  that  their  titles  were 
valid.  The  demands  of  the  bishops  and  priests  for  majes- 
terial  rank  was  a  constant  irritation.  The  attitude  of  the 
converts  was  often  insolent  and  intolerable.  Likewise  the 
opium  trade,  while  unchallenged  by  the  populace,  aroused 
the  resentment  of  the  few  who  could  justly  claim  public 
spirit  and  patriotism.  Meanwhile  the  prompt  and  often 
unjust  demands  for  reparations  and  for  the  settlement  of 
claims,  which  were  collected  locally  even  though  they  were 
paid  from  Peking,  again  touched  the  Chinese  people  on  their 
most  sensitive  nerve,  their  money,  and  aroused  resentment. 
The  officials  and  the  gentry  whose  privileges  were  most 
threatened  by  the  anti-Manchu  movements  were  not  slow 
to  direct  the  unrest  of  the  people  against  the  foreigners. 

In  a  word,  both  the  Manchu  government  and  the  for- 
eigners were  steadily  inviting  and  stimulating  the  antago- 
nism of  the  Chinese.  One  wonders  how  the  latter  endured 
as  much  as  they  did. 

The  powers  sustained  the  Manchu  government  not  be- 
cause they  respected  it,  but  because  they  did  not  dare  to 
take  the  risk  of  permitting  successful  revolution  which 
would  have  resulted  either  in  the  separation  of  the  Empire 


652  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

into  fragments,  or  the  establishment  of  some  new  vigorous 
central  authority  which,  while  restoring  order  and  promot- 
ing the  development  of  the  country,  would  likewise  have 
been  able  to  set  up  an  effective  opposition  to  the  encroach- 
ment of  the  powers.  To  the  latter  it  was  most  profitable 
to  sustain  a  weak  government  which  they  could  intimidate 
and  control.  The  policy  of  the  foreign  governments  was  to 
crowd  the  Chinese  to  a  compliance  with  every  foreign  de- 
mand, but  to  stop  just  short  of  creating  the  causes  for  suc- 
cessful revolution.  A  weak,  disintegrating  China  made  pos- 
sible the  continuance  of  extraterritoriality,  an  absurdly  low 
tariff,  and  an  hundred  kindred  privileges  such  as  the  Japa- 
nese, who  were  eluding  the  grasp  of  the  powers,  were  more 
and  more  able  to  escape.  Probably  the  most  effective  ally 
of  China  was  the  mutual  jealousies  of  the  powers. 

Had  the  powers  realized  that  Japan  would  be  victorious 
in  the  war  of  1894-5  and  that  as  a  result  of  the  Chinese 
defeat  the  Chinese  people  also  would  slip  for  the  moment 
from  the  indirect  control,  presumably  they  would  have  in- 
tervened and  driven  the  Japanese  back  to  their  island 
homes.  What  they  had  expected  was  a  victory  for  China 
which  would  cripple  Japan  and  restore  the  latter  to  their 
power.  But  the  treaty  of  Shimoneseki  revealed  the  Manchu 
government  enfeebled  beyond  all  hope  of  recovery.  It  also 
showed  Japan  preparing  to  assert  herself  not  merely  in  the 
Korean  peninsula  but  also  elsewhere  on  the  mainland  of 
Asia. 

The  weakness  of  the  Empire,  the  growing  ambitions  of 
Japan,  the  political  rivalries  of  Europe  and  the  overflowing 
coffers  of  European  money-lenders,  created  conditions 
favorable  for  a  stampede  among  the  powers.  The  leasing 
of  ports,  the  acquirement  of  spheres  of  influence,  the  non- 
alienation  compacts  followed.  The  Manchu  government 
was  being  treated  with  derision  by  the  powers,  and  the 
Chinese  people  saw  themselves  the  present  and  future  vic- 
tims. They  would  have  to  pay.  They  were  therefore  ready 
to  turn  upon  the  Manchus  not  because  they  were  Manchus 
but  because  they  were  collecting  taxes  under  false  pretenses. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  653 

They  were  rendering  poor  government  and  surrendering 
their  domain.  The  Chinese  were  also  ready  to  turn  against 
the  foreigners,  not  because  they  were  foreigners,  but  because 
they  were  secondarily  the  disturbing  influence. 

Following  the  Sino-Japanese  War  the  powers,  had  they 
been  united  in  a  desire  to  help  China,  might  have  given  sup- 
port to  a  reform  movement  which  would  have  resulted  in  a 
better  government  and  set  the  Chinese  people  on  the  path  of 
advance.  But  the  powers  were  utterly  divided.  Only  the 
United  States  wanted  a  strong  China  and  the  United  States 
was  after  all  only  slightly  interested.  The  Empress  Dow- 
ager therefore  seized  the  opportunity.  She,  also,  was  not 
conspicuously  anti-foreign,  but  she  was  shrewd  enough  to 
see  that  her  best  hope  of  sustaining  the  Manchu  dynasty 
and  her  own  influence  was  to  exterminate  or  expel  the  for- 
eigners. This  program,  successfully  carried  through,  would 
restore  the  vanished  prestige  of  her  government.  The 
powers,  by  their  jealousy  of  each  other  and  by  their  unvar- 
nished greed,  played  directly  into  her  hand  by  furnishing 
her  each  day  with  fresh  illustrations  of  rapacity.  The  for- 
eigners, from  the  Parsee  opium  trader  up  the  scale  to  the 
most  unselfish  and  untiring  Christian  missionary,  owed  their 
lodgment  in  the  Empire  to  the  "naked  force"  of  some  for- 
eign vessel  of  w^ar  which  had  never  been  out  of  call  since 
1842.  Between  the  muzzle  of  these  guns  and  the  people  at 
whom  they  were  aimed  were  a  multitude  of  foreigners,  many 
of  them  seekers  after  peace,  honest  and  kindly  in  their  deal- 
ings, but  no  amount  of  uprightness  could  conceal  the  guns 
which  supported  them  and  which  were  each  month  becom- 
ing more  numerous.  The  people,  ignorant  and  incredibly 
superstitious,  were  goaded  to  desperation.  While  the  for- 
eigner remained  aloof,  the  Empress  Dowager,  "Old 
Buddha,"  skillfully  diverted  from  herself  and  her  dynasty  to 
the  foreigner  the  wrath  which  in  spite  of  its  horrible  mani- 
festations was  none  the  less  the  proof  of  the  innate  vitality 
of  the  Chinese  people.  Thus  the  Manchus  escaped  a  few 
years  longer.  The  foreigners  became  the  victims.  Collec- 
tively they  richly  deserved  their  fate;  but  as  so  often  hap- 


654  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

pens  the  individuals  who  paid  the  terrible  price  were  in 
equal  measure  innocent. 

The  important  events  of  the  Boxer  insurrection,  which 
have  been  chronicled  by  a  multitude  of  writers,  may  be  tabu- 
lated with  brevity.^  On  September  22,  1898,  following  a 
''hundred  days"  of  unintelligent  and  frantic  reform  under  a 
rash  young  Emperor,  the  Empress  Dowager  resumed  her 
place  as  captain  of  the  Chinese  junk  of  state.  The  follow- 
ing winter  the  Legations  at  Peking  found  it  wise  to  bring  up 
small  companies  of  guards  from  the  foreign  fleets.  The  total 
number  of  guards  that  winter  was  141,  of  which  the  Ameri- 
cans supplied  18.  In  the  spring  the  guards  retired  and  it  was 
not  thought  necessary  for  them  to  return  the  following 
winter,  but  the  rapid  increase  of  hostility  to  foreigners  and 
the  murder  of  several  of  them  elsewhere  in  North  China 
alarmed  the  foreign  community  and  May  31,  1900,  a  much 
larger  force  representing  eight  nationalities  was  brought  up 
from  Tientsin.*  Meanwhile  the  Boxer  bands  were  closing 
in  upon  Peking  and  were  being  merged  in  the  Imperial 
troops.  The  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Government  became 
obviously  hostile  and  on  June  10,  a  relief  expedition  from 
the  foreign  vessels  of  war,  475  strong,  under  Admiral  Sir 
Edward  H.  Seymour,  set  out  to  afford  the  foreign  com- 
munity in  Peking  additional  protection.  The  next  day  a 
member  of  the  Japanese  Legation  was  murdered  and  on  the 
14th  the  Legations  were  definitely  cut  off  from  communica- 
tion with  the  outside  world.  On  the  17th  the  forts  at  Taku 
were  taken  by  the  joint  action  of  the  foreign  fleets,  the 
Americans  not  participating;  three  days  later  the  Imperial 
troops  at  Peking  opened  fire  upon  the  Legations  and  the 
German  Minister,  von  Ketteler,  was  shot  in  the  street.  The 
Seymour  expedition  had  encountered  resistance  and  had 
been  compelled  to  return  to  Tientsin.  The  viceroys  and 
governors  of  the  Yangtze  and  Southern  provinces  held  aloof 
from  the  insurrection  and  for  the  most  part  protected  the 
foreigners,  thus  confining  the  conflict  to  the  North  and  espe- 
cially to  Shantung  and  Chihli. 

♦There  wore   458   foreigners   actually  engaged   as   military   in   the   siege ;   56 
were   American. 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  655 

After  the  capture  of  the  Taku  forts  the  Chinese  engaged 
in  a  systematic  attack  upon  the  foreign  community  at  Tien- 
tsin, and  on  July  14  the  city  was  captured  by  the  joint 
efforts  of  the  foreign  forces,  the  American  forces  participat- 
ing. On  July  30  the  Tientsin  Provisional  Government,  a 
civil  organization  under  the  direction  of  the  military,  was 
set  up. 

The  Peking  relief  expedition  did  not  actually  start  from 
Tientsin  until  August  4.  It  comprised  about  19,000,  of 
which  2,500  were  Americans  with  Major  General  Adna  R. 
Chaffee  commanding.  Germany  was  unrepresented  in  this 
expedition;  it  was  composed  chiefly  of  Russians  and  Jap- 
anese. There  was  no  allied  command,  each  nation  operating 
independently  yet  with  a  semblance  of  conference  between 
the  commanding  officers.  The  Russians  betrayed  a  lack  of 
good  faith  and  revealed  suspicious  ulterior  motives.  The 
Legations  were  relieved  on  August  14  at  the  end  of  one  of 
the  most  thrilling  episodes  in  modern  history.  Although 
the  American  flag  was  first  on  the  walls  of  the  Tartar  city, 
the  British  preceded  the  Americans  into  the  Legation  area. 
On  August  24  Li  Hung  Chang  and  Prince  Ching  were  for- 
mally appointed  as  Chinese  plenipotentiaries.  About  two 
months  later  Count  Waldersee,  a  German  Field  Marshal, 
with  the  approval  of  all  the  foreign  governments,  assumed 
the  duties  of  Generalissimo  of  the  foreign  forces  in  China, 
and  thus  supplied  a  nominal  unity  to  the  military  govern- 
ment, the  relation  of  which  to  the  diplomatic  body  was  never 
very  clearly  defined.  On  December  24  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  a  joint  note 
which  contained  their  demands  as  a  basis  for  peace.  Two 
days  later  these  demands  were  accepted  and  the  negotiations 
for  the  terms  of  the  protocol  were  begun.  There  were  many 
delays  in  the  perfecting  of  this  convention,  due  chiefly  to 
the  inability  of  the  powers  to  agree  among  themselves,  and 
it  was  not  signed  until  September  7,  1901. 

With  this  rapid  survey  of  events  in  mind,  let  us 
pass  to  a  review  of  American  policy  at  the  end  of  the 
century. 


656  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  Desires  of  the  American  Government 

When  the  true  nature  of  the  insurrection  became  known 
the  American  Government  naturally  shared  to  the  fullest 
extent  in  the  common  desire  of  the  powers  to  effect  the 
rescue  of  their  Legations,  to  make  sure  of  reparations  for 
the  damage  done  and  for  the  expense  of  their  naval  and 
military  forces,  but  on  the  question  of  the  correction  of  the 
conditions  which  had  made  possible  the  insurrection,  the 
agreement  among  the  powers  was  less  marked. 

The  American  Government  had  already  defined  the 
general  principles  of  its  political  and  commercial  policy  in 
the  Hay  notes,  but  now  something  more  specific  was  re- 
quired. Secretary  of  State  Hay  addressed  a  circular  note  to 
the  powers  on  July  3,  which  became  the  base-line  for  all 
subsequent  American  policy. 

"In  this  critical  posture  of  affairs  in  China  it  is  deemed  ap- 
propriate to  define  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  as  far  as  the 
present  circumstances  permit  this  to  be  done.  We  adhere  to  the  policy 
initiated  by  us  in  1857  of  peace  with  the  Chinese  nation,  of  further- 
ance of  lawful  commerce,  and  of  protection  of  lives  and  property  of 
our  citizens  by  all  means  guaranteed  under  extraterritorial  treaty 
rights  and  by  the  law  of  nations.  If  wrong  be  done  to  our  citizens  we 
propose  to  hold  the  responsible  authors  to  the  uttermost  accounta- 
bility. We  regard  the  condition  at  Peking  as  one  of  virtual  anarchy, 
whereby  power  and  responsibility  are  practically  devolved  vipon  the 
local  provincial  authorities.  So  long  as  they  are  not  in  overt  collu- 
sion with  rebellion  and  use  their  power  to  protect  foreign  life  and 
property,  we  regard  them  as  representing  the  Chinese  people,  with 
Avhom  we  seek  to  remain  in  peace  and  friendship."  ^ 

The  reference  to  the  policy  of  1857  is  illuminating,  and 
1/  recalls  the  continuity  of  American  policy.  Hay  did  not 
conceive  himself  to  be  the  originator  of  new  principles. 
Great  Britain,  France,  Russia  and  Japan  had  all  been  at  war 
with  China;  the  United  States,  never.  But  the  kernel  of 
the  policy  in  1900  was  to  forestall  a  declaration  of  war  and  a 
military  movement  by  one  or  more  of  the  Powers  against 
the  Chinese  Empire.  ''Anarchy"  at  Peking  might  be  dealt 
with  locally  and  was  susceptible  of  settlement  by  repara- 
tions, but  war  against  the  Empire  would  probably  involve 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  657 

permanent  occupation  or  the  surrender  of  territory.  A 
declaration  of  war  against  China  by  any  one  of  them  would 
quite  probably  have  been  followed  in  a  short  time  by  hostili- 
ties between  rival  powers.  Hay,  greatly  aided  by  the  jeal- 
ousies of  the  other  powers,  was  entirely  successful  in  this 
phase  of  his  policy.  It  cannot  be  asserted  that  Hay  was 
solely  responsible  for  no  declaration  of  war  against  China, 
but  it  seems  fair  to  rate  the  circular  note  of  July  3  as  an  im- 
portant contribution  to  the  peaceful  solution  of  the  Chinese 
problem.  It  was  unaccompanied  by  any  compromising 
acquiescence  in  the  programs  of  other  powers  such  as  in 
1857  had  rendered  the  policy  of  Buchanan  and  Cass  so 
futile  and  hypocritical. 

Hay  elaborated  in  a  few  carefully  phrased  sentences  the 
general  policy  of  the  United  States  adding  both  definiteness 
and  scope  to  what  had  been  stated  in  the  notes  of  the  pre- 
vious year: 

".  .  .the  policy  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  to  seek  a 
solution  which  may  bring  about  permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China, 
preserve  Chinese  territorial  and  administrative  entity,  protect  all 
rights  to  friendly  powers  by  treaty  and  international  law,  and  safe- 
guard for  the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and  impartial  trade  with 
all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire." 

Such  phrases  as  ''territorial  and  administrative  entity"  and 
"all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire"  reveal  a  certain  vigor  and 
precision  of  purpose  which  were  lacking  in  the  Open  Door 
Notes.  One  has  a  feeling  that  since  September  6,  of  the  year 
previous,  American  policy  in  China  had  been  taking  shape 
and  stiffening.  \ 

^,,Hay's  broad  purpose  as^reyealed-m-tbc  courcc  QL_Lhi 

Protopol  iipg?rtT?rtTrrrprwqs  suhstflntin11y_as_follows:  to  main-,^j^^ 

'tain  harmony  among  the  Powers  and  by  united  action  to 
secure  as  quickly  as  practical  the  removal  of  the  foreign  "  : 
military  forces  from  Chinese  territory;  to  secure  adequate 
reparations  and  adequate  punishments  for  the  responsible 
instigators  of  the  insurrection  and  yet  to  prevent  the  imposi- 
tion upon  China  of  injustices  which  would  be  fruitful  of  new 
antagonisms  and  sow  the  seeds  for  an  even  more  formidable 


658 


AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 


popular  uprising ;  -^smrl   to  semirp  suoh   n dministrative  an( 
fiscal  reforms  as  wouldjnakEJiIliina  iii^^the~Iuture  the  l)esj: 
w^ggiKlpjTiarl-pt  for  i]itpr7-inti'^^''«1  tracTe!    Efe~TTUw^d~ClTrna 
as  the  wei 


lire"TTr(^i4mtiaLial.^Q0Jj.tical  and  commer- 
cial^ystem.  --Enlightened  self-interest  dictated-thai~~.lh£ 
jinivers^iould  unite  tostrength^nJMsJink.  The  American 
policyirTT^O  has'Since'beericlothed  with  a  garb  of  altruism 
which  it  could  not  properly  claim.  Its  motive  was  not  con- 
spicuously benevolent,  but  its  object  was,  nevertheless, 
highly  beneficent. 

The  rescue  of  the  foreigners  at  Peking  and  the  cessa- 
tion of  atrocities  having  been  accomplished  without  a  decla- 
ration of  war,  the  next  pressing  questions  were  the  punish- 
ment of  the  guilty  and  the  fixing  of  the  form  and  amount  of 
reparations,  Germany  brought  forward  the  proposal  that 
the  foreigners  should  not  only  designate  the  guilty  but  also 
become  their  executioners.  The  American  Government 
opposed  such  a  plan.  Russia,  in  harmony  with  its  estab- 
lished policy  of  conciliating  China,  supported  the  United 
States.  In  the  end  the  views  of  the  United  States  and 
Russia  partially  prevailed.  The  demands  for  capital  pun- 
ishment were  eventually  reduced  from  ten  to  four,  many 
names  were  removed  from  the  lists,  and  lighter  forms  of 
punishment  were  indicated  for  others.  The  execution  of  the 
penalties  was  carried  out  by  the  Chinese  Government. 
Likewise  the  American  Government  opposed  further  puni- 
tive expeditions  after  the  occupation  of  Peking  and  Tientsin. 
Here  the  policy  of  the  United  States  was  unsuccessful  and 
Mr.  Hay's  purpose  was  foiled.  The  punitive  expeditions  of 
some  of  the  powders,  notably  Germany,  Russia  and  France, 
exhibited  to  the  Chinese  the  worst  phases  of  Caucasian  char- 
acter and  made  the  white  man  in  many  localities  of  China 
an  object  of  terror  which  still  lingers. 

In  the  determination  of  the  amount  of  the  indemnity  the 
American  proposals  likewise  failed.  The  Department  of 
State  reached  the  tentative  conclusion  that  the  most  that 
China  could  pay  without  permanent  damage  to  the  Empire 
was   about   $150,000,000,   an   estimate   which   was   subse- 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  659 

quently  increased  to  $200,000,000.  It  was  believed  that  any 
larger  amount  "would  not  only  entail  permanent  financial 
embarrassment  on  the  country,  but  might  possibly  result  in 
either  international  financial  control,  or  even  loss  of  ter- 
ritory." The  United  States  was  willing  to  accept  bonds 
issued  at  par,  bearing  3  per  cent  interest  and  running  for 
thirty  or  forty  years.  The  American  claims  were  fixed  at 
the  maximum  lump  sum  of  $25,000,000.  The  other  Powers 
had  scant  sympathy  for  such  a  proposal  and  the  indemnity 
was  eventually  placed  at  $333,000,000.  It  would  perhaps 
have  been  even  larger  had  it  not  been  for  the  opposition  of 
the  United  States.  The  bonds  were  issued  at  par  and  bore 
4  per  cent. 

Russia  would  have  preferred  that  the  Chinese  indemnity 
be  guaranteed  by  the  powers  rather  than  paid  in  bonds 
issued  directly  by  the  government.  This  proposal  met  with 
the  immediate  opposition  of  the  powers  which  wished  to 
protect  China  as  much  as  possible  from  subsequent  Euro- 
pean interference,  but  Mr.  Hay  at  length  agreed  that  he 
would  support  the  objectionable  guaranty  plan  if  measures 
were  taken  to  reduce  the  amount  of  the  indemnity.  To  this 
the  powers  would  not  consent.  The  American  Government 
opposed  the  suggestion  for  the  creation  of  an  international 
fortress  at  Peking  or  elsewhere,  and  would  not  support  the 
proposal  that  the  powers  jointly  forbid  the  importation  into 
China  of  arms,  ammunition  or  material  for  their  manufac- 
ture. In  a  word  the  United  States  opposed  all  measures 
which  were  calculated  to  weaken  the  resistance  of  China  in 
future  conflicts  with  encroaching  powers. 

Russia,  which  was  suspected  of  having  already  entered 
into  a  secret  agreement  with  China  that  she  would  use  her 
influence  in  China's  favor  in  return  for  the  actual  or  virtual 
cession  of  Manchuria,  just  as  in  1860  she  had  obtained  the 
left  bank  of  the  Amur  as  a  reward  for  her  supposed  influence 
in  persuading  the  French  and  the  British  armies  to  retire 
from  Peking,  suggested  that  the  whole  question  of  the 
indemnity  be  referred  to  the  Hague  Tribunal.  The  United 
States  supported  this  proposition,  but  the  other  powers 


660  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

would  not  listen  to  it.  However,  they  did  agree  to  the  sug- 
gestion of  Mr.  Hay  that  the  indemnity  be  fixed  in  a  lump 
sum  to  be  divided  among  the  powers  subsequently  by 
mutual  agreement.  This  arrangement  protected  China  from 
the  pressure  of  individual  powers  and  made  it  impossible  for 
any  power  to  commute  its  financial  claim  into  a  demand  for 
territory  or  special  privilege.  For  the  sake  of  further  shield- 
ing the  Empire  from  the  rapacity  of  the  powers  the  Ameri- 
can Government  would  have  liked  to  see  the  entire  negotia- 
tions for  the  Protocol  transferred  from  Peking  to  some 
foreign  capital.  This  proposition  received  no  support  ex- 
cept from  Russia  which  doubtless  would  have  greatly 
profited  from  such  an  arrangement. 

The  next  most  important  point  in  the  negotiations  was 
the  proposal  to  increase  the  customs  dues  to  provide  more 
ample  funds  for  the  payment  of  the  huge  indemnity. 
France  and  Russia  desired  to  have  the  tariff,  which  was  at 
that  time  only  about  3.17  per  cent  effective,  increased  to 
10  per  cent.  Mr.  Hay  suggested  (April  11)  that  there 
should  be  a  thorough  revision  of  the  commercial  treaties, 
following  the  signing  of  the  Protocol,  and  that  in  return  for 
certain  long  desired  reforms  in  Chinese  domestic  taxation,  a 
new  tariff  be  made  in  which  the  duties  be  increased  to  from 
5  to  15  per  cent  according  to  the  character  of  the  goods, 
the  scale  being  graded  according  to  whether  the  articles  were 
necessities  or  luxuries.*    Mr.  Rockhill  was  very  cautious  in 

♦Paraphrase  of  telegram,  Hay  to  Rockhill,  April  11,  1899 :  "...  the 
essential  object  of  the  revision  of  consular  treaties  is  to  favor  Chinese  financial 
stability  and  promote  ability  to  buy  in  any  market  and  to  exchange  native 
products,  wherever  produced,  on  equal  terms  with  all  nations.  Inequalities  of 
likin  should  be  removed,  and  fixed  rates  for  all  China  should  be  scheduled 
according  to  the  importance  and  value  of  imports — some  higher  than  now  and 
others  lower,  as  they  can  safely  stand.  Trade  with  the  interior  is  made 
speculative  and  uncertain  liy  the  present  irregular  likin.  Customs  duties 
should  he  scheduled  anew.  Besides  discriminating  against  cheaper  necessaries, 
the  pi'esent  uniform  rate  yields  inadequate  revenue.  Five  to  fifteen  per  cent, 
according  to  the  character  of  the  goods,  would  equalize  trade  without  partiality 
or  burden,  and.  as  trade  penetrates  the  interior,  would  yield  steadily  increasing 
revenue.  Application  to  the  whole  of  China  of  the  open  door  is  required  to  do 
this.  Equal  opportunity  should  be  had  by  all  trading  nations  to  sell  through- 
out the  Empire.  Lower  duties  should  be  attached  to  imports  tending  to 
develop  Chinese  productiveness.  Agricultural  implements  and  simpler  manu- 
facturing machinery  should   be  especially  favored." 

"The  Chinese  can  gain  i)rosperity  so  as  to  bu.v  what  they  do  not  produce 
only  by  developing  native  productions.  Special  trade  favors  to  any  Power 
on  the  ground  of  reciprocity,  territories,  occupation,  or  spheres  of  influence 
should  be  guarded  against  by  stringent  favored-nation  clause  now  and  for  the 
future.     It  is  necessary  to  secure  increased  access  to  interior  markets.  .  .   ."  * 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  661 

committing  the  American  Government  to  raising  the  tariff 
because  he  recognized  on  the  part  of  the  nations  like  Russia, 
which  were  least  interested  in  the  trade,  a  disposition  to 
make  large  the  indemnities  and  then  to  shift  the  burden  of 
payment  upon  the  trading  nations  by  increasing  the  tariff. 
He  also  was  unwilling  to  separate  the  tariff  question  from 
that  of  internal  fiscal  reform  whereas  the  non-trading  na- 
tions were  not  unwilling  to  see  the  continuance  of  the  inter- 
nal abuses  which  had  always  been  such  an  embarrassment 
to  the  trader.  China  would,  indeed,  have  been  better  off 
with  a  $150,000,000  indemnity  and  an  only  5  per  cent  effec- 
tive tariff  than  with  a  $333,000,000  indemnity  and  a  10  per 
cent  tariff,  but  what  was  needed  was  a  genuine  fiscal  reform. 
Mr.  Rockhill  specified  as  compensating  advantages  for 
treaty  revision:  abolition  of  likin  on  imports  and  exports, 
including  transit  pass  duty ;  right  of  foreigners  to  reside  and 
do  business  throughout  the  Empire ;  revision  of  inland  navi- 
gation rules;  creation  of  a  mining  bureau  and  good  regula- 
tions; strict  adherence  to  principle  of  equal  opportunity  to 
people  of  every  nationality;  the  opening  of  Peking  as  a 
treaty  port;  and  the  adoption  of  measures  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  river  approaches  to  Shanghai,  Tientsin  and 
Newchwang.^ 

When  the  stupendous  indemnity  had  been  decided  upon, 
and  when  Mr.  Rockhill  encountered  general  opposition  to 
thorough  reforms  Hay  cabled  (June  21)  that  the  American 
Government  was  opposed  to  raising  the  revenue  above  5 
per  cent  effective.*  At  the  same  time  he  instructed  Rockhill 
to  refrain  from  opposing  the  proposition  that  a  10  per  cent 

♦That  the  opposition  of  Mr.  Hay  to  a  10  or  even  IH  per  cent  tariff  was 
due  to  tlie  fact  that  the  indemnity  liad  been  raised  to  so  hii?h  a  figure  and  the 
lilcin  was  not  abolished  is  perfectly  clear  from  the  correspondence. 

John  A.  Kasson,  special  commissioner  plenipotentiary,  to  Hay,  March  2, 
1901  :  "It  would  appear  to  be  the  better  opinion  that  the  duties  on  imports 
must  be  raised  to  at  least  15  per  cent  ad  valorem  in  lieu  of  the  jiresent  rate. 
The  calculations  must,  of  course,  be  based  upon  the  amount  of  the  indemnity, 
now  unknown.  Assuming  this  is  not  to  exceed  $200,000,000,  and  further 
assuming  that  the  Powers  will  accept  the  bonds  of  China  instead  of  compelling 
her  to  sell  these  bonds  to  raise  the  indemnity  money  in  the  open  market  with 
a  further  loss  of  capital  .  .  ."  ° 

John  Foord,  Secretary  of  the  American  Asiatic  Association,  to  Hay,  January 
25,  1901  :  "The  American  Asiatic  Association,  recognizing  the  financial  neces- 
sities of  the  Chinese  Empire,  has  no  ob.iection  to  offer  to  the  proposed  increase 
of  duties  on  foreign  imports.  The  suggestion  which,  according  to  Sir  Robert 
Hart,  was  formulated  last  spring  by  the  special  commission  appointed  to 
consider   the   subject   of   tariff  revision,   is   deemed   a   reasonable   one.     This   was 


662  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

tariff  be  reserved  for  future  discussion  if  the  withdrawal  of 
American  objections  would  aid  in  bringing  the  Protocol 
negotiations  to  a  close.  Meanwhile  Great  Britain  refused 
to  consider  a  10  per  cent  tariff.  In  the  Protocol  it  was 
determined  that  the  tariff  be  raised  to  5  per  cent  effective, 
on  the  condition  that  all  existing  ad  valorem  duties  be 
changed  to  specific  duties,  the  average  value  of  merchandise 
for  the  years  1897,  1898  and  1899  being  taken  as  the  basis 
of  estimate.  Peking  was  not  given  the  status  of  a  treaty 
port.  The  American  demand  for  the  opening  of  the  entire 
Empire  to  trade  did  not  commend  itself  to  those  who  were 
most  familiar  with  the  conditions  because  of  the  extraterri- 
torial status  of  foreigners.  It  would  have  been  highly  unjust 
to  China  to  force  her  to  admit  foreigners  as  freely  as  Mr. 
Hay  had  contemplated,  while  they  were  exempt  from 
Chinese  law  and  so  much  removed  from  effective  control  by 
their  own  governments.  Mr.  Rockhill  was,  however,  able 
to  have  specified  in  the  Protocol  that  the  river  approaches 
to  Tientsin  and  Shanghai  be  improved  under  a  plan  by 
which  the  Chinese  and  the  foreigners  jointly  bore  the  ex- 
pense. Through  the  jealousy  and  short-sightedness  of  the 
powers  an  opportunity,  had  been  lost  to  do  much  towards 
setting  China  on  a  firm  foundation  which  would  in  the  end 
have  been  as  profitable  for  the  powers  themselves  as  for  the 
Empire.  Meanwhile  the  United  States  had  acquired  the 
reputation  of  having  opposed  the  increase  of  Chinese  tariffs 
which  is  a  partial  and  quite  inaccurate  statement  of  the 
facts.* 

The  Protocol,  as  signed,  stipulated  the  following  points : 

to  the  effect  that  the  import  duty  should  be  fixed  at  10  per  cent  plus  5  per 
cent  transit  dues,  payable  simultaneously,  coupled  with  the  total  abolition  of 
all  other  taxes  on  such   imports  forever  after  and  everywhere."  ^ 

*T\V()  other  minor  proposals  made  by  the  United  States  were  lost.  Mr.  Hay 
suggested  that  it  would  be  well  to  stipulate  that  in  the  reorganization  of  the 
Tsung-li  Yamen  upon  which  all  the  powers  were  agreed,  only  an  otflcial  speaking 
some  ^^■esterll  language  be  appointed  to  conduct  the  foreign  relations.  This 
proposal  was  unwise  as  Rockhill  immediately  pointed  out,  for  it  would  have 
eliminated  from  the  direction  of  foreign  affairs  all  the  ablest  Chinese.  Mr.  Hay 
also  suggested  that  China  be  made  to  indemnify  Chinese  Christians  for  wrongs 
to  tlieir  persons  and  property.  Conger,  although  an  ardent  friend  of  the 
missionaries,  did  not  believe  such  a  policy  wise.  It  would  have  reopened  the 
(juestion  of  the  French  protectorate  of  Catholic  missions  in  its  most  oI)jec- 
tional)le  form.  These  minor  proposals  betray  the  fact  that  Secretary  of  State 
Hay,  although  directly  supervising  the  negotiations  by  telegraph",  actually 
was  not  at  all  well  informed  as  to  general  conditions  in  China.' 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  663 

(I)  apology  to  Germany  for  the  murder  of  Baron  Ketteler, 
and  the  erection  of  a  memorial  to  him  at  the  place  where  he 
was  shot;  (2)  punishment  of  Chinese  officials  responsible 
for  the  insurrection;  (3)  apology  to  Japan  for  the  murder  of 
Sugiyama,  chancellor  of  the  Japanese  Legation;  (4)  suspen- 
sion of  official  examinations  in  all  cities  where  foreigners 
were  attacked  or  murdered;  (5)  erection  of  expiatory  monu- 
ments in  foreign  cemeteries  which  had  been  desecrated; 

(6)  China  to  forbid  for  two  or  more  years  the  importation  of 
arms,  ammunition  and  materials  used  in  their  manufacture ; 

(7)  indemnity  of  450,000,000  Haekwan  taels  and  a  5  per 
cent  effective  tariff;  (8)  reservation  of  the  Legation  Quarter 
at  Peking  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  Legations  with 
the  right  to  make  it  defensible;  (9)  razing  of  forts  at  Taku 
between  Peking  and  the  sea;  (10)  the  occupation  by  the 
foreigners  of  certain  points,  thirteen  in  number  including 
Tientsin,  as  a  security  of  open  communications  to  Peking; 

(II)  publication  of  certain  edicts  tending  to  prevent  renewal 
of  Boxer  propaganda;  (12)  China  to  agree  to  the  amend- 
ment of  commercial  treaties  and  to  the  Pei-ho  and  Whangpu 
conservancy  projects;  (13)  abolition  of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen 
and  the  creation  of  a  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs;  (14) 
evacuation  of  Peking,  with  exception  of  Legation  guards  on 
September  17,  1901. 

Independent  or  Concurrent  Action 

In  the  sixty  years  of  official  American  relations  with  the 
Far  East,  the  fundamental  American  purpose  had  been 
definite,  consistent  and  unvarying.  The  United  States 
sought  the  open  door  for  American  trade.  But  the  methods 
employed  had  been  subject  to  many  changes.  What  the 
Americans  asked  for  and  what  they  obtained  at  Peking  in 
1900-1  is  therefore  of  less  significance  than  the  diplomatic 
methods  employed. 

There  were  three  possible  stages  of  independent  or  iso- 
lated action:  absolute  neutrality;  intervention  in  favor  of 
Asia;  and  mediation.    Likewise  there  were  three  stages  of 


664  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

cooperation:  concurrent  yet  separate  action;  joint  action; 
and  an  alliance  with  some  one  or  more  foreign  powers.  Any- 
one of  these  might  conceivably  become  a  means  for  main- 
taining the  open  door  and  Asiatic  integrity.  In  the  course 
of  its  diplomatic  relations  in  Asia  the  United  States  had 
been  forced  to  consider  each  of  these  methods  and  had  em- 
ployed more  or  less  energetically  every  one  of  them  except 
the  last.  In  1840,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Anglo-Chinese 
War,  some  of  the  Americans  had  proposed  joint  naval  action 
with  England,  France  and  Holland  against  China.  Others 
suggested  mediation.  The  United  States  adopted  neutrality. 
In  1853  at  the  opening  of  Japan  and  during  the  troubles  at 
Shanghai,  the  American  representatives  had  rejected  coop- 
eration and  followed  an  absolutely  isolated  course.  Four 
years  later,  at  the  time  of  the  revision  of  the  Chinese  treaties 
and  of  the  making  of  the  commercial  treaties  with  Japan, 
the  American  Government,  officially  rejecting  both  isolated 
and  joint  or  allied  action,  adopted  a  concurrent  policy  which 
in  effect  involved  cooperation  in  all  peaceful  measures. 
During  the  Seward  administration  cooperation  was  the  slo- 
gan. In  Japan  it  was  carried  to  the  point  of  joint  military 
action  and  a  similar  policy  on  an  even  more  extended  scale 
was  contemplated  in  Korea.  Then  followed  a  period  of 
non-cooperation.  The  opening  of  Korea  and  the  revision  of 
the  Japanese  treaties  had  been  accomplished  by  isolated 
action.  Both  concurrent  and  joint  action  in  the  Sino-Jap- 
anese  War  had  been  rejected,  as  had  also  armed  or  allied 
intervention  in  favor  of  Korea.  The  Hay  notes  of  1899 
may  be  classified  in  two  ways.  They  represented  isolated, 
diplomatic  intervention  in  favor  of  China  and  against 
Europe ;  but  they  were  also  the  expression  of  an  underlying 
cooperative  policy  which  fell  only  a  little  short  of  joint  action 
with  Japan  and  Great  Britain  against  Russia.  They  were 
as  near  to  an  Anglo-Japanese-American  alliance  as  the 
United  States  was  able  to  go.  Their  underlying  spirit  was 
the  farthest  possible  removed  from  that  of  Gresham  in  1894. 
Of  these  possible  methods,  which  was  the  United  States 
to  choose  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Boxer  trouble?    It  could 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  665 

not  remain  neutral  between  the  East  and  the  West,  for 
American  lives  and  American  property  had  been  attacked. 
It  could  not  intervene  against  Europe — not  directly.  An 
offer  of  niechation  would  have  been  interpreted  as  an  indi- 
cation of  American  weakness  and  an  encouragement  to  the 
Manchu  government,  just  as  the  failure  to  support  the 
Italian  demands  for  a  leased  port  in  1899  had  been  construed 
as  an  encouragement  to  China.  Extreme  isolated  action 
would  be  futile:  some  form  of  cooperation  was  necessary, 
but  an  alliance  was  out  of  the  question.  Only  concurrent  or 
joint  action  was  practical. 

"Act  independently  in  protection  of  American  interests 
where  practicable,"  telegraphed  Hay  to  United  States  Min- 
ister E.  H.  Conger  June  8,  1900,  "and  concurrently  with  rep- 
resentatives of  other  powers  if  necessity  arises."  ^  Two  days 
later  he  amplified  this  with  a  second  message :  "We  have  no 
policy  in  China  except  to  protect  with  energy  American 
interests,  and  especially  American  citizens  and  the  Legation. 
There  must  be  nothing  done  which  would  commit  us  to 
future  action  inconsistent  with  your  instructions.  There 
must  be  no  alliances."  In  the  circular  of  July  3d  to  the 
powers  Hay  defined  the  method  again:  "The  purpose  of 
the  President  is,  as  it  has  been  heretofore,  to  act  concurrently 
with  other  powers;  first,  in  opening  up  communications 
with  Peking  and  rescuing  the  American  officials,  mission- 
aries and  other  Americans  who  are  in  danger;  secondly,  in 
affording  all  possible  protection  everywhere  in  China  to 
American  life  and  property;  thirdly,  in  guarding  and  pro- 
tecting all  legitimate  American  interests;  and  fourthly,  in 
aiding  to  prevent  a  spread  of  the  disorders  to  the  other 
provinces  of  the  Empire  and  a  recurrence  of  such  disasters." 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  between  June  8  and  July  3  the 
American  Government  had  come  to  see  the  futility  of  exclu- 
sively independent  action,  even  in  the  protection  of  Ameri- 
can interests,  and  was  prepared  for  cooperation — for  a  larger 
degree  of  cooperation,  probably,  than  the  jealousies  of  the 
other  powers  made  it  possible  to  achieve.  Thus  while 
eschewing  the  commitments  of  alliances  or  their  equivalent, 


666  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

in  the  face  of  a  great  crisis,  the  United  States  forsook  the 
timidities  of  the  past  and  announced  itself  as  ready  to  lead 
in  cooperation. 

The  word  "concurrent"  is  the  key  to  the  interpretation 
of  American  policy  at  this  time.  This  word  had  a  long  his- 
tory. It  first  appeared  in  the  discussions  of  the  early  fifties 
which  preceded  the  adoption  of  the  policy  of  1857.  The 
earlier  American  policy  has  been  primarily  obstructive  to 
England.  But  it  was  seen  that  an  independent  obstructive 
policy  might  actually  prove  to  be  less  obstructive  to  a  dis- 
memberment of  China  than  would  a  cooperative  policy. 
Concurrent  action,  therefore,  came  to  mean  cooperation  for 
the  purpose  of  restraining  England  and  France.  It  utterly 
failed  in  1858  owing  to  the  ineptitude  of  the  American  rep- 
resentative, but  the  idea  was  taken  up  by  Seward  and  used 
with  some  success.  It  succeeded  in  China  but  failed  in 
Japan  because  there  was  lacking  a  man  of  Anson  Bur- 
lingame's  caliber  to  carry  it  out.  The  policy  was  sound  but 
it  required  an  able  executive.  A  concurrent  policy  was  the 
one  to  which  Mr.  Hay  returned  in  the  summer  of  1900  and 
to  insure  its  success  he  dispatched  his  trusted  aid,  W.  W. 
Rockhill,  as  Commissioner  (technically,  Special  Agent)  to 
China  in  the  latter  part  of  July  when  the  fate  of  the  Lega- 
tions and  of  Minister  Conger  was  still  in  doubt.  There  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  any  serious  differences  of  opinion 
between  Conger  and  Rockhill,  but  when  two  men  ride  a 
horse  one  must  ride  behind  and  early  in  1901  Mr.  Conger 
found  it  desirable  to  ask  for  permission  to  return  to  the 
United  States,  leaving  Mr.  Rockhill  as  plenipotentiary  to 
carry  out  the  negotiations  and  sign  the  Protocol  for  the 
American  Government.* 

"While  we  maintained  complete  independence,"  stated 
Mr.  Rockhill  in  making  his  final  report,  "we  were  able  to  act 
harmoniously  in  the  concert  of  powers,  the  existence  of 
which  was  so  essential  to  a  prompt  and  peaceful  settlement 
of  the  situation,  we  retained  the  friendship  of  all  the  nego- 

*It  Is  intorestiiiff  to  note  that  in  the  settlement  of  the  Boxer  affair  the 
Senate  hail  no  part.  Neither  KockhiH's  appointment  as  Special  Agent  nor  th© 
Protocol  required   the   approval  (tf   the   Senate, 


UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  BOXER  INSURRECTION  667 

tiation  powers,  exerted  a  salutary  influence  in  the  cause  of 
moderation,  humanity  and  justice,  secured  adequate  repara- 
tion for  wrongs  done  our  citizens,  guaranties  for  their  future 
protection,  and  labored  successfully  in  the  interests  of  the 
world  in  the  cause  of  equal  and  impartial  trade  with  all 
parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire."  ^  Complete  independence, 
yes;  but  not  the  sort  of  independence  which  had  been  main- 
tained in  Korea  or  the  independence  of  President  Cleveland. 
There  was  military  and  naval  cooperation,  and  there  was 
diplomatic  "give  and  take"  in  which  the  American  Govern- 
ment most  of  all  showed  a  willingness  to  make  concessions 
for  the  sake  of  securing  harmony  of  action  and  a  real  con- 
cert of  the  powers. 

At  the  signing  of  the  Protocol  the  diplomatic  grouping 
of  the  principal  powers  remained  about  what  it  had  been  for 
the  preceding  two  years.  Great  Britain  and  Japan  stood 
together  and  were  separated  from  the  United  States  only  by 
the  greater  extent  of  their  political  and  commercial  interests 
in  China.  All  three  stood  opposed  to  Russia  which  was  sup- 
ported consistently  by  France.  Germany  was  playing  a 
dubious  game,  now  encouraging  Russia  and  then  making  a 
convention  with  England  to  oppose  her.  Even  in  1901  it 
probably  would  not  have  been  impossible  to  form  a  conven- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Japan  and  the  United 
States  to  safeguard  China  from  every  assault  if  only  the 
American  Government  could  have  been  counted  on  to  invest 
its  fair  share  of  military  and  naval  support.  The  United 
States  was  in  a  position  of  potential  leadership  which  it 
allowed  to  slip  from  its  grasp  primarily  because  the  Ameri- 
can people  misread  the  events  of  the  three  preceding  years. 
They  supposed  that  their  influence  had  been  due  to  their 
independence  and  isolation,  whereas  it  had  been  brought 
about  by  concurrence  and  cooperation.  But  more  funda- 
mental as  a  cause  for  the  failure  of  the  United  States  to 
grasp  the  opportunity  to  continue  its  beneficent  work  for 
Asia,  was  the  fact  that  the  American  people  did  not  prize 
the  influence  Mr.  Hay  and  his  collaborators  had  secured  for 
them.i" 


w 


668  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  There  are  no  books  on  the  Boxer  Insurrection  or  on  the  Protocol 

which  can  be  recommended  as  a  substitvite  for  the  official  docu- 
ments. Foreign  Relations  for  1900,  and  the  Appendix  volume 
for  1901  (also  published  as  Sen.  Doc.  67  :57-l)  containing  the 
Rockhill  Correspondence,  and  Notes  on  China,  Aug.,  1900^ — 
War  Dept.  Document  124,  Publication  XXX — are  the  primary 
sources,  Moore's  "Digest,"  Vol.  5,  pp.  476  ff.,  contains  an 
excellent  summary  but  does  not  make  excerpts  from  corre- 
spondence not  previously  published.  Paul  H.  Clements :  "The 
Boxer  Rebellion,  a  Political  and  Diplomatic  Review"  (Studies 
in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law,  Columbia  Univ.,  Vol. 
LXVI,  No.  3)  is  excellent  so  far  as  it  goes,  but  is  deficient  in 
background  and  not  discriminating  in  references  to  earlier 
history.  For  a  chronicle  of  events,  H.  B.  Morse :  "Intern.  Rel. 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,"  Vol.  3,  is  recommended.  For  adequate 
bibliography,  see  Clements.  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck :  "Con- 
temporary Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  chap.  13,  and  elsewhere, 
is  an  admirable  interpretation  which  is  especially  valuable  for 
the  understanding  of  the  Protocol  in  the  light  ol  more  recent 
history. 

2.  Rockhill  Correspondence,  p.  12. 

3.  Ihid.,  p.  368. 

4.  Ihid.,  p.  171. 

5.  Ihid.,  p.  210. 

6.  Ihid.,  p.  217. 

7.  Ihid.,  pp.  349,  45. 

8.  For.  Relations,  1900,  p.  143. 

9.  Rockhill  Corres.,  pp.  6-7. 

10.  Thayer's  "John  Hay,"  Vol.  II,  chap.  XXVI,  "The  Boxer  Ordeal 
and  the  Open  Door,"  sheds  some  light  on  the  general  phases  of 
Mr.  Hay's  policy,  but  for  some  reason,  possibly  from  an  excess 
of  caution  on  the  part  of  the  biographer,  is  singularly  lacking 
in  answers  to  many  of  the  important  details  of  the  negotia- 
tions; so  also  are  the  "Letters  and  Diaries  of  John  Hay,"  3 
vols.     Printed  but  not  published,  Washington,  1908. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 
PERSONALITIES  AND  PRINCIPLES 

The  Consular  and  Diplomatic  Service 

American  relations  with  Asia  in  the  nineteenth  century 
were  so  largely  personal  and  individual  that  the  Americans 
who  made  the  contacts  assumed  a  transcending  importance. 
At  no  time  during  the  century  did  the  Chinese  or  the  Ko- 
reans become  travelers,  and  while  the  Japanese  manifested 
an  extreme  desire  to  go  abroad  and  study,  nevertheless  for 
the  great  mass  of  the  people  what  knowledge  of  the  United 
States  was  obtained  came  through  the  American  official  and 
unofficial  representatives  in  Japan,  To  the  inhabitants  of 
Eastern  Asia  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was 
what  the  American  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  repre- 
sented it  to  be.  The  personalities  and  personal  character 
of  the  diplomatic  and  consular  representatives  became  a 
legitimate  object  of  study. 

The  American  consular  service  throughout  the  century 
presents  a  picture  over  which  one  would  wish  to  draw  the 
veil.  The  system  of  merchant  consuls  continued  in  China 
without  change  until  1854  when  they  were  replaced  at  the 
five  ports  by  others  whose  only  legitimate  emoluments  were 
$1000  a  year  for  judicial  services  under  extraterritoriality, 
and  part  or  all  of  the  fees  of  their  office.*  It  was  hardly  a 
change  for  the  better.  The  older  merchant  consuls  had 
been  of  the  type  of  the  merchant  prince.  While  it  was  true 
that  they  smuggled  opium  and  manipulated  the  powers  of 
their  office,  sometimes  to  the  prejudice  of  their  competitors, 
they  did  take  pride  in   their  position,   and   towards   the 

♦Merchant  consuls  were  reintroduced  a  few  years  later  at  unimportant 
points  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  Chinese  Government. 

669 


670  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

Chinese  they  maintained  the  same  benevolent,  if  patroniz- 
ing, attitude  which  characterized  their  business  relations. 
The  men  who  displaced  them  were  often  appointed  from  the 
lower  ranks  of  political  "hangers-on"  in  the  United  States 
and  were  set  down  in  strange  places  where  the  cost  of  re- 
spectable living  ranged  upwards  from  three  or  four  thou- 
sand dollars  a  year.  Consulates  were  not  provided  and  the 
allowances  for  rent  and  for  clerical  help  were  meager.  At 
Canton,  Shanghai  and  later  at  Yokohama  they  handled 
large  sums  of  money  for,  in  addition  to  the  fees  of  the  office, 
there  was  the  fund  for  the  relief  of  distressed  seamen  and 
the  estates  of  intestate  deceased  fellow  citizens.  To  the  per- 
sonal temptations  which  accompany  residence  in  a  foreign 
land  where  public  sentiment  is  of  slight  support  to  personal 
character  there  was  the  constant  temptation  to  peculation. 
\y-  The  theory  of  their  government  was  to  make  the  consular 
system  support  itself  by  the  fees  it  collected,  and  the  pre- 
vailing theory  of  the  occupants  of  office  was  to  gather  in  as 
much  as  the  probably  brief  tenure  of  office  would  permit. 
The  fee  system  made  this  especially  easy.^ 

We  know  that  there  were  consular  officers  who  rendered 
honest  and  efficient  service  even  under  these  adverse  condi- 
tions, but  it  would  appear,  even  from  the  printed  reports  of 
consular  inspectors,  that  the  average  grade  of  honesty  and 
efficiency  was  deplorably  low.  In  concluding  his  report 
covering  Asia  and  South  America  in  1872  Special  Inspector 
DeB.  Randolph  Keim  stated: 

"It  will  have  been  seen  that  there  was  not  a  single  consulate  at 
which  a  complete  set  of  record-books  from  the  beginning  as  required 
by  the  regulations,  was  to  be  found.  .  .  .  Almost  every  consulate  had 
some  defects  in  its  history,  owing  to  the  incompetency,  low  habits, 
and  vulgarity  of  some  of  its  officers  during  the  endless  round  of 
evils  incident  to  official  rotation.  Abuses  had  been  committed  in  the 
collection  of  fees;  in  the  exercise  of  judicial  powers;  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  business  affairs  of  American  citizens;  in  the  settlement, 
where  permitted,  of  the  estates  of  intestate  American  citizens  dying 
abroad ;   in   selling  the  American   flag ;   in   'running-out'  *  ships ;   in 

*"Running-out"  ships  was  a  practice  by  which  the  consul  connived  with  a 
ship  captain  in  forcing  a  crew  shipped  in  an  American  port  to  desert  in  an 
Asiatic  port  wliere  a  new  crew  of  Asiatic  sailors  could  be  obtained  at  a  very 
great  reduction  in  wages.  The  American  sailor,  forced  by  the  abuse  of  the 
captain  to  desert,  lost  the  wages  due  him  for  the  outward  voyage,  thus  effecting 
a  second  saving  for  the  owners. 


PERSONALITIES  AND  PRINCIPLES  G71 

discharging  seamen ;  in  establishing  American  settlements  abroad ;  in 
issuing  illegal  passports ;  in  countenancing  shipping-masters ;  in  tax- 
ing Chinese  emigrants.  Indeed,  the  most  important  feature  of  my 
investigations  was  the  iniquity  displayed  by  consiilar  officers,  since 
the  act  of  1S56  particularly,  in  defrauding  the  government  and  grasp- 
ing gains  from  various  outside  sources."  ^ 

The  best  that  can  be  said  for  the  consular  system  at  that 
time  in  Asia  is  that  every  instance  of  extreme  dishonesty 
can  be  matched  with  one  of  even  more  extensive  malfeasance 
from  consulates  in  some  other  quarter  of  the  globe,  and  one 
may  also  remember  that  those  were  the  days  of  scandals  in 
Washington  over  the  payment  for  Alaska,  the  Pacific  Mail 
Subsidy,  and  the  Credit  Mobilier.  Inspector  Keim  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  consular  irregularities  reached  their 
highest  point  among  the  appointees  of  the  Buchanan  admin- 
istration, but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  at  that  early  day  many 
of  the  possible  avenues  of  graft  were  still  relatively  unex- 
plored and  the  methods  of  the  dishonest  consul  underwent 
many  refinements  in  the  following  forty  years.  At  the  end 
of  the  century  the  American  consular  establishments  in  /' 
Asia  were  still  a  stench  which  succeeding  administrations 
had  been  singularly  loath  to  correct,  and  the  long  urgent 
reforms  did  not  appear  until  the  second  Roosevelt  term.* 
While  honest  American  trade  suffered  from  this  pro- 
cession of  pilfering,  low-living  and  inefficient  officials,  it  was  V 
American  relations  with  the  native  peoples  which  suffered 
most.  The  American  Government  had  demanded  the  ex- 
emptions of  extraterritoriality  and  then  sent  the  off-scour- 
ings  of  the  "spoils  system"  to  become  the  agents  of  American 
law  and  justice.  In  the  act  of  May  16,  1848,  Congress 
authorized  the  establishment  of  consular  courts  by  which 
the  consuls  were  enabled  to  hear  and  determine  civil  cases 
where  the  debt  or  damage  did  not  exceed  $1000  and  to  try 

*  Third  Assistant  Soorotarv  of  Statp.  Tlorbcrt  W.  D.  Piercp.  reportod  in 
1904,  after  a  tour  of  consular  inspoction  :  "Unfortunately.  Iw'set  by  the 
temptations  which  are  rife  in  tlie  East,  it  lias  sometimes  liappened  that  some 
of  our  consular  officers,  finding  their  salaries  inadequate  to  meet  the  <'(>nstant 
drain  upon  their  resources,  have  .yielded  to  this  temptation  and,  under  the  cover 
of  such  protection  as  our  unfortunate  system  of  partial  compensation  by  fees 
affords,  have  taken  a(h;intar:re  of  it  to  extort  unwarranted  charges  for 
services  of  an  unofficial  character,  and  in  other  instances  have  employed  their 
official  positions  to  increase  their  incomes  improperly,  thus  bringing  "the  office 
into  contempt."  ^ 


672  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

and  punish  criminal  offenders  where  the  fine  did  not  exceed 
$100  or  imprisonment  for  60  days."*  The  law  was  to  be  that 
of  the  United  States,  supplemented  by  the  ''common  law, 
and  the  law  of  equity  and  admiralty,"  to  which  might  be 
added  "decrees  and  regulations"  having  the  force  of  law, 
which  the  minister  was  authorized  to  promulgate  with  the 
approval  of  such  consuls  as  were  accessible.  For  the  more 
important  cases,  the  consul  was  required  to  invite  some 
fellow  citizens  to  sit  with  him  in  the  hearing  of  the  case,  and 
appeal  was  possible  to  the  minister,  and  through  him  in 
some  cases,  to  the  United  States  circuit  court  in  California. 
The  effect  of  the  arrangement  was  that  the  consul  might 
combine  in  himself  all  the  functions  of  government,  legis- 
lative, judicial  and  executive.  He  was  a  member  of  the 
legislature,  judge,  jury,  prosecuting  attorney  and  police 
officer  all  in  one.  He  was  never  selected  for  his  legal  train- 
ing. If,  in  addition  to  all  this,  the  consul  was  a  dishonest 
man  or  one  who  nourished  that  contempt  for  the  colored 
races  which  the  white  man  often  acquires  when  he  goes  to 
Asia,  imagination  fails  to  grasp  all  the  possibilities  which 
were  invested  in  his  person  for  the  creation  of  ill  feeling  and 
hatred  among  the  Orientals  who  were  so  miserable  as  to  fall 
in  his  path.  When  one  encounters  even  today  the  sporadic 
outbursts  of  distinctly  anti-American,  as  well  as  anti-foreign 
feeling,  in  Eastern  Asia,  the  recollection  of  this  shameful 
page  of  past  history  will  do  much  to  explain  and  extenuate 
the  hatred  for  Americans  which  still  lingers  in  many  an 
Oriental  breast. 

One  turns  with  relief  from  the  consular  to  the  diplomatic 
service.  From  the  days  when  John  Quincy  Adams  in  his  old 
age  was  suggested  as  the  most  suitable  first  Commissioner 
to  China  and  Edward  Everett  at  the  Court  of  St.  James  was 
actually  appointed  to  the  post,  it  was  recognized  by  the 
American  Government  that  its  diplomatic  representatives  in 
the  East  ought  to  be  men  even  above  the  grade  of  those  who 
were  sent  to  many  European  capitals.  During  the  century, 
not  counting  those  who  were  appointed  and  declined,  and 
omitting  the  various  charges  d'affaires,  there  were  thirty-five 


PERSONALITIES  AND  PRINCIPLES  673 

American  diplomatic  representatives  in  China,  Japan  and 
Korea.  Peter  Parker,  George  F.  Seward,  H.  N.  Allen,  Edwin 
Dun  and  W.  W.  Rockhill  were  selected  from  those  who  had 
already  held  lower  positions  in  the  diplomatic  service  in  the 
East;  Alexander  H.  Everett  had  a  previous  and  extended 
diplomatic  career  in  Europe.  A  few  typical  "shirt-sleeves" 
diplomats  like  Richard  B.  Hubbard  ^  in  Tokio  found  their 
way  to  these  high  appointments,  and  the  picture  of  Charles 
E.  De  Long,  revolver  bulging  from  his  belt,  driving  ex-Secre- 
tary Seward  through  the  streets  of  Tokio  behind  a  pair  of 
ponies  and  cracking  his  whip  over  the  backs  of  scurrying 
pedestrians  is  not  edifying,**  but  there  were  very  few  such 
ministers  and  at  the  most  not  more  than  three  instances  of 
conspicuously  weak  character,  one  of  these  being  a  dipso- 
maniac.'^ On  the  other  hand  Gushing,  Perry,  Harris,  Bur- 
lingame.  Young,  Bingham,  Denby  and  Rockhill  represented 
the  best  of  contemporary  American  life.  Although  it  was 
customary  for  each  new  administration  to  make  new  ap- 
pointments. Judge  Bingham  served  at  Tokio  for  thirteen 
years,  and  Colonel  Denby  served  slightly  longer  at  Peking 
and  had  the  distinction  of  being  in  two  Republican  as  well 
as  in  two  Democratic  administrations,  the  latter  being  one 
in  which  he  was  first  appointed.  In  general  the  quality  of 
diplomatic  representation  in  the  East  rose  and  fell  with  the 
character  of  the  administration  and  the  quality  of  the 
appointees  in  the  Department  of  State.  On  the  whole  the 
legations  at  Peking  and  Tokio  compared  favorably  with  the 
department  to  which  they  were  responsible. 

A  word,  in  passing,  ought  to  be  added  in  regard  to  the 
American  naval  officers  who  also  represented  their  govern- 
ment to  the  peoples  of  Eastern  Asia.  L^sually  they  were  an 
exceptionally  fine  set  of  men,  sustaining  a  higher  average, 
perhaps,  than  those  of  any  other  class.  The  naval  officers 
were  feared  by  the  consuls  whose  delinquencies  they  re- 
ported, and  not  always  welcomed  by  the  civilian  ministers 
who  resented  their  frequently  lordly  ways,  but  they  had  a 
fine  regard  for  the  honor  of  the  flag  under  which  they 
served  and  rarely  disgraced  it. 


674  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

The  Contributors  to  American  Policy 

In  bringing  our  study  to  a  close  it  is  well  to  repeat  that 
American  policy  in  Asia  has  been  an  accretion  which  was 
built  up  from  no  exclusive  single  source.  It  did  not  spring 
full-grown  from  the  mind  of  any  individual,  nor  was  it  care- 
fully projected  from  a  planning-board  or  group.  In  this 
respect  it  was  utterly  unlike  the  foreign  policy  of  Japan,  of 
Great  Britain,  and  of  the  European  powers.  Contributions 
came  from  three  different  sources:  from  the  American  rep- 
resentatives in  Asia;  from  the  Department  of  State  or  the 
administration  in  Washington;  and,  in  a  single  instance, 
from  Congress  in  response  to  a  popular  demand.  We  may 
review  briefly  the  nature  and  significance  of  each  one  of 
these  classes  of  contributors. 

Every  item  in  American  policy  in  Asia  as  we  find  it  at 
the  end  of  the  century  was  first  the  personal  contribution  of 
some  individual  representative  of  the  government  in  Asia. 
To  this  statement  there  are  no  exceptions.  It  is  equally 
notable  that  every  item  of  policy  was,  in  principle,  on  record 
before  1870.  After  that  date  came  only  sifting,  integration, 
elaboration,  and  the  application  to  specific  situations. 
Throughout  the  century  the  fundamental  purpose  of  the 
United  States  remained  unaltered:  the  American  Govern- 
ment demanded  most-favored-nation  treatment;  demanded 
it  from  China,  Japan  and  Korea,  and  demanded  it  also 
from  Western  powers  which  sometimes  threatened  to  close 
the  door  of  equal  opportunity  in  regions  where  the  American 
merchant  was  interested. 

What  methods  should  be  employed  to  maintain  the 
open  door?  Ought  the  United  States  to  depend  solely  on 
treaties  or  ought  it  to  acquire  territory  as  Great  Britain, 
Russia  and  France  were  doing?  Again,  ought  the  American 
Government  to  adopt  a  cooperative  policy  or  was  it  wiser 
to  keep  to  political  isolation?  The  drama  of  the  second  half 
of  the  century  revolves  around  the  discussion  of  these  differ- 
ing methods  of  realizing  a  single  purpose — most-favored- 
nation  treatment. 


PERSONALITIES  AND  PRINCIPLES  675 

Caleb  Gushing,  in  harmony  with  the  general  instructions 
of  Daniel  Webster,  devised  a  plan  by  which  the  United 
States  would  depend  solely  upon  the  force  of  treaties  and 
the  strength  of  international  law.  Commodore  Perry  had 
less  confidence  in  legal  documents  and  earnestly  recom- 
mended the  acquisition  of  territory  as  a  base  of  operations 
from  which  the  door  might,  in  case  of  necessity,  be  forced  to 
remain  open.  Burlingame  followed  Cushing,  while  Parker 
sided  with  Perry,  and  carried  forward  a  policy  which,  while 
rejected  by  his  superiors,  was  taken  up  in  principle  by 
Seward.  At  the  end  of  the  century  we  find  the  two  schools 
of  thought  both  represented  and  merged  in  the  McKinley 
administration  to  such  a  degree  that  we  may  not  with 
certainty  separate  those  who  held  one  and  those  who  advo- 
cated the  other.  Cushing's  policy  was  still  held  to  be  sound 
in  theory  but  in  practice  it  had  proved  inadequate.  Perry's 
method  had  been  premature  at  its  inception  but  was  now 
found  to  meet  the  facts  as  they  had  developed  and  to  be 
not  exclusive  of  the  Cushing  policy.  If  McKinley  inclined 
towards  the  school  of  Perry  and  Seward,  certainly  John  Hay 
found  himself  more  at  ease  with  Cushing  and  Burlingame. 

To  what  extent  the  men  at  the  end  of  the  century  were 
conscious  that  they  were  following  in  the  footsteps  of  pred- 
ecessors we  do  not  fully  know,  but  in  speculating  upon  this 
question  we  may  be  guided  by  the  fact  that  the  American 
Government  in  its  foreign  relations  possesses  a  continuity 
which  is  not  always  appreciated  by  its  commentators.  Ad- 
ministrations come  and  go;  Secretaries  of  State  and  of  the 
Navy  pass  through  the  departments  to  which  they  are 
appointed,  and  with  them  come — in  the  past  probably  more 
than  is  likely  in  the  future — new  appointments  to  subordi- 
nate positions,  but  the  new  administrations  cannot  eradicate 
the  records  of  the  past  and  they  ignore  them  at  their  peril. 
Policies  as  well  as  international  law  and  diplomatic  practice 
are  built  up  layer  by  layer  and  while  American  foreign 
policies  have  undergone  some  changes  and  even  reversals  in 
the  generations  which  are  past,  those  changes  were  neither 
abrupt  nor  revolutionary.    As  concerns  the  Far  East  certain 


676  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

unchanging  geographical,  or  slowly  changing  industrial  and 
political  facts  have  made  a  channel  within  the  boundaries 
of  which  American  policy  must  contain  itself.  It  it  were 
true  that  the  McKinley  administration  adopted  policies 
without  knowing  that  they  were  returning  to  old  ones  it 
would  also  be  true  that  two  sets  of  men  removed  a  genera- 
tion from  each  other  discovered  the  same  major  facts  and 
found  themselves  forced  to  similar  conclusions.  That  indi- 
vidual American  representatives  of  the  forties  and  fifties 
should  have  so  clearly  forecasted  the  conclusions  of  their 
successors  at  the  end  of  the  century,  and  now,  is  a  tribute  to 
the  quality  of  their  political  sense. 

Twice  within  the  century  a  Secretary  of  State  or  a 
President  picked  up  the  Far  Eastern  question  and  set  it 
forward  with  important  personal  contributions.  That  these 
contributions  were  indeed  personal  is  only  too  apparent  from 
the  records.  When  the  Senate  gave  its  approval  of  the  con- 
ventions of  1864  and  1866  with  Japan  it  was  still  preoccu- 
pied with  war-time  affairs,  and  it  is  not  evident  that  there 
was  any  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  issues  involved  or  of 
Seward's  way  of  handling  them.  One  finds  it  difficult  to 
believe  that  Seward  would  have  found  in  Congress  sufficient 
support  for  his  proposed  Korean  policy.  Seward's  policies 
were  peculiarly  personal  to  himself  and  did  not  even  have 
the  unqualified  support  of  his  own  representatives  in  Peking 
and  Yedo.  McKinley  likewise  had  the  advantage  of  a  war- 
time Congress,  and  even  then  he  had  to  coerce  Congress  to 
secure  the  approval  he  needed  for  his  Philippine  policy. 
Congress  handled  the  Philippines  more  as  a  domestic  than 
as  a  foreign  question.  The  adroit  John  Hay  was  able  to 
accomplish  his  policy  in  China  by  eliminating  the  Senate 
from  its  consideration  and  then  by  giving  the  policy  an 
aspect  of  independence  which  concealed  its  true  cooperative 
nature. 

Once  Congress  intervened  in  Far  Eastern  affairs  and 
seized  the  initiative.  The  Asiatic  immigration  policy  be- 
longs to  Congress  and  arose  directly  out  of  the  people  who 
were  being  touched  on  the  bare  nerve  of  their  industrial 


PERSONALITIES  AND  PRINCIPLES  677 

and  social  life.  Congress  steadily  forced  the  hand  of  the 
Presidents  and  of  the  Secretaries  of  State.  This  policy 
formed  the  only  really  national  item  in  our  relations  with 
the  Far  East  for  it  was  the  only  one  which  was  adopted  after 
full  discussion  and  investigation  in  Congress.  Unquestion- 
ably it  represented  the  will  of  the  people.  But  it  is  signifi- 
cant that  the  question  was  discussed  as  a  purely  domestic 
issue  and  was  settled  in  utter  and  brutal  disregard  for 
foreign  relations  and  existing  treaties.  The  settlement  of 
this  question  is  an  illustration  that  the  American  system  of 
government  presents  no  insuperable  obstacles  to  the  control 
of  foreign  policy  by  the  people  where  the  economic  and 
social  interest  is  sufficient,  and  is  also  a  warning  that  other 
items  of  foreign  policy  are  liable  to  initiation  or  revision  by 
similar  measures.  That  the  American  people  are  prone  to 
resolve  all  questions  into  partisan  and  domestic  issues  and 
are  deficient  in  a  sense  of  cooperative  responsibility  in  inter- 
national affairs  is  evident.  This  fact  becomes  somewhat 
disquieting  when  one  turns  to  the  political  situation  in  the 
Far  East  and  notes  how  necessary  a  cooperative  policy 
has  become. 

The  Cooperative  Policy 

When  closely  scrutinized  it  appears  that  the  United 
States  never  during  the  century  actually  retired  from  the 
cooperative  policy  first  timidly  proposed  in  the  fifties  and 
then  followed  with  so  much  vigor  in  the  sixties.  When  the 
American  Government  withdrew  from  close  cooperation 
with  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  it  had  already 
entered,  without  any  formality  or  documentary  pledge,  into 
cooperation  with  and  support  of  Japan.  The  United  States 
did  not  retire  from  cooperation ;  it  merely  changed  partners. 
The  corollary  of  the  open  door  was  the  policy  of  promoting 
an  Asia  strong  enough  to  be  its  own  door-keeper.  When 
England  and  France  revealed  a  disposition  to  use  the  power 
of  a  cooperative  policy  to  repress  and  weaken  Asia  the 
United  States  withdrew  from  cooperation  with  them  and 
sought  the  accomplishment  of  its  purpose  by  cooperation 


678  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

with  an  Oriental  power.  Then,  in  the  McKinley  adminis- 
tration, when  Great  Britain  had  come  to  adopt  the  Amer- 
ican contention  that  a  strong  Japan  was  advantageous  to 
the  trading  nations,  the  United  States  resumed  its  cooper- 
ative pohcy  with  England.  The  principles  of  American 
policy  were  entirely  consistent  from  the  days  of  Seward 
onward. 

Only  the  cooperative  policy  stood  the  test  of  time.  In 
the  necessities  of  the  case  this  must  have  been  so.  An  iso- 
lated policy  committed  the  American  Government  to  one  of 
two  courses;  either  to  retirement  when  American  interests 
were  threatened,  or  the  defense  of  those  interests  with  suffi- 
cient force  to  protect  them.  An  isolated  policy  in  Asia  tends 
inevitably  either  to  a  surrender  of  most-favored-nation 
treatment  or  a  defiance  of  all  comers.  It  is  essentially  bel- 
ligerent. Commodore  Perry  was  entirely  consistent  when,  in 
addition  to  his  non-cooperative  policy,  he  advocated  the 
establishment  of  protectorates  over  half  a  dozen  pieces  of 
Asiatic  territory.  If  the  United  States  were  to  pit  its 
strength  against  the  world  in  the  Pacific  it  must  fortify  its 
position  after  the  most  approved  military  manner. 

That  the  cooperative  policy  suffered  from  mishandling 
in  the  following  forty  years  there  can  be  no  doubt.  While 
charging  the  other  Powers  with  bad  faith  and  with  wresting 
the  power  of  the  policy  to  serve  purposes  which  were  not  in 
the  interest  of  all  the  cooperating  powers,  we  may  properly 
confess  the  American  share  in  the  wreck  of  general  coopera- 
tion. Seward  approached  dangerously  close  to  bad  faith  and 
he  sometimes  used  the  policy  not  as  a  statesman  but  as  a 
sharp  politician.  The  withdrawal  of  the  United  States  from, 
cooperation  with  the  European  powers  in  Japan  found  an 
excuse  in  the  brutal  conduct  of  Sir  Harry  Parkes,  but  the 
withdrawal  was  petulant  and  probably  unnecessary.  All 
that  it  accomplished  in  bringing  about  a  change  in  British 
policy  favorable  to  the  promotion  of  a  strong,  enlightened 
and  prosperous  Japan,  probably  could  have  been  better  ac- 
complished had  the  American  Government  continued  the 
cooperative  policy  and  exercised  a  more  diplomatic  influence 


PERSONALITIES  AND  PRINCIPLES  679 

upon  the  British  Foreign  Office.  Judge  Bingham  proved 
himself  to  be  a  fine  type  of  American  during  his  long  service 
in  Tokio  but  he  was  neither  a  statesman  nor  a  diplomat. 
The  American  policy  in  Korea  also,  while  not  properly  open 
to  the  charge  of  having  betrayed  the  Koreans,  was  certainly 
lacking  in  political  sagacity  and  was  most  deficient  in  its 
contempt  for  general  cooperation.  Statesmanship  was  no- 
where apparent. 

A  cooperative  policy  is  not  a  trust  company  to  which  a 
government  may  consign  the  management  of  its  foreign  rela- 
tions and  then  feel  free  to  bestow  its  executive  and  diplo- 
matic posts  as  badges  of  honor  upon  men  who  are  merely 
loyal  Republicans  or  sound  Democrats.  American  interests 
in  the  Far  East  unquestionably  suffered,  but  the  fault  was 
not  so  much  in  the  cooperative  policy  as  in  the  fact  that 
the  American  representatives  and  the  American  administra- 
tions were  less  capable  than  those  with  which  they  were 
cooperating.  Fatality  to  American  interests  always  fol- 
lowed the  appearance  of  an  incompetent  American  diplomat 
or  a  provincial  Secretary  of  State.  It  was  true  at  Tientsin 
in  1858,  in  Japan  after  Harris  left,  in  China  after  Bur- 
lingame's  retirement.  The  wreck  of  the  cooperative  policy 
in  the  East  in  the  nineties  was  due  as  much  to  American 
ineptitude  as  to  European  jealousies. 

It  was  the  utter  wreck  of  the  cooperative  policy  which 
made  it  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  retain  the 
Philippines  and  one  may  at  least  question  whether  the 
annexation  of  Hawaii  would  have  taken  place  had  not  Japan 
betrayed  an  inclination  to  encroach  upon  the  islands.  Only 
the  reestablishment  of  cooperation  between  Great  Britain, 
Japan  and  the  United  States  prevented  the  dismembermen': 
of  the  Chinese  Empire.  In  the  resumption  of  cooperation  in 
1899  the  United  States  suffered  no  loss  for  it  was  ably  rep- 
resented. 

The  only  unknown  quantity  making  a  cooperative  policy 
a  gamble  for  the  United  States  is  the  quality  of  American 
representation.  But  the  uncertainties  of  American  politics 
are  always  a  liability  to  be  reckoned  with,  and  as  disastrous 


680  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

to  an  isolated  as  to  a  cooperative  policy.  The  history  of 
American  policy  in  the  nineteenth  century,  and  there  does 
not  appear  to  be  any  different  testimony  from  more  recent 
history,  indicates  that  American  interests  in  Asia,  which  are 
best  served  by  the  open  door  and  the  development  of  strong 
Asiatic  states,  fare  best  under  a  cooperative  policy  in  which 
the  American  Government  is  ably  and  energetically  repre- 
sented. That  under  such  a  policy  the  United  States  will 
attain  the  full  measure  of  its  desires  is  unlikely,  but  under 
an  isolated  policy  it  will  certainly  obtain  even  less  both  for 
itself  and  for  Asia.  The  American  people  delight  to  honor 
Seward  and  Hay  both  of  whom  reached  this  conclusion,  but 
perhaps  even  yet  they  have  not  grasped  the  secret  of  their 
statesmanship.  The  cooperative  policy  in  Asia  has  not  been 
lifted  to  a  place  in  American  foreign  policy  by  the  side  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  where  it  is  above  the  reach  of  issue- 
hujiiing  campaign  managers. 

£_In  conclusion,  we  repeat  that  the  tap-root  of  American 
policy  in  Asia  is  most-favored-nation  treatment.  An  atti- 
tude of  self-righteousness  is  neither  becoming  nor  justified. 
American  policy  is  not  philanthropic ;  it  is  not,  in  its  motive 
and  history,  benevolent ;  but  it  is  beneficent,  for  the  United 
States  is  so  situated  that  American  interests  in  Asia  are  best 
promoted  by  the  growth  of  strong,  prosperous  and  enlight- 
ened Asiatic  states.  Indeed  it  is  difficult  for  an  American 
to  believe  that  the  repression  or  weakening  of  any  part  of 
Asia  is  a  benefit  to  any  power.  The  United  States  is  com- 
mitted to  its  policy  by  geographical,  economic  and  political 
facts,  and  in  the  same  measure  is  also  bound  to  a  policy  of 
cooperation  with  all  powers  which  sincerely  profess  a  similar 
purpose. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

1.  The  documentary  and  pamphlet  literature  on  the  consular  system 
is  voluminous.  The  student  is  referred  to  the  index  to  Foreign 
Relations,  and  to  the  following  documents :  A  Report  to  the 
Hon.  George  S.  Boutwell,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  upon  the 
Consular  Service  of  the  U.  S.  A.  by  DeB.  Randolph  Keim 
(Washington,  1872) ;  the  Keim  Report  is  also  given  in  S.  Ex. 


PERSONALITIES  AND  PRINCIPLES  681 

Doc.  7:41-3;  Report  to  the  Hon.  John  Hay,  Secretary  of  State, 
upon  a  tour  of  consuhir  inspection  in  Asia,  by  Herbert  H.  D. 
Pierce  (Washington,  1904)  ;  also  H.  Misc.  Doc.  31  :45-2  (Part  2) 
which  contains  the  documentary  evidence  as  to  the  conditions 
in  the  consular  service  of  China,  with  special  reference  to 
Shanghai  up  until  1877;  this  document  should  be  studied  with 
H.  Rept.  134:45-3,  Investigation  of  fleo.  F.  Seward.  Seward 
while  serving  as  minister  at  Peking  was  charged  with  corrup- 
tion in  his  previous  service  as  Consul  General  at  Shanghai. 
The  Committee  on  Expenditures  in  the  State  Department  in 
the  House  presented  a  bill  of  impeachment  against  Seward 
which  was  referred  (June  4,  1879)  to  the  Committee  on 
Judiciary  from  which  it  never  reappeared.  The  following  year 
Seward  was  replaced  at  Peking  by  James  B.  Angell.  Chester 
Lloyd  Jones :  "The  Consular  Service  of  the  United  States,  its 
History  and  Activities"  (Univ.  of  Pa.  Series  in  Political 
Economy  and  Public  Law,  No.  18,  Philadelphia,  1906)  is  a 
good  general  summary  of  the  development  of  the  entire  consular 
system,  but  it  contains  only  passing  references  to  Asia. 

2.  Keim:    Report,  p.  183. 

3.  Pierce:    Report,  p.  15. 

4.  Moore's  "Digest,"  Vol.  2,  pp.   613  ff.;   S.  Ex.  Doc.  72:31-1    (the 

report  of  John  W.  Davis). 

5.  Hubbard  was  so  unwise  as  to  write  a  book  after  his  return  from 

Tokio.    It  is  a  very  revealing  document.     Richard  B.  Hubbard : 
"The  United  States  in  the  Far  East,  or.  Modern  Japan  and  the 
Orient"  (Richmond,  Va.,  1899). 

6.  William  Seward's  "Travels  Around  the  World,"  p.  89. 

7.  Foulk  Papers  (New  York  Public  Library,  Manuscripts  Div.). 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

N®TES  ON  BIBLIOGKAPHY 

Quotation  or  exact  citation  with  attached  bibliograph- 
ical reference  where  statements  of  fact  are,  or  may  be,  mat- 
ters of  dispute  have  been  uniformly  utilized  in  this  study. 
Other  quotations  have  been  introduced  to  give  the  reader 
the  peculiar  flavor  of  the  sources  quoted,  for  in  the  deter- 
mination of  policy  prejudices  and  personal  feelings  were 
fully  as  influential  as  facts.  A  bibliographical  list  is  ap- 
pended which,  while  abbreviated  in  form,  is  sufficient  for 
the  identification  of  the  source.  In  this  list  will  be  found 
some  titles  of  little  known  contemporary  sources  throwing 
light  on  various  phases  of  domestic  history  or  on  American 
foreign  relations  outside  of  Eastern  Asia. 

The  attempt  to  supply  a  complete  and  critical  bibliog- 
raphy of  the  subject  has  been  abandoned  because  it  cannot 
be  done  satisfactorily  except  at  great  length.  Such  a  bib- 
liography would  be  most  satisfactory  were  it  the  result  of 
collaboration  rather  than  of  purely  individual  selection. 
Many  general  works  of  reference  to  which  the  student  nat- 
urally turns  for  general  information,  and  even  many  histories 
bearing  directly  upon  the  subject  are  not  mentioned  in  the 
bibliographical  citations.  Some  comments  of  a  general 
nature  at  the  end  of  this  chapter  will  give  the  reason  for 
this  omission.  The  appended  list,  containing  as  it  does  every 
title  cited  in  the  text,  does  constitute  a  selected  bibliography 
of  the  sources  which  the  writer  has  found  sufficiently  accu- 
rate to  justify  quotation.  The  citation  of  a  book  for  a 
specific  reference  does  not  however  constitute  an  endorse- 
ment of  the  book  as  a  whole.  In  general  books  on  the  Orient 
are  very  uneven  in  quality. 

The  writer  has  had  exceptional  privileges  of  access  to 

682 


NOTES  ON  BIBLIOGRAPHY  683 

the  archives  of  the  Department  of  State  and  it  has  seemed 
that  the  most  valuable  personal  contribution  he  can  make 
towards  the  critical  bibliography  which  is  so  sorely  needed, 
is  in  the  way  of  comparison  of  these  records  with  the  printed 
documents  and  with  such  other  manuscripts  or  printed 
sources  as  run  parallel  to  the  government  archives.  This 
contribution  is  offered  in  payment  of  the  debt  of  gratitude 
due  to  those  writers  who  have  already  pioneered  in  the  field 
and  have  published  bibliographies. 

The  primary  documentary  source  for  American  affairs  in 
the  East  Indies  and  Eastern  Asia  before  1844  are  the  con- 
sular letter  books  in  the  Department  of  State.  The  Canton 
Letters,  however,  begin  approximately  with  1800  and  while 
the  Calcutta  Letters  begin  in  1793  they  are  very  incomplete 
and  the  student  must  look  elsewhere  for  the  bulk  of  the 
material.  The  Miscellaneous  Letters  of  the  Department  of 
State  archives,  for  which  there  is  a  calendar  in  the  Depart- 
ment, contain  some  correspondence  from  merchants  engaged 
in  trade  and  throw  light  on  the  relations  of  such  men  as 
Astor,  Girard,  and  the  Providence  and  Boston  merchants  to 
the  Embargo,  War  of  1812,  appointment  of  consuls,  etc. 
The  first  volume  of  Canton  Letters  contains  some  mis- 
placed correspondence  with  reference  to  the  Columbia  and 
Lady  Washington  expedition  to  the  Northwest  Coast,  and  a 
packet  of  letters  and  documents,  unbound,  in  the  State 
Department  Library,  gives  further  information  about  the 
Northwest  Coast  trade. 

The  most  complete  printed  contemporary  sources  of  in- 
formation for  the  period  preceding  1800  are:  Shaw's  Jour- 
nals, published  in  1847,  which  not  only  include  Shaw's 
reports  to  John  Jay,  but  also  supply  much  additional  infor- 
mation as  to  the  circumstances  under  which  the  East  India 
trade  was  initiated,  and  the  manner  of  conducting  it  in  the 
East;  the  O'Donnell  correspondence  in  Diplomatic  Corre- 
spondence 1783-9,  Volume  3;  Spark's  "Life  of  John  Led- 
yard" ;  the  biographical  sketches  of  Elias  Haskett  Derby  and 
others  in  Hunt's  "American  Merchants";  the  "Letters  of 
Phineas  Bond,"   and   William  Milburn's  "Oriental   Com- 


684  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

merce,"  the  editions  of  1813  and  1825  being  unlike  and  both 
valuable. 

These'  printed  sources  are  supplemented  by  many  scat- 
tered manuscripts.  The  Library  of  Congress  contains  the 
Ingraham  Journal  of  the  Voyage  of  the  Hope,  a  long  letter 
from  Thomas  Randall  to  Alexander  Hamilton  and  other  less 
important  items.  The  Hudson  Collection  in  the  New  York 
Public  Library  contains  papers  relating  to  the  building  of 
the  ship  Massachusetts  for  Samuel  Shaw  in  1784,  and  the 
Bancroft  Collection  in  the  same  library  contains  copies  of 
some  of  the  Phineas  Bond  letters  as  well  as  reports  of  other 
British  agents  which  are  of  the  utmost  importance  in  deter- 
mining the  initial  East  India  trade  of  Philadelphia,  Balti- 
more, New  York  and  the  Rhode  Island  ports. 

The  documentary  sources  in  the  Massachusetts  libraries 
are  given  in  S.  E.  Morison's  incomparable  "Maritime  His- 
tory of  Massachusetts"  and  K.  S.  Latourette's  "Early  Rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  China"  gives  an  exten- 
sive though  not  complete  list  of  contemporary  sources  both 
manuscript  and  printed. 

The  Canton  Consular  Letters  from  1800  to  1840  were 
published  in  part  in  H.  Doc.  119:26-1  and  H.  Doc.  71:26-2. 
While  no  important  information  bearing  on  the  question 
before  Congress,  namely,  the  proposed  treaty  with  China, 
was  omitted  from  these  documents  the  unpublished  ma- 
terial is  of  the  greatest  historical  interest,  and  contains, 
many  shipping  reports  and  comments  which  throw  much 
light  on  early  American  economic  and  industrial  develop- 
ment. The  Kearny  Correspondence,  published  in  full  in 
S.  Doc.  139:29-1,  is  an  indispensable  introduction  to  the 
Cushing  negotiations,  and  in  part  supplies  the  deficiency 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  consular  correspondence  beyond 
1840  was  not  published. 

The  Edmund  Roberts  papers  are  deposited  in  the 
Library  of  Congress.  They  must,  however,  be  supple- 
mented by  the  Roberts  papers,  unbound,  in  the  library  of 
the  Department  of  State,  and  by  the  Batavia  Consular 
Letters.     The  Chinese  Repository  for  the  period  contains 


NOTES  ON  BIBLIOGRAPHY  685 

some  important  comments  on  the  Roberts  Mission.  Ed- 
mund Roberts'  own  book  is  of  very  slight  value  for  the 
historian  owing  to  the  editorial  supervision  it  received  from 
the  Department  of  State. 

The  published  consular  correspondence  for  the  period  is 
supplemented  by  Paullin's  "Early  W)yages  of  American 
Naval  Vessels  in  the  Orient,"  which  is  based  on  the  archives 
of  the  Navy  Department,  and  contains  full  quotations  and 
citations.  Seybert,  Pitkin  and  Milburn  supply  much  sta- 
tistical and  other  information,  but  the  best  sources  for  the 
conditions  of  American  trade  are  found  in  the  Parliamen- 
tary Papers.  While  many  statements  were  made  in  the 
various  Parliamentary  investigations  which  tended  to  ex- 
aggerate the  growth  of  American  trade,  these  reports  are, 
on  the  whole,  more  reliable  than  the  incomplete  figures  in 
the  Consular  Letters,  and  are  more  comprehensive  than 
those  of  Seybert  or  Pitkin. 

The  Caleb  Cushing  Correspondence  is  published  with 
the  omission  of  no  important  details  in  S.  Docs.  67  and 
58:28-2. 

Between  1844  and  1853  very  little  of  the  diplomatic  or 
consular  correspondence  was  published.  The  Chinese  Re- 
pository in  a  measure  supplies  this  gap  and  is  also  a  valuable 
supplement  to  all  the  published  documents  during  the  years 
(1832-51)  of  its  publication.  For  the  years  1828-61  the 
Hasse  Index  of  U.  S.  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign  Affairs 
is  a  certain  and  invaluable  guide  which  renders  unnecessary 
the  compilation  of  complete  lists  in  this  volume. 

From  1853  to  1869  practically  all  of  the  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence of  the  American  representatives  in  China  and 
Japan  was  published.  The  Department  of  State  apparently 
had  no  compunctions  about  publishing  material  which  con- 
tained or  implied  a  criticism  of  other  powers.  The  volu- 
minous and  highly  entertaining  as  well  as  instructive  cor- 
respondence of  Humphrey  Marshall  for  1853  was  printed 
almost  without  editing  or  the  omission  of  the  many  con- 
fidential dispatches.  This  and  the  correspondence  of  his 
successors,  McLane,  Parker,  Reed  and  Ward,  more  than 


686  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

2500  pages  in  all,  constitute  a  primary  source  not  merely 
for  American  but  for  British  and  French  history  in  China. 
These  volumes  have  been  uniformly  ignored  by  the  British 
and  French  historians  of  the  period  and  yet  so  important 
is  their  contribution  that  the  entire  history  of  the  period 
may  well  be  rewritten  from  them.  These  documents,  to 
which  may  be  added  S.  Wells  Williams'  Journal  of  the  Reed 
and  Ward  Missions,  have  an  unique  value  which  gives  them 
precedence  over  the  British  Blue  Books.  The  latter  were 
published  while  the  British  Government  was  being  sub- 
jected to  searching  criticism,  and  they  were  obviously  de- 
signed to  justify  a  policy  already  determined  upon.  The 
American  documents  were  not  edited  to  meet  a  criticism 
and  were  designed  to  plead  no  case.  They  record  events, 
month  by  month,  as  they  occurred  and  are  an  historical 
source  of  surpassing  value.  They  are  the  birth  records  of 
American  policy. 

The  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  begun  by  Seward, 
when  compared  with  the  manuscript  dispatches,  reveals  a 
continuance  of  the  policy  to  supply  the  fullest  possible 
information  on  the  relations  of  the  United  States  to  China 
and  Japan.  Only  a  small  amount  of  editing  took  place. 
The  China  dispatches  contain  relatively  little  of  importance 
which  was  not  printed.  The  same  may  be  said  for  Japan 
with  the  exception  that  the  information  relative  to  the 
convention  of  1866  was  very  defective,  and  much  of  the 
negotiation  with  reference  to  Korea,  having  been  entirely 
verbal,  was  omitted  entirely. 

The  Townsend  Harris  correspondence  w^as  published 
only  in  fragments  but  the  deficiency  has  been  largely  sup- 
plied in  Griffis'  "Harris"  which  was  based  on  Harris'  Journal 
and  contains  extensive  excerpts.  The  Harris  Papers  are 
now  deposited  in  the  Library  of  the  College  of  the  City  of 
New  York,  and  there  are  in  addition  to  them  some  Harris 
papers  in  the  New  York  Public  Library.  Griffis  did  not 
have  access  to  the  latter  papers  but  they  contain  nothing 
which  would  modify  greatly  the  facts  already  published. 
The  present  writer  has  added  in  the  text  certain  facts  not 


NOTES  ON  BIBLIOGRAPHY  687 

hitherto  known  relating  to  the  appointment  of  Harris  to 
his  various  posts.  The  Pruyn  papers  to  which  Treat  had 
access  and  from  which  he  printed  many  excerpts  would 
appear  to  be  very  similar  in  content  to  the  dispatches  in 
the  Department  of  State. 

The  Burlingame  private  papers  do  not  appear  to  have 
Ijeen  extensive  and  Williams'  biography  is  complete  except 
for  certain  details  of  the  negotiations  in  Europe  which  were 
reported  in  more  or  less  private  letters  to  Seward  and  are 
bound  up  in  the  first  volume  of  Notes  from  the  Chinese 
Legation  in  the  Department  of  State. 

Some  additional  correspondence  for  the  period  covered 
by  Seward's  term  of  office  appear  in  the  documents  report- 
ing the  investigations  of  0.  B.  Bradford  and  George  F. 
Seward,  in  the  document  supplying  information  on  the 
Ward-Hill  claim  against  China,  and  in  the  reports  relative 
to  the  return  of  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  indemnities. 

Parts  of  the  missing  documents  with  reference  to  Sew- 
ard's negotiations  over  Korea  have  been  printed  in  the  text, 
and  more  completely  by  the  writer  of  this  book  in  the 
American  Historical  Review. 

A  change  of  policy  with  reference  to  the  publication  of 
diplomatic  correspondence  by  the  Department  of  State  ap- 
pears after  1870.  The  dispatches  were  subjected  to  an  in- 
creasing amount  of  editing.  The  reason  may  be  found  in 
the  complaints  of  the  American  representatives  in  Peking 
and  Tokio.  The  full  publication  of  their  dispatches  had 
become  a  source  of  extreme  embarrassment.  The  English 
newspapers,  most  of  them  bitterly  and  vituperously  hostile 
to  Americans,  seized  upon  the  volumes  of  Foreign  Relations 
with  avidity  and  published  long  extracts,  with  com- 
mentaries. For  several  years  thereafter  the  ministers  them- 
selves were  permitted  to  designate  the  dispatches  which 
they  were  willing  to  have  published,  and  then  a  system  of 
editing  was  introduced  into  the  State  Department  which 
was  very  conservative  and  erred  only  on  the  safe  side.  The 
effect  of  this  system  was  to  render  the  succeeding  volumes 
of  Foreign  Relations  of  decreasing  value  to  the  student  of 


688  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

American  policy  in  the  East,  One  is  not  safe  in  making 
any  generalizations  based  on  the  pubUshed  dispatches  in 
Foreign  Relations  from  1875  to  1894.  But  the  relations  of 
the  American  Government  to  the  Sino-Japanese  War  was 
exhibited  with  no  important  omissions,  and  the  Boxer  cor- 
respondence is  in  no  way  misleading. 

The  voluminous  documents  relating  to  the  Philippine 
question  are  of  a  different  character.  They  are  fully  and 
critically  discussed  by  LeRoy.  In  general  we  may  note  that 
they  resemble  in  character  the  British  Blue  books  on  the 
Elgin  Expedition  and  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin.  They  were 
published  to  justify  a  policy  and  to  influence  public  opinion 
and  as  such  must  be  used  with  the  greatest  caution.  They 
represent  the  first  instance  in  the  19th  century  in  Ameri- 
can relations  with  the  East  where  government  documents 
were  used  as  polemics  to  justify  a  policy  already  adopted. 

The  manuscript  or  printed  material  running  parallel 
with  the  diplomatic  records  for  the  period  since  1868  is 
scanty.  The  Shufeldt  papers  are  deposited  in  the  Navy 
Department  Library  and  the  Foulk  papers,  containing 
letter-press  copies  of  practically  all  his  reports  and  diplo- 
matic dispatches  and  some  personal  notes  and  correspond- 
ence (1884-7)  with  reference  to  Korean  matters,  are  in  the 
New  York  Public  Library.  These  two  collections  constitute 
an  independent  documentary  record  of  American  relations 
with  Korea  down  to  1887.  They  are  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance and  are  another  block  of  material  which  materially 
changes  a  chapter  of  American  history.  Perhaps  no  phase 
of  American  history  has  been  more  mishandled  and  more 
wrested  to  serve  partisan  purposes. 

Other  manuscript  material  relating  to  this  period  is 
known  to  exist  but  so  far  as  the  writer  is  aware  it  has  not 
been  made  generally  available  to  students.  The  John 
Russell  Young  papers  covering  the  years  1882-5,  provided 
they  are  not  lost,  will  yield  a  record  of  surpassing  value  for 
afl"airs  in  both  China  and  Japan  and  also  in  Korea.  The 
Young  dispatches  contain  the  best  portraiture  of  Li  Hung 
Chang  at  that  period  that  the  writer  has  seen.     Likewise 


NOTES  ON  BIBLIOGRAPHY  689 

the  Young  papers  will  probably  throw  light  on  the  inter- 
national significance  of  the  tour  of  General  Grant  in  the 
East  which,  so  far  as  American  policy  is  concerned,  marked 
an  epoch.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  in  time  the  literary  records 
of  more  recent  Americans,  many  of  them  still  living,  may 
find  their  way  into  libraries. 

American  historical  literature  is  not  rich  in  the  biog- 
raphies and  published  letters  of  American  representatives 
in  the  East.  Many  of  the  Americans  were  not  literary  men 
and  even  where  the  records  are  ample  it  would  appear  that 
there  has  been  a  regrettable  lack  of  interest  in  their  pub- 
lication. There  are  in  American  historical  literature  very 
few  volumes  comparable  for  historical  importance  and 
readability,  with  Oliphant's  "Elgin  Expedition,"  Walrond's 
"Letters  of  Lord  Elgin,"  Michie's  "Englishman  in  China," 
or  Lane-Poole's  "Life  of  Parkes."  Williams'  biography  of 
Burlingame,  the  "Life  and  Letters  of  Williams,"  the 
Williams  Journals  of  the  Perry,  Reed  and  Ward  missions, 
and  Foster's  "Diplomatic  Memoirs"  only  partially  meet  the 
need.  The  books  of  Young,  Holcombe  and  Denby,  while 
valuable,  leave  much  to  be  desired.  The  result  of  this 
poverty  of  American  historical  literature  and  the  general 
ignorance  of  the  vast  mass  of  government  documents  for 
the  period  before  1860  has  been  that  American  relations 
in  the  East  have  been  very  inadequately  treated  by  his- 
torians and  also  very  badly  misrepresented.  One  cannot 
refer  to  a  single  history  of  the  period  which  is  not  exposed 
to  the  charge  of  grave  misstatements  of  fact,  and  equally 
serious  errors  of  interpretation. 

Some  few  works  by  American  and  British  writers  have 
had  such  a  currency  and  have  been  so  widely  used  and 
generally  cited  as  authorities  that  a  few  critical  comments 
upon  them  may  not  be  out  of  order. 

H.  B.  Morse's  "International  Relations  of  the  Chinese 
Empire,"  three  volumes,  is  an  invaluable  chronicle  of  events 
in  China.  It  is  also  an  important  interpretation  by  one 
who  made  an  honest  effort  to  be  just  and  fair  to  all,  and  had 
a  liberal  view-point.     Mr.  Morse's  distinguished  career  in 


690  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

the  "Chinese  Maritime  Customs,"  and  his  close  association 
with  Sir  Robert  Hart  gave  him  access  to  invaluable  sources 
of  information.  These  three  volumes  are  an  exposition  of 
the  point  of  view  of  a  liberal  Englishman  in  China.  The 
second  and  third  volumes  reflect  in  a  pronounced  way  the 
views  of  Sir  Robert  Hart.  All  the  volumes  have,  however, 
two  very  serious  deficiencies.  By  confining  the  study  to 
China  with  some  attention  to  Korea,  and  by  excluding 
Japan,  they  present  a  distorted  picture,  for  it  was  the  policy 
of  all  the  Powers  to  regard  the  Far  or  Extreme  East  as  a 
unity.  The  second  deficiency  is  due  not  to  the  limitation 
of  the  theme  but  to  the  use  of  sources.  In  the  first  volume, 
which  brings  the  narrative  down  to  1860,  and  which  covers 
the  period  in  which  American  policy  had  its  birth,  Mr. 
Morse  draws  upon  only  seven  American  sources,  most  of 
which  are  not  contemporary,  and  none  of  which  are  official 
records.  The  result  is  a  volume  in  which  the  British  Blue 
books  and  other  British  sources  supply  the  information  and 
control  the  conclusions.  It  is  an  extremely  unreliable  guide 
to  the  study  of  American  policy.  The  two  later  volumes 
are  less  deficient  in  their  use  of  American  sources,  and  yet 
American  interests  are  slighted  and  misrepresented. 

The  writings  of  S.  Wells  Williams  demand  special  at- 
tention. As  a  source  book  of  Chinese  history  the  "Middle 
Kingdom"  still  occupies  a  unique  position.  The  abridg- 
ment of  this  monumental  work  by  the  author's  son  in  "A 
History  of  China,"  shares  the  merits  of  the  larger  work. 
However,  for  some  reason,  possibly  because  of  Dr.  Williams' 
intimate  and  confidential  association  with  the  American 
Government  for  so  many  years,  the  phases  of  American  re- 
lations with  China  are  slighted  to  an  extraordinary  degree, 
and  these  volumes  are  of  little  value  in  a  study  of  American 
policy.  On  the  other  hand  the  Wilhams'  Journals,  pub- 
lished in  China  and  Japan,  and  little  known  to  American 
readers,  are  of  superlative  importance. 

John  W.  Foster's  "American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient" 
has  been  for  nearly  a  score  of  years  the  only  book  by  an 
American  author  to  cover  the  field  which  the  present  writer 


NOTES  ON  BIBLIOGRAPHY  691 

has  chosen.  The  book  may  not  fairly  be  judged  for  what 
it  did  not  purport  to  be.  It  was  not  based  on  manuscript 
sources,  nor  did  it  attempt  a  critical  handling  of  any  source. 
Its  most  important  contribution  was  for  those  years  in 
which  the  author  was  himself  an  actor  in  the  events  he 
described.  Its  later  chapters  were  written  with  the  extreme 
caution  of  a  gentleman  who  was  writing  about  his  friends 
and  political  associates,  and  the  entire  volume  reflects  a 
complacent  judgment  which  has  had  the  effect  of  presenting 
American  policy  in  Asia  as  a  form  of  philanthropy.  Per- 
haps the  most  serious  defect  of  the  book  is  its  failure  to 
bring  out  the  importance  of  events  before  1860.  General 
Foster  appears  to  have  regarded  the  questions  as  they  arose 
in  the  last  three  decades  of  the  century  as  novel,  whereas, 
in  principle,  they  were  but  the  recurrences  of  older  questions 
in  the  settlement  of  which  ample  precedents  had  been  laid 
down.  Of  more  importance  to  the  student  is  Foster's 
"Diplomatic  Memoirs,"  the  chapters  of  which  devoted  to 
the  Sino-Japanese  War  and  the  Treaty  of  Shimoneseki,  are 
a  primary  historical  source. 

There  are  no  books  on  American  policy  in  Korea  which 
can  be  recommended.  The  information  upon  which  they 
have  been  written  has  been  scanty  and  very  partisan. 
American  policy  has  been  misrepresented.  This  was  not  a 
very  bright  page  in  American  history,  but  it  is  not  open  to 
the  charges  which  have  been  brought  against  it. 

The  British  writers,  Boulger,  Parker,  Michie,  Lane- 
Poole,  Douglas,  Alcock,  and  others,  all  have  the  deficiencies 
noted  in  Morse.  They  did  not  find  it  worth  while  to  consult 
American  sources  of  information.  While  not  uncritical  of 
British  policy,  they  incline  to  accept  the  British  Blue  Books 
as  the  inspired  word  of  truth,  and  the  facts  of  American 
relations  receive  only  passing  attention  and  the  most  as- 
tonishing interpretations.  They  perpetuate  many  state- 
ments which,  according  to  American  sources  of  the  highest 
historical  value,  would  appear  to  be  utterly  untenable. 
Sargent's  "Anglo-Chinese  Commerce  and  Diplomacy"  is  of 
a  different  character,  admirable  and  alone  in  its  class. 


692  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

In  conclusion  we  draw  attention  to  a  group  of  studies  by 
American  scholars  of  certain  limited  phases  of  the  American 
policy.  Callahan's  "American  Relations  in  the  Pacific  and 
the  Far  East,  1784-1900,"  was  the  pioneer.  It  was  written 
just  after  the  occupation  of  the  Philippines  and  reflects  the 
resurgence  of  American  imperialism  of  the  period.  It  has 
been  much  criticised  but  it  had  many  merits  as  an  introduc- 
tion to  the  subject.  Callahan  grasped  the  cycle  of  events 
and  realized  that  in  1898  the  United  States  was  really  re- 
turning to  a  phase  of  policy  similar  to  that  of  the  fifties. 
This  was  an  important  contribution  which  not  all  students 
were  ready  to  appropriate.  Paullin's  "Diplomatic  Negotia- 
tions of  American  Naval  Officers,"  and  his  even  more 
valuable  "Early  Voyages  of  American  Naval  Vessels  in  the 
Orient"  set  a  high  standard  of  scholarship  and  remain  in 
this  field  unchallenged.  Their  deficiency  is  merely  in  the 
scope,  for  they  were  based  too  exclusively  upon  the  naval 
records.  The  State  Department  archives  are  necessary  to 
complete  the  picture  and  when  PauUin  wrote  the  more  re- 
cent ones  were  not  available.  Treat's  "Diplomatic  Rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Japan,  1853-65,"  is 
another  scholarly  study.  While  the  present  writer  has  not 
always  found  it  possible  to  accept  Treat's  interpretations, 
and  has  rejected  the  valuation  which  he  placed  upon  the 
services  of  one  man,  he  has  used  the  book  with  very  great 
appreciation.  Treat's  more  recent  "Japan  and  the  United 
States,  1853-1921,"  is  of  less  value  and  the  irenic  nature  of 
the  lectures  which  it  comprises  would  appear  to  have  em- 
barrassed a  perfectly  impartial  statement  of  the  facts. 
LeRoy's  intensive  study  of  the  first  few  years  of  American 
policy  in  the  Philippines  stands  in  a  class  by  itself.  It  is 
the  indispensable  guide  to  the  student.  Likewise,  Morison's 
"Maritime  History  of  Massachusetts,  1783-1860,"  is  an 
incomparable  book.  It  has  only  the  defect  of  the  limita- 
tion of  the  subject.  From  Morison  one  might  easily  reach 
the  conclusion  that  the  contribution  of  Massachusetts  to 
the  early  East  India  trade  of  the  United  States  was  greater 
than  it  actually  was.    Philadelphia  and  New  York  would 


NOTES  ON  BIBLIOGRAPHY  693 

appear  from  the  records,  incomplete  though  they  are,  to 
have  had  an  importance  which  is  not  assigned  to  them  by 
Morison.  The  most  adequate  single  source  for  the  entire 
period  is  the  historical  sections  of  Aloore's  "Digest." 

Passing  from  the  mature  works  of  American  historians 
we  come  to  a  group  of  academic  studies  by  post  graduate 
students.  At  the  head  of  this  list,  in  value,  stands  Koo's 
"Status  of  Aliens  in  China."  Next  to  it  is  Nitobe's  study 
which  now  possesses,  in  addition  to  its  scholarly  research, 
the  value  of  a  historical  document  for  it  is  an  interpreta- 
tion by  a  Japanese  student  in  an  American  university  in  the 
early  nineties,  Hinkley's  "American  Consular  Jurisprudence 
in  the  Orient"  gives  a  good  summary  of  extraterritoriality; 
it  is  deficient  in  statements  of  historical  fact.  Latourette's 
"Early  Relations  between  the  United  States  and  China," 
1784-1844,  is  particularly  valuable  for  its  critical  bibliog- 
raphy. Clements'  "Boxer  Rebellion"  is  good.  There  is  a 
steadily  increasing  list  of  doctorate  theses  by  Japanese  and 
Chinese  students  in  American  universities.  They  are  of 
very  unequal  value.  Their  too  common  defects  are  a 
neglect  of  original  sources,  and  a  tendency  towards  special 
pleading.  Many  of  the  Japanese  students  have  made  im- 
portant contributions  by  supplying  translations  from  Japa- 
nese sources  not  otherwise  available.  A  few  Chinese  have 
made  similar  contributions,  but  there  is  a  regrettable  lack 
of  Chinese  source  material  in  the  output  of  Chinese  stu- 
dents and  an  undiscriminating  use  of  British  sources  which 
often  weakens  the  cause  so  dear  to  their  hearts.  While 
Chinese  sources  may  not  be  available  to  Chinese  students 
in  America,  and  while  many  of  the  Chinese  historical  rec- 
ords were  conveniently  destroyed  by  the  vandalism  of 
foreign  invading  armies  at  Peking  in  1860  and  in  1900,  there 
is  nevertheless  in  China  a  very  considerable  amount  of 
historical  record  of  the  highest  value  which  only  the 
Chinese  graduate  student  is  competent  to  make  use  of. 
Hitherto  China  has  rarely  spoken  for  herself  in  the  writing 
of  history,  and  for  this  reason  the  Chinese  story  has  suffered 
greatly  in  the  telling.     The  publication  of  Chinese  source 


694  AMERICANS  IN  EASTERN  ASIA 

material  on  the  history  of  China's  foreign  relations  would 
doubtless  work  havoc  in  all  existing  histories.  Meanwhile 
the  Chinese  students  have  by  no  means  made  the  most  of 
the  Chinese  sources  which  are  available  in  American  Gov- 
ernment documents. 

It  is  also  very  regrettable  that  greater  inducement  has 
not  been  given  to  post-graduate  historical  students  to  edit 
and  publish  as  theses  the  vast  amount  of  manuscript  ma- 
terial which  lies  unused  and  unknown  in  the  various  manu- 
script collections,  particularly  in  the  libraries  of  the  north- 
ern Atlantic  seaboard.  Some  of  these  manuscripts,  com- 
petently edited,  would  be  at  least  as  good  a  test  of  scholarly 
ability  as  the  theses  which  appear  from  year  to  year,  and 
to  the  general  public  they  would  be  of  vastly  greater  value. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Manuscripts  in  United  States  Government  Archives 

Department  of  State. 

Despatches  to  Consuls. 

Batavia  Consular  Letters. 

Canton  Consular  Letters. 

Honolulu  Consular  Letters. 

Ningpo  Consular  Letters. 

Manila  Consular  Letters. 

Smyrna  Consular  Letters. 

British  Legation,  Notes  from. 

China  Instructions. 

China  Despatches. 

Chinese  Legation,  Notes  from. 

Japan  Instructions. 

Japan  Despatches. 

Japanese  Legation,  Notes  from. 

Korea  Instructions. 

Korea  Despatches. 

Russia  Instructions. 

Russia  Despatches. 

Russian  Legation,  Notes  to. 

Townsend  Harris  Papers.    Bureau  of  Appointments. 

Capt.   John    Kendrick.      Correspondence    concerning   Settlement   of   his 
Estate.     Library,  D.  of  S. 

Miscellaneous  Letters. 

Edmund  Roberts  Papers, 
Navy  Department. 

Captains'  Letters. 

East  India  Squadron  betters. 

Commodore  R.  W.  Shufeldt:  "Cruise  of  the  Ticonderoga." 

:  Papers  (deposited  in  Library). 

Other  Manuscripts 

Bancroft  Collection.    America  and  England.     New  York  Public  Library. 

Papers  of  Continental  Congress.     Library  of  Congress. 

Philip  Cuyler  Letter  Book.     New  York  Public  Library. 

George  C.  Foulk  Papers.    New  York  Public  Library. 

Alexander  Hamilton   Papers.     Library  of   Congress. 

Townsend  Harris  Papers.    College  of  the  City  of  New  York  Library. 

.     New  York  Public  Library. 

Journals  (typewritten  copy).    Library  of  Congress. 

Hudson  Collection.     New  York  Public  Library. 

Joseph  Ingraham.     "Journal  of  the  Voyage  of  the  Hope."     Library  of 
Congress. 

695 


696  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Thomas  Jefferson  Papers.    Library  of  Congress. 
William  Law  Papers.     New  York  Public  Library. 
James  Madison  Papers.     Library  of  Congress. 

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Edmund  Roberts  Papers.  Library  of  Congress. 
Daniel  Webster  Papers.  Library  of  Congress. 
Oliver  Wolcott  and  Co.    Account  Books.    New  York  Historical  Society. 


United  States  Government  Publications. 

Congressional  Documents  (given  below  in  the  order  of  publication). 
Lowndes  Report  on  Coinage.    H.  Doc.  Ill,  15th  Cong.  2nd  Sess. 
Floyd  Report  on  Oregon.     H.  Repts.  45,  16-2. 
China  Trade,  Report  on,  Feb.  6,  1826.     S.  Doc.  31,  19-1. 
Tea  Smuggling.    H.  Doc.  137,  19-1. 

Forbes,  R.  3.  and  Others,  Memorial  of.    H.  Doc.  40,  26-1. 
Fanning,  Edmund,  Memorial  of.    H.  Doc.  57,  26-1. 
Canton  Consular  Letters.    H.  Doc.  119,  26-1. 
Boston  and  Salem  Merchants,  Petition  of.     H.  Doc.  170,  26-1. 
China  Trade,  Secretary  of  Treas.  Report  on.     H.  Doc.  248,  26-1. 
Canton  Consular  Letters.    H.  Doc.  71,  26-2. 
Pres.  Tyler,  Message  of  July  1,  1842.    H.  Doc.  35,  27-3. 
Adams,  John  Quincy,  Report  on  China  Mission  Appropriation.    H.  Repts. 

93,  27-3. 
Cushing,  Caleb,  Correspondence  of.     S.  Doc.  67,  28-2. 

.    S.  Doc.  58,  28-2. 

Webster,  Daniel,  Instructions  to  Cushing.     S.  Doc.  138,  28-2. 

Pratt  Resolution  on  Treaty  with  Japan.    H.  Doc.  138,  28-2. 

Kearny  Correspondence.     S.  Doc.  139,  29-1. 

Palmer,  Aaron  Haight,  Letter  to  Buchanan,  H.  Doc.  96,  29-2. 

.     Memoir    Geographical,    Political   and    Commercial    on   Siberia, 

Manchuria,  and  Asiatic  Islands  of  the  N.  Pacific  Ocean.    S.  Misc.  Doc. 

80,  30-1. 
King,  T.  Butler,  Report  of  Com.  on  Naval  Affairs.    H.  Repts.  596,  30-1. 
Davis,  John  W.,  Corres.  on  Consular  Courts.     S.  Ex.  Doc.  72,  31-1. 
Glynn,  Commander  James,  Correspondence  of.     H.  Ex.  Doc.  84,  31-1. 
Balestier,  Joseph,  Correspondence  of.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  38,  32-1. 
Webster,  Daniel,  Report  on  Present  Relations  with  Japan.    S.  Ex.  Doc. 

59,  32-1. 
Kennedy,  John  P.,  Report  on  Trans-Pacific  steamers.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  49, 

32-2. 
Marshall,   Humphrey,  Correspondence  of.     H.  Ex.  Doc.  123,  33-1. 
Perry,  M.  C,  Correspondence  of.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  34,  33-2. 
Palinor,  Aaron  Haight,  Memorial  to  Senate.    S.  Misc.  Doc.  10,  33-2.    ' 
Rockhill,  John  A.,  Report  on  Trans-Isthmian  Canal.     H.  Rept.  145,  33-2. 
Parker,  Peter,  Correspondence  on  Coolie  Trade.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  99,  34-1. 
McLane,  Robert  M.,  Correspondence  of.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  22,  35-2,  2  vols. 
Parker,  Peter,  Correspondence  of.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  22,  35-2,  2  vols. 
Consular  Officers,  Compensation  for.    H.  Ex.  Doc.  68,  35-2. 
Reed,  William  B.,  Correspondence  of.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  30,  36-1. 
Ward,  John  E.,  Correspondence  of.     S.  Ex.  Doc.  30,  36-1. 
Marcy,  William  H.,  Instructions  to  McLane.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  39,  36-1. 
Harris,  Townsend,  Corres.  on  Japanese  Mission.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  25,  36-1. 
Japan,  Purchase  of  War  Steamers  in  U.  S.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  33,  37-3. 
Midway  Islands,  Occupation  of.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  79,  40-2. 
Japanese  Immigration  to  Hawaiian  Islands.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  80   40-2, 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  •  697 

Midway  Islands,  Harbor  Improvement.     S.  Rept.  194,  40-3. 

China,  American  Claims  on.     H.  Ex.  Doc.  29,  40-3. 

Consular  Service  Inspection.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  7,  41-3. 

Chinese  Immigration  Investigation.    S.  Rept.  689,  44-2. 

Chinese  Immigration.    Oliver  P.  Morton  Opinion.    S.  Misc.  Doc.  20,  45-2. 

Shanghai  Consulate  Investigation.    H.  Misc.  Doc.  31,  45-2. 

Seward,  Geo.  F.,  Report  of  Investigation.     H.  Rept.  134,  45-3. 

Chinese  Indemnity,  H.  Rept.  970,  48-1;  see  also,  H.  Kx.  Doc.  29,  40-3; 

H.  Ex.  Doc.  69,  41-2;  H.  Rept.  113,  45-3;  H.  Rept.  1142,  46-2. 
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China,  Report  on  Pending  Treaty,  Sept.  18,  1888.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  273,  50-1. 
Merchant  Marine  in  Foreign  Trade  (1890).    H.  Rept.  1210,  51-1. 
Hawaiian  Islands,  Harrison  Message  on  Annexation.    S.  Ex.  Doc.  76,  52-2. 
Philippines,  McKinley  Transmits  Treaty  of  Paris  to  Senate.    S.  Doc.  62, 

55-3. 
Aguinaldo,  Communications  with.     S.  Doc.  208,  56-1. 
Philippine  Islands,  Senate  Hearings.    S.  Doc.  331,  57-1,  3  parts. 
Rockhill,  W.  W.,  Correspondence  on  Boxer  Settlement.     S.  Doc.  67,  57-1. 
China,  U.  S.  Military  Operations  in.   War  Dept.  Doc.  124,  Pub.  XXX. 

(For  complete  list  of  congressional  documents  1828-1861,  .see  Adelaide 
R.  Hasse.  Index  to  U.  S.  Docs,  relating  to  Foreign  Affairs  [Washington, 
1914,  3  parts]  ;  for  further  details  of  printed  diplomatic  correspondence 
1861-1900,  see  index  volume  to  Foreign  Relations.) 

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U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large. 

Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Sept.  19,  1783-Mar.  4,  1789. 
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Intercontinental  Telegraph,  Seward  Report  to  Senate  (1864). 
Charles  Sumner,  Speech  on  Cession  of  Russian  America  (1867). 
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Rejection  of  Henry  W.  Blair  by  Chinese  Government  (1892). 
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Monthly  Summary  of  Commerce  and  Finance,  July,  1899. 
Monthly  Summary  of  Commerce  and  Finance,  June,  1901. 
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"Treaties  and  Conventions  between  the  United  States  and  Other  Powers 

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698  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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House  of  Commons,  1821,  Vol.  7. 

House  of  Commons,  Sessional  Papers,  1830,  Vols.  5-6. 

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(Editions  noted  in  titles  given  below  are  those  to  which  references  are 
made  in  the  foregoing  pages,    hi  many  cases  there  are  other  editions.) 

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APPENDIX 


Presidents,  Secretaries  of  State,   and   Diplomatic   Representatives  in   China,  Japan, 

AND  Korea   (1842-1900) 
JOHN  TYLER 

Danikl  Whiistei!    (Mass.)    (Mar.   5,   '41-Ma,v  8,   '43). 

China  Japan  Korea 

Caleb  Gushing,"  (Mass.) 
(May    8,    '43— Com- 
iiiissioiKT ;      also      E. 
E.   &   M.    P.). 
John  C.  Calhoun  (So.  Car.)    (April  1,   1844-Mar.   10.   1845). 
Caleb  Gushing"  (Mass.) 
(Aug.  1.5,  '44).  Com- 
missioner. 
JAMES  K.  POLK 

James  Buchanan   (Penn.)    (Mar.   11,   '4ri-Mar.   7,   '49). 


Japan 
Alexander  H.  Everett " 
(Mass.). 


China 
Alexander    H.     Everett 

(Mass.)      (Mar.      13, 

'45-June  28,   '47). 
John    W.    Davis    (Ind.) 

(Jan.  3,  '48-May  25, 

'50). 

ZACHARY  TAYLOR  and  MILLARD  FILLMORE 

John  M.  Clayton   (Del.)    (Mar.   7,  '49- July  22,  '50). 
Daniel  Webstki:   (Mass.)    (July  22,   '50-Oct.   24,   '52) 


Japan 
John  H.  Aulick  *  (June 

10,    '51). 
M.  C.   Perry"   (Nov.  5, 

'52). 


China 
Thomas    A.    R.    Nelson 
(Tenn.)       (Mar.      6, 
'51  ;   resigned). 
Joseph    Blunt    (N.    Y.) 
(Oct.     15,     '51  ;     de- 
clined). 
Humphrey  Marshall 

(Ky.)   (Aug.  4,  '52- 
Jan.    27,    '54). 
Edward  Everett   (Mass.)   (Nov.  6,  '52-Mar.  3,  '53). 

FRANKLIN  PIERCE 

William  L.  Marcy   (N.  Y.)   (Mar.  7,  '53-Mar.  6,  '57). 


China 
Robert        J.        Walker 

(Miss.)      (June      22, 

'53  ;    declined). 
Robert       M.       McLane 

(Md.)    (Oct.   18,  '53- 

Dec.    12,    '54). 
Peter  Parker  "    (Mass.) 

(Aug.     16,     '55-Aug. 

25,    '57). 


Japan 
Tovsrnsend  Harris  "    (N. 
Y.)       Gone.      Gen. 
(Sept.      13,     '56-Jan. 
19,    '69). 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

Lewis  Cass   (Mich.)    (Mar.  C 

,  '57-Dec.   12,  '60). 

China 

Japan 

William      B.      Reed »  " 

Townsend  Harris  "^ 

(N 

(Pa.)    (Apr.  18,  '57- 

Y.)     (Jan.     19, 

'59 

Dec.    8,    '58). 

Apr.  26,  '62). 

John    E.    Ward     (Ga.) 

(Dec.      5,      '58-Dec., 

'60). 

Korea 


Korea 


Korea 


Korea 


705 


706 


APPENDIX 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  and  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

William   H.   Seward    (N.   Y.)    (Mar.   6,   '61-Mar.   3,   '69). 


China 
Anson        Burlingame 

(Mass.)      (July      15, 

'61-Nov.    21,    '67). 
J.   Ross   Browne   (CaL) 

(Mar.  11,  '68-July  5, 

'69). 


ULYSSES  S.   GRANT 


Japan 
Robert    H.    Pruyn    (N. 

Y.)     (Jan.     22,     '62- 

Oct.   25,   '65). 
Chauncey      M.      Depew 

(N.    Y.)     (Nov.    15, 

'65  ;   declined). 
Robert  B.  Van  Valken- 

burgh   (N.   Y.)    (Jan. 

18,       '66-Nov.        11, 

'69). 


Hamilton  Fish    (N.   Y.)    (Mar.   17,   '6r»Mnr.   12,   '77). 


China 
William      A.      Howard 

(Mich.)      (Apr.      17, 

'69  ;    declined). 
Frederick        F.        Low 

(Cal.)    (Dec.  21,  '69- 

Mar.    28,    '74). 
Benjamin       P.       Avery 

(Cal.)  (Apr.  10,  '74- 

Nov.   8,   '75). 
George     F.     Seward 

(Cal.[?])     (Jan.    7, 

'76-Aug.  6,  '80). 


Japan 

Charles  E.  DeLong  •> 
(Nev.)  (Apr.  21, 
'69-Oct.   7,   '73). 

John  A.  Bingham 
(Ohio)  (Dec.  11, 
'73-July  2,  '85). 


Korea 
George      F.      Seward " 
(N.     Y.)     (July    27, 
'68). 


Korea 
Frederick       F.       Low ' 
(Cal.)    (1870). 


RUTHERFORD  B.  HAYES 

William  M.  Evakts  (N.  Y.)   (Mar.  12,  '77-Mar.  7,  '81). 
China  Japan 

James  B.  Angell  ° 
(Mich.)  (Apr.  9, 
'80-Oct.    4,    '81). 


Korea 


JAMES  A.   GARFIELD  and  CHESTER  A.   ARTHUR 
James  G.  Blaine  (Mc.)   (Mar.  7,  '81-Dec.   19,  '81). 

China  Japan  Korea 

R.   W.   Shufeldt   (Cal.) 
(Nov.  14,  '81). 

Frederick  T.  FnELiNCrHUYSEN   (N.  J.)    (Dec.   19,  '81-Mar.  6,   '85). 
John      Russell      Young 
(N.    Y.)     (Mar.    15, 
'82-Apr.  8,  '85). 


Lucius  H.  Foote  (Cal.) 
(Feb.  27,  '83-Jan. 
19,    '85). 


GROVER  CLEVELAND 

Thomas  F.  Bayahd  (Del.)  (Mar.  7,  '85-Mar.  6,  '89). 

China  Japan 

Charles    Denby     (Ind.)  Richard     B.      Hubbard 

(May     29,     '85- July  (Texas)       (Apr.       2, 

15,    '98).  '85-May  15,  '89). 


BENJAMIN  HARRISON 

James  G.  Blaine   (Me.)    (Mar. 
China 
Henry  W.  Blair  (N.  H.) 
(Feb.  27,  '91  ;  unac- 
ceptable to  China). 


7,   '89-June  4,   '92). 

Japan 
John    F.    Swift    (Cal.) 
(Mar.     12,     '89-Mar. 
10,  '91). 
Frank  L.  Coombs  (Apr. 
20,   '92). 


John  W.  Foster  (Ind.)   (June  29,  '92-Feb.  23,  '93). 


Korea 
William     H.     Parker « 

(D.    C.)       (Feb.    19, 

'Se-Oct.   29,   '86). 
Hugh       A.       Dinsmore 

(Okla.)      (Jan.      12, 

'87). 


Korea 
William      0.      Bradley 

(Ky.)        (Mar.       30, 

'89  ;   declined). 
Augustine     Heard 

(Mass.)       (Jan.      30, 

'90-June  27,   '93). 


APPENDIX 


707 


GROVER  CLEVELAND 

Walter  Q.  Gresham   (IlL)    (Mar.  6,  '93-May  28,  '93). 
China  Japan 

Edwin       Dun       (Ohio) 
(Apr.      4,      '93-June 
30,   '97). 
Richard    B.    Olney    (Mass.)     (June    10,    '95Mar.    5,    '97). 

WILLIAM  McKINLEY 

John  Sherman  (Ohio)   (Mar.  6,  '97-Apr.  26,  '98). 
China  Japan 

Edwin  H.  Conger  (111.)  Alfred    E.    Buck    (Ga.) 

(Jan.  19,  '98-Mar.  8,  (Apr.     13,     '97-Dec, 

'0.5).  4,  '02). 

William  R.  Day   (Ohio)   (Apr.  28,  '98-Sept.  16,  '98). 
John  Hay   (D.  C.)    (Sept.   30,  '98-)- 
William    W.    Rockhill  ' 
(Pa.)    (July   19,   '98- 
Sept.  8,  '01). 

"  Commissioned  to  make  treaty. 

"  Post  raised  to   Envoy   Extraordinary  and   Minister  Plenipotentiary. 
■^  Post  reduced  to   Minister  Resident  and  Consul   General. 
••  Post  raised  to  Minister  Resident. 

*  The  dates  given   below   the   names   of  the   diplomatic   representatives   indicate  dates 
of  appointment  or  confirmation,  and  of  retirement  or  resignation. 
'■  Special  agent. 


Korea 

John  M.  B.  Sill  (Cal.) 
(Jan.  12,  ■&4-Sept. 
13,    '97). 


Korea 
Horace  N.  Allen  (Ohio) 
(July     17,     '97-Dec. 
10,   '01). 


INDEX 


Abbot,  Com.  Joel:    191 

Adams,  John  Quincj-:  89;  105; 
106;  lecture  before  Mass.  Hist. 
Soc,  107;   opium,   120;   672 

Advisers,  foreign:  in  China,  587;  in 
Japan,  588 

Africa :  v ;  30 

Aguinaldo,  Emilio:  617-8 

Alaska:  telegraph,  409;  purchase, 
416;  590;  610;  636;  payment, 
671 

Alcock,  Sir  Rutherford :  201 ;  217ff. ; 
226;  228;  317;  386;  "naked 
force,"  388;  391-2;  396;  policy 
in  Japan,  400;  401;  418 

Aleutian  Islands:  409;  416;  590 

Allen,  Dr.  H.  N.:  478;  483;  made 
minister,  505;   557;  569;  616 

Alliance :  with  Great  Britain,  vi ; 
281;  298tf.;  Siam,  351;  357;  361; 
China-Japan,  437-8;  608;  over- 
tures in  1898,  640;  Beresford 
tour,  641-2;  664 

American  Policv,  see  United  States 

Amoy:  211;  327;  557 

Amur  River:  179;  357;  409;  429; 
590;  649 

Andereon,  Gen.  T.  M.:  618 

Angell,  James  B.:  458;  on  treatv 
of  1868,  540 ;  treaty  of  1882,  543 

Anglo-Chmese  War,  1839-42:  Amer- 
ican rel.  to,  91fT. ;  cause  of, 
106-7;  179;  181;  influence  in 
Japan,  256;   304;  664 

Anglo-French  War  with  China:  343; 
354;  386;  388;  490;  509 

Anglo-Japane.se  alliance:  640-1;  644 

Annam:  428;  French  relations, 
491-2 

Annapolis:  Jap.  students  at  naval 
academy,  454 

Aoki,  Count:  address  to  Diet,  497; 
529;   missionaries,  566 

Arbitration:  U.  S.  proposed  to 
Japan,  400;  443;  490-1;  491; 
494;  Sino-Jap.  War,  498;  Boxer 
Protocol  discussions,  659 


Archer,  Samuel:  10;  18 
Armstrong,     Com.    James:     Barrier 

Forts,  282;  Formosa,  286ff.;  300 
"Arrow"  affair:  282;  311;  402 
Arthur,   Pres.  Chester  A.:   464;    on 

treaty   revision,  523-4;    Chinese 

immigration,  544 
Ashmore   Fisheries   dispute:    494 
Astor,  John  Jacob:  71;  78;  683 
Audience  question:  334;  441;  636 
Aulick,   Com.  J.   H.:    commissioner 

to  Japan,  258;  261 

Bacon,    Augustus    O.:    joint   resolu- 
tion, 628-9 
Balestier,  Joseph :  350 
Balfour,  Capt.  G.:   195 
Balluzec:  Russian  Minister,  Peking, 

374 
Baltimore:  6;  26;  115;   Wabash  of, 

opium  ship,  119-20 
Bankok,  see  Siam 
Barrier    Forts:     Americans    attack, 

282;  300 
Batavia  and  Batavian  Republic,  see 

Java 
Bayard,  Thomas  F.:   546;  608 
Bcche  de  nicr:  34;  41 
Belgium:    Hankow-Peking  railroad, 

601-2 
Benton,    Senator    Thos.:    112 
Beresford,    Lord    Charles:    visit    to 

East,     641 ;     proposes     alliance, 

642;  644 
Berthemy,     J.     F.     G.:     375;     and 

Seward,  419 
Betsey  of  N.  Y.:  11 
Biddle,  Com.  James:  190;  Shanghai, 

197;  Japan,  249-50;  and  Kiying, 

294 
Bingham,    John    A.:    and    Shufeldt, 

456;    on   treaty   revision,  515fT. ; 

523 ;    retirement,  525 ;   673 
Blaine,    James    G.:    instructions    to 

Shufeldt,  461;  608;  Hawaii,  611 
Blair,  Henry  W.,  rejection  of:  548 
"Blood  Thicker  than  Water":  338ff. 


709 


710 


INDEX 


Boer  War:   639;    645 

Bombay:  27;  Com.  Parker,  opium, 
126;  Roberts  at,  129 

Bond,  Phincas:    opinion  of,  56 

Bonliam,  Sir  John:  275 

Bonifacio,  Andreas:  611 

Bonin  Islands:  U.  S.  flag  raised, 
266;  272;  274;  British  claims, 
275;  361;  428;  Japan  asserts 
sovereignty,  432-3 

Boston:  5;  27;  trade  with  Zanzibar, 
30;  merchants'  memorial  to 
Congress,  103;  115;  list  prin- 
cipal  merchants,   137;   683 

Bom-boulon,  M.  de:  334 

Bowring,  Sir  John:  222;  230ff.;  at 
Pei-ho,  238-9;  281;  Formosa, 
288;  297;  299;  and  Townsend 
Harris,  349 ;  Siam  treaty,  351 ; 
Japan  mission,  353;   357 

Boxer  Insurrection:  650ff. ;  Protocol, 
655ff. 

Bradford,  Oliver  B.:  railways,  595-7; 
687 

Brandt,  von:  435;  513;  635 

Brice,  Calvin:  railways  in  China, 
602 

Bridgman,  Rev.  E.  C:  Chinese 
sect'y,  chaplain,  Gushing  mis- 
sion, 142;  295;  555-6;  559;  563 

British,  see  Great  Britain 

Broughton's  Bav:   467;  485 

Bruce,  Sir  F.  W.  A.:  334;  336ff.; 
and  Burlingame,  372ff. ;  trans- 
ferred to  Washington,  379 

Buchanan,  James:  to  Everett,  186; 
223;  293;  policy  of  administra- 
tion, 293ff.;  on  Ward  mission, 
343;  607;  consular  system, 
671 

Burgevine,  Henry  A.:  369-71;  586; 
595 

Burlingame,  Anson:  vi;  sketch, 
367;  service  of  in  China,  368ff.; 
in  U.  S.  and  Europe,  368; 
death,  368;  mission  to  western 
powers,  378ff.;  "shining  cross" 
speech.  385;  and  Seward,  410; 
418;  589;  telegraphs,  590;  595; 
papers,  687 

Burmah :  428 ;  Margery,  454 

Cables,  see  Telegraphs 

Cabot.  George:  letter  to  Pres. 
Washington.  29 

Calcutta:  3;  10;  27;  Consular  Let- 
ters, 683 


California:    177;    180;    adventurers, 
188;  253;  374;  Chinese  immigra- 
tion,   536ff. ;    demands    Chinese 
exclusion,  546;   549 
Callahan,  J.   M.:    692 
Canton:  3;  methods  of  early  trade, 
49-51;    flag-staff    incident,    153; 
180;    211;    British   attack,    "Ar- 
row"    affair,     281-2;     right     of 
entry,     295-6;     capture,     311-2; 
336;    riot,    1883,    494;    mission- 
aries, 559;  589;   consulate,  670; 
Consular  Letters,  683 
Cape  Horn:  24;  34 
Cape  of  Good  Hope:  9;  24 
Cape  Town,  see  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
Captains,  see   Ship-masters 
Cargoes:    19ff.;   California,  180 
Carr,  Lewis:    229 
Carrington,  Edward:  63 
Cass,     Lewis:      policy     of,     293ff.; 
Napier    corres.,    300ff. ;    instruc- 
tions to  Reed,  306;  328;  Harris 
to,  359;   608 
Chaffee,  Maj.  Gen.  Adna  R.:  655 
Chamberlain,  Joseph:    642;   643 
Chapedelaine,  Abbe:  murder  of,  311 
Chemulpo:  467;  474 
Chesapeake:  26 
Chichester,  Admiral:   620;   639 
China:    and  Pacific,   177;   compared 
with   Japan,   347;    ibid.,   425ff.; 
and    Korea,    436-7;    Am.    trade 
with,  table,  580-1; 
— Sea:    Perry  on  control  of,  273 
—Dismemberment    of:    206;    220 
British     attitude,     223-4;     296 
379;     and     Burlingame,    388-9 
claims  to  Korea,  451ff.;   461-2 
threatened     war     with     Japan 
468;    political    conditions,    1881 
471 ;  603-4 ;  621 ;  649 ; 
— Merchants   Co.   steamers:    471; 
Franco-Chinese  War,  494-5 ;  585 ; 
See  also  Chinese,  Anglo-Chinese, 
Franco-Chinese,    Sino-Japanese, 
Manchu,        Tsungli        Yamen, 
Treaties  and  Conventions,  ami 
names  of  individuals  and  places 
China   trade:    early   importance   of, 

18;  speculation,  74 
Chinese:     dishonesty,    58;     account 

Treaty  Wanghia,  157 
Chinese    Government,    international 
relations     of :     ix ;     54 ;     orders 
foreigners     expelled,     93;     de- 
termines  destruction    opium   t., 


INDEX 


711 


94;  opens  Five  Ports  to  all  na- 
tions, 110;  opium,  1817,  120-1; 
189;  345;  Burlingame  mission, 
386;  policy  in  Korea,  460ff. 

Chinese  Government:  Americans 
applj'  for  protection,  83-4;  arro- 
gance, 106;  and  treaty  revision, 
378-9;  policy  on  telegraphs  and 
railroads,  592ff.;  Woosung  Rail- 
way Co.,  596;  turns  to  Russia, 
600 

Chinese   Repository:   556;   684-5 

Chinese  students  in  U.  S.:  463;  545; 
600 

Civil  War,  American:  392;  409;  and 
Seward's  policy,  414;  416;  579; 
588;  590 

Claims:  169;  211;  Shanghai,  1854, 
230;  306;  review  of  Am,  326tT.; 
commission,  329-30;  Japan,  399; 
Bonin  Islands,  432;  Ashmore 
Fisheries,  494 ;  651 ;  Boxer 
claims,  658-9;  Ward-Hill,  687; 
See  also  Arbitration,  Good  Offices, 
Mediation,  Indemnity 

Clarendon,  Lord:  230;  238;  on 
Bonin  Islands,  275;  Parker 
visits,  280-1;  299;  305;  368; 
Burlingame  and,  386ff.;  510;  567 

Clemens,  Paul  H.:  693 

Cleveland,  Pres.  Grover:  524-5;  530; 
Chinese  immigration,  546;  547; 
withdraws  Hawaiian  treaty, 
551;  612;  640 

Clippers:  opium,  126-7;  introduc- 
tion, 179-80 

Coal:  lS3ff.;  Japan,  253;  261ff.; 
269;  Formosa,  276;  284ff.; 
Parker  to  Marcy,  287;  Lay-Os- 
born  flotilla,  587;  Kaiping  Com- 
pany, 598 

Coasting  trade:  China,  161;  321; 
510;  Japan,  514;  Korea,  522; 
China  and  Japan,  585 

Cochin  China,  proposed  treaty, 
1832,  128;  Roberts  visit,  1832, 
133;  134;  272;  France  annexes, 
471;  491-2 

Co-hong,  see  Hong-merchants 

Columbia,  voyage  of:  9;  16;  38;  683 

Columbia  River:  39 

Commissioner,  U.  S.:    proposed  by 
Tyler,  111;  not  merchant,  136; 
See   also   Diplomatic  service   and 
appendix 

Commission  firms:  17;  52;  60; 
growth  of  Am.  firms,  71 


Communications:    176;    206;    short- 
ened, 409 
See  also  Telegraphs,  Steam  Navi- 
gation, Railroads 

Concessions  (foreign  settlements) : 
China,  168;  194ff.;  Shanghai, 
196;  Burlingame  doctrine,  373; 
382;  589;  in  Japan  and  Korea, 
590; 
— (commercial):  in  China,  588- 
90;  597-601;  Korea,  504 

Conger,  Edwm  H.:  555;  665;  retires 
on  leave,  666 

Congress:  petitioned  for  consular 
system  at  Canton,  76;  discusses 
Anglo-Chinese  War,  102;  303-4; 
Korea,  475 ;  481 ;  Chinese  immi- 
gration, 544ff.;  Act  of  Alav  6, 
1882,  544;  Act  of  Sept.  13,  1888, 
547;  Scott  Act,  547;  Geary  Act, 
548;  anne.xation  of  Hawaii,  552; 
Pacific  Mail  subsidj',  585;  trans- 
Pacific  Telegraph,  590;  Ha- 
waiian annexation,  614;  debates 
on  Hawaii  and  Philippines,  624ff. 

Congress,   cruise   of:    79 

Connecticut :    6 

Consequa :  58 ;  petition  to  Pres. 
Madison,  86 

Consular  .service:  63;  75;  170; 
Tyler  on,  186ff.;  McLane  re- 
port, 187;  230;  courts,  319-20; 
Chinese  immigration,  544 ; 
scandals,  597 ;  general  survey  of, 
669ff. ;  Keim  report,  670 ;  Pierce 
report,  671;  Act  of  May  16, 
1848,  671 

Cook,  Capt.:  4 

Coolie  trade:   189;  320;  Maria  Luz, 
490;   536ff. 
See  also  Immigration 

Coombs,  Frank  L.:  549-50 

Cooperative  policy:  vi;  at  Canton, 
1839,  96;  rejected,  97;  Canton 
merchants  propose,  99;  Caleb 
Cushing  on,  104;  Boston  and 
Salem  merchants,  136;  159;  182; 
211;  213;  British  desire,  223; 
McLane  instructions,  225;  Bow- 
ring,  233;  Shanghai,  1854,  334; 
McLane's  proposal  for  joint 
blockade,  240 ;  Parker-Claren- 
don interview,  280-1 ;  for  Can- 
ton, 289;  Marcy,  290;  Alex.  H. 
Everett,  296;  Buchanan-Cass, 
303ff.;  Reed,  312ff.;  Ward, 
338ff.;    Burlingame   and,   372ff.: 


712 


INDEX 


in  Japan,  392-3;  405;  Seward's 
policy,  410ff. ;  complete  abroga- 
tion, 500;  508ff.;  Bingham  on, 
516-7;  treaty  of  1878,  608;  643; 
review  of,  664ff.;  necessity  for, 
677 

Cornwallis,  Lord:  26 

Cotton :  beginnings  of  Am.  export 
of,  20-21;  tariff  of  1816,  27;  34; 
73;  growers,  102;  177;  King  re- 
port, 183;  Japan,  252;  319;  raw 
cotton  trade  with  Japan,  582 

Credits:   at  old  Canton,  52 

Crews:  character  Am.  sailor,  15; 
British  sailor,  15;  treatment,  16 

Crimean  War:  180;  201;  233;  257; 
275;  300;  639 

Cunningham,  Edw.:  200;  217ff. 

Curtius,  Donker:  353 

Cushing,  Caleb :  vi ;  104 ;  Cliina 
mission,  113;  preparation  for 
mission,  128ff. ;  instructions,  138; 
mission  organized,  142;  at 
Macao,  143;  policy  of,  145fT.;  to 
Act'g  Gov.  Ching,  149ff. ;  com- 
pared with  Sir  H.  Pottinger, 
159-60 ;  on  extraterritoriality, 
164ff.;  175-6;  181;  failure  of 
policy,  192;  206;  opinion  as 
Att'y  Gen.  on  claims,  232; 
Japan,  249;  254;  and  Perry  poli- 
cies, 277;  compared  with  Bur- 
lingame,  368;  384;  missionaries, 
556;  607;  608;  published  corres., 
685 

Cushing,  John  P.:  cliaracter  of,  60; 
71;  "rice-ships,"  91;  opium,  118; 
579 

Danish,  see  Denmark 

Davis,  Sir  J.  F.:  analysis  of  Treaty 

of  Wanghia,  161 
Davis,  John  W.:   sketch,   190;    197; 

Griswold    to,    198;    to    Viceroy, 

199;    Japan,   251;    and    Kiying, 

294;  296-7;  327 
DeLano,     M.     M.:     telegraphs     in 

China,  591-2 
DcLong,  C.  E.:  432;  on  China-Jap. 

alliance,    437-8;     recalled,    454; 

673 
Democratic  party:    535;   541;  624 
Denby,     Charles:      Sino-Jap.     War, 

500-2;     on     cooperation,     509; 

Chinese  immigration,  546;  rail- 
ways, 598-600;  673 
Denby,  Charles  Jr.:  496 


Denmark:  26;  57;  345;  Great 
Northern  Teleg.  Co.,  591ff.;  592 

Dennv,  O.  N.:   in  Korea;  482-3 

Department   of  State,   182;   675 

Derbv,  Elias  Haskett:  9;  17;  24; 
27;  biography,  683 

Derby,  Lord:   513 

Deshima:  246;  256;  353 

Dewey,  Com.  George:  614;  fleet, 
615;  Battle  Manila  Bay,  616-7 
and  Germans,  619 

Dietrichs,  Admiral  von:   619 

Dinsmore,  Hugh  A.:  625 

Diplomatic  service:  170;  186ff.;  re- 
view of,  189ff.;  salary,  190ff.; 
purchase  legation,  Peking,  330; 
general  survey,  672ff. ;  "shirt- 
sleeves" diplomats,  673 

Disraeli:  298 

Dole,  Sanford  B.:  611 

Dun,  Edwin:   499 

Dutch,  in  India:  26;  in  Japan,  246; 
256;   363-4;   language  in  Japan, 
557; 
— East  India  Co.:  at  old  Canton, 
54;  Japan,  243-4;  extinct,  256 

Duties:  American  unpaid,  17;  at 
old  Canton,  91 ;  Siam,  133;  Mus- 
cat, 134; 
China,  respoiLsibility  for  collec- 
tion, 165;  Shanghai,  1853, 
216ff.;  Japan,  1858,  359; 
See  also  Tariff,  Smuggling, 
Treaties  and  Conventions 

East  Indies  Company:  5;  26;  rel. 
to  N.  W.  Coast  trade,  38;  influ- 
ence at  Canton,  51 ;  54 ;  attitude 
to  Americans,  56;  dissolution  of 
monopoly,  92;  opium,  117 
East  India  Telegraph  Co.:  591 
East  India:  trade,  3;  causes,  5;  69; 

British  possessions,  357;  579 
Elcanore:  seal  skins  to  India,  36 
Elgin,  Lord:  311ff.;  360;  364;  644 
E-liang,    Viceroy:      McLane    inter- 
view, 227;  234£f. 
Eliza:  goes  to  Japan,  1798,  32; 
Elliot,  Charles:  policy  of,  93 
Embargo:      American,      1808,      33; 
Korean  on  food-stuffs,  486 ;  683 
Emery  and  Frazier:  ship-yard,  154 
Empress  Dowager:  344;  653 
Empress  oj  China:  5;  6;  8;  at  Can- 
ton, 44; 
See  also  Samuel  Shaw 
Englishmen,  see  British 


INDEX 


713 


Evarts,  William  M.:  instructions  to 
Shuf(>l(lt,  455-6;  treaty  of  1878, 
Japan,  518-9 

Ever-Victorious  Army:  369-71;  642; 
Sec  also  F.  T.  Ward,  Burgevine, 
Gordon 

Everett.  Alex.  H.,  Com.  to  China, 
186;  sketch,  190;  Japan,  249;  295 

Everett,  Edward:  112;  264;  on 
Perry  proposals,  273;  672 

Exchange,    problem    of:    18ff. ;    bills 
on  London,  72;  basis  in  Japan, 
355; 
See  also  Specie 

Experiment:    11 

Extraterritoriality:  Cashing,  vi; 
Americans  acknowledge  Chinese 
jurisdiction,  84;  Terranova  in- 
cident, 87ff.;  Canton  merchants, 
100;  Siam,  133;  Muscat,  134; 
Hsii  A-man  affair,  153;  Treaty 
of  Wanghia,  162rf. ;  186 ;  omitted. 
Perry  treaty.  269;  319;  Marcy 
on,  Siam  and  Japan,  350;  Siam, 
351;  353;  Russia-Japan,  354; 
384;  in  Korea.  447;  Korea,  470; 
510;  Japan,  513;  514ff.;  526; 
Japan  treaties,  1894,  529;  mis- 
sionaries and,  561 ;  and  coasting 
trade,  583;  and  consuls,  669ff.; 
consular  courts,  671 ; 
See  also  Treaty  revision.  Treaties 
and  Conventions 

Factories,  see  Hongs 

Faulkland  Islands:  37 

Fillmore,  Pres.  Millard:  message, 
190-1 ;  to  Emperor,  Japan,  261 ; 
263;  292-3 

Fish.  Hamilton:  on  China-Jap.  al- 
liance, 438;  on  mediation,  489; 
cooperation,  508-9;  treaty  revi- 
sion, 517-8;  missionaries,  567; 
on  telegraph  monopolv,  592-3; 
608;  610 

Foochow:  187,  211;  McLane,  233; 
Parker.  281 ;  328 

Foord,  John:  to  Hay,  661 

Foote,  Com.  Lucius  H.:  appointed 
to  Seoul,  472;  resigns,  475 

Forbes,  J.  M.:  to  Webster,  135-6; 
579 

Forbes,  Paul  S.:  notifies  Kiying,  147 

Formosa:  U.  S.  flag  over,  vii;  coal, 
183;  Perry's  opinion,  272;  Perry 
orders  investigation,  276;  Par- 
ker's policy  of  acquisition,  284ff . ; 


320;  Townsend  Harris,  349 
357;  U.  S.  punitive  exp.,  411 
427;  Japanese  expedition,  440 
490;  Sino-Jap.  War,  501ff.;  591 
railwavs,  599;  612;  638 

Foster.  John  W.:  501;  635;  books, 
690 

Foulk,  George  C.  in  Korea:  478;  re- 
called from  Korea,  484;  papers, 
688 

France:  expedition  Korea,  vi;  at 
old  Canton,  54;  plenipo.  at 
Macao,  152;  178;  Shanghai,  198; 
Parker  visits.  281;  Korea,  282; 
290;  296;  300;  301;  359-60; 
Korea,  417fT.;  in  E.  Asia,  428; 
451 ;  Tientsin  massacre,  454 ; 
460;  annexes  Cochin  China, 
471 ;  vu'ges  Japan  to  declare  w. 
on  China,  479-80;  expansion, 
491-2;  recession  of  Liaotung 
Peninsula,  503;  Tani  on,  527; 
withdraws  from  intern'l  settle- 
ment, Shanghai,  590;  Syndicate 
of  Tientsin.  598;  Hankow-Pe- 
king railroad,  601 ;  sphere  of  in- 
fluence, 603-4;  Sandwich  Is., 
612;  entente  with  Ger.  and  Rus- 
sia, 635 ;  Franco- American  rela- 
tions, 637; 
See  also  Franco-Chinese  War, 
Anglo-French  War,  Treaties  and 
Conventions 

Franco-Chinese  War:  478;  and 
China-Japan  trcatv,  480;  Amer- 
ican good  offices"  391ff.;  502; 
586;  597;  637 

Freight  rates:  10;  Hongkong-Can- 
ton, 1840,  98;  180;  Chinese  sub- 
sidy, 586 

Frelinghuysen,  F.  T.:  464;  instruc- 
tions to  Foote,  474;  Franco- 
Chinese  War,  492-4;  608;  637 

French,  see  France 

Fukien,  Province:  Japanese  sphere, 
604 

Fur  trade:  price  furs,  5;  voyage  of 
Betsey,  11;  20;  36;  seal-skins, 
36ff. ;  and  opium,  118;  and 
Japan,  242; 
value  of:  12;  40ff.; 
See  also  Northwest  Coast,  In- 
graham,  Columbia,  Nootka 
Sound 

Fusan:  Shufeldt  at,  456;  Jap.  settle- 
ment, 467 ;  Japanese  telegraph, 
484 


714 


INDEX 


Geary  Act:  548 

General  Sherman:  wreck  of,  417ff. 

Gensan:  467 

Gentlemen's  Agreement  with  Japan: 
550 

Germany:  at  old  Canton,  54;  345; 
Korea,  475 ;  and  Franco-Chinese 
War,  492;  recession  of  Liaotung 
Peninsula,  503;  520;  growth  of 
influence  in  Japan,  525 ;  Tani  on, 
527;  syndicate,  1885,  597;  602; 
sphere  of  influence,  604;  and  the 
Philippines,  619-20;  entente 
with  France  and  Russia,  635; 
relations  with  U.  S.,  636-7;  aid 
to  Filipino  insurgents,  638 

Gifts:  U.  S.  to  Siam,  Muscat,  etc., 
132;  to  China,  135-6;  list  of  to 
China,  137;  Cushing  mission, 
139;  to  China  declined,  156;  to 
Japan,  265 

Ginseng:  6;  7;  17;  36 

Girard,  Stephen:  10;  683 

Gladstone  ministry:   510 

Glynn,  Com.  James:  Japan,  251;  257 

Good  offices:    Tientsin  treaty,  321; 
431-2;  Shogun  offers,  434;  473; 
general     survey     of     American, 
489ff. ;  Sherman,  506 ; 
See  also  Arbitration,  Mediation 

Gordon,  Major  Charles  G.  "Chi- 
ne.se";  371 

Gore,  John:  4 

Grand  Turk:  9;  19;  24 

Grant,  Pres.  U.  S.:  good  offices  to 
Japan  and  China,  444-5;  455; 
469;  policy  adopted  by  U.  S., 
473-4;  518;  542 

Great  Britain:  5;  commercial 
policy  at  Canton,  54-5;  Ameri- 
cans have  trouble  with,  81 ;  ag- 
gressions, 93;  policy  before  1842, 
128;  Roberts  on  "  policy,  129; 
Webster  on,  138;  Kiying, 
Chinese  ill  will,  154;  extra- 
territoriality, 162;  smuggling, 
166;  168-9;"  foreign  policv,  1840- 
53,  176ff.;  Navigation  laws,  180; 
consuls  in  China,  188;  claims  at 
Shanghai,  196;  Marshall  on, 
218-9;  and  Taipings,  219rf.; 
Bowring  demands,  1854,  238; 
early  efforts  to  open  Japan, 
243ff.;  and  Japan  before  1853, 
255;  Perry  on,  273;  Parker  on, 
287;  Am.  distrust  of,  294ff.; 
Alex.  H.  Everett  on,  296;  pro- 


poses alliance  with  U.  S.,  298ff. ; 
intentions  in  China,  300;  "pri- 
ority," 318;  policy  in  China, 
353 ;  Harris  on,  357 ;  Clarendon 
to  Burlingame,  387;  interests  in 
E.  Asia,  428;  461;  Shufeldt  on, 
463;  on  Am.  policy,  468;  and 
opening  of  Korea,  472-3;  475ff. ; 
and  Franco-Chinese  War,  492; 
Sino-Jap.  War,  500ff.;  on  treaty 
of  1878,  519;  conciliation  of 
Japan,  524;  Tani  on,  527; 
British  Passengers  Act,  536; 
sphere  of  influence,  604;  Sand- 
wich Islands,  609-10;  Philip- 
pines, 620 ;  sympathy  with 
Japan  and  U.  S.,  635;  relations 
with  U.  S.,  1899,  638-9;  agree- 
ment with  Russia,  643; 

Great  Britain:  manufactures:  sold 
by  Americans  in  China,  72;  Ja- 
pan,  360; 

minister  in  Wash.:  213;  223; 

proposes  alliance,  300  ff.;  inter- 
vention, Sino-Jap.  War,  498-9 

Great  Northern  Telegraph  Co.: 
591ff. ;  592;  monopoly  in  China, 
593;  620 

Green,  Capt.  John:  7 

Gresham,  Walter  Q.:  Sino-Jap.  War, 
495ff.;  states  poHcy,  499;  502; 
608 

Griffis,  W.  E.:  558;  686 

Griswold,  J.  Alsop :  197,  579 

Gross,  Baron:  31  Iff. 

Haley,  "Lady":  36 

Hankow:  settlement,  589;  railways, 
602 

Hanna,  Mark:   609 

Harriet:  9;  11 

Harris,  Townsend:  293;  sketch  of, 
348;  instructions,  349-50;  minis- 
ter resident,  391;  419;  and  mis- 
sions, 565;  papers,  686 

Harrison,  Pres.  Benj.:  547-8;  549; 
Sandwich  Is.,  612 

Hart,  Sir  Robert:  229;  374;  Korean 
customs,  481;  to  H.  C.  Merrill, 
482;  Tranco-Chinese  War,  494; 

Hasse  Index:  686 

Hawaiian  Islands:  Am.  vessels  at, 
1826,  12;  N.  W.  coast  trade,  42; 
70;  British  flag  hoisted,  177; 
275;  357;  416;  505;  Jap.  immi- 
gration, 550;  551-2;  585;  gen- 
eral survey  Am.  relations  with. 


INDEX 


715 


607-9;  annexation,  609ff.;  revo- 
lution, 611-2;  Ncwlands  joint 
resolution,  614;  debates  on, 
624ff.;  Hoar  on,  626;  679 

Hay,  John:  V;  420;  60S;  622;  enters 
cabinet,  634;  Salisbury  proposes 
alliance,  642;  contribution  of, 
645 ;  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty, 
645 ;  open  door  notes,  646-7 ;  Cir- 
cular note  of  July  3,  1899,^656-7; 
Protocol  negotiations,  657ff. 

Hayes,  Pres.  Rutherford  B.: 
Chinese  immigration,  542 

Heard,  Augustine:   72 
:  in  Korea,  485 

Hepburn,  Dr.  J.  C:  565 

Heusken,  C.  J.:  354;  murder  of,  396; 
Seward  on,  412-3 

Hienfeng,  Emperor:  d.  1861,  344 

Higginson,  James  B.:  U.  S.  consul, 
Calcutta,  1843,  29 

Hinkley,  F.  E.:  693 

Hiogo:  362 

Hoar,  George  F. :  on  Hawaiian  an- 
nex., 552;  626;  Philippines,  630-1 

Holcombe,  Chester:  assists  in  Ko- 
rean treaty  negotiations,  459; 
464;  556-7 

Holland:  4;  345; 
See  also  Dutch,  Treaties  and  Con- 
ventions 

Hong-Kew:  Am.  settlement,  590 

Hongkong:  occupation  predicted, 
55;  British  occupy,  98;  British 
expansion,  128;  Am.  ship-yard 
moved,  154;  bonded  warehouse, 
161;  165;  181;  210;  coolie  trade, 
536;  Am.  trade  with,  table,  581; 
telegraph,  591;  608;  Dewey,  617 

Hong-merchants:  49;  59;  co-hong, 
opium,  117;  to  Wilcocks  on 
opium,  120-1 ;  559 

Honolulu,  see  Hawaiian  Islands 

Hope,  Admiral  Sir  James:  336; 
Tattnall  assists,  340;  and  Gen. 
F.  T.  Ward,  369-70;  Tsushima, 
431 

Hope:  11 

Hoppo:  59 

Hotta,  Lord:  to  Mikado,  394;  426-7; 
528;  641 

Houqua:  57;  honesty,  59;  sued  in 
Phila.,  85;  opiurn,  118 

House    of    Representatives,    appro- 
priation,   China    mission,    112; 
Burlingame  in,  367 
See  Congress 


Hubbard,  Richard  B.:  528;  673 

Hughes,  Charles  E.:   vi 

Hung-Sin-tshuen :  see  Taiping  Re- 
bellion 

Hunt's  "Lives  of  Am.  Merchants": 
683 

Ignatieff,  Nicholas:  337 

Inunigration,  Asiatic:  378;  380; 
Seward,  410;  454;  Shufeldt- 
Sargent  letter,  462;  general  sur- 
vey of  Am.  policy,  535ff. ;  char- 
acter of  Chinese  immigrants, 
537-8;  Treaty  of  1868,  539-41; 
Fifteen  Passengers  Bill,  542; 
Treaty  of  1882,  542-3;  Act  of 
May  6,  1882,  544;  and  Korean 
policy,  545;  Scott  Act,  547; 
Geary  Act,  548;  Japanese,  549ff.; 
Hawaiian  Islands,  550-2;  585; 
611;  677;  Hawaiian  Islands, 
550-2;  Gentlemen's  agreement, 
550;  585;  611;  677 

In-chuin,  see  Chemulpo 

Indemnity :   376 ;  381 ;   Shimoneseki, 
401;  Korea  to  Japan,  469;  anti- 
Chinese    riots    in    U.    S.,    546; 
Boxer,  660-2 ; 
See  also  Claims 

India  Trade:  opening  of,  26;  special 
privileges,  27;  extent,  28;  ap- 
pointment U.  S.  consul,  28; 
India-Canton  trade,  29;  opium, 
116ff. 

Ingraham,  Capt.  Joseph:  11 ;  684 

Inouve:  456;  and  J.  R.  Young,  469; 
479;  525 

Inspectorate  of  Maritime  Customs: 
58;  inauguration,  225ff.;  324; 
370;  efforts  to  make  cosmopoli- 
tan, 374;  British  head,  604 

Interpreters:  at  Canton,  63;  Roberts 
mission,  133;  Gushing  mission, 
136;  142;  161;  Ningpo,  187; 
230;  Seoul,  474;  missionaries, 
555 

Intervention:  effect  in  China,  61; 
Marshall,  232-3 

Isle  de  France:  see  Mauritius 

Italy:  345;  519 

Ito,  Count:  treaty  with  China,  479- 
80;  treaty  of  Shimoneseki, 
502ff.;  513 

Irving,  Washington:  40 

Iturup,  Island  of:  354 

Iwakura  Embassy:  439;  returns  to 
Japan,  441-2;  559;  567 


716 


INDEX 


Jackson,   Pres.   Andrew:    letters  to 
Oriental  sovereigns,  132 

Japan:  V;  32;  U.  S.  interest  in,  1832 
131ff.;  175;  and  Pacific,  177 
182;  183;  and  N.  W.  coast  trade 
242ff.;  attempts  to  open,  242ff. 
Edmund  Roberts  mission,  244 
Gushing,  249;  Zedoc  Pratt,  249 
and  European  powers  before 
1853,  254ff.;  internal  conditions, 
1853,  257;  claims  to  Bonins  and 
Lew  Chews,  276;  proposed  alli- 
ance against,  302;  and  China 
compared,  347 ;  349;  anti-foreign 
feeling,  393;  and  China,  425-6; 
and  Korea,  429;  expansion  of, 
430ff.;  and  Korea,  434ff.;  claim 
to  Korea,  451 ;  threatened  war 
with  China,  468;  Ito  on  Korea, 
479-80;  food-stuffs  controversy, 
485-6;  policy  in  Korea  after 
1895,  502ff.;  and  treaty  revision, 
51  Iff.;  Iwakura  Embassy,  512-3; 
and  Hawaiian  Islands,  551-2; 
Am.  trade  with,  table,  581 ;  rail- 
ways, 594-5 ;  sphere  of  influence, 
604;  Honolulu,  612-3;  and 
Philippines,  623;  relations  with 
U.  S.,  1899,  638; 
See      also     Sino-Japanese      War, 

Treaties  and  Conventions; 
— Expedition:     192;     review     of, 
260ff . ;    instructions,    261 ;    con- 
ciliatory spirit  of  Japanese,  276; 

Japanese  Embassy:  1860,  to  U.  S.: 
394;  see  Iwakura 
— Policy:  267ff.;  astuteness,  356; 
crisis,  1858,  363-4;  393ff.;  civil 
war,  398ff. ;  expulsion  of  for- 
eigners, 398;  in  Sino-Japanese 
War,  497ff. ;  treaty  revision, 
512ff.;  missionaries,  567; 
— Restoration :  404-5 ;  Seward's 
policy,  415 ;  497 

Java:  Am.  vessels  at  Batavia,  1834, 
12;   Am.  exports  to,  21;   review 
of  trade  with,  31-2;  Americans 
to  Japan,  243; 
—Head:  33 

Jay,  John:  28;  62 

Jefferson,  Thomas:  policy  of,  77 

Jehol:   343 

Joy,   Benjamin:    first  U.  S.  consul, 
Calcutta,  29 

Kagoshima:   British  bombard,  398; 
399;  criticism,  400 


Kaiping  Railway  Co.:  598 

Kanagawa :  362 ;  see  Yokohama 

Kagoshima:  248 

Kasson,  John  A.:  on  Chinese  re- 
sources, 661 

Katsu,  Count,  memorial:  526 

Kearny,  Commodore  Lawrence: 
104 ;  demands  most-favored- 
nation  treatment,  108ff.;  ordered 
to  China,  125ff.;  327;  609;  pub- 
lished corres.,  684 

Keenan,  Consul  James:   283 

Keim,  DeB.  Randolph:  consular 
service,  670 

Kendrick,  Capt.  John:  sketch  of, 
39-40 

Kennedy,  John  P.:  report,  184 

Ketteler,  Baron,  murder:  663 

Kiaochow:  604;  637 

Kiatka:  591 

Kim  Ok-kiun:  murder  of,  486; 
career,  487 

King,  C.  W.:  voyage  of  Morrison  to 
Japan,  247-8 

King,  T.  Butler:  report,  183 

Kioto:  361 

Kiying:  to  Kearny,  108-9;  notified 
of  Cushing  mission,  147;  de- 
cline's Cushing's  gifts,  156;  to 
Emperor,   156-7;   294 

Koo,  V.  K.  W.:  693 

Korea:  V;  182;  Roberts,  246;  249; 
France,  282;  357;  409;  Seward 
and,  417ff. ;  proposed  Jap.  con- 
quest, 427;  tribute  to  Japan, 
429;  Sovereignty  and  China, 
433;  treaty  with  Japan,  1876, 
447;  treaty  with  U.  S.,  450ff.; 
Low-Rogers  Expedition,  452-3; 
Shufeldt  turned  away,  457; 
treaty  signed,  460;  King  of,  to 
Pres.  of  U.  S.,  460 ;  464 ;  domes- 
tic conditions  after  1863,  466; 
Civilization  Partv,  467 ;  treaty 
with  Japan,  1882^  469;  Chinese 
trade  regulations,  470;  survey  of 
intern,  rels.,  471ff. ;  and  Russia, 
472;  Foote,  474;  Admiral 
Willes,  474;  Parkes's  treaty, 
475;  treaty  with  Ger.,  475; 
Chinese  resident,  475-6;  King 
asks  for  Am.  advisers,  477 ;  em- 
bassy to  U.  S.,  478;  coup  d'etat, 
Dec,  1884,  478-9;  Russian 
treaty,  480;  survey,  1885-94, 
482ff.;  attempted  coup  d'etat, 
1886,    484;    sends    minister    to 


INDEX 


717 


Wash.,  484;  food-stuffs  for 
Japan,  485-6;  declares  indcp.  of 
China,  487;  weakness  of  gov't, 
495;  Sino-Jap  War,  496ff.; 
China  recognizes  indep.,  502; 
Jap.  policy,  502ff. ;  coup  d'elat 
of  1895,  503-4;  King  in  Russian 
Legation,  504;  mining  conces- 
sion, 504;  analj'ses  of  Shufeldt 
treaty,  520ff.;  Christian  mis- 
sions, 568;  trade  with,  582;  612; 
offers  U.  S.  naval  base,  616 

Korff,  S.  A.:  635 

Kowtow:  Roberts  mission,  133; 
Webster  to  dishing.  139;  164; 
Ward,  Peking,  342;  426;  455 

Kuldja:  dispute,  471;  542 

Kung,  Prince:  344;  380;  Bellonet 
correspondence,  418;  Grant  to, 
444-5;  Franco-Chinese  War, 
493-5 ;  Chinese  immigration, 
545;  593 

Kurile  Islands:  255;  427;  divided, 
431-2 

Kwangchow-wan :  lease  of,  604 

Ladrone  Islands:  620 

Lady  Washington:  9;  16;  in  Japan, 
242 

Latourette,  K.  S. :  684 ;  693 

Lay,  Horatio  N.:  229;  376;  587; 
railways  in  Japan,  594 

Lay-Osborn  flotilla:  229;  370;  dis- 
posal of,  371;  376;  587;  595 

Ledyard,  John:  4;  38 

Legations,  sec  Diplomatic  sei-yice 

LeGendre,  C.  W.:  440;  443 

LeRoy,  J.  A.:  689 

Lew  Chews:  250;  U.  S.  coal  depot, 
266;  sovereignty,  268;  Perry's 
opinion,  272;  Pres.  Pierce  and 
Edw.  Everett,  273;  Perry  at, 
273-4;  361;  428;  China-Japan 
controversy,  438-9;  Japan  an- 
nexes, 444-6;  490 

Li  Hung  Chang :  344 ;  and  Burge- 
vinc,  371 ;  and  Soyeshima,  441 ; 
Lew  Chew  controversy,  446;  in- 
vites Shufeldt,  457;  negotiates 
treaty,  460ff.;  468;  trade  regula- 
tions, Korea,  470;  471;  policy 
in  Korea,  473ff. ;  474;  on  war 
with  Japan,  477;  negotiations 
with  Ito,  479-80;  appoints  0.  N. 
Denny  to  Korea,  482ff. ;  asks  re- 
call of  Foulk,  484 ;  advises 
Korea  to  conciliate  Japan,  485; 


sends  troops  to,  487 ;  convention 
with  France,  1883,  491-2; 
Franco-Chinese  War,  492-5;  Li- 
Fournier  convention,  493;  asks 
U.  S.  mediation  in  Sino-Jap. 
War,  496;  sends  Detring  to 
Japan,  501 ;  goes  to  Shimone- 
scki,  502;  Chinese  immigration, 
545;  and  missionaries,  568;  585; 
Chinese  navy,  587;  588;  tele- 
graphs, 592;  railways,  594ff.; 
598;  599;  turns  to  Russia,  600; 
635;  Boxer  settlement,  655 
Liaotimg  Peninsula :   501 ;   recession 

of,  503 
Liliuokalani,  Queen:  611 
Lin,    Imperial    Commissioner:    ulti- 
matum, 95 
Likin  tax:  301;  323;  510;  520 
Lintin  Island:  opium  ships,  117;  122 
Livingston,     Edw.:     132;     Roberts, 

Japan,  245 
Loans:  Japan,  594;  China,  599;  600 
Low,    F.   F. :    expedition  to   Korea, 
436;    452-3;    595;    on    Russian 
policy,  636 

McCartee,  Rev.  D.  B.:  187 

McEnery,  Samuel  D.:  joint  resolu- 
tion, 629 

McKinley,  Pres.  William:  vi;  607; 
609;  annexation  of  Hawaii, 
613;  instructions  to  peace  com- 
mission, 621-2;  decides  to  retain 
Philippines,  627;  and  open 
door,  634ff.;  642;  676 

McLane,  Robert  M.:  on  consulates, 
187;  sketch,  191;  Shanghai  land 
q.,  204;  instruction,  214;  222-3 
policy  of,  225ff.;  mediator,  230 
McLane    to    Marcy,    240;    277 
299  ■  327 ■  556 

Macao:' 46;  ' Gushing  at,  142;  330; 
coolie  trade,  536 

Macartney,  Lord,  Embassy:  55 

Madison,  James:  7 

Madras:   10 

Manchu:  dynasty  fears  displace- 
ment, 93;  and  Taipings,  207; 
347 ;  356 ;  650 

Manchuria:  320;  357;  427;  Russia 
and,  472;  604;  Russian  schemes 
in  1900,  659 

Manila:  export  Am.  cottons,  1824 
20;  first  Am.  relations,  33;  98 
276;  Dewey,  614;  Battle  of,  617 
occupation  of  city,  627 


718 


INDEX 


Marcy,  Wm.  H.:  Marshall  to,  204; 
coop,  policy,  214;  223;  to 
McLane,  225;  Shanghai  claims, 
231;  238;  against  joint  action, 
240;  277;  attack  on  Barrier 
Forts,  283;  to  Parker's  imperial- 
ism, 290;  299;  to  Harris,  351; 
608;  610 

Margery:   murder  of,  454 

Maria  Luz,  case  of:  490-1 

Marshall,  Frederic:  to  Lord  Derby, 
513 

Marshall,  Humphrey :  report  on 
crime,  188;  appointed  com.  to 
China,  191 ;  on  Shanghai  mu- 
nicipal code,  203-4;  and  Tai- 
pings,  206ff.;  277,  327;  369;  556; 
and  missionaries,  560;  589;  603 

Martin,  Rev.  W.  A.  P.:  313;  381; 
translates  Wheaton's  Intern. 
Law,  385;  559;  561 

Marj'land:  6 

Massachusetts:  6 

Massachusetts:  building  of,  13;  684 

Mauritius:  10;  24 

Mediation:  306;  Harris  offers  to 
Japan,  358;  clause,  Japan-U.  S. 
treaty,  360;  443;  U.  S.  Grant, 
444-5;  473;  Japan  treaty,  489; 
Maria  Luz,  490; 
See  also  Good  Offices  and  Arbitra- 
tion 

Mediterranean  trade:   21 

Meiji  Era:  391 

Merrill,  H.  F.:  Korean  customs,  482 

"Middle  Kingdom":  first  edition, 
558 

Midway  Islands:  U.  S.  takes  posses- 
sion, 416;  610 

Mikado:   362;    364;   ratifies  treaties 
of  1858,  403;  404;  412;  reverence 
for,  426; 
See  also  Japan 

Milburn's  Oriental  Commerce:  683 

Min  family,  Korea:  468 

Missionaries:  102;  Anglo-Chinese 
War,  146;  161;  169;  France  and, 
179;  180-1;  187;  191;  and  Tai- 
ping^  Reb.,  207ff.;  Japan,  248; 
Abbe  Chapedelaine,  311;  Treaty 
of  Pekmg,  343;  348;  352;  361; 
Burlingame  treaty,  381 ;  385 ; 
417;  Tientsin  massacre,  454; 
478;  494;  505;  520;  general  sur- 
vey, 555ff.;  legal  status,  559ff.; 
extraterritoriality,  561;  aggres- 
sive spirit,  563;   policy  of  Jap. 


Govt.,  564ff.;  Jap.  patriotism, 
565-6;  Seward,  567;  Shufeldt 
treaty,  568;  and  neutrality, 
569ff.;  rights  in  China,  572ff.; 
580;  French  protectorate  of  R. 
C.  Missions,  637;  651 

Miura,  Viscount:  in  Korea,  503 

Mocha:  30 

Mollendorf,  Herr  von:  Korea,  471; 
treaty  with  Russia,  481 

Monopoly:  352;  telegraphs  in 
China,  593 

Monocacy,  U.  S.  S.:  dispatched  to 
Korea,  469 

Monroe  Doctrine:  177;  636 

Monsoon:   34 

Morris,  Robert:  5;  6;  8;  10 

Morrison,  Dr.  Robert:  American 
support  of,  64;  76;  to  Edmund 
Roberts,  131;  181;  550 

Morrison:  voyage  of  to  Japan,  246ff. 

Morse,  H.  B.:  689 

Morrison,  S.  E.:  Maritime  History 
of  Mass.,  684 

Most-favored-nation  treatment:  V; 
VI;  108f!.;  and  open  door,  110; 
Muscat,  134;  Gushing  instruc- 
tions, 141 ;  145 ;  Chinese  grant, 
158;  195;  222;  237;  312;  314; 
353;  355;  376;  basis  of  Am. 
policy,  407;  478;  680 

Muravieff,  Gov.-Gen.  Nicholas:  179; 
Japan,  255;  431 

Murphy,  R.  C:   226,  229 

Muscat:  30;  Roberts  to  Sultan  of, 
129;  treaty  with  U.  S.,  133-4; 
261 

Nagasaki:  first  American  visits,  32; 
243ff.;  Phaeton  incident,  245; 
265;  267;  352;  355;  persecu- 
tions, 415;  Shufeldt,  456-7 

Nanking:  209;  316;  opening  of,  318; 
See  also  Treaty  of  Nanking 

Napier  (Lord)  incident:  92 

Napoleonic  wars:  and  China  t'-ade, 
46;  256 

Naval  demonstration,  158;  402; 
Seward's  proposed  joint,  413 

Newchwang  opened :   320 

Newlands,  Francis  G.:  Hawaii,  614 

New  York:  6;  merchants,  8;  17;  20; 
trade  with  Zanzibar,  30;  list 
principal  merchants,  137;  Town- 
send  Harris,  348-9 

Ningpo:  187,  211;  Townsend  Harris, 
348;  557 


INDEX 


719 


Non-Alienation  Agreements:  603-4 

Nootka  Sound:   42 

Norfolk:  6;  26 

Northwest    Coast:    3;    Ledyard,   5; 
Mass.  trade,  9;   general  survey 
of  trade,  37ff.;  70;  683; 
See  also  Fur  Trade 

Nye,  Gideon  Jr.  and  Formosa :  285 

Occidental  and  Oriental  Steamship 
Co.:  585 

O'Donnell,  Capt.  John:  8;  26;  28; 
683 

Okuma,  Count:  528 

Olyphant,  D.  W.  C:  organizes  firm, 
1828,  72;  opium,  119;  voyage  of 
Morrison,  247-8;  failure  of  firm, 
599 

Open  Door  Policy :  v ;  and  most- 
favored-nation  clause,  110; 
Chinese  choice,  158ff.;  183;  Am. 
policy,  1858.  358;  in  1861.  407; 
608;  McKinley,  622;  631 ;  634ff.; 
England  and.  639;  Beresford, 
641 ;  643;  Hay  notes.  646-7;  defi- 
nition of  policy,  647-8;  677 

Opium:  exportation  from  N.  Y., 
20;  Turkey,  30;  115-6;  117;  in- 
fluence of  trade  on  exchange, 
73;  and  specie,  93;  118;  pro- 
posed legalization,  1836,  93; 
proposed  destruction,  94;  execu- 
tion of  de;der,  Canton,  95;  sur- 
render, 96;  Americans  quit 
trade,  97;  Caleb  Cushing  on, 
104;  105;  American  share  in  t., 
115ff.;  pledge,  122-3;  Siam 
treaty,  1832,  133;  N.  Y.  mer- 
chant to  Webster,  135;  instruc- 
tions to  Cushing,  140;  Treaty 
Wanghia,  168;  King  report, 
183;  and  tobacco,  185;  189;  and 
Taipmg,  207;  211;  300;  304; 
306;  320;  legalization,  324-6; 
Siam,  351;  Harrison,  358;  pro- 
hibited by  Japan,  362;  Korea, 
461;  521;  523;  542; ^651;  669 

Oregon  Territory:  39;  177 
See  also  N.  W.  Coast 

Osaka:  362;  402 

Pacific  Ocean:  42;  175;  commerce, 
182;  243;  steam  navigation,  253; 
Am.  policj^  in,  262-3;  Perry  on 
control  of.  273;  275;  Seward's 
views,  408-9;  Shufeldt,  462; 
trans.  Pacific   trade,   580;    608; 


Sandwich  Islands,  609ff.;  status 
quo  in,  1898,  613 

Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Co.:  584-5; 
scandal,  671 

Pallas:  8;  44 

Palmer,  A.  H.:  Japan  expedition, 
252-3 

Palmerston,  Lord:  instructions  to 
Elliot,  162-3;  165;  175;  177; 
298 ;  345 ;  386 

Panama:  184;  253;  canal,  645 

Parker,  Daniel:   5;  7 

Parker,  Com.  Foxhall  A.:  opium 
smuggling,  126;  Charge  in 
China,  156 

Parker,  Rev.  Peter,  M.  D.:  in 
Wash.,  1841,  108;  136;  Chinese 
sect'y,  Cushing  mission,  142; 
152;  interpreter,  156;  sect'y 
legation,  186;  190;  191;  229; 
visits  Japan,  248;  policy  of  re- 
viewed, 279ff. ;  and  Formosa, 
284ff.;  295;  297;  299;  328-9; 
357;  555;  557;  622 

Parkes,  Sir  Harry:  351;  392;  arrives 
Japan,  401 ;  policy,  402ff. ;  Con- 
vention of  1866,  402;  and  co- 
operation, 405;  and  Bingham, 
516;  518-9 

Paulet,  Lord  George:  609 

Paullin,  C.  0.:  685 

Passports:   515;   561;  Japan,  566 

Pauncefote,  Sir  Julian:  519;  645 

Peacock,  crui.se  of:  79 

Pearl  Harbor:  leased,  611 

Pehtang:  337;  340;  ratificarions,  342 

Pei-ho  river:  136;  McLane-Bowring 
exped.,  230ff.;  233;  297;  block- 
ade of,  300;  Reed  at,  312ff.;  336; 
343;  river  conservancy,  663 

Peking:  Cushing's  proposal,  147; 
Cushing  waives  right  to  go,  155; 
296;  dip.  residence,  300;  Ward, 
334ff.;  capture,  343;  telegraphs, 
592;  legation  guards,  654;  siege, 
654;  legation  quarter,  663 

Pennsylvania:  6;  306 

Pembroke  fired  on:  398;  claim,  399 

Pepper:  10;  11;  review  of  trade,  31; 
Friendshi-p  plundered,   130 

Perkins,  T.  H.:  18;  20;  32;  40;  71; 
243;  579 

Perry,  Com.  M.  C:  acquisition  of 
territory,  VI;  131;  181-2;  and 
coal,  185;  192;  201;  Taipings, 
215;  on  intervention  in  China, 
233;  policy  in  Japan  and  Paci- 


720 


INDEX 


/ 


fie,  260ff.;  instructions,  262; 
spirit  of,  269;  Far  Eastern 
policy,  270ff.;  357;  607;  622 

Pescaderoes:  501 

Philadelpiiia :  6;  10;  17;  115;  Syndi- 
cate, 599 

Philippines:  retention  of,  VII;  177; 
291;  450;  and  China,  603;  and 
annexation  of  Hawaii,  614;  re- 
bellion, 617-9;  620ff.;  debate  on, 
628ff.;  679 

Pierce,    Pres.    Franklin:    184;    206 
Taipings,  212;   222;    on  protec 
tion  of  Am.  citizens,  232;  238, 
peaceful  policy,  Japan,  267;  on 
Lew  Chews,  273;  277;  283;  290; 
review  of  policy,  292-3;   Harris 
to,  349 ; 
Sec  also  Marcy 

Pierce,  H.  H.  D.:  on  consular  re- 
form, 671 

Pirates:  189;  376 

Polk,  Pres.  James  K.:  253 

Putiatin,  Count:  275;  31  Iff.;  354; 
431 

Potomac,  U.  S.  Frigate:  31 

Port  Arthur:  Japan  captures,  500; 
502;  503;  599;  604 

Port  Hamilton :  British  occupy,  480 ; 
retire,  481 ;  offered  to  U.  S.,  616 

Port  Lazareff:   480 

Portman,  A.  L.  C:  391;  Conven- 
tion of  1866,  401fi[.;  railways, 
593-4 

Portugal:  policy  at  Macao,  54; 
towards  Americans,  80ff.;  345 

Pratt,  E.  Spencer:   618 

Pratt,  Zedoc:  Japan,  249 

Protection,  legislative:  8;  27;  517 

Providence:  6;  10;  683 

Pruyn,  Robert  H.:  391;  review  of 
policy,  397ff.;  war-steamers, 
397;  414;  mediation,  491 

Pumpelly,  Raphael:  382;  587 

Quallah  Battoo:   31;   130;   132 

Railroads:  378;  Burlingame  treaty, 
381;  Chemulpo-Seoul,  504;  511; 
first  in  Japan,  593-4;  in  China, 
594-9;  Kaiping  Railway  Co., 
598;  Tientsin-Taku,  599; 
Americans  seek  concessions, 
601-2 ;  Hankow-Peking,  601 ; 
Hankow-Canton,  602;  604 

Randall,  Thomas:  8;  report  to 
Hamilton,  62;  684 


Reed,  William  B.:  192;  236;  290-1; 
appointment  and  instructions, 
302ff.;  review  of  policy,  311ff.; 
settlement  of  claims,  328-9;  on 
missionaries,  556 

Religious  toleration:  180;  244;  263; 

312;   321;   353;   361;    381;    415; 

460;  Korea.  520-1;  559-60;  573; 

See  Missionaries  and  Treaties  and 

Conventions 

Republican  party:  535;  541;  542; 
543;  624;  630 

Residence,  rights  of:  China,  168; 
194ff . ;  381 ;  Japan,  268-9 ;  Naga- 
saki, 353;  Shimoda,  Hakodate, 
355;  360;  393;  rights  waived,  396 

Rizal,  Dr.  Jose:  617 

Rhode  Island:  6; 
See  Providence 

Roberts,  Edmund:  treaty  with 
Muscat,  30;  review  of  mission, 
127ff.;  death,  134;  and  Japan, 
245;  254;  Siam  treaty,  350;  618; 
684 

Roberts,  Rev.  Issachar  J.:  208;  327; 
at  Nanking,  564 

Robertson,  J.  Barr,  address:  510 

Rockhill,  W.  W.:  341;  483;  616; 
sketch,  634;  642;  660ff.;  666 

Rover,  wreck  of:  411;  440 

Russell  and  Company:  34j  forma- 
tion, 1818,  71;  97;  123;  J.  M. 
Forbes,  135-6;  at  Shanghai,  195; 
197;  212;  Bankok,  352;  China 
merchants,  494 ;  failure  of,  579 ; 
584;  585;  588;  railways,  598-9 

Russell,  Sturgis  and  Company:  34 

Russia:  Northwest  coast  trade,  38; 
178;  201;  Taipings,  215;  242; 
and  Japan  before  1853,  254; 
Perry,  275;  296;  298;  300;  306; 
345;  356;  Harris  on  R.  policy, 
357;  428;  and  Tsushima,  430-1; 
Japan  feared,  442 ;  451 ;  and 
Korea,  472;  treaty  of  1884 
480-1;  483;  490;  Maria  Luz, 
491;  Sino-Jap.  War,  501ff.;  re- 
cession of  Liaotung  Peninsula, 
503;  in  Korea,  504;  on  treaty 
revision,  521;  Tani,  527;  con- 
ciliation of  China,  601 ;  Han- 
kow-Peking railroad,  601 ; 
sphere  of  influence,  604 ;  entente 
with  Ger.  and  France,  635;  rela- 
tions to  U.  S.  and  China,  635-6; 
agreement  with  Eng.,  643;  bad 
faith,  655 


INDEX 


721 


"Sailing  letters":   584 

Sailors,  see  Crew 

Sakhalin:  243;  254;  Russia-Japan, 
354;  357;  428;  negotiations,  431 

Salem:  6;  trade  with  Zanzibar,  30; 
merchants'  memorial  to  Con- 
gress, 103;  115;  list  principal 
merchants,  137 

Sandalwood  trade:  41 

Sandwich  Islands,  see  Hawaiian 
Islands 

San  Francisco:  180;  535;  538 

Sargent,  Senator  A.  A.:  letter  from 
Shufeldt,  462-3;  Chinese  immi- 
gration, 542;  545 

Satsuma  Rebellion:  516 

Scott  Act:  547 

Sea-letter:  7 

Seal-skins:  trade,  how  conducted,  37 

Seoul:  467;  attack  on  Jap.  legation, 
1882 ;  468 ;  469 ;  foreigners  asked 
to  withdraw,  484;  Tong-haks, 
486;  503 

Seward,  Geo.  F.:  375;  Burlingame 
to,  377-8;  commissioned  to 
make  Korean  treaty,  419-20; 
542;  railways,  595-7;  published 
corres.,  687 

Seward,  William  H.:  open  door,  v; 
approves  Burlingame  policj% 
377;  and  Japan,  392;  401;  re- 
view of  Far  Eastern  policy, 
407ff.;  joint  naval  demonstra- 
tion, 413;  Tsushima,  430;  Sak- 
halin, 431-2;  450;  Treaty  of 
1868,  539-41 ;  missionaries,  567 ; 
spoils  system  and  China,  586; 
608;  673;  676 

Seybert,  Adam:  3 

Seymour,  Admiral  Sir  E.  H.:  relief 
of  Peking,  654 

Shanghai:     Am.    trade    with,    180; 
consulate,     187;     lawless,     188; 
land   question,   municipal   code, 
194ff. ;    Montauk,    197;    import- 
ance to  U.  S.,  204;  fall  of,  1853, 
211;   216;   free  port,  220ff.;   In- 
spectorate   Maritime    Customs, 
226ff.;    327;    342;    510;    Steam 
Navigation  Co.  organized,  584 
internat'l  settlement,  589;  590 
telegraph,  592;  railways,  594-7 
river   conservancy,   667;    consu- 
late, 670 

Shantung:  320;  604 

Shaw,  Major  Samuel:  7;  owner  of 
Massachusetts,   13;   at  Batavia, 


32;   reports,  as  consul,  62;  88; 
Journals,  683 

Shellaber,  John :  U.  S.  Con.,  Batavia, 
and  treaties,  130;  and  Japan 
mission,  244-5 

Sherman,  John:  to  Allen,  defining 
policy,  506 

Shimoda:  opened,  268;  no  coal,  269; 
Harris  arrives,  352;  U.  S.  con- 
sulate, 354ff. 

Shimoneseki,  Straits  of:  Pembroke, 
398;  Wyoming  fights,  399;  joint 
naval  expedition,  400;  401;  414; 
treaty  of,  502ff. 

Ship-building:  13;  179;  Japan-U.  S. 
treaty,  1858.  361 

Ship-masters:  character  of  Ameri- 
cans, 16 

Ship-owners:   13;  16;  profits,  179-80 

Shogun:  William  II  of  Holland  to. 
256;  270;  347;  356;  363;  364; 
393;  retires  in  favor  of  Mikado, 
404;  412;  and  Korea,  433;  512 

Shufeldt,  Com.  Robert  W.:  433; 
450ff. ;  and  Korea,  455ff.;  or- 
dered to  China.  458;  treaty  ne- 
gotiations, 458ff.;  Blaine's  in- 
structions, 461 ;  letter  to  Sar- 
gent, 462-3;  467;  545;  587;  616; 
papers,  688 

Siam:  beginnings  of  trade  with,  31: 
extraterritoriality,  88;  British 
treaty.  1826,  129;  Roberts  visit, 
133;  261;  Perry's  opinion,  272; 
Townsend  Harris,  349ff.;  stops 
Chinese  tribute,  429; 
See  also  Treaties  and  Conven- 
tions 

Siberia:     Russian    aggression,    179; 
and  Japan,  427;  590; 
See  also  Trans-Siberian 

Silk:  4;  17;  Shanghai,  180;  transfer 
of  trade  to  Japan,  582 

Sill,  J.  M.  B.:  good  offices  in  Korea, 
495-6;  reproved  by  Gresham, 
505 ;  neutrality  proclamation, 
571-2 

Silver,  see  Specie 

Singapore:  32;  181 

Sino-Japanese  War:  VI;  events  pre- 
ceding, 485-7;  496ff.;  530;  546; 
549 ;  571 ;  Am.  trade  after,  582 ; 
599 

Skins,  see  Furs 

Slaves:  9; 

See  also  Coolie  trade 

Smith,  Thomas  H.;  18;  72 


722 


INDEX 


Smuggling:  at  Canton,  59;  opium 
clippers,  armed,  127;  Webster 
to  Gushing,  138;  165;  opium, 
211;  Shanghai,  1854,  226; 
opium,  326;  510;  524;  669 

Smj-rna:  trade  with  Mocha,  30; 
opium,  115-6 

Snow,  Peter  W.,  consul  at  Canton: 
strikes  flag,  95;  96ff.;  106;  re- 
ports on  opium,  124 

Snow,  Samuel :  63 ;  71 

South  America:  3     ■ 

Sovereignty,  Chinese :  Shanghai, 
203;  219;  Marcy,  223;  Burlin- 
game  treaty,  382;  384 

Soyeshima :  mission  to  Peking,  441 ; 
'  455 

Spain:  early  policy  at  Manila,  34; 
54;  345;  Filipino  rebellion, 
617ff.;  peace  negotiations  with 
U.  S.,  620 

Spanish-American  War:  615ff. ; 
peace  terms,  620 

Spanish  dollars,  see  Specie 

Specie:  20;  drained  from  U.  S.,  20; 
Randall  report,  63;  72;  drained 
from  China,  93;  and  opium,  118; 
payment  of  duties,  217;  Ja- 
pan, 269;  drained  from  Japan, 
395 

Spheres  of  influence :  603ff . 

Spices:  10 
See  also  Sumatra,  Pepper 

States,  voyage  of:  34 

Steam  navigation:  183;  and  open- 
ing of  Japan,  253;  256;  275;  and 
Formosa,  287;  356;  Seward,  409; 
Chinese  coasting  trade,  583; 
Sandwich  Is.,  610 

Stephenson,  Sir  McDonald:  595 

Straits  of  Anjier:  33 

Sumatra:  3;  10;  11;  130;  272 

Summer  Palace:  343 

Supercargo:  Shaw,  7;  commissions, 
17;  70 

Surat:  2-7 

Swatow:  opened,  320;  494;  coolie 
trade,  536 

Swift,  John  T.:  542;  minister  to 
Japan,  549-50;  Japanese  immi- 
gration, 550 

Taiping  Rebellion:  175;  182;  189; 
205;  review  of,  207ff.;  277;  sup- 
pression of,  369ff.;  375;  509;  and 
missionaries,  564 ;  587 ;  594 

Tai-wen-Kun:  434;  466ff.;  482;  483 


Takezoye :  476-7 ;  coup  d'etat  of 
Dec,  1884,  478-9 

Taku  Forts:  attack  on,  313;  333; 
337;  battle,  339;  342;  request 
for  mediation,  490;  railway,  599; 
Boxer  insurrection,  654;  663 

Tani  Memorial:  526-7;  641 

Tariff,    revision    of:    China,    322ff. 
Japan,  362;  Japan  reduces,  400 
Convention     of      1866,     403ff., 
China,  511 ;  Japan  and  tariff  au- 
tonomy,    513;     Jap.     proposed 
tariff,    1879,    520;    proposals    in 
1886,  526;   Chinese  tariff,  1900, 
660-1 ; 
— U.  S.:  act  of  1789,  8;   of  1816, 
27,  69 

Tattnall,  Com.  Josiah:  338ff.;  con- 
duct approved,  343 

Tea:  4;  tariff  on,  8;  continental 
trade  declines,  56;  re-exporta- 
tion to  Europe,  57 ;  121 ;  Shang- 
hai, 180;  transfer  of  trade  to 
Japan,  582; 
— price  of:  8;  speculation,  17; 
21 ;  first  cargoes,  44;  and  clipper 
ships,  179 

Telegraphs:  378;  Burlingame  treaty, 
381;  Seward,  Alaska,  409; 
Chinese  monopoly  in  Korea, 
484;  511;  trans-Pacific,  590-1; 
Great  Northern  Teleg.  Co., 
591ff.;  Woosung-Shanghai,  592; 
Fukien-Formosa,  592;  China- 
Japan,  593;  620 

Terranova  case:  85;  account  of,  87; 
91;  and  opium,  121;  164 

Tibet:  428 

Ticondcroga,  cruise  of:  456 

Tientsin:  210;  313;  opened,  343; 
364;  massacre,  452;  583;  settle- 
ment, 589;  telegraphs,  592;  con- 
cession-hunters, 597;  railway, 
599;  Chinkiang  railroad,  602; 
Boxers,  654-5;  river  conserv- 
ancy, 663; 
See  also  Treaty  of 

Times  (London):  312;  524 

Tobacco:    185 

Tokio:    Yokohama  railway,  594 

Tokugawa:   opposition  to,  363;  393 

Tonk-hak  Society:  486 

Trade,  review  of:  3ff. ;  early  trade 
compared,  27 ;  Zanzibar,  30 : 
Sumatra,  31 ;  Siam,  31 ;  Batavia, 
31;  Manila,  32;  Canton  trade 
before   1812,  45;   54;  survey  of 


INDEX 


723 


Canton  t,  1815-39,  70ff.;  report 

on  China.  1840,  105; 
Trade:  circuitout:   19;  24;  34; 
—  stopping:  51;  82;  87;  93;  136; 

human  element  at  Canton,  58; 

327 
Trans-Siberian    railway:    472;    502; 

639 
Transit  dues,  see  Likin 
Treat,  Payson  Jackson:   692 
Treaties  and  Conventions: 

China-France,    (Whampoa)    1844 

143;  152;  155;  178; 
China-France.     (Tientsin)      1858 

312ff.;  379;  562; 
Ciuna-France.       f  Peking)       1860 

343-4;  369;  562-3; 
China-France  (Berthemy  Conven- 
tion) 1865:  563;  572; 
China-France,  1885:  598; 
China-Great    Britain,     (Nanking) 

1842:   99;   146;   158; 
China-Great      Britain,       (Bogue) 

1843:  99;  146;  158;  168;  194; 
China-Great     Britain.     (Tientsin) 

1858:  312ff.;  378;  379;  510; 
China-Great      Britain,      (Peking) 

1860:   343-4;  369; 
Chma-Japan.  1871:  437-8;  441; 
China-Japan.  1874;  443; 
China-Japan.  1885:  479ff.;  487; 
China-Japan.    (S  h  i  m  o  n  e  s  e  k  i) 

1895:  502ff.;  652; 
China-Russia.  (Kuldja)  1850:  255; 
China-Russia,        (Aigun)        1858: 

179;   561; 
China-Russia,     (Tientsin)      1858: 

312ff. 
China-Russia,  (Kuldja)  1881:  471; 
China-U.    S.,    (Whampoa)     1844: 

145tf.;     advantages     of,     158ff.; 

160-1;  182;  228;  294;  584; 
China-U.     S.,      (Tientsin)      1858: 

182;  228;  review  of,  312ff.;  ex- 
change of  rat.,  333ff. ;  379 ;  561 ; 

562 
China-U.  S.,  1868:  368;  review  of, 

380ff.;  510;  595; 
China-U.  S.,   1880:    520;    negotia- 
tion, 542ff.; 
Japan-China,  see  China-Japan; 
Japan-France  (1858):  364; 
Japan- France    (1866) :   see  Japan- 

U.  S.; 
Japan-Grent.  Britain,  1854:  353; 
Japan-Great    Britain,    1858:    360; 

364; 


Treaties  and  Conventions: 

Japan-Great  Britain,  1866:  see 
Japan-U.  S. ; 

Japan-Great  Britain,  1894:  529; 

Japan-Mexico,  1888:  528; 

Japan-Netherlands,  1855:   353; 

Japan-Netherlands,   1856:    353-4; 

Japan-Netherlands,  1858:  364; 

Japan-Netherlands,  1866:  see 
Japan-U.  S.; 

Japan-Russia,  1855:  354; 

Japan-Russia,  1858:  364; 

Japan-Russia,  1875:  432;  514; 

Japan-Russia,  1896-7  (Lobanofif- 
Yamagata,  Waebcr-Komura, 
and  Rosen-Nissi) :  504; 

Japan-U.  S.  (1854):  268ff.;  564; 

Japan-U.  S.  (1857):  355; 

Japan-U.  S.  (1858):  352;  356ff.; 
394;  518; 

Japan-U.  S.  (1866,  joint  conven- 
tion): 401ff.;  516;  518; 

Japan-U.  S.  (Postal  convention) 
1873:  514-5; 

Japan-U.  S.,  1878:  454;  negotia- 
tions. 518-9 

Japan-U.  S.  (extradition)  1886: 
524-5; 

Japan-U. 

Japan-U. 
614; 

Korea-Germany,  1883:  475; 

Korea-Great  Britain,  1882:  474; 

Korea-Great  Britain,  1883:  475; 
522  ■ 

Korea-Japan,  1876:  446ff.;  450; 
455;  461; 

Korea-Japan,  1882:  469; 

Korea-Japan.  1885:  479; 

Korea-U.  S..  1882:  general  survey, 
450ff.;  analysis  of,  520ff. 

Korea-Russia,  1884:  480; 

Muscat-U.  S.,  1832:  134; 

Muscat-Great  Britain.  1839:  134; 

Siam-Great  Britain.  1826:  129 

Siam-U.  S..  1832:  133; 

Siam-Great  Britain.  1855:  351 

Siam-U.  S.,  1856:  351; 

U.  S.-Great  Britain.  1794:  27; 

U.  S.-Netherlands.  1782 :  31 ; 

Spain-U.  S..  1898:  620ff.:  627ff. 
Treaties  of  Washington,  1922:  vii 
Treaty  revision:  China,  161;  211; 
McLane's  efforts,  232ff.;  Mar- 
shall's project,  232-3;  280ff.; 
300;  Tientsin,  314;  Siam,  351; 
Japan,    362;    China,    378;    404; 


S.,  1889:  528;  550; 
S.,    1894:     530;    550-1; 


724 


INDEX 


Japan  preoccupied  with,  485; 
general  sur\'ev  of,  508ff.  ■ 

Trescott,  W.  H.:  542 

Tribute:  341;  426; 
See  also  Kowtow 

Triton:  cargo  of.  19-20 

Tsungli  Yamen:  orjianizcd,  344;  on 
status  of  Yuan  Siii  Kai,  476; 
591 ;  replaced  by  Ministry  of 
For.  Affairs,  663 

Tsushima  island:  418-9;  428;  430 

Tungshih,  Emperor:  344 

Tycoon,  tic&  Shogun 

Tyler,  Pres.  John:  nie.ssage,  111;  on 
gifts  to  China,  137;  to  Chinese 
Emperor,  140-1 ;  delivery  of  let- 
ter, 155;  on  consular  and  dip. 
service,  186;  609 

United  States  policy:  unity  of,  v; 
early  traders,  3;  precedents,  4; 
between  British  and  Chinese, 
53;  conciliation,  55;  foundations 
of,  69;  Pacific  Ocean,  70;  influ- 
ence of  export  trade  after  1840, 
74;  91;  opium,  1844,  126;  gifts 
to  Siam,  Muscat,  etc.,  132;  in- 
structions to  Cu.shing,  138; 
Gushing,  145ff. ;  divergence  from 
British  p.,  167-8;  before  Civil 
War,  175ff.;  180;  compared,  182; 
Marshall,  206ff. ;  McLane, 
237ff.;  Glynn  on  Japan,  257-8; 
Perry,  261ff.;  Perry  and 
Cushing  compared,  277;  dis- 
tnist  of  Eng.,  294ff.;  statement 
of,  1858,  358;  Burlingame  on, 
383;  in  Japan,  392-3;  civil  war 
in  Japan,  397;  in  Korea,  450ff.; 
Shufeldt  on  China,  462-3;  Korea 
after  1882,  473-4;  good  offices, 
489ff.;  in  Korea  after  1895, 
504-5;  in  Sino-Jap.  War,  498ff.; 
rejection  British  proposal,  498- 
500;  in  treaty  revision,  508ff. ; 
Fish,  517-8;  528;  missionaries 
and,  555ff.;  review  of,  607ff.; 
open  <loor,  634ff. ; 

Sec  also  Congress,  Senate,  House 
of  Representatives,  Consular, 
Diplomatic  service,  and  indi- 
viduals; 

merchants:      character      of, 

60;  memorial  to  Congress,  99; 
on  extraterritoriality,  163;  at 
Canton,  186-7;  218;"  protests  at 
Shanghai,  220ff. ;  229;  old  firms 


disappear,  579;  character  after 
1860.  597;  603; 

United  States  Trade:  general  survey, 
578ff. ;  decline  of  merchant  ma- 
rine, 583ff. ;  foreign  advisers  in 
China  and  Japan,  586ff. ; 

Navy:  naval  protection,  79; 

101 ;  124 ;  naval  vessels  and 
opium,  123ff.;  character  of  offi- 
cers, 673; 

flag:    use    of,    opium,    117-8 

125;  abuse  of,  234;  325;  411; 
583 

Upshur,  Abel  P.:  140 

Urup,  Island  of:  354 

Van  Valkenburgh,  R.  B.:   391;  404 
Verbeck,  Rev.  Guido:  361;  559;  565; 
567 

Vessels,  size   of:    11;    12;   Shanghai 
Steam  Navigation  Co.  fleet,  584 
Vest,  Geo.  G.:  joint  resolution,  628 
Vladivostok:  472 

Wabash:  opium  ship,  119-20 

Wade,  Sir  T.  F.:  229;  591;  596 

Waldersee,  von.  Count :  655 

War  of  1812:  10;  speculation  follow- 
ing, 17;  trade  with  Muscat,  30; 
56;   Danish  privateers,  57;   de- 
stroyed   trade    with    India,   69 
speculation    in    China    t.,    74 
"right  of  search"  in  China,  81 
Japan,  243;  683 

Ward,  General  Frederick  T.:  369-70; 
587;  Ward-Hill  claim,  687 

Ward,  John  E. :  review  of  service  in 
China,  333ff.;  mediation,  490; 
589 

Wanghia,  Treaty  of,  see  Treaties, 
Cushing,  Webster,  Kiying 

Webster,  Daniel:   to  Edw.  Everett 
113;  consults  merchants,  135ff. 
instructions    to    Cushing,    138 
policy,  146;  Japan,  258;  instruc- 
tions for  Japan  Exp.,  261 ;  Sand- 
wich Is.,  609 

Webster,  Fletcher:    113;   126;   142 

Wei-hai-wei:  501;  502 

West  Indies:  3 

Wensiang:   344 

Wetmore,  W.  S.:  72;  579 

Whale  fisheries:  North  Pacific,  70; 
Japan,  245 ;  251 ;  wreck  of 
Lawrence,  251 ;  Lagoda,  251 ; 
and  Jap.  tariff,  359;  Sandwich 
Islands,  609 


INDEX 


725 


Whampoa:   12;  48-9;  323 

Wilcocks,  Beiij.  C:  63;  71 

Wildman,  Rounscville:   618 

Willes,  Admiral:  in  Korea,  475; 
521 

Williams,  S.  Wells:  sketch,  191-2; 
Taiping  Reb.,  207;  visits  Japan, 
248;  extraterritoriality,  269; 
295;  313;  on  opening  rivers  of 
China,  317;  to  Cass,  321;  on 
opium,  326;  proposes  American- 
Chinese  College,  330;  335;  337; 
381;  411;  555;  558;  561;  565; 
writings  of,  690 

Wilson,  Gen.  James  H.:  railways, 
598 

Witte,  Count :  635 

Wolcott,  Henry  G.:  195 

Wolcott,  Oliver:   17 

Woosung  Railway  Company:  592; 
595-7 

Wu  Ting  Fang:  598;  Hankow-Can- 
ton railroad,  602 

Wyoviing,  U.  S.  S.,  at  Shimoneseki: 
399;  413 


Yangtze,  River:   blockade   of,  300; 

316-7;  British  sphere,  604 
Yedo:  248;  Manhattan,  249;  Perry, 

265if.;  355;  Harris  at,  356; 
See  also  Tokio,  Morrison 
Yeh,    Viceroy:     211;     221;     refuses 

meeting  McLane,  233;  236;  and 

Parker,  281ff.;   capture,  311 
Yokohama:     362;     ordered     closed, 

398;      joint     occupation,     404; 

Tokio    railway,   594;    consulate, 

670; 
— Chamber  of  Commerce,  521 
— Specie   Bank:    loans   in    Korea, 

476; 
Young,  John  Russell:  446;  464;  and 

Korea,      468;      Franco-Chinese 

War,  492-4;  on  cooperation,  509 
Yuan  Shi  Kai:  476;  coup  d'etat  of 

Dec,    1884,    479;    and    Denny, 

482-3;    attempted    coup    d'etat, 

1886,  483-4;  oppressions  of,  486; 

503;  and  missionaries,  570 

Zanzibar:  Roberts  at,  129;   134 


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